I looks like we both have an uneasiness with possible world semantics. I think your unease is more with the metaphysics, while mine is with the application. The PI sections you had mentions, 253 to 256 are typically associated with Wittgenstein's argument around private language. Should this extend to possible world semantics? At first glance, I would say "no". Possible worlds are not suppose to be a private language. In PI, a private language is about language only a single individual understands that refers to purely private inner experiences. — Richard B

The issue is the relationship between one possible world and another, and the discontinuity implied by that relationship. If someone assumes that there is an object with the same identity in multiple possible worlds, then this supposed object is nothing but an object of a private language, unless the continuity between distinct possible worlds can be established. So it's not that possible worlds are supposed to be a private language, but that the matter of transworld identity creates a private language problem. The matter is the problem of identifying objects which exist in distinct mental images, as "the same object". That is the private language problem. The assumption of "the same" is unjustified, rendering the proposed "object" being an unity of multiple instantiations, as unintelligible.

Think about the chair in Wittgenstein's example. Suppose I insist that the chair here today is the same chair that was here yesterday. This is analogous to saying that the thing named "Nixon" in one possible world is the same as the thing name "Nixon" in another possible world. So you may ask me to justify my claim that the chair is the same object. Since it is a publicly accessible object, I could say look at it, doesn't it look exactly the same. It's identical. That still might not appease you, because you could say that every room in the building has identical chairs, how do I know that they weren't switched. Then, I could say that someone watched over it in the interim, or refer to security video, and the continuity required to justify my claim could be justified.

In the case of "Nixon", justification cannot be done in the same way because the possible worlds are inner objects, imaginary. This means that the continuity of the proposed object referred to, between distinct possible worlds, must also be imaginary, fictitious, or stipulated. And if the thing referred to as "Nixon", is supposed to be the same thing in multiple possible worlds, this stipulation needs to be justified. What makes it "the same thing"? Obviously it's not identical because the different worlds give it different properties. And the supposed continuity from one possible world to the next is not a temporal continuity, so reference to observation, or surveillance is not relevant. Nevertheless, we need justification. Without justification it is simply a private object which is absolutely unintelligible.

In Wittgenstein's other example, where "S" signifies a private thing referred to as "a sensation", the thing referred to is unintelligible to others, until justification of the use of "S" is provided. It turns out that the use of "S" coincides with an observable rise in blood pressure, and this forms the justification. That could be the "essential property" of the sensation referred to by "S". Now justification of continuity between distinct worlds could be done through an essential or necessary property. We could do the same with the thing referred to by "Nixon". We could say that there are essential, or necessary properties, which identify the thing called "Nixon", in every possible world, and this would suffice for transworld identity. However, notice how this arbitrarily, or subjectively, limits the extent of possibility. The number of possible worlds is thereby limited. This amounts to saying that it is impossible for there to be a possible world where the thing called "Nixon" does not have the named essential properties. Therefore the limiting of the possibilities in this way, itself need to be justified. And the choice of these limiting factors becomes very subjective dependent on purpose. And if we want to allow all possibilities, infinite possibility, we must deny any essential properties, and we are back at an unjustifiable, and completely unintelligible object of a private language.

If you take a look at the SEP's description of combinatorialism, the issue might become more clear to you. Here, the object of the private language is called the "simple". The simple has transworld identity as such, having no essential properties, allowing for infinite possibilities. However, because it has no inherent properties it is completely unintelligible, as an object of a private language. Being a private language doesn't mean that we cannot use the word, it just means that what the word refers to cannot be known. So we can all talk about "the simple", just like we can all talk about "the beetle", but this talk doesn't make the private object referred to, intelligible.

So you'll notice in the SEP, that the different philosophers who use this system, of employing "the simple", have different ideas of what "the simple" refers to. That is because it is essentially an object of a private language, in a case where justification of the use of the term varies according to an individual's preference, or purpose. In general, "the simple" is supposed to be an object whose identity, and existence, cannot be justified, as simply a requirement for unlimited possibility. This leaves justification as completely subjective, because justification is to apply limits, boundaries. Consequently the philosopher is allowed to apply limits, and justify what "the simple" refers to, according to the purpose at hand. But the object of the private language is inherently unbounded and therefore unintelligible, then the philosopher applies limits as desired. However, the application of boundaries. limits, is contrary to the basic assumption, and need within the system. The need is for an unlimited object of the private language, and the corresponding assumption. so we are left with self-contradiction when we try to make the object of the private language, referred to here as "the simple", into something which could be understood.

Reading the SEP, you'll see that the simple has a different meaning for Russell as it does for Wittgenstein. Also Quine and Cresswell suggest a different interpretation. Armstrong argues something different. Ultimately, the ontology of "the simple" is a matter of debate. This is because it is employed as the object of a private language, whose existence cannot be justified. That is the purpose of "the simple", to allow for transworld relations which cannot be justified. And, as the object of a private language use of the term is completely unjustifiable. Attempts at justification are self defeating

He does not say this in the quote I mentioned from N&N. What he says is "Don't ask: how can I identify this table in another possible world, except by its properties? I have the table in my hands, I can point to it, and when I ask whether it might have been in another room, I am talking, by definition, about it." — Richard B

Look at what he is saying Richard B. The table being spoken about is referred to as the one "I can point to", "the table in my hands". That is very clearly how "the table" is defined here, in this context, by Kripke. It is impossible that this table, the one indicated by the definition, as the one "I can point to", "the table in my hands", could be in another room, or else it would not be the defined table.

Therefore his question is answered very easily. He cannot identify this table in another possible world. That is because he has defined the table spoken about as the table here, and now, in this world, the table I can point to, the table in my hands. By defining the proposed object in this way, he denies the possibility that it could be in another possible world.

Physics can describe relations between states using a time parameter, but that parameter by itself does not amount to temporal succession. A mathematical ordering does not yet give us a meaningful before and after. The fact that most fundamental physical equations are time-symmetric illustrates the point: the time parameter in physics functions is an index of relations between states, not an account of temporal succession or passage. Direction, duration, and the sense of "before" and "after" enter only at the level of interpretation, description, and experience. Hence the philosophical problem of "time's arrow", which is understood to be absent from the equations of physics. — Wayfarer

I believe there is something very important hidden within this passage. The "time-symmetric" character of physical equations is a feature of determinism. If everything which occurs is determined, then backward and forward necessarily produce the very same order, only reversed.

It is our sense, our intuition, which tells us that the future is somewhat undetermined, making us realize that we need to chose. This producers the fundamental difference between before and after in our understanding. I can make choices to influence events in front of me, in the future, and even produce the events I want, but the past is fixed and those events cannot now be chosen in that way.

So the matter of "time's arrow" is very real to us. We could assume determinism, fatalism, or whatever, and claim that time's arrow is not a real issue. Nevertheless, in our daily lives we all accept that we cannot alter what has occurred, and we all make choices in relation to the future. And every time we make choices we belie the determinist claim, which the successes of physics inclines us toward.

Now, the underlying importance is related to the way that we understand reality when we reject the determinist approach to time, and accept that the real difference between past and future is demonstrated by the reality of choice. This perspective makes the entirety of physical existence contingent. And what I mean by "contingent" here is dependent on a cause which is selected therefore not necessary.

This is what produces the difficulty for the common notion of physicalism. In denial of physicalism, we do not necessarily insist that consciousness is prior to physical events. All we need to do is to demonstrate how selection is necessarily prior to physical existence. Then if consciousness is demonstrated as posterior to physical existence, we need to identify a type of selection which is non-conscious. Proposals like random chance, symmetry-breaking, or quantum fluctuations, can be shown to be incoherent, and the product of misunderstanding, rather than the required "selection".

