Descartes was a great man who was very popular — Marcus de Brun
Just what sort of a thing do you imagine a thought is, if it is not the product of the being who thinks it? Or as a Phil. Prof. noted on a paper of mine a long time ago, "No mind, no thought." Or, if you think "to be" is a subject-less verb, it isn't. Gerunds like being, or like flying, are abstract only in the sense of being non-specific. Flying requires fliers for there to be flying. Being requires beings for there to be being. Thinking requires a thinker.Absolutely NOT. From where did you pull the chain of assumption that leads you come up with the notion that the "I" is the cause and 'thought' the effect?
This is the very (failed) paradigm that is under scrutiny here. If thought exists apriori the 'I' cannot function as its causation. — Marcus de Brun
I broadly agree.2. The definition we have for the term 'alive.'
That varies, and is subject to debate, even on the sample size of one we have here on Earth. I know of no standard definition that would apply to a random extraterrestrial entity. What are our moral obligations to something we find if we cannot decide if it’s alive, or if it being alive is a requirement for said moral obligation? — noAxioms
You would need to explain why you think 'cogito ergo sum,' is fallacious. But perhaps we could put that one aside based on the results I got from searching TPF with the keywords 'cogito ergo sum threads.' Why do I always think of @Agent Smith, anytime I type latin?3. The 'I think therefore I am,' proposal.
Fallacious reasoning in my opinion, especially when translated thus. Descartes worded it more carefully, but still fallacious. — noAxioms
4. The proposal that only life, can demonstrate intent and purpose.
Just that, a mere proposal, and very wrong given the word ‘demonstrate’ in there. — noAxioms
As for my suggestion that all lifeforms in the universe contain protons, neutrons, electrons etc. I expected you to reject the 'all life in the universe is baryonic' label as useless, as everything with mass is baryonic
I have a really hard time with non-baryonic life, so I’m not on record disagreeing with that. Call it a truth then. The bolded bit is wrong. Dark matter accounts for far more mass than does baryonic matter. — noAxioms
The more I read about Cogito Ergo Sum, the less I understand existence.
Descartes presupposed I; he took existence as a starting point to prove existence. In doing so, he failed.
All I want to know is that I exist. I want to know that my thoughts are my own. But I have found nothing that proves certainty.
Anyone help? — Kranky
So, 'professional' should surely be understood to mean 'professional academic' not just anyone who has managed to earn money from philosophizing. — Bartricks
OK, but here ordinary language clashes with ontology: "be" is classified as a verb, yes, but then does it make any sense to affirm that X causes - or else is an agency for - its own being (let's avoid the God's causa sui issues, please). For example, does the phrase "I am" entail that the "I" addressed causes - is an agency for - its own being? — javra
To know and to perceive are both ambiguous terms in ordinary language. We can get into this if you'd like. Knowledge by acquaintance, or else by experience - such as in knowing oneself to be happy/sad or certain/uncertain in manners devoid of inference - for example. Or seeing that apple one imagines to be: the perception of imaginary givens. I'm thinking so doing might deviate too much from the topic, though. — javra
In a state, like Texas? Or in a state of being then exists some given that is in that state of being. And who on Earth is describing this given that is as an entity?! Concepts matter here. — javra
But where did the ego get introduced? Where is the step from "There is something." to "I am aware of something."
The nature of being could be self-fulfilling, self-sufficient. — Heiko
Cotard's delusion, also known as walking corpse syndrome or Cotard's syndrome, is a rare mental disorder in which the affected person holds the delusional belief that he or she [...] does not exist[...] — Wikipedia
Come to think of it, even if "aware" is an adjective - a state of being - you still must rely on the premise that asserts that being (verb) in that state implies something that can be (verb) in that state. — TheMadFool
OK, but here ordinary language clashes with ontology: "be" is classified as a verb, yes, but then does it make any sense to affirm that X causes - or else is an agency for - its own being (let's avoid the God's causa sui issues, please). For example, does the phrase "I am" entail that the "I" addressed causes - is an agency for - its own being? — javra
Well, as I see it, the English translation of cogito ergo sum viz. I think. Therefore, I am, is slightly inaccurate. My research, for what it's worth, shows that cogito ergo sum actually means: Thinking. Therefore I am. — TheMadFool
My issue is with premise 1 and I've already said what I wanted to say. Your point concerns argument 2. — TheMadFool
Let's look at the issue of awareness from a different angle. In my humble opinion, if one is aware, necessary that one doing something with one's mind e.g. thinking, perceiving, etc. — TheMadFool
Also, what's the proof for the premise If in a state (awareness) then exists something that is in that state (the entity that's aware)? — TheMadFool
In a state, like Texas? Or in a state of being then exists some given that is in that state of being. And who on Earth is describing this given that is as an entity?! Concepts matter here. — javra
Read above. — TheMadFool
There seems to be an excessively binomial use of the term 'Skepticism' here - either one is skeptical or one is not, but surely skepticism, by whatever definition, is a matter of degree? — Inter Alia
As one example, were a single light in the home to no longer turn on when I flick the light switch, the realism of an external world would indicate that there is something physically amiss with the light switch, the respective lightbulb, or with the wiring that dwells in between. The real problem might not be perceived nor thought of at first, yet the web of causal relations which such realism affirms facilitates my being able to discover what is wrong so as to resolve the problem. Other hypotheses, such as a Cartesian evil demon (or the materialist counterpart of being a BIV), could be conceived as alternatives to the reality of an external world. Yet, devoid of upheld belief in the very same external world, these alternative hypotheses would at best only encumber my ability to remedy the stated problem. This then can be expanded to why electricity operates the way that it does, to the question of where the electricity in my home originates from, etc. — javra
The question to me is one of why uphold something like the Cartesian evil demon rather than an external world? I.e., what justifies the upholding of such a conviction? — javra
For example, it is common knowledge that Plato, an idealism-leaning philosophical skeptic, was a realist. It seems logically sound to me that Buddhists, by virtue of upholding Nirvana to be, are all realists--regardless of possible divergences as concerns other aspects of ontology—for Nirvana (and the four Noble Truths) would yet be even if all sentience were to somehow be, or become, unenlightened (in the Eastern sense of this term) … in other words, the Buddha didn’t invent an axiom of Nirvana but, instead, discovered Nirvana's existential presence via enlightenment (this, of course, in Buddhist worldviews). Materialist realism is, of course, yet another variant of realism—one that strictly upholds an underlying physical reality (here thinking of QM, the vacuum field, etc.). In all cases, there are one or more things postulated to be even when not perceived, thought of, or talked about by anyone. — javra
Skepticism is the tendency for beliefs in representational theories of perception to collapse into beliefs in direct-perception and vice-versa.
