The claim is that we have no access to the parts of the objective world that aren't our own subjectivity, so there is no contradiction. — Michael

Well if you don't see a problem with the notion that subjectivity is the only thing that is objective, then I wish you good luck with the hard problem.

"This view solves the hard problem of consciousness by killing two birds with one stone".
What it does is kill any chance at understanding the origin of the problem, which is separating the world into relations and non-relations. Once you do that you end up with ridiculous concepts like Qualia.
Try this: Imagine that what youve always thought of as an object, a thing that self-persists , is self-identical and is assigned attributes, is an illusion. Imagine that there is no such thing, anywhere, as an object understood in this way. Instead, there are interaction of interactions, changes that change other changes, a world of dynamic self-organizing process, with no stasis, no 'things' that are not already ahead of themselves. There's your qualia, not some 'thing' , like a photon, in a consciousness, but the very fact of the world that nothing persists as simply 'itself' moment to moment. You have to learn to translate your notion of a thing into a process of change before you can see the fundamental basis of experienced reality as already 'affective'

I think you are saying that there is only an Explanatory Gap if the Intentional Reality is found to be in the Neurons — SteveKlinko

I am not sure what, operationally, it would mean to find intentional reality "in the neurons." If intentions are to be effective, if I am actually able to go to the store because I intend to go to store, then clearly my intentions need to modify the behavior of neurons and are in them in the sense of being operative in them. Yet, for the hard problem to make sense requires more than this, for it assumes that the operation of our neurophysiology is the cause of intentionality. What kind of observation could possibly confirm this?

But if it is found to be in the Neurons then that means that Science has an Explanation for How and Why it is in the Neurons — SteveKlinko

Knowing what is, is not the same as knowing how or why it is. We know that electrons have a charge of -1 in natural units. We have no idea of how and why this is so.

If Intentional Reality is not found in the Neurons then there would exist a Huge Explanatory Gap as to what it could be. — SteveKlinko

Not at all. We already know what intentionality is. We can define it, describe it, and give uncounted examples of it. What we do not know is what we cannot know, i.e. how something that cannot be its cause is its cause. That is no more a gap than not knowing how to trisect an arbitrary angle with a compass and straightedge is a gap in our knowledge of Euclidean geometry. There is no gap if there is no reality to understand.

. How does this non-Material Intention ultimately interact with the Neurons, as it must, to produce Intentional or Volitional effects? — SteveKlinko

I think the problem here is how you are conceiving the issue. You seem to be thinking of intentional reality as a a quasi-material reality that "interacts" with material reality. It is not a different thing, it is a way of thinking about one thing -- about humans and how humans act. It makes no sense to ask how one kind of human activity "interacts" with being human, for it is simply part of being human.

I have argued elsewhere on this forum and in my paper (https://www.academia.edu/27797943/Mind_or_Randomness_in_Evolution), that the laws of nature are intentional. The laws of nature are not a thing separate from the material states they act to transform. Rather, both are aspects of nature that we are able to distinguish mentally and so discuss in abstraction from each other. That we discuss them independently does not mean that they exist, or can exist, separately.

Would it make any sense to ask how the laws of nature (which are intentional), "interact" with material states? No, that would be a category error, for the laws of nature are simply how material states act and it makes no sense to ask how a state acts "interacts" with the state acting. In the same way it makes no sense to ask how an effective intention, how my commitment to go to the store, interacts with my going to the store -- it is simply a mentally distinguishable aspect of my going to the store.

I know this does not sound very satisfactory. So, think of it this way. If I have not decided to go to the store, my neurophysiology obeys certain laws of nature. Once I commit to going, it can no longer be obeying laws that will not get me to the store, so it must be obeying slightly different laws -- laws that are modified by my intentions. So, my committed intentions must modify the laws controlling my neurophysiology. That is how they act to get me to the store.

Am I correct in saying that Volition is the same as Intention in your analysis? — SteveKlinko

Volition produces what I am calling "committed intentions." There are many other kinds of intentions like knowing, hoping, believing, etc.

intelligence and consciousness are two different things

dont get them mixed up

explaining intelligence still doesnt explain consciousness at all

dont mix up the easy problem with the hard problem

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.

