:up:

I agree with Wayfarer. Nobody is wooing any gaps. — frank

"Panpsychism" isn't woo? "Substance dualism"? :roll:

Your continual invocation of 'woo of the gaps' only illustrates that you're not grasping problem at hand. It's a hard problem for physicalism and naturalism ... — Wayfarer

And again, you prove my point by incoherently (in this case) invoking philosophical criteria when referring to a problem even an idealist like you, Wayf, acknowledges is empirical. Oh I grasp this topic – which is outside your supernatural ("new age") ambit – just fine. :sweat:

:100:

It transposes the discussion into an inappropriate frame of reference. — Wayfarer

But talking about the "neural binding problem" does not shift to an inapproprate empirical frame of reference (i.e. what your guru Chalmers calls "an easy problem of cognition") when discussing the allegedly philosophical "hard problem of consciousness"? :shade: Your hypocrisy, Wayf, is only exceeded by your conspicuous lack of grasping what's at issue here. :brow:

But it can be described from the perspective of function. — Hermeticus

That is the task of functionalism. That is covered by what Chalmers describes as the easy problem.

consciousness consists of experience and in order to know consciousness, you must experience it. — Hermeticus

Correct!

Would such reproduction, in the eyes of the advocates of a hard problem of consciousness, suffice to disprove this very problem? Or would there be any concerns left? — Hermeticus

We manifestly do not have the ability to replicate living beings, so it's idle speculation.

While science has brought a pletora of evidence to the table that thoughts and consciousness corrospond to physical (electromagnetic) processes, — Hermeticus

So can propositional statements be described in terms of physical processes?

There are the equations that govern electromagnetic interactions, which are well-understood as far as the behaviour of laboratory objects is concerned.

But the rules governing propositional statements are those of grammar and syntax, and they appear to operate quite independently of physical laws.

All signs, symbols, and codes, all languages including formal mathematics are embodied as material physical structures and therefore must obey all the inexorable laws of physics. At the same time, the symbol vehicles like the bases in DNA, voltages representing bits in a computer, the text on this page, and the neuron firings in the brain do not appear to be limited by, or clearly related to, [those] very laws.... Even the mathematical symbols that express these inexorable physical laws seem to be entirely free of these same laws — Howard Pattee, Physics and Metaphysics of Biosemiosis

So I think by claiming a 'correspondence' between propositional knowledge and neural functions, there's a conflation of two different kinds of explanation, the physical with the symbolic, as if the latter can be reduced to the former, when they're of a different order. And in order to even begin to explain and understand physical order, one must first have recourse to logic and rational inference, so in that sense logic has epistemic priority over physics as such.

How does one actually get the point across why this is not an acceptable answer as far as the hard problem is concerned? — schopenhauer1

Why is it unacceptable? It doesn't beg the answer desired?

I've actually never grasped the problem others have tried to convey since I cannot identify anything unexplainable by natural means. So explain the problem to me, since I apparently don't see one.

I've actually never grasped the problem others have tried to convey since I cannot identify anything unexplainable by natural means. So explain the problem to me, since I apparently don't see one. — noAxioms

To me all knowledge seems to be part of the same "hard problem": how to explain things outside human congnitive faculties, using the very same faculties. That's nothing but magical to me. So explaining these faculties is not really any different. It's all magic.

Why is that framing the problem based on a category mistake? — schopenhauer1

As pointed out

... "subjectivity" and "objectivity" [ ... ] described in terms of one another ... — 180 Proof

How is it that that phenomena fits into the structure of material processes?

I don't understand the question.

Really, I see the hard problems as a direct critique at Materialism.

As a pseudo-problem it fails as a "critique".

Materialism proposes that everything is material or abstractions of material.

What do you understand "material" means in "materialism"?

There is no room for "inner aspects" because that itself is not material.

What does "inner aspects" refer to? Are you implying that these "inner aspects" do not affect the "material"? If so, then they are also material; if not, then "inner aspects", with respect to the "material", are a distinction without a difference, no?

If you go and say "but material can be inner aspects" the question is "how".

At most (if your terms are coherent), a scientific problem and not a philosophical question.