I don't like discussions of skepticism in relation to idealism or realism, since both idealism and realism have been interpreted through the lens of representational metaphysics, and it isn't clear that either position constitutes a substantial ontological thesis. — sime
The problem with this is that we understand computation to be a process. The laptop at T2 can't complete a computation without having undergone the process of computing starting at T1. — Marchesk
But given that we're doing philosophy, a strong reason to trust the realist inference is because when we do watch our laptops, they undergo a process of computation from one state to the next. So we have no reason to think they don't just because we've closed our eyes. — Marchesk
Big "S" skepticism seems lazy and cowardly to me. Come on Rene - don't give me this "cogito ergo sum" bullshit. Make up your damn mind. As I said previously, that type of skepticism is a luxury for those who can afford to sit around on their asses. — T Clark
Aren't you and Wayfarer mixing up two different types of skepticism? When Descartes says "cogito ergo sum" he is talking about facts. Do I exist? Does the world I see exist? Is the capital of France Paris? When you talk about skepticism about Naturalism, you are questioning the metaphysical basis of a whole system of belief. Those seem fundamentally different to me. The only problem I really have with Naturalism is that its proponents seem to believe it provides some sort of privileged outlook on the nature of reality, which I strongly believe is wrong. — T Clark
Is this an acceptable inference - To the best of my memory, every time I saw something and then closed my eyes, one of two things happened when I opened my eyes again. Either it was still there or I could find an explanation of why it wasn't there. If there were times I don't remember when I couldn't find an explanation, I am confident enough in my understanding of the world to believe that there was an explanation even if I couldn't figure out what it was.
That seems trivial to me. — T Clark
It seems to me that the evil demon hypothesis or one where reality is just a program running on a computer are metaphysically equivalent to realism as long as we can never step outside the universe/program/demon's imagination to see what is really going on. If Morpheus, Neo, and the crew had never escaped the Matrix, could never escape it, what difference would it have made that it existed?
This is a fun thread. — T Clark
Possibleaaran’s excellent thread. — Wayfarer
Some isms are, debatably, not possible to reject. For example (debatably) it's not possible to reject the view that there is a world outside our own perceptions. — Cuthbert
"There's no escape from isms"- ↪TheMadFool
Ism there? — Janus
...so you are an ismist. You espouse ismism. — Banno
Can it? Rejecting the purported overarching status of any ism looks like an ism... — Banno
Not all isms end with “ism”
To reject all isms is another ism. “Rejectism” let’s call it. — khaled
I am not sure that we are just restricted to isms. For example, one can be a Jungian and that is not an ism. Generally, I think that isms are about putting ideas into boxes, and I am not sure that we need to make use of such boxes to label our ideas, but rather juxtapose them in the most creative ways to develop our viewpoints. — Jack Cummins
Depends on what you mean by "reject". The purported overarching status of any ism can be rejected without that rejection being an ism, but rather just an observation of the diversity of human fields of inquiry and opinion — Janus
I was gonna say 'Escapism' - but there ya go...you just can't get away...and perhaps it is a good thing that we can't avoid -isms. — Amity
Maybe it is about having an encyclopedia or not, crystallizing works to make them comparable to each other.
Like a butterfly collection but with thoughts being held down by the pin. — Valentinus
Any conception can be rejected merely by re-thinking the conditions for it.
While re-thinking is the exchange of conceptual validity, which is an entailed judgement alone, re-thinking is not necessarily conceptual substitution, which is a separated cognition incorporating its own conditions.
(Re: I can easily think some concept does not belong to its cognition, without ever thinking which concept does so belong.)
Therefore, rejecting an -ism, which at the same time explicates rejection of the concept appended to it, does not necessarily require another —ism and its appended conception be substituted for it.
It follows that the statement, “rejection of -isms is itself an -ism, and hence contradictory”, is false. — Mww
So, you went right back to a requirement that I do not believe in. I suppose that's a hard thing to get past. If you want to HIDE behind an academic construct instead of addressing the issue, that is not going to help. It does not matter, by the way, if you are right. The fact that even everyone but me agrees that the above is true is irrelevant.So, you must then agree that the reader must agree that this theory indeed can possibly describe moral realism.
Any theory can possibly “describe” moral realism. That it is a form of moral realism depends on if it is purporting at least the following thesis:
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism].
2. Moral judgments express something objective [moral objectivism].
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism]. — Bob Ross
And I am not convinced. I am not even convinced now that moral realism matters at all if it must answer the 3 propositions. I am trying to argue for objective moral truth. That has ramifications that disagree entirely in my opinion with those three propositions as stated. It does not help at all that you keep regurgitating them back to me. I will try to address your comments about why they are necessary below.Does it feel like or seem to be moral realism? If it bears little resemblance to moral realism, the debate is ended because you are demanding us to lose our minds and believe that black is white as a starting point.
