I don't know Dan, we're not making progress. In fact, what you write now, is making less and less sense to me.

A good candidate for a measure of value is one that is likely to be correct. In order to consider what is most likely to be correct, we make some assumptions, or theory selection criteria. — Dan

For instance, this appears to be totally backward to me. When you say "correct", wouldn't it be better to say "true"? The thing about correctness, is that it is theory dependent, so that "correct" is relative to the theory, therefore determined by the criteria set out by the theory. This leaves no principles for comparing one theory to another. So, your specific theory places "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices", as the principle which sets the criteria, but we still need a way to judge that principle. That is what I am asking you for. Justify that principle, give me the reason why it is the one you have chosen, why you think it is the best measure, the ideal. "True" implies corresponding with reality, and since you claim to believe in objective morality, then we ought to be able to look for some form of truth to serve as judgement for that principle. Can you tell me why you think it is true that "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices" makes a good candidate for a measure of value.

For example, utilitarianism selects happiness based on the assumption that whatever humans pursue for themselves they should also pursue for others based on the additional assumptions that not doing so would be irrationally making an exception of yourself and doing that would be immoral, and that humans all pursue their own happiness. As I've pointed out before, — Dan

The key aspect of this utilitarian principle is "the additional assumptions that not doing so would be irrationally making an exception of yourself". Happiness is a personal thing, just like making choices is a personal thing. That it is irrational to place one's own happiness as more important than that of another, is a principle which needs to be justified, just like a claim that it is irrational to place one's own choices as more important than the choices of another, would need to be justified. It seems to me that the opposite is really the case. Only I can do the things most required to make me happy, eat, sleep, etc., so I think it would be irrational to think that I should place other persons' happiness as just as important as mine, when another cannot give a person what is most required for happiness. If everyone had that attitude, that the happiness of others is just as important as one's own happiness, we'd end up with no one being happy, because no one would properly look after themselves, us all sinking into misery not be able to give oneself more than we are capable of giving to others. In reality (truth), happiness is a deeply personal thing. brought about by a person's relationship with oneself. It is not provided by others. And it is irrational not to make an exception of oneself.

When a tornado changes course and doesn't destroy someone's house, that is morally good, but the tornado isn't morally praiseworthy. — Dan

This makes no sense. Morality is associated exclusively with the intentional behaviour of human beings. It makes no sense to say that the behaviour of a tornado is "morally good". That's a terrible category mistake.

...but it is reasonable to assume consent to this.. — Dan

We haven't discussed "consent" at all. But, by your definition of what constitutes a choice which belongs to a person, consent from another would not suffice to convert a choice which is not one's own into one which is one's own.

There are lots of intentional acts one could make that affect others but are entirely that person's own choice. If I beat you in a contest, I have affected you with my choices, and in ways you would presumably prefer I didn't, but I haven't restricted your ability to understand and make your own decisions. — Dan

This is contrary to your definition of "one's own choice". You defined this as a choice concerning only what belongs to the person, one's mind, body, and property. A contest is something public, so choices concerning a contest are not one's own choices. Whether or not your choice restricts my ability to understand and make my own choices, is not an accurate indication as to whether or not your choice is your own choice. There are many choices which are not one's own choice, and so they have an effect on others, but the effect is not to restrict another's ability to make one's own choices.

This poses the problem that humans have lack of capability to change, at the level of thoughts and neurochemistry.

...

I am interested in research and also the nature of personal change and self mastery? Do you think that self-mastery is possible? — Jack Cummins

Hi Jack, I think that your op, and the title, show an inadequate approach to the issue. The questions you ask imply a separation between what we call "self", and what we call "thoughts", so that you ask "can we change our thoughts", and "do you think that self-mastery is possible". The latter even suggests a separation between "self", and something further which masters the self. Notice that "mastery" implies a master and something which is mastered, and the two are distinct.

So I believe questions like this are somewhat mistakenly expressed, and are therefore ill-fated to being forever discussed without being resolved. The problem is with what is assumed as implied, by the question, a separation between the thing directing and the thing being directed. The implied separation is not a true representation, so the question is doomed by the implicit falsity. The common example I've seen is "have you quit beating your wife?". Notice that the assumption implied by the question can make the question impossible to answer.

Instead, I suggest that you approach the issue with the attitude that thoughts are an inseparable part of one's self. Thoughts are not separable from the self, in a way that would allow the self to control the thoughts, rather the thoughts are an integral part of the self. And, we can look at the self, itself, as a changing being. From this perspective we can ask to what degree does the self, as the changing being, have control over its own changes. Then we ask about "self-control". Notice that "self-control" implies one unified being, rather than "self-mastery" which implies a master/slave separation.

Proceeding in this way, we see that thinking, and thoughts, are a means of self-control. Therefore we do not have to ask the ill-fated question, "does the self control the thoughts", we can accept as an observed fact, that the self has some degree of control, over itself, through the use of thoughts. Then we can proceed to investigate the nature of this self-control, and what it consists of.

The fact that these choices are not the ones which are often not the ones which are morally praiseworthy has nothing to do with whether it is a good measure of value. — Dan

You need to justify this. We are talking about moral value here, moral praiseworthiness. If these choices are not necessarily morally praiseworthy, then what makes the ability to make them a "good" measure of value? See, "good" here must have a meaning other than morally good, and this other meaning causes ambiguity and invites equivocation. This is what I mean when I say that your principles imply two distinct scales of value. One value system judges acts for moral praiseworthiness, and the other scale of value places the ability to make one's own choices" as "a good measure of value", therefore implying that which 'ought' to be protected. The latter, as the measure of value for the former, serves as the ideal for that scale.

The problem I apprehend is the issue of establishing compatibility, commensurability, between the two systems of value, the one which assigns moral value, and the other which assigns value to the ability to make one's own choice. You appear to have created a dichotomy between making one's own choices, the ability to do which, serves as the measure of moral value, and making morally good choices, which are inherently not one's own choices. Such a dichotomy would leave the two scales of value as incompatible.

I would agree that the freedom to choose X includes the freedom not to choose X, but that isn't an issue here because that is entirely consistent with the idea that only freedom over those things which belong to a person ought to be protected. — Dan

Sure, but we literally have no place to go from here. Making only choices which belong to the person would lock one into one's own self=created solipsist world of private property. As soon as we enter the public sphere, even just to open our mouths to speak, we have an effect on the property, or minds, of others. Therefore the freedom to make one's own choices is not any type of freedom at all, it refers to a severe restriction. Because of this restrictive nature of "making one's own choices", I don't see how it could ever be something valuable.