If you say "illusion" that has to be accounted for.

See previous reply.

If you say that physical  is qualitative, then you become a sort of panpsychist or idealist and no longer a materialist.

Incoherent muddle. "Physical" =/= "material" (i.e. event-patterns =/= events).

I'm theorizing that the self, by definition self-referential (please bear with the circularity here, as circularity lies at the heart of memory functions), doesn't appear in a materialist-objectivist model until the second order of feedback looping that, in a vertical structure, rides atop first order feedback looping. In short, the self is the reflection of the first order behaviorist automaton, and thus this automaton individualizes over time as it examines ever more thoroughly the reflections of its automaton self. — ucarr

:cool: This reminds me of Damasio's "core self" and Hofstadter's "strange loop".

But that is the question the hard problem shines a light on - how does electrical signals bounding around in our heads deceive our heads? In essence the brain is fooling itself into believing that it is not a brain. Why would it do that? What evolutionary problem would that solve (ie why would such a thing evolve in the first place)? — Harry Hindu

I would argue that the experience of consciousness does solve a practical problem. But it's mostly about making the brain more efficient, not about giving the brain an entirely new ability. I think that is why people find it confusing; it seems like a whole lot of work just to make the brain faster. Using conscious experience is like chalking the end of a pool stick; you could still hit the ball without it.

If your conscious brain making decisions is like walking the paths of a park, then conscious experience would be like looking at a map of the park. You could discover all the paths eventually if you walk around long enough, but the process goes a whole lot faster when you are using the map to make decisions. Some would also be quick to point out the deceitful nature of your strategy: "You fool, that is just a piece of paper with lines drawn on it; it is not actually the park!"

But does that mean it isn't useful?

Instead of trying to imagine why the human brain is using consciousness, it might be easier to imagine how difficult it would be without conscious experience.

The first part of my definition is descriptive. — Nickolasgaspar

Sure, this bit is reasonably theory free, and can more or less serve as a definition (I'd leave out the arousal bit):

"Consciousness is an arousal and awareness of environment and self,... — Nickolasgaspar

...whereas this bit (whether it is true or not) is pure theory, even if it has become so accepted in the community you refer to as to be, for practical purposes, a definition:

....which is achieved through action of the ascending reticular activating system (ARAS) on the brain stem and cerebral cortex (Daube, 1986; Paus, 2000; Zeman, 2001; Gosseries et al., 2011). "
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3722571/

This is a philosophy forum, not the community you are talking about. So we can't take this as definition here. This must be treated here as theory, to be shown, not assumed.

From what I understand he is proposing a different ontology for the same phenomenon.(Consciousness). My attempt was to point to our current scientific ontological framework. — Nickolasgaspar

OK, that's no problem. Your theory contradicts Dfpolis'.

If he promotes a different ontological framework then his philosophy is problematic at best because a. his epistemology is not up to date and b. his Auxiliary philosophical principles governing his interpretarions are not Naturalistic(Methodological).

OK, more work need to be done than just tell us we're out of date. We're unlikely to slap our foreheads and say "Whoops! Thanks Nikolasgaspar for correcting us. No more philosophy of mind. Problem solved."

Is your objection about our different ontological frameworks when you say "That's not the definition he's using!"?

Not at all, no. Once we have agreed on the subject matter we are talking about (consciousness) then the disagreement about the nature of it can begin. :)

IF not then tell me what is your objection. What is his definition that I missed?

I'm not sure if he's given one, I've only skimmed the paper so far. But it's the same definition that is talked about in any discussion of the hard problem. Something like "Consciousness is that by which X can have experiences" or something like that. I've tried to put that definition in an as theory-free way as I can.

I haven't worked out my approach to the problem. It's on my list of chestnuts that I would like to get my head around one day. But I would start by making sure that the problem isn't in the way it is formulated. My suspicion is that it is not capable of solution and merely demonstrates that Wittgenstein was right about subjective experiences (which is what, I think, "qualia" are supposed to be). I will concede, however, that his response to the expostulation that there is a difference between you experiencing a pain and me experiencing the same pain. He asks what greater difference there could be. I don't think that's enough.