I agree with this. Rhetorically, even if the theory is a form of moral realism, people will not be convinced if it seems counter to moral realism. — Bob Ross
Yes, I can. I just did. I do again. If that makes me incoherent, so be it. Maybe I am not whatever a moral realist is but I do believe that morality is objective and does not change, so you tell me, what is that WITHOUT the other requirements? What is that called? Because that is what I believe and my current state.I have already given my argument for the uselessness of moral cognitivism.
Moral cognitivism is the metaethical theory that moral judgments are propositional, which is a required position for moral realists to take. You cannot reject moral cognitivism and be a moral realist. — Bob Ross
Well, ok, so, I think that statement is true, so, that means I must be for what you call moral cognitivism, but, the idea of anti-cognitivism is then the issue. But you for some reason did not do the redefine of that one here.1) All beliefs are in error partially because perfection is impossible (anti-cognitivism)
2) Some moral statements are possibly true because they embrace the concept of limits towards infinity as infinity. (cognitivism)
Beliefs being fallible does not entail that moral judgments are non-propositional. Saying moral judgments are propositional means that one can formulate them into statements which are truth-apt. If you reject moral cognitivism, then, for example, “one ought not torture babies for fun” is incapable of being true or false. — Bob Ross
OK, If I must decide, it does indeed seem that moral cognitivism is, within reason, acceptable. I know we will have to revisit that issue though. So, hopefully my objection is noted.This ... proves ... to me ... that moral cognitivism (and anti-cognitivism both) are useless.
They are defined such that they are foils to each other and, thusly, you have to either accept one or the other (or suspend judgment): you cannot sidestep the issue by claiming they have low practical utility—even if it is true. — Bob Ross
So, what is deemed a contradiction is often not. I understand you are saying that these are not interpreted phenomena that seem contradictory but that the negation was DERIVED from the opposite. Well, ok. But when in the history of mankind has the wording not been wrong on something? Never. I do not want to just digress into confusion either. On we go.They are simultaneously false and true meaning they are both true and juxtaposed
That is logically impossible, because non-cognitivism is the negation of cognitivism. You are saying X and !X are both true, which is the definition of a logical contradiction. — Bob Ross
I can accept for now, with the objection in place.Here you are throwing out two entire models and expect people to read all and follow. I only expect one post at a time and you are expressing difficulty.
Correct. Moral cognitivism and non-nihilism are metaethical theories which are not themselves the same as the debate about realism vs. anti-realism; rather, they are subcomponents of the moral realist thesis, and, for the sake of brevity and because I have already outlined them in full in my moral subjectivism thread, I refer the reader there. This OP is about a moral naturalist theory that presupposes moral cognitivism and non-nihilism and ventures to prove objectivism. — Bob Ross
I consider myself both an idealist and a realist. So, about now you are shaking your head. Yes, I mean it. I am dedicated to balance. Balance and wisdom REQUIRE in my ethics that idealist is correct AND that pragmatism is correct at the same time. The contradiction is not there even though people erroneously believe that it is. Sounds familiar right?1) There is no such thing as a mind-independent state of affairs. That's the biggest issue.
Are you an idealist? I am a realist (ontologically), so I think that most events are mind-independent. — Bob Ross
And this is a retreat to jargon again.2) If the good is a form, that is mind-independent, in the only way I think you mean it, which means more properly stated that the GOOD does not depend on opinion or choice, but is preset, a law of the universe, then I agree, you are talking about objective morality. But you later suggest that you are NOT talking about a law of the universe making your premises unclear (entirely).
To clarify this a bit, another way of thinking about it is that the Good under this view is identical to flourishing, and flourishing is objective. The methodological approach to determining that is two-fold: (1) the analysis of acts such that they are conceptually subsumed under general categories and (2) the semantic labeling of a particular category as ‘the good’. — Bob Ross
You say it is not a law and that is not relevant at all. It depends entirely on law. Everything does. There is nothing in the universe but truth, and that is what philosophy is about discovering. We do not create truth. We can only discover it. If we make something, it is flawed. Same argument I used before. Perfection is a limit and we cannot arrive, only intend to make progress towards it by aiming directly at it the best we can.3) This means you are asserting that these 'forms' which you do not define yet, are mind-independent. But you also have said in other posts that you are not referring to a law of the universe. So you are contradicting yourself and not in a good way.
That which is mind-independent is not necessarily a law. A law is a force of nature that dictates particular behaviors of objects. The action of a cup smashing to pieces is a mind-independent state-of-affairs, but it is not itself a law. — Bob Ross
Holy lack of clarity batman! Pow! Ok! Well, I think you should state the list of categories and also mention that they are a single value on a sliding scale if they are. Because these things are all different conceptually, yes?I assume you mean good and evil as the only categories.
At least those two, there could be more. Such as a neutral category. — Bob Ross
This can only be true if all definitions of flourishing are perfect, e.g. precisely the same. That is not to say that progressing towards what someone erroneously considers as good is acceptable. No, that that they consider as good must itself also be exactly the same. Otherwise, flourishing is not good. And perfection is quite demanding, I assure you.So what precisely denotes good and what evil?
The good is flourishing, and the bad is the negation of that. In action, what is good is progressing towards The Good (i.e., flourishing) at its highest level (i.e., universal flourishing) and evil is the regression from it. — Bob Ross
Yes, as long as the 'highest' Good, and I already warned you about the term 'highest', is the same for everyone. No two people can differ on what flourishing is, because that is subjective morality.How does a behavior fall into one category or the other?