When we take into account the fact that anytime an intentional act has an effect on others then it is not properly called "one's own choice", there is significant doubt as to whether this type of choice has any value at all. So to give "freedom" any value we need to release the restrictions beyond that of the self-imposed solipsism of "making one's own choices". However, when we move into the public sphere of making choices which affect others, we need to respect the fact that the freedom to make a good choice is also the freedom to make a bad choice. The freedom to say something good is also the freedom to say something bad. The freedom to take what is necessary for my subsistence may be the freedom to rob you of what is necessary for your subsistence. Consequently, the inability to assign value to "freedom" is extended accordingly.

No, I would say that we should judge the morality of choices by reference to their consequences and that the measure of goodness/badness of those consequences is how ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is protected/violated. I feel like I've said this many times, and you are still attempting to interpret what I'm saying to mean anything other than what I am saying. — Dan

Ok, so we're back to where we were a few posts ago. The goodness or badness of an intentional act is judged according to how the "ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is protected/violated" by that act. Now I will ask again, the question you refused to answer. Why do you believe that the moral value of all intentional acts can be based int this principle, "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices", when you have explicitly said that good acts come from choices which are not one's own choices? How do you justify the value of this type of choice, "one's own choice", when this is not even the type of choice which produces good acts?

It sounds like you are saying that it is not coherent to say that a person is free to choose X but not free to choose Y. Or free to do what you like with X (in this case, your own mind, body and property) but not with Y (other people's). — Dan

As I said, the issue is that freedom to choose X is also freedom to not choose X, or to choose not X. If a person is free to do something, then the person is also free not to do that. If X signifies a good act, and good implies moral value, then it is incoherent to say that there is moral value in freedom. Good and not good are equally the consequences of freedom.

Maybe it would help me if you told me what you think it is I am claiming as simply as possible. Then maybe we can get to the bottom of where this misunderstanding is coming from. — Dan

That's what I'm doing, trying to understand what you are claiming. I indicated a long time ago, that your entire system makes very little sense to me. To begin with, I could not at all understand how you used "freedom", and "types of freedom". When I got beyond that, I found the key to understanding the entire system was in your principle "one's own choices", or choices which belong to the person, Now that I am beginning to understand, I am beginning to see the reasons for your strange representation of "freedom". I've come a long way, but I still cannot tell you what I think you are claiming. I think I need to know why you place such high value on "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". To me, this is not valuing freedom at all, because freedom is equally the ability to make choices which are not one's own.

In your temperature analogy, the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is not like the boiling point of water or the freezing point of water. — Dan

Yes, that is the point I am making, the two are dissimilar, because in the case of your ethical example, the ideal is not something which relates to the scale.

It would be more like the average amount of kinetic motion per atom (not a perfect analogy here, but certainly closer). Which is to say, it's the thing we are using as the measure of value. — Dan

OK, so you are saying that the things to be judged (in this case choices), have a specific property, and we can measure the quantity of that property. The specified property is "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". So, it appears like what you are saying is that we must look at choices made by people, and evaluate these choices as to the quantity of this property which they display.

The problem which I've been trying to bring your attention to, is that the choices being judged, or evaluated, are explicitly not "their own choices". So you are asking to evaluate choices for a property which they have been stated as not having. We cannot get anywhere like this.

Therefore, you need to propose a different way that the ideal, "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices", is related to the things being judged. But as I pointed out already, the two are dichotomous. The things being judged are "choices which are not their own". So you'll find, that the two are only related as opposing ends of the scale, like hot and cold.

To your second point, that doesn't answer my question. Is you issue that your don't think freedom can be valuable because you don't think it is coherent to talk about being free to do something but not free to do something else? — Dan

I'm saying that it is not coherent to say that a person is free to choose X, but not free to not choose X. Further, I am saying that if freedom is supposed to be valuable, some reasons must be given which respect this fact, that freedom means both, the possibility that X will be chosen, and also that X will not be chosen. That is to say that if you want to assign moral value to freedom, you must respect the fact that freedom provides the possibility of bad acts, just as much as good acts. So if we say X represents something which is good, freedom allows for the possibility of bad. Because of this it is impossible to say that "freedom" is valuable, from the perspective of "value" assigned by a system of morality. That's why I suggested earlier, that "freedom" must transcend the moral system, as something taken for granted, which makes the moral system both possible and necessary (in the sense of needed).

What I mean by "ideal", is a thing upon which a standard is based. For example in the temperature scale, the freezing point and boiling point of water, serve as ideals

The issue I am trying to point out to you, is that in scales like temperature, the ideals have a position within the scale, so that the scale is properly related to the ideal. In the case of your moral principle, the scale, good and bad is related to choices which are not one's own, but the ideal (the thing which serves as the standard of measurement) is choices which are one's own. So the ideal is outside of, and not properly related to the scale.

Now, you assign a value to the ideal, as that which ought to be protected, but this value is extrinsic to the values expressed by good and bad, and the value is not within the scale. So, unlike the scale of temperature, where the ideals are values within the scale, and other values are related, the value assigned to "the ability to make one's own choices" is not part of the scale of bad and good. Therefore you need to refer to another type of value, other than moral value (bad and good), to justify that this is something which ought to be protected, i.e., has value.

Also, as to your post replying to Punshhh: Are you suggesting that the freedom to do absolutely anything is valuable? Your freedom to, for example, torture a child to death? — Dan

The freedom to be evil, is equally the freedom to be good. That's the nature of free choice. So the freedom to torture a child to death, is the very same freedom as the freedom to save a child from being tortured. That's the point with free choice, it is the ability to choose freely from a vast variety of possibilities. Plato said that the man who is capable of doing the most evil is also capable of doing the most good. So when we look at knowledge as power, it can be used for bad or good. These are not distinct types of knowledge, the same knowledge might be put toward good actions, or it might be put toward bad actions. Likewise with "freedom". The same freedom allows a person to be good or to be bad.

Good luck trying to get Dan to understand that. He seems to think that by representing "relative to the agent" as "types of freedom", he can get around that issue. So he ends up with types of restrictions, and then proceeds with a compromised "freedom". I' am now trying to show him that even with his compromised sense of freedom, the problem still cannot be resolved because the compromised freedom cannot be justified as something valuable.

The whole idea of these choices being "the ideal type" is an invention of yours. It is not reflected in anything I have said. — Dan

You said:

The thing which makes any action good or bad is the extent to which is protects or violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. — Dan

If you cannot understand that this means that this type of choice ("their own choices") is the ideal in relation to what makes any action bad or good, then I don't know what else to say.

