I find that an “objective norm” (or “categorical norm”) is a norm (i.e., an obligation) which is necessarily issued by a being’s faculty of normitivity; and it is implicit and involuntary. — Bob Ross

Is there a name you might use, by which this faculty is also known?

In other words, such a norm (which is objective) is because one exists with a nature that fundamentally has such and not an obligation that they decided to fixate upon. — Bob Ross

To say one exists with a nature that fundamentally includes such an objective obligation, as opposed to some other decidable kind, seems to question the need for a faculty to issue it necessarily.

I get what you’re driving at; just trying to see if I can arrange what you say in my terms.

Hello Moliere,

Yes. Though I'm hopeful that the point is non-trivial to what you are asking. I pretty much hold this belief with respect to any discussions about determining what is real, so there is a general place I'm coming from in thinking here, though I'm trying to tailor it to the specific topic at hand.

General philosophical categories are frequently like this. They are not like the general category of "cars" because there are concretes to refer to. Here the elements of the set are philosophical positions, which themselves usually operate more like webs than isolated propositions. And as you hold certain parts of a view as true -- the metaphor of nailing them down within a conversation -- usually you can find various ways of interpreting a position as part of one camp or another due to the web-like structure of philosophical positions and how you can interpret them in various ways.

Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems as though you are noting that philosophical positions tend to be complex and hard to nail down precise distinctions between views, which I agree with; but, why would this entail that we can’t achieve one—or shouldn’t strive for it? I don’t think that we are barred from making “concrete” distinctions in philosophy, but I would grant it is exceptionally difficult to achieve such due to the nature of the study.

The reverse! We can make distinctions, but upon doing so we are no longer talking generally, but rather are creating a set of understandings that we can think through together.

But after making those distinctions, say you were to go to another group of people who are enthusiastic about philosophy, they won't hold in some general sense. New terms will have to be forged in that group.

But the general notions of realism or nihilism will still be there…

...But upon doing so we usually start holding terms steady. And that's when it seems that we're no longer dealing with some general philosophical categories which have distinct meanings but rather a loose grouping of positions which we can then explore together upon coming to a mutual understanding.

I agree that it is best to come to set definitions before discussing a topic, as we do tend to make general distinctions and then make (usually false) assumptions about each other’s views; but I do think that distinctions should and can have set definitions (including for general ones). Moral realism and anti-realism have set definitions (and are not, in terms of their definition, blurry), and I would argue that my position simply breaks it (and that is what I meant by “blurring the distinction”) in it being mutually exclusive and exhaustive options. It sounds like, and correct me if I am wrong, that you are arguing that we just simply don’t have set definitions at all (unless we dive in precisely into each other’s views)—whereas, for me, I would grant that humans tend to make ambiguous, general distinctions but, nevertheless, people should derive clear definitions of things (and certainly can if they put in enough effort) which includes general distinctions. In my opinion, the realist vs. anti-realist distinction was predicated on false presumptions, which is why I am able to validly (I would argue) break it; but that just means we need to re-think the distinction and make it better. To your point (I think), we can never truly know that we aren’t still operating on false presumptions until someone validly breaks the new distinction we make; but I still think we should be trying to achieve clear distinctions and would say that we can (just not in the sense of absolute knowledge).

I do agree, to your point, that we do seem to be no longer working with the general categories once we’ve been discussing each other’s particular views for some time, but if the general distinction is supposed to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive, then ours views should be squarely in one or the other. If we can provide a view which doesn’t, then we have successfully broken the distinction and need a new one—because the old one is ambiguous now.

And with what I've said so far I'd expect any particular philosophical position to be difficult to categorize within the general frames.

I agree, but I still think we should strive for it. However, I am starting to view general distinctions in philosophy as not mutually exclusive and exhaustive options (to your point).

From "real" to "not-real" -- the reversal is with respect to the judgment of a position as realist or nihilist.

I see; so a reversal would be to negate what one previously held (e.g., “this position was realist, now it is anti-realist”), is that correct?

Yes! A rephrase, though -- I don't think I could make the claim in history, because while I'm familiar with the terms I'm not familiar with the contemporary history. However, conceptually, that's what I'm saying. It may be that this was more an idiosyncratic example of a theory which forced me to rethink the categories, but I think I've managed to communicate myself by golly. :)

It seems as though we have a lot in common with our views; and that you’re response to my “blurring of the distinction” is that that is what the distinction is (i.e., blurry) by its own nature; but I still think we ought to strive to make clear distinctions (even generally).

Bob

Hello Banno,

Well, that's a stretch. As a counterexample, consequentialists claim to make moral judgements without reference to the (or a) categorical imperative...Now a categorical norm, like a categorical imperative, would be one that applies in all cases. That's not the same as being "objective". Something is objective if it is not the result of personal feelings, or something along those lines.