"Let's call something a rigid designator if in every possible world it designates the same object, a nonrigid or accidental designator if that is not the case. Of course we don't require that the objects exist in all possible worlds" — Richard B

Notice this condition, it's a rigid designator "if" it designates the same object in every possible worlds. The issue is that possible worlds are abstractions, so there are no objects in any possible worlds. This makes "rigid designator" useless right from the start, unless we go to some form of concretism. But concretism disallows such transworld identity anyway, for other very clear reasons. So "rigid designator" is completely useless.

Here is the way that Wittgenstein elucidated this issue of identity in "Philosophical Investigations", starting from 253.

253. When I say "another person can't have my pains", what is the criteria of identity? Consider: "This chair is not the one you saw here yesterday, but is exactly the same as it". But if it makes sense to say "my pain is the same as his", then it makes sense to say that we both have the same pain.

254 The substitution of "identical" for "the same" is an "expedient in philosophy". The question for the .philosopher is to give an account of the temptation to use a particular phrase. What, for example mathematicians are inclined to say about "mathematical facts", is not philosophy, but "something for philosophical treatment".

255. "The philosopher's treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness."

256. Now, how can I give an account of my inner experiences? How can I use words to refer to my inner sensations? I could use natural expressions, but suppose there were none, and I had to "simply associate names with sensations".

Richard B, please reflect on what has been exposed here. There is a problem of "identity" when referring to inner things such as sensations. We cannot employ the same criteria of "identity" which we use when referring to physical objects like the chair. This is because in the case of physical objects we distinguish between "identical" and "the same", but we cannot make that distinction in reference to inner things like sensations. So, with the physical object, there is a chair here today, which is "identical" to the chair which was here yesterday, but it is not "the same" chair, if someone switched two identical chairs. In the case of inner things, if I feel a pain today which is "identical" to the one yesterday, I call it "the same" pain, and the two terms "identical" and "the same" are used interchangeably.

In this way, as described by 253, it makes sense to say "pain" may refer to the same thing for me, as it does for you, therefore you and I feel the same pain, and refer to the same thing when we say "pain". However, this only works if we have the criteria required for justification.

So this matter of criteria is the key point for transworld identity, and specifically the notion of "rigid designator". To signify the object which the rigid designator refers to requires some criteria. This would produce the need for necessary (essential) properties, thereby compromising the usefulness of the possible worlds semantics. We need to allow that the designated object has nothing essential, to cover all the possible worlds. But this denies the possibility of criteria. Then, whatever it is, the supposed object, which is designated by the rigid designator, is completely unintelligible in the way described by Wittgenstein's "private language". It is a private, inner thing, with no criteria for identification, hence no way of knowing the thing being referred to.

So, after laying out this platform, Wittgenstein proceed to talk about the problem of producing such criteria of identification, which I call justification of the use of the name.

Kripke's example, I like it because it seems rather apropos for everyday conversations we have about everyday objects. — Richard B

Kripke's example is naive, and not at all a fair, or an accurate representation. He says:

"I have the table in my hands, I can point to it, and when I ask whether it might have been in another room, I am talking, by definition, about it. I don't have to identify it after seeing it through a telescope."

What he says here is demonstrably wrong and deceptive. The spoken about object is actually defined as "the table in my hands". Therefore the question about "whether it might have been in another room" must be answered with "No". It is impossible that "the table in my hands" could be in another room because then it would not be ""the table in my hands". The point is that if we adhere to what he says "I am talking by definition, about it", where "it" clearly refers to the table in his hands, then it is impossible that this object is in another room. If it was in another room, it would not be the designated object "the table in my hands".

So Kripke just makes a deceptive use of language, to produce the appearance that the table in his hands could also be in another room. Clearly though, if we adhere strictly to the example, this claim is false. The object defined as ""the table in my hands" could not possibly be in another room, because that would not be consistent with the definition.

And "rigid designator" turns out to be a nonsensical, unintelligible proposal, for the reasons demonstrated by the private language argument. If the designated object is identified by physical existence "the table in my hands", then it cannot be in other possible worlds. And if we remove the physical existence, then it's a private object with no criteria for identification. Any criteria for identity (essential properties) denies certain possible worlds as not possible, arbitrarily compromising the use of "possible worlds".

This is the issue which Wittgenstein elucidated with the so-called private language argument. First, he lays out the common conditions for "identity" with reference to the chair. The chair in this position today, looks like it's the same chair as the one here yesterday. But, if someone switched it out overnight, then it is not the same chair with the same identity. It is implied that an object, "the same" object, has temporal extension between distinct acts of observation. The identity as "the same object" is therefore supported by an observable (public) temporal continuity.

Then, he plays a little mental trick on us. He goes on to refer to a sensation, which he signifies with "S". Each time that this supposed "same" sensation occurs, he marks an "S". Now the "S" is proposed as referring to "the same" sensation, but it's a trick because there is no continuity between one instance to another. In reality, "S" refers to distinct occurrences of similar sensations.

The problem is that the assumed continuity of the supposed object, referred to by "S", which is necessary for concluding that it is a single object, is private, within the mind of the one who senses it. It is not verifiable by public observation. Therefore the supposed object identified by "S" with its required temporal continuity is a private object, making this language which employs "S" to refer to a single identified sensation, is a private language. The thing referred to by "S" is an imaginary thing, and as such, it doesn't have identity in the common way that the chair has identity.

So this is the issue with rigid designation. The supposed continuity of the object, between one possible world and another, which establishes rigid designation, is completely imaginary, private, like the continuity between one instance of "S" and another. This supposed identity, as rigid designation, cannot be supported by empirical observation. Therefore it is nothing but a private language. "Nixon" refers to the same person in a multiplicity of possible worlds, just like "S" refers to the same sensation. That is, by assumption of a private object. There is no observable temporal extension of the object, and the extension between possible worlds is completely imaginary, unverifiable through (public) empirical observation, therefore the supposed "identity" is private. This constitutes a private language, as we assume an object whose existential extension is completely unintelligible. Now "S", or "Nixon" in the example, refers to a completely unintelligible object, making that private language incoherent.

We're just interested in what our speaker means by it. — frank

Sure, but this implies that whether the speaker wants the meaning to be necessary (the same in all possible worlds) or not, is just a subjective stipulation. And, the ability to whimsically stipulate that the 'identity' of "water" is necessary, and the 'identity' of "air" is not necessary, just defeats the whole purpose of possible worlds semantics.

Am I not also raising a concern about the process of rigid designation as well? — Richard B

Yes you are, and Banno is simply in denial, about the reality that it is incoherent to say that the same object, or person, has contradictory properties at the same time. Putting the same thing into different possible worlds does not provide the premise required to say that these differences are at a different time.

I'll refer you to @Banno's incoherent notion of "change" here. For Banno, change does not require time. So an object might "change" between one possible world and another, from having a property to not having it, while still remaining "the same" object, just like we say that an object changes from one moment to the next, in time, from having a property to not having it, while still remaining "the same" identity as the object which it is.

The problem of course, is that without a demonstrated continuity, the claim of "change" is unsupported, and the two are distinct, separate things, rather than one changed thing. So with a temporally supported "change" we have empirical observation of a continuity of the object from one moment to the next, despite the fact that it changes in that time. With rigid designation, there is absolutely nothing to support the requirement of continuity. So the stipulation of "change", rather than two distinct objects, is completely arbitrary.