Again, I'm happy to, but I'm not moving off of this topic while you are still misunderstanding the measure of value under discussion. If you don't understand the measure of value, then I think any conversation about why it is our best candidate for a measure of value is likely to be doomed from the off. — Dan

I'm afraid it's you who is having difficulty understanding "the measure of value under discussion". The principle by which value is scaled is "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". This implies that "ones own choices" is the ideal which the scale for valuation, is modeled on. You very clearly said that the extent to which the ability to make their own choices is protected or violated is the thing which makes an action bad or good. "The thing" here refers to an ideal, the ability to make their own choices. Therefore their own choices is an ideal.

This discussion has strayed too far off topic.

One's own choices often aren't really good or bad. If I choose to key my own car, that isn't good or bad, it just is. These choices certainly aren't "the ideal". What is important is the ABILITY of persons to understand and make their own choices. Their freedom. That is what needs protecting. Since most choices of my own choices don't protect that freedom or violate it, they are generally fairly neutral actions. — Dan

If such choices, "one's own" are generally not good choices, then why seek to protect that ability. I think it's incorrect to say that these choices are not the ideal, according to your principles. If protecting the ability to make such choices is the standard whereby other choices are judged as good or bad, than this type of choice is named as the ideal choice, the one which all others are measured against in relation to their capacity to enable that type. If this wasn't the case, then you could simply posit as your principle, "to protect the ability to make good choices". But you didn't propose "good choices" as your ideal, you proposed "choices which are one's own". So you talk about protecting the ability to make that type of choice, rather than the ability to make good choices

This is where the inconsistency lies hidden. You want to protect freedom, because you think that it has some value. However, freedom allows for both good and bad acts, and what you really want out of personal freedom is good acts. So valuing freedom is inherently inconsistent with valuing good acts because freedom allows bad acts As a sort of compromise to "freedom" you posit a "type of freedom", which is the freedom to make one's own choices. This is a type of choice which is generally neutral, removed from good and bad. But, like I already explained, this is not a type of freedom at all.

It's a highly compromised, restricted sense of "freedom", specifically formulated so as to make it appear like there is a type of freedom, which the protection of, would be consistent with the desire for good acts. In other words, if true freedom was what your principle sought to protect, this would not be consistent with cultivating good acts, because freedom allows for bad acts. So you posit a false freedom, the freedom to make one's own choices, which is not any type of freedom at all, because it consists of a very restricted, narrow and limited, range of choices. Then you state that one's own choices are neutral choices, to ensure that protecting one's own choices would not result in bad choices, in which case this ability ought not be protected. Therefore you end up with an extremely contrived sense of "freedom" which you are seeking to protect, the freedom to make choices which are neither bad nor good, i.e. choices which are morally irrelevant.

To support your enterprise, you need to produce some solid principles as to why the ability to make morally neutral choices ought to be protected at all. And, if this is supposed to be a form of freedom, what kind of freedom is it really. Is it the freedom from moral principles? If we all made only this type of choice, then we wouldn't have to concern ourselves with good or bad anymore. Is this the ideal?

Again, I'm very happy to discuss why I think the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices is the best measure of value we have available, but I really want to make sure you have understood what that is first. — Dan

Go right ahead, I really want to know how you justify what I believe to be a false freedom. This is what it's all about. You have specifically designed what you call a "type of freedom", the freedom to make choices which belong to oneself, in an effort to make the value of "freedom" consistent with the value of morality. Now I would like to see you justify the value which you assign to this "type of freedom"

...which is what I was doing in suggesting that we look at how other animals make decisions. If how animals make decisions is similar to how humans make decisions then that can shed some light on the human condition. This is why we use animals as test subjects to get at some aspect of the human condition without harming humans. — Harry Hindu

But we still don't know how animals make choices. And, it's doubtful that selections made by other animals can even qualify as decisions. To choose, and to decide, have very different meanings.

It is you that is ignoring my request for you to explain what you mean by free will. — Harry Hindu

I answered this. It's the capacity to make choices. Some say it's free will, others do not. That there is not agreement on this indicates that we do not understand it.

If free will simply entails making decisions and I have shown that computers can make decisions does that mean computers have free will? You either agree that it does and we can then settle the case as one of where you use different words than I do to explain the same process, or disagree and you would have to come up with a better explanation as to what free will is. The ball is in your court. — Harry Hindu

Computers do not make decisions. To decide is to come to a resolution as the result of consideration. Computers are incapable of consideration. Computers do not even choose, they simply follow algorithms. To choose is to select from a multitude of options. There are no options for a computer, it must follow its rules. Even a so-called random number generator is a case of following a set of rules, and not a true choice

It appears like you just like to throw words around willy nilly, pretending that you can argue logically by giving the same word different meanings. That's known as equivocation. You can say that a computer "decides" if you want, and we say that a human being "decides", but obviously what is referred to by that word in each of these two cases, is completely different. So to say that the computer's activity is relevant to what we are discussing, would be equivocation.

The capacity to choose isn't just a human condition. Other animals make choices too. — Harry Hindu

You're still make irrelevant comments. The fact that human beings are animals is an essential aspect of the human condition. So, presenting the fact that other animals make choices, as do human beings, does nothing to suggest that this is not a part of the human condition. Neither does the fact that human beings make machines which also appear to be making choices.

Logically, you will always make the same choice given the same set of circumstances and the same set of options, just like a computer. And just like a computer, you choices can become predictable. — Harry Hindu

I believe this proposition is fundamentally flawed. There is no such thing as two distinct instances of "the same set of circumstances". That is a fundamental aspect of reality, and also of the human condition, ensured by the nature of time. Any set of circumstance is unique, and not repeatable as "the same". Do you disagree with this?

So the question isn't, "do we have the capacity to choose". It's "do we have the capacity to choose freely", whatever that means. Hopefully you can enlighten me. — Harry Hindu

You seem to be willfully ignoring what I am saying. We do not understand the capacity to choose. Therefore we do not understand the human condition. In order to understand the human condition we need to first understand the capacity to choose. "We" includes I. Therefore I cannot "enlighten" you on this matter.

There isn't two scales or value systems. The thing which makes any action good or bad is the extent to which is protects or violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices.

...

I'm happy to answer why this is the best measure of moral value (though I think it is covered in the primer), but I'd like to make sure we have pinned down the misunderstanding you seem to be having with the measure of value first. — Dan

Take this principle, "the extent to which it protects or violates the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". We have to justify it by saying why understanding and making there own choices is something which ought to be protected. This means that we need to place that principle "the ability to understand and make their own choices" in relation to other potential first principles, and scale it as the most valuable, in order to justify it as "the best measure of moral value".

Now the problem is that "the good acts", which are acts that protect another's or a multitude of others' ability to make their own choices, are not derived from a person's own choices. Since these good acts are ones which come from choices which are not one's own choices, it appears like this is contrary to the chosen principle, that protecting the ability to make their own choices is "the best measure of moral value".