It will be whether or not the action progresses or regresses from a world with universal flourishing—i.e., the highest Good. — Bob Ross
This is classic jargon and obfuscates understanding. It does not help in understanding.It is no help because you just basically gave no filter and expect that we can decide what makes something good or evil. You have not even said that there is a continuum. What relates the good to the bad?
This has nothing to do with that quote of me, which was:
For example, there is no mind-independent state-of-affairs (or arrangement of entities) in reality that makes it true that “one ought not torture babies” but, rather, it is true because it corresponds appropriately to the mind-independent category (i.e., abstract form) of ‘the good’ — Bob Ross
Well, I think you should realize by now what my issue with flourishing is. It does not work as an example for the reasons I have stated many times now. You have not addressed my concerns in that sense. You are still just repeating it. I do not know what else to do to get you to address it.I was referring to, here, is that, in simplified terms, normativity is not objective; but the good is. The good is flourishing—which is the abstract category I was referring to—and this is objective. I do grant that I need to refurbish the OP to be more clear. If it helps, then use my summary I gave a couple responses back instead of the OP itself. — Bob Ross
Which it isn't. Your flourishing is not the good as described. That is unless no two people can differ in any way on precisely the details of what flourishing is, not the fact that they are making progress towards their goals. That can be progress towards evil. It can be evil for one and less evil for another making the latter more objectively moral in their intents. Is that agreed?In the OP, I focused too much on the methodological approach to determining what goodness is and not in clarifying the end result (of it being identical to flourishing). — Bob Ross
And you wonder why I got confused. No. Stick with one theory at a time. You are laying out tenets of a subjectivist theory in an objectivist thread. People will of course respond to each/both.
The problem with that is that you argued as if I was arguing for moral subjectivism, which is not what is happening in the OP. For those tracking my threads, of which many have been, I wanted to provide clarity on how I overcame my main argument for moral non-objectivism.[/.quote]
We are past that.
— Bob Ross
This is classic you so far. You just state these things and do not say why. That means I ignore you. I say it does negate P1 and it is tautological and round and round we go until you deign to explain WHY.Wow! There is nothing to support this wild conjecture at all up to this point. In fact I would offer a much more reasonable proposition which is this:
Anti-P1: The way reality is currently is clearly the best example of how it should be because it's the only example we have. Guess what? That's a tautology
P1 wasn’t supposed to be incredibly elaborate: it was meant to re-iterate the syllogism from my moral subjectivism thread. The elaboration of that premise is found there.
As for your ‘anti-P1’, it doesn’t negate P1 and it isn’t tautological. — Bob Ross
Yes, but, the twain shall meet. We are both within reality. One of us is onto a better set of assertions and beliefs. This is collaborative. But explanation is needed. If you just assume the work without showing it, we all lose. I admit I am trying to learn here. Are you?No they are not.
Better P2: Moral facts are statements about what choices should be made by any and all choosers.
We have entirely different theories of truth and, subequently, of facticity. — Bob Ross
They are not. They never do. They cannot.Facts are statements that agree with reality. — Bob Ross
Said like a mind path only advocate for sure.Truth is the correspondence of thought with reality. — Bob Ross
I know that. I agree.By states-of-affairs, I do not just mean temporal processes: I also mean atemoral arrangements of entities in reality. — Bob Ross
There are no other facts apart from moral.Moral facts are morally signified statements which agree with reality. — Bob Ross
Why? You should not just say that and not explain.Moral statements are possibly true. That means they do not change.
This is a non-sequitur. — Bob Ross
I disagree. There is no way to define something that does not exist. To try is insane.What is TF, true, false?
Sorry, that is shorthand for ‘therefore’.
By the way this statement undoes YOUR P2 completely so you have two contradictory premises
C follows logically from P2 and P1.
You say what a moral fact is and then say they cannot exist.
One can define something and in the next breath claim that something cannot exist: there’s no logical contradiction nor incoherence with that. — Bob Ross
Interesting. I do claim that everything comes into being from thoughts. But being is another path, just like intent and will is. The structure and order is thought.Instead, by form or category, I just mean an abstract category we derive by validly subsuming actions or events into more general classifications. — Bob Ross
This is nothing more finally than conceit.
It is the conceit of thought, of a thinker, to think that, in thinking, all else came from thought alone
Categories are conceptual, and conceptualization is the process of subsuming things under more general concepts. I never claimed everything came into being from thoughts. — Bob Ross
The which is exactly what I was saying and missed by you for no known reason. I can also use the other two paths to make similar theoretical statements:It is a ruination of 'Cogito ergo sum!'
That is not what the cogito argument means: it is not that “thinking is the one aspect of being”. It is the argument that one exists because they can think.
Bob — Bob Ross
Well, perhaps I need to detail more of my model, but, I agree that this is kind of derailing this thread because of the way everyone, including me of course, is choosing to discuss it. I am a free form theorist, but I can learn this way, I think; assuming it's not just repugnant once I do get more of it. For now I think I'll read more of what others say here on these forums and digest it. Maybe I can. Who knows.In terms of “hiding” behind moral realism, it cannot be hiding if the OP is an exposition of a moral realist theory. If you have disputes with moral realism, or the underlying framework within metaethics, then we can discuss that. — Bob Ross
Well, If I explain more of my model it would help. But I surmise that it would be rejected from start to finish here, although I think its way more useful to people in its verbiage and formulation than what I seem to need to do and say here to interact with you successfully.He seem to use the terms ‘objective’ and ‘truth’ very differently than me and the contemporary literature, which is fine; but I need more clarity from you on what you mean by them. I have already explained what I mean by them. — Bob Ross
Well, no. It does not change. So, to me you can also say, TF it is a law of the universe. It is truth or part of truth. And there are many such laws. But one can also say 'Morality is truth' or 'Morality is objective' or 'Objective morality is a law of the universe'. The 'rules' of morality do not change. Opinion is only error. Choice always contains error. Belief always contains error. Fact is just a certain type of belief, so, facts always contain error.Maybe I am not whatever a moral realist is but I do believe that morality is objective and does not change, so you tell me, what is that WITHOUT the other requirements? What is that called? Because that is what I believe and my current state.
