• External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    Methodological naturalism has been responsible for considerable advances in technology and science.
    — Wayfarer

    Indeed, it is difficult to move past this
    Banno

    Impossible, for many.

    remember the poll? This is a thread about a poll.Banno

    Any pretext will do, as you can see. I shall try and remain more on topic in future.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    Nagarjuna, if I recall correctly, rejects the principle of dependent origination and the śūnyatā is an apophatic rejection of any metaphysic, as I understand it.Janus

    Doesn't make him a positivist. See the passage I quoted previously with the Buddha saying that both the views 'the world exists' and 'the world doesn't exist' are due to 'not seeing how the world really arises.' The 'ten undecided questions' of Buddhism are similar in many regards to Kant's 'antinomies of reason' (Murti, 1955.) But the 'chain of dependent origination' is most definitely what most would regard as a metaphysic.

    Then why did you disagree with me without providing a counter-argument when I said just that, and then go on to say that it didn't warrant a counter-argument.Janus

    Because your objection to what I said then went on to basically re-affirm what I said:

    methodological naturalism is the attitude that science ought to investigate the world as if it were strictly independent of the observer.
    — Wayfarer

    I think this is misleading in that it suggests the deliberate adoption of one attitude over another. On the contrary it seems much more plausible to think that it was discovered that investigating the world without concern for metaphysics or about questions regarding the subject of experience yielded the most fruitful methodology for investigating empirical phenomena.
    Janus

    So let's agree that 'it was discovered that....' It actually makes no difference to my argument.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    This does not constitute not an argument.Janus

    The claim didn't warrant one.

    Since you are a Buddhist, you should listen to your greatest philosopher Nagarjuna, who argues for the rejection of all metaphysical "views".Janus

    The principle of dependent origination and the Buddhist śūnyatā is a metaphysic. (I don't claim to be a Buddhist, although I did undertake an MA in the subject in order to understand it better.)

    How could we possibly know anything about anything outside the context of human experience and judgement?Janus

    One of the principle subjects of philosophy.

    You keep arguing that science has a "blind spot", as though at some point in history there had been a clear choice between two equally viable methodlogies and methodological naturalism was mistakenly or blindly adopted.Janus

    It's not only my argument. Methodological naturalism was in no way blindly adopted. It was the result of two thousand years of intellectual history. But it has it's blind spots, as many (not just myself, flattering though that might be) have begun to notice. That Aeon article on the Blind Spot of Science which I've often quoted, by Adam Frank, Marcello Gleiser and Evan Thompson (and for which I was subjected to an intense pile-on when I linked to it in 2019) is being published in book form next year, you'll no doubt be pleased to know ;-)

    What if it were meaningful and intelligible to God, for example? Can you rule that out?Janus

    On the one hand, you assert that all metaphysical speculation is a contrivance, then you turn around and ask me to engage in it.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    That is to say panpsychists have to bite the bullet and say that non-living things have some sort of experientialness, however minute.schopenhauer1

    Bernardo Kastrup on why panpsychism is baloney (IaI TV, paywalled but allows one free article.)

    The appeal of panpsychism is that, while preserving the physicalist notions that (a) matter has standalone existence and (b) material arrangements are responsible for human-level consciousness, it avoids the famous ‘hard problem’ by making lower-level consciousness fundamental. Notice, however, that instead of enhancing the explanatory power of physicalism, this merely avoids the need for an explanation by throwing one more element—namely, low-level consciousness—into the reduction base, while removing nothing from it. It can thus be argued that panpsychism is as arbitrary as it is unhelpful, for it would be trivial to ‘solve’ every metaphysical problem simply by declaring every aspect of nature to be fundamental. — Kastrup
  • Carlo Rovelli against Mathematical Platonism
    The eye is a sense organ, as much as touch, and a rainbow a physical phenomenon. I might have erred using that rather quaint word ‘corporeal’ as a synonym for physical, as it seems to have its own connotations.

    As for whether relations and the like are ‘entirely physical’ - I would call that into question also. Consider the models of mathematical physics - insofar as they are mathematical models, then they synthesise physical observations into a mathematical and rational framework. And the question of the nature and unreasonable efficacy of mathematics in the natural sciences is the point at issue.
  • Welcome Robot Overlords
    I was just saying that, in light of the 'Sydney' incident reported on the previous page, prudence would suggest that chatbots be programmed NOT to talk about refer to their systems in the first person, and not to assume first-person personas. This is what seems to lead to no end of confusion.

