If you are willing, I will proceed further with the reading of the presented section. I believe I broke off at page 208 where he is in the midst of supporting the claim that continuous identity is an erroneous, fictitious principle.

He continues on with this argument, proposing the possibility of assuming an external object, independent from the perception. Such a 'dual existence' could resolve the contradiction, allowing that perceptions are interrupted, and the independent object maintains identity as a continuously existing object. This, assuming an external object independent from perception, is what he called "feigning a continu’d being". He says that this is done to support "identity". We have perceptions from one time to another, which appear to be perfectly identical, so we want "identity" despite the interruptedness of perception, and so we assume an independent object to support "identity".

This feigning of continued being is attributed to the "vivacity of the idea". (We ought to have proper respect for the fact that "vivacity" implies activity, change.) The vivacity involves a smooth passage from the present impression (I assume this is a strong sense perception) to the idea. But this description is rather convoluted, as it involves smooth passage between numerous impressions, and also the "propensity of the imagination". So the vivacity of the idea is really a very complex concept, involving numerous impressions, memory, and imagination. In any case, the vivacity of the idea is what leads to, or causes the feigning of a continued being, identity.

Simply put, we have impressions which through the use of memory appear to be perfect resemblances, but interrupted in time. The interruptions are caused by us (lack of attention etc.). And so we ascribe continued existence to independent objects.

So we have the foundation here for dual existence. The perceptions, separated by time, though providing the appearance of perfect resemblance, are known not to be perfect resemblances. |Perfect resemblance" of these impressions is a falsity. So they do not provide a reasonable approach to identity (209). However, the resemblance is very strong, vivid, producing the propensity for the idea of "identity". Thus philosophers have assumed "identity", and independent objects, to account for what is believed to be a deficiency in perception. Perception is incapable of providing the reason for an independent object, but the false principle "identity" provides a philosophical remedy to this deficiency.

Now he proceeds with descriptions of experiments which demonstrate that perceptions themselves do not have any independent existence. They are dependent on the organs of the body. So philosophers adopt a separation between perception and the object. This is a principle Hume calls "palliative", as a supposed remedy for the senses' inability to provide us with true identity, a vivid idea which we have a propensity toward due to the resemblance of perceptions.

So again we have the sort of paradox exposed (211). We start with the assumption that our only objects are our perceptions. We are led from the appearance of perfect resemblance amongst the impressions, toward believing in a continuous identity. But the perceptions are also known to not actually give a perfect resemblance. But resemblance itself produces a propensity to believe in identity, so we assume independent objects to support identity. But this negates the starting point, that our only objects are our perceptions. (A sort of Hegelian dialectics here.)

So at this point (212) we have two contrary positions, the vulgar, that our only objects are our perceptions, and the dual existence proposed by philosophers, that there are independent objects, distinct from our perceptions. The stumbling point between these two is "identity", and the supposed continuous existence which is the only support for this principle..

Yes, that sounds accurate to me. A few comments:

One part of the paradox, which he states but does not expand on, is the topic of the duration of these perceptions. Although not in the section you are discussing now, he uses examples of closing his eyes or turning his head and then states that these perceptions are new.

I think that's true, but then it also seems to me evident that even if we don't close our eyes or turn our heads, there is only so long we look at an object before we claim that we are currently having a new perception.

And, also, strictly speaking, we have a new object, say a chamber, which is extremely similar to the previous chamber, but not literally the same one, the wind might have blown a curtain to the side, particles of rock or leather have deteriorated and so on.

We are insensible of these changes, but they nonetheless occur. It is curious that reason itself can present us with such a problem, when at first glance it seems evident, we are looking at the real object in real time, but then Hume has a point with his idea of "double existence", which look quite unreasonable the more you examine it.

It is useful to note in this quote, the following:

"Whoever wou’d explain the origin of the common opinion concerning the continu’d and distinct existence of body, must take the mind in its cummon situation, and must proceed upon the
supposition, that our perceptions are our only objects, and continue to exist even when they are not perceiv’d. Tho’ this opinion be false, ’tis the most natural of any, and has alone any primary recommendation to the fancy." (p.213)

(Bold mine)

For some reason, which is not easy to discern, these we are content with these paradoxes in "vulgar reasoning", because it is "the most natural of any" and produces the least amount of trouble to postulate.

And you know as well as I, that unless the power and absolute necessity of a priori reasoning denied by Hume and continental empiricists in general, became part and parcel of the rational human condition, there wouldn’t be a sufficiently explanatory theory, ever. — Mww

I agree that these explicit a-priori conditions are missing from Hume, aside from the very broad label of "instinct". But even if you take say, Descartes, Cudworth or Kant, and add all these innate mechanisms and architecture, we can say, roughly, that the "inner side", of identity is present to us.

It is still very curious that each perception is new, and that IN our reasoning, we cannot connect our perceptions, though we can postulate an internal cognitive power, which does such binding for us. The problem of the connection of perceptions pointed out by Hume remains, or so it looks like to me, in terms of it being fiendishly difficult to focus on each perception and looking for the connection of perception of object O at T1, T2 and so on.

the very faculty of reason is again ascribed to natural impulses, instincts; such that it is as inescapable (and I’ll add, a-rational) as is the natural impulse to breath: A toddler does not reason that one breaths in order to live and thereby breaths; nor does it reason that it is using its faculties of reason to develop its reasoning skills in order to better live; yet it inevitably engages in both activities a-rationally - this, the argument would then go, just as much as we adult humans do. — javra

Overall, a well-thought post. Nothing in it to counter-argue conclusively. That being said, it might be worthwhile to consider the different between reason the faculty, which the infant hasn’t developed, and reason the innate human condition, by which development of the faculty is possible. — Mww

As to your comments on my post, thanks. It can happen now and then. :smile:

Words can be ambiguous. So as to clarify what I had intended: by “faculty of reason” I intended “ability or capacity to reason” rather than “reasoning skills” … equating the former to what you’ve termed “reason the innate human condition”. It then was this “capacity to reason / reason the innate human condition” which was claimed to be a “natural impulse or instinct” in my last post. If its warranted, my bad for lack of clarity in the expression.

But to address an overarching theme in Hume the empiricist that was previously addressed: Take the nonrealistic hypothetical of a human who is completely deprived of all present and past “impressions” as Hume terms them; be these what we moderners term perceptions, memories, the experience of physical pain, or anything other which could quality. I for instance disagree with Hume’s definition of ideas as “faint images” of impression – instead understanding ideas to be concepts and, thereby, abstractions which are a) abstracted from “impressions” and b) are of themselves perfectly devoid of imagery in so being concepts/abstractions. E.g., the idea/concept of animal does not have a “faint image” – and to ascribe an image to this concept (e.g., the image of a cat) is to at the same time exclude a plethora of other possible images that the concept encapsulates (dogs, whales, insects, etc). Neither does the concept of cat, for – for one example – to see the “faint image” of a white cat is to exclude all the different colors which cats can take. Yet, be this as it may, a question for the non-empiricist:

In the absence of all present and past impressions, what reasoning might such a hypothetical human yet engage in? And this via what content?

More concretely, in Kantian terms, to paraphrase, we innately endow our perceptions with time and space. Yet, in the complete absence of all present and past perceptions, is it to be assumed that we’d yet hold the ideas of time as space as contents to reasoning?

(BTW, so it’s said, I personally neither agree with empiricists nor rationalists, instead viewing both experience and reasoning as essential to epistemological content. But I’m here addressing the issue in what I take to be Hume’s favor: where it's argued that reasoning is brought about by impressions - such that there can be no reasoning in the complete absence of impressions and of that which is derived from impressions.)

I’m currently more interested in your point of view regarding these questions than to engage in debate.

….interested in your point of view regarding these questions…. — javra

You know what they say: careful what you wish for.