By something being ‘objective’, are you just meaning that it is ‘immutable’? — Bob Ross
That makes no sense to me at all. It's like you started talking about microscopic portions of the wall and their dimensions and such, but I am not allowed to discuss that same wall my way. It's ridiculous to me. Of course all opinions about the wall should be entertained when speaking about the wall. I mean moral objectivism is indeed what we are both talking about, just two apparently quite different models of that same thing. I do not mind leaping into such a discussion and saying, no, that's not what 'red' means to me. Here is what it means to me. I will tell you why and how I support my belief. I will not just say, 'Hey we are only discussing this way to moral objectivism.' I suppose if that is how it is, I need a new thread of my own.Who cares is my answer. Morality is objective. I can offer arguments as to why.
The purpose of this thread is to discuss the view outlined in the OP, not your ethical theory insofar as it doesn’t relate thereto. — Bob Ross
As discussed already in great detail I suppose I would have to be a cognitivist.My position is a form of moral realism, and a part that is the affirmation of moral cognitivism. Are you a moral cognitivist or non-cognitivist? — Bob Ross
Well then tradition is not so useful to me. I'm more fluid.I consider myself both an idealist and a realist
By ‘idealism’ and ‘realism’, I was referring to metaphysical, specifically ontological, outlooks—not whether or not you like following ideals. Idealism, traditionally, is the position that reality is fundamentally made up of minds, and realism is the view that it is fundamentally made up of mind-independent parts. — Bob Ross
Everything in reality, all iota of matter and even dreams, all of it, yes, everything, partakes of fear. It cannot avoid it. It is objectively true. It is a law of the universe. But, yeah, assuming there is interest, I need another thread to discuss it it seems.I was thinking perhaps you are an idealist, and that would explain why you seem to think that nothing in reality is mind-independent. — Bob Ross
Ah, then we agree. Perfection is singular.If you think that flourishing can be defined by two different cultures, and that either one could be correct, you are not what I call a moral objectivist.
It cannot be defined by two different cultures in the sense that they are both correct about what flourishing is while simultaneously having contradictory accounts. There is only one way there is to be flourishing. — Bob Ross
No, because you will now go off into state changes that do not matter to truth at all.Moral objectivity is truth to me
So this would entail that what is true is equivocal to what is moral, which seems very implausible. — Bob Ross
Again, truth does not apply to states. I would even use another word and clear up logic itself on that basis. A true state is a goofy thing to say/discuss. States can change.If it is true that Gary raped that woman, then is it thereby moral? Of course not. If it is true that 1+1=2, then is it moral? Of course not. — Bob Ross
Yes it is, to me. To me there is nothing but morality in the universe and that is synonymous with truth, or God, or Love; choose your delusion.Truth is correspondence of reality, or perhaps the whole, or what is, but certainly not equivalent to what is moral. — Bob Ross
Yes, I agree. I am discussing objective morality as I understand and believe it to be. But that should be useful to you. If I have even some shred of a point, at all, you can use my model and assertions to fuel thought and discussion on yours. Clearly I was confused at the examples you gave and admittedly I thought you were on the track of subjective morality and then what you were saying sounded like objective morality.Your flourishing example is terrible and cannot be used. That is because either the intent is to the aim of the perfect good or it is abject failure
You are importing your own views and then simply demonstrating mine are incompatible with them; instead of analyzing my position on its own merits. This ‘perfectness’ being ‘goodness’ doesn’t exist in my theory: should it? I don’t think so. — Bob Ross
Well it's not hard to imagine, is it?1) Morality is objective and represented by a perfect intent, which is unique.
I don’t know why morality is ‘represented by a perfect intent’, or what that means. — Bob Ross
And again, that is precisely correct. I assert that is true. They are the same thing.2) Moral perfection is all truth at once. Nothing that is possible is left out.
Again, this just equivocates truth with morality. — Bob Ross
We need as choosers, as moral agents, some capacity to judge the error level of a choice or state. Due to the nature of the limiting force and the seeming impossibility of perfection, this 3rd contention becomes true and interesting. It means if we have a morality meter no two choices or beliefs could ever be precisely equal in moral value, goodness value. This all depends on, you guessed it, moral objectivism.3) Between any two beliefs, one is always better than the other, because it is intended along a vector more proximal to objective moral truth.
Why would this be a part of the thesis? — Bob Ross
The physical reality we think we know, is not known. It is delusion. It is just emotion, just consciousness. The model I am getting to is a theoretical 'proof' for this truth.There is no state for which there is not a mind component. That component is not zero, ever. The seed of our human mind is in inorganic matter. The fact that science does not yet understand this is irrelevant.
Hence why I thought you may be an idealist. Anyways, you are confusing ontology with epistemology: our knowledge of the world is always mind dependent, but that does not entail that what fundamentally exists is mind-dependent. — Bob Ross
Not in my model, I am not.There are plenty of believers out there that assert consciousness is all there is. I am one of them.