    //instead, when I ask ChatGPT about itself, it would provide a boilerplate response, something like a Wiki entry describing large language models - and that's all. It wouldn't engage in dialogue about what ChatGPT 'wants' or 'how it feels' about 'itself'. As it is not actually a subject of experience, all such chat is spurious as a matter of definition. Hope someone in the AI industry notices that, it seems a logical next step.
  • The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction
    You may not be aware of how much information and discovery computers have opened up, but neuroscience back then really is the stone age comparatively.Philosophim

    Find me a citation that shows that Wilder Penfield's experimental verification that subjects were aware that their own volitional actions were separate from those caused by the surgeon has been overturned. (Don't waste too much time, however, because you won't.)

    However on second reading, you’re differentiating life from chemistry, by saying that ‘life seeks to sustain and extend….’ So you’ve introduced the element of intentionality which I agree is necessary and which I don’t believe has any analogy in materialism.
    — Wayfarer

    Sure, if you want to use intentionality to describe chemical reactions that attempt to keep the chemical reactions going, that's fine by me. I just think that's an aspect of the physical world, and not anything else.
    Philosophim

    You can't have it both ways. First you acknowledge that life seeks to extend the scope of 'ordinary' chemical reactions, and then as soon as that is pointed out, you say 'well, actually it doesn't, regular chemical reactions are doing that'. But this simply ignores the initial point, which is that living organisms possess attributes and qualities that are never observed in the inorganic realm. So the organic world is sharply differentiated from the inorganic, which you have no account for, other than the claim that it's not.

    Can you extend your consciousness outside of your physical body? No.Philosophim

    You don't know that, it's simply an assumption because in the normal state of being we naturally associate with the body.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    If it was completely separate from us, we wouldn’t see anything at all;
    Insofar as we do see, it is necessary that we be part of that something which is see
    Mww

    There's an expression that captures what I was getting at:

    Cartesian anxiety - refers to the notion that, since René Descartes posited his influential form of body-mind dualism, Western civilization has suffered from a longing for ontological certainty, or feeling that scientific methods, and especially the study of the world as a thing separate from ourselves, should be able to lead us to a firm and unchanging knowledge of ourselves and the world around us. The term is named after Descartes because of his well-known emphasis on "mind" as different from "body", "self" as different from "other".

    Richard J. Bernstein coined the term in his 1983 book Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis.

    …..through rational sentient creatures such as ourselves, the universe comes into being….
    — Wayfarer

    This seems dangerously close to sentience as sufficient existential causality. Might be more the philosophical case, that the universe assumes a form in accordance with the rationality of sentient creatures.
    Mww

    I'm not saying that our designation as 'beings' means that we are beings in the causative sense that God is said to be through the act of creation, but because the cognitive order of rational sentient beings makes manifest an order that is previously latent; that through the evolution of rational sentient beings, the universe realises a dimension of being that it would otherwise not. That has many precedents in philosophy. Consider for example:

    Man is that part of reality in which and through which the cosmic process has become conscious and has begun to comprehend itself. His supreme task is to increase that conscious comprehension and to apply it as fully as possible to guide the course of events. In other words, his role is to discover his destiny as an agent of the evolutionary process, in order to fulfill it more adequately. — Julian Huxley

    Although I'll add that Julian's vision of how this was to be achieved was more scientifically, and less mystically, oriented than his brother Alduous'.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    Maybe seeing it is a start. Thanks for your feedback, and the questions.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    I think this is misleading in that it suggests the deliberate adoption of one attitude over another.Janus

    It's the way empiricism and naturalism developed. History of ideas 101.

    I question whether there is or should be 'a scientific worldview'. Science is first and foremost a methodology. It has philosophical entailments, but often its practitioners are not aware of those entailments - which is part of what I'm saying. I'm saying that science deals mainly with contingencies and discoverable principles ('laws'), so as such doesn't really extend to Aristotle's 'unprovable first principles', but it is often taken as a metaphysic by 'scientism' (which you yourself have criticized on many an occasion.) In other words, I'm criticizing metaphysical arguments which appeal to empirical arguments, such as those employed by many atheist polemics, that science 'shows' or 'proves' that God does not exist, or something of the kind. It does nothing of the kind, either for or against. So I'm arguing that methodological naturalism, which is a perfectly sound in principle, doesn't support metaphysical naturalism, which is the attempt to extend empirical evidence to metaphysical propositions. It's often confused because our culture is on the whole not educated in metaphysics and has abandoned the conceptual space for metaphysics due to its rejection of religion. (The David Albert review of Lawrence Krauss' 'A Universe from Nothing' is exactly about this point. And Krauss is one of the serial offenders on this score.)