It is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. — David Chalmers

http://consc.net/papers/facing.html

Personally, I think the above passage reads better if 'being' was used in the place of 'experience'.

So someone raised a question about qualia in stackexchange and this means the hard problem must be one only dualists care about? It is a problem all of these things must face if we want to explain the gap between physical and mental states. A functionalist or identity theorist is only going to say "When I see red, these brain states are occurring". So? How IS red THOSE brain states? How are body/brain states a subjective experience itself?

So someone raised a question about qualia in stackexchange and this means the hard problem must be one only dualists care about? It is a problem all of these things must face if we want to explain the gap between physical and mental states. A functionalist or identity theorist is only going to say "When I see red, these brain states are occurring". So? How IS red THOSE brain states? How are body/brain states a subjective experience itself? — schopenhauer1

Chalmers argues for an "explanatory gap" from the objective to the subjective, and criticizes physicalist explanations of mental experience, making him a dualist. — Wikipedia

:chin:

That's great, now answer how. — schopenhauer1

I already did. Brain activity (something physical) both sufficient and necessary for qualia . :chin:

Right. And let me suggest why: because the strong consensus in our culture is to believe that everything is reducible to physical systems. That is what we make the world out to be: that which is understandable in physical, or natural, or scientific terms. Whatever is not thus understandable is subjective or private or personal - right? — Wayfarer

Right but I fail to see what follows.

A different way to illustrate the problem (the explanatory gap / mind conundrum) could be to ask:
Can you derive what a bat's echolocation is like by examining the bat?
Can you derive those special formats of experience (qualia) from looking at an (alleged) experiencer?
We can guess and correlate of course; is that the extent of it?
Either way, I cannot experience your self-awareness, since then I'd be you instead. — jorndoe

The hard problem of consciousness is the bedrock for all arguments for dualism for it addresses the issue of qualia directly, without resorting to imagined scenarios. Refute it and you undermine the significance of qualia and do that and all qualia-based arguments fall.

Each unique arrangement of biochemical ingredients is comprised of different qualia, just like differing matter is of different sizes, shapes and colors. — Enrique

That answers the easy problem, not the hard problem.

(Nagel) is implying that science being objective and consciousness being subjective make it impossible for science to study consciousness. — TheMadFool

You can study consciousness through cognitive science and psychology. That's why I keep saying the question really is about the nature of being - 'what it is like to experience [x]', or what it means to be the subject of experience.

As you can see, 2 (scientific objectivity) doesn't contradict 3 (subjectivity); after all where's the contradiction in being scientifically objective about a subjective experience unless Nagel's implying that before we can be objective about anything an observation needs to be made and in the case of consciousness this isn't possible because consciousness is subjective and inaccessible for observation. This interpretation matches two other definitions of subjective/objective I found; they're listed below:

4. Subjective = private

5. Objective = public — TheMadFool

Getting close to the nub of the problem.

Remember the previous exchange:

I feel I should disagree with the last sentence: "...not reducible to physical systems" — TheMadFool

Right. And let me suggest why: because the strong consensus in our culture is to believe that everything is reducible to physical systems. That is what we make the world out to be: that which is understandable in physical, or natural, or scientific terms. Whatever is not thus understandable is subjective or private or personal - right? — Wayfarer

The point is that in the culture of the scientific west, there's a view that humans are part of this objective order, which is why it is believed that they - we - can be completely understood through the perspective of evolutionary biology and brain science, even if in practice it is very difficult to fill in all the details.

Nagel and Chalmers are both arguing that this view is mistaken in principle, and not simply as a matter of lack of detail. Chalmers lays it out in terms of the 'hard problem of consciousness', which refers to Nagel's earlier essay 'what is it like to be a bat?'. And then Nagel's 2012 book, Mind and Cosmos, elaborates on this point in some detail. (You know this was nominated as most despised book of 2012, right? Because it questions the strong consensus.)

