Your failure to understand this prevents you from correctly understanding Aristotle (and Plato) and you get bogged down in unfounded and futile "interpretations" that can only lead to materialism in the best case and to psychological issues in the worst — Apollodorus

While I disagree with many parts of Metaphysician Undercover's reading of Aristotle, I also disagree with your penchant to decide what the different interpretations lead to. I have no idea whether Metaphysician Undercover's interpretation leads to the results you portend. The categories you employ are not matters of fact but involve many unresolved questions of scholarship and reflection.

For instance, I disagree with a large number of Gerson's arguments that I have been encouraged to engage with here. I have no interest in pronouncing any judgement upon his views outside of agreeing or disagreeing with his statements about the arguments and intent of the text he puts forth.

What possible value could be derived from treating those disagreements as proof of an agenda not stated in the text?

Of course, Plato should ideally be read in the original Greek. But I think even an English (or any other modern) translation will convey enough of Plato's actual teachings for the reader to form a fair idea of what he is talking about.

The crucial approach is to read Plato himself before reading modern interpretations of him. What is interesting is that in my experience at least, if you do that, you will be far more likely to find traditional readings like Plotinus and Proclus more in agreement with your own than those of modern scholarship.

To me, this suggests that a break must have occurred at some point in the interpretative tradition and that modern scholars have hopelessly lost the thread - and sometimes the plot - as noted by Gerson.

Incidentally, another key element that can be added to the list of East-West (or Greek-Indian) parallels is the conception of spiritual or philosophical practice as a process of purification, which goes hand-in-hand with the concept of liberation or release:

And therefore those who care for their own souls, and do not live in service to the body, turn their backs upon all these men [the lovers of money and other material things] and do not walk in their ways, for they feel that they know not whither they are going. They themselves believe that philosophy, with its deliverance (lysis) and purification, must not be resisted, and so they turn and follow it whithersoever it leads(Phaedo 82d).

Again, "purification" here may be interpreted as a process by which consciousness is gradually cleansed of ignorance until the knowledge or wisdom inherent in consciousness or intelligence alone remains.

But what I find particularly interesting, and commendable, is the "whithersoever-it-leads" attitude which indicates a rather philosophical openness that I believe should form the basis of authentic philosophical or spiritual effort.

To me, this suggests that a break must have occurred at some point in the interpretative tradition and that modern scholars have hopelessly lost the thread - and sometimes the plot - as noted by Gerson. — Apollodorus

Quite so. I've often commented on the idea of the forgotten truths of the wisdom tradition, generally to either indifference or scorn. (Not that that bothers me.)

But still scholars differ in their renderings and their interpretations, and it seems no one can completely escape their native assumptions, which means that Plato for us is always going to be Plato-for-us. — Janus

Subjectivism, again.

I preface this to say I've been extremely pre-occupied with other things the last week (the mother of all house-moves) but I had previously entered some responses to your earlier posts so wanted to raise them. The context is, my interest in Platonism, that is, the reality of intelligible objects.

I think it is very important to understand that when [we] analyze experience as experience, we are not going to generate anything that is what experience is — Astrophel

That is a very Buddhist observation.

So value, reason, pragmatics, all terms that are abstractions of an original whole whcih is not reducible to anything — Astrophel

As is that. This is something that seems to come across from some of your remarks.

Analysis is an abstracting from the given preanalytic actuality, dividing it into parts and ways experience presents itself — Astrophel

Recall the origin of classical metaphysics with Parmenides. He was an axial age philosopher, contemporary of the Buddha. Parmenides is where the reality of the idea of the forms was first considered, so is the origin of metaphysics proper. (I suppose it is this that is the subject of Heidegger's criticism of Western metaphysics, although I've yet to study that in detail.)

I read in a letter from Husserl to I think it was Rudolf Otto, he wrote how his students were becoming Christian converts in their studies of phenomenology. — Astrophel

Most famously, Edith Stein, who became a nun and was canonized a saint.

I note your appeals to 'pure presence' and (I think) the pre-rational sense of being, which is somehow opposed to the rationalist view or the appeal to reason, of which you are generally dismissive. And I am intuitively sympathetic to that, as I did an MA in Buddhist Studies 10 years ago, and have pursued Buddhist meditation.