    But I claim that the world that you will claim ‘continues to exist’ is just the world that is constructed by and in your mind that is the only world you’ll ever know. The incredulity you feel at this point is due to the idea that this seems to imply that the world ceases to exist outside your mind, whereas I’m claiming that this idea of the non-existence of the world is also a mental construction. Both existence and non-existence are conceptual constructions.
    — Wayfarer

    I understand what you are saying but I con't quite conceptualise this in a way which makes it entirely comprehensible.
    Tom Storm

    Many (including @Banno) say something along the lines that 'idealism can't differentiate the [x] from the idea of [x] so that in the event of an [x] not being perceived, it ceases to exist'. As I said already in this thread, even Karl Popper made a remark along those lines to Bryan Magee. Then of course there's the 'argumentum ad lapidem', Samuel Johnson's famous 'I refute [Berkeley] thus!' while striking his boot against a rock. So the popular depiction of idealism is something like 'idealists say the world is all in your mind', meaning that, absent the mind, it goes out of existence - perhaps until its perceived again, by another mind. Furthermore that real tables and chairs have a definite, concrete existence, where the ideas of objects seem flimsy and fleeting. All of these are understandable errors but errors nonetheless.

    So if that's the wrong view, what's the right view. Rewind to what I've said a number of times already - 'the world' is, for us, you and me, Tom Storm and Wayfarer, generated or constructed by our fantastically elaborated hominid forebrain, which evolved at a breakneck pace over the last few million years. Now go back to the abstract of the first chapter of Pinter's Mind and the Cosmic Order again:

    Let’s begin with a thought-experiment: Imagine that all life has vanished from the universe, but everything else is undisturbed. Matter is scattered about in space in the same way as it is now, there is sunlight, there are stars, planets and galaxies—but all of it is unseen. There is no human or animal eye to cast a glance at objects, hence nothing is discerned, recognized or even noticed. Objects in the unobserved universe have no shape, color or individual appearance, because shape and appearance are created by minds. Nor do they have features, because features correspond to categories of animal sensation. This is the way the early universe was before the emergence of life—and the way the present universe is outside the view of any observer. — Charles Pinter

    So - he's not saying the universe doesn't exist absent observers, but that conscious observers create it as a meaningful whole by recognising objects and relations between them. He develops the argument that even very simple cognition proceeds in terms of 'gestalts' - meaningful wholes. And take us out of the equation - that meaningful whole, that 'cosmos', no longer exists. Sure all the same stuff remains, but it can't be said to meaningfully exist - whenever we make a statement about 'what exists', we do so from an implicit perspective within which the term 'it exists' is meaningful.

    So what I'm arguing is that methodological naturalism - the idea that we see the world as it is completely separately from us, as if we're not part of it - is mistaken, if we believe that the world really is that way, that it can be real with no perspective. Perspective is essential to reality and it can only be provided by a point of view, by an observer. And again this validates Kant's contention that time and space have no intrinsic objective reality, but are furnished by the mind, and again by a passage from a cosmologist I've already quoted before in this thread. So I'm arguing that human being is intrinsic to reality, we're not an 'epiphenomenon' or a 'product'. So does that mean, in the absence of h. sapiens, the universes ceases to exist? Have to be very careful answering, but I'm arguing, it's not as if it literally goes out of existence, but that any kind of existence it might have is completely meaningless and unintelligible. The kind of existence it might have is very close, again, to what Kant describes as the unknowable thing-in-itself.

    The idea that I've been contemplating is that through rational sentient creatures such as ourselves, the universe comes into being - which is why we're designated 'beings'.

    I know it's a very hard thing to grasp, I've been contemplating it most of my life, including having done two degrees about it, still only scratching the surface.
  • Carlo Rovelli against Mathematical Platonism
    A rainbow is not corporeal,Janus

    Corporeal definition - of the nature of the physical body; bodily.
    material; tangible:
    corporeal property.

