In even shorter: fast and unstable wins the race. It wins many races, that's for sure. I'm not sure why you're so inclined to frequent a place that holds the opposite in high regard, frankly. Or, perhaps that's exactly why you do.

Thrasymachus returns.

Plato was the tortoise, Thrasymachus the hare:

Who won the race? “Thrasymachus!”, do you dare?

Philosophers (at least in Ancient Greece) wanted two important things with the power of arguments: ethics and happiness.
Nevertheless, the real life that is like a jungle, only wins the argument from the power doesn’t matter if it is empty.

Out in the real world, it's about the argument from power. — baker

Darwinism rules!

Out in the real world, it's about the argument from power. In the real world, the argument from power is always the most powerful one, "criticial thinking" be damned. — baker

The Uber-powerful don't require your critical reasoning when it comes to doing what they tell you to do. It just requires your obedience. But you vs. the top dog isn't the only relationship you have. In many contexts, critical thinking is essential. The top dogs expect their minions to solve problems, and for that you need to think.

Another thing you need to think about critically is what answer the top dog wants. Guess wrong, and it's off with your head.

It's a well-known trope that famous and powerful people never know who truly likes them and cares about them, because there's always an ulterior motive to be flattering and accommodating even for someone who doesn't like or care about them. This is usually portrayed as a problem that these famous and powerful people don't like having to deal with; they'd like to know that they are genuinely liked, not just being lied to by people who are afraid of them or want something from them.

Likewise, even the famous and powerful would like to know that their views are actually right, and they're not just being constantly lied to by yes-men. (Even this is a trope of its own: a powerful person appreciating the uninhibited honestly of someone, after growing tired of never getting anything but vacuous agreement from everyone).

Rational argument is how they can find out whether they really are right, and so is something to be valued even by those who can appeal to other power to otherwise get what they want.

Joe Frazier famously went on record, long after his rivalry with Muhammad Ali ended, and asked "Who really won that fight?"

Out in the real world, it's about the argument from power. — baker


Darwinism rules! — Wayfarer

Although Wayfarer is probably sarcastic, I am not on the opinion that the statement is incorrect. The answer to your question is, that arguments have power, because they are product of the argument in power, as you put it. Dispute and argument sometimes appease the necessity. And sometimes there are other more direct ways to deal with certain contexts that employ order automatically, even if it isn't of the antropocentric mental kind. Sometimes, there are simply more effective ways to debate then to talk, and more effective ways to argue, then to explain. But conversant eloquence and sophisticated sense of resolution through human reason has some place. If I am not misreading Wayfarer's previous remarks on this forum, they would similarly interpret the existence of reason as being sourced at the ultimate power of nature as well.

Insightful. Our modern age, which is apparently so rooted in reason, actually bows to irrationalism by making evolutionary biology something which it is not, namely, a philosophy. But of course, mere philosophers are no match for the powerful cultural forces which tacitly insist that power will always prevail.

In traditional theology and metaphysics, the natural was largely conceived as the evil, and the spiritual or supernatural as the good. In popular Darwinism, the good is the well-adapted, and the value of that to which the organism adapts itself is unquestioned or is measured only in terms of further adaptation. However, being well adapted to one’s surroundings is tantamount to being capable of coping successfully with them, of mastering the forces that beset one. Thus the theoretical denial of the spirit’s antagonism to nature – even as implied in the doctrine of interrelation between the various forms of organic life, including man – frequently amounts in practice to subscribing to the principle of man’s continuous and thoroughgoing domination of nature. Regarding reason as a natural organ does not divest it of the trend to domination or invest it with greater potentialities for reconciliation. On the contrary, the abdication of the spirit in popular Darwinism entails the rejection of any elements of the mind that transcend the function of adaptation and consequently are not instruments of self-preservation. Reason disavows its own primacy and professes to be a mere servant of natural selection. On the surface, this new empirical reason seems more humble toward nature than the reason of the metaphysical tradition. Actually, however, it is arrogant, practical mind riding roughshod over the ‘useless spiritual,’ and dismissing any view of nature in which the latter is taken to be more than a stimulus to human activity. The effects of this view are not confined to modern philosophy. — Max Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason

I agree with much, but probably not the conclusion. I agree that sometimes evolutionary biology is wrongly ascribed as resolution of philosophy, ethics, or something else of that nature. Nonetheless, even as pure empiricism, stating the obvious, i.e. what can be will be, it can be argument for expressing judgement on the utility, plausibility, or feasibility in our ethical and philosophical interrelations. Assuming that we are biological entities, of course, and not substance-dual, it can also emphasize the need for the various collective and personal compromises, i.e. the tradeoffs inherent in our decisions.