I apologize if I seem dismissive. I don't mean to be. People who deserve respect take the hard problem very seriously. — Ludwig V

So my response is based on the fact that describing the mechanisms of how phenomenal experience evolved, doesn't account for the phenomenal experience itself. It gives an origin story, but not an ontological account of the inner aspect itself. Here are keywords that become a sort of "hidden Cartesian theater" from the article:

"Response becomes Privatized...

"Phenomenolization" "recursive activity".

"Sentition evolves to be a virtual form of bodily expression"

These are all pointing to the easier problems/ideas of the mechanics but not what this virtual, recursive, phenomenolization is as to its ontological nature as compared with the other parts of nature.

If there is a bifurcation of "mental" and "physical" it still only gets at the physical mechanisms underpinning the mental. You lose the bifurcation, fine but then what? Proto-panpsychism? Most people can't tolerate that view. Pan-semiotics? Great, but you simply accounted for the computation and not the thing-itself (the phenomenal inner aspect).

It appears to be a near-universal intuition that mind is somehow different and separate from matter, a form of thinking that sticks with us and appears all over the place. I think we by now have sufficient evidence to show that mind and matter are not distinct (different) ontological categories, but instead should be considered part of the same phenomena, matter, which we do not understand well at all.

However, within matter, the aspect we are most confident about is our conscious experience, so that specific aspect of matter is less obscure.

And if what I'm formulating is roughly on the right track, as I believe it is, it's no wonder some people think of this as a "hard problem", the only issue is that the problem should be reversed. What we don't understand is matter absent consciousness- we study its structural characteristics only - and we do not understand what 95% of the universe even is, though we must assume it's a variation of physical stuff.

Compared to that picture of matter, consciousness shouldn't be as problematic as discussed in the literature. Of course, there's a whole lot we don't know about it, but to think that it's this massive problem is quite misleading, for the given reasons.

I am just making the point that experiences are clearly information for us in a very trivial way. I see something, I am distinguishing something: that is information. — Apustimelogist

Right. I moved your comment from that other thread to here because we're touching on the debate about qualia, which is generally associated with the hard problem.

Of course it is true that when we see something we 'distinguish information' but in the case of perception, there is much more to it, because there are factors such as judgement, context, interpretation, and so on. The same information can mean something quite different to two subjects.

I would be interested to hear why you would think this mapping does not hold up, if you did believe that it did not. — Apustimelogist

I'm not sure why that's significant. Anecdotally, I recall reading that studies indicating that the brain can and does re-organise its operations dynamically, so any kind of mapping is hardly a simple 1:1 operation, and again, the human mind deals with many other factors than information.

who's to say that experience is not just what it is like to be information? — Apustimelogist

Speaking of mapping, that doesn't map! The expressions 'what it is like to be a bat' or 'to experience music' or 'see the deep blue of the sea' draw attention to the fact that states of experience are qualities of being. Information, as such, is an abstract term, as we've already suggested, so I don't see how that maps.

There needs to be a mind observing the result to make it a simulation. — RogueAI

:up: That is connected to the topic I explore in The Mind Created World.

It's like saying the detective can't solve the crime if you set up a scenario where the clues are out of his reach. Sure. Nothing to do with logical impossibility though — Baden

Of course, the analogy isn’t perfect, and here, it requires some elements to simply be “out of reach” for a human while it seems that other humans can reach it: after all, the plastic bricks are made by humans so naturally it’s not impossible to break down plastic… But it shows that a system has its limits based on how it’s made. Our mind is made out of neurons and the way the neurons communicate and the way the neural networks are built present limitations. Just like the child was limited to working with plastic bricks, our reasoning is limited by what it is made of.

If you want a more formal proof of this reasoning, it’s the same principle as Gödel’s incompleteness theorems: any consistent formal system capable of arithmetic contains true statements that are unprovable within that system. The self reference problem brings contradictions when you're trying to prove something by using that thing itself, just like with the liar paradox, just like the hard problem of consciousness.