With all due respect, I feel you are assuming the scientific/western perspective in pretty well everything you write. Please don't take this as a personal pejorative, but a philosophical critique (and hope you can appreciate the distinction.) But that's why I said we have to learn to look at this perspective, and not simply through it - which is extraordinarily difficult to do, because of the strong consensus.

Have we invented the hard problem of consciousness? — Beautiful Mind

No. The problem of explaining the emergence of immaterial processes --- such as Life, Mind, & Consciousness --- was inherent in the theory of Materialism. That notion was based on the observation that physical Effects usually had prior physical Causes. So, it was just common sense to conclude that even meta-physical aspects of reality should be reducible to physical causes. Unfortunately, no one has ever found the missing link between Matter and Mind. This glaring gap in cause & effect may be why Plato concluded that ultimate Causes (Forms) were not physical, but meta-physical : i.e. Ideal.

I have come to believe that the "missing link" in the emergence of non-physical phenomena -- such as the invisible Mind -- is the meta-physical process of En-formation : creation of novel forms of being. It's analogous to the mysterious emergences that physicists call "Phase Transitions". My odd notion of EnFormAction is derived in part from Shannon's theory of abstract Information (1s & 0s), and partly from the Quantum queerness of Virtual states of being. I have a thesis to explain how I came to such an un-real worldview. It combines elements of Realism with Idealism. :smile:

Hume on Causation : Natural relations have a connecting principle such that the imagination naturally leads us from one idea to another.
"And what stronger instance can be produced of the surprizing ignorance and weakness of the understanding than [the analysis of causation]?…so imperfect are the ideas we form concerning it, that it is impossible to give any just definition of cause,. . ."
https://iep.utm.edu/hume-cau/

Information :
Claude Shannon quantified Information not as useful ideas, but as a mathematical ratio between meaningful order (1) and meaningless disorder (0); between knowledge (1) and ignorance (0). Hence, that meaningful mind-stuff exists in the limbo-land of statistics, producing effects on reality while having no sensory physical properties. We know it exists ideally, only by detecting its effects in the real world.

For humans, Information has the semantic quality of "aboutness" , that we interpret as meaning. In computer science though, Information is treated as meaningless, which makes its mathematical value more certain. It becomes meaningful only when a sentient Self interprets it as such.

When spelled with an “I”, Information is a noun, referring to data & things. When spelled with an “E”, Enformation is a verb, referring to energy and processes.
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page11.html

Enformationism : http://enformationism.info/enformationism.info/

Then how can you even use the term, "physicalism" and "experiences", when you have no means of testing and all you can do is guess at what they mean and how they are related? You keep using the terms without explaing what they mean.

I agree that we've invented the hard problem. The problem arises from the incoherent terms that we are using.

Hundreds of years of lack of progress on something so fundamental as consciousness wouldn't be a problem for physicalism? Obviously, at some point (e.g., 10,000 years from now), lack of progress on the Hard Problem would be catastrophic for physicalism.

Unless a discourse is able to derive physical causation as an abstracted modification of a more primary hermeneutic process, it fill fail to come to grips with the origin of the hard problem, as your link demonstrates. Starting from causative relations between objects and then trying to explain consciousness on top of this IS the problem

Starting from causative relations between objects and then trying to explain consciousness on top of this IS the problem — Joshs

Yeah, I’m fine with that brief. Personally, I would then ask, if science solves the hard problem by relating the physical mechanisms of brain to the metaphysical mechanisms of subjectivism......what has really been accomplished? I rather think no one will care, except the scientists.

Yeah, I’m fine with that brief. Personally, I would then ask, if science solves the hard problem by relating the physical mechanisms of brain to the metaphysical mechanisms of subjectivism......what has really been accomplished? I rather think no one will care, except the scientists. — Mww

So you are no longer interested in the subject if it no longer resides in the domain of philisophy and becomes part of the domain of science. I can understand this. Unsolved mysteries are interesting to philosophers. Solved mysteries are no longer interesting to philosophers but are interesting to scientists. :cool:

However, we should be careful not to allow our interest in keeping it a mystery prevent us from solving the problem. The answers were never guaranteed to be interesting to everyone for every goal that they may have.