As theory of guidance of life through genocidal adversity, I am not sure that evolutionary biology is actually so spiritually abject. It is indeed absent of benevolent antropocentric antropomorphic character, but it still allows people to accept their impulse to seek dignity and decency, even under the belief in dystheistic higher order, and the caustic implications.

I am not sure that evolutionary biology is actually so spiritually abject. It is indeed absent of benevolent antropocentric antropomorphic character, but it still allows people to accept their impulse to seek dignity and decency — simeonz

I wouldn't imbue 'it' (evolutionary biology) with agency in this way. Culture and society allow people to accept their impulse to seek dignity and decency.

Culture and society allow people to accept their impulse to seek dignity and decency. — Wayfarer

And to tie this with the OP question: Would you say that philosophers advocate for critical thinking in an effort to seek dignity and decency?

I would say so, yes. But again, 'critical thinking' in the original Platonic context, started with very different background assumptions to critical thinking in the current day and age.

That aside, presumably one of the main motivators for the West's long struggle to arrive at democracy, was the desire to provide individuals with the power of self-determination, rather than being dominated by the powerful. It's a still a very fraught and difficult challenge to maintain, there are many forces conspiring to undermine democracy.

But again, 'critical thinking' in the original Platonic context, started with very different background assumptions to critical thinking in the current day and age. — Wayfarer

Could you sketch out the difference, please?


Obviously, there are several ways to interpret "critical thinking". In the OP, I was referring to critical thinking as it is usually understood in modern secular academic textbooks about the topic (notably, in textbooks about informal logic and informal logical fallacies). But beyond that, people tend to have diverse ideas about what comprises "critical thinking" (e.g. I've seen Bahais argue that if one thinks critically, one will see that Bahaullah is the prophet of God).

Could you sketch out the difference, please? — baker

The background assumptions of Greek were still formed by near universal belief in spirits that animated the world (in Plato's philosophy 'the demiorgos'), notwithstanding the naturalist tendencies that began to appear. Many elements of Greek philosophy became absorbed in Christian theology in the form of Christian Platonism, which in many ways was or is the mainstream of Western philosophy ('philosophy as footnotes to Plato', as Whitehead said).

So critical thinking, in ancient philosophy, aimed to discern formal and final causes, the broadest class of reasons for the existence of particulars, which tended to become subsumed under the heading of theology. It presumed the universal nature of reason as the 'logos' or 'first cause'; Aristotle wishes to 'contemplate the first principles' in the Nichomachean Ethics. Modern thinking, reacting against religion, is generally dismissive of that kind of vision, seeking only to discern what Greek philosophy would categorise as material and efficient causes and the natural principles which give rise to them. Due to the vast proliferation of the special sciences, there's really little hope at arriving at the kind of unitive vision that the ancients aspired to through reason and contemplation. There's simply too much for any one person to know.

The upshot is, that in Western liberalism, individual and social aspirations are the principle focus, no longer grounded in any kind of universal vision per se. Rights are underwritten by the Western notion of human rights, which actually originated with the universal rights presumed by Christianity, but have now been transposed to secular culture where it manifests as political identity etc. Within that milieu, the rights of individuals and minorities is garaunteed by such things as declrations of rights, national constitutions, and so on, although there are many factors seeking to undermine it. Cases of 'might makes right' are clearly discernable in cultures without the human rights background of the West, conspicuously the People's Republic of China, where individual rights are held to be subordinate to the requirements of the State, as well as in other authoritarian and one-party states.