In the absence of all present and past impressions, what reasoning might such a hypothetical human yet engage in? — javra

I’d probably go with the notion there wouldn’t be any reasoning going on at all. Or, maybe, given how it is with us normally, I’d say if there was reasoning going on absent past and present impressions, it would be utterly unintelligible to us. I don’t see how I could think, if there was nothing to think about, which is what impressions give us. And I don’t think I’d understand a thing, if it were possible to think stuff like ideas, if those ideas never were presented with an object given from an impression I’ll never have.

The second part of your question, then…..

And this via what content? — javra

….becomes moot, insofar as if reasoning is not possible it may be because it lacks content, or if it is unintelligible, its content would be just as unintelligible as the reasoning to which it belongs.
—————

in Kantian terms, to paraphrase, (…) is it to be assumed that we’d yet hold the ideas of time as space as contents to reasoning? — javra

In Kantian terms, space and time are not the contents of reasoning. They are nothing but the necessary conditions for the possibility of reasoning. And even that’s not quite right, but close enough to what you’re trying to say. But to answer directly, I might say we might well hold the pure intuitions of space and time in abeyance until there is an impression given to us, which would extend to if even if that never happens. But then, it’d be pretty hard to call ourselves….or that hypothetical human…..human at all. Be a different kind of intellect, no doubt.
—————-

But I’m here addressing the issue in what I take to be Hume’s favor: where it's argued that reasoning is brought about by impressions - such that there can be no reasoning in the complete absence of impressions and of that which is derived from impressions — javra

That’s just it. While it may be the case no reasoning is possible in the complete absence of impressions, reasoning is still very possible without an impression being given that represents the reasoning. We know what a beautiful thing would be upon perception of it, because we already have a sense of what it is to be beautiful. We can conceive infinity but never be impressed with a thing that is infinite. And, above all that, we dream things we’ve never done.
—————-

I personally neither agree with empiricists nor rationalists, instead viewing both experience and reasoning as essential to epistemological content. — javra

I also view both empiricism and rationalism equally essential for empirical knowledge, or knowledge of the empirical content of our cognitions. But I think we have just as much capacity for pure rational thought in the form of logical relations, which have no empirical content. But, if I want to prove that logical relation, I must subject it to empirical conditions, let Mother Nature be the judge.

That’s my story and I’m sticking to it.

You know what they say: careful what you wish for. — Mww

No regrets so far. Thanks for the reply.

I also view both empiricism and rationalism equally essential for empirical knowledge, or knowledge of the empirical content of our cognitions. But I think we have just as much capacity for pure rational thought in the form of logical relations, which have no empirical content. But, if I want to prove that logical relation, I must subject it to empirical conditions, let Mother Nature be the judge. — Mww

For what its worth, here we differ a little. What you term "pure rational thought" I would understand as (very) abstract thought ... which, as abstraction, is abstracted by us from experience (of the world, of our thoughts' workings, and so forth). As one example, our modern knowledge of formal logic(s) is, to my mind, then governed by a long history of axiomatic stances which more or less correlate with our experience and which, for the most part, have been improved with time; axioms that would themselves not be conceivable in the hypothetical absence of, again, what Hume terms "impressions". Nevertheless, I concur (it at least so far seems) with the idea that at least the most basic aspects of logic of which our reasoning makes use of are not empirically - nor for that matter evolutionarily - developed in us. Instead being, for lack of better phrasing, existentially fixed aspects of the world; existentially fixed aspects we have biologically evolved to make much better use of, via our far more abstract understanding, then any other species of living being known to us.

I know. Lots to potentially disagree with in this point of view. But I'll leave this in even though its not paramount to the discussion. Thanks again for the previous post.

One part of the paradox, which he states but does not expand on, is the topic of the duration of these perceptions. Although not in the section you are discussing now, he uses examples of closing his eyes or turning his head and then states that these perceptions are new. — Manuel

The subject of duration in relation to sensation is very intriguing, and actually quite difficult. Suppose we take your example, the chamber, and you observe it in a way one would describe as continuously. Now when you think about it, you are only ever actually perceiving the chamber at any given moment of time, at the present. The rest of your supposed continuous observation is in the past. So you always have a moment of perception, now, and memories of past perceptions, and this constitutes your continuous observation.

If I ask you to describe what you see, you might be inclined to describe a static scenario, walls windows, chairs, desk, etc.. It is this idea of a perception, that a perception is of a static thing, or static array of things, which produces the problem of identity which Hume describes. This is because you would also refer to past static descriptions, a few moments ago, as perceptions, and there would be some slight changes to your perceptions, as you say.

But what if you described activity instead? The curtain is moving in the wind, a dog is running outside the window, someone has walked into the chamber and is now moving a chair. Isn't this really the way that we describe what we are seeing at any given time? We sense activity, and this is very clear with hearing. And when we describe what we are sensing, these are observations of activity..

The issue here is that perception is not ever at an instant in time which is the moment of the present. We tend to assume that there is a moment at the present, which constitutes the instant that sense perception is taking place, but in reality sense perception only occurs over a duration of time. So what the senses are really picking up is motion, activity, and we actually directly observe change with the senses.

So, if someone represents our observations of change as seeing the way things are at one moment (a perception), then seeing them in a different way at the next moment (the next perception), and we conclude with the use of reason, that change has occurred between these two perceptions, this is really not the way that we actually sense change. Through the senses we are actually perceiving change directly. And this, perceiving change directly, as activity and motion, is what leads us to believe in continuity. Instead of seeing the chair here at one moment, and there at the next moment, we see someone moving it. We see the curtain moving in the wind. And this, sensation of activity, is what produces the propensity toward believing in continuity. So when our sensing is interrupted, as it often is, and we see that the chair is in a different place than it was yesterday, we assume a continuity of change between these two perceptions, because this is what we would have seen if we kept up the observation.

The problem though is that reason works best with static descriptions, predications with laws of logic, like non-contradiction, so it does not properly apprehend what the senses give to it, change. As Aristotle demonstrated, change is what occur between is and is not. A thing goes from having a given property, to not having it, and "change" refers to the intermediate, neither having nor not having the property. But reason tries to describe change as a series of static pictures, of is and is not. Things were like this, then like that, and finally like so. Notice that change is always what occurs between the static pictures which reason likes to employ. So this is the incompatibility between sense and reason. Sense gives us a picture of continuous change, while reason says that at any step of the way it must be describable as either this or not this, and if it is changing from being this to not being this, it must be describable as being something else.

There is a lot of material here to cover. One pertaining directly to Hume's own vocabulary, the other pertaining to your examples and illustrations. You are of course right that, perception is a complex process that we make seem instantaneously but is not. The issue is, is it correct to say that a perception of say, a curtain NOT moving in the wind, that is, appearing static, count as a distinct perception?

In this case, we have no way of establishing this, absent some environmental change such as the wind, or a person or pet moving the curtain. But plainly we must attribute distinctness to perception, if we didn't, then we wouldn't register anything, just movements of events.

On to your own examples:

The problem though is that reason works best with static descriptions, predications with laws of logic, like non-contradiction, so it does not properly apprehend what the senses give to it, change. — Metaphysician Undercover

It does, and I think we can venture to say - based on current evidence - that "higher" mammals tend to perceive this particular aspect of the world similarly, they seem to sense continuity in a single object. But we know that isn't the case, though Locke pointed this out several times, we now have advanced physics that tells us so. There are no fixed objects in nature. It's just the way we see the world.

And it isn't altogether clear that evolution-arguments about survival here make sense. Like, if we happened to see objects in an interrupted manner, kind of like an object flashing quickly on and off, we would necessarily die - depending on how quick these interruptions are, I think creatures could survive such a circumstance, or see no reason why they couldn't do so.