So this is the way that it looks to me. You have two distinct types of choices, those which are one's own, and those which are not. The two produce a dichotomy. There is a scale for evaluating the one type, those which are not, as to bad or good. That scale is based in the assumption that the other type is valuable. The problem is that the two are dichotomous, "one's own", and "not one's own". And, since the primary category labeled "one's own" is the basis for scaling the acts of the other category as to bad or good, then no matter how good an act which is not one's own gets on the scale, it can never reach the level of one's own act. We will always have to say that one's own choice will trump any moral value of good or bad, assigned to an act which is not one's own.

The important thing to acknowledge is that there is a dichotomy produced by the principle "the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices". This principle turns making one's own choices into an ideal, in relation to the other category which is judged for good and bad. "One's own choices" is the highest goal, a sort of perfection, and it is set off from the other choices which are not one's own, in a special ideal category, as distinct, and incompatible with, the other choices, not one's own, which are judged for degrees of goodness.

It is my opinion, that you need to dissolve this dichotomy. The principle which sets the high (good) or low (bad) of the scale needs to relate to something within the scale, instead of something which the scale cannot provide for, because the dichotomy. For example, in a temperature scale, the boiling point of water, the freezing point of water, are "ideals" which the scale is modeled on, but they relate to points within the scale. So for instance, suppose we class all free choices together, including one's own and not one's own, in one class, as free choices, and scale them as to bad or good. Notice, we cannot say that as the choices get closer and closer to being totally one's own, they get better and better. This indicates that "the ability to make their own choices" is not an acceptable principle to scale good and bad. It is not a valid ideal. Therefore, I can conclude that you have arbitrarily placed that principle as an ideal, and the dichotomy which it creates between the acts which fulfill the criteria of that principle, and the acts which are judged for goodness, are incompatible. And, unless you dissolve this dichotomy you will always have inconsistency in your ethics.

You're still not making any sense. Let's assume that there is a whole lot of people, and each one has the capacity to make one's own choices, and so we value each such capacity as one. The capacity to make a choice which does not belong to the person is given a value of zero. Doesn't this imply that making a choice which does not belong to you, has no value? The capacity to make such a choice is not at all something to be protected, it has no value.

Now, you say that making a choice which does not belong to you can be good. How do you value this designation of "good"? It cannot be that it is valuable because it protects the capacity of others to make their own choices, because no matter how many things with the value of one that you add up, it still cannot remove the value of zero from the choice which does not belong to the person. So you base that value of good in some supposedly objective moral principles.

This is why Amadeus and I have both told you that you have two distinct value scales. And I believe that the two are incompatible. The primary scale of value, as stated by you, is the value of one's ability to make one's own choices. The secondary scale of value is the scale which we assign to choices that do not belong to the person. This is the scale of good and bad, and it's based on moral principles.

If the secondary scale, the one that applies to choices which do not belong to the person, is the one for good and bad, then what is the primary scale based in? What is the reason for protecting one's capacity to make one's own choices? "Good choices" are in the category of choices which do not belong to the person, so how is there any reason to protect choices which do belong to the person? Do you see what I mean? There appears to be no reason why the capacity to make one's own choices ought to be protected. This appears to be just an arbitrary designation by you. You could have chosen the capacity to eat, or the capacity to breathe, or to walk, or to sleep, or to grow, etc.. Why choose "the ability to understand and make their own choices" as the thing which needs to be protected. What value system do you apply, to give this type of activity the highest position?

You're assuming that free will is part of the human condition. I'm saying that it likely isn't. — Harry Hindu

What you believe about "free will" is irrelevant. We do have the capacity to choose, and we all know and accept this. Some call this 'free will", if you want to just call it "the capacity to choose", that's fine. Whatever, way that you describe it, or try to understand it, it's part of the human condition which we need to understand in order to adequately understand the human condition. The fact that some people say we have free will, and others do not, is very strong evidence that the human condition is not understood, and we need to know the truth about this matter before it will be understood.

The fact that something is commonly said does not necessarily imply that what is said is a fact. — Harry Hindu

That is exactly the point I am making. We need to know the truth about these things before we can claim to have an understanding of the human condition. If we knew the truth about free will, then we'd have a much better basis for a claim about understanding the human condition. Since we do not know the truth about this, we cannot claim to have an understanding of the human condition.

I doubt it's possible. We communicate much more than mathematical ideas. If we tried using math to talk about any of those things, it would no longer be math. It would be numbers, equations, etc., representing things. Just another language. 1 stands for me. 27 stands for eat. 4,534 stands for apple.
1 + 27 + 4,534 = I eat apple.
There's no math in that. Yeah, I just did that in five minutes. But would we find a solution if we spent a thousand years trying? I doubt it. And I assume it's been tried by plenty of mathematicians over the centuries. I can't imagine a way of actually doing math that also means things we want to discuss. — Patterner

I think this is where the op goes astray. Information is what is represented by symbols, and "mathematical" is a type of information. Mathematical symbols have corresponding with them, mathematical information. But not all symbols are mathematical symbols, nor is all information mathematical information.

"Identity" is what a particular (individual) thing is said to have. So when a symbol represents a particular thing, this is a special type of information in which identity is assumed. So the information represented with "that apple is mine", is not mathematical information.

The principal difference between these two types of information seems to be that the same mathematical information is freely applied in a wide variety of situations, in a universal way, and to a multitude of different things, while identity information is by its nature restricted in application, to particular things.

Dreams and hallucinations are existentially dependent upon veridical perception. — creativesoul

That is an unwarranted assumption. It is quite possible, and even likely I would say, that dreams are prior to sense perception.

It is the measure of moral value, the goodness or badness of this choice is precisely because of how it affects persons' ability to understand and make their own choices. Just like if the person shot a lion that was about to eat someone, it isn't that shooting lions is intrinsically valuable it is good because it protects the ability to understand and make their own decisions of the person who is about to be eaten. This isn't contradictory, it's consequentialism. — Dan

The problem is that the choice being made does not belong to the person making it. It is not one's own choice. It is a choice concerning the life of another. Therefore, by your principle, goodness or badness is irrelevant because these are concerned with the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices, and this is a different type of choice. It is a choice which is not one's own.

Having a true understanding of the human condition would come first and from that extrapolate whether our actions are free or determined. — Harry Hindu

No, that doesn't make any sense. Obviously, having a true understanding of the human condition requires knowing about free will, as a part of the human condition.

I don't want to steer to far off-topic but what is meant by "free" in "free will"? — Harry Hindu

What is meant by it, is irrelevant to this point. Since it is commonly said that human beings have free will, then we need to know what is being referred to in order to understand the human condition, of which free will is said to be a part of.