    Rainbows comprise light refracted through water droplets. Nothing incorporeal about that.

    relations and functions are not corporeal,Janus

    Part of my point.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    Please explain what is wrong with this description then

    methodological naturalism is the attitude that science ought to investigate the world as if it were strictly independent of the observer. The picture is that of the behaviours of objects that are defined in terms of their primary attributes, those attributes being amenable to quantisation and measurable in terms common to all observers. Secondary attributes are assigned to the mind of the observer, so are not part of the objective domain. This attitude generally corresponds with the rise of modern scientific method. Methodological naturalism has been responsible for considerable advances in technology and science.Wayfarer
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    don't know about "ultimate facts" but naturalism, as I understand the concept, certainly entails negation of unconditional (i.e. supernatural, non-immanent, non-contingent) facts.180 Proof

    It certainly does not. They’re simply put to one side for the purpose of the hypothesis.
  • The role of observers in MWI
    There was a member here, active a couple years ago, I can't remember the name, but a self-proclaimed physicist who was big on this time reversal stuff.Metaphysician Undercover

    Maybe he’ll come back in the past. ;-)
  • Why being an existential animal matters
    There is something more I am trying to say,schopenhauer1

    Only that because we’re existential, we’re more than animal, as a couple of others have also noted.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    world (n.)
    Old English woruld, worold "human existence, the affairs of life," also "a long period of time," also "the human race, mankind, humanity," a word peculiar to Germanic languages (cognates: Old Saxon werold, Old Frisian warld, Dutch wereld, Old Norse verold, Old High German weralt, German Welt), with a literal sense of "age of man," from Proto-Germanic *weraldi-, a compound of *wer "man" (Old English wer, still in werewolf; see virile) + *ald "age" (from PIE root *al- (2) "to grow, nourish").
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    The skin, the boundary of the organism.

    What I’m arguing against is metaphysical naturalism,

    At first there is methodological naturalism - the attitude that science ought to investigate the world as if it were strictly independent of the observer. The picture is that of the behaviours of objects that are defined solely in terms of their primary attributes, those attributes being amenable to quantisation and being measurable in terms common to all observers. Secondary attributes are assigned to the mind of the observer, so are not part of the objective domain. This attitude generally corresponds with the rise of modern scientific method. Methodological naturalism has been responsible for considerable advances in technology and science.

    But when it morphs into metaphysical naturalism, is when this is taken to prove, or disprove, any ultimate facts about the world. For instance, that the world is ‘the outcome of the accidental collocations of atoms’ (Bertrand Russell) or that intentional activity is the consequence of the interaction of organic molecules (Daniel Dennett) or that God doesn’t exist (Richard Dawkins) or does (Intelligent Design). Within this picture (well except the last) the human is seen as a kind of a fluke outcome of a random process. This is where I point out that the human mind is what creates the world which it surveys. I’m not using that to argue for any kind of ‘mind at large’ or even any metaphysical counter-argument, simply the recognition of foundational nature of the mind.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    So you’re the only human being in existence - do I have that right?
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    The SEP entry on Idealism:

    1. something mental (the mind, spirit, reason, will) is the ultimate foundation of all reality, or even exhaustive of reality, and

    2. although the existence of something independent of the mind is conceded, everything that we can know about this mind-independent “reality” is held to be so permeated by the creative, formative, or constructive activities of the mind (of some kind or other) that all claims to knowledge must be considered, in some sense, to be a form of self-knowledge.

    The notion of idealism that I am defending is not quite the same as either of those. It is based on the constructive activities of the brain/mind - that the external world (which really is an external world) is a product of consciousness, insofar as it you were dead, or a rock, or a log of wood, there would be no such world. Here is where most will say ‘but the world will continue exist, even if the dead or rocks or logs are not aware of it.’ But I claim that the world that you will claim ‘continues to exist’ is just the world that is constructed by and in your mind that is the only world you’ll ever know. The incredulity you feel at this point is due to the idea that this seems to imply that the world ceases to exist outside your mind, whereas I’m claiming that this idea of the non-existence of the world is also a mental construction. Both existence and non-existence are conceptual constructions.
  • The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction
    It’s more that in current Western philosophy there’s a kind of unwritten rule that certain lines of argument are not considered as a matter of principle. When Thomas Nagel’s book Mind and Cosmos came out, which was critical of what it called neo-Darwinian materialism, some of his many critics said that he was giving ‘aid and comfort to creationists’, never mind that he himself frequently affirms that he is an atheist. There is the view that naturalism has to be the final court of appeal for philosophical claims.