If a person who has consequentialist tendencies claims there are no categorical imperatives, then they are thereby squarely a moral anti-realist (metaethically). That's not to say that all consequentialists are anti-realists, but if they make that specific claim then I do think they are an anti-realist. A “categorical imperative”, in metaethics, I would argue, is an “objective moral judgment” (as they are used inter-changeably). When a moral realist claims there are true objective judgments, they are thereby claiming that there are categorical claims they can make about moral judgments (hence the use of “categorical imperatives”).

Now, with being said, I totally understand your distinction (and I agree) that something being objective does not entail that it is obligatory for a person to obey it (and so one could denote an objective moral judgment as disynonymous with a categorical imperative in that sense); but, traditionally, if a moral judgment is objectively true, then it is thereby obligatory for one to obey (and it is true and applies in all cases—which is a categorical imperative).

I, like you (as far as I am understanding), would push back on this presumption (that an objectively true moral judgment is thereby obligatory to hold) and I, instead of making a “objective moral judgment” vs. “categorical imperative” distinction, am inclined to make a implicit-moral judgment vs. fixated-upon-moral judgment distinction—but these are essentially (as far as I am understanding) expressing the same critique. Within how you are using the terms, I would say that I am claiming that there are no categorical imperatives (i.e., no absolutely obligatory moral judgments which are not grounded ultimately in a will) but there are true, objective moral judgments (i.e., involuntary obligations that are grounded in the nature of the being).

Seems to me also that your use of "categorical imperative" is nonstandard. You speak of a plurality, when there is usually only the one.

I agree that most ethical theories that invoke “categorical imperatives” tend to only have one, but the definition of a “categorical imperative” does not entail, by necessity, that there is only one.

Finally, the dissection between meta-ethics and ethics is perhaps not quite so clear as you seem to think, in that deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics signify differences in meta-ethical approach as well as to normative ethics. Each may subscribe to or be implied by differences in metaethics.

I agree that normative ethical theories are fundamentally grounded in meta-ethical theories; but that doesn’t mean there isn’t a clear difference between the two different studies themselves. Normative ethical theories are not the study of the metaethical differences that each may instantiate—but, to your point, they are definitely pertinent to such discussions.

Bob

Hello unenlightened,

Not the point at all. What people want is absolutely to be removed from the equation. Animals take shelter from the storm, or the predator, or the heat or cold, or they die. No recourse to subjective wants explains how a yeast cell absorbs sugar and excretes alcohol. that's just how they work, and this is how humans work, - they shelter or they die. they arrange the environment just as rabbits do or birds do We don't have to invoke the subjective world of these animals at all, any more than we have to invoke the subjective world of a yeast cell.

Life does what is necessary to survive, or it dies. but if it dies, it is no longer life. Therefore life does what is necessary to survive. And human life is no exception. We need to control our environment or we die. And those that are homeless must make a shelter from cardboard and plastic waste as best they can.

Again, if you are going to claim that peoples’ wants are absolutely to be removed from the equation in terms of morals, then you must be able to ground objectively the choice to keep surviving. By my lights, all you are noting is biological (or otherwise scientific) facts and not moral ones: it is a fact that “life does whatever is necessary to survive, or it dies”, but why ought a person keep surviving? By noting that life either survives or dies, you have not thereby made any moral claims at all.

In other words, a person needs to control their environment (to some extent) to survive, but this tells me nothing of why I am obligated to keep surviving—why not just die? That is where the moral facts come into play (if any). All I know, at best, from your argument is that if I would like to keep living, then I must control my environment; but that is just, by definition, a hypothetical imperative.

Bob

Hello Mww,

I appreciate your response!

Is there a name you might use, by which this faculty is also known?

I purposely did not note an organ or what not which is responsible for such production because I don’t think a subject is reducible to its body and, even if it were, I do not know which organ(s) would specifically deal with producing norms. Regardless of which way one leans in terms of philosophy of mind, I don’t think it matters for all intents and purposes: by analysis of wills (i.e., subjects) we can come to understand how they issue norms (i.e., obligations) and see if there are any which are involuntary. By “faculty of normativity”, I just mean a power (i.e., faculty) which produces norms for a given being—whether that is a physical organ or a spiritual substance (or neither), I think it is irrelevant (but correct me if I am wrong).

To say one exists with a nature that fundamentally includes such an objective obligation, as opposed to some other decidable kind, seems to question the need for a faculty to issue it necessarily.

By “faculty”, I just mean the power to produce norms: are you questioning whether there needs to be a biological organ or spiritual substance that produces it? In other words, are you taking more a bundle theorist approach?