Ok, so you are an idealist. — Bob Ross
I agree. That is only because I am not saying it quite right. But, unlike logicians I am more comfortable with that. So, I need your help actually.There are plenty of believers out there that assert consciousness is all there is. I am one of them. And although mind is only precisely one third of reality
That is a flat-out contradiction. You can’t say X is all there is and X is one third of what all there is. — Bob Ross
And of course, I disagree entirely. I would say there is precious little reason, the limit as x approaches none, to suspect that. It is in fact a horrid suspicion, and groundless. It is much more likely that all seeds of emotive capacity were part of natural law. We only see discrete breakpoints because we are still deeply deluded. We do not have enough awareness yet. We are going there.I still think you mean that there seems to be a respectable barrier between one mind and another. I think that is what you mean. Please confirm what you mean. I need some term or understanding I can follow. our minds are NOT actually separate from one another.
I mean that it seems as though, and we have good reasons to believe that, our minds are emergent from mind-independent parts and that the universe is fundamentally mind-independent. — Bob Ross
Whereas Descartes fits my model well and indeed my model would allude to the other statements I made as equivalent and necessary as a full closed set.The which is exactly what I was saying and missed by you for no known reason. I can also use the other two paths to make similar theoretical statements:
I am because I think.
I am because I intend.
I intend because I think.
I intend because I am.
I think because I intend.
This set of statements encircles all the possible equivalent statements at that level. Without these statements the understanding is less than best. It highlights the think side only, a problem I detect amid most of academia.
It's compelling, tempting, and entirely wrong to pursue truth only through thought.
I never was, nor will I be, arguing for the cogito argument. I don’t see the relevance of this to my moral realist position. I do not hold cogito ergo sum: I don’t buy the descartes argument for it. ‘I’ do not exist simply because something thinks. — Bob Ross
I mean, I think I get you. I am not at all sure you get me. I would like to discuss the whole topic of objective morality.For the sake of brevity, I am going to stop there for now; and see if that helps. — Bob Ross
So, you must then agree that the reader must agree that this theory indeed can possibly describe moral realism.
Does it feel like or seem to be moral realism? If it bears little resemblance to moral realism, the debate is ended because you are demanding us to lose our minds and believe that black is white as a starting point.
I have already given my argument for the uselessness of moral cognitivism.
1) All beliefs are in error partially because perfection is impossible (anti-cognitivism)
2) Some moral statements are possibly true because they embrace the concept of limits towards infinity as infinity. (cognitivism)
This ... proves ... to me ... that moral cognitivism (and anti-cognitivism both) are useless.
They are simultaneously false and true meaning they are both true and juxtaposed
Here you are throwing out two entire models and expect people to read all and follow. I only expect one post at a time and you are expressing difficulty.
1) There is no such thing as a mind-independent state of affairs. That's the biggest issue.
2) If the good is a form, that is mind-independent, in the only way I think you mean it, which means more properly stated that the GOOD does not depend on opinion or choice, but is preset, a law of the universe, then I agree, you are talking about objective morality. But you later suggest that you are NOT talking about a law of the universe making your premises unclear (entirely).
3) This means you are asserting that these 'forms' which you do not define yet, are mind-independent. But you also have said in other posts that you are not referring to a law of the universe. So you are contradicting yourself and not in a good way.
I assume you mean good and evil as the only categories.
So what precisely denotes good and what evil?
How does a behavior fall into one category or the other?
It is no help because you just basically gave no filter and expect that we can decide what makes something good or evil. You have not even said that there is a continuum. What relates the good to the bad?
For example, there is no mind-independent state-of-affairs (or arrangement of entities) in reality that makes it true that “one ought not torture babies” but, rather, it is true because it corresponds appropriately to the mind-independent category (i.e., abstract form) of ‘the good’
And you wonder why I got confused. No. Stick with one theory at a time. You are laying out tenets of a subjectivist theory in an objectivist thread. People will of course respond to each/both.
Wow! There is nothing to support this wild conjecture at all up to this point. In fact I would offer a much more reasonable proposition which is this:
Anti-P1: The way reality is currently is clearly the best example of how it should be because it's the only example we have. Guess what? That's a tautology
No they are not.
Better P2: Moral facts are statements about what choices should be made by any and all choosers.
Moral statements are possibly true. That means they do not change.
What is TF, true, false?
By the way this statement undoes YOUR P2 completely so you have two contradictory premises
You say what a moral fact is and then say they cannot exist.
Instead, by form or category, I just mean an abstract category we derive by validly subsuming actions or events into more general classifications. — Bob Ross
This is nothing more finally than conceit.
It is the conceit of thought, of a thinker, to think that, in thinking, all else came from thought alone
It is a ruination of 'Cogito ergo sum!'
Maybe I am not whatever a moral realist is but I do believe that morality is objective and does not change, so you tell me, what is that WITHOUT the other requirements? What is that called? Because that is what I believe and my current state.
Who cares is my answer. Morality is objective. I can offer arguments as to why.
I consider myself both an idealist and a realist
If you think that flourishing can be defined by two different cultures, and that either one could be correct, you are not what I call a moral objectivist.
Moral objectivity is truth to me
Your flourishing example is terrible and cannot be used. That is because either the intent is to the aim of the perfect good or it is abject failure
1) Morality is objective and represented by a perfect intent, which is unique.
2) Moral perfection is all truth at once. Nothing that is possible is left out.
3) Between any two beliefs, one is always better than the other, because it is intended along a vector more proximal to objective moral truth.
There is no state for which there is not a mind component. That component is not zero, ever. The seed of our human mind is in inorganic matter. The fact that science does not yet understand this is irrelevant.
There are plenty of believers out there that assert consciousness is all there is. I am one of them.
There are plenty of believers out there that assert consciousness is all there is. I am one of them. And although mind is only precisely one third of reality
I still think you mean that there seems to be a respectable barrier between one mind and another. I think that is what you mean. Please confirm what you mean. I need some term or understanding I can follow. our minds are NOT actually separate from one another.