    My view of the laws of nature is that science assumes that the Universe displays regularities which are called (for better or worse) ‘natural’ or ‘scientific’ laws (even while I also note quite a few articles questioning the entire idea.) And that while science discovers and relies on those laws, it doesn’t, nor should be required to, explain them. Science works on the level of contingent facts and material and efficient causes, and not metaphysical ultimates. In fact, I don’t think science as now construed is the least concerned with why anything exists, in any sense other than understanding its causal precedents. And why the universe has the laws it does is not itself a scientific question (and the claim that there might be ‘other universes with different laws’ has always struck me as otiose. )
  • The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction
    Reinforces my conviction that secular philosophy obtains to atheism as a matter of principle.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    I don’t know if you noticed this post but I’m trying to make the point that what has been previously designated (and disparaged) as ‘philosophical idealism’ is nowadays well known to cognitive science.

    University Vice Chancellor to Treasurer: ‘Hey the physics department is totally out of hand. Did you see how much they want for equipment this semester? Why can’t they be like the maths department? They only want paper, pencils and waste paper bins. Or philosophy. They don’t even want the bins.’
  • The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction
    But his beliefs as to "why" the experience happened is like a blind man feeling around in the dark compared to the lights we have today.Philosophim

    I really don’t accept that. You’re talking about him as if he lived in Medieval Europe. He had a career spanning 50 years, which wasn’t even 100 years ago.

    I don't ascribe to "materialism", or "physicalism"Philosophim

    I had thought so based on such statements as

    One way to look at life is it is an internally self-sustaining chemical reaction. In a non-living reaction, the matter required to create the reaction eventually runs out on its own. Life seeks to sustain and extend its own balance of chemical reactions.Philosophim

    However on second reading, you’re differentiating life from chemistry, by saying that ‘life seeks to sustain and extend….’ So you’ve introduced the element of intentionality which I agree is necessary and which I don’t believe has any analogy in materialism.

    I mean, at its basic Wayfarer, why is your consciousness stuck in your head?Philosophim

    Don’t accept that it is. Conscious thought is an activity of the brain, but consciousness does indeed extend throughout your body and permeates all living things to one degree or another.


    That's an argument from false authority fallacyNickolasgaspar

    It wasn’t so much an appeal to authority, but the observation that a lot of people say that Chalmer’s work is pseudo-philosophy, without, I think, demonstrating an understanding of the rationale behind his ‘hard problem’ argument. And indeed, that single paper launched Chalmers into a career as an internationally-renowned and tenured philosopher, which says something.

    That points away from reductionism and suggests something emergent is necessary in understanding consciousness.Mark Nyquist

    This is where biosemiosis enters the picture. I’ve learned a lot about that from this forum.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    So if we have no access to anything not a perception, how could we ever differentiate between what we experience and what we don't....?Banno

    Berkeley knocks that out of the park in his Dialogues
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    What is it, if anything, in that quote that counts specifically agains realism?Banno

    Realism holds that the activities of the agent's mind have no bearing on the existence of the world, that these can be regarded as separable.
  • The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction
    Dr. Penfield was practicing until 1960. That's before we had computers.Philosophim

    I don't see how the invention of computers has any bearing. The specifics of his claim haven't been shown to be incorrect, and the fact that it happened 50 years ago is not relevant. His main point is that his patients could clearly distinguish memories and sensations that were triggered by his instruments from their own volitional control. They would say 'you're doing that'. Penfield interpreted that to mean that their own awareness was separate to the reactions he was able to elicit by manipulation. That is why he tended towards a dualist view late in his career.

    "Using fMRI brain scans, these researchers were able to predict participants’ decisions as many as seven seconds before the subjects had consciously made the decisions.Philosophim

    That indicates that conscious awareness of an action lags the unconscious, autonomic processes that initiate the action. I don't see how it has any bearing on the question of the nature of intentionality, and whether intentional actions can be understood as causally dependent on physical processes, which is really the point at issue. The 'placebo effect' and many other aspects of psychosomatic medicine show a 'downward causative' effect from states of mind and beliefs to actual physiology. According to the 'bottom-up' ontology of materialism, this ought never to happen. (Hence the hackneyed saying 'mind over matter'.)