I take issue with the constant mentioning of Trump because this isn't about Trump. — Tzeentch

Everything Trump does is about Trump. It's all designed as a show to demonstrate how great he is. He has no other intentions.

And most definitely not because the US is sensing it is starting to lose control, and feels the need to rapidly consolidate what it has considered its part of the globe to rule for hundreds of years as per the Monroe doctrine. — Tzeentch

How does it make sense to talk about "the US" as if it is a being with senses and feelings?

No oil company will invest in infrastructure in the circumstances Trump has created. — Banno

That's about the size of it. If any American company takes over an oil well, it becomes a terrorist target. Defense of such holdings would require an on the ground force of occupation. The only real means to American dominance would be to provide a very strong force to assist in Venezuelan governance, like they tried (and failed) in Afghanistan, but have had some degree of success in Iraq. Maybe the Americans are learning, and will come up with something reasonable this time around.

He is making a point about the interpretation of modal theorems, such that such equivalences, if true, are necessarily true.

So the question concerning air is misbegotten. — Banno

Right, none of them are actually true when properly analyzed. Identity doesn't work that way. So forget about it, Kripke is just blowing smoke.

“William James's "specious present" describes our experience of the present as a short, flowing duration, not an instantaneous point, acting like a "saddle-back" of time with a bit of the immediate past and future held together, allowing us to perceive motion and succession rather than just isolated moments, a key idea in his Principles of Psychology (1890). He contrasted this "thick" experience with the "knife-edge" mathematical present (a single point) and the "stream of consciousness," arguing that our awareness always carries a sense of "now" that's extended and contains felt duration.” — Joshs

I see the point and I agree with the principles, but it looks to me like a misuse of "specious". What James argued is that the common conception of "present", when "present" is defined as the divisor between past and future is a faulty concept. So, that thin, instantaneous, "knife edge" present which separates past from future, is what ought to be referred to as the "specious present". "Specious" because it is false and misleading. The common concept of an instantaneous present moment, is false and misleading, therefore it ought to be called "the specious present".

The thick present, which James proposes, is a combination of past and future, and it is supposed to be the true present, what Derrida calls "pure actuality", and therefore not "specious". The difference being that one description of "present" is as a division between past and future, the other one has the present as a unity of past and future. That's a substantial difference. Since the former is the conception which is false and misleading, we ought to say that it is the specious present.

What now? — ssu

Chaos? Civil war?

To me specious means inclusive or thick, that the ‘now’ has room for past and future , not just the present. So what would the opposite of this be? — Joshs

OK, the problem is in the way we understand the word. My dictionary defines "specious" as superficially plausible, but actually wrong, or misleading.

If the present never appears as the ‘moment’ , what is a moment, and how does the present appear? — Joshs

The present appears as we discussed, as the past and future in simultaneity. Here:

I believe that I experience the present as the simultaneity of the past (as memory) and the future (as anticipation. That seems to be the foundation of experience for me. — Metaphysician Undercover

The "moment" is an abstract tool, created for the purpose of measurement. For example, we insert two artificial "moments", now, one thousand and, now, and measure the time in between as one second.

What do you think Derrida means by ‘pure actuality’? You dont think it includes what has just passed and what is just about to occur? — Joshs

As I said, I agree with this.

But I think that describing the present as pure actuality is far from indicating that the present is "specious". "Pure actuality" indicates that "now" is more like the opposite of specious. I seem to remember that this is how he objectifies subjective experience, through the objective reality of "now". That the reality of "now" is the simultaneous occurrence of past and future, doesn't render the present as specious.

I think what he is indicating in your quoted passage, is that the present never appears to us as "a moment" So it is "the moment" which is specious, not the now. In other words, "the moment" is not a correct representation of "the present".

For Derrida, the present is ‘specious’. It includes within itself past and future, not as sequentially separate but as simultaneous. — Joshs

I'm inclined to agree with Derrida on this. I believe that I experience the present as the simultaneity of the past (as memory) and the future (as anticipation. That seems to be the foundation of experience for me.

I really don't think that the present is specious for Derrida though. Years back, we did a reading group on Derrida's "Voice and Phenomenology". I just did a brief review of the part where he talked about "now" and I see that he described it as "pure actuality". So I don't agree that "now" is specious for Derrida.

(2) Why is it important? — Mikie

I believe that determinism obscures the importance of the present by establishing continuity between past and future. This makes understanding our experience of being present impossible. That is because the need to choose is fundamental to our experience.

When Jesus spoke about the end of the world, I think he refers to the whole world, everywhere. In this sense, every part of the world is in The Bible.

0.25 seconds is a period of time. Similarly, one week is a period of time and one decade is a period of time.

To call 0.25 seconds a present moment in time would be like calling a decade a present moment in time. — RussellA

I think I said this already. I believe there is no such thing as "a present moment in time". That is an artificial construct which amounts to a falsity. All time is duration.

Accordingly, the length of the present is dependent on perspective and purpose. We might refer to the current second, minute, hour, day, week, month, year, whatever, as the present, depending on context.

Both the past and present are fixed, in that we can only remember one past, and by the Law of Non-contradiction there can only be one present. Therefore, both the past and present must be static rather than dynamic. — RussellA

How can you say that the past is fixed, when what I remember as past is changing all the time? The things which have happened within the past are fixed, but that is changing all the time, so the past itself is dynamic.

If the present has a duration, then it may well be of the order of Plank’s time, but certainly not much more than that. — RussellA

Claims of how long the human "now" is vary between a few milliseconds to a few seconds, depending on the purpose of the estimation. Clearly this is a much longer duration than Plank's time.

I observe a truck coming round the corner, which quickly becomes a memory. I can then make a judgement, such that the truck was travelling too fast, but this judgement was made in the present and based on a memory of the past. — RussellA

A "judgement" as your example of something which occurs "in the present", takes a lot longer than Plank time. The average human reaction time is 25 one hundredths (,25) of a second. This is basic reflex, without allowing any time for conscious thought, which is required for judgement.

It is not a contradiction to observe something and imagine a different thing. Similarly, I can see the Eiffel Tower in Paris and imagine the Eiffel Tower in Reno. Neither is this a contradiction. — RussellA

Sure, but that's not the issue. The issue is that you cannot believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, and also believe that it is possibly in Reno, without implied contradiction. One can imagine all sorts of things, and know that these things are contradictory to what is believed, that is not a problem. The problem is when we designate things which are contrary to what we believe as "possible".

That's what produces the contradiction, because "believing X" implies that the possibility of not-X has been excluded. If we quantify "believe" with a Bayesian model of probability, then the belief that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris is represented as a degree of probability, rather than as a truth. This would allow the possibility that it is in Reno. But I don't think this is an accurate representation of common "belief".

When we believe something as true, we assume to exclude the possibility of falsity. When we are uncertain, we say something like "I think that is correct". However, if we all allow that knowledge is fallible, no matter how certain we are, then we'd probably accept that the Bayesian representation would be better representation. But this requires that we reject the attitude of certitude, and "truth" as we know it, which we have not.

The extension of "Bridgett Bardot" remains Bridgett Bardot, even if she had started a fish shop instead of going into acting. — Banno

How does that answer the question? I asked you about the difference between "extension" in relation to physical objects, and "extension" in relation to abstract objects.

