Now, I'm no physicalist, But this seems kind of like question begging does it not?

I want my penny up front!

Calculus is more complex than basic arithmetic and if someone were to tell me that they're taking a course in calculus, it goes without saying that they have basic airthmetic under their belt, — TheMadFool

I'd take the other side of both of those propositions.

First, calculus has been artithmetized. That is, we can formalize calculus using only the arithmetic of the natural numbers within set theory.

https://encyclopediaofmath.org/wiki/Arithmetization_of_analysis

So it's true pedagogically that 2 + 2 = 4 is "simpler" than \(\displaystyle \lim_{x \to \infty} \frac{1}{x} = 0\), but logically, there's no fundamental difference between them.

Secondly, speaking as someone who's been to beer and pizza with a bunch of math grad students, I can assure you that mathematicians are no better at simple arithmetic than the average non-mathematician.

There's a famous story about Alexander Grothendieck, the greatest mathematician of the second half of the twentieth century. (Hilbert won the first half). He was famous for thinking in extremely abstract terms and not thinking much about down-to-earth cases. Once he proved some theorem about primes and someone asked, Can you give a specific example of a prime? And Grothendieck answered, "You mean like 57?" The joke being that 57 = 3 x 19 is not prime, but he was too abstract a thinker to realize that. 57 is now known ironically as a Grothendieck prime.

I don't see what this has to do with p-zombies particularly, but your premises are easily falsified.

P-zombies are simpler than normal humans for they're missing consciousness. — TheMadFool

Hmmm. More on topic to your point (ignoring the premises that aren't relevant and are false anyway) even this doesn't follow from anything. Am I simpler than an elephant because I'm missing a trunk and tusks? And what of those philosophers who consider consciousness an epiphenomenon, or not even existing (I don't understand that point but some smart people believe it) or is merely an emergent property or whatever? Is a thing with consciousness automatically more complex than a thing without it? By what measure of complexity? I think you have a hard row to hoe to support this thesis.

And I don't see how p-zombies falsify physicalism. We have human-like creatures with consciousness and without. But both are physical. Consciousness is just something extra, like tusks. You haven't shown that consciousness is not physical.

Well, let's look at it from a complexity/simplicity angle. The only example that I can come up with off the top of my hat is mathematical. Calculus is more complex than basic arithmetic and if someone were to tell me that they're taking a course in calculus, it goes without saying that they have basic airthmetic under their belt, assuming of course that this someone isn't pulling my chain and/or isn't insane. In short, a level of complexity implies that a certain level of simplicity has already been achieved.

P-zombies are simpler than normal humans for they're missing consciousness. That should mean that since humans are not only possible but also real, p-zombies should also be possible. — TheMadFool

The question is whether a human can exist in physical exactitude without consciousness, or if consciousness is integral to our physical human existence.

So I don’t think this answers the question. That we have reason to believe a number of less complex physical structures have consciousness suggests to me that p-zombies may not be possible after all.

I’m inclined to view consciousness not as a quantitative level, but in terms of a qualitative or relational complexity. In your analogy, it’s a difference between ‘understanding calculus’ because you understand the symbols, or because you understand the sums.

In humans there is the consciousness of recognizing a problem and recognizing a path to a solution of that problem and proceeding along that path, and then there is self-consciousness. Computer programs may be conscious in the former sense but not in the latter sense. When we are in the flow of activities we may lose the self-perspective and act more like an automaton, although still feeling various sensory inputs. Where is a line of demarcation?

Now, I'm no physicalist, But this seems kind of like question begging does it not — Elliot Fischer

How so? I didn't assume that p-zombies are possible. I simply worked my way to the conclusion that p-zombies are from the fact that if a certain level of complexity is real, it must be that a simpler stage/state along the way has to be possible.

You have raised some pertinent points and the first one to consider is that my mathematical example of arithmetic and calculus
vis-a-vis simplicity/complexity falls short of the mark.

Secondly, coming to the matter of a measure for complexity/simplicity, all I can say is that I'm not saying anything that isn't part of the existing framework of knowledge:

Google definition of "complex": consisting of many different and connected parts..

It must be that, from the "many" in the definition, the more components there are, the more complex something is. Ergo, a human, possessing consciousness in addition to a physical body, must be more complex than a p-zombie which is only physically identical but lacks consciousness. If I have a dollar, I must surely be in possession of cents; after all 1 dollar = 100 cents.