The which is exactly what I was saying and missed by you for no known reason. I can also use the other two paths to make similar theoretical statements:
I am because I think.
I am because I intend.
I intend because I think.
I intend because I am.
I think because I intend.
This set of statements encircles all the possible equivalent statements at that level. Without these statements the understanding is less than best. It highlights the think side only, a problem I detect amid most of academia.
It's compelling, tempting, and entirely wrong to pursue truth only through thought.
The analysis of Descartes' argument is a bit off-topic here, so I'll resist commenting.The logic of cogito ergo sum is neither rationalisation nor myth, it is the indubitable fact that, in order to be subject to an illusion, there must be a subject. — Wayfarer
But I can't resist saying that I agree with you.I have my doubts about Descartes, in that I believe his dualistic separation of the physical and mental as separate substances is profoundly problematical and has had hugely deleterious consequences for Western culture, but as for the essential veracity of his ‘cogito’ argument, I have no doubts. — Wayfarer
Yes. I did not put my point well. I was thinking of philosophical zombies, which would (if I've understood the idea correctly) not behave like zombies in the flicks.I had the idea that zombies don’t feel pain, at least they never do in zombie flicks. You have to literally dismember or disintegrate them to overcome them, merely inflicting blows or wounds does nothing. — Wayfarer
There's a contradiction here. People is animal. A machine is not animal. But a machine can be people? That means a machine is animal and not animal. — noAxioms
Are these two remarks compatible? My point is that there is no easy and clear way to state what the Turing hypothesis is trying to articulate.I mean, deep down, you're a machine as well running under the same physics. I think you're confusing determinism with predictability. — noAxioms
Thank you for the clarification. I misunderstood what the thread was about. My apologies. It is clear now that I haven't understood what the simulation hypothesis is. However, when I checked the Wikipedia - Simulation hypothesis, I found:-I think you are again envisioning imitation people, like Replicants. That's a very different thing than the simulation hypothesis which does not involve machines pretending to be people. — noAxioms
For me, a conscious being is a person and a simulated person is not a person, so this confuses me. Can you perhaps clarify?Suppose that these simulated people are conscious (as they would be if the simulations were sufficiently fine-grained and if a certain quite widely accepted position in the philosophy of mind is correct).
Well, since you have now used it, and I understand it (roughly, I think), it is a word now. Who knows, it may catch on and then you'll be awarded a place in the dictionaries of the future!why isn't 'dubit' a word? It ought to be. — noAxioms
You seem to think I cannot refer to anything that I have not experienced. But the reference of a word is established in the language in general, not by what I may or may not have experienced. So when I can refer to the President of the United States even if I don't know that Joe Biden is the President.You do not understand what "refer" means, in other words. — L'éléphant
I agree with @noAxioms, except that I would add that it's not something it can justify on the basis of its subjective experience.Then you misunderstand what "true" means in statements. — L'éléphant
As I indicated, behaviorism has fallen into disfavor these days.
I was using the term "cognitive science" as it is often used, to denote the study of human behavior through the lens of new technologies such as CAT, MNR, and PET scans. When I was a psychology major in the 1970s, we called it "cognitive psychology." "Psychology" became "science" as more hard science techniques joined the team. On this forum, many posters are not willing to recognize that CS is psychology at all. — T Clark
Are you really suggesting that the brain is not the seat of the mind? That if i damage your brain I won't also damage your mind?There is no "hard problem of consciousness." But that's another discussion. — T Clark
Tell me how pain "reflects" electrical current running through living conductors. What does that mean? They have no traits in common that I can see. If you and I are watching basketball on TV, would you say that the television equipment is the same as the presentation of the game? — T Clark
This is not a new argument. It's been around for hundreds of years. It is discussed often on the forum. For you to claim that you cannot fathom it is... well, I'm not sure what it is.
As I've said elsewhere, I think I may open another discussion on the general subject of the underlying assumptions and values of science without focusing on god. Maybe that will make it easier. — T Clark
it may show that you are, despite and unbeknownst to, yourself, a realist after all. — Janus
The existence of different epistemic methods gives rise to the existence of different epistemic domains: mathematics, science, and history. — alcontali
The distinction between objective and subjective is treated here as the illusion. — Valentinus
I agree with this, but I also maintain that the world is as it is independent of our knowledge of it. We do not know the world as it is but as it is for us. It is here, the world as it is for us that we find the two poles. Most of what is going on in the universe we know nothing of. Some of those things we will come to discover but others we will never know anything of given the vastness of the universe. — Fooloso4
I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves. To this idealism is opposed transcendental realism, which regards space and time as something given in themselves (independent of our sensibility). The transcendental realist therefore represents outer appearances (if their reality is conceded) as things in themselves, which would exist independently of us and our sensibility and thus would also be outside us according to pure concepts of the understanding.