Are you admitting that you do not recognize that there is such a difference? If so that would explain why you always seem to conflate the "actual world", in reference to a physical thing, and the "actual world" in reference to an abstract object in possible worlds semantics.

Because extension is about reference. The extension of "Banno" is me. — Banno

Do you actually believe that "extension" in the case of physical objects is the same as "extension" in the case of abstract objects?

Because extension is about reference. The extension of "Banno" is me. And it was in response to your — Banno

You just got finished describing how "extension" in possible worlds relates to abstract objects. Now you use "me" as an example of extension. No wonder you think I'm lost, you're giving me arrows pointing in two different directions. When I choose neither, you think that means I'm lost, when actually I've just decided on something reasonable.

Using your term “ontological possibility”. As regards the proposition “there will be a truck coming round the corner”. In the present, we cannot know whether this proposition will be true or not. However, we can know that either it will be true or won't be true. This is a future possibility — RussellA

This is correct, but it doesn't quite capture the complexity of "ontological possibility". Because things can happen, between now and that future time, which would influence the future true or falsity, and those things could be affected by human choices, it does us very little good to say that there will be a truth or falsity.

Using your term “epistemic possibility”. As regards the proposition “there is a truck coming round the corner”. In the present, it may be that we don’t know whether this proposition is true or not. However, we can know that either it is true or is not true. This is a present possibility. — RussellA

I would not call this a "present possibility". The judgement would be based on observation, and observation is always past by the time it is judged. The reason i am making this distinction is because we experience the present as active, and changing, so we ought not think of it as "fixed".

If we consider the present to always be a duration of time, we ought to allow that not only does part of the present share the properties of the past (fixed), but we need to allow that part shares the proerpties of the future (not fixed). This is necessary to allow that a freely willed act, at the present, can interfere with what would otherwise appear to be fixed.

You base your claim on counterfactuals. You say “but they are not truly "possible" in any rational way, so they need to be excluded, as not possibilities at all.” It is true that both the past and present are fixed. The present is as fixed as the past. If there is a truck coming round the corner then it is true that “there is a truck coming round the corner” — RussellA

"The present" is very difficult because things are always changing, even as we speak. That is why I stressed that we ought not think of the present as fixed. So, for example, a person might observe that there is a truck coming around the corner. Then the statement “there is a truck coming round the corner” is judged to be true, or stated as true, based on that observation which is now past. However, in the time that it takes the person to judge and make the statement, the truck could have slammed on the brakes or gone off the road.

This is why we ought not extend the fixedness of the past into the present. Doing this produces a determinist perspective ("perspective" being present), and obscures the truly dynamic nature of the present. This becomes very important with fast moving things like computers, and quantum physics. Notice that the wave function of quantum physics deals with possibilities (the future side of the present), rather than factual statements about the position of a particle.

In the sense of ordinary language, if “the truck is coming round the corner” then it is possible that “the truck is not coming round the corner”. — RussellA

This is not consistent with any ordinary use I am familiar with. How does it make sense to you, that a person would say both, a truck is coming around the corner, and also it's possible that the truck is not coming around the corner?

It may be argued that counterfactuals which violate the laws of nature, such as “the truck was travelling faster than the speed of light” must be necessary and therefore not possible, whilst counterfactuals which don’t violate the laws of nature, such as “the truck is not coming round the corner” are contingent and therefore possible. — RussellA

That time flows in one direction, and the past cannot be changed, is the most basic law of nature. Any counterfactual which proposes a different past violates this fundamental law of nature.

I have the thought that there is an apple on the table.

If I did not believe that there was not a correspondence between my mind and the way things are in the world, I would not attempt to pick the apple up. — RussellA

It's pointless to do this with examples. I can make just as many counter examples. I wanted an apple, so I got up and looked for one. It's just a difference in the way that you and I believe animals think. I think they want something and so they go look. You think they see something, and want it.

Of course, thinking consists of both ways. But you said that correspondence was a necessary condition, and this claimed necessity would exclude the possibility of what I claim. Therefore to allow that the way of thinking which I describe is a real way of thinking, you need to relinquish your claim that all thinking is based in correspondence.

I can believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, whilst also imagining the Eiffel Tower being in Reno. These are not contradictory thoughts. — RussellA

I really don't understand how you can make this claim. If the Eiffel tower is in Reno, then it is not in Paris. If I believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, then it is implied that I also believe it is impossible that it is in Reno, which is somewhere other than Paris. Therefore to believe that it is possible that it is in Reno, implicitly contradicts my belief that it is in Paris.

That my thoughts do correspond with my actual world is the very basis for enabling me to think about other possibilities. — RussellA

I don't think this is true at all. Thoughts are primarily guided by intention, and this is not based in correspondence. We think about what we want and how to get it, without necessarily thinking about the way things are. That's why mistake is common and unsound arguments are abundant. To base our thoughts in correspondence requires a special type of effort, which does not come naturally to the mind of an animal.

In my mind is the thought that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris. In my actual world the Eiffel Tower is in Paris.

There is a correspondence between the thought in my mind that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris and the fact that in my actual world the Eiffel Tower is in Paris

In my mind is the thought that it is possible that the Eiffel Tower could be in Reno. In a possible world the Eiffel Tower is in Reno. — RussellA

You contradict yourself. If, in your mind the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, you contradict yourself to say that in your mind it is also possible that the Eiffel Tower is in Reno.

That is the point which I had great trouble to get through to Banno in the other thread. If you believe that the Eiffel tower is actually in Paris, you cannot also believe that it is possibly in Reno. That would be self-contradiction. Therefore you must alter your belief about the Eiffel tower being in Paris, to "the Eiffel Tower is possibly in Paris", to allow that it is possibly in Reno, without contradiction.

This is why, when designating counterfactuals as "possibilities", it is necessary to make what you believe as the actual world, merely a "possible" world. Correspondence cannot have status, or else the supposed "possible worlds" which are really just counterfactuals, would have to be rejected as false, rather than "possible". This is also why I proposed as #3 above, that counterfactuals must be rejected as a proposed form of "possibility" in order to maintain consistency between "possibility" and correspondence. The use of "possibility" to refer to a counterfactual is an incorrect and misleading use of that word.

That my thoughts do correspond to my actual world (I think that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris and in fact it is in Paris), is the very basis for enabling me to think about other possibilities (I think that the Eiffel Tower could be in Reno). — RussellA

As explained above, this is clearly incorrect. It is only by denying the fact (truth by correspondence) that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, that we can allow that it is possibly in Reno. If we accept as a (truth by correspondence) fact, that the Eiffel tower is in Paris, then we must reject the proposition that it might be in Reno. That it is in Paris makes it impossible that it is in Reno.

Modal logic makes use of extensionality within possible worlds, not the dubious notion of correspondence. — Banno

Then why did you say the following:

Yes!

Sad that this has to be said! — Banno

In reply to the following statement from RussellA concerning correspondence?

I would have thought that the main purpose of Possible World Semantics (PWS) is to reference the world, meaning that correspondence is a core part of PSW. — RussellA

You seemed so emphatic, now you explicitly change your mind.

The experimental stage should be as important as the application itself when considering ethics here. — L'éléphant

i think this technology should only be used for learning purposes. As such, the AI's role within the biological system would be primarily observational. There is a lot which can be learned from an embedded AI. For example, scientists are very limited in their capacity to actually observe the neurological working of a complex brain. A number of implanted AIs could greatly improve observational capacity. However, experimentation generally works through interaction. We design a very controlled way to elicit a response. Therefore the best learning potential would be derived from interaction. The issue with the AI I believe, is that if we want it to do its job we need to relinquish some control because it has to work so much faster than our ability to understand what it's doing.