That we have reason to believe a number of less complex physical structures have consciousness suggests to me that p-zombies may not be possible after all. — Possibility

That consciousness is subjective precludes the inference of its existence in others. My argument works within a solipsistic framework.

Kindly go through my reply to fishfry.

Where is a line of demarcation? — jgill

Indeed. The notion of a p-zombie is closely related to computer processing. Computers do respond to external stimuli given they're equipped with the right kind of sensors. This may be taken to be the equivalent of a p-zombie's behavioral repertoire insofar as awareness (consciousness) of the external world is the topic of discussion.

Too, a p-zombie will pass the mirror test just like a normal human being can and does. The assumption that we're working on here is that consciousness can be deduced from behavior. Solipsism, although for very different reasons, says "no".

P-zombies are simpler than normal humans for they're missing consciousness. That should mean that since humans are not only possible but also real, p-zombies should also be possible. — TheMadFool

We do have something simpler than humans that we can probably say doesn't have consciousness - bacteria and viruses - but none of these are humans. So are you saying that newborn infants are p-zombies and we eventually develop compexity through our lives that then becomes consciousness, or what? How does that happen? I really don't get what you are trying to show here.

You said that your argument shows that p-zombies are possible. Well, where are they? Who is a p-zombie - newborn infants?

If p-zombies are like humans in every way except that they dont posses consciousness, then how do p-zombies know that they know anything? What form would knowledge take in p-zombies head?

One simply needs to point to blind-sight patients as evidence that lacking conscious visual experiences has a noticable impact on a human's behavior.

It's said or the argument goes that if p-zombies are possible physicalism is false. — TheMadFool

P-zombies are simpler than normal humans for they're missing consciousness. That should mean that since humans are not only possible but also real, p-zombies should also be possible. — TheMadFool

Google definition of "complex": consisting of many different and connected parts.. — TheMadFool

A physical system is more complex if it has more parts, yes. But the argument you refer to relies on their being some non-physical element to human consciousness such that, if p-zombies existed, they would not have it. This is why Elliot is right when he says:

But this seems kind of like question begging does it not? — Elliot Fischer

I physicalist doesn't believe in a non-physical aspect to consciousness. This leads to three possibilities:

1. p-zombies are possible, but the assertion that human consciousness is non-physical is false: it would just be that p-zombies lack the physical constitution to have consciousness;
2. p-zombies are not possible: to behave like a human, you have to have human consciousness, which is physically based;
3. we are all p-zombies: the consciousness referred to is a magical thing that doesn't exist. Since p-zombies behave like humans, they are humans, therefore humans are p-zombies.

A physical system is more complex if it has more parts, yes. But the argument you refer to relies on their being some non-physical element to human consciousness such that, if p-zombies existed, they would not have it. This is why Elliot is right when he says:

But this seems kind of like question begging does it not?
— Elliot Fischer — Kenosha Kid

I beg to differ. Look at the p-zombie argument:

1. IF physicalism is true THEN p-zombies are impossible.

2. P-zombies are possible

Ergo,

3. Physicalism is false

Argument for premise 2 above:

4. IF a normal human being is not just possible but real THEN p-zombies [being simpler] are possible.

5. A normal human being is not just possible but real

Ergo,

6. P-zombies [being simpler] are possible [premise 2]

Whether consciousness is physical or not, it can't be denied that something simpler has to be possible if a more complex form has been actualized. In other words, I haven't assumed that consciousness is non-physical in the argument for premise 2. No begging the question fallacy has been committed.

IF physicalism is true THEN p-zombies are impossible. — TheMadFool

The definition of a p-zombie is something that behaves exactly as a human but does not have consciousness. But in physicalism consciousness is physical, so a p-zombie is a physical thing similar to, but lacking one physical feature of, a human. If physicalism is true and p-zombies exist, then both p-zombies and humans are physical.

Starting with "physicalism is true", you can't reach the above conclusion unless you assume that humans have a non-physical consciousness, which violates your own preposition that physicalism is true.

Starting with "physicalism is true", you can't reach the above conclusion unless you assume that humans have a non-physical consciousness — Kenosha Kid

Sorry but I remain unconvinced by your objection. Please bear with me. Which is simpler, a brain or a conscious brain? Doesn't matter if it's physical or not (no petitio principii)?

Are p-zombies possible? Is physicalism false? — TheMadFool

No. No (at least, not on this basis).