I mean it more generally, as I don’t think it matters what position one takes on that in philosophy of mind, but I could be wrong on that.

I get what you’re driving at; just trying to see if I can arrange what you say in my terms.

I totally understand: hopefully I did an adequate job of addressing your questions. Otherwise, please ask away!

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

but why ought a person keep surviving? By noting that life either survives or dies, you have not thereby made any moral claims at all. — Bob Ross

Again, if you are going to claim that peoples’ wants are absolutely to be removed from the equation in terms of morals, then you must be able to ground objectively the choice to keep surviving. — Bob Ross

No, I haven't made any moral claims, and no one has to choose to keep surviving. But if one should choose not to keep surviving, there is no more choice and no more obligation. There is an inequality between living and dying. And out of this inequality comes necessity and from necessity comes obligation. If you want to die, don't be bothering me about morality, because I am concerned with living, I'm not interested in dying.

Is the moral realism vs. anti-realism just a good approximate line to draw? Is it clear and cut? Do you think one can hold there are objective moral judgments and that none of them are obligatory to fixate upon? — Bob Ross

Whether moral realism or anti-realism is correct is a function of how we define the terms.

Assume we use your definition of moral realism as the reality of “categorical imperatives”, which I take to be imperatives about what we somehow ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences. Then I would argue that moral realism is unlikely to be true.

But, as Hanover mentioned, people have also defined moral realism as:

"Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately."
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realism

By wikipedia’s definition, I support moral realism. My realism claim is based on the empirical observation that past and present cultural moral norms (ethical sentences) refer to parts of cooperation strategies (reciprocity strategies for the most part) which are objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion.

One criterion for the most useful definition of moral realism (and other terms in moral philosophy) is which will make understanding morality less confusing. It would be confusing to simultaneously 1) define moral realism as the reality of “categorical imperatives” (which results in the conclusion that moral realism is likely false) and 2) accept the empirical data that the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems (which implies a kind of moral realism).

Thus, the most useful definitions of moral realism and other terms in moral philosophy could be based on what we empirically observe about morality.

Perhaps the difficulties you refer to in your opening post are due to a mismatch between your chosen definition of moral realism and the reality of what human morality is?

I purposely did not note an organ or what not which is responsible for such production — Bob Ross

Cool. I was just thinking…..Enlightenment moral philosophy proposed freedom as a causal “what not”, the necessary condition for production of objective obligations.

are you questioning whether there needs to be a biological organ or spiritual substance that produces it? — Bob Ross

If we actually do have objective obligations, we should expect a source sufficient to provide for them, and usually our will is considered that way.

Irrelevant sidebar: there was a guy on PBS in the early 70’s, had a painting technique demonstration broadcast, from upstate Vermont, on Saturday afternoons. His name was Bob Ross.

Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems as though you are noting that philosophical positions tend to be complex and hard to nail down precise distinctions between views, which I agree with; but, why would this entail that we can’t achieve one—or shouldn’t strive for it? I don’t think that we are barred from making “concrete” distinctions in philosophy, but I would grant it is exceptionally difficult to achieve such due to the nature of the study. — Bob Ross

Oh I think it's OK to strive for impossible goals. Else philosophy would surely disappear! :D

Just noting that as we move from different communities that we sort of have to start rolling the rock from the bottom of the hill again. (EDIT: And sometimes even within the same community!)

I agree, but I still think we should strive for it. However, I am starting to view general distinctions in philosophy as not mutually exclusive and exhaustive options (to your point). — Bob Ross

Cool. :)

It seems as though we have a lot in common with our views; and that you’re response to my “blurring of the distinction” is that that is what the distinction is (i.e., blurry) by its own nature; but I still think we ought to strive to make clear distinctions (even generally). — Bob Ross

Yup! I think we understand one another now!

If a person who has consequentialist tendencies claims there are no categorical imperatives, then they are thereby squarely a moral anti-realist (metaethically). — Bob Ross

See, that doesn't work. A consequentialist claims that the worth of an action is found by looking at its consequences. This stands in opposition to the deontologist looking at a moral rule, such as the categorical imperative.

And yet consequentialism prides itself on being "objective", as basing its morality on measurables. It is realist.

If your account has consequentialism as being antirealist, it has gone astray.

Hello unenlightened,

No, I haven't made any moral claims, and no one has to choose to keep surviving.

I apologize: I must have, somewhere along our conversation, misunderstood what you are claiming. Are you claiming there are objective moral judgments, or are you not?

But if one should choose not to keep surviving, there is no more choice and no more obligation. There is an inequality between living and dying. And out of this inequality comes necessity and from necessity comes obligation. If you want to die, don't be bothering me about morality, because I am concerned with living, I'm not interested in dying.