Yes!

Sad that this has to be said! — Banno

Indeed. — Banno

That makes two very uneducated people participating in this threat. Not surprising.

The thread seems to have sort of come off the rails. Instead of assessing the problems which possible worlds semantics poses, as the SEP directs us, the thread has become a worship of the Platonist presuppositions which support possible worlds semantics.

I would have thought that the main purpose of Possible World Semantics (PWS) is to reference the world, meaning that correspondence is a core part of PSW. — RussellA

Yes!

Sad that this has to be said! — Banno

Obviously this is false. Clearly allowing that counterfactuals are "possibilities" is a violation of "truth" by correspondence. Probably the reason for so much misunderstanding about "possible worlds", which has been demonstrated by principal participants in this thread, is that they think it is possible to make counterfactuals consistent with truth by correspondence.. If correspondence was the purpose, we wouldn't be describing counterfactuals as possible worlds, as counterfactuals are clearly expressions of "worlds" which violate correspondence..

As the opening of the SEP article states, there is a limit to "the actual world", yet we wonder how things could have been different. The empirical gap between the way things are in the world, and the fictional, "different"', along with the the desire to relate these two in a rational way, is the purpose of "possible worlds semantics". Clearly correspondence cannot be the first principle, as establishing a relation between the world and fictional worlds must be the first principle.

That's is why "possible worlds" is so problematic. To establish a relation between the possible and the actual, "the actual" must be assigned the same status as the possible. Banno clearly recognizes this when he says that the actual is one of the possible, but he fails to respect this principle in his interpretations.

The SEP describes three ways in which this is done. 1. Concretism, within which each world is concrete, 2. Abstractionism, within which each world is abstract, 3. Cobinatorialism, within which each world is a combination of concrete and abstract.

Notice, correspondence is not a fundamental principle. It cannot be, or else that first principle would alter the relation between the true (by correspondence) world, and the other worlds. This would leave the other worlds as nothing but fictions. That's the point we discussed in the other thread which Banno seems incapable of comprehending. If we have a true (by correspondence) world, the other proposals which contradict are false, and they cannot be considered as possibilities. Therefore, we must alter the status of the supposed "true" (by correspondence) world, to allow that the possible worlds are something other than false. In other words, to allow that the possibilities are in fact possible, which is the intent of "possible worlds", we must rid ourselves or "true" (by correspondence), and this produces a compromised representation of "the world".

The terms possibly, necessarily, ought, could, might, etc are central to understanding the meaning of ordinary language, and ordinary language is useful when it does refer to the world. “If I cross the road now, there might be a truck around the corner, and I could be knocked down” is a real world situation where modal terms are critical. — RussellA

This is why I think we need to define the different senses of "possible", each of which requires a different type of logic, and enforce those distinctions. I differentiated three significant difference earlier in the thread.

1. Ontological possibility. This is real possibility in the world which necessitates the need for decision making. Ontological possibility is in relation to propositions about the future and the important feature is that there is no truth or falsity to such propositions. By your example, "I will cross the road within the next minute" has no truth or falsity because it is undecided. Such propositions, when ontological possibility is involved, must defy either the law of non-contradiction or the law of excluded middle. Common language use has the law of excluded middle violated, we say that it is neither true nor false, the action which is undecided, and may go either way. Some ontologies however, prefer a violation of the law of non-contradiction.

2. Epistemic possibility. In this case, we assume that there is an actual truth or falsity to the situation, yet the person posing the possibility does not know which. So the possibility of "there is a truck around the corner" is a case of epistemic possibility. You, as the person deciding whether or not to cross the road, does not know if the proposition is true or false, yet you believe there is a truth or falsity to it. Unlike the decision to cross the road, in which case there will only be a truth or falsity after the appropriate time passes, the fundamental laws of logic are not violated here because ask about something which is supported by the past.

3. Counterfactuals. Counterfactuals are often called "possibilities", so I include this in the senses of "possibility", but they are not truly "possible" in any rational way, so they need to be excluded, as not possibilities at all. They reference the past, where there is a truth or falsity (by correspondence) so there is no ontological possibility. Also, as the name "counterfactual" indicates, the truth of the matter is assumed to be known, so there is no epistemic possibility here either. So "counterfactuals" are not possibilities in either of the two principal senses of "possibility", and to avoid confusion ought not be called that. Counterfactuals are very useful, especially in designing experiments, and aiding in predictive capacity, but they ought not be confused as "possibilities".

I propose that if we maintain the above principles, we can keep truth as correspondence, as the first principle. Notice that I produced the definitions of "possible" in a way which corresponds with our experience of "the world". The fundamental problem with possible worlds semantics is that it allows for counterfactuals which are not actually "possible" in any true (by correspondence) sense, to be considered as possibilities. Therefore "possible worlds" has at its very basic level, a violation of "truth" as correspondence.

Most of us also believe that things, as a whole, needn't have been just as they are. Rather, things might have been different in countless ways, both trivial and profound. History, from the very beginning, could have unfolded quite other than it did in fact: the matter constituting a distant star might never have organized well enough to give light; species that survived might just as well have died off; battles won might have been lost; children born might never have been conceived and children never conceived might otherwise have been born. In any case, no matter how things had gone they would still have been part of a single, maximally inclusive, all-encompassing situation, a single world. Intuitively, then, the actual world is only one among many possible worlds. — SEP

Everything which has already occurred, cannot be altered. In that sense it is necessary, and this is the foundation of truth as "correspondence". To propose that things which have already occurred, in the past, could be otherwise, as a possibility, is to violate "truth" as correspondence. Allowing that counterfactuals are possibilities violates the principle of truth as correspondence in a fundamental way.

You keep making posts like this with absolutely nothing to support these very strange assertions. If it's true that I appear to you as "completely wrong" "maximally bonkers", then I can only conclude that you appear to me as highly uneducated.

The risk associated with errors. And it is even riskier with the inherited genes. — L'éléphant

I would say that it's not only riskier than inherited genes, which have a very small degree of risk due to billions of years of evolutionary execution, but it's also much riskier than GMOs. This is because the genetic modifications would be ongoing, at the discretion of the implanted AI. This is what the quoted articles calls " recursive intelligence", using biofeedback loops. From what I understand the digital implant modifies the genetics, then it modifies itself according to the effects of the changes. It appears like a trial and error process.

As trial and error, the probability of mistakes and bad outcomes is many degrees higher than the likelihood of good outcomes, so the thing must be closely monitored, caged to avoid letting loose the monster. However, since it is possible to make many many trials, the probability of discovering something good, eventually, is also quite high. The issue would be to define what "good" is in this context. Some would say, probably many would say, "we ought not interfere with God, therefore there is no possibility of good here", but that's an absolutist, exclusionary, and probably unrealistic approach. We already have GMOs.

So that Post-Human Biotechnologies article proposes "multi-layered control systems", " fail-safe genetic circuits, which activate kill-switches", and of course "human-in-the-loop-governance". But then the issue of "transparency" is brought up. And as these technologies become more popular and available, how can we expect that such principles will be observed, and enforced. And at 8.5 "The Fragility of Control in Recursive Systems". The issue being that "biology responds in unpredictable ways". This would produce effects which escape the design parameters. In other words, the implanted AI might not know how to respond. Some, perhaps the most dangerous effects, could completely escape detection. The highest danger is in the unknown.

