We could both be, for example, just interested in debating each other and are thusly just communicating counter points to each other (and not for the sake of what we think is true pertaining to the subject at hand) for the sake of having a good debate. To clarify, I don’t find any evidence either of us are doing that, but, as far as I am understanding you, it seems as though that kind of conversation wouldn’t be able to function properly (especially on a grand scale)--but I am failing to see how it would degenerate. Fundamentally, I think this is our dispute: — Bob Ross
"A key miscommunication between us is what the “function of cultural moral norms” refers to. “Function” refers to the primary reason cultural moral norms exist. Clarifying what this feature of our universe ‘is’ should shed light on how to best define “objective moral judgments”.
Assume for a moment that there is a mind-independent feature of our universe that determines the primary reason that culture moral norms exist (what their function empirically is). Understanding what the function of cultural moral norms ‘is’ provides an objective standard of what is good and bad."
Thank you for elaborating on this, but, to me, I don’t see why a “primary reason” for norms existing would be thereby an objective norm: why is that the case? — Bob Ross
When the boy cries wolf when there is no wolf, he teaches the world to ignore what he says. When we all ignore what each other says, there is no meaning and nothing to understand. It seems so obvious to me that i struggle to understand what you cannot understand. You do know the story?
I repeat, "Understanding what the function of cultural moral norms ‘is’ provides AN objective standard of what is good and bad." How could you argue that was false?
The key to many miscommunications in moral realism discussions may be that one side is assuming the subject is "imperative obligations" and the other side is assuming the subject is "objective features of the world".
If the boy who cried wolf masked his narcissistic desire to spook his village with crafty, legitimate reasons for crying (whereof when they approached there was no wolf but everything indicated that the boy was sincere—even though he truly isn’t), then they would have kept showing up. I am not sure if I am explaining this adequately, but hopefully that helps. — Bob Ross
That is why I call it immoral realism as much as moral realism.
it is only when the charlatans become dominant that there is a collapse, and then the hard lesson has to be learned again that nothing can be done without virtue.
For example, let’s say that 99% of the population were convinced there wasn’t an objective law prohibiting murder, but they realize that the best bet to not get killed (in very unnecessary ways) is to promote and insincerely affirm that there is an objective law prohibiting it. In that case, I don’t see how society would crumble. In other words, dominant pretending isn’t necessarily a highway to destruction. — Bob Ross
Yes, you have found an exception.
If one were to pretend to believe something that was true, though one believed it false... one would be telling the truth while thinking oneself deceitful.
(Not that I really know what an objective law is, mind. It tends to make me think of laws of physics that one obeys without exception, rather than human prescriptions that one can and sometimes does break.)
it seems as though you are claiming that there is some sort of “objective moral law” — Bob Ross
You seem to be essentially noting that we can derive objective facts pertaining to what norms societies are setup with (and sustain) and that these judgments (which are guided by the need for cooperation) are an objective standard for morals. Am I understanding you correctly? — Bob Ross
the sort of objectivity I am claiming is the objective inequality I mentioned way back – honesty is moral and dishonesty is immoral; similarly killing folks is immoral and keeping them alive is moral. It cannot work the other way around, and thus there is objectivity, without that being the kind of law like gravity that one cannot defy.
Yes, you have found an exception..If one were to pretend to believe something that was true, though one believed it false... one would be telling the truth while thinking oneself deceitful.
The dishonesty has to be, as Attenborough says 'very occasionally', because otherwise the warning would not work either as a deception or as a warning. And I would add that it is clearly an intentional deception, and thus the original sin.
Not quite. You are missing a critical element: the subject of the objective facts. The subject is the function of cultural moral norms (norms whose violation is commonly thought to deserve punishment).
Assume it is objectively (mind independently) true that the function of cultural moral norms is to solve cooperation problems and cultural moral norms are fallible heuristics for parts of strategies, such as reciprocity strategies, which solve those problems. Knowing the function of cultural moral norms enables us to resolve many disputes about if and when cultural moral norms will fail this function or will fulfil it in a way that is contrary to our values and goals.
Therefore, this function provides an objective standard for moral behavior we can use to understand cultural moral norms better and thereby resolve disputes about them.
For example, consider “Do to others as you would have them do to you” as a fallible heuristic for initiating reciprocity. When tastes differ and following it would create rather than solve cooperation problems, the proposed moral standard (solving cooperation problems) provides an understanding that it would be objectively immoral to follow the Golden Rule in this case.
Again, the function of cultural moral norms provides AN objective standard for morality. This objective truth is silent regarding the existence of other moral standards that are either “objective features of the world” (as it is) or “involuntary obligations” (which it is not).
If you agree that people lying about there being objective moral standards (such as “thou shall not kill”) would actually sustain society (or at least not burn it to the ground), then you are conceding that it is possible for dishonesty to function as a ‘good’ thing in society. — Bob Ross
Again, I am operating under the semantic use of an ‘objective moral judgement’ being more than just a description of proclamations which are contingent on wills (in a voluntary sense): would you disagree with that usage of the term? — Bob Ross
Yes. it is possible occasionally that dishonesty can have good consequences, but not that it is 'a good thing'. It is possible that murdering Hitler would have had good consequences, but not that murdering people is a good thing. It is possible that abortion has good consequences sometimes, but it not a a good thing, in the sense that it is worth getting pregnant for.
Objective moral judgments are proclamations dependent on the same objective aspects of our world responsible for cultural moral norms and our moral sense
The existence of objective moral judgments is not contingent on our wills. Their acceptance as moral obligations IS dependent on our wills since imperative obligation is not a necessary part of what is objectively moral.
Perhaps you are still thinking something like “what is objectively moral is necessarily an imperative obligation”. This idea is “an illusion foisted on us by our genes" (as the philosopher of biology Michael Ruse likes to point out).
"It is moral to solve cooperation problems; it is immoral to create cooperation problems"
It is objective (mind independent) in that it is the product of the objective aspects of our world responsible for cultural moral norms and our moral sense – cooperation problems and the strategies that solve them.
In metaethics, it is exceedingly common to divide views into two subcamps: anti-realism (i.e., that there are no categorical imperatives) and realism (i.e., that there are categorical imperatives). Although I find this to be an intuitive distinction (as an approximation), I am finding the distinction blurring for me the more precise I analyze my metaethical commitments. — Bob Ross
I was outlining that 99% of the population didn’t think that there was such a thing as an objective “thou shall not kill”, but they kept promoting it as objective (thusly lying) because they recognize that it would be in their best interest to do so. In that example, lying is predominant and good. — Bob Ross
P1: One ought to consider what causes cultural moral norms and our moral sense objective moral judgments.
P2: Solving cooperative problems is the cause of cultural moral norms and our moral sense.
C: Therefore, one ought to solve cooperative problems.
Is that syllogism accurate? — Bob Ross
I feel that the distinction is indeed blurry, however it only seems Hegelian in that respect if I may say so
In terms of meta ethics is where morality does indeed retain its objectivism for right and wrong are both imperative and categorical using kantian terminology (if i was to really get dialectical in the German sense)
The interjection only becomes obvious post fact although admittedly that is not always the case
Right. The way everyone pretends that Father Christmas exists.
but such conventions are not lies but agreed performances
One of the things it talks about is the possibility of social collapse brought about by the ubiquity of deep-fakes becoming impossible to detect. Worth watching quite carefully, and rather supposing the moral case I have been making.
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