This is all fine and well if you are claiming that there are no objective moral judgments and, consequently, the obligation is ultimately subjective; but once one obligates themselves (by subjective affirmation) to keep living, then they must determine the best means to achieving that, which produce sub-obligations (so to speak). Is that what you are trying to convey?

Bob

Hello Mark S,

I appreciate your response!

Assume we use your definition of moral realism as the reality of “categorical imperatives”, which I take to be imperatives about what we somehow ought to do regardless of our needs and preferences. Then I would argue that moral realism is unlikely to be true.

I agree, as there is no such thing as a “stance-independent” judgment.

By wikipedia’s definition, I support moral realism. My realism claim is based on the empirical observation that past and present cultural moral norms (ethical sentences) refer to parts of cooperation strategies (reciprocity strategies for the most part) which are objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion.

Very interesting! To be honest, I have a hard time conceding this definition as truly a moral realist position (but please correct me where I am wrong here): it seems to me that this definition fundamentally accepts that everything is ultimately subjective, but it adds that there can be inter-subjective norms. By my lights, these inter-subjective norms can persist and function very similarly to objective norms (insofar as any given individual can die an the norm is still present in some manner—i.e., laws) but are not themselves objective (for they are not stance-independent nor are they deptictions of involuntary aspects of one's will): they are formulated based on collective agreement). To me, theoretically, the only valid definition of “objective moral judgments” is essentially that it is a description of an involuntary obligation (of a will).

2) accept the empirical data that the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems (which implies a kind of moral realism).

Again, I have a hard time understanding how this is actually a moral realist position: can you please elaborate?

Thus, the most useful definitions of moral realism and other terms in moral philosophy could be based on what we empirically observe about morality.

The problem I have with this is that it seems to conflate description about prescriptions with the prescriptions themselves. The fact that you can describe that I obligated myself to X does not thereby make that obligation objective; that is, the empirical inquiry of obligations is not itself an indicator of obligations themselves being objective—it is just an indicator that we would like to study them.

Perhaps the difficulties you refer to in your opening post are due to a mismatch between your chosen definition of moral realism and the reality of what human morality is?

This could the issue: I am not sure. However, currently I don’t think it is: I think that the moral realist vs. anti-realist distinction is broken for my views; but it could be due to me misunderstanding them or formulating an invalid metaethical theory—that is partly why I create this discussion board!

I look forward to hearing from you,
Bob

Hello Mww,

Cool. I was just thinking…..Enlightenment moral philosophy proposed freedom as a causal “what not”, the necessary condition for production of objective obligations.

If by “causal freedom” you are referring to libertarian free will, then I do not think that such is necessary for one to have obligations (as I am equally perfectly happy with a compatibilistic view as much as a libertarian one).

If we actually do have objective obligations, we should expect a source sufficient to provide for them, and usually our will is considered that way.

Exactly! I would say that a description of an involuntary aspect of our will would be an objective moral judgment.

Irrelevant sidebar: there was a guy on PBS in the early 70’s, had a painting technique demonstration broadcast, from upstate Vermont, on Saturday afternoons. His name was Bob Ross.

This is the man wherefrom I get my name (;

Bob

Hello Moliere,

Oh I think it's OK to strive for impossible goals. Else philosophy would surely disappear! :D

Just noting that as we move from different communities that we sort of have to start rolling the rock from the bottom of the hill again. (EDIT: And sometimes even within the same community!)

Fair enough my friend!

Yup! I think we understand one another now!

I think so too.


As I am unsure what to segue into now, I would like to just tell you that I really appreciated our conversation Moliere, and I look forward to many more! I think, as of now, we understand each other, so I don’t think there’s much more to say; but please do not hesitate to contact me (or respond to this message) if you have anything you would like to discuss further!

Bob

Hello Banno,

See, that doesn't work. A consequentialist claims that the worth of an action is found by looking at its consequences. This stands in opposition to the deontologist looking at a moral rule, such as the categorical imperative.

I see. The problem (I think) is that consequentialism does not entail, in itself, any metaethical position specifically. I wasn’t trying to claim that all consequentialists tend towards the view that there are no categorical impertatives, as simply noting that one is going to derive “the good” from consequences (and not intentions—like deontic normative ethical theories) does not entail anything about the fundamental origins of this “good”: it could be objective or subjective (or inter-subjective or what not). So, to clarify, I think that a consequentialist can be a moral realist or a moral anti-realist; but, fundamentally, if a given consequentialist claims there are categorical imperatives, then they are thereby a moral realist and if they claim there aren’t, then they are thereby a moral anti-realist. The “good” which a consequentialist is analyzing in the consequences of an action is what a metaethicist is going want to get a clear answer on (and that isn’t really a part of normative ethics to answer that question itself).