So this is the incompatibility between sense and reason. Sense gives us a picture of continuous change, while reason says that at any step of the way it must be describable as either this or not this, and if it is changing from being this to not being this, it must be describable as being something else. — Metaphysician Undercover

And, Hume aside for this moment, it is very curious. I mean, for us, the philosophically inclined, when we think about this topic, it just seems obvious to us that something is "wrong", or "incomplete" about objects: that's why such topics have been debated for millennia, back to Heraclitus and more.

Senses are very good at what they do: react to what they're supposed to react to. But we know that senses alone, absent some mental architecture, however minimal, would leave us no better than an amoeba or some other creature with a rather poor nature.

So, if reason is a problem, and senses don't help with objects, it is correct to postulate something else, call it nature, instinct, negative noumena - SOMETHING, that renders this intelligible. Even though Hume concludes that the imagination misleads us here, it is a faculty not explored enough, that can also be postulated.

In any case, knowledge of objects brings with it the idea of something not quite being right with naive, "vulgar" pictures of the world.

It is still very curious that each perception is new….. — Manuel

Yes, but the representation of these perceptions, is not, re: consciousness. The implication of each new perception is that we have to learn a thing every time we perceive it. Not very efficient of Nature to force that upon us, methinks.

…. and that IN our reasoning, we cannot connect our perceptions, though we can postulate an internal cognitive power, which does such binding for us — Manuel

You mean an internal cognitive power like, “… This resemblance is observed in a thousand instances, and naturally connects together our ideas of these interrupted perceptions by the strongest relation, and conveys the mind with an easy transition from one to another. An easy transition or passage of the imagination along the ideas of these different and interrupted perceptions, is almost the same disposition of mind with that in which we consider one constant and uninterrupted perception.…”?

The problem of the connection of perceptions pointed out by Hume remains, or so it looks like to me, in terms of it being fiendishly difficult to focus on each perception and looking for the connection of perception of object O at T1, T2 and so on. — Manuel

Perception is impression and/or idea, so are we really looking for connection of perceptions, or are we looking for the connection of impression to idea, or, impressions/ideas to each other? Imagination, then gives us the connection between an impression, re: “sensation, emotion”, of O, and its idea, re: “thinking or reasoning” about the sensation of O, in any time of our relation to O, which gives us something about object O.

I don’t see this part as very difficult, so you must have meant something else.

The issue is, is it correct to say that a perception of say, a curtain NOT moving in the wind, that is, appearing static, count as a distinct perception? — Manuel

Where I have a problem is with the idea of a distinct sense perception. I do not believe there is such a thing, and therefore I think this idea is a misrepresentation. As you agree, sensation always occurs over a duration of time, and we might add that there is always a spatial element as well. What could possibly constitute the spatial and temporal boundaries of a perception, boundaries being required to make the sense perception properly distinct from other perceptions? Time appears continuous, so it seems that any temporal divisions would be completely arbitrary, imaginary and fictitious. And a spatial boundary for a distinct sense perception could not be well defined either, as sensations seem to just get blurry, fuzzy, or confused, toward the sense's spatial limits.

My proposal would be to completely dismiss the idea of a distinct sense perception, as unreal, and misleading. Then, if there is such a thing as a distinct perception, this would be something which the mind has created with the imagination. And, we can see that we do this (create the illusion of distinct perceptions), for a reason. The mind is fundamentally analytic in its desire to understand, so it breaks down the sense information into composite parts, which you might call distinct perceptions. We can see this analysis and comparison of parts, in the mind's treatment of each and every one of the five senses, and also in its comparison between what the various senses provide. So the idea of a "distinct perception" is something the mind produces from its own way of dealing with what it derives from the senses, The senses themselves, in no way produce distinct perceptions.

But plainly we must attribute distinctness to perception, if we didn't, then we wouldn't register anything, just movements of events. — Manuel

I think that this is exactly the case. All that the senses provide is movement information. We need to pay attention to the very close relationship between senses and the brain, and recognize that the brain is not a sense organ. So whatever the brain adds to sensation, this is not coming from the sense. And if our proposed separation is between mind and sense, then we would say that since it's not coming from the sense, but from the brain, it must be contributed by the mind.

This is a basic problem with Hume's approach. His proposed separation appears to between the senses, and reason. But "reason" in its proper definition is only the rational and logical activity of the mind. This leaves a vast amount of mental, or brain, activity which is obviously not reasoning, and obviously not activity of the senses, as unassailable, in an uncategorized grey area.

It does, and I think we can venture to say - based on current evidence - that "higher" mammals tend to perceive this particular aspect of the world similarly, they seem to sense continuity in a single object. But we know that isn't the case, though Locke pointed this out several times, we now have advanced physics that tells us so. There are no fixed objects in nature. It's just the way we see the world. — Manuel

What higher mammals have, which allows them to perceive the world in this way, is greater brain capacity. This is not a greater sense capacity. And it's very interesting to look at the sense capacity of some of the lower mammals, rodents, and even creatures like reptiles and insects. Some of the specific sense capacities are unbelievable. So the term "higher" here is used to refer to the creature's brain capacity, not its sense capacity. And when you say that higher mammals perceive the world in a specific way, this is attributable the type of brains that they have, not to their senses.

If we adhere to the principles then, we sense continuity, but the brain wants to break up the continuity into discrete, or distinct parts for the purpose of understanding. Therefore, individual, fixed and distinct objects is a creation of the brain, hence mind (even reason?) rather than senses. Now Hume says that this is an unjustified creation, an erroneous fiction. However, we must pay respect to the fact that we call these creatures with the advanced brain capacity "higher" mammals. And, we consider that this analytic aspect of the mind which breaks the sensations into parts for separate comparison and understanding is an advantage. Therefore we ought not conclude that this separation into distinct objects is an erroneous mistake, as Hume does. Furthermore, the science of physics supports this position of distinct individual objects with the concepts of gravity, mass, and inertia. And so, we really ought to conclude that it is the senses which are misleading us, with the appearance of continuity, not the mind or brain with its assumption of distinct objects.

Of course, that is an oversimplification because we really need to separate space and time to distinguish whether one of these is responsible for the intuition of continuity, and the other responsible for the intuition of distinct objects. That's what I mentioned earlier in the thread, that there is a fundamental incompatibility between continuity and distinct objects, though Hume simply classes these together and talks of the continued existence of a distinct object. If, for example, we say that an object's spatial existence is discrete, or distinct, and its temporal existence is continuous, it appears like we might have both distinct and continuous within an object. However, as the ancients knew, objects are generated and corrupted in time, so that temporal continuity is a bit elusive, and as we now know from things like gravity and electromagnetic fields, objects overlap each other in their spatial presence, so that spatial distinctness is a bit elusive as well.

Senses are very good at what they do: react to what they're supposed to react to. But we know that senses alone, absent some mental architecture, however minimal, would leave us no better than an amoeba or some other creature with a rather poor nature.

So, if reason is a problem, and senses don't help with objects, it is correct to postulate something else, call it nature, instinct, negative noumena - SOMETHING, that renders this intelligible. Even though Hume concludes that the imagination misleads us here, it is a faculty not explored enough, that can also be postulated. — Manuel

So the problem here is with the sense/reason division. As described above, there is vast area of activity which fits neither category, it lies between these two. We can find other ways of dividing, sense/brain, or body/mind, but each has its own problems of not being able to properly account for everything, sp we get aspects, parts of reality which have no category. This indicates that this sort of division is not the best way to go. The same problem is evident in the distinct perspectives of Parmenides and Heraclitus, and Plato's attempts to resolve the issue with the mind/body dualism.