No, there is no presupposition of dualism.
There are two perspectives, first person, and third person. The brain, uniquely, is an object that can be experienced from either perspective. Simultaneously, with the right equipment.
Science is the endeavor of explaining third person facts with third person facts. But to explain consciousness, science must make the perspectival leap, and explain first person facts with third person facts. This required leap is unique to this problem, and is what makes it the Hard Problem.

So I'm experiencing my brain? Here I thought I was experiencing the world the whole time. Is your post in my brain or in the world that my brain accesses? — Harry Hindu

Any externally originating experience is both the experience of the world, and a phenomenal event generated by your brain. And, you can experience the brain from the third person, by looking at one, even your own with the right instrument. As well as your everyday experience of the brain in the first person.

Sounds like dualism is presupposed to me. — Harry Hindu

But only the dualism of perspective presupposed by everyone: the world out there vs the world in the head.

The first person experience is a manifestation of the way in which sensory information is presented. — Harry Hindu

This is not what I had in mind.
You can regard a brain as a lump of grayish, convoluted tissue. This is the third person perspective of the brain.
Or, you can experience it as a rich internal universe. This is the first person perspective.
The hard problem is to reconcile these two perspectives. In particular, it seems that no matter how much you elaborate the working of the brain scientifically, from the third person, there is no conceivable way to make the leap to explaining the first person experience.

The answer may somehow involve substance dualism. But posing the problem certainly does not presuppose it.

A. Does materialism have a particular handicap compared to other types of metaphysics that do not consider fundamental consciousness, and if so, what is this handicap? — Eugen

The notion that consciousness can arise from particular arrangements of entirely non experiential matter seems a particularly difficult metaphysical barrier. One subject to the charge of "mysterianism" as much as any form of pan or proto psychism. Modern physics suggests a much different view of "matter" than traditional mechanistic determinism.

B. Are there rational arguments to circumvent the hard problem in other types of metaphysics, or does neutral monism / panprotopsychism collapse into mysterianism? — Eugen

In general the various forms of panpsychism suffer from the "combination problem" how do primitive units of experience combine to produce minds, experience, qualia and consciousness but from an ontological metaphysical point of view this seems less of a barrier or a form of "mysterianism" than A.

Here's another snippet from Thomas Nagel on why the hard problem appears for modern philosophy, in particular:

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos, Pp 35-36

Once you understand this, many issues are resolved, but it takes quite a bit of work to understand it.

:100:

:up:

What "consciousness"? If it is "immaterial" "nonphysical" or "super-natural", then, not only is it inexplicable, it's also non-evident in a scientific sense too. Assuming that, what are you (idealists, mysterians & pan-whatchamacallits) even talking about when you talk about "consciousness" ("experience" "qualia" etc)? The explanatory gap is a scientific problem, not a philosophical aporia, because it concerns explaining facts of the matter which philosophy does / can not; therefore philosophers can only propose woo-of-the-explanatory-gap nonsense (e.g. panpsychism, substance dualism, subjective idealism) that only begs the question of one unknown with a further (metaphysical? magical?) unknowable. As suggested already by , this latest "hard problem" is a DOA anachronism that confuses, even occludes, far more than it clarifies or informs research.

"The hard problem of consciousness" is a conspicuous example of a pseudo-problem and remains "unsolvable" in so far as "the explanatory gap" is treated as metaphysical topic rather than a scientific one. — 180 Proof

So do you see phenomenal consciousness as essentially being an emergent property of the brain's processing capabilities? Details to be understood in the fullness of time via a scientific approach?

An urge to explain consciousness in supernatural terms seems as fraught as the need to use the more speculative aspects of quantum physics as the engine for driving a fresh cult of transcendental obscurantism. — Tom Storm

'Supernatural' is a very loaded word. It denotes the boundary between 'rational, sensible, scientific', and 'obscure, mystical, occult', right? Notice the responsese? The references to 'woo', to the occult? That what I call 'handrail naturalism' - gives you something to hang on to. That's why I so often refer to Nagel's essay, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion. But, don't mention the war.