Same, I think, goes for deontic normative ethical theories: one is simply noting simply that one has a duty to a rule, and that rule could be grounded in a subject (i.e. a will) or something objective. Simply telling me that one has deontic ties (or is wholly subscribed to a deontic normative ethical theory) does not, in itself, tell me whether one is a moral realist or anti-realist. Now, I will grant that it is usually a safe bet to assume they are a moral realist, but that isn’t actually deducible therefrom.

Hopefully that clears things up. If not, then please correct me where you think I am wrong!

Bob

This is the man wherefrom I get my name — Bob Ross

Cool. Guess the sidebar wasn’t that irrelevant after all.

Thanks for your careful reply. I am keenly interested in better understanding reasons for preferring your or Wikipedia’s definitions of moral realism.

Wikipedia’s definition - "Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately."

I understand your definition to be

the only valid definition of “objective moral judgments” is essentially that it is a description of an involuntary obligation (of a will) — Bob Ross

Rewriting Wikipedia’s claim in a parallel structure:

“A valid definition of objective moral judgments is that they refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately."

What are the advantages and disadvantages of the “involuntary obligations” definition of "objective moral judgments"?

Advantages:

• Harmonious with our innate perception of moral obligations as involuntary.

Disadvantages:

• No such involuntary obligations appear to exist.
• Resulting moral antirealism claims based on this definition are confusing if moral judgments refer to objective features of the world.
• Offers no objective (mind independent) basis for resolving moral disputes.

What are the advantages and disadvantages of the “objective features of the world” definition of "objective moral judgments"?

Advantages:

• Objective features of the world exist that are the basis of moral judgments as summarized by cultural moral norms. Those features are strategies that solve cooperation problems.
• Understanding the function of cultural moral norms provides an objective, mind independent basis for resolving disputes about cultural moral norms.
• Understanding the function of cultural moral norms explains the origin and function of our innate perception of moral obligations as involuntary.

Disadvantages:
?

Additions or corrections to advantages and disadvantages?

Also, I don’t understand “this definition fundamentally accepts that everything is ultimately subjective” when the subject is objective features of the world. Science is good at being objective concerning features of the world.

Then you say “Again, I have a hard time understanding how this is actually a moral realist position: can you please elaborate?”

It is not a moral realist position by your definition. My response's point is that your definition of moral realism is less useful than the “objective features of the world” definition based on the above advantages and disadvantages. These are just definitions. We are free to choose, assume, or advocate the most useful.

Postscript:
Do you have a reference for a formal definition of “objective moral judgments” consistent with

the only valid definition of “objective moral judgments” is essentially that it is a description of an involuntary obligation (of a will)? — Bob Ross

Yes, I think that is close to what I am saying. Obligations are not facts, oughts are not is'es. But there is a radical inequality that makes obligations take one position and not the opposite. Another example: truth and falsehood. We can play at tall stories sometimes and see who can tell the most outrageous lie. But that game is a holiday from the functional use of language to communicate. The story of the Boy who cried "Wolf". illustrates, how falsehood destroys communication and prevents cooperation. If the truth does not prevail overall, language has no use; one stops listening. The deceiver can only be parasitic on a community of honest speakers, and therefore I conclude that one ought to tell the truth,and one cannot make the argument that one ought to lie, except in rare and exceptional circumstances.

One can choose to be moral or immoral, but one cannot chose what is moral and what is immoral.

One can choose to be moral or immoral, but one cannot chose what is moral and what is immoral. — unenlightened

Is there a difference in your mind between choosing and deciding? Are you associating choice with something arbitrary or capricious? That's not how we generally make choices, especially about things that we deem to be important.

In summary, seems to me that the realist/antirealist distinction and the objective/subjective distinction are very different, but that your account does not recognise this.

I hadn't thought about it, but I don't think there is a terribly important difference, in my mind at least. What's important is that one can decide things that are undecided, or one can choose things when there is a choice. But one cannot choose or decide that 2 + 2 = 5, and one cannot value deceptive communication as a rule because it undermines itself. We discount and ignore what habitual liars say. so they do not communicate at all; their talk has no meaning. This kind of inequality necessarily applies to social beings in their social relations. Asocial beings have no need for morality

Hello Mark S,

Wonderful response! Let me see if I can adequately respond.

I think that, firstly, I must, regrettably, dive into a bit of semantics, as I think you are alluding to such a discussion with:

My response's point is that your definition of moral realism is less useful than the “objective features of the world” definition based on the above advantages and disadvantages. These are just definitions. We are free to choose, assume, or advocate the most useful.

I certainly agree that we can use terms how we please; so let me explain how I am using the terminology and why so that we can compare.