"P-zombie" is an incoherent construct because it violates Leibniz's Indentity of Indiscernibles without grounds to do so. To wit: an embodied cognition that's physically indiscernible from an ordinary human being cannot not have "phenomenal consciousness" since that is a property of human embodiment (or output of human embodied cognition). A "p-zombie", in other words, is just a five-sided triangle ... — 180 Proof

(Again) I submit myself for correction. :sweat:

3. we are all p-zombies: the consciousness referred to is a magical thing that doesn't exist. Since p-zombies behave like humans, they are humans, therefore humans are p-zombies. — Kenosha Kid

:up:

You're basically claiming p-zombies are impossible and Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles, the second component of his theory of identity, is controversial to say the least.

Don't try to evade the point by fixating on Leibniz, Fool, address my subsequent elaboration re: property-output ... of embodied cognition.

Which is simpler, a brain or a conscious brain? — TheMadFool

Silly. That's like asking which is "simpler": a black & white photograph of X or a color photograph of X? What difference does the 'conscious/not-conscious' distinction make to the brain as such?

Silly. That's like asking which is "simpler": a black & white photograph of X or a color photograph of X? What difference does the 'conscious/not-conscious' distinction make to the brain as such? — 180 Proof

What's silly about it? A black & white photograph is simpler than a color photograph. More parts, more complex. Less parts, less complex.

:roll:

It must be that, from the "many" in the definition, the more components there are, the more complex something is. Ergo, a human, possessing consciousness in addition to a physical body, must be more complex than a p-zombie which is only physically identical but lacks consciousness. — TheMadFool

So an elephant is more complex than me because it has tusks?

So an elephant is more complex than me because it has tusks? — fishfry

Good attempt but tusks are nothing more than overgrown teeth.

Which is simpler, a brain or a conscious brain? Doesn't matter if it's physical or not (no petitio principii)? — TheMadFool

Not quite sure that works TMF. Which is simpler... a running laptop, or a laptop in sleep mode?

The answer is kind of a matter of taste, but it also doesn't really matter. Granting that the laptop in sleep mode is simpler, the running laptop nevertheless is physically distinct from it. What you require for an argument against physicalism is that there is a distinction between the conscious brain and a p-zombie, but that said distinction is not a physical one. So if e.g. a person who is awake is more complex than a person who is asleep, but the person who is awake is physically distinct from a person that is asleep, then the distinction cannot be used as an argument against physicalism.

What's silly about it? A black & white photograph is simpler than a color photograph. More parts, more complex. Less parts, less complex. — TheMadFool

Sorry, Fool, but this is painful. Aren't we defining complexity with abandon here?

Sorry, Fool, but this is painful. Aren't we defining complexity with abandon here? — Caldwell

Explain yourself first.

Sorry but I remain unconvinced by your objection. Please bear with me. Which is simpler, a brain or a conscious brain? Doesn't matter if it's physical or not (no petitio principii)? — TheMadFool

I'm not arguing whether p-zombies are simpler (fine) or even whether they exist. I'm arguing that you can't start from assuming physicalism true then conclude they don't exist or else a contradiction if they do. That is to assume a non-physical basis for consciousness.

If physicalism is true and p-zombies exist, all that means is that humans have a physical characteristic that p-zombies don't, or else that all humans are p-zombies. (The former can be rejected by other physical arguments.)

Not quite sure that works TMF. Which is simpler... a running laptop, or a laptop in sleep mode?

The answer is kind of a matter of taste, but it also doesn't really matter. Granting that the laptop in sleep mode is simpler, the running laptop nevertheless is physically distinct from it. What you require for an argument against physicalism is that there is a distinction between the conscious brain and a p-zombie, but that said distinction is not a physical one. So if e.g. a person who is awake is more complex than a person who is asleep, but the person who is awake is physically distinct from a person that is asleep, then the distinction cannot be used as an argument against physicalism. — InPitzotl

A laptop in sleep mode is simpler of course and that actually proves the point that given a certain level of complexity, a simpler stage/state is a given. The same logic applies to asleep and awake people.

I don't have to draw the distinction between awake and asleep because my argument is specifically about consciousness as we understand it (awake) vs a p-zombie (behaving exactly like an awake human being).

Depends on several things, two of which stand out to me:

1) What do you mean by "physicalism"? Do you mean it analogous to something like what Dennett has in mind or Galen Strawson? If you mean Dennett, then it makes no sense. If you mean Strawson, then it's not possible. If you have someone else in mind or your own view of what it is you should offer a brief example, definition or explanation.

and

2) Are they possible? Well, probably no. But what about cases when people sleep walk, that's almost a p-zombie. People who are sleepwalking may or may not "imagine" they are doing something, so consciousness could be absent in real life cases. This says little about consciousness or behavior.