Color experience requires both, colorful things(things capable of being seen as colorful by a creature so capable) and a creature so capable. — creativesoul

This doesn't affect the point I made. "Things capable of being seen as colourful by a creature so capable" is really a meaningless statement. Different creatures could see different things as colourful. And when you consider that absolutely anything could be seen as colourful, you will start to understand that the "thing capable of being seen" is not even necessary for the experience of colour. That's what Descartes demonstrated in his "evil demon" thought experiment, which is now commonly presented as "brain in a vat". The reality of dreams and hallucinations demonstrates that your stated condition is really not required.

Things capable of being seen as red are those with physical surfaces reflecting the appropriate wavelengths of the visible spectrum. A capable creature is one capable of detecting and/or distinguishing those wavelengths. — creativesoul

That's only by your definition of "seeing red". But that definition is clearly debatable, so who knows what range of experiences could be known by other creatures as "seeing red".

They are inherently capable of being seen as red by a creature so capable. They do not look red unless they are capable of being seen as red by a creature so capable and they're being looked at. — creativesoul

This is really very meaningless. It's like saying that a good act is one capable of being seen as good by a creature so capable. Notice, you take something purely subjective, a creature's capacity for discernment, and create the illusion that the discernment "red" is a property of the thing, rather than being the judgement produced by the subject.

You do this by saying that the thing itself is "inherently capable of being seen as red". However, if you think about this statement, we could say it about anything. Anything in the universe, whatsoever, has the capacity to been seen as red, by a creature which is capable of seeing it as red. And so the statement is completely meaningless.

You say that the ability to make "one's own" choices is the measure of moral value. Then, you want to allow that a person making choices which are not one's own, also has moral value. This is contradictory.

From Plato's Allegory of the Cave.
After exiting the cave, and "seeing the light", the philosopher returns to the cave, with the intent of teaching others what has been revealed to him.

[Socrates] Imagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?

[Glaucon] To be sure, he said.

[Socrates] And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the prisoners who had never moved out of the cave, while his sight was still weak, and before his eyes had become steady (and the time which would be needed to acquire this new habit of sight might be very considerable) would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only catch the offender, and they would put him to death.

[Glaucon] No question, he said.

[Socrates] This entire allegory, I said, you may now append, dear Glaucon, to the previous argument; the prison-house is the world of sight, the light of the fire is the sun, and you will not misapprehend me if you interpret the journey upwards to be the ascent of the soul into the intellectual world according to my poor belief, which, at your desire, I have expressed whether rightly or wrongly God knows. But, whether true or false, my opinion is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort; and, when seen, is also inferred to be the universal author of all things beautiful and right, parent of light and of the lord of light in this visible world, and the immediate source of reason and truth in the intellectual; and that this is the power upon which he who would act rationally, either in public or private life must have his eye fixed.

It's been moral value all along. What is morally valuable (or rather what is the measure of moral value) is persons' ability to understand and make their own choices. It isn't about whether you value your ability to do so or not, or whether that provides some value to your life, the claim is that the extent to which that ability is violated or restricted determines the goodness or badness of the consequences of some action (and therefore the morality of that action). — Dan

OK, so let's call this premise #1, a person's capacity to make one's own choices is what defines "morally valuable". That is the premise which lays out the measurement scheme for "moral value". We can say that a person's ability to make choices which belong to them defines "moral value", and moral valuation is a judgement as to the degree that this ability is enabled

Now, you want to allow a second premise, that a person's choices which are not one's own choices (as per your examples), are also morally valuable. Do you see that the two proposed premises are inconsistent? We cannot say, without contradiction, that the measure of moral value is a person's ability to make one's own choices, and also say that the person's ability to make choices which are not one's own choices also has moral value. The latter, premise #2, the person's ability to make choices which do not belong to them, has already been excluded from the possibility of having any moral value, by premise #1.

In a deterministic universe, we all do what we naturally do. All acts feel natural and intended. — Harry Hindu

A true understanding does not simply consist of "things are as they are".

I don't understand why we would need to escape determinism, or why free will is necessary. — Harry Hindu

To have a true understanding of the human condition.

What makes causality and determinism necessarily materialistic? My thoughts naturally lead to other thoughts. Certain experiences are prerequisites for certain thoughts. It seems to me that my thoughts can "bump into" other thoughts and create novel thoughts. New thoughts are an amalgam of prior thoughts and experiences. It seems to me that causality and determinism could be just as immaterial as material. — Harry Hindu

OK then, just take "materialism" out of that post, and replace it with "determinism", if it offends you.

The observer, when he seems to himself to be observing a stone, is really, if physics is to be believed, observing the effects of the stone upon himself.

The next step, I believe, after freeing oneself from naive realism, is to free oneself from materialism altogether, and understand that the so-called "effects of the stone upon himself" are not properly called "effects" at all. The percept is a freely constructed creation of the living being, rather than the effects of a causal chain. This understanding enables the reality of the concept of free will. The living being's motivational aspects, which are very much involved in all neurological activity, and appear to allow the being to act with a view toward the future, (understood in its most simple form as the will to survive), cannot be understood as the product of causal chains. This is what science reveals to us, through its inability to understand such aspects in determinist terms.

I think the problem might be that you are thinking of things having "moral value to you" or "to me", but that isn't the case. — Dan

Your example is of a choice which an individual must make. And, your principle is that what is valued and protected is the individual's capacity to understand and make one's own choices. How do you introduce this other sense of "value", "moral value" which is neither a value to me in my decision making, nor to you in your decision making?

You've been saying that my ability to choose is protected, and valuable, as well as that of others. Now you are claiming another type of value, "moral value". This is an indication of what I've been telling you, you have to distinct scales of evaluation.

I didn't say it wasn't a restriction. It is a type of freedom, specifically one restricted to only those choices that belong to a person. — Dan

How can you say it isn't a restriction to freedom, and then proceed to say that it is a freedom which is restricted to...? Don't you see this as explicit contradiction?

I say that a person's ability to understand and make their own choices (which I have always maintained are the choices that belong to them) is the measure of moral value, the thing that determines whether the consequences of an action are good or bad. — Dan

But now you are saying that moral value is independent from anyone's choices. If it's independent from the choices people make, then on what principles do you value a person's ability to choose? This would just be a random choice as something to be chosen as valuable. If the ability to choose, the ability to make my own choices, is not a value to me, and not a value to anyone else, then how can you claim that it is something valuable? You're making no sense at all now. You are proposing values which are not valuable to anyone. How can you even call them "values"?