By “objective moral judgement” (and “categorical imperative”), I mean “a description of an involuntary obligation”, and, by my lights, the only valid source thereof is a will. However, this is not a contemporary definition in terms of the traditional definitions of moral realism and moral anti-realism: it would be, technically speaking, a niche subgroup within moral realism—but I disagree that it should be there as I think it also agrees with fundamental aspects of moral anti-realism (and thusly think the distinction fails to function properly).

For example, I totally understand that moral cultural relativism (which, correct if I am wrong, is what it seems you are at least partially describing) is a moral realist position in the literature; however, within my view, I don’t see it is a view that is holding truly objective moral judgments as existent. To me, it is describing inter-subjective judgments at best (i.e., judgments which are not contingent on one particular will but, rather, on multiple—but is still contingent on wills and thusly not objective). Nevertheless, my view is not a mainstream, traditional definition when it comes to the moral realist vs. anti-realist distinction; and that is why, I would presume, standford keeps the definition incredibly ambiguous:

“Moral realists are those who think that, in these respects, things should be taken at face value—moral claims do purport to report facts and are true if they get the facts right. Moreover, they hold, at least some moral claims actually are true. That much is the common and more or less defining ground of moral realism (although some accounts of moral realism see it as involving additional commitments, say to the independence of the moral facts from human thought and practice, or to those facts being objective in some specified way). ...It is worth noting that, while moral realists are united in their cognitivism and in their rejection of error theories, they disagree among themselves not only about which moral claims are actually true but about what it is about the world that makes those claims true” (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-realism/)

So, to answer:

Do you have a reference for a formal definition of “objective moral judgments” consistent with

No. The reason I use my definition is because I think there is a lot of ambiguity and overlap between moral realism and anti-realism. Something being “objective” means for it to be “will-independent” (by my lights), “subjective” is to be “contingent on at least one will”, and “inter-subjective” is to be “contingent on wills”. The study of what laws we put in place, as a cooperative society, is an objective study of inter-subjective facts.

A valid definition of objective moral judgments is that they refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately.

I suspect that you are using a different definition of “subjective opinion” than me, as I don’t think societal norms and laws are truly independent of wills. What do you mean by a “subjective opinion”? Is it being used more in a whimsical, colloquial sense of the term?

Now let me try to address your disadvantages of my definition:

No such involuntary obligations appear to exist.

I actually do think such involuntary obligations exist: I can elaborate on them if you would like.

Resulting moral antirealism claims based on this definition are confusing if moral judgments refer to objective features of the world.

Firstly, I agree and understand my view is confusing, but I would argue it is confusing in light of the moral realist vs. anti-realist distinction; in other words, it is only confusing when one tries to fit it into one category or the other as traditionally laid out. Secondly, I would like to clarify that the objective moral judgments (i.e., involuntary obligations) which I refer do not result in moral anti-realist claims: the involuntary obligations are squarely within a realist’s perspective of the world; however, anyone’s obligation to fixate on those objective moral judgments is squarely within a moral anti-realist’s perspective (since I don’t think there is such a thing as a fixated-upon-stance-independent judgment). In other words, the term “objective moral judgment” has the idea of “absolute fixated-upon obligation” stripped out of it completely.

Offers no objective (mind independent) basis for resolving moral disputes.

I think it does (in just the same manner any other moral realist could argue for): we resolve our disputes by committing ourselves to fixating upon any objective moral judgments.

Let me know address your advantages of your definition:

Objective features of the world exist that are the basis of moral judgments as summarized by cultural moral norms. Those features are strategies that solve cooperation problems.

If “objective moral judgments” are defined as “will-independent”, then those are not objective features pertaining to moral judgments. At best, it is really objective features of events which themselves are inter-subjective facts about societies.

Understanding the function of cultural moral norms provides an objective, mind independent basis for resolving disputes about cultural moral norms.

Maybe I am just misunderstanding you, but I don’t see how this provides a “mind-independent” basis: it seems as though you are making laws and cultural norms the standard of what is good.

Understanding the function of cultural moral norms explains the origin and function of our innate perception of moral obligations as involuntary.

In a literal sense of the term, cultural norms and laws are not involuntary at all. They are very much voluntary—albeit sometimes hard to get away with disobeying (but that isn’t thereby involuntary).

Also, I don’t understand “this definition fundamentally accepts that everything is ultimately subjective” when the subject is objective features of the world. Science is good at being objective concerning features of the world.

Let me try to explain with an analogy. Let’s say I wake up in the morning and, despite my bodily wants directing me to go back in my cozy bed and fall back asleep, I decide to workout. I then workout. Now, from a post-analysis, it is an objective fact that (1) I “wanted” to workout (in the sense of myself as a will and not my bodily wants) and that (2) decision (which is an obligation I issued upon myself) originates from my will (and is thusly contingent upon it). In this example, it would be incorrect to say that my decision that “I ought go workout instead of fall back asleep” is objective because it one can post-analyze the events that occurred. In other words, the fact that I worked out because I decided to doesn’t make the judgment (which is my decision) objective.