A laptop in sleep mode is simpler of course and that actually proves the point that given a certain level of complexity, a simpler stage/state is a given. — TheMadFool

Sure, but a running laptop is physically different than a laptop in sleep mode.

I don't have to draw the distinction between awake and asleep — TheMadFool

But I'm not claiming you have to show that. This was just another example.

my argument is specifically about consciousness as we understand it (awake) vs a p-zombie (behaving exactly like an awake human being). — TheMadFool

Understood, but, the running laptop is not merely more complex than the laptop in sleep mode... it is also physically distinct from it. And the awake human may be considered more complex than the sleeping human, but those two humans are also physically distinct. IF likewise your consciousness-as-we-understand-it human (awake) is more complex than your p-zombie (behaving exactly like an awake human being [without consciousness]), BUT the same awake human is physically distinct from the p-zombie, THEN your argument against physicalism does not work.

So it's inadequate to simply establish that conscious humans are more complex than your p-zombies. You must show that they are physically indistinct. If we define p-zombies as physically indistinct, but presume conscious entities and p-zombies are both possible, then your claim of greater complexity of the human presumes there is a non-physical piece, which begs the question. Of course if there's a non-physical piece, physicalism is false. But the real question is, is there a non-physical piece?

All I'm saying here is that your argument doesn't work.

Understood, but, the running laptop is not merely more complex than the laptop in sleep mode... it is also physically distinct from it — InPitzotl

Why bring it up then? We are, after all, discussing physically identical objects (p-zombies and human beings)? We should be comparing two laptops (both on) instead of one in sleep mode and the other not.

the same awake human is physically distinct from the p-zombie, THEN your argument against physicalism does not work. — InPitzotl

That's begging the question.

Why bring it up then? We are, after all, discussing physically identical objects (p-zombies and human beings)? — TheMadFool

Which is simpler, a brain or a conscious brain? — TheMadFool

^^-- This. You're comparing here a "brain" and a "conscious brain". Let's backtrack:

1. IF physicalism is true THEN p-zombies are impossible.
2. P-zombies are possible
Ergo,
3. Physicalism is false — TheMadFool

...this follows unless you're committing an amphiboly between 1 and 2. This for example:
"1. IF physicalism is true THEN p-zombies are physically impossible.
2. P-zombies are hypothetically possible.
Ergo,
3. Physicalism is false"
...does not work, due to the amphiboly. Physicalism presumes that the physical is all there is; so physicalism's claim to impossibility is a claim about what can be realized. So physical impossibility is fair for 1. But to get to 3 from adding 2, then 2 must also be talking about the same kind of possibility else this is an amphiboly. Therefore in 2, you need to show your p-zombies are physically possible. That's the thing you're missing. Best I can tell, all you're doing is imagining the p-zombie as a simpler being. Physicalism would demand only that your imagined zombie cannot actually exist, not that you can't imagine it.

So if your "brain" as opposed to "conscious brain" is an entity that cannot physically exist, then physicalism is not shown false.

That's begging the question. — TheMadFool

No, it's not. Your argument against physicalism only works if there's a difference that's not physical. So if there's a physical difference then your argument doesn't work. That's a truth criteria you must meet, not question begging. Since you define a p-zombie as physically indistinct, except for the consciousness, the applicability here is showing that your non-conscious entity can be attained without any physical differences.

Think of it this way. Take a laptop running a spreadsheet, and let's just remove the part of it that runs a spreadsheet (say, we close the program). That's all we're doing. But that's a physical difference. Analogously, take a conscious human being, and let's just remove the part of it that is being conscious. Is that a physical difference or not?

Just to be crystal clear here, since you're jumping the gun with the question begging allegation, I'm not arguing against your case. I'm arguing against your argument; I'm arguing for what the criteria is that your case must meet. If your argument against physicalism is to hold, then you have to show why consciousness is unlike this spreadsheet, and simply imagining that it is doesn't suffice to show that it is.

P-zombies are entities physically identical to normal human beings except that they lack consciousness. It's said or the argument goes that if p-zombies are possible physicalism is false. — TheMadFool

Why do you want to figure this out?

I'm asking because sometimes, getting clarity about one's motivation to solve a problem can be more useful than solving the problem itself.

You can't subtract warmth from a fire and get something simpler.