The transcendental idealist, on the contrary, can be an empirical realist, hence, as he is called, a dualist, i.e., he can concede the existence of matter without going beyond mere self-consciousness and assuming something more than the certainty of representations in me, hence the cogito ergo sum. For because he allows this matter and even its inner possibility to be valid only for appearance – which, separated from our sensibility, is nothing – matter for him is only a species of representations (intuition), which are called 'external', not as if they related to objects that are external in themselves but because they relate perceptions to space, where all things are external to one another - but that space itself is in us. — Critique of Pure Reason A369-370
We have images of molecules breaking chemical bonds. These images would not be possible without our instrumentation but are they merely artifacts of it or does the image capture what is really going on at the molecular level? — Fooloso4
"Cogito ergo sum." I think therefore I am. If I did not exist, I could not think, therefore thinking alone proves undoubtedly to myself that I exist. — god must be atheist
thank you for starting this thread and writing the OP as you have done. — L'éléphant
Descartes, for one, never claimed that humans are being deceived. — L'éléphant
Can you list 3 ways in which it might benefit us, in real, daily-job terms? — baker
Very well, from the start.Here is a new metaethical theory I am working on that is a form of moral realism, and, since I find it a worthy contender of my moral anti-realist position, I wanted to share it with the forum to see what people think. — Bob Ross
On we go, in good faith ...I do not have a name for it yet, so I will just explicate it. — Bob Ross
I have already given my argument for the uselessness of moral cognitivism. That applies here. To assert uselessness is useless.For the sake of brevity, and because I have already covered arguments in favor of them in my moral subjectivist paper, I am presupposing moral cognitivism and non-nihilism in this thread. — Bob Ross
Here you are throwing out two entire models and expect people to read all and follow. I only expect one post at a time and you are expressing difficulty.If anyone would like me to elaborate on them, then I certainly can; and I suggest anyone who is interested in that to read the relevant portions of my discussion board OP pertaining to moral subjectivism on those two metaethical positions. I will focus on a positive case for moral objectivism, which I deny in my moral subjectivist (anti-realist) view. — Bob Ross
There is so much wrong with this paragraph that it might take infinite time to detail it.The core of this theory is that ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’ are not determined by mind-independent states-of-affairs or arrangements of entities in reality but, rather, are abstract categories, or forms, of conduct. — Bob Ross
You are unclear here as to the 'categories'. I assume you mean good and evil as the only categories. That is confusing because we all know there is a continuum there. If one is dealing with a continuum one must/should specify the dividing line between them. So what precisely denotes good and what evil? What filter do I use to distinguish between them? How does a behavior fall into one category or the other?The (mind-independent) states-of-affairs, or arrangements of entities, in reality inform us of what is right or wrong in virtue of being classified under either category. — Bob Ross
This paragraph explains NOTHING OF USE about the former paragraph and yet that is what it purports to be doing. No help. Why?For example, there is no mind-independent state-of-affairs (or arrangement of entities) in reality that makes it true that “one ought not torture babies” but, rather, it is true because it corresponds appropriately to the mind-independent category (i.e., abstract form) of ‘the good’. — Bob Ross
And you wonder why I got confused. No. Stick with one theory at a time. You are laying out tenets of a subjectivist theory in an objectivist thread. People will of course respond to each/both.So, in light of this and in an attempt to contrast with my other moral anti-realist theory, I would like to point out the flaw, from the perspective of this theory, of my moral subjectivist argument; so let me outline it briefly again: — Bob Ross
Wow! There is nothing to support this wild conjecture at all up to this point. In fact I would offer a much more reasonable proposition which is this:P1: The way reality is does not entail how it should be. — Bob Ross
No they are not.P2: Moral facts are statements about states-of-affairs which inform us of how reality should be. — Bob Ross
I do not know what you mean here. What is TF, true, false? By the way this statement undoes YOUR P2 completely so you have two contradictory premises. You say what a moral fact is and then say they cannot exist. Again, putting TF in front of this statement with no explanation is messy at best.C: TF, moral facts cannot exist. — Bob Ross
I like that. It's not discrete but it says the right things to be considered in support of realism.Analyzing this argument from this theory, as opposed to moral subjectivism, P2 is false; because moral facts are not only about states-of-affairs, in the sense that they are made true in virtue of corresponding to some state-of-affairs in reality, but, rather, are made true in virtue of how the state-of-affairs sizes up to the abstract category of ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’. — Bob Ross
Smaller sentences might help. This is hard to follow. You merely claim it is a misunderstanding and although this sentence is perhaps one of the longest in history it does not say why there even is a misunderstanding.So, the key misunderstanding of moral subjectivism, or so the argument goes (:, is that a fact is a statement that corresponds to reality and not solely states-of-affairs in reality—as abstract categories are still mind-independently true insofar as, although we can semantically disagree, the actions are subsumable under more general classifications and this is not stance-dependent—and thusly P2 is false. — Bob Ross
You do not say what this means. So what if P1 only refers to states and not truths? And this is wrong anyway.Likewise, P1, if taken as true, only refers by 'reality is' to states-of-affairs or arrangements of entities in reality and not abstract categories of events or actions in that reality (nor what potentially could occur in that reality). — Bob Ross
Is that a sentence? Smaller is better. Discreet! You asked me to address ONE thing instead of a complex and interweaved response to you, but sentences like this are a tornado through a trailer park. Wreckage abounds.Although there is a lot I would like to say, I want to keep this brief—so I will say only one last thing: this is not a form of platonism. By abstract form or category I do not mean that there exists an abstract object, or a set of them, in reality that in virtue of which makes moral judgments (which express something objective) true—as this falls into the same trap that they are indeed states-of-affairs, or arrangements of entities, in reality and this violates P1. — Bob Ross
This is nothing more finally than conceit.Instead, by form or category, I just mean an abstract category we derive by validly subsuming actions or events into more general classifications. — Bob Ross
The difference between realism and all other metaphysics is that realism is the metaphysical view we're born with. Kids play catch, they expect the laws of physics to work, they act as if the laptop (to borrow another example on this thread) is going to be the same laptop when they open their eyes as it was a minute ago., they act as if effect followed cause, and investigate cause using their senses fully anticipating that this will yield fruitful results. All other metaphysics are something people made up. That doesn't make them wrong, I think we've firmly established it would be impossible to prove that, but it does mean that, like the banana-fudger, they should not just be automatically stored alongside our native realism as an equally viable option, they must prove their worth. — Inter Alia
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