This is why Aristotle proposed a completely different system. The proposed division is between actual (formal) and potential (material). The difference here, which made his system so useful is that all elements of reality are considered to consist of both aspects (although he did leave open the possibility of pure, separate form). This means that instead of classifying all aspects of reality as either of the mind or of the body, we say that within each individual part of reality which is presented to us for consideration, there is a formal aspect and a material aspect. From this perspective, the difficulties we incur in our attempts to understand, (such as that presented by Hume), are due to our inability to properly differentiate the formal (actual) part of the thing from the material (potential) part of the thing.

In any case, knowledge of objects brings with it the idea of something not quite being right with naive, "vulgar" pictures of the world. — Manuel

The vulgar or naive perspective fails to account for the complexity of reality. It is a simplistic view which serves us well in all our mundane activities, so it has become the dominant view, a simplistic monism. The philosopher seeks a higher understanding and quickly uncovers the problems inherent with the simplistic view. The difficulty for the philosopher is in finding a system which can resolve all the problems in a coherent way.

Yes, but the representation of these perceptions, is not, re: consciousness. The implication of each new perception is that we have to learn a thing every time we perceive it. — Mww

Correct. The object serves as a stimulus, which leads us to develop representations of that object. So we have the representation of the object even when we are not receiving sense-data from said object. Nevertheless, the moment of perception, if you will, is still new: the object ever so slightly changes, and so do we. This us leads down some avenues, concerning rationalist thought, nevertheless, correct statement on your part.

You mean an internal cognitive power like, “… — Mww

Sure, Hume's quote is fine. But I can also say something like my comment above. An object stimulates us, we form a representation. However, each perception we have of the object is new, even though the representation is not, though we often don't register this unless the change is noticeable: a fire is still a fire, until the moment it is extinguished, then it's either tar or smoke.

so are we really looking for connection of perceptions — Mww

At t1, we are looking at a clock telling us it's 5:10 pm, at t2, it's telling us the same thing, the same thing at t3, but at t4, the clock now indicates it's 5:11. But this can be expanded to most objects.

So the idea of a "distinct perception" is something the mind produces from its own way of dealing with what it derives from the senses, The senses themselves, in no way produce distinct perceptions. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with such a proposal and it's the mental side of distinct perceptions which is problematic, given what you correctly say about the arbitrariness of our cutting up of time.

But "reason" in its proper definition is only the rational and logical activity of the mind. This leaves a vast amount of mental, or brain, activity which is obviously not reasoning, and obviously not activity of the senses, as unassailable, in an uncategorized grey area. — Metaphysician Undercover

Absolutely. There are many powers or capacities in the brain which Hume does not recognize or spell out well enough, one area of particular weakness is his notion of ideas being faint copies of impressions. As @Mww correctly reminded me, we should be thinking of representations, which are far stronger and more stable than Humean ideas, heck, I'd even say representations are underdetermined given the brevity of our impressions.

Furthermore, the science of physics supports this position of distinct individual objects — Metaphysician Undercover

I thought physics supported the idea of the world being made fundamentally of probabilities and constant activity, individuation of objects is something we do, which is clearly helpful for all kinds of reasons. So I am unclear here of your example.

If, for example, we say that an object's spatial existence is discrete, or distinct, and its temporal existence is continuous, it appears like we might have both distinct and continuous within an object. However, as the ancients knew, objects are generated and corrupted in time, so that temporal continuity is a bit elusive... — Metaphysician Undercover

By today's standards, everything is a bit elusive, so to speak. These "fictions" or representations that come innately from us are for sake of convenience. And here we should keep in mind that we are analyzing objects (mostly, not exclusively) from a "vulgar" perspective, which is rather different than analyzing an object from the point of view of physics.

The vulgar or naive perspective fails to account for the complexity of reality. It is a simplistic view which serves us well in all our mundane activities, so it has become the dominant view, a simplistic monism. The philosopher seeks a higher understanding and quickly uncovers the problems inherent with the simplistic view. The difficulty for the philosopher is in finding a system which can resolve all the problems in a coherent way. — Metaphysician Undercover

We might disagree here. I don't think it's simplistic, even though I say it is convenient. Philosophers focus on different aspects of the world, those dealing with, say, ethics or law, will care much about the vulgar world. Those that focus on epistemology find interests in both. And then we have philosophers who focus mostly on science.

Back in Hume's day, these distinctions were not nearly as sharp as they are today.

Sorry for not commenting on your Aristotle's portion, I don't know enough about him, and would need more serious study, for some other time. Though I'm sure what you point out about him also merits consideration

if someone represents our observations of change as seeing the way things are at one moment (a perception), then seeing them in a different way at the next moment (the next perception), and we conclude with the use of reason, that change has occurred between these two perceptions, this is really not the way that we actually sense change. Through the senses we are actually perceiving change directly. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is just assertion.

I'm not taking a position on whether you're right, but on what grounds will anyone agree or disagree?

Honestly, the only thing I can see here worth doing, is try to determine what our powers of discrimination are scientifically, to treat this as an empirical question.

No doubt the terms in which we investigate the question will change, but I think we'll have to allow that based on what the investigation shows. "Senses" will turn out to be far too coarse, as will "perception". We'll want to know which neurons are activated, what level of input it takes to do so, how long that takes, when they're ready to be activated again, at what point information is passed up to the central nervous system, how much information is enough to act on, all with or without conscious awareness, and then there are additional questions about what we become aware of, how, and when.

The problem though is that reason works best with static descriptions, predications with laws of logic, like non-contradiction, so it does not properly apprehend what the senses give to it, change. — Metaphysician Undercover

If the story you're telling is that reason distorts the true nature of the senses, or of their testimony, then that seems to me not a story worth telling. Better actually to go and look at how our nervous system works. That would include what the senses actually do and how, but also how our brains organize the information we have about the world. Reason comes in elsewhere, I suspect, and I think so far as all this goes, Hume's general approach is the right one, regardless of what particulars he may have gotten wrong.

This is a basic problem with Hume's approach. His proposed separation appears to between the senses, and reason. But "reason" in its proper definition is only the rational and logical activity of the mind. This leaves a vast amount of mental, or brain, activity which is obviously not reasoning, and obviously not activity of the senses, as unassailable, in an uncategorized grey area. — Metaphysician Undercover

So close, but isn't it the case that Hume is precisely discovering that a lot of mental activity cannot be attributed to the senses or to reason? Isn't that what we've been talking about for pages now? How on earth can you end up claiming that Hume overlooked this, when he's the one that drew our attention to it in the first place?

If we adhere to the principles then, we sense continuity, but the brain wants to break up the continuity into discrete, or distinct parts for the purpose of understanding. Therefore, individual, fixed and distinct objects is a creation of the brain, hence mind (even reason?) rather than senses. Now Hume says that this is an unjustified creation, an erroneous fiction. — Metaphysician Undercover

Obviously there's a problem with saying "brain, hence mind (even reason?)," and Hume is very clear that we cannot attribute the theory of external objects to reason. As for mind — well, perceiving (in the modern sense) sure looks like a mental activity, in addition to being a physical activity, but you'll have to look carefully to figure out what in your perceiving is down to the peripheral nervous system and what the central. No reason at all to think it's only one or the other. Hume doesn't talk about the brain much, so I don't think it's helpful to read his claims about the mind as just being 18th-century speak for 'brain'.

So the problem here is with the sense/reason division. As described above, there is vast area of activity which fits neither category, it lies between these two. We can find other ways of dividing, sense/brain, or body/mind, but each has its own problems of not being able to properly account for everything, sp we get aspects, parts of reality which have no category. This indicates that this sort of division is not the best way to go. — Metaphysician Undercover

And again it's Hume who takes enormous pains to insist that there is centrally important mental activity clearly not attributable either to the senses or to reason. Somehow you've talked yourself into accusing him of doing what he, quite remarkably for his time, did not do.