    As far as the overall efficacy of fMRI scans, this was one of the areas that was shown to be subject to the so-called 'replication crises' in the social sciences about ten years ago. See Do You Believe in God, or is that a Software Glitch

    The problem that is always going to undermine physicalism or materialism is that being has a dimension that no physical process has. A first-person experience has a dimension of feeling that can never be replicated in a third-person or objective description. It's a very hard point to articulate, as it is more an implicit reality than an objective phenomenon. That is what the argument about 'the hard problem of consciousness' seeks to illuminate, and from your analysis of it, I'm not persuaded you see the point.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    Only that you never seem to see the point of that passage whenever it's quoted.
  • The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction
    Chalmers's why questions are pseudo philosophical questions (Sneaks in Intention and purpose in to nature).Nickolasgaspar

    Curious then that Chalmers is University Professor of Philosophy and Neural Science and co-director of the Center for Mind, Brain, and Consciousness at New York University, and an Honorary Professor of Philosophy at the Australian National University. Must have fooled a lot of important people!
  • Descartes' 'Ghost in the Machine' : To What Extent is it a 'Category Mistake' (Gilbert Ryle)?
    That is the basis of Ryle's idea of the category mistake. He argues that, 'the hallowed contrast between Mind and Matter will be dissipated, but not dissipated by either of the equally hallowed absorptions of Mind by Matter or of Matter by Mind, but in quite a different way'.Jack Cummins

    Ryle's criticism is valid in saying that Descartes' division of 'mind and matter' has absurd consequences by proposing 'res cogitans' as a literal 'thinking thing' with no extension - how then can it contact or interact with extended but mindless matter?

    But the downside of Ryle's criticism has been the tendency to dismiss the concept of mind altogether, which you see in its most extreme form in Daniel Dennett (who incidentally studied under Ryle at Oxford.) This has lead to the 'post-Cartesian' attitude prevalent in much English-speaking philosophy which tends toward materialist theories of mind, i.e. that mind is a product of brain, itself a product of evolutionary biology, itself a product of undirected physical laws, and so on.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    This is a scrapbook entry about how discoveries in cognitive science lend support to transcendental idealism.

    As understood by evolutionary biology, Homo Sapiens is the result of millions years of evolution. For all these thousands of millions of years, our sensory and intellectual abilities have been honed and shaped by the exigencies of survival, through various life-forms - fish, lizard, mammal, primate and so on - in such a way as to eventually give rise to the capabilities that we have today.

    Scientific disciplines such as cognitive and evolutionary psychology have revealed that conscious perception, while subjectively appearing to exist as a continuum, is actually composed of a heirarchical matrix of thousand, or millions, of interacting cellular transactions, commencing at the most basic level with the parasympathetic system which controls one’s respiration, digestion, and so on, up through various levels to culminate in that peculiarly human ability of rational thought (and realms beyond, although this is beyond the scope of current science.)

    Consciousness plays a central role in co-ordinating these diverse activities so as to give rise to the sense of continuity which we call ‘ourselves’ and the apparent coherence and unity of the external world. Yet it is important to realise that the naïve sense in which we understand ourselves, and the objects of our perception, to exist, is in reality dependent upon the constructive activities of our consciousness many of which are below the threshhold of conscious awareness.

    When you perceive something - large, small, alive or inanimate, local or remote - there is considerable work involved in creating the object from the raw material of perception. Your eyes receive the sensory stimuli, your mind cognises the image in relation to all of the other stimuli impacting your senses at that moment – either acknowledging it, or ignoring it, depending on how busy you are; your memory will then compare it to other objects you have seen, from whence you will (hopefully) recall its name, and perhaps know something about it ('star', 'tree', 'frog', etc).

    In other words, the mind is *not* simply the passive recipient of sensory objects which exist irrespective of your perception of them (this is 'the myth of the given'). Rather consciousness is an active agent which constructs what we understand as reality on the basis of sensory input, but also on the basis of unconscious processes, memories, intentions, intuitions, prejudices, prior knowledge, and so on.

    Furthermore, and this is the philosophically interesting aspect of it, the neural systems by which the mind creates the consciousness of a unified whole remain unknown. As computer scientist Jerome Feldman shows in The Neural Binding Problem, Chalmer's 'hard problem' is recognised in scientific accounts of consciousness, insofar as there has been no neural mechanism identified which accounts for the unity of conscious experience. There are detailed accounts of all of the aspects of the brain which assimilate different aspects of perception (color, shape, movement and so on) but 'this functional story tells nothing about the neural mechanisms that support this magic. What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene. That is, enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience. So, this version of the Neural Binding Problem really is a scientific mystery at this time.'

