If you want to think sensibly about it, then try to deflate the hysterically overblown figures of speech. Hume never said any such thing, his prose was really rather quotidian.

There's a subtle but profound point at the basis of this. It is Hume's observation that certitude is only possible with respect to propositions that are true by definition. When I studied Hume at university the tired textbook example was always that a bachelor is an unmarried man, by definition. Therefore if you claimed that this particular bachelor was unmarried, you had zero chance of being mistaken. The tired textbook example of an inductive claim was that all swans are white, which is derived not from logic but from the observation of swans. And of course this was completely deflated when Western Australia, the famous abode of the Black Swan, was discovered. So if you want to engage in such excited hyperbole, first of all come to terms with the quotidian arguments around which these debates revolve. At the moment, you sound as if you've been inhaling nitrous oxide.

I had the idea that complex numbers were required for the rather inelegant mathematical technique of 'renormalisation' which is required lest the predictions of quantum physics yield unexpected infinities.

you sound as if you've been inhaling nitrous oxide. — Wayfarer

:rofl: I wish...haven't laughed in a while except yesterday when watching They do it with mirrors (Ms. Marple), a TV adapatation of an Agatha Christie murder mystery novel. There's this part where Chief Inspector Slack has a conversation with Dr. Maverick (vide infra).

Dr. Maverick (deadpan): In their subconscious every male wants to kill his father and marry with his mother (a reference to Freud's Oedipus Complex)

Chief Inspector Slack (mortified): I beg your pardon! :lol:

'Oedipus, schmedipus, what do I care, so long as he loves his mother!' - a line, I think from a musical, my mother used to repeat often. (Another was 'my son, the doctor, is drowning!!')

Anyway, where were we......

Chaoskampf. The thirst for order; the alternative is insanity.

Well spotted. The application of complex numbers in physics came later and I have to admit that does look a bit 'magical', contra myself...

What if the effect of cause is unpredictable? Can we still call it a cause? Or the effect the effect? I think for cause and effect to exist, there has to be a logical relation between them. Can events happen in the first place if no causal relations exist? In German, cause is called "Ursache". The "primordial case". The prime mover. Is cause the logical necessity of effect? How is motion involved? Are objects moving in space cause and effect. Will reversing their motion cause effect to become cause? Is the drinking contaminated water the cause of death, or the contamination?

- "Doesn't that depend on your interpretation of QM?" I don't know. I am not sure how to answer that. What do you think?

What if the effect of cause is unpredictable? Can we still call it a cause? Or the effect the effect? I think for cause and effect to exist, there has to be a logical relation between them. — Haglund

Good observation, but the whole question of whether such relations can be described as 'logical' is what is at issue in this thread.

Did I mention the following?

1. Mill's 5 Methods

1. Method of agreement

A, B, C correlates with X, Y, Z
A, E F correlates with X, Q, R

X $\to$ A

Thus,

A is a necessary cause/effect of X

2. Method of difference

A, B, C correlates with X, Y, Z
B, C correlates with Y, Z

~X $\to$ ~A

Ergo,

A is a sufficient cause/effect of X

3. Joint method of agreement & difference

A, B, C correlates with X, Y, Z
A, E, F correlates with X, Q, R
B, C correlates with Y, Z

X $\to$ A

~X $\to$ ~A

So,

A is the cause of X

4. Method of concomitant variation

As A increases/decreases X increases/decreases (direct variation)
As A increases/decreases X decreases/increases (inverse variation)

Hence,

A is the cause of X

5. Method of residue

A, B, C correlates with X, Y, Z
B is a cause of Y
C is a cause of Z

Therefore,

A is the cause of X

2. T is the cause of U

IFF

1. T is correlated with U
2. There is no V such that V causes both T and U (rule out third-party causation; use one's background knowledge)
3. U is not the cause of T (rule out reverse causation; the cause must precede the effect)
4. The correlation between T and U is not coincidental (persists over time; background knowledege will come in handy; mechanism of causation identified)

I'm interested in the fact that Kant acknowledges 'pure physics'. — Wayfarer

He does? I don’t recall. Doesn’t seem quite right.

So I understand the idea of 'pure maths' but I'm finding the idea of 'pure physics' pretty hard to get my head around..... — Wayfarer

“Pure” physics as a self-contained science is a misnomer, I think, at least without reference to a specific text. Math is pure only insofar as reason itself constructs the objects of it, whereas physics has its objects already constructed in and by Nature. Mathematics is entirely pure in its constructs and the relations between them, because the human intellect is responsible for the inception of both, whereas physics is only partially pure, insofar as while the objects of physics are already given in and by Nature, it is only with respect to the relations between them and between them and us that reason constructs its principles. Apparently, nowadays, these different forms of constructs are termed prescriptive regarding mathematics, and descriptive regarding the physical sciences. Altogether superfluous if asked of me.....but it wasn’t, so.....