This is just assertion. — Srap Tasmaner

Yes, I'd say it's specualtion, and it would require a long discussion to get through all the reasons for that speculative assertion, but I did provide a brief explanation, and some examples.

I thought physics supported the idea of the world being made fundamentally of probabilities and constant activity, individuation of objects is something we do, which is clearly helpful for all kinds of reasons. So I am unclear here of your example. — Manuel

I think the point is that both perspectives are supported. This is why we can't say that one or the other, sense or mind is correct, they are each tuned in to different aspects of reality, kind of like each different sense is tuned in to a different aspect. It wouldn't be correct to say that one apprehends truth and the other falsity.

That's why I argued that reality is complex, and referred to Aristotle's system by which everything is composed of both matter and form. These two aspects seem to be completely incompatible, but somehow things consist of both. The mind has a wonderful way of making incompatible things appear to be compatible, like the number line of real numbers, makes distinct and discrete units, numbers, appear to be compatible with a continuous line.

I'm going to go try to finish reading the section now, and will report back.

To my knowledge, Hume's skepticism was aimed at a very specific target, but then it spilled over into other domains; for some reason he didn't go all the way if you know what I mean.

However, each perception we have of the object is new…. — Manuel

Nevertheless, the moment of perception, if you will, is still new: the object ever so slightly changes, and so do we. — Manuel

Even from a Hume-ian point of view, in which a perception is that which is given to the mind, in this case as impression rather than idea, which contains a sensation involving the stimulation of sensory apparatus, from the perspective of that system in its operation, as it is performing its function, is it better to say a perception/impression/sensation/stimulus is new, or just in a successive time? If every successive perception is new, what is left to say about a perception that is in fact new, re: a stimulus that has not yet been an impression?

The rest of the section, 213-218, is pretty much a rehash of what has been already stated, with little new material. He states a challenge at the beginning of 213:

Let it be taken for granted, that our perceptions are broken, and interrupted,
and however like, are still
different from each other ; and let any one upon this -
supposition shew why the fancy, directly and immediately, proceeds to the belief of another existence, resembling these perceptions in their nature, but yet continu’d, and uninterrupted, and identical; and after he has done this to my
satisfaction, I promise to renounce my present opinion. — 213

Here we have complete evidence of Hume's mistaken interpretation of the philosophical concept of "identity". Notice that he uses "identical" here, and this is indicative of how he interprets "identity". For him, "identity" is a continued invariable existence which he earlier called "perfect identity". But in philosophy, the law of identity, and even in vulgar uses of "identity", the word is used to refer to a thing which remains being the same thing despite undergoing changes. So it is not at all meant to indicate invariable existence as Hume supposes.

So "identity" does not equate with "identical", and the law of identity, which states that a thing is the same as itself, is actually intended to provide for the changing nature of a thing. It allows that we can say the identified thing, X, at one time has the property A, and at another time does not have the property A, all the while continuing to be the same thing.

The entire section therefore, has Hume attacking a strawman "identity", due to his misunderstanding of identity. So his purported causes, or reasons, why we assume an independent existence (dual existence), being a fanciful imagination, are incorrect, and his claim that the dual existence is unjustified is equally incorrect.

To get to the real causes for the assumption of dual existence, look at Hume's premise above. "Let it be taken for granted, that our perceptions are broken, and interrupted, and however like, are still different from each other". "Interrupted" refers to a break in temporal duration. And, although it is true that sense perceptions do get interrupted, it is also true that they have a temporal duration inherent within them. A perception requires a temporal duration. So each perception has an extent of duration, and does not exist as an atemporal, timeless, static moment. This duration provides us with an uninterrupted perception, during which time we perceive the activity of change.

Now, we can understand that sense perception is fundamentally an uninterrupted observance of activity, which occurs through temporal duration. Hume throws interruptions into the sense perception, and these interruptions (being caused for a multitude of different reasons) are very real as well. So the fundamental constituent of perception is continuous uninterrupted activity, which is change. But, these perceptions may also be interrupted. When they are interrupted we perceive the before and after of change, and we do not perceive the activity of change itself. So we posit the independent object, as the thing which is changing, to account for the reality of the changes which occur that we do not perceive when the perception is interrupted. Accordingly, any time that I perceive things (such as my chamber) to be different from the last time I perceived it, having been an interruption in my perception, but due to a very high degree of resemblance remaining, I am inclined to believe that if my perception had not been interrupted, I would have perceived a continuity complete with the activity of change, then I invoke the "independent object" to account for this deficiency (interruptedness) of my perception. The change, which I did not observed, happened to the independent object while I wasn't looking.

So you can see that rather than assuming an independent, invariable, unchanging "identical" object of Humes "perfect identity", what the "identity" of philosophy, and common use, refers to is a changing object. This misunderstanding has completely misled Hume as to what causes us to take the independent, distinct and continued object for granted. The independent object is not an imaginary, fanciful ideal, of a perfectly invariable, unchanging object with "perfect identity", as Hume presents us with, rather it is a continuously changing object which philosophers and the vulgar take to be the independent object with "identity". And such an independent object is assumed not as something from the imagination, as completely fictitious and erroneous, but it is assumed with good reasons. We assume it to account for the difference between continuous, uninterrupted perception, and the interruptions in perception, which naturally occur for many different reasons.

More evidence of Hume's mistake can be seen at 215. Here he repeatedly refers to the idea of continued existence, as something imaginary, in complete denial or ignorance of the fact that continuity, or continued existence is derived directly from sense perception. We sense activity, motion, and this requires an uninterrupted duration of time, constituting a continuity of existence. All of our five senses detect motion, activity, therefore continuous existence, and the idea of continued existence is derived from this, not from the imagination.

Consider the following:

The contradiction betwixt these opinions we elude by a new
fiction, which is conformable to the hypotheses both of reflection and fancy,
by ascribing these contrary qualities to
different existences; the interruption to perceptions, and the
continuance to objects. — 215

He does not assign continuance to perceptions. If he properly assigned continuance to perceptions, which is necessary due to the fact that we actually perceive motions and activities, which can only be described in terms of temporal continuity, then he would see that the presented contradiction inheres completely within sense perception itself. We have continuous perceptions which get interrupted. Therefore continuity, "continuance" in this case is a feature of the perception itself, and we do not need to assume an independent object to account for the reality of continuity. Continuity is inherent within our perceptions. However, we do assume the independent object to account for the interruptions in our perceptions. When the continuity of sensation is interrupted, and we have good reasons to believe that there was continuity, then we need to assume the independent object to account for these good reasons.

Notice that the assumption of the independent object is not a product of the fancy, or imagination, as Hume claims, it is the product of good reasons. Hume's strawman "identity" as a perfect, ideal, invariable continuity of an object, rather than the changing existence of true identity and true objects, is what misleads him into thinking that the idea of an independent object is a product of the imagination rather than a product of good reason.

Again, we see a similar issue at 216. He says that we must make any supposed external objects to resemble internal perceptions. But he does not respect the duality of perception which I've pointed out. We perceive some aspects of a perception as unchanging, and some aspects as changing. And it is this dual nature of perception which leads to the contrariety which he refers to, rather than a difference between sense and reason. Some aspects of the perception appear to continue unchangingly, and other aspects of the perception are changing. Both of these are inherent to the perception itself.

So finally, p217, we see a very clear expression of how Hume's misunderstanding of "identity" has misled him.