Yep. States of affairs include change. — Banno

It doesn't matter how you define change, and states of affairs, the problem I described remains, because the difference between distinct states of affairs cannot be accounted for by reference to further states of affairs. Therefore we need to conclude that the reality of the world, any possible world, must consist of more than just states of affairs. Once we commit to using "states of affairs", we must accept that the possible worlds thus created are necessarily incomplete.

Meta has a conceptual difficulty with limits and infinitesimals, and sometimes pictures states of affairs as descriptions at an instant, disallowing change within states of affairs. Sometimes, because his view changes from post to post. Or at least it appears to - there may be some obtuse way in which he can make it coherent, but so far as I can make out, it remains unexpressed. — Banno

I'd say that you don't seem to understand what is required of the concept "limit", what a real limit must consist of.

Ultimately, States of Affairs cannot be about what exists in a mind-independent world, but must be about our concepts of what exists in a mind-independent world .

If that is the case, then the enquiry is not about the State of Affairs in the world (Caesar was a General) but more about the State of Affairs in the mind “Caesar was a General”. — RussellA

I think that this is a very important point. Possible world semantics necessitates that the propositions, states of affairs, or whatever, reference our ideas, not any independent physical world. This is why truth by correspondence is excluded. Then a further judgement of correspondence is usually required, what the SEP calls whether the statement "obtains". The issue though is that this is not a judgement of 'truth", it is a subjective judgement made relative to the purpose of, or what is intended by, the model. That is why I claim that possible worlds semantics is fundamentally sophistry. If you don't like that word, we might try "rhetoric".

That's the argument. What's your solution? To posit that all change takes place instantaneously between states of affairs? That's absurd. — Ludwig V

Nothing is instantaneous. It would be equally absurd to say that one state of affairs instantaneously changed into another. I believe the solution is as recommended by Aristotle, we allow for an aspect of reality which defies the fundamental laws of logic. He called it "matter", "potential", and we know it as possibility, what may or may not be.

Exactly. So there is no need to insist that all change occurs between states of affairs. — Ludwig V

it's not that change necessarily exists between states of affairs. The two coexist. The absurdity of "between states of affairs" is just what occurs if you insist that all of reality can be conceived of as states of affairs. Then we'd have the situation of distinct states of affairs, and no explanation of how one state ends and one starts, or any relation between them.

So you don't seem to understand the problem. Here is another way to look at it. Suppose we propose that all of reality could be accounted for by states of affairs. I'm sure you would agree that there is a difference between distinct states of affairs. Isn't the difference between states of affairs also a part of reality? Therefore, in our account of reality we need to also account for the difference between states of affairs as well as the states of affairs.

Consider now that each possible world is a different state of affairs. The difference between each possible world is what "possibility" is. So we'll never understand the reality of what possibility is unless we recognize as real, that aspect which cannot be accounted for by states of affairs.

I like to define words so that they do not produce absurdities. — Ludwig V

Good luck with that!

So it does depend on the definition of "state of affairs". Aristotle's argument is indeed a good reason for changing that definition, to allow that states of affairs can comprise change. Problem solved! — Ludwig V

The problem is not quite solved because you haven't produced the definition. And it's not that simple. If we redefine "state of affairs" as you suggest, such that 'state of affairs" covers all of reality, then all you have done is produced a false description of reality. Redefining things to suit your purpose, instead of to provide an understanding of reality doesn't solve the problem mentioned.

Yes, I knew that was why Aristotle constructed his system. But I don't think it would be helpful to adopt it now that we have other ways of explaining it. — Ludwig V

What other ways? Do you mean to define words so that they reflect the way that you want reality to be, rather than the way that it is? That's not very good ontology.

The state of affairs is that the apple is on the table. It is, for the purposes of the Abstractionist, an abstract object. It is not a description. — Banno

So, "the apple is on the table" is an abstract object. That looks to me, like the type of abstract object which would be correctly called "a description". "Description" is defined as a spoken or written representation. Can you explain why I am wrong to call this type of abstract object a description?

Can you give me a reason for restricting the term in that way? — Ludwig V

The reason is the argument presented by Aristotle. Suppose at some time we have state of affairs A, and at a later time state of affairs B. Since these two are different we can conclude that change has occurred in the time between A and B. As philosophers we desire to know and understand this change. We might explain the change with a third, distinct state of affairs, C, which occurred between A and B, but then we have a change which occurred between A and C, and between C and B. We might posit two more states of affairs, D and E, to account for these changes, but then we have changes between A and D, D and C, C and E, and E and B, requiring more states of affairs. And so on.

As you can see, we are headed toward an infinite regress of states of affairs between A and B, without ever addressing the actual change which occurs between two states of affairs. So, what Aristotle proposed is that we recognize "change" or "becoming" as something distinct and incompatible with "states of affairs", or "being". This implies that something occurs between two successive states of affairs which cannot be accounted for with a state of affairs, and we know this as "change". This is the principal reason for Aristotle's duality of matter and form in his physics. When one state of affairs changes to another, the form or formula changes, but matter provides for the underlying continuity between the two.

If you look at combinatorialism in the SEP article, you'll see that the "particular", takes the place of matter. So we have the "universal" which serves as the descriptive (abstract) form or formula, and the "particular" which is explicitly separate from the formula which is a universal. In this way, the particular is allowed to be independent from every universal, and since identity is obtained from the universal formula. the problem of transworld identity is thereby avoid. The particles of matter, or even space-time points ("Quine (1968) and Cresswell (1972)") in this way, do not have an identity so their transworldliness does not violate the law of identity. The problem here of course, is whether the particulars, and the idea of "simples" in general, have any real substantial existence, or are they merely convenient fictions.

So how do you know it even exists, pardon my juvenile abutment. — Outlander

I know it exists through the logic which I outlined, derived from Aristotle. If we describe the temporal world as a succession of states of affairs, then we notice that change has occurred between two distinct states of affairs. This implies that something very real happened between those states, and we desire to understand what it was. The "change" cannot be described as another state of affairs because this would lead to an infinite regress of intermediary states of affairs, without ever getting to a description of the change which happens between the distinct states of affairs.

If you can refer to something, it can be described. If you have proof of something, or reasonable belief of said something, it can be referred to. Therefore, it can be described. — Outlander

It definitely can be referred to, as I've been doing, and I believe it can be described or we can devise ways to describe it. it cannot be described as states of affairs though.

"State of affairs" is simply a name for what the description is a description of. It has very little content, like the word "thing". — Ludwig V

Right, so what I am talking about is something which cannot be placed in that category. The name "state of affairs" cannot be used to refer to this.

When we have invented new kinds of description, "state of affairs" is extended to include those new kinds of description. — Ludwig V

Not in this case, that would lead to the issue describe, potential infinite regress without ever describing the thing we want to describe. The thing we want to describe is something which demonstrable cannot be described as a state of affairs.

In other words "state of affairs" is just a correlative to "description", and is no more limited than "description". — Ludwig V

No it isn't If we insist that all description must be as a state of affairs, then we deny ourselves the capacity to describe this part of reality which cannot be described as a state of affairs. that would be a mistake.

And when you contradict yourself in the one paragraph - as were you say first that "the observed world cannot be described by states of affairs" then that "when we reach the current limitations of our language, and there is still reality which we cannot describe, then we must devise new ways of speaking"... and thereby say what was previously unsayable, presumably. — Banno

Where's the contradiction?