Cases of 'might makes right' are clearly discernable in cultures without the human rights background of the West, conspicuously the People's Republic of China, where individual rights are held to be subordinate to the requirements of the State, as well as in other authoritarian and one-party states. — Wayfarer

Might makes right is the doctrine of modern Western capitalist countries as well, given that the pursuit of justice costs a lost of money. For many people, it is prohibitively expensive.
People can do all kinds of things to you, things that are nominally illegal/criminal. Yet if you don't have the money to pursue them legally, this counts as agreeing with them, condoning those actions done to you.

There is a wide body of literature in the foreign policy and security studies fields that shows that norms (e.g. rule of law, honor culture, etc.) shape and constrain the use of force. Even when there is total state breakdown and no monopoly on force, not every battlefield regresses into the maximum apocalyptic scenes of say, the Liberian Civil War.

Philosophy shapes thoughts, which in turn shapes actions. Might makes right isn't necissarily the case even in warfare. I'd argue it's generally not the case in day to day life. Otherwise, after a lifetime of weight lifting and martial arts practice, I wouldn't wait in lines anymore.

For me the notable divide is that, though I find idealist thought more appealing, even recognizing deep truths in them, I spend 90% of my waking time thinking and acting in terms of substance. I'm a very failed Platonist.

I like the way you touched upon terms of conflict on the way to measuring a proportion of effective methods versus not particularly helpful Platonic ideas.
One of my favorite parts of the Republic is when Socrates' brother stares down Thrasymachus and assures him that any wager made would be satisfied if he should lose.
Thrasymachus left the room shortly afterwards.

Might makes right isn't necissarily the case even in warfare. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I agree with you, but how do you argue the case against someone who doesn't accept the power of rational persuasion? Which is why I didn't reply.

but how do you argue the case against someone who doesn't accept the power of rational persuasion?

Spinning roundhouse kicks? :chin:

I dropped karate a long, long time ago.....

There is a wide body of literature in the foreign policy and security studies fields that shows that norms (e.g. rule of law, honor culture, etc.) shape and constrain the use of force. Even when there is total state breakdown and no monopoly on force, not every battlefield regresses into the maximum apocalyptic scenes of say, the Liberian Civil War.

Philosophy shapes thoughts, which in turn shapes actions. Might makes right isn't necissarily the case even in warfare. I'd argue it's generally not the case in day to day life. Otherwise, after a lifetime of weight lifting and martial arts practice, I wouldn't wait in lines anymore. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Might isn't limited to brute force. Might is everything that other people can use as leverage against you, and that can be anything from brute force to blackmail.

I agree with you, but how do you argue the case against someone who doesn't accept the power of rational persuasion? — Wayfarer

And further, how do you make sense of being the loser/victim/underdog in such a situation?

Gandhi and the Indians used some passive resistence methods of rebelling against the British. And those methods worked: but only because the British were honorable enough to be persuaded by those methods.

In contrast, such a passive resistence proved futile in many other cases, such as for the Native Americans against European colonizers or the Jews against the Nazis.

A massive boulder rolling down a hill on a trajectory to run you over does not accept the power of rational persuasion, and you wouldn't expect it to anyway. But normally, one expects humans to be open to rational persuasion, esp. when they themselves open the communication with you by appealing to rational persuasion.

Making the step from seeing other people as humans (who are open to rational persuasion) to seeing them as no different than massive boulders rolling down a hill on a trajectory to run you over requires some considerable change in one's outlook on life. It's not clear how that change can be made.

One of my favorite parts of the Republic is when Socrates' brother stares down Thrasymachus and assures him that any wager made would be satisfied if he should lose.
Thrasymachus left the room shortly afterwards. — Valentinus

IOW, Socrates' brother appealed to might makes right, and apparently had the wealth and the power to back up his challenge. No surprise there.

Why is this a favorite part of yours of the Republic?