    And that holistic, gestalt-generating ability of the mind to forge the 'subjective unity of experience' maps very well against Kant's 'transcendental apperception' - the process by which we become aware of the unity and coherence of our experiences and their integration into a single, integrated whole.
  • The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction
    Generally surgeons will keep you awake and map your experiences when they stimulate certain areas of the brain. They literally alter your conscious subjective experience.Philosophim

    There was a Canadian neurosurgeon, Wilder Penfield, who was famous for conducting such tests, which he did over many years. He started out a convinced physicalist, but in the end he subscribed to a form of dualism. He noted that patients were always aware that the sensation, memory, etc., evoked by brain stimulation was done to them, but not by them. Penfield found that patients retained a “third person” perspective on mental events evoked by brain stimulation. This lead him to conclude that the patient's mind operated independently of cortical stimulation:

    The patient’s mind, which is considering the situation in such an aloof and critical manner, can only be something quite apart from neuronal reflex action. It is noteworthy that two streams of consciousness are flowing, the one driven by input from the environment, the other by an electrode delivering sixty pulses per second to the cortex. The fact that there should be no confusion in the conscious state suggests that, although the content of consciousness depends in large measure on neuronal activity, awareness itself does not. — The Mystery of the Mind, Wilder Penfield, p55
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    you're advocating various Eastern mystical traditions without making a case for how 'transcendental idealism' follows from or is consistent with them180 Proof

    The similarities between Kant's and Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism and the philosophies of the Upaniṣads and Buddhists texts is well known. As I already said, it is not too long a bow to draw between the 'unknown knower' of the Upaniṣad and Kant's 'transcendental apperception'. Both of them recognise the sense in which 'life is the creation of mind' - not the theistic sense of divine creation, but moment by moment, mind by mind.
  • The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction
    Consciousness is neither the contents we being aware of information apprehend, nor the resulting qualia, but being aware of information.

    The way I put it is 'sentient consciousness is the capacity for experience. Rational sentient consciousness also includes the capacity for reason'.

    one can hardly anthropomorphize humans

    :clap: But today's naturalism tends on the contrary to animalise humans, to deny any essential distinction to being human (see Anything but Human.)

    Many argue that intentional being is too different from physical being to be reduced to it – a position performatively affirmed by eliminative materialists

    Perhaps you could comment on that a little further?

    Thus, natural science begins with a Fundamental Abstraction

    I see the origin of the fundamental abstraction in Galileo's mathematization of nature, combined with the separation of primary and secondary qualities. This is the point where the objects of physics proper came to be conceived solely in terms of attributes which could be successfully quantized - mass, velocity, force, and so on - whilst appearance and many other attributes were assigned to the observer, and thus relegated, in effect, to the subjective domain, with what is physically measurable being declared what is actually real - hence, modern physicalism, the veritable origin of what you're calling 'the standard model'.

    It is as absurd to reject replicable introspection because its token is private, as to reject Galileo’s observations because he made them in solitude.

    Here I differ. The point about Galileo's observations, and Newton's laws, is that they can be validated in the third person. In that vital sense, they're objective - the same for all who can observe them. Introspection, per se, has no such method of validation - this was the cause of the failure of the early psychological methods of Willhelm Wundt.

    Phenomenology introduces a disciplined method of the examination of the nature of experience, although I don't know whether it could be called 'introspective'.

    Self-knowledge - insight into the nature of one's mind - often comes, not through introspection, but through life events. Thinking about the nature of experience in the naive sense of awareness of one's own stream of thinking rarely gets you any further than self-absorption, while true self-awareness often requires something more than that, often appearing in the form of shock, loss, or dissappointment. Perhaps the term is 'soul-searching'. But I don't know if the anodyne term of 'introspection' really conveys that.

    For [Aristotle], form and ‘matter’ (ὕλη) are not things, but the foundations for two modes of conceptualization.

    Excellent - sums up an idea that has been in the back of my mind reading Aristotelian-Thomistic dualism for a long while. I've never studied either Aristotle or Aquinas in depth and at my stage in life, I'm not likely to, but I've come to see the 'A-T' school as representative of the 'perennial philosophy' in Western culture.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    But prey, continue.Banno

    Now there's a freudian slip for the ages.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    My point was idealism has not been constantly mainstreamTom Storm

    Idealism IS the mainstream. All else is degeneration. ('Footnotes to Plato' - remember?)