.....as it seems to me physics is always a combination of the analytic with the experiential. — Wayfarer

Yep. Just like that. Except synthetic rather than analytic, for a couple reasons. Maybe, depending on how you intend the meaning of the word. First, because you’ve admitted to pursuing the Prolegomena, you’ve found that “analytic” in Kant is not the analytic of common usage, and second, because the context herein is Kantian, “analytic” should be left to pure logic, the truths of which are deductively certain, while the truths of anything empirically grounded, such as all physical sciences, is merely inductively certain, re: fn 6. Properly speaking, then, again with respect to Kant alone, physics is a combination of the synthetic a priori (legislative principles given from reason), with the experiential (objects given from observations to which the principles apply).

So...agreed. Pure physics is unintelligible, ain’t no such thing.

When "necessity" is understood in the sense of required, needed, necessary for, then logical necessity and the necessity of causation are the same type of "necessity". The purpose which validates the requirement, is understanding. Why is it necessary that we accept valid logic as valid? For the purpose of understanding. Why is it necessary that we associate a cause with an effect? For the purpose of understanding. The two senses of "necessity" are the same in the sense of what is needed for understanding.

It's only when we propose a sense of "necessity" which is supposed to be independent from the wants and needs of the human beings, that we find a different form of "necessity". This is the sense of "necessity" which is supposed to support the philosophical position of "determinism". Philosophically, it is important to note that this form of "necessity" is not well supported by evidence, as indicated by Hume and others. It's basically just an assumption or assertion which people make for one purpose or another, which has no justification.

This form of "necessity" is a tool which we use for the application of theories, making the theories work for us. But we need to understand that it is completely unsupported, and is only a useful assumption supporting our mundane activities. In times past, this form of "necessity" was supported by "the Will of God". The consistency of God's Will supports the continued truth to inductive conclusions that form the laws of physics. The best example is probably Newton's first law. That a body in motion will persist in its motion in a continuous way, unless being acted on by a force, is a "necessity" which we take for granted in an atheist society. But Newton was religious and said that his first law of motion required the Will of God, to ensure its truth.

What's evident is a difference between the atheist way, and the theist way of understanding causation. The theist way requires that any form of consistency, or temporal continuity of sameness, requires a cause. The cause of this continuity of existence is God. And without God there would be absolute unintelligible randomness from one moment to the next in time, even the idea of one moment to the next would be nonsensical. Absolutely everything would be scattered randomness.

The atheist way takes the fundamental consistency describable by laws like Newton's first law of motion, for granted, i.e. not requiring a cause. This fundamental assumption produces the necessity of determinism, by denying the basic level of causation represented by the Will of God. Then nothing is required to establish consistency in the universe, that consistency simply "is", and it is taken for granted. Therefore the fundamental consistency itself, is understood as "necessary", rather than as caused by the Will of God. Instead of saying that God is necessary, as "required for" the fundamental consistency, we simply say that the fundamental consistency is "necessary". From here, the first level of causation is the cause which is required to change the basic consistency, continuity of existence, which is taken for granted as "necessary" rather than as caused by God. Then the primary form of causation, is the force that changes the inertia of continued existence. But this force must be derived from some other inertial activity, and we get trapped in the circular logic of determinism.

recently posted a thread on Stack Exchange on the relation between physical and logical causation. — Wayfarer

Causation is basically explanation, so in drawing a distinction between "physical" and "logical" causes, are you asking if we're bound to rely on logic for our explanations?

Are you asking if logic is innate?

So a world is always a construction. — frank

Yes. “World” is an object in general, comprised of and representing a multiplicity of other objects subsumed under it. All objects in general are objects of reason therefore constructed a priori by it in accordance with rules, which.....for better or worse....it also constructs. Perils of the game, donchaknow.

All that subsumed under such general conception, on the other hand, the constituency of it, as given members of a world, which must necessarily exist of their own accord, that is to say, by means other than reason, and by which we are presented with the material of our empirical cognitions, is not a human construction.

As might concur, the objects as such in a world we can either think or experience, but a world as such we can only think.