Although now you've brought it up, I have to mention the 'Copenhagen Interpretation'. As we saw earlier in the thread, the outlook that gave rise to 'the hard problem of consciousness' was a consequence of Galileo's division of the world into objective (primary) and subjective (secondary) qualities. This held good for a long while, but the discovery which really made its shortcomings clear was the discovery of 'observer problem' in early 20th century physics. Another contributor put it very well in an earlier thread.

Another way of putting it is in terms of Lockean primary versus secondary qualities; Traditionally, the discipline of Physics charts only the primary qualities of objects, events and processes i.e. their mathematical interrelations, where the relationship of their primary qualities to their secondary qualities (i.e. qualia) is ignored and undetermined. The reason why the secondary qualities are classically ignored by physics is as a consequence of traditional physics treating it's subject matter to be independent of any particular observer, which is itself due partly to convenience and simplification, and due partly as a consequence of the objective of physics to model the causal relationships that hold between action and consequence irrespective of the contextual nuances and discrepancies of any given observer.

Strictly speaking, the propositions of physics are senseless, like an unexecuted computer program, until as and when the propositions are used by an agent and thereby become grounded in the agent's perceptual apparatus in a bespoke fashion, at which point Locke's secondary qualities become temporarily welded to the physical concepts.

Classical physical concepts are therefore by design irreducible to mental concepts; something has been a central feature of physics rather than a bug, at least up until the discovery of special relativity and quantum mechanics, both of which show that even the Lockean primary qualities of objects are relative to perspective. — sime

The problem is, secular western culture is structured around a worldview in which it doesn't exist - there's no conceptual space for it, and so there's no easy way to conceive of it. In practical terms, it requires either reading of, or absorption into, a domain of discourse in which it is real, for example by reading the literature of traditions which do recognise it. Maybe, as you've mentioned David Bentley Hart favourably, his book 'The Experience of God' might be worth a read. (I found it a little polemical in a lot of places, but overall I liked it.)

Nevertheless, idealism, if true, seems to make the hard problem of consciousness a cinch to solve - the world out there (objective) is simply the world in here (subjective — TheMadFool

Well as one of the resident idealists, I can't disagree, but I get the sense that most of what people say about idealism is based on misunderstanding it. But I'll refer back to my earlier posts in this thread, this one and the one after.

Most problems in understanding the world are "hard problems".

Anyone can use whatever vocabulary they see fit, I'm thinking qualia here is just a very loaded word. We all have experience, we can see outside our window and see a blue sky, or a green tree or a person walking around.

We can listen to music, etc. No problem with that.

We know way too little about the brain to think about how the brain interprets a stimulation as an ordinary object.

We have problems with the behavior of particles, much simpler than a brain. So, it's not surprise we can't say much about something as complex as seeing another person or looking at the sky, etc.

Most problems in understanding the world are "hard problems". — Manuel

I agree.

Anyone can use whatever vocabulary they see fit, I'm thinking qualia here is just a very loaded word. We all have experience, we can see outside our window and see a blue sky, or a green tree or a person walking around.

We can listen to music, etc. No problem with that. — Manuel

Yes, we all have experience, though our experiences are all unique. I actually used the word ‘qualia’ in an attempt to simplify the OP, but perhaps it caused more confusion than it alleviated.

We know way too little about the brain to think about how the brain interprets a stimulation as an ordinary object.

We have problems with the behavior of particles, much simpler than a brain. So, it's not surprise we can't say much about something as complex as seeing another person or looking at the sky, etc. — Manuel

Right, I completely agree. However, I think there is a conceptual difference between being able to know why and how the brain might accomplish this and being able to know that it does so. That is to say, we don’t need to know the manner in which the brain gives rise to experience in order to know *that* it does.

Although understanding the ‘why and how’ would conclusively show *that* the brain gives rise to experience, I don’t think it is necessary for us to go that far in order to confirm that it does.

We utilize brains to perceive brains. That's the real hard problem, IMO. Why, in the first place, grant your brains magical clarity to infinitely perceive things as they are? I say there's a huge gap in the translation between information and information processing.