No, it doesn't. I seriously do not think you are taking enough time to read these replies. I am directly, stringently addressing this point in each reply and you seem to miss it entirely. I have given you several inarguable examples of why pain is not always unpleasant and further that this isn't part of it's nature. If you reject this, fine, but you need to actually tell me why all the examples and reasons are wrong. You have not. The quote you used directly contradicts your position by my existing in this discussion. You can't be missing that, can you? You're replying, after all, to someone who does not always experience unpleasantness along with pain. — AmadeusD

What you are insisting in this discussion, that pain does not necessarily involve unpleasantness, simply indicates that you and I have a different understanding of the what the word "pain" means.

You keep referring to examples you have given of pain without unpleasantness, but I can't find any such examples. All I see is assertions.

In order that we can discuss our difference in opinion as to what "pain" refers to, you need to provide for me a definition, or some examples. Tell me what sort of sensation is "pain", if it is not an unpleasant sensation as the dictionary defines it. Or, is it not a sensation at all? Is pain a bunch of neurological processes? If so, then what distinguishes the neurological process called "pain" from other instances of the sense of touch?

Pain does not require unpleasantness to obtain. It simply doesn't. I don't know why you're claiming this against empirical evidence of millions of humans experiencing pain without unpleasantness - and in fact, experiencing pleasure from pain. This is just... why are you trying to simply erase a load of facts about other people's experience, including mine? Are you trying to say I'm lying? — AmadeusD

Again, you are simply insisting there is empirical evidence from millions of humans, and saying that I am denying it, without providing any such evidence. The fact that in many cases, pleasure comes from pain, does not prove that pain is not unpleasant. Plato covered this very thoroughly, because at his time there was a believe that pleasure was nothing but a relief from pain This would imply that all pleasure comes from pain, and pain is a necessary requirement for pleasure. as the pleasure comes from the relief which is actually the pain ending.

But Plato demonstrated how there is pleasure which does not require pain. What this indicates is that "pain" is not a proper opposite to pleasure. However, it does not demonstrate that pain does not consist of unpleasantness. Unpleasantness may still be posited as the proper opposite to pleasure, and since there are unpleasant feelings which are not pain, pleasure may be derived as a relief from these feelings rather than from a relief from pain.

Pain is a sensation directed at the host attending to an injury. — AmadeusD

Oh good, here's a sort of definition. It's not adequate though, for two very important reasons. First, 'the sensation of an injury' does not suffice because there are many internal pains like headache, stomachache, commonly called "pains" which are not due to injury. Second there are many instances when "the host attending to an injury" does not involve pain. If we look at natural healing, the first and most obvious is coma. Also, in the natural process of healing a wound there is always much time with no pain, and often an itch (which is not pain) develops. Further, there are unnatural instances, when the injury does not cause pain, such as the use of painkillers. They are called "painkillers", not "host attending to an injury killers", because they do not prevent the host from attending to the injury. In other words, it should be very clear to you now, that there is no specific sensation associated with "attending to an injury", so this would make a very faulty definition of pain.

It's a tricky thing. I absolutely, almost sexually, enjoy the pain of scalding water on the tops of my hands, my inner thighs, behind my shoulders and right on my hip bones (to the point that i had very midly burned myself many times in pursuit of it (opportunistic pursuit, to be sure)). It is definitely pain. But it is definitely not unpleasant. Its a tool telling me to stop fucking running scalding water on myself lmao. EVENTUALLY this can get unpleasant - as, when my skin starts melting, my brain kicks it up a few notches. Fair, too. I'm not exactly the most caring about my own body in this way. I self harmed for years. another notch on this club. — AmadeusD

Finally, an example for me to look at. What you are doing with this example, is taking your faulty definition of pain, "the host attending to an injury", and saying, 'I have had injury before, without unpleasantness, therefore pain, which is the sensation of the host attending to an injury does not require unpleasantness. I think we've all experienced injury without pain. Sometimes, I'll accidentally cut myself without even noticing it, until I see blood. So all your example really does, is prove that your definition is wrong. We can, and do, have injury without pain, and your example is a demonstration of this this. So this is just more evidence that there is no specific sensation which can be defined as the host attending to an injury, as injury causes many different sensations, crossing all sorts of boundaries.

I just like pointing out how the semiotic approach goes further in emphasising that our model of the world is also the model of "ourselves in the world". — apokrisis

I don't think this is really the case, and that is why this sort of discussion goes on forever. Our model of the world is one put together through the scientific method of experimentation and observation. The model of ourselves in the world is based in principles of moral philosophy, because it must include intention motivation, politics and other human interactions. These two types of models are very far apart.

Clearly, as between you and I, there is not a 1:1 match between pain and "unpleasantness". — AmadeusD

For sure, there are many types of unpleasantness, and not every one is pain. "Unpleasant" is the wider concept. So not all unpleasantness is pain, but all pain involves unpleasantness.

Pain (i.e a sensation that indicates injury - physical, or mental (but mental is awhole different discussion I think)) doesn't, inherently, mean displeasure. Maybe that's clearer? — AmadeusD

No, not any clearer at all. I think you misunderstood what I meant when I said that unpleasantness inheres within the definition of pain. "Inheres" means existing within something, as an essential property. What this means is that pain implies unpleasantness, because one cannot have pain without unpleasantness. But the inverse is not implied, unpleasantness does not imply pain, because there is unpleasantness which does not involve pain, so pain does not inhere within the definition of unpleasantness.

Perhaps you need to maintain my position (that pain is mental) to support the idea that pain is inherently unpleasant, as clearly, to the injury part (i.e the "physical" aspect of pain) this is patently not hte case. — AmadeusD

We are not talking about the physical aspect of pain. We are talking about pain. I went through this already. There is understood to be a sensory aspect of pain and an affective aspect of pain. You want to focus on the sensory aspect, but just because there is a sensory aspect does not mean that the affective aspect is not a real, and necessary part of pain. Have you not researched those two aspects yet?

No, everything you just said is incorrect. There aren't two systems of value at all. I think you have gotten very much the wrong end of the stick again, but somehow it's an entirely different end than you had before. I'm starting to wonder what shape this stick is. Let me try to explain again. — Dan

I don't know Dan, you presented me with the stick. I tried both ends, and still get it wrong, maybe it's time to go sideways.

What is of moral value is the ability of persons to understand and make their own choices. The extent to which this is protected or restricted/violated determines whether some set of consequences is good or bad. For example, if I steal your car, then i have restricted your ability to understand and make choices regarding your car, which you own, so this is bad. If I save your life from an alligator, I have protected your ability to choose whether you want to live, so this is good. — Dan

Now we're right back to the original problem. I think the stick is circular, we've gone right around the bend, and we're back at the beginning What is of moral value to me, is to make my own choices, my free choice. But that includes the possibility of choosing to steal your car, or throw you to the alligators. When I told you this, you wanted to restrict this value, to choices which "belong" to me, meaning concerning what is mine. So that is how you define "one's own choice".