But isn’t it intuitively obvious? We explain things by breaking them down, it’s either a bottom-up or a top down but every explanation implies breaking things down into elements and explaining how the elements interact together. We know that any reasoning implies consciousness and that we can’t break it down, this “subject experience” is always there as a whole… I think the problem might arise from the illusion that sciences can break down consciousness, because we’re making a lot of hypothesis about its parts, but we seem to forget that every single one of these hypothesis was made using consciousness as a whole…

Is this an impossible picture? — SophistiCat

Why would it be an impossible picture? It is possible to take a photograph of a painter and his art.

The idea is that, in addition to the physical properties of matter we're familiar with - mass, charge, spin, etc. - properties that we can measure and study with our physical sciences, there is a mental property. Not being physical, we cannot measure and study it with our physical sciences. It is no more removable from matter than mass is. Even though it is not physical, it is not "apart from the physical reality we live in." — Patterner

I'd sign off on that as in interpretation of Chalmers.

Another, from Bernardo Kastrup:

Chalmers basically says that there is nothing about physical parameters – the mass, charge, momentum, position, frequency or amplitude of the particles and fields in our brain – from which we can deduce the qualities of subjective experience. They will never tell us what it feels like to have a bellyache, or to fall in love, or to taste a strawberry. The domain of subjective experience and the world described to us by science are fundamentally distinct, because the one is quantitative and the other is qualitative. It was when I read this that I realised that materialism is not only limited – it is incoherent. The ‘hard problem’ of consciousness is not the problem; it is the premise of materialism that is the problem.

Then, as somebody with a strong analytic disposition, I immediately felt a gaping abyss in my understanding of the world. So I started looking for an alternative, correcting those previously unexamined assumptions – materialist assumptions – that I was making, replacing them with what I thought was a more reliable starting point and trying to rebuild my understanding of the world from there. I ended up as a metaphysical idealist – somebody who thinks that the whole of reality is mental in essence. It is not in your mind alone, not in my mind alone, but in an extended transpersonal form of mind which appears to us in the form that we call matter. Matter is a representation or appearance of what is, in and of itself, mental processes.

This would require a little more than improvements in transportation or communication… This would require that our mind is restructured in a way that does not require “consciousness” to be a building block in our mind. And even if that is managed, this would be replaced by another “building block” and we would then face the same problem for this other building block. We use tools from our mind to understand the world, just like in the Lego analogy I explained later in this message, and it’s impossible to explain these tools when all we have to do so are the same tools we’re trying to explain... — Skalidris

You have so much to say but yet you don't have anything else to add to my remark?

If you want a more formal proof of this reasoning, it’s the same principle as Gödel’s incompleteness theorems: any consistent formal system capable of arithmetic contains true statements that are unprovable within that system. The self reference problem brings contradictions when you're trying to prove something by using that thing itself, just like with the liar paradox, just like the hard problem of consciousness. — Skalidris

You wanted a more formal proof of this logic impossibility, are you not satisfied with this one?

Not so sure about "logical ideas" (maybe just "ideas"?) but otherwise I agree. — J

I included "logical" because you mentioned "rules" where 22 people are following some rules. So minds follow rules that we call logic as 22 people follow rules that we call soccer.

At this point we need to make sure it's not just a dispute over terms. What do we want "phenomenon" to designate? I vote for something like "appearance to a mind," so that the 22 people and the soccer game are two different phenomena. On that understanding, I want to say that neurons and consciousness are also two different phenomena, appearing from two different perspectives. But notice that it doesn't really matter how we understand "phenomenon" here. We could go the other way and stipulate that "phenomenon" designates a single event in time, in which case the soccer game and consciousness are now redescriptions of "the same phenomenon." Either way, we're left with the hard problem. I know many people want to do some arm-waving here and say, "Well, it's two different descriptions, what more do you need to know?" but surely the answer is, "A lot. Why are these descriptions as they are? What allows the passage from one description to another? Are we right in believing that the mental-level description is grounded in, but not caused by, the physical-level description? Does the physical-level description have a "translation" into Mentalese? When we encounter something as extraordinary as subjective experience, what else do we need to say about it to fill out the experience? Yes, consciousness is, in a sense, "only" a description of how things look to a subject, but don't we feel it's a lot more than that too -- somehow constitutive of identity?" etc. etc. — J

I don't know what "appearance to a mind" means. It seems to imply that a mind can be independent from some appearance as if something appears to a homunculus in the brain. It seems to me that some appearance is part of a mind, or is a necessary constituent of a mind.