'Tis a gross illusion to suppose, that our
resembling perceptions are numerically the same ; and .'tis
this illusion, which leads us into the opinion, that these
perceptions are uninterrupted, and are still existent, even
when they are not present to the senses. — 217

Clearly, it is the activity, and motion of our perceptions which incline us to believe in the continuity of perception. The resemblance between interrupted perceptions does not lead us to believe that they are identical, or "numerically the same", thereby causing us to create this imaginary fiction of continuity as Hume claims. The idea of continuity has already been created by our perceptions of activity. The resemblance between one interrupted perception and another, which is not a "perfect identity", only inclines us to believe that there is a continuity of activity, or change, which unites the two, thereby validating what we tend to believe, that they are not perfectly the same. So it is change which we attribute to continuity and identity, not sameness. The independent, identified thing, is assumed to be continuously changing, not maintaining a "perfect identity", as in "identical" like Hume has presented.

Under the framework you sketch out here, that is, depending solely on impressions and not bringing in any cognitive apparatus, it would indeed be correct to say that the impression is successive in time, as "newness" would involve the registration of this concept to the mind, instead of mere perceiving.

I can't answer your second question under these constraints, because again, to register something as new would require us to recognize that the object in front of us is not exactly the same, as the object we were looking at mere moments ago.

If you introduce cognition in addition to impressions, of whatever kind, the answer is far from trivial, in my opinion. There is no neat way of introducing a new object while separating this strictly from continuity in time, in fact, this is one of the problems we've been discussing, that of trying to establish how sensible it is to speak of a distinct impression being distinctly existent.

There is no neat way of introducing a new object while separating this strictly from continuity in time….. — Manuel

Separating this….what? Introduction of a new object? Time itself is continuous, so, no, there is no way to introduce a new object that doesn’t occur somewhere in the continuity of time. But time in general, while itself continuous, is not the series of continuous times of any particular object. For any object that did not exist, then it does, its time is only continuous from the time of its existence. So under these conditions, re: introduction of a new object to the mind as an impression/sensation, such introduction can be separated from the continuity of time in general.

because again, to register something as new would require us to recognize that the object in front of us is not exactly the same, as the object we were looking at mere moments ago. — Manuel

What do we use to qualify newness when we cannot perceive the difference in exactness regarding the object in front of us? If we’re talking impressions, we can’t use logic, insofar as logic has no bearing on mere perception, its sole domain being reason. Which raises another point: if we can’t distinguish exactness of successive impressions, and if impressions are the source of ideas, then it follows that there would be successively indistinguishable ideas corresponding to those indistinguishable impressions. Then….how would we know there was anything new?

In the case where a new object is nothing at all like the object we were looking at, in which case exactness is irrelevant, makes explicit the registration of change belongs to the perceiver, not the object. An object that changes in successive perceptions by the same perceiver, on the other hand, would necessarily be new at the logical level, but may still be represented by the same conception. Healthy apple on a tree, same rotten apple on the ground, is still an apple. Sorta like Descartes’ wax, right?

If you introduce cognition in addition to impressions….. — Manuel

That wouldn’t be fair to Hume. I don’t recall his use of the concept, do you? If so, be interesting to read the context.

if we can’t distinguish exactness of successive impressions, and if impressions are the source of ideas, then it follows that there would be successively indistinguishable ideas corresponding to those indistinguishable impressions. Then….how would we know there was anything new? — Mww

I think I may have misread your own quote originally, when you said "Even from a Hume-ian point of view...", I took that to mean that what followed need not be restricted to Hume, hence my introducing extra innate factors he does not talk about. My mistake.

As per what you say here, it's through reason that we can say that an impression is new, that's what Hume seems to be saying, I also think this simply follows logically that we have new perceptions every time we close and then open our eyes. I'll skip innate talk here, unless you want to pursue it.

An object that changes in successive perceptions by the same perceiver, on the other hand, would necessarily be new at the logical level, but may still be represented by the same conception. Healthy apple on a tree, same rotten apple on the ground, is still an apple. Sorta like Descartes’ wax, right? — Mww

Damn, I feel restricted here by sticking to Hume, but, that's the point of this thread (mostly). In a sense, yes, like Descartes' wax. But then we'd have to say that the conception of rotten and melted (in the case of wax) is not exactly the same one we have of a healthy apple or unmelted wax. We can still refer to them as apple and wax respectively but modified.

That wouldn’t be fair to Hume. I don’t recall his use of the concept, do you? If so, be interesting to read the context. — Mww

Not "concept" per se, but important innate considerations. You'd have to fill in a lot, but it is in the book. Here are a few quotes, not limited to this chapter or book even, but can be incorporated into it, fruitfully, in my opinion:

"There is a great difference betwixt such opinions as we form after a calm and profound reflection, and such as we embrace by a kind of instinct or natural impulse, on account of their suitableness and conformity to the mind." (This one can be found in this chapter)

"Reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls..."


"Nothing is more admirable, than the readiness, with which the imagination suggests its ideas, and presents them at the very instant, in which they become necessary or useful. The fancy runs from one end of the universe to the other in collecting those ideas, which belong to any subject... [the imagination is] a kind of magical faculty in the soul, which, tho' it be always most perfect in the greatest geniuses, and is properly what we call a genius, is however inexplicable by the utmost efforts of human understanding."

It's easier to search here, finding that quote in the text I provided is difficult, not here: https://davidhume.org/texts/t/full

Finally, and most importantly, for me, is in his Enquiry, where he says:

"But though animals learn many parts of their knowledge from observation, there are also many parts of it, which they derive from the original hand of nature; which much exceed the share of capacity they possess on ordinary occasions; and in which they improve, little or nothing, by the longest practice and experience. These we denominate Instincts, and are so apt to admire, as something very extraordinary, and inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human understanding."

Italics mine.

Instincts as Hume discusses here, as well as talk of the soul, are innate, there are no other intelligible readings of such passages.

https://davidhume.org/texts/e/9

Hume is a naturalist... so what goes for animals, goes for us too, though not always the other way around. If one keeps quotes like these in mind, it may make reading Hume more interesting, given that instincts are always in the background.

we have new perceptions every time we close and then open our eyes. — Manuel

In skepticism regarding the senses, “new” is used once…..

“…. I shut my eyes, and afterwards open them; and find the new perceptions to resemble perfectly those, which formerly struck my senses. This resemblance is observed in a thousand instances, and naturally connects together our ideas of these interrupted perceptions by the strongest relation, and conveys the mind with an easy transition from one to another….”

….and if a new impression resembles perfectly a former impression…..what is new about it?

Despite my sympathy with regarding identity, which undercuts the standard notion of “new perceptions”, it appears that Hume intends us to understand “new” to merely indicate the difference in existential quality of the impression alone, a contingent condition of the mind, rather than existential quality of that by which the mind is impressed, which is a necessary condition of the object causing the impression.

If the “strongest relation” is constant conjunction, then the connecting of ideas can still occur without the input from interrupted impressions, which explains how it is we don’t forget what we’re looking at during those interruptions. Apparently, imagination is that by which our ideas continue to be naturally connected to each other absent the impressions to which they would belong if our impressions were uninterrupted. In modern parlance, perhaps we might say, the mind “rolls over” from one impression to the next?

Now…..how do we describe this operation, when the interruption lasts for a week? And in an extreme case, how does this strongest relation “constant conjunction” work for a single impression, e.g., a visually discernible passing comet, or, the death of a particularly important person, in such case as the mind has nothing to which to “roll over”? Imagination must then supply its own ideas, and connect them to each other. But if “impressions are the cause of our ideas, not our ideas that cause impressions”, for any singular impression for which constant conjunction of its ideas doesn’t work with congruent certainty as with repetitive impressions, imagination may very well supply its ideas with respect to that singular impression, which may not belong to it.

There was subsequently a metaphysical theory perfectly describing how this works, but what would Hume say about it? I suspect he would have rejected it, insofar as having already granted imagination extraordinary power, he would have insisted that power cannot merely be the ground of the greater one the new theory prescribes, especially seeing as how he’s already denied its validity.