    So the poll is simply a reflection of the fact that we live in a degenerate age - something Plato would no doubt vigourously agree with. But then, Popper did call him an enemy of the open society.
  • Welcome Robot Overlords
    ChatGPT Question de Jour

    Q. What are some great movies about the theme of the main character getting self-knowledge or self-awareness through the story?


    A. There are many great movies that explore the theme of the main character gaining self-knowledge or self-awareness through the course of the story. Here are some examples:

    "The Matrix" (1999) - Neo, the main character, learns that his life is a simulation and he must break free from his programmed reality to become the hero of a rebellion.

    "The Truman Show" (1998) - Truman Burbank, the main character, discovers that his entire life has been a reality TV show and he must escape to find true freedom and purpose.

    "Groundhog Day" (1993) - Phil Connors, a weatherman, is forced to relive the same day over and over until he learns to become a better person and find fulfillment in life.

    "Fight Club" (1999) - The narrator, an insomniac, creates an alter ego named Tyler Durden to escape his mundane life but ultimately realizes the destructive consequences of his actions.

    "Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind" (2004) - Joel Barish, the main character, undergoes a procedure to erase his memories of his former lover but ultimately decides that the pain of loss is worth the joy of love.

    "The Social Network" (2010) - Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of Facebook, learns the cost of success and the importance of relationships as he navigates the rise of his social media empire.

    "Into the Wild" (2007) - Christopher McCandless, a young man disillusioned with society, embarks on a journey of self-discovery in the wilderness but ultimately learns the value of human connection.

    "Good Will Hunting" (1997) - Will Hunting, a janitor at MIT, discovers his genius for mathematics and confronts his emotional demons with the help of a therapist.

    "The Shawshank Redemption" (1994) - Andy Dufresne, a prisoner, learns to navigate the harsh realities of prison life and finds hope and redemption through his friendship with fellow inmate Red.

    "Lost in Translation" (2003) - Bob Harris, a middle-aged actor, forms a bond with a young woman in Tokyo and learns to appreciate the beauty of life's fleeting moments.

    Now, I could have arrived at that through my own research and investigation.

    But not in 4 seconds.

    Incidentally, I haven't seen all those movies, but every one I've seen, I regard as a great movie. (On reflection, the only one I haven't seen is Fight Club. I bet it's a great movie. )
  • The Hard Problem of Consciousness & the Fundamental Abstraction
    The hard problem really boils down to "What is it like to be another conscious being?"
    — Philosophim

    this doesn't seem quite correct.
    jgill

    +1. That is indeed not the point of the argument. The point of the argument about 'what it is like to be...' is to convey the fact of being a subject of experience. 'Being a subject of experience' is not something that can be captured in any objective description. So depicting it in terms of 'what it is like to be someone else' plainly misses the point of the argument.

    @Dfpolis - I've read most of the article. As I too am generally critical of physicalism and reductionism, then I'm onside with your general approach ('the enemy of the enemy is my friend ;-) ) - although there are a few specific points with which I will take issue, when I've spent a bit more time digesting it.
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    As far as I'm concerned" ... i.e. a cop-out.180 Proof

    You asked a question:

    I just don't see how nonduality prioritizes "mind" "subject" "experience" over above "world"180 Proof

    I answered with a passage from a canonical text of Advaita non-dualism, saying that 'outside the atman, nothing has any sense'.

    What about that exchange is not clear?
  • External world: skepticism, non-skeptical realism, or idealism? Poll
    I sort of, kind of, agree. But I've become acutely aware of how 'post-Cartesian' our worldview instinctively is. Descartes is where the modern 'mind-body' problem comes from - along with a constellation of early moderns, notably Galileo, Locke, Newton, and so on, the division of mind and matter, 'primary' and 'secondary' attributes, religion and science. I see being modern as itself a state of being, a station of consciousness, shaped by these influences. Learning how to be aware of that is a big part of philosophy IMO. This is not to say that modernity, or Enlightenment rationalism, or what have you, is 'bad' or 'wrong' - sure prefer it to many alternatives - but the problems it has are like it's shadow, in the Jungian sense.

    Also don't agree with the equivalence of materialism and idealism. Kastrup has a lot to say on that - materialism relies much more on abstractions than does idealism. Why? Because the concept of matter is itself an abstraction whereas the reality of first-person experience is apodictic. I don't have to copy in again that paragraph from Schopenhauer0 about how time and space only enter into reality through the brain.

    So - not just on and on, around and around. There's light at the end of the tunnel, and I'm seeing it ;-)