But this means choosing to save you from the alligators has no value to me, because it is not a choice which belongs to me. Now you include others, and say that their ability to make their own choices is also to be protected, and, " The extent to which this is protected or restricted/violated determines whether some set of consequences is good or bad." But this still does not provide me with the principle require to save you from the alligators. What gives me the right to make a choice which does not belong to me? Making such choices is not protected, and if you move to protect them, I may choose to throw you to the alligators instead.

Do you see what I mean? My freedom to choose what belongs to me is protected. But for me to choose to protect someone else's freedom to choose what belongs to them, this is not a protected choice. However, it is necessary for me to make choices which do not belong to me, in order for me to do morally good deeds. So that restriction, the restriction which limits my protected choices to those which belong to me, must be bad itself. And now we're right back to the beginning, where protecting one's freedom of choice meant protecting ones right to choose anything.

We can't have it both ways. If restricting one's freedom, to only choices which belong to the person, is good, then we cannot base good and bad on whether or not a persons freedom is restricted. You first assumed that this was not a restriction, just a type of freedom, but when I pressed you, you recognized that it really is a restriction. Now, since it is a restriction, and it is a good restriction, we cannot base moral good and bad on whether freedom is restricted.

You ought to see the vicious circle you put us into. First you say that a person's freedom to make one's own choices is good. Then you say "one's own" means concerning only their own body and property. Then you want to allow that saving someone from the alligators, a choice which is not one's own choice, is also good, so you allow that making a choice which does not belong to the person is also good, so long as it protects another's ability to make own's own choice. But this circling back has undermined your primary principle, because we now we have to allow that making a choice which is not one's own choice, is also good, and might even be better than making one's own choice. Therefore we must conclude that the primary premise, that a person's ability to make one's own choices is what needs to be protected is faulty. We need to premise instead, that one's ability to make choices, whether the choices belong to them or not, needs to be protected, if we want to proceed with consequentialism.

Yes, the person's ability to make this decision is not inherently valuable. However, the value is in the choices that belong to the people who may lose their sight/life. Again, to compare to another form of consequentialism. The decision whether to flip the switch in the trolley problem isn't valuable according to utilitarianism. The world wouldn't be missing out on any value were you not able to make that decision because no one was on the tracks in the first place. Rather, the value is in the lives of the people being saved. Likewise, the value here is not in your ability to make a decision regarding other people's freedom, it is in those people's freedom. — Dan

I think I now see what's going on, thanks to @AmadeusD. You have two distinct value systems. One is "moral value" based in consequentialism, and the other is the value of a person's ability to understand and make their own decisions. The problem is, as I've been saying from the beginning of the thread, that these two, consequentialism based principles, and freedom based principles, are "incompatible". But now that we have progressed toward looking at these principles in terms of "values", the better word might be "incommensurable". So, we have the situation where the value of one cannot be measured by the same scale as the value of the other, and this indicates the the two are categorically different.

To put this in perspective, with your example, let's consider that all people have freedom to understand and make there own decisions. And, any individual can scale and value the decisions which one makes. That is how a person decides, through some priority system. Also, since everyone has such freedom, and one's own system for deciding, we need a scale of value to relate one person's freedom and decisions to another person's. These two are very different, how I value and scale my own freedom and decisions, and how I relate two or more people's freedom and decisions.

Let's call the latter, relating a number of peoples freedom and decisions, to each other, as "moral" value. The reason I got so confused was that you were saying that the former, the value of one's freedom to make one's own decisions constituted "moral relevance". So let's give this value a different name. I propose we call this "intellectual value". So the value of a person's ability to understand and make ones own decisions, is called "intellectual value", and the value of one person's decisions in relation to others is called "moral value".

Would you agree that it might be helpful if we look at things under these distinct terms, so that I don't get confused? Then in your example, each person involved has one's own intellectual value, and the question you are asking does not concern the intellectual value of one person, the person in the position of making that choice, but it concerns moral value, which is a relationship of the intellectual values of all the people involved.

No. No it's not. I have given plenty of examples which violate this definition. It is inapt. Pain is not inherently unpleasant. If that were the case, the examples i've given would not obtain. I think what you meant to discuss is discomfort. I tried to lead you here... Discomfort is inherently uncomfortable. Pain is not. — AmadeusD

Huh. I think that's a very strange thing to say. Unpleasantness is exactly what "pain" indicates to me. It refers to a wide range of unpleasant feelings, just like the dictionary states. What does "pain" mean to you? Does it simply mean the sensation of touch? Are all touches painful to you, or do you have a way to distinguish a painful feeling from a not painful feeling?

Again, I have been saying that decisions which belong to other people are valuable all along. What I have been saying is not valuable is one person's ability to make choices which don't belong to them. — Dan

Isn't this what the example is, a person faced with making a choice which does not belong to that person, because it concerns the lives of others? And isn't this what you say is not valuable?

The decision between one happening and the other is morally important because it leads to bad consequences, not for the person making the choice, but for other people. — Dan

Yes, for the person making the choice, the choice does not concern this person's life, or eyesight, so the choice does not belong to the person who is making the choice. Therefore by the principle stated above, this choice is not valuable.

By "value scale" do you mean any moral principles at all, or do you mean something else? Those two definitely are relevant, as both make the application of moral principles relevant. That isn't what consequentialism is and there isn't really a conflict there. — Dan

I mean any type of value judgement, from moral to numerical. The thing to be judged must first be categorized to determine what sort of scale is applicable. So for example, are we judging temperature, weight, volume, etc..

In the case of your example, the person is faced with making a choice concerning the life and eyes of others, so that choice does not belong to that person. Therefore, as you say it is not morally valuable. However, I suggest that perhaps there is another type of scale by which it could be judged.

Can you perhaps lay out which two aspects you're referring to, in terms of the scientific understanding? — AmadeusD

I told you already. The two aspects are known scientifically as the sensory aspect of pain and the affective aspect of pain. If you research those to names you'll find plenty of information.

Though pain undeniably has a discriminatory aspect, what makes it special is its affective-motivational quality of hurting.

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0149763408001188

Not really, but I think pain from sensory input and pain with no sensory input are the same thing from different sources. The experience is the same. — AmadeusD

I was talking about the unpleasantness of pain. This is what makes it so that we cannot say that pain is simply sensory. Did you not read my example of sweetness? The taste of "sweet" is not defined as a pleasant or enjoyable taste, and sweet is simply a sensory experience. But if "sweet" was defined as a pleasant sensory experience, then it would be in the same category as "pain" which is defined as unpleasant.