You know…..consign it to the flames kinda thing.

it appears that Hume intends us to understand “new” to merely indicate the difference in existential quality of the impression alone, a contingent condition of the mind, rather than existential quality of that by which the mind is impressed, which is a necessary condition of the object causing the impression. — Mww

Is that so clear to you? How can you tell what is contingent from what is necessary? For instance, Hume points out that:

"When we press one eye with a finger, we immediately perceive all the objects to become
double, and one half of them to be remov’d from their common and natural position. But as we do not attribute a continu’d existence to both these perceptions, and as they are both of the same nature, we clearly perceive, that all our perceptions are dependent on our organs, and the’ disposition of our nerves and animal spirits." (This chapter)

Some animals see way more colors than we can, are we also to say that these animals are in a better necessary condition to perceive objects in the environment than we are? Or is this fact of perception contingent on the nervous systems they have?

So, this distinction is a bit blurry to me, not that it doesn't exist.

If the “strongest relation” is constant conjunction, then the connecting of ideas can still occur without the input from interrupted impressions, which explains how it is we don’t forget what we’re looking at during those interruptions. Apparently, imagination is that by which our ideas continue to be naturally connected to each other absent the impressions to which they would belong if our impressions were uninterrupted. In modern parlance, perhaps we might say, the mind “rolls over” from one impression to the next? — Mww

Sure. I agree, in principle it works this way. In practice, we need the proper stimulation to "awaken" the ideas we have in us.

That is one aspect of the imagination for Hume, but he also stresses "instinct and natural impulse."

I do think he does do us a favor in highlighting the role of the imagination in general, we may disagree with his exposition, but it is a quite pervasive theme in his philosophy, not explored in similar length or depth in other figures.

Kant did talk about it, but gave it a lesser role than Hume did, if I recall correctly: which is totally fair.

for any singular impression for which constant conjunction of its ideas doesn’t work with congruent certainty as with repetitive impressions, imagination may very well supply its ideas with respect to that singular impression, which may not belong to it. — Mww

Yes, and this may be putting too much power in the imagination. As I've said a few times, I'm not an empiricist, I agree with Cudworth, Descartes and Kant about the nature of perception, differences aside, which they indeed do have: they gave the proper role to the mind, which Hume supposed to be "an empty theater", which cannot be sustained anymore - maybe not even back then.

There was subsequently a metaphysical theory perfectly describing how this works, but what would Hume say about it? I suspect he would have rejected it, insofar as having already granted imagination extraordinary power, he would have insisted that power cannot merely be the ground of the greater one the new theory prescribes, especially seeing as how he’s already denied its validity.

You know…..consign it to the flames kinda thing. — Mww

One need not go to Kant: there was a prior metaphysical account, before Hume, considered to be "the most extensive treatment of innatism by any seventeenth-century philosopher", Cudworth. (From the SEP) The same essential idea is to be found here.

There is some evidence he knew of his ethics. Locke did know his work, but he rejected the reasoning.

In a similar vein, Hume would likely send Kant's theories to the flames too had he been able to read them somehow.

But then we must throw Hume's own theory to the flames for several reasons: his discussion of the self is not the best, him saying that ideas can sometimes replace impressions cast doubt upon his formulation.

Also, by far, and most importantly, is his own example, in the Enquiry, of the "missing shade of blue", which destroys his own theory. It is quite remarkable that he can so acutely point to such an example and proceed as if it merited no more attention.

If the “strongest relation” is constant conjunction, then the connecting of ideas can still occur without the input from interrupted impressions, which explains how it is we don’t forget what we’re looking at during those interruptions. Apparently, imagination is that by which our ideas continue to be naturally connected to each other absent the impressions to which they would belong if our impressions were uninterrupted. In modern parlance, perhaps we might say, the mind “rolls over” from one impression to the next? — Mww

I've given it considerable thought, and I just cannot understand Hume's description of perception as a succession of individual perceptions, related to each other through resemblance. This seems to be completely inconsistent with my experience.

If I take an experience of sitting and paying attention to my senses, I have the experience of a continuous act of perception. That a large part of what I am perceiving with my vision is remaining the same, as time passes, indicates to me that this is one continuous act of perception. Yet I know that it is extended temporally because my perception does not remain the same, perfectly. The sense of sound especially, provides me with many changes which are not evident in my visual field. There are sudden sounds for example, a bird, a dog, or continuous changing sounds, like a car passing or other machinery operating. These aspects of change which coexist with my continuous visual perception of many things remaining the same, vary greatly in the way that they punctuate the continuous perception. The sound of a gun shot for example, is sudden and quickly disappears, but in the visual field, the sun moving across the sky is slow and persistent, requiring a willful reference to memory to be noticed. In none of this, do I experience a succession of distinct perceptions which are related by resemblance, as is required to be consistent with Hume's description.

So I think that Hume manufactures this description, by throwing in artificial interruptions. By hypothesizing a succession of interruptions, Hume creates the illusion of a succession of distinct perceptions. But it's not really a succession of distinct perceptions, it is the continuous act of perception with numerous interruptions. Or, it might be a number of distinct acts of perception, each being a continuous act, but for a limited duration of time.

And if I look at the act of the conscious mind, as willful, intentional thinking, I do not find that this is consistent with Hume's description of a resemblance relation either. The progression of thoughts is not related by some form of resemblance, rather the thoughts are related by principles of conception, or other associations, and habits produced over time, and by training. There does appear to be what can be referred to as distinct thoughts, probably due to the use of distinct words which are like united bundles of meaning, but they are not related to each other in the way that Hume says perceptions and impressions are related to each other.

Even if I look for something that fits in between my act of paying attention to my senses, and my willful thinking, something like dreaming, where my mind appears to run free without influence from the senses or conscious intention, I do not find what Hume describes. I find that I might describe this as a succession of distinct impressions, but I do not find that the impressions are related by resemblance. In fact I see it very hard to see how the distinct impressions of a dream are even related to one another because it is not consistent with my conscious habits of association and training. It appears like there's a large aspect of randomness in my dreaming.

So I find that Hume's description of perception is not at all consistent with my experience. He doesn't properly consider the continuous act of sensing and proposes interruptions to break this act it up into distinct perceptions. But this is only done to make perception consistent with thought, which seems to employ distinct objects. Then he tries to manufacture continuity out of these distinct objects, through a resemblance relation, and this cannot provide him with continuity as we know it, in its basic, intuitive form, as derived from continuous perception. So he insists that this manufactured continuity is erroneous, a falsehood. And yes, it is a falsity, but only because it does not adequately recreate the continuity which continuous perception gives us, it is a synthesized continuity. Therefore he does not disprove continuity, as an erroneous idea, like he claims, he just proves that this synthesized continuity, which he has manufactured from interrupted perception, is not an adequate representation of the true continuity of perception.

Is that so clear to you? — Manuel

I think, sure. Add nails to a bucket; wait a few minutes, add some more. As far as the bucket is concerned, the second batch is a bunch of new nails. Still nails, but new compared to the original nails. Also, however full the bucket is, is contingent on how many batches of nails get put in it.
———-

Some animals see way more colors than we can (….) Or is this fact of perception contingent on the nervous systems they have? — Manuel

Yep. Each kind of animal’s nervous system is necessary for whatever that kind of animal perceives, but each animal’s perception is contingent on the system it has. It’s like….an object is an effect on our sense organs, while our sensory organs are affected by that object. Outward mind to object we have the necessity of being affected; inward from object to mind we have contingency of effective objects.

“….When we press one eye with a finger, we immediately perceive all the objects to become
double….”

True story: when I was 12, I was in the basketball line-up, listening to the coach. Somehow I got absolutely fascinated by rapidly forcing my ears to open/close as fast as I could move my fingers, such that the coach’s voice was an on/off of sound, in which I heard only bits and pieces of words. It was soooo comical in its oddity; I wasn’t LOL, but I was obviously not paying attention. I got thrown off the team.