Any appearance in the mind is the result of some measurement in that the brain measures and interprets wavelengths of light and sound and these measurements are the means by which we interact with the world. An interpretation of quantum mechanics includes the observer problem where the act of observing changes what is being observed and the measurement problem where we don't directly see the collapse of a wave function and the idea that mutually incompatible quantum states result in the concrete nature of the world once observed or measured.

Personally, I believe that irreconcilable differences between quantum physics and classical physics will be resolved with a proper explanation of consciousness.

Report: RH = RH. — ucarr

I’ll need photographic evidence in this case ;-)

I say that when I make a claim about something, intending by my claim to establish an objective fact, I simultaneously treat that something as an object. — ucarr

Fair point. We could say of someone, ‘she has a brilliant mind’. In that case her mind is indeed an object of conversation. I could say of my own mind that at such and such a time I was in a confused state, in which case my own mind was the subject of the recollection.

You can also use ‘see’ metaphorically, as in ‘I see what you mean’. But in both cases the metaphorical sense is different to the physical sense.

A related point - the eye of another person might be an object of perception such as when it is being examined by an optometrist. And I can view my own eyes in a mirror. But I cannot see the act of seeing (or for that matter grasp the act of grasping) as that act requires a seen object and the perceiving subject (or grasping and grasped). It is in that sense that eyes and hands may only see and grasp, respectively, what is other to them. That is the salient point.

So the first use of the term ‘object’ employs a different sense of the term ‘object’ than the sense it is used when we say ‘the eye can’t see itself’.

The subject/object duo cannot be broken apart. Each always implies the other. That's the bi-conditional, isn't it? — ucarr

I agree that subjects and objects are ‘co-arising’. This is a fundamental principle in Buddhist philosophy. Schopenhauer uses it to great effect in his arguments. But it doesn’t address the basic issue, that of whether or in what sense mind or consciousness can be known objectively.

Consider the primitive elements of physics. They can be specified in wholly objective terms of velocity, mass, spin, number and so on. Within the ambit of natural science, then objective judgement is paramount. And with respect to at least classical physics, judgements could always be verified against objective measurement. Nowadays the scope of objective judgement covers an enormous range of subjects. But not the nature of first-person experience, and that is intentional, as the subjective elements of experience were assigned to the 'secondary qualities' of objects in the early days of modern science.

The modern mind-body problem arose out of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, as a direct result of the concept of objective physical reality that drove that revolution. Galileo and Descartes made the crucial conceptual division by proposing that physical science should provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time, a description limited to spatiotemporal primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were assigned to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world in order to permit this powerful but austere spatiotemporal conception of objective physical reality to develop. — Thomas Nagel, Mind and Cosmos

That is the background, if you like, that the 'hard problem' is set against. If you don't see that, you're not seeing the problem.

In our context here, it is a measurement system. This is a fact about consciousness, thus establishing its identity as an object. — ucarr

No, consciousness is obviously a flying unicorn, or maybe a rock, or a planet. Consciousness can indeed associate itself with all kinds of objects, but doing so creates a self referential problem, aka the hard problem of consciousness.

What does consciousness do? In our context here, it changes the state of superposition into the state of (well-defined) position. — ucarr

So what? How does that have anything to do with this self referential problem?

However, the hard question is pointing to the fact that there is an unexplainable phenomena (i.e. the "explanatory gap") for how or why it is that brain states are correlated with mental states. It is the difference between causing an event and being an event. We know that biological/chemical/physical activity causes mental states, but what is not explained is why this particular set of bio/chemical/physical events are mental states. — schopenhauer1

Firstly, thanks for the clarification. What you say makes sense but the hard problem of consciousness characterized as being about an explanatory gap is, essentially, to claim that physical brain activity is not sufficient in providing an explanation of subjective mental experiences but if we recognize the fact that when we wake up from sleep, reactivated brain activity corresponding to a return of subjective mental experiences, we'll come to the realization that the explanatory gap you speak of has more to do with our ignorance than anything even remotely linkable to the many versions of dualism that are doing the rounds.

