• lorenzo sleakes
    7
    How is that the brain generates the private subjective world of the self and then for what purpose? it seems logically impossible that nerve signals can generate a subjective observer while at the same time enabling that self to have its own distinct powers. It appears to be a useless appendage.
    I propose that the brain only generates the content of consciousness and not the self that binds it into a whole. The visual processing center for instance generates visual perceptions and thoughts. But the conscious self, that private world that binds the sensations into a simple unity, has a more permanent status and is not generated by the pattern of nerve signals. Instead the mental subject comes from an already conscious nerve cell from which it splits off to become what Lebiniz called the dominant monad. The conscious self then is an atomic unity evolving from other conscious natural beings in a panpsychist universe and as such can have real causal powers.
    see:
    Panpsychism and Real Mental Causation
  • bert1
    312
    I'm a panspychist too and I agree with some of this.

    it seems logically impossible that nerve signals can generate a subjective observer while at the same time enabling that self to have its own distinct powers.lorenzo sleakes

    This is intuitively plausible but could do with more elaboration and argument, if you have time. Can you explain further what you mean?

    I propose that the brain only generates the content of consciousness and not the self that binds it into a whole. The visual processing center for instance generates visual perceptions and thoughts. But the conscious self, that private world that binds the sensations into a simple unity, has a more permanent status and is not generated by the pattern of nerve signalslorenzo sleakes

    I agree with that I think. I think identity should be distinguished from consciousness. Consciouness seems to me to be about the unification of its content, whereas identity is about the contents of consciousness, which are various and plural and determined by brain (or perhaps body) function.

    Instead the mental subject comes from an already conscious nerve cell from which it splits off to become what Lebiniz called the dominant monad. The conscious self then is an atomic unity evolving from other conscious natural beings in a panpsychist universe and as such can have real causal powers.lorenzo sleakes

    I can't bear Leibniz's Monadology, so I instinctively recoil from this. But you may have repurposed his ideas fruitfully, I don't know. I'd need to hear more about this bit.
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k
    How is that the brain generates the private subjective world of the self and then for what purpose? it seems logically impossible that nerve signals can generate a subjective observer while at the same time enabling that self to have its own distinct powers. It appears to be a useless appendage.lorenzo sleakes

    You're seeing the brain and the subjective world of self as two different things--you're at least assuming some sort of epiphenomenalism if you're not simply asserting a partial dualism.

    The subjective world of the self is a property of brains. It's not something different than brains that is generated for some purpose. It's what brains are like/it's simply qualities brains have. It's what those materials, in those structures, undergoing those processes, are like. It's not something separate from that.
  • Pantagruel
    250
    The subjective world of the self is a property of brains. It's not something different than brains that is generated for some purpose. It's what brains are like/it's simply qualities brains have. It's what those materials, in those structures, undergoing those processes, are like. It's not something separate from that.Terrapin Station

    True. Chemical properties are "properties" of physical systems, however chemical properties are not explicable in terms of the laws of physics. Rather they are a new set of "rules" which emerge as a result of the formation of a complex-stable physical system creating a fundamentally new type of context. Likewise for other superordinate systems, biological, psychological, etc. Different systems can be connected without one necessarily being reducible to the other.
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k
    however chemical properties are not explicable in terms of the laws of physics.Pantagruel

    What are the criteria for explanations in that scenario?
  • Pantagruel
    250
    Not sure what you mean by "criteria for explanations"?

    The fundamental forces of physics are gravitation, electromagnetism, the weak nuclear force, and the strong nuclear force. Chemical properties abound. Flammability isn't explicable by any of the fundamental forces of physics. However the fundamental forces of physics can account for the formation of new macroscopic systems (gas clouds, stars, planetary bodies). These new environments, to the extent that they are stable, create the conditions of possibility for novel formations which exhibit novel properties giving rise to new rules.
  • Wayfarer
    8.7k
    I propose that the brain only generates the content of consciousness and not the self that binds it into a whole. The visual processing center for instance generates visual perceptions and thoughts. But the conscious self, that private world that binds the sensations into a simple unity, has a more permanent status and is not generated by the pattern of nerve signals. Instead the mental subject comes from an already conscious nerve cell from which it splits off to become what Lebiniz called the dominant monad.lorenzo sleakes

    I think this is very likely true, and is supported by the science. There's a recognized issue called the neural binding problem, which basically comes down to this: science knows a great deal about the neural systems that assimilate colour, movement, quantity, shape, and so on. But there's no faculty that has been identified that is responsible for 'binding' all of the disparate stimuli into a coherent whole. Aside from Liebniz' monad, this also corresponds with Kant's analysis of the transcendental unity of the subject.