What if the effect of cause is unpredictable? Can we still call it a cause? Or the effect the effect? I think for cause and effect to exist, there has to be a logical relation between them. — Haglund

Good observation, but the whole question of whether such relations can be described as 'logical' is what is at issue in this thread. — Wayfarer

In asserting that an effect is unpredictable given some cause, are we talking about causation or our knowledge of some causal event? "Random" events only seem random when you don't have all the information about the causes that preceded some effect.

If you are out to describe some causal relation as logical or not I guess you'd need to define "logical" and "causal" as a starting point.

In describing something are you not engaged in both a causal and logical process? The description would be a causal relation with what it is that you are describing and a logical use of language in that you are using words to refer to something that is not necessarily another use of words, or even that the rules of some language cause you to use them in a particular way (the effect), just as your beliefs/knowledge cause you to behave in certain ways (If A then B).

Yes. “World” is an object in general, comprised of and representing a multiplicity of other objects subsumed under it. All objects in general are objects of reason therefore constructed a priori by it in accordance with rules, which.....for better or worse....it also constructs. — Mww

How is Kant not doing the thing he says can't be done?

He's saying there is no mind independent world. There can't be because worlds are always constructions of mind. But what's the setting for this mind that constructs worlds? It's not a world?

Also, would Kant say that when we talk about mind-independence in science, we're talking about non-human causation?

Good observation, but the whole question of whether such relations can be described as 'logical' is what is at issue in this thread. — Wayfarer

If two natural events always turn up together they have a causal relation or a common cause. So if A and B always, either A causes B (in the case of temporal separation) or C causes A and B (if A and B spatially separated). If someone drinks water from a well, and the effect is always that that someone dies, the drinking of the water can be said to be the cause, though a direct cause of death is difficult to establish exactly.

Causal forks can explain correlations between spatially separated events. Like the entangled electron spins.

How is Kant not doing the thing he says can't be done? — frank

I’m not sure I understand the question. What have I said he’s done, that he himself said couldn't be done?

But what's the setting for this mind that constructs worlds? — frank

In a word, the setting is “transcendental logic”, a condition of human reason, albeit quite speculative, needless to say, hence not mind-independent. The mind....or more properly, reason....doesn’t construct worlds; it constructs a world to which all empirical objects are thought to belong.

“....we form to ourselves, by anticipation**, the idea of a science of pure understanding and rational cognition, by means of which we may cogitate objects entirely a priori. A science of this kind, which should determine the origin, the extent, and the objective validity of such cognitions, must be called transcendental logic, because it (...) concerns itself with these only in an a priori relation to objects....”

(The parenthetical denotes an exposition of what transcendental logic can’t do, when we want to know what it can. It can explain how the thought of a world as transcendental object of pure reason is possible, and why it is fitting that we should thereby confine our understanding to it.)

**Anticipation herein reflects the proclivity of pure reason to seek the unconditioned, in this case, to seek the limit for that which contains all empirical objects, just because it’s something we might want to know. Pure understanding (the categories) and rational cognition (synthetic a priori judgements) inform us such a limit can be represented, and transcendental logic informs of the conception (which schema of which category) by which the limit is represented...... “world”. Unconditioned, in its turn, meaning that outside the objectively valid.....not objectively real, mind you.....conception of “world”, there can be thought no objects whatsoever. Or, put another way, it is impossible for “world” to be subsumed under something else, just as it is absolutely necessary for all empirical objects to be subsumed under it.
————

would Kant say that when we talk about mind-independence in science, we're talking about non-human causation? — frank

Damned if I know. Talking about mind-independence in science? Not sure what that means. Isn’t all causation non-human? What does a human cause, just by being a human? I suppose a human causes a certain quantity of space and a certain duration of time to be occupied. Dunno. Help me out?

Nobody said this stuff was easy, which gives the inevitable....why even bother. Maybe it’s just fun to think about, even if it won’t pay the bills or get you laid.

I’m not sure I understand the question. What have I said he’s done, that he himself said couldn't be done? — Mww

Wouldn't he say it's wrong to think in terms of a noumenal world? Since a world is a construction of the mind?

But if so, where is the mind? Within its own contructed world (I don't think that makes sense) ? Or outside it in the noumenal realm?

Talking about mind-independence in science? Not sure what that means. Isn’t all causation non-human? — Mww

I should have said supernatural causes. Science is about natural causes. Human causes, or acts of will would be distinct from natural causes. That's built I to the meaning of "natural" right?

If two natural events always turn up together they have a causal relation or a common cause. — Haglund

That is precisely the assumption that David Hume calls into question in his 'Treatise on the Human Understanding'. He argues that even though we observe causal relations, there is no epistemological basis for concluding they're connected over and above observation of repeated occurences. In other words, there's no logical reason why someone drinking from said well may not suffer any consequences even though previously others have. There's more to it than meets the eye.