Indeed, since the state of affairs is how things are, not a model of how things are. — Banno

Reread the section in the SEP. The state of affairs is a description, that's how possible worlds can consist of states of affairs. If the state of affairs corresponds with "how things are" in the concrete world, it is said to "obtain". Come on Banno, you are falling right back into your bad habits of that other thread. This is "abstractionism", get with the program.

You used a non sequitur, since from “it does not capture all dynamics” it does not follow that it is captures none. — Banno

You are neglecting the point I was making. The point was that the entirety of the observed world cannot be described by states of affairs. I readily admit that states of affairs capture some of reality, but there is a very significant and real portion which cannot be described this way.

You might prefer Wittgenstein's logic "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent", but I prefer to think that when we reach the current limitations of our language, and there is still reality which we cannot describe, then we must devise new ways of speaking.

When we reach the limits of what "states of affairs" can do for us, and there is still more reality to describe, we must devise a new way to speak about it.

You missed the point entirely: the example was precisely to show that a state of affairs can be temporally extended and dynamic. — Banno

I've always agreed that states of affairs are temporally extended. In fact, I insist that they must be temporally extended. That's why I object to concepts like "instantaneous velocity" which are not really instantaneous states of affairs, but just use that word, And, I do not deny that "states of affairs" are very useful to describe a significant part of the empirical world. The issue is with the rest of the observed empirical world, the part which sound logic demonstrates cannot be described with states of affairs.

In short, you mistook modelling for misdescription, and abstraction for error. — Banno

You continue with your straw man. The point is that modeling the observed empirical world as states of affairs and nothing else is an error. Above, you accept that states of affairs "does not capture all dynamics". So how does the other, the part not captured by states of affairs fit into the abstractionist's model of possible worlds? If you reject the sound logic, and simply refuse to accept that there is any part of empirical reality which cannot be describe as states of affairs, then you are in denial.

Examples of biodigital convergence should be provided.

1. pace makers
2. genetic manipulation to produce desired behavior or charateristics
3. wearable device such as timed insulin delivery
4. I would say targeted treatment for certain diseases

Are these good examples? — L'éléphant

Those are good examples as a starting point. But the technology has advanced to the point where computers can be integrating into DNA, to influence or control biological behaviour. here's a quote from the beginning of the last article I referenced in the op:

2.1 Synthetic Biology and CRISPR-Driven Integration
Synthetic biology has evolved from gene editing into full genome reprogramming, enabling scientists to design life from scratch. The advent of CRISPR-Cas9 and more recent CRISPR-3.0 systems has introduced precision tools capable of altering human DNA with algorithmic control (Doudna & Sternberg, 2022). When paired with AI-driven gene expression models, the possibility arises of dynamically editable DNA a codebase not just inherited, but upgradable. Researchers such as Venter (2023) have proposed synthetic “xenogenomes” for future human-machine interfaces, where artificial nucleotides interact with embedded processors to form hybridized bio-digital systems. This raises the possibility of DNA encoding both biological traits and computational logic. — Post-Human Biotechnologies: Toward Recursive Intelligence and Bio-Digital Identity

If you like, we can include an error: the apple accelerates at 9.8±0.1m/s². — Banno

It's still incorrect, for the reasons explained. And as a philosopher, your attempts to avoid the reality of the situation through denial are unconscionable.

I agree that on the micro scale, such as a second, I do feel that I experience a duration of time, even though intellectually I believe that there can be only one moment in time. Very mysterious. — RussellA

Very mysterious indeed, and when thoroughly analyzed, along with the ability to direct one's own actions through choice, it becomes very complicated.

The state of affairs is an apple falling with an acceleration of 9.8m/s². — Banno

Sure, that's a state of affairs meant to describe a specific situation, but it would be false in any particular case. Due to resistance from the air, friction, the apple does not actually accelerate in the way of your statement.

Put simply, states of affairs can be dynamic. — Banno

What you have done is reduced a dynamic situation to a state of affairs. But your state of affairs is false because it does not properly account for the dynamics of the situation. In reality, the rate of acceleration varies over time, due to the forces of friction from the air, and probably some other factors. As the apple accelerates, the force of friction increases and counteracts the acceleration, until a balance would be reached when there would be no more acceleration. In the true dynamics of the situation acceleration would not be constant. Therefore the state of affairs which you stated is false because it does not describe the dynamics of the situation.

You reduce a dynamic situation to a state of affairs, "an apple falling with an acceleration of 9.8m/s²", but that state of affairs is actually false because it does not adequately account for the true dynamics of the situation. You have provided a very good example of why states of affairs cannot provide an adequate representation of a dynamic world. Describing a dynamic situation as a state of affairs will always fail to capture the true dynamics of the situation.

The reason why combinatorialism is fundamentally better than the other two interpretive models, is because it maintains the appropriate separation between particular and universal. So in the example, we have "John" ("particular"), and "being 1.8 metres tall" ("universal"), and also (the "fact" of) John exemplifying that universal.

This separation between particular and individual provides a more versatile foundation than the abstractionist "state of affairs" as the base element, because the latter unites the particular with the universal, within the basic state of affairs, and this produces the need for the incoherent "transworld identity". In combinatorialism, the fundamental particular, the "simple", is simply a point of matter, and matter on its own without any properties has no identity. So the incoherence of transworld identity can be avoided in this way.

And now
This is false,
— Metaphysician Undercover

Keep dithering and vacillating and no one can touch you with anything so solid as an argument. — Banno

I always knew you have extreme difficulty understanding simple points, but have you completely lost your mind now? For the sake of argument, I allowed that your compilation of states could be considered to be a single state, just to show that this does not affect the soundness of my argument.

When I see an apple falling to the ground, are you saying we are able to empirically observe more than one moment in time at the same time? — RussellA

No, I am saying that we do not observe any moments in time. A "moment" is an artificial, mental construct. Strictly speaking, we do not "observe" time at all. If a person sees an apple moving one can deduce that time has passed, but we do not observe time. So "time" itself is a mental construct. And to construct that concept of time as consisting of moments, is not consistent with the empirical observation of the apple. The apple is observed to move in a continuous way without any moments in time.

To answer your question now. The question is loaded by asking about observing more that one moment at a time, when "moment" is not an acceptable term in the first place. So, what I would say is that we are always experiencing and observing a duration of time. If you research it, it is unclear as to the exact length of the human present, and perhaps some people experience a different length as their present, than others do.

It is more the case that when we empirically observe the apple hitting the ground, we have a memory of the apple leaving the tree. — RussellA

I agree, because the duration of the human present is shorter than the length of time that it takes for an apple to fall. So the apple is seen to hit the ground, and leaving the tree is already a past observation. But have you ever seen something that moves so fast that it looks like a blur? If the apple moved that fast, it would appear like a blur from the tree to the ground.

First, the idea that a ‘state’ must be unchanging is a stipulation, not a truth. A state of affairs can include change. ‘The ball rolled east at 2 m/s for five seconds’ is a perfectly ordinary state of affairs. — Banno

As I explained, there is no change in that state of affairs. The ball is rolling east for the entire time. And if that changes, it's not the same state of affairs.

You keep treating a state of affairs as a snapshot, not a way things are. — Banno

This is false, you are making a straw man. As I said, I do not accept snapshots. A state of affairs must last for a duration of time, whether long or short. In no way does the fact that a state of affairs cannot be changed without becoming a different, separate state of affairs imply that a state of affairs must be instantaneous. The ball rolling east, or any other state of affairs can persist indefinitely, but if the situation changes, a new descriptive state of affairs is required.