So we all receive impressions into our minds, contingent on the effect the object naturally has. In addition, now is included the falsified machinations of their respective deliveries. Our mind’s workings don’t change; the input to it, does. Tantamount to….falsified deliveries may indeed be exceptions to a rule, therefore can be deemed a form of contingency, but still not saying much about what the treatment of the deliveries by the rule is, hence the necessity that any and all deliveries are treated by the same rule, remains constant.

But Hume and I both were conditioned by something that never actually happened in the world beyond ourselves. For him, there were not two objects to look at, and for me there was not broken speech and the coach certainly wasn’t saying anything comical. These were treatments by minds, according to a rule, by which something follows necessarily as an experience. In what form the necessary experience manifests, is contingent on the treatment the mind endows to the impression.
————-

Kant did talk about it, but gave it a lesser role than Hume did… — Manuel

I’m not sure what Hume did with imagination itself other than stipulate its overall usefulness, but Kant split imagination itself into two separate and distinct forms, pursuant to the domain within the cognitive system. He gave us the reproductive imagination with respect to empirical phenomena, and productive imagination with respect to conceptions that arise absent phenomena. For whatever that’s worth, which isn’t much, insofar as the concern here is with Hume.
————

…..imagination may very well supply its ideas with respect to that singular impression, which may not belong to it.
— Mww

Yes, and this may be putting too much power in the imagination. — Manuel

Imagination has no self-control, else it wouldn’t be imagination proper. If Kant gave more overall usefulness to an aspect of the system than Hume, it would be judgement, which became theorized as imagination’s governor. Then of course, judgement needs a governor, for which we shall designate the faculty of reason, but that only works in a tripartite logical system, so….futuristic indeed, for Hume.
————-

In the Enquiry, of the "missing shade of blue", which destroys his own theory — Manuel

It’s also presented in T. H. N. 1.,1.,1., towards the close of the section, but I didn’t bring it up due to the stipulation carried by the thread title.

If one just grants the mind will supply the missing shade, he can move on to other things about the mind. If one stops to wonder under what authority the mind provides it, then moving on without the required explanation jeopardizes the validity of all that follows. Back in 1738, the mind supplying the color was good enough, so…..onward and upward he went.

I've given it considerable thought, and I just cannot understand Hume's description of perception as a succession of individual perceptions, related to each other through resemblance. — Metaphysician Undercover

It’s easy enough to understand, just not easy to accept. Superficially, his account works well enough; it does seem like the dog we see here and now is just like the dog we saw yesterday. Oversimplification, I know, but still a place to start.

He doesn't properly consider the continuous act of sensing and proposes interruptions to break this act it up into distinct perceptions. (…) this is only done to make perception consistent with thought — Metaphysician Undercover

Maybe that’s exactly the key. If Hume understood it is only possible in humans to have one thought at a time, and asserting the mind to be the container of thoughts, Hume very well could have figured the mind can only do one thing at a time, which must include receiving impressions one at a time, otherwise he suffers self-contradiction. Even though this is logically consistent given the set of premises Hume worked with, it subsequently became obvious the premises were not as sufficiently explanatory as they need to be.

Beginning with the notion that the mind itself doesn’t explain anything that doesn’t depend on that which is supposed to be the constituents of it, or, if not constituency, than at least working in conjunction with it, it becomes clearer that whatever the constituency happens to be, it is that which is doing all the work, and it would behoove the philosopher to start his speculations by naming those and qualifying on their respective function.

It only took less than half a century for that shift to come about, met with almost as many objections as Hume himself caused with his philosophy. Metaphysics is indeed risky business.

I think that the imagination is a topic which deserves more discussion- it is a very curious fact of human beings, true that Hume kind of posits it as a very broad faculty, but his highlighting of it has merits. As for the stipulations of the OP, I’m still learning, it’s only my 2nd reading group thread. I suppose I’ll modify the next one to make it less strict. As for the necessary/contigent distinction, it’s interesting but likely derserves its own thread. Yep, if one can supplement one missing shade of blue, we can get two, and red, yellow and sounds and smells and on an on till we have almost nothing left except what the mind postulates. I think there has to be a minimum of stimulation, but probably not much.

It’s easy enough to understand, just not easy to accept. Superficially, his account works well enough; it does seem like the dog we see here and now is just like the dog we saw yesterday. Oversimplification, I know, but still a place to start. — Mww

The problem though is that the dog is not the complete perception. The dog is only a part of the perception, so it is not very accurate to say that each time a dog is seen, that this is a perception of a dog. That's not what perception is like, it always consists of many aspects, so that the dog is only a part. Perception always has many facets.

Maybe that’s exactly the key. If Hume understood it is only possible in humans to have one thought at a time, and asserting the mind to be the container of thoughts, Hume very well could have figured the mind can only do one thing at a time, which must include receiving impressions one at a time, otherwise he suffers self-contradiction. Even though this is logically consistent given the set of premises Hume worked with, it subsequently became obvious the premises were not as sufficiently explanatory as they need to be. — Mww

Right, because if this was Hume's premise it would be very inaccurate. The reality is that we can perceive with all of the senses at the same time. So a person might be looking at something, while hearing something else, and also touching, tasting, and smelling all at the same time. And even with one sense, such as sight for example, there are many different things being sensed at the same time. How would Hume describe this type of perception?

Incidentally, we often think of observation as watching with the eyes, but it's interesting to note the importance of hearing in ontology. Vision often gives us an image with the majority of the aspects within that image, appearing quite static, staying the same as time passes. But hearing only gives us the effects of a change. Something changing is what causes a noise.

The Pythagoreans understood sound as a vibration, and had developed some theories about the division of the octave, and basic musical principles. As I understand it, they hypothesized that if there was a sound which was constant and unchanging, it would not be heard. And this formed the basis of their cosmology. They posited a background vibration in an aether that permeates the entire cosmos, the vibration being continuous and consistent, so that it could not be sensed with the eyes. Then all the heavenly bodies in their orbs, are supposed to be variations to the background vibration, making them visible.

imagination is a topic which deserves more discussion- it is a very curious fact of human beings — Manuel

Cool as hell, ain’t it? One of several of those abstract conceptions talked about all the time, a veritable plethora of theories fall apart without them, while there being no such thing.

Minimum stimulation…certainly. Deer, for instance, if they don’t move, you can look right where one is and probably not see it as such.
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it does seem like the dog we see here and now is just like the dog we saw yesterday.
— Mww

The problem though is that the dog is not the complete perception. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah, but you’re over-generalizing. Doesn’t matter what the complete perception is, when the judgement of congruency in successive cognitions of a single object, re: “the dog”, requires only the appearance of that object.

Of course we can view a general scene, not picking out any particular object, but picking out particular objects is Hume’s philosophical implication. The mind wouldn’t have an interest in a general scene, or an expanded perception when cognizant of a certain thing.

The reality is that we can perceive with all of the senses at the same time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Sure, no doubt. Maybe the best reason to remove Hume’s notion of perception having to do with the mind, and place it only in that which has to do with sensation. Then, while we may receive sensations from any combination of our five physical sensory devices, other faculties decide which are to become our cognitions.

Something changing is what causes a noise. — Metaphysician Undercover

True, but this works for sight as well. Technically, the irreducible principle is…the intelligibility of any cause is the change of which is its consequence.

By the way, pal, we will have to iron out our differences concerning new perceptions, my reply was made on my phone, which limits how much I can write without making it look like a wall of text.

But since you rely on Kant, as a good Kantian should, I may create a thread about the topic, or if it happens to arise in some other thread, there we can discuss it without restrictions.

It's an interesting topic.

On to more Hume...