    It's what those materials, in those structures, undergoing those processes, are like. It's not something separate from that.Terrapin Station

    This is completely incorrect, and here's a scientific paper which spells it out https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3538094/


    We will now address the deepest and most interesting variant of the Neural Binding Problem, the phenomenal unity of perception. There are intractable problems in all branches of science; for Neuroscience a major one is the mystery of subjective personal experience. This is one instance of the famous mind–body problem (Chalmers 1996) concerning the relation of our subjective experience (aka qualia) to neural function. Different visual features (color, size, shape, motion, etc.) are computed by largely distinct neural circuits, but we experience an integrated whole. This is closely related to the problem known as the illusion of a stable visual world (Martinez-Conde et al. 2008).

    We normally make about three saccades [rapid movement of the eye between fixing points] per second and detailed vision is possible only for about 1 degree at the fovea (cf. Figure 1). These facts will be important when we consider the version of the Visual Feature-Binding NBP in next section. There is now overwhelming biological and behavioral evidence that the brain contains no stable, high-resolution, full field representation of a visual scene, even though that is what we subjectively experience (Martinez-Conde et al. 2008). The structure of the primate visual system has been mapped in detail (Kaas and Collins 2003) and there is no area that could encode this detailed information. The subjective experience is thus inconsistent with the neural circuitry. Closely related problems include change- (Simons and Rensink 2005) and inattentional-blindness (Mack 2003), and the subjective unity of perception arising from activity in many separate brain areas (Fries 2009; Engel and Singer 2001).

    Bolds added.
  • Terrapin Station
    13.8k


    There's no way to map third-person observable data to first-person subjective data to make a statement to the effect of "there is no area that could encode this detailed information."

    Not that I was saying something about the relationship between external data and mental representations of it in my comment anyway. I was saying something about the idea that the "sense of self" is something different than certain states that one's brain is in.

    At least offer objections and criticisms that stem from understanding what I wrote/what I was saying in the first place. Otherwise you're just wasting my time.
  • lorenzo sleakes
    7
    This is intuitively plausible but could do with more elaboration and argument, if you have time. Can you explain further what you mean?bert1

    What i am saying is roughly the same as Michael Lockwood's disclosure view in which Awareness can be thought of as "a kind of a searchlight, sweeping around an inner landscape in the brain" . The brain can then create the various sensations but there is a self that ties them into a single unified being. The nerve signals are ephemeral and correspond to the ephemeral generation of experiences. But the self observing those experiences has more continuity and derives from the underlying consciousness of a conscious nerve cell from which its consciousness splits off to become the dominant consciousness in the brain. It is an interactive dualism, but one grounded in a natural panpsychist world where there is a flow of mentality in every living eukaryotic cell and all the way down. Why else would the brain spend so much energy creating a virtual world of colors and sounds and feelings if not for the benefit of an independent entity that has powers of its own? see https://philpapers.org/rec/SLEPAR
  • OmniscientNihilist
    117
    How is that the brain generates the private subjective world of the self and then for what purpose?lorenzo sleakes

    u have it backwards. its consciousness that is generating the brain
  • Alan
    62


    The brains of people in comma remain despite having lost consciousness...
  • OmniscientNihilist
    117
    The brains of people in comma remain despite having lost consciousness...Alan

    dont assume other consciousness's exist
  • Alan
    62


    So, I guess you're just explaining this to yourself and not the OP, right?
  • OmniscientNihilist
    117
    So, I guess you're just explaining this to yourself and not the OP, right?Alan

    u dont need other consciousness's to exist to have a conversation. you can talk to a computer if it responds well enough
  • Alan
    62

    Where's consciousness generated, then?
  • OmniscientNihilist
    117
    Where's consciousness generated, then?Alan

    consciousness is not generated its eternal

    and its omnipresent
  • Alan
    62

    How can you prove you have been around that long? How can you prove you have been everywhere?
  • OmniscientNihilist
    117
    How can you prove you have been around that long? How can you prove you have been everywhere?Alan

    only the here now is real, time and space are illusions
  • Zelebg
    100

    How is that the brain generates the private subjective world of the self and then for what purpose?

    I would phrase it like this: Brain generates cognition, sensation, and emotion. How can "self" experience those feelings and thoughts? For what purpose? What is "self"?

    The purpose of sentience or consciousness is so our brain can learn, which is how we "make choices". In other words, the purpose is so we can have "free will".
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