My objection is to the idea that fundemental differences in external objects somehow do not exist or change within the object when conscious observation occurs. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Why do you assume reality is such that there exist external objects? I get why, I guess, but I think that assumption has to be argued for
How would computation work in an idealistic reality? Would that solve some of the confusion here?
Thus, in Hegel’s rigorous (but rather obviously nonstandard) terminology, the finite is always that which is intelligible in terms of or is explained by its reference to something else, its “nega- tion.” For something, x, to be finite, means that it can only be grasped in terms of its contrast with y.
In my own musings on the development of Information Theory, I take seriously the conclusion of quantum theorists that abstract analog Information is equivalent to Energy. If so, there can be both Potential Information (DNA) and Actual Information (protein). Any "uninterpreted information" would be like the Energy stored in Momentum or Position : it can be actualized in a "collision" that transforms Momentum into Action. That dynamic relationship works for both organic and non-organic aspects of Nature. Potential Energy (ability to do work) is the not-yet-activated Power of Position (relationship), as illustrated by gravity's changing force relative to a gravitational body.↪hypericin
Is there such a thing as uninterpreted information? Put another way, how does anything constitute information until its been interpreted? I mean, the genetic information transmitted by DNA is interpreted by ribosomes. But in the non-organic realm, what sense does it make to speak of information at all? Sure, we can ascertain vast amounts of data about the Universe, which then constitutes information, but does the Universe itself constitute 'information' in any meaningful sense? — Wayfarer
It seems to me that subjective idealism requires a level of skepticism that should also put the existence of other minds and the findings of empiricism in doubt, in which case it becomes only arbitrarily distinct from solipsism....In Kastrup's system, external objects are indeed external to us, they are just composed of mental substance — Count Timothy von Icarus
As I elaborate extensively in my new book, The Idea of the World, none of this implies solipsism. The mental universe exists in mind but not in your personal mind alone. Instead, it is a transpersonal field of mentation that presents itself to us as physicality—with its concreteness, solidity and definiteness—once our personal mental processes interact with it through observation. This mental universe is what physics is leading us to, not the hand-waving word games of information realism. — Bernardo Kastrup
I take seriously the conclusion of quantum theorists that abstract analog Information is equivalent to Energy. — Gnomon
Information is notoriously a polymorphic phenomenon and a polysemantic concept so, as an explicandum, it can be associated with several explanations, depending on the level of abstraction adopted and the cluster of requirements and desiderata orientating a theory....Information remains an elusive concept.
Suppose we have 7 people in a room. We have cut them off from the rest of reality using a magical forcefield, thus they exist in a closed system. They are playing poker. We want to bet on the hands, or maybe even the conversation they make, who goes to the bathroom when, etc.
Well, with our Le Place's Demon, we can cheat, right? Just fire it up and have it evolve the system forward. It will create a fully accurate projection of the future. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Even if we model the demon as a Markov chain, it is still passing through these many states. And here is the crux of my argument, a full description of each of the states the demon passes through to evolve the system from time T to time T' would require more information than is used to describe either T or T' alone. If you say, "not true, T3 tells you all about T4 and T5," my response would be, "if that is the case, show me T5 without passing through any more states." If T is truly equivalent to T', it shouldn't be discernible from it. If it is discernible, then difference exists (Leibnitz Law), and so to new does information. — Count Timothy von Icarus
That is, we cannot ignore the process of evolution, as is often done. Computation creates discernible differences across a time dimension, such that if we had a second Le Place's demon producing outputs about every state the first demon passes through, the output would be many times larger than the first's when it simply describes T' based on T. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Thanks. Perhaps I'm not fully understanding your point, but does this actually reduce the number of computations required or just the length of the algorithm needed to describe the transition from T1 to Tn? — Count Timothy von Icarus
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