Would all rational, well-informed people wish to maintain or increase the cooperation benefits of living in their society? Perhaps.
If they did, then the proposed objective morality without imperative moral obligations would be normative by Gert's SEP definition.
Is Morality as Cooperation Strategies (MACS) a kind of moral realism? Does it determine mind-independent moral truth values?
Yes, a necessary moral component (a definition of right and wrong) exists for all highly cooperative societies of independent agents.
Does MACS tell us what we imperatively ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences?
I still don’t see, if I am being honest, how your view has any objective moral judgments in it. — Bob Ross
According to the video China contained AI, and somehow they are bad guys in the presentation while attaining what the researchers want. — Moliere
Well I think that is good rhetorical tactics; rather than get into an argument that China might be a more peaceful, internationalist, and socially responsible society, just suggest learning from the enemy because they are certainly learning from you. — unenlightened
Which is pretty much straightforward Kant. Lies need to be justified, and the truth does not. — unenlightened
That's fine with me, I'm not much enamoured of the objective/subjective distinction in the first place. I tried to explain myself in your conceptual language and failed. Or maybe I'm just confused.
But now Bob's going to say that I'm promoting deception for the greater good. And i might be, but only as the exception, not as the rule.
Which is pretty much straightforward Kant. Lies need to be justified, and the truth does not.
If your child walks into the road in front of a bus, it's ok to jerk them back to the pavement so violently it dislocates their shoulder. But if you do something like that because they are using the fish knife when they should be using the butter knife, that's child abuse.
So it seems, if universal objective categorical imperatives are real, we shouldn't be able to make exceptions. I think that might be some of confusion between yourself and @Bob Ross?
If everyone is capable of lying about morals and society doesn’t crumble (but could actually flourish), then I think that a pretty large exception to the so called rule. — Bob Ross
I agree with you. but I do not believe in the flourishing society of liars. You would have to show me a real example
Bob,An objective moral judgment itself, I would argue, is involuntary and is an imperative in the sense that we do it regardless of whether we want to or not. — Bob Ross
Where are the objective moral judgments in their view? — Bob Ross
I do commit myself to the principle that I ought to fixate upon what is of my nature I fixate upon the objective, implicit moral judgments—so I act, in every day-to-day life, like a moral realist. — Bob Ross
You are holding now to the standard of necessary truth, not objective truth.
If I take my keys out of my pocket in front of you, then I have demonstrated that my keys were in my pocket; I do not have to prove that they couldn't have been anywhere else.
Why would you argue that? I can't think of any rational or instrumental (goal-related) reasons for doing so.
That may be your intuition, but what is your intuition’s philosophical merit if it is an illusion foisted on you by your genes?
Building moral philosophy on an illusionary understanding of “an objective moral judgment” is a recipe for endless speculations.
Why not ground moral philosophy in the origins and objective function (the principal reason it exists) of cultural moral norms and our moral sense?
With that, you can build a solid, culturally useful structure and, for the most part, leave the endless speculations behind.
Any sort of moral realism which depends upon our nature, similar to your:
will have to reconcile with some apparent difficulties like the naturalistic fallacy or the fact/value distinction.
I think the way I'm reading unenlightened is the actuality of human realitionships require moral commitments to be shared overall in order for said set of human relationships to not deteriorate. And by and large I think there's some truth to that. And it makes for an interesting case where we are sort of combining values and facts together at once -- from the existential perspective we can always choose against some rule or value, and there are some who are smarter than others and can exploit the rules, but in actuality people are generally wise to who they can trust. If trust fades then relationships die, and trust is very important when it comes to keeping people together -- the very stuff of morality.
So actions are the value-makers in moral propositions -- if you act to make it so, and it is also good, then moral realism is true -- because the good is now true.
I want to clarify that my commitment to fixating upon what is of my nature is not itself an objective moral judgment. I don’t think that a metaethical theory that simply contains the obligation to what is one’s nature is thereby a form of moral realism. — Bob Ross
I am not sure if I entirely understood your second post, but let me try to adequately respond. If someone acts as though “P is good”, that does not thereby make P objectively good (although, arguably, it may be subjectively good). A normative judgment is objective iff the proposition (that expresses it) has a truthity that is will-independent. If the truthity, on the other hand, is indexical, then it is subjective. — Bob Ross
I'd counter here and say that a metaethical theory in conjunction with a metaphysical theory of naturalism is what makes that fixation a form of moral realism.
The metaphysical claim of naturalism is what girds it. If you're a naturalist, what could be more objective than your nature?
Right! So the truthity of a fixation is your nature, and since nature is all that is real, it's a form of moral realism. It's not like you got to will your nature -- you were born human.
I am a naturalist in the sense that I do think we are all a part of one, natural reality though; I just don't think that that justifies claiming that the propositions who's truthity is relative to (a) will(s) is somehow objective in virtue of our will's being a part of nature. — Bob Ross
Making the virtue true -- that part takes a will.
Do you see how this is different from the usual notion of will, which generally revolves around making choices?
But if goodness is somehow a natural pattern, in a similar way to procreation being a natural pattern (the desire to procreate isn't exactly something one wills) -- then the objectivity comes from it being apart from our will.
Such and such a moral proposition -- whatever form we decide is best(virtues, rules, or consequences) -- could be objectively good, if not objectively true.
Interesting: could you elaborate more an this distinction between a proposition being "objectively true" vs. "objectively good"? I do not fully understand what that entails. — Bob Ross
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