I think that is what you are doing with cultural norms and laws: you are correctly noting that we can post-analyze the events, which ultimate originate from wills, and that those events are objective facts—but that doesn’t make the judgments themselves (which originated from the wills) objective.

Bob

Hello Unenlightened,

I agree with your first paragraph and I think I understand better what you are saying: thank you!

However, your last sentence is confusing me:

One can choose to be moral or immoral, but one cannot chose what is moral and what is immoral.

To say someone can choose to be moral (or immoral) is to concede that there is a standard ultimately outside of themselves for what is moral (or immoral); and, likewise, to say that they cannot choose what is moral is to say the same thing. However, I thought in agreement that your position doesn’t have any objective moral judgments in it: so how is there a standard of what is moral which no one gets to choose?

Bob

Hello Banno,

In summary, seems to me that the realist/antirealist distinction and the objective/subjective distinction are very different, but that your account does not recognise this.

Hmm, I see: could you please elaborate on that more?

Bob

so how is there a standard of what is moral which no one gets to choose? — Bob Ross

We are trying to communicate.
Communication depends on honesty.
It is open to us to be dishonest, and only pretend to want to communicate in order to manipulate each other rather than understand each other.

But the moment either one claims that they are not intending to communicate but to manipulate, the meaning of their words is lost, and the discussion is over. Our social relations depend on honesty and -cannot depend on dishonesty. Social relations presume morals, and the particular morals are necessary features of social relations. We simply cannot discuss on the basis that we are not going to tell the truth - we would be wasting our breath. One can lie, but one cannot make lying good.

“… the only valid definition of “objective moral judgments” is essentially that it is a description of an involuntary obligation (of a will)”— Bob Ross

I understand you to be saying (here and elsewhere) that fixating on a cultural moral norm (encoding it as a moral norm in your moral sense in my terms) makes it an objective moral judgment – an involuntary obligation.

Also,

"Understanding the function of cultural moral norms provides an objective, mind independent basis for resolving disputes about cultural moral norms." - Mark S

Maybe I am just misunderstanding you, but I don’t see how this provides a “mind-independent” basis: it seems as though you are making laws and cultural norms the standard of what is good. — Bob Ross

A key miscommunication between us is what the “function of cultural moral norms” refers to. “Function” refers to the primary reason cultural moral norms exist. Clarifying what this feature of our universe ‘is’ should shed light on how to best define “objective moral judgments”.

Assume for a moment that there is a mind-independent feature of our universe that determines the primary reason that culture moral norms exist (what their function empirically is). Understanding what the function of cultural moral norms ‘is’ provides an objective standard of what is good and bad.

(The superficially diverse, contradictory, and strange norms of cultural moralities without this insight into their ultimate source and function is relatively useless.)

But what is the source of this function’s bindingness? Are we logically free to “fixate” (and advocate as a matter of will) for a different standard of what is good and bad? Of course. The empirical observation of the ultimate source of cultural moral norms carries no innate bindingness. This function’s bindingness may be subjective and the choice to fixate on it to trigger the feeling of bindingness a matter of preference. But the ultimate source of human morality is an objective truth not a subjective one.

So what is the mind-independent function of cultural moral norms? To solve cooperation problems that are innate to our universe.

In highly cooperative societies, all intelligent, independent agents must solve these same cooperation problems and therefore their morality will also have the function of solving these cooperation problems. (We can expect them all to know why the Golden Rule is a useful moral guide and, if they are sufficiently advanced, when and why it goes wrong and should be abandoned.)

Based on what I argue the function of human morality is (solving cooperation problems), the most useful definition of "objective moral judgments" is based of the “objective features of the world” rather than “an involuntary obligation (of a will)”.

Morality as Cooperation Strategies is wonderfully compatible with
Wikipedia’s definition - "Moral realism (also ethical realism) is the position that ethical sentences express propositions that refer to objective features of the world (that is, features independent of subjective opinion), some of which may be true to the extent that they report those features accurately."

But could it be normative? By the SEP, normativity sounds likely:
"The term “morality” can be used ... normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people."

I expect rational people would prefer to live in cooperative societies and therefore would be interested in basing their moral system on solutions to problems that block cooperation.

We are trying to communicate.
Communication depends on honesty.
It is open to us to be dishonest, and only pretend to want to communicate in order to manipulate each other rather than understand each other.

But the moment either one claims that they are not intending to communicate but to manipulate, the meaning of their words is lost, and the discussion is over. Our social relations depend on honesty and -cannot depend on dishonesty.