Mysterians, with an A, aren't irrational. On the contrary, we're the only ones facing the fact that total global perspective is simply impossible. Here on Flat Earth everything seems steady. We seem solid. From a grander perspective, nothing is this tangible.

It isn't even a wooey problem if the brain does create consciousness, as that's still no explanation of what consciousness actually is. Which brings us full circle to Chalmers.

Neither are we fully aware of the parameters of the reality in which it exists; nor, most likely, will we ever be.

As a Mysterian, I can accept that the brain has a big correlate to consciousness, but not that it's comprehensive. Even if it "creates consciousness," that doesn't automatically entail any particular philosophy, if you accept the big picture.

We have to learn to embrace the mysterious and work backwards from there, elucidating with honesty that which is uncontrovertible fact from that which doubt (even the smallest inkling) can be cast upon. And that's most things.

If we're to be honest. Which I'm sure we're not.

But the fact is that experience precedes language, and experience is consciousness, and no matter how deep we dig, we remain on the surface. Bodies are not inside brains; people are not inside brains. Though the brain has a strong correlate in examining what we animals do and are like.

We're still "out here" though, not inside our heads. And really, if the brain NEEDS oxygen, then even trees produce our consciousness. And, of course, the rest of our vital organs, which do not exist "inside the brain." The true nature of consciousness is surface level. We're whole bodies, whole people, interacting with a completely mysterious environment.

I ain't seen no answers yet! Where are we?

I don't see science answering these questions anytime soon, so I think the continued failure of science to say whether machine x is conscious or not is catastrophic to the question of whether science will ultimately explain how unconscious matter can produce conscious states. — RogueAI

Relative on human time line, the current level of scientific sophistication has been around for a second and has already produced compelling evidence and insights. Philosophy and religion on the other hand, have been revolving around this very topic for some time now - but to this day we're circling around the topic with no definitive answers.

The main issue shared between both science and philosophy is that objectively, we can not get past our subjectivity. We can't put our finger exactly on our subjectivity either though. The sciences are meticulous in trying to circumvent this by collecting quantifiable data. Sometimes successful, sometimes not. Ultimately, I don't think there's a way around employing smoke and mirror to see past the self. Philosophy in common dialogue form is not unlike this at all - but ultimately philosophy relies on personal insights rather than reproducable measurements.

There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience — Thomas Nagel, the Core of Mind and Cosmos

Indeed, there can not be a physical description of consciousness itself because it's not a thing with physical properties. But it can be described from the perspective of function. Now here we do have physical processes that can be described with physical properties.

But ultimately I think the reason that the "subjective essence of experience" can not be captured by descriptions is the same why you can't see my thoughts directly in the brain as I've elaborated to Harry Hindu - consciousness consists of experience and in order to know consciousness, you must experience it.

The argument then goes if we do learn everything that is to be physically known about mind, body and process, we can take these electrical and chemical signals, emulate them and have a second person experience the exact same thing as we. This goes beyond simple impression of senses as all the function of cognition takes place here. So not just can we tell the individual that he is looking at grass when he's not - we can artificially trigger all kinds of association, from the smell of grass to nostalgic childhood feelings of things that never happened - in the end re-constructing exactly what it's like to be someone else.

Would such reproduction, in the eyes of the advocates of a hard problem of consciousness, suffice to disprove this very problem? Or would there be any concerns left?

Maybe we could rephrase the question this way: "Why are there non-structured stuffs associated with structures of (causal) relations?" And then the answer might be: "Because the relations are between those stuffs." So, stuffs and relations between them are inseparable. Evolution creates causal structures of high organized complexity and these structures contain stuffs such as the qualia of our consciousness, for example (the feeling of) redness or sweet chocolate taste. — litewave

The distinction between stuffs and relations is the root of the problem , and is what is driving the Hard Problem.
In order to get past this dualistic thinking it is necessary to deconstruct the notions of identity, substance, qualia, inner feeling, intrinsicality and inherence grounding the idea of ‘stuffs’.

If you want to explain the hard problem to John Doe, just ask him which animals and which plants feel something.

Obviously, it's not a bogus problem because it affects people's behavior, one is an animal rights activist, another is an animal abuser, the next doesn't care.