The text does not agree with your impression:

[337D] “Then what if I show you a different answer about justice,” he said, “beyond all these, better than they are? What penalty would you think you deserve to suffer?” “What other penalty,” I said, “than the one it’s fitting for someone who doesn’t have knowledge to suffer? And it’s fitting, no doubt, for him to learn from someone who has knowledge. So I think I too deserve to suffer this penalty.”
“You’re amusing,” he said, “but in addition to learning, pay a penalty in money too.” “Okay, whenever I get any,” I said. “He’s got it,” said Glaucon. “So as far as money’s concerned, Thrasymachus, speak up, since all of us will chip in for Socrates.” [337E] “I imagine you will,” he said, “so Socrates can go on with his usual routine: he won’t answer but when somebody else answers he’ll grab hold of his statement and cross-examine him.” “Most skillful one,” I said, “how could anyone give an answer who in the first place doesn’t know and doesn’t claim to know, and then too, even if he supposes something about these things, would be banned from saying what he believes by no inconsiderable man? So it’s more like it [338A] for you to speak, since you do claim to know and to have something to say. So don’t do anything else but gratify me by answering, and don’t be grudging about teaching Glaucon here as well as the others.” And when I’d said these things, Glaucon and the others kept begging him not to do otherwise. And Thrasymachus was obviously longing to speak in order to be well thought of, believing that he had an answer of overwhelming beauty. But he made a pretense of battling eagerly for me to be the one that [338B] answered. But making an end of this, he gave way, and then said, “This is the wisdom of Socrates; he himself is not willing to teach, but he goes around learning from others and doesn’t even pay them any gratitude.” “In saying that I learn from others,” I said, “you tell the truth, Thrasymachus, but when you claim that I don’t pay for it in full with gratitude, you lie, for I pay all that is in my power. I have the power only to show appreciation, since I don’t have money. And how eagerly I do this, if anyone seems to me to speak well, you’ll know very well right away when [338C] you answer, for I imagine you’ll speak well.” “Then listen,” he said. “I assert that what’s just is nothing other than what’s advantageous to the stronger. So why don’t you show appreciation? But you won’t be willing to.” “First I need to understand what you mean,” I said, “since now I don’t yet know. You claim that what’s advantageous to the stronger is just. Now whatever do you mean by this, Thrasymachus? For I’m sure you’re not saying this sort of thing: that if Polydamas the no-holds-barred wrestler is stronger than we are, and bull’s meat is advantageous to him for his body, this food [338D] would also be advantageous, and at the same time just, for us who are weaker than he is.” — Plato. Republic, translated by Joe Sachs

One thing I like about the passage is that paying a penalty is on the basis of some kind of justice that applies to Thrasymachus and Socrates equally. Otherwise, there would be no reason to honor the debt incurred.

In short:

Officially, in philosophy, it's about the power of the argument.

Out in the real world, it's about the argument from power. In the real world, the argument from power is always the most powerful one, "criticial thinking" be damned.

But philosophers are aware of that, are they not?
So why do they still advocate for criticial thinking? — baker

A loaded gun's muzzle pushed against the temple can be very convincing, so convincing in fact that the owner of the temple may be convinced of faer own nonexistence [pace Descartes].

Likewise, a sound argument has the same power of persuasion that a loaded gun's muzzle pushed against the temple has. One is always, without exception, forced to accept the conclusion of a sound argument.

It seems that either way - whether you're in the presence of a philosopher presenting a good argument or whether you're under duress to believe something - we're being forced on pain of injury, death, or looking like a fool.

. I want you to understand this ...

. No Philosopher has ever been able to know the truth.

. All the philosophers have been thinking about the truth.

. But, thinking about the truth is an impossibility.

. Either you know it, or you don't.

Likewise, a sound argument has the same power of persuasion that a loaded gun's muzzle pushed against the temple has. One is always, without exception, forced to accept the conclusion of a sound argument.

It seems that either way - whether you're in the presence of a philosopher presenting a good argument or whether you're under duress to believe something - we're being forced on pain of injury, death, or looking like a fool. — TheMadFool

Not at all, given that two people can be presented with the same argument, and one feels forced to accept it (because he thinks it's so irresistibly good), and the other one doesn't (because he thinks it's dumb).

IOW, an argument's strength doesn't somehow exist objectively, independently of persons, as an inherent trait of the argument itself. Rather, strength is ascribed to it by people, and different people will ascribe different strengths to it.