To sum up, notwithstanding the fact that, as of now, subjective mental experiences haven't been explained by brain activity, I've demonstrated a sufficient and necessary connection between the brain and these subjective mental experiences which entails that there really is nothing spooky going on at all - it's not a matter of "IF mental phenomena can be explained with brain activity?" but of "WHEN this will happen?"

Included in all this is suffering in general: it's very hard to measure. No one doubts it exists. — Manuel

Would you agree that most living philosophers accept the hard problem in some form? Maybe the conflict is over whether it is solvable at all?

As fsr as I know, most physicalist philosophers and cognitive neuroscientists take the position that there is not – never has been – a "hard problem", just a hard confusion (category mistakes, etc).

I don't see any hard problem — T Clark

:up:

:100:

Not faith, confidence. Could I be wrong? Of course. — T Clark

:fire:

: S knows P is the issue. One cannot disentangle P from justification, and it really looks like P and the justification are the same thing — Constance

The beginning of a theory of consciousness would just start with guessing at what kind of system could produce the experience of gazing straight ahead, being aware of sights and sounds in a seamless unity.

I think you're focusing more on the philosophy of propositions?

Then, working with a physical model seems hopeless. I actually suspect that the brain does not produce conscious experience, but rather conditions it. Experience exceeds the physical delimitations of the physical object, the brain. Call it spirit?? — Constance

You're basically describing the hard problem, the point of which is that science needs to grow conceptually in order to have the tools to create a theory of consciousness.

You're basically describing the hard problem, the point of which is that science needs to grow conceptually in order to have the tools to create a theory of consciousness. — frank

I certainly agree. I am coming to believe phenomenology holds the key.

I don't want to get into a long discussion about how science has to proceed. I will say that there is no reason the mind would not be among entities amenable for study by science. You and Constance are just waving your arms and promoting a ghost in the machine with no basis except that you can't imagine anything else. — T Clark

It's an interesting one, isn't it? I think at this point in history there are a few key issues left to people who wish to find support for higher consciousness/idealism/theism worldviews - the nature of consciousness, and the mysteries of QM, being the most commonly referenced. I don't know if consciousness is a hard problem or not. It seems to depend on what presuppositions one brings to it. Nothing new there. But I do know that it has become a 'god of the gaps' style argument, a kind of prophylactic against naturalism and a putative limitation on science and rationalism and their questionable role generating Weberian disenchantment in our world. I'm suspicious of the arguments and I'm not sure the matter will be resolved in my lifetime.

Consciousness is not information. But consciousness is informational. It is a phenomenon arising from flows of information. That is why the hard problem is so seemingly intractable. It tries to leap directly from matter to consciousness. But the matter of the brain supports flows of information, from which emerges consciousness. How is unclear. But it is far more conceivable that consciousness arises from information than from matter.

Has anyone considered that the ability to manipulate information (and information itself) and consciousness are one in the same. — Mark Nyquist

Isn't this what they call the hard problem - How does manipulating information turn into our experience of the world? The touch, taste, sight, sound, smell?

Isn't this what they call the hard problem - How does manipulating information turn into our experience of the world? The touch, taste, sight, sound, smell? — T Clark

No.

The hard problem is just more masturbation.

Phenomenal consciousness and metacognition constitute the hard problem. There is something it is like to be you (or me) what is this? (And no, I'm not looking for an answer.) — Tom Storm

I'm not sure how that is different from what I wrote. And no, I'm not looking for an answer either.

He's not suggesting that information processing gives rise to subjectivity. He's point out that it's two different things. There's functional consciousness such as seeing, and there's the experience of seeing.

Computers can see and process visual information. There's no accompanying awareness, though. Providing a scientific explanation for the experience that accompanies function: that's the hard problem.