Second, your complaint that states of affairs don’t ‘describe the change itself’ is misleading. A description doesn’t re-enact what it describes. A trajectory doesn’t move; a sentence about change doesn’t change. That’s not a deficiency. A state of affairs specifies what’s the case, it doesn't bring it about. — Banno

The point is that the state of affairs, nor any state of affairs, can describe what brings about a state of affairs. This is because there will always be a "change" which occurs in between, intermediary between, any two successive states of affairs. Therefore no state of affairs can satisfactorily describe what brings about any specific state of affairs. That is the incompatibility between being and becoming demonstrated by Aristotle. But what brings about a state of affairs is a very real aspect of the world. Because of this, states of affairs are insufficient for describing the totality of reality.

So, the problem isn’t with states of affairs, but with a picture that insists they must be instantaneous, static, and incapable of internal temporal structure. — Banno

Why insist on this faulty straw man representation? Did you not read my last post? I very explicitly explained that I did not accept instantaneous states of affairs. I said they were fictional. But I allow for very true states of affairs, ones with temporal extension. To be true, a state of affairs must have temporal extension. However, the problem is that "states of affairs" cannot explain the totality of reality because no state of affairs can adequately describe what brings about one state of affairs from another.

Furthermore, it is not the case that I believe there is a problem with "states of affairs". As stated above, a state of affairs can provide a true representation, of what it is designed for. The problem is with the assumption that states of affairs can provide a complete representation of reality. The description which consists only of states of affairs is necessarily incomplete, and that's why abstractionism fails.

We should look at combinatorialism. It's a bit more complicated, but I think it may provide the best approach out of the three. The problem which jumps out at me, is the issue with substantiating the proposed "simples". This idea of simples is similar to the ancient atomists. That the concrete world could actually be composed of such simples as the fundamental elements, is shown by Aristotle to be problematic. In the SEP, it looks like the combinatorialist can actually assume fictitious simples, and in a way, that would solve the problem, but then we wouldn't have a distinction between real simples and fictitious simples. And since the real simples can't be substantiated, we'd have to conclude that all simples are fictitious, leaving no substance to the physical world.

I think I will not remove them until the middle of January! — javi2541997

So long as you wait until after January 6, Epiphany. And thanks for the chance at the lottery!

Your only direct and immediate knowledge of time is that of the present, the present moment in time. — RussellA

As I said, the present, as we experience it, exists as a continuous duration within which activity is occurring. The representation of the present as a "moment in time" is completely inconsistent with empirical observation, therefore a falsity.

Are you referring to concretism?("for the concretist, there is no special property of the actual world — actuality — that distinguishes it, in any absolute sense, from all of the others; it is simply the world that we inhabit.")

I agree that is a problem with concretism. — Relativist

It's not only concretism but abstractionism as well. You are referring to the world we inhabit, (which I take as the independent physical world) as "the actual world". But this is not what "the actual world" refers to in possible worlds semantics. Look at the difference between "actual" and "concrete" in the SEP's account of abstractionism. SOAs may be actual or non-actual. "Actrual" means that it has been judged to obtain in the concrete world.

Importantly, SOAs constitute a primitive ontological category for the abstractionist; they are not defined in terms of possible worlds in the manner that propositions are in §1.3. Just as some propositions are true and others are not, some SOAs are actual and others are not.[28] Note, then, that to say an SOA is non-actual is not to say that it does not actually exist. It is simply to say that it is not, in fact, a condition, or state, that the concrete world is actually in. However, because ‘____ is actual’ is often used simply to mean ‘____ exists’, there is considerable potential for confusion here. So, henceforth, to express that an SOA is actual we will usually say that it obtains.

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Note also that, for the abstractionist, as for the concretist, the actual world is no different in kind from any other possible world; all possible worlds exist, and in precisely the same sense as the actual world. The actual world is simply the total possible SOA that, in fact, obtains. And non-actual worlds are simply those total possible SOAs that do not. — SEP

The term "state of affairs" is perhaps first found in the Tractatus, or in Russell. There is no indication in either Russell or Tractatus-Wittgenstein that a state of affairs must occur only at an instant, or that it cannot encompass temporal extension or change. The idea that states of affairs are instantaneous is your own addition. — Banno

I agree that there is nothing to indicate that a state of affairs must be a moment in time, and I think that this is a false representation of "state of affairs", like what RussellA is proposing, the present consists of moments. A state of affairs may have a long or short duration in time. I dismiss "a moment" if this implies a point with no time passage, (RussellA's apparent approach) as fictitious. I do not dismiss "state of affairs" as fictitious, only as incapable of capturing the totality of reality.

Contrary to what you say here "a state of affairs" cannot encompass "change" without self-contradiction. The stated "state" must be unchanged for the specified, or unspecified period of time. If it changes then it is not the stated state. Therefore the state of affairs cannot encompass change. That the SOA could change, and still be the same SOA would imply contradiction.

So, we might try to avoid this and allow change within the SOA, with the most general statement about change, and say that a thing is in "a state of change". But that doesn't describe anything, and would be a useless SOA. And, once we identify a specific activity, and say that the thing is in the state of having this activity ("The ball rolled east at 2m/s"), then it cannot "change" from this without moving out of the descriptive capacity of the SOA. If anything about the ball's movement changes, the SOA no longer obtains and a new SOA would be required.

We might then describe a new SOA to match the changed situation (the ball rolled northeast at 1.5m/s), but that does not describe the change itself, how it passes from one SOA to the next. That is why SOAs are insufficient for describing the reality of change. Change is what happens between SOAs, and positing another SOA as intermediary (the ball was struck by another) still leaves change as what occurs between those SOAs. Looking for further intermediary SOAs implies infinite regress without ever describing change itself.

The important, and significant thing to notice is that "possibility" is a feature of the change itself, not the SOA. So if we want to understand the mode of "possibility" we need to look at what is intermediary to SOAs, and attribute "possibility" to that, rather than to SOAs. That's what the concept of energy does. As "the capacity to do work", "the energy" of a thing, or system, refers to the possibility that thing or system has, to effect change to an SOA.

Again, I'll state the relevant point. Some, especially Banno prefer denial, so I'll make it clear.

Motion, change, becoming, or activity, cannot be understood with the terminology of "states". This is because change is what occurs between states, therefore does not get described by "a state". To describe the change which happens between states, with another state, produces the need to describe what happened between those states, causing the appearance of an infinite regress, without ever addressing the issue of what "change" is, change being when one state ends and the next begins.

So, even if we take Banno's example "The ball rolled east at 2m/s", and consider this to be "a state", the next "state" might be "the ball rolled northeast at 1.5m/s. Notice, that what happens in between is not described. We can posit an intermediate state, "the ball was hit by a ball moving north". This still does not provide a description of the change. We could posit many more intermediary states, indentation of the ball, elasticity, difference in molecular activity, electrons, whatever, and all those intermediary states will never produce an understanding of the "change" which occurred between one state and another. So, the simple solution is to employ the concept of "force". There was an exchange of "force". But "force" is not a state of affairs, nor can it be understood as a part of a state of affairs, because it describes something about the relation between distinct states of affairs.

Now Banno will have you believe that a compilation of "states", such as "The ball rolled east at 2m/s'", since it is a compilation of distinct states, could have "force" included within that compilation. The rolling ball had a specific force. But of course, apprehending a compilation of states as "a state", is an ontological misunderstanding.

And Merry Christmas to all!