This does not seem true to me. — AmadeusD

The definition of pain in my OED is: "1a the range of unpleasant bodily sensations produced by illness or by harmful physical contact, etc.."

Notice, "unpleasant" is the defining aspect of pain, sensations which are unpleasant. If you do not acknowledge this, then you and I will always be talking about different ideas when using the word "pain". And we' will be forever talking past each other in any discussion like this because I will refuse to accept the contradictory idea of pain which is not unpleasant.

Here there's the possibility of a descent into a kind of degenerative recursiveness, the artist viewing their relationship with their subject matter through the eyes of their audience viewing the artist's relationship with their subject matter etc, a kind of hall of mirrors effect that distances the artist from the source of their art. — Baden

I wouldn't call it a hall of mirrors, but more like a relation of reciprocation. Each back and forth comes with a change. That change ought to be increased knowledge.

In my mind, the solution is that for this type of "knowing" to work it should be purely intuitive and incidental rather than purposeful and deliberative. — Baden

In some ways I would agree with this. However, if we start with the assumption that "pure art" is solely a relationship between the artist and the medium, allowing that the only purpose which the artist proceeds with is to please oneself through experimentation with the medium, we are bound to encounter boredom. So I think that even within what might be called "pure art", there is the desire to please others. This is a base inclination which the artist may block, to avoid manipulation, but it still inheres as a source of inspiration. And, I think that this becomes a very critical and difficult balance for many artists, the balance between the desire to please oneself and the desire to please others. It has many facets. At the base level, the desire to please others may provide for manipulation, while the desire to please oneself may lead into a creative rut, but the reciprocation effect may mix this all up, with the influence of other interests, so that for example, the desire to please others may be replaced with a desire to make money, which is fundamentally a desire to please oneself, but in relation to interests other than the art. And this in turn could lead to the creative rut.

That entirely depends on the legal system. The same decision that may be a non-issue in one jurisdiction will result in a lengthy prison sentence in another jurisdiction. That is why jurisdiction shopping is such an important tool. — Tarskian

The problem with this point of view is that it assumes to know the type of legal action which will be applied, before hand. This implies that the person doing jurisdiction shopping intends wrongdoing from the beginning. However, you present the issue as if it is honest mistakes that would be made, which would bring about unwanted legal action, and these would be completely accidental.

The two are inconsistent. If a person going about one's life in a normal way, brings about unwanted legal action against oneself, due to honest mistake, and completely accidental circumstances, then that person would have no way to know in advance what sort of jurisdiction to shop for, being completely unaware of what sort of misadventure one might wander into. If the person is doing jurisdiction shopping, then they know what type of so-called "mistakes" they will be engaging in, and they plan to find somewhere that they can get away with these mistakes without legal ramifications.

Since you seem to be very focused on jurisdiction shopping, instead of focusing on limiting risk through understanding, care, and temperance, as the appropriate means for avoiding unwanted legal action, it appears like you are actively promoting intentional wrongdoing.

I don't agree that a pure medium can provide coherency where none comes from the artist's connection with their subject matter. — Baden

Some don't apprehend the coherency, others do. This is why ideas are fundamentally subjective, some see meaning where others do not, and this serves in the creation of ideas.

Incoherency in that respect to me must always be only apparent incoherency if it's to remain art. Otherwise, there's no way to distinguish random sounds from art. — Baden

Yes, I think that is exactly the point. The incoherency must be considered as 'it's incoherent to me, but maybe someone else can grasp the coherency'. Now, we can allow a blurring of the boundary between the aspects of coherency added (intentionally) by the artist, and those provided already by the medium. The artist may intentionally add things which may appear to some as incoherency within the medium. In Aristotelian words, accidentals are proper to the material aspect, but even the accidents have some form, so they are fundamentally intelligible. Then the basic intelligibility of the medium, which to many would appear unintelligible, can be mixed with the intelligibility of the form added by the artist. The skilled surrealist will completely hide the boundary between form provided by the intention of the artist, and form provided as inherent in the matter of the medium.

This can be called "understanding the medium" and in this way the artist knows the matter of the medium better than the scientist knows that matter, through observation and apprehension of how the accidental coherencies can mix with the intentional coherencies within a newly created object. The scientific observations are limited to judgements of consistent/not consistent with the theory. But the artist is not confined to those restrictions and can consider the raw perceptual response of human beings,

We can understood this allegorically as a sort of harmony which is not included in the applied theory of harmony. Take the example of music. The beat is given by a combination of the tempo and the time signature. This provides a formula for frequency, call it beats per minute. The musical notes also provide a formula for frequency, call it Hertz, or cycles per second. In theory, we could apply theories of harmony, and experiment to see how these frequencies sync up in harmony. But I don't think there is any such theory, only the experimentation by artists as to which beats harmonize better with which keys. Further, in a similar way the artist can cross boundaries between distinct media, to experiment with completely unknown coherencies. The wavelengths of colour for example, are actually frequencies, which may display harmonic properties with specific tones.

Those are just examples of how the artist is free to experiment with hidden coherencies undisclosed by theory. Of course the expression here is a sort of theory, so it defeats the purpose, because what I am talking about is coherencies which are truly unknown, hidden from all theory. However, it is given as an example of how it is possible that experimentation in abstract art, can expose through the observation of human response, coherencies which are completely hidden and unknown. Theory must be derived from somewhere.

Art to me is what results from a special connection between artist and world that the listener, reader, viewer etc can access through a given medium. But the connection is the origin of the art not the medium — Baden

Yes, that connection is the origin of the art, but we must consider the priority of the medium. The connection between the artist and the world is a very special type of relation in which the artist has a unique understanding of the medium, or media. The uniqueness of that understanding is displayed by the uniqueness of the art. However, I do believe we can apply some generalizations. To begin with, that unique understanding is a type of understanding of the response of the audience (listener, reader, viewer, etc.) to the medium. So the first principle is that the audience is not responding to the work of the artist, rather they are responding to the effects of the medium. The artist then designs an effective way to deliver the medium. So what you describe as "a special connection between artist and world", is better described as the artist's understanding of the connection between the audience and the world. What a good artist knows, is how to present (give) the world to the audience. That is why true art is best known as an act of unconditional love.

You cannot just take the initiative to try something, no matter how minor or innocuous, and hope that things will go alright because even though your attempt was undoubtedly expected, it may not be well received, and any such failed attempt is already potentially a serious legal matter. — Tarskian

So a person should avoid ever trying anything new in one's life if one doesn't want the potential for a serious legal matter? Don't even go out the door, it's simply not worth the risk. How could you ever find that land of milk and honey, where you can do whatever you want and not worry about legal consequences, if you're so afraid to do anything that you can't even leave your house?