Nowhere in this do I find a moral judgment. You are simply noting that if one wants to communicate, then they must speak the truth most of the time.

The part which one cannot choose in that example is something which is not a moral judgment: it’s the best means of abiding by the moral judgment—it is the means not the judgment itself.

Social relations presume morals, and the particular morals are necessary features of social relations.

I agree and totally understand; however, it seems to me that you are simply noting that one cannot control the sub-obligations which emerge as a result of the ultimate obligations that one commits themselves to (which I agree with): I am failing how those moral judgments are objective in that case. It seems as though they are ultimately objective but there are better ways of achieving them (or abiding by them).

Bob

I understand you to be saying (here and elsewhere) that fixating on a cultural moral norm (encoding it as a moral norm in your moral sense in my terms) makes it an objective moral judgment – an involuntary obligation.

Not quite! I am saying the opposite: fixating on a moral judgment is subjective; and moral judgments which one cannot opt-out of (cannot unfixate upon) are objective.

A key miscommunication between us is what the “function of cultural moral norms” refers to. “Function” refers to the primary reason cultural moral norms exist. Clarifying what this feature of our universe ‘is’ should shed light on how to best define “objective moral judgments”.

Assume for a moment that there is a mind-independent feature of our universe that determines the primary reason that culture moral norms exist (what their function empirically is). Understanding what the function of cultural moral norms ‘is’ provides an objective standard of what is good and bad.

Thank you for elaborating on this, but, to me, I don’t see why a “primary reason” for norms existing would be thereby an objective norm: why is that the case?

The empirical observation of the ultimate source of cultural moral norms carries no innate bindingness. This function’s bindingness may be subjective and the choice to fixate on it to trigger the feeling of bindingness a matter of preference. But the ultimate source of human morality is an objective truth not a subjective one.

As you can probably guess, I am confused by the last sentence: why would that be an objective truth of moral judgments? Are you claiming there is a force (or something) which is the ultimate reason why we do what we do?

So what is the mind-independent function of cultural moral norms? To solve cooperation problems that are innate to our universe.

I went ahead and read your initial post for that discussion board, but, nevertheless, I don’t see how cooperation problems are objective moral judgments nor how it pertains to morality itself. I don’t think something is determine right or wrong solely on whether it helps us cooperate better. Also, even if is the case that cooperation is a key driving factor for why people tend to have certain obligations, that would tell us nothing about whether those obligations are objective or not.

But could it be normative? By the SEP, normativity sounds likely:
"The term “morality” can be used ... normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given specified conditions, would be put forward by all rational people."

I expect rational people would prefer to live in cooperative societies and therefore would be interested in basing their moral system on solutions to problems that block cooperation.

Personally, I just don’t think that description by SEP is correct: morality is not an appeal to the populace.

Bob

Nowhere in this do I find a moral judgment. You are simply noting that if one wants to communicate, then they must speak the truth most of the time. — Bob Ross

I'm not saying that. "Come buy my snake oil, it will make you immune from snake bites." Some people do lie all the time. It is corrosive to society. I'm saying that one cannot in good faith say say it is good to lie. One cannot found a society on the practice of lies, because lies only work at all in a social context of trust and honesty.. It is an argument against subjectivism and against error theory.

I'm not following how this goes against error theory. Or, at least, there are some thoughts I have.

All moral statements are false.

However, trust and honesty are frequently built on false beliefs. In fact, for a lot of communities belief in false things is how a group checks to see if someone is trustworthy -- if you believe the gods are watching, you might think twice about crossing the rules of the tribe even when the people aren't watching. Christian communities are often obsessed with what people believe, and belief maintenance. Going to church is part of belief maintenance is part of community building is part of trust and honesty. Once a month, in the Morman church -- at least when I was a little one, who knows now -- there is what is called a "Faith and Testimony Meeting" where people who feel the spirit will get up and declare to the church their faith and testimony in the church due to the teachings and beliefs which are being maintained.

In fact, if moral statements were true, then I'd expect the sort of behavior as above, but I'd expect it across a much smaller groupings of beliefs. Instead what we have are a very wide margin of possible false beliefs that, insofar as a group lands on some strategy for child-care and belief-reproduction (belief maintenance within the family, missionary work) it's good enough to survive and thrive in the cultural jungle.

The scenario is different from the snake oil salesman, who knows he's selling snake-oil, and the false prophet, like Joseph Smith -- it's the people they are talking to who believe in false things, and form community from that. There's plenty of faith, honesty, and trust. Just not much truth.

The categorical imperative that I long considered as true was "Thou shalt not kill" -- but reality woke me up from that one. Clearly the societies which are very efficient at assigning the best people to killing are the ones which thrive. At which point -- what is moral realism anymore?