“Pure” physics as a self-contained science is a misnomer, I think, at least without reference to a specific text. — Mww

Well, there is at least one:

But it happens fortunately, that though we cannot assume metaphysics to be an actual science, we can say with confidence that certain pure a priori synthetical cognitions, pure Mathematics and pure Physics are actual and given; for both contain propositions, which are thoroughly recognized as apodictically certain, partly by mere reason, partly by general consent arising from experience, and yet as independent of experience. We have therefore some at least uncontested synthetical knowledge a priori, and need not ask whether it be possible, for it is actual, but how it is possible, in order that we may deduce from the principle which makes the given cognitions possible the possibility of all the rest.. — Prolegomena, Section 4

Are you asking if logic is innate? — frank

The question is about the connection between logical necessity and physical causation. It's trickier than it looks!

As ↪Wayfarer might concur, the objects as such in a world we can either think or experience, but a world as such we can only think. — Mww

:up:

'World' - Origin

Old English w(e)oruld, from a Germanic compound meaning ‘age of man’; related to Dutch wereld and German Welt.

The question is about the connection between logical necessity and physical causation. It's trickier than it looks! — Wayfarer

Understanding your question is tricky. Causation is explanation. It's the answer to "why?"

Necessity is modality. It's the answer to "could it have been otherwise?“

Where do you see the connection?

In other words, there's no logical reason why someone drinking from said well may not suffer any consequences even though previously others have. There's more to it than meets the eye. — Wayfarer

I depends on the logic used. If your logic is that if two events A and B appear in conjunction every time they show themselves then they have or a common cause (if the events are spatially separated) or ,(if temporally separated) they are a connected cause and effect, then the logic dictates a causal connection.

Wouldn't he say it's wrong to think in terms of a noumenal world? — frank

Oh. That. Ya know....folks just need to get over this noumenal stuff. To a human, and as far as anything whatsoever concerning human intelligence, they have no standing whatsoever. No human can even THINK a particular noumenal object, much less perceive one, and if neither of those are possible, they do not even enter the cognitive system. They are merely a logical distinction a separation, and the text that describes the notion of them, is very brief, indicating Kant didn’t intent the should ever be included in his philosophy.

But, being Kant, he leaves room for his readers to make something out of it. If you like, I can post the pertinent discourse. Specifically, he says they are not impossible, but doesn’t say they are possible. So to answer...yes, it’s wrong to think in terms of a noumenal world.
————-

Human causes, or acts of will would be distinct from natural causes. — frank

Oh. Yes, acts of will. A definite human causality. My oversight. I’ve been stuck on empiricism the last few pages, so talking about mind-independence in science threw me a curve-ball. Sorry.

Yes, acts of will are distinct from natural causes. Another Kantian logical separation. Another search for the unconditioned. The transcendental conception covering causality by humans is “freedom”, and only applies in moral doctrines, determined by pure practical reason, as opposed to pure speculative or theoretical reason, which covers the empirical doctrines.

One good thing....that book has a whole lot fewer words. Which is kinda odd, in that Kant attributes to pure practical reason, and hence moral philosophy, much more importance that the speculative.

Oh. That. Ya know....folks just need to get over this noumenal stuff. — Mww

Ok. So the mind is phenomenal. It's a product of itself.

Why not?

Ahhhh.... thanks. I might be inclined to say the pure part of physics, rather than pure physics, but that might be taking unwarranted liberties with The Esteemed Professor’s magnum opus.

So the mind is phenomenal. It's a product of itself. — frank

Ya know...here we go again...I disfavor “mind” as well. Reason says all we need mind to say.

Mind is a convention of speech; reason is what humans do. That makes it easier to say mind is an object of reason. Not much of an improvement, I suppose, but that every human can justify he thinks much simpler that he can justify he has a mind. Everybody says, “I think.....”; nobody says, “my mind thinks....”

A toss-up. There’s no philosophy of reason in university curriculum, and there’s no critique of pure mind in philosophical literature.

But neither mind nor reason are phenomenal, insofar as these are derivatives of perception.

Ya know. — Mww

Kant wanders off into inexplicability.

Ehhhh.....little challenge ain’t nothing to be afraid of.

Ehhhh.....little challenge never hurt anybody. — Mww

I don't think that's true.

HA!!!! That’s why I changed it.

HA!!!! That’s why I changed it. — Mww

:lol: