A good candidate for a measure of value is one that is likely to be correct. In order to consider what is most likely to be correct, we make some assumptions, or theory selection criteria. — Dan
For example, utilitarianism selects happiness based on the assumption that whatever humans pursue for themselves they should also pursue for others based on the additional assumptions that not doing so would be irrationally making an exception of yourself and doing that would be immoral, and that humans all pursue their own happiness. As I've pointed out before, — Dan
When a tornado changes course and doesn't destroy someone's house, that is morally good, but the tornado isn't morally praiseworthy. — Dan
...but it is reasonable to assume consent to this.. — Dan
There are lots of intentional acts one could make that affect others but are entirely that person's own choice. If I beat you in a contest, I have affected you with my choices, and in ways you would presumably prefer I didn't, but I haven't restricted your ability to understand and make your own decisions. — Dan
This poses the problem that humans have lack of capability to change, at the level of thoughts and neurochemistry.
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I am interested in research and also the nature of personal change and self mastery? Do you think that self-mastery is possible? — Jack Cummins
The fact that these choices are not the ones which are often not the ones which are morally praiseworthy has nothing to do with whether it is a good measure of value. — Dan
I would agree that the freedom to choose X includes the freedom not to choose X, but that isn't an issue here because that is entirely consistent with the idea that only freedom over those things which belong to a person ought to be protected. — Dan
No, I would say that we should judge the morality of choices by reference to their consequences and that the measure of goodness/badness of those consequences is how ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is protected/violated. I feel like I've said this many times, and you are still attempting to interpret what I'm saying to mean anything other than what I am saying. — Dan
It sounds like you are saying that it is not coherent to say that a person is free to choose X but not free to choose Y. Or free to do what you like with X (in this case, your own mind, body and property) but not with Y (other people's). — Dan
Maybe it would help me if you told me what you think it is I am claiming as simply as possible. Then maybe we can get to the bottom of where this misunderstanding is coming from. — Dan
In your temperature analogy, the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is not like the boiling point of water or the freezing point of water. — Dan
It would be more like the average amount of kinetic motion per atom (not a perfect analogy here, but certainly closer). Which is to say, it's the thing we are using as the measure of value. — Dan
To your second point, that doesn't answer my question. Is you issue that your don't think freedom can be valuable because you don't think it is coherent to talk about being free to do something but not free to do something else? — Dan
Also, as to your post replying to Punshhh: Are you suggesting that the freedom to do absolutely anything is valuable? Your freedom to, for example, torture a child to death? — Dan
The whole idea of these choices being "the ideal type" is an invention of yours. It is not reflected in anything I have said. — Dan
The thing which makes any action good or bad is the extent to which is protects or violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. — Dan
Again, I'm happy to, but I'm not moving off of this topic while you are still misunderstanding the measure of value under discussion. If you don't understand the measure of value, then I think any conversation about why it is our best candidate for a measure of value is likely to be doomed from the off. — Dan
One's own choices often aren't really good or bad. If I choose to key my own car, that isn't good or bad, it just is. These choices certainly aren't "the ideal". What is important is the ABILITY of persons to understand and make their own choices. Their freedom. That is what needs protecting. Since most choices of my own choices don't protect that freedom or violate it, they are generally fairly neutral actions. — Dan
Again, I'm very happy to discuss why I think the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is the best measure of value we have available, but I really want to make sure you have understood what that is first. — Dan
...which is what I was doing in suggesting that we look at how other animals make decisions. If how animals make decisions is similar to how humans make decisions then that can shed some light on the human condition. This is why we use animals as test subjects to get at some aspect of the human condition without harming humans. — Harry Hindu
It is you that is ignoring my request for you to explain what you mean by free will. — Harry Hindu
If free will simply entails making decisions and I have shown that computers can make decisions does that mean computers have free will? You either agree that it does and we can then settle the case as one of where you use different words than I do to explain the same process, or disagree and you would have to come up with a better explanation as to what free will is. The ball is in your court. — Harry Hindu
The capacity to choose isn't just a human condition. Other animals make choices too. — Harry Hindu
Logically, you will always make the same choice given the same set of circumstances and the same set of options, just like a computer. And just like a computer, you choices can become predictable. — Harry Hindu
So the question isn't, "do we have the capacity to choose". It's "do we have the capacity to choose freely", whatever that means. Hopefully you can enlighten me. — Harry Hindu
There isn't two scales or value systems. The thing which makes any action good or bad is the extent to which is protects or violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices.
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I'm happy to answer why this is the best measure of moral value (though I think it is covered in the primer), but I'd like to make sure we have pinned down the misunderstanding you seem to be having with the measure of value first. — Dan
You're assuming that free will is part of the human condition. I'm saying that it likely isn't. — Harry Hindu
The fact that something is commonly said does not necessarily imply that what is said is a fact. — Harry Hindu
I doubt it's possible. We communicate much more than mathematical ideas. If we tried using math to talk about any of those things, it would no longer be math. It would be numbers, equations, etc., representing things. Just another language. 1 stands for me. 27 stands for eat. 4,534 stands for apple.
1 + 27 + 4,534 = I eat apple.
There's no math in that. Yeah, I just did that in five minutes. But would we find a solution if we spent a thousand years trying? I doubt it. And I assume it's been tried by plenty of mathematicians over the centuries. I can't imagine a way of actually doing math that also means things we want to discuss. — Patterner
Dreams and hallucinations are existentially dependent upon veridical perception. — creativesoul
It is the measure of moral value, the goodness or badness of this choice is precisely because of how it affects persons' ability to understand and make their own choices. Just like if the person shot a lion that was about to eat someone, it isn't that shooting lions is intrinsically valuable it is good because it protects the ability to understand and make their own decisions of the person who is about to be eaten. This isn't contradictory, it's consequentialism. — Dan
Having a true understanding of the human condition would come first and from that extrapolate whether our actions are free or determined. — Harry Hindu
I don't want to steer to far off-topic but what is meant by "free" in "free will"? — Harry Hindu
Color experience requires both, colorful things(things capable of being seen as colorful by a creature so capable) and a creature so capable. — creativesoul
Things capable of being seen as red are those with physical surfaces reflecting the appropriate wavelengths of the visible spectrum. A capable creature is one capable of detecting and/or distinguishing those wavelengths. — creativesoul
They are inherently capable of being seen as red by a creature so capable. They do not look red unless they are capable of being seen as red by a creature so capable and they're being looked at. — creativesoul
[Socrates] Imagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?
[Glaucon] To be sure, he said.
[Socrates] And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the cave, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable) would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.
[Glaucon] No question, he said.
[Socrates] This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally, either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.
It's been moral value all along. What is morally valuable (or rather what is the measure of moral value) is persons' ability to understand and make their own choices. It isn't about whether you value your ability to do so or not, or whether that provides some value to your life, the claim is that the extent to which that ability is violated or restricted determines the goodness or badness of the consequences of some action (and therefore the morality of that action). — Dan
In a deterministic universe, we all do what we naturally do. All acts feel natural and intended. — Harry Hindu
I don't understand why we would need to escape determinism, or why free will is necessary. — Harry Hindu
What makes causality and determinism necessarily materialistic? My thoughts naturally lead to other thoughts. Certain experiences are prerequisites for certain thoughts. It seems to me that my thoughts can "bump into" other thoughts and create novel thoughts. New thoughts are an amalgam of prior thoughts and experiences. It seems to me that causality and determinism could be just as immaterial as material. — Harry Hindu
The next step, I believe, after freeing oneself from naive realism, is to free oneself from materialism altogether, and understand that the so-called "effects of the stone upon himself" are not properly called "effects" at all. The percept is a freely constructed creation of the living being, rather than the effects of a causal chain. This understanding enables the reality of the concept of free will. The living being's motivational aspects, which are very much involved in all neurological activity, and appear to allow the being to act with a view toward the future, (understood in its most simple form as the will to survive), cannot be understood as the product of causal chains. This is what science reveals to us, through its inability to understand such aspects in determinist terms.The observer, when he seems to himself to be observing a stone, is really, if physics is to be believed, observing the effects of the stone upon himself.
I think the problem might be that you are thinking of things having "moral value to you" or "to me", but that isn't the case. — Dan
I didn't say it wasn't a restriction. It is a type of freedom, specifically one restricted to only those choices that belong to a person. — Dan
I say that a person's ability to understand and make their own choices (which I have always maintained are the choices that belong to them) is the measure of moral value, the thing that determines whether the consequences of an action are good or bad. — Dan
No, it doesn't. I seriously do not think you are taking enough time to read these replies. I am directly, stringently addressing this point in each reply and you seem to miss it entirely. I have given you several inarguable examples of why pain is not always unpleasant and further that this isn't part of it's nature. If you reject this, fine, but you need to actually tell me why all the examples and reasons are wrong. You have not. The quote you used directly contradicts your position by my existing in this discussion. You can't be missing that, can you? You're replying, after all, to someone who does not always experience unpleasantness along with pain. — AmadeusD
Pain does not require unpleasantness to obtain. It simply doesn't. I don't know why you're claiming this against empirical evidence of millions of humans experiencing pain without unpleasantness - and in fact, experiencing pleasure from pain. This is just... why are you trying to simply erase a load of facts about other people's experience, including mine? Are you trying to say I'm lying? — AmadeusD
Pain is a sensation directed at the host attending to an injury. — AmadeusD
It's a tricky thing. I absolutely, almost sexually, enjoy the pain of scalding water on the tops of my hands, my inner thighs, behind my shoulders and right on my hip bones (to the point that i had very midly burned myself many times in pursuit of it (opportunistic pursuit, to be sure)). It is definitely pain. But it is definitely not unpleasant. Its a tool telling me to stop fucking running scalding water on myself lmao. EVENTUALLY this can get unpleasant - as, when my skin starts melting, my brain kicks it up a few notches. Fair, too. I'm not exactly the most caring about my own body in this way. I self harmed for years. another notch on this club. — AmadeusD
I just like pointing out how the semiotic approach goes further in emphasising that our model of the world is also the model of "ourselves in the world". — apokrisis
Clearly, as between you and I, there is not a 1:1 match between pain and "unpleasantness". — AmadeusD
Pain (i.e a sensation that indicates injury - physical, or mental (but mental is awhole different discussion I think)) doesn't, inherently, mean displeasure. Maybe that's clearer? — AmadeusD
Perhaps you need to maintain my position (that pain is mental) to support the idea that pain is inherently unpleasant, as clearly, to the injury part (i.e the "physical" aspect of pain) this is patently not hte case. — AmadeusD
No, everything you just said is incorrect. There aren't two systems of value at all. I think you have gotten very much the wrong end of the stick again, but somehow it's an entirely different end than you had before. I'm starting to wonder what shape this stick is. Let me try to explain again. — Dan
What is of moral value is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. The extent to which this is protected or restricted/violated determines whether some set of consequences is good or bad. For example, if I steal your car, then i have restricted your ability to understand and make choices regarding your car, which you own, so this is bad. If I save your life from an alligator, I have protected your ability to choose whether you want to live, so this is good. — Dan
Yes, the person's ability to make this decision is not inherently valuable. However, the value is in the choices that belong to the people who may lose their sight/life. Again, to compare to another form of consequentialism. The decision whether to flip the switch in the trolley problem isn't valuable according to utilitarianism. The world wouldn't be missing out on any value were you not able to make that decision because no one was on the tracks in the first place. Rather, the value is in the lives of the people being saved. Likewise, the value here is not in your ability to make a decision regarding other people's freedom, it is in those people's freedom. — Dan
No. No it's not. I have given plenty of examples which violate this definition. It is inapt. Pain is not inherently unpleasant. If that were the case, the examples i've given would not obtain. I think what you meant to discuss is discomfort. I tried to lead you here... Discomfort is inherently uncomfortable. Pain is not. — AmadeusD
Again, I have been saying that decisions which belong to other people are valuable all along. What I have been saying is not valuable is one person's ability to make choices which don't belong to them. — Dan
The decision between one happening and the other is morally important because it leads to bad consequences, not for the person making the choice, but for other people. — Dan
By "value scale" do you mean any moral principles at all, or do you mean something else? Those two definitely are relevant, as both make the application of moral principles relevant. That isn't what consequentialism is and there isn't really a conflict there. — Dan
Can you perhaps lay out which two aspects you're referring to, in terms of the scientific understanding? — AmadeusD
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0149763408001188Though pain undeniably has a discriminatory aspect, what makes it special is its affective-motivational quality of hurting.
Not really, but I think pain from sensory input and pain with no sensory input are the same thing from different sources. The experience is the same. — AmadeusD
This does not seem true to me. — AmadeusD
Here there's the possibility of a descent into a kind of degenerative recursiveness, the artist viewing their relationship with their subject matter through the eyes of their audience viewing the artist's relationship with their subject matter etc, a kind of hall of mirrors effect that distances the artist from the source of their art. — Baden
In my mind, the solution is that for this type of "knowing" to work it should be purely intuitive and incidental rather than purposeful and deliberative. — Baden
That entirely depends on the legal system. The same decision that may be a non-issue in one jurisdiction will result in a lengthy prison sentence in another jurisdiction. That is why jurisdiction shopping is such an important tool. — Tarskian
I don't agree that a pure medium can provide coherency where none comes from the artist's connection with their subject matter. — Baden
Incoherency in that respect to me must always be only apparent incoherency if it's to remain art. Otherwise, there's no way to distinguish random sounds from art. — Baden
Art to me is what results from a special connection between artist and world that the listener, reader, viewer etc can access through a given medium. But the connection is the origin of the art not the medium — Baden
You cannot just take the initiative to try something, no matter how minor or innocuous, and hope that things will go alright because even though your attempt was undoubtedly expected, it may not be well received, and any such failed attempt is already potentially a serious legal matter. — Tarskian