I reconciled some of my thoughts on the relationship of Buddhism and Platonic Realism on a thread on dharmawheel - see especially this post (only if you're interested.)

So there you are, studying pure mathematics. What would a full analysis tell you about this event? What drives it? One is not driven by the logical structure of the event. One interested, has a desire to know, is fascinated by the elegance of the complexity of mathematics, and so on. One might be tempted to call this will to power. — Astrophel

The point about pure mathematics, is only that it is a real subject, something about which can be completely wrong, yet it contains no empirical percepts whatever. It is a vast area of knowledge - not even to mention applied mathematics, which has had such enormous consequences for our age. And that is the theme of the often-discussed essay by Nobel Laureate, Eugene Wigner, called The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences - actually one of the first articles I encountered via philosophy forums.

And I'm still not seeing how Kant's philosophy of mathematics does justice to this subject, as I put it in this post, although I also recognise that nobody seems to understand what I'm talking about.

So - yes, I understand this approach I'm pursuing is different to yours, and also different to the general preoccupations of phenomenology. I'm trying to understand Platonic realism, which I think is real. I'm heartened by the fact that one of the pre-eminent scholars in that field, Lloyd Gerson, has recently published a book called Platonism and the Possibility of Philosophy, which 'contends that Platonism identifies philosophy with a distinct subject matter, namely, the intelligible world, and seeks to show that the Naturalist rejection of Platonism entails the elimination of a distinct subject matter for philosophy.' All of which is, I suppose, tangential to Kant, but nevertheless Kant is central to it.

That is a very Buddhist observation. — Wayfarer

Right. And it never was the prerogative of language to BE what language talked about. The trap is hermeneutical: Can language ever talk about something other than language? For all my words have their meanings bound to one another, and without this "difference" among terms, meaning falls apart.
But deconstructing meaning leads to disillusionment with language, or, language's culture, history, science paradigms and so on, and a turn toward the presence of the world itself.

Miraculous, literally, that we can do this, because impossible. Meaning is supposed to be what can be said, and if being said is simply this contingent, assailable kind of thing, and if language is this "totality" that makes the world toe the line, then there is no hope for the understanding to step beyond this.

But this kind of thinking misses the point completely. The given actuality of the world is not given in language, but is given intuitively. It is language that has to toe the line to the world, and the world is magnificent, intractable, powerful, eternal, and note how words like this are so elusive, intellectually fuzzy. Analytic philosophers would NEVER talk like this. Hence, the failure of analytic philosophy.

Recall the origin of classical metaphysics with Parmenides. He was an axial age philosopher, contemporary of the Buddha. Parmenides is where the reality of the idea of the forms was first considered, so is the origin of metaphysics proper. (I suppose it is this that is the subject of Heidegger's criticism of Western metaphysics, although I've yet to study that in detail.) — Wayfarer

The flower blooms and fades, but the idea of the flower endures. Which is more real? This is where Plato started. I know Heidegger thought very highly of the Greeks, especially Parmenides and Heraclitus who he considered "primordial" philosophers. He was very interested in making fundamental changes in t he way we think and going back to these beginnings were part of this. But this idea that something deeply important has been lost through the ages of bad metaphysics is a good one. But for Heidegger the answer rested with language, as he thinks language carries forth meaning. But have never read that he could make that really interesting transition from language to intuition, which is one way to talk about what Buddhism is about. Putting aside the details and the mountains of academic work, Buddhism is THE primordial grounding for discovery. Of this I have no doubt at all.

I'm reading Heidegger's Parmenides now. He is always interesting, always leads us away from beaten paths.

I note your appeals to 'pure presence' and (I think) the pre-rational sense of being, which is somehow opposed to the rationalist view or the appeal to reason, of which you are generally dismissive. And I am intuitively sympathetic to that, as I did an MA in Buddhist Studies 10 years ago, and have pursued Buddhist meditation.

I reconciled some of my thoughts on the relationship of Buddhism and Platonic Realism on a thread on dharmawheel - see especially this post (only if you're interested.) — Wayfarer

On this that you wrote, apologies for getting carried away, but it is an interesting idea:

Vert sticky wicket. As with all philosophical questions, first, I say, drop the science. It has no place, nearly, in philosophy. Nominalists that I have read are generally guided by the lack of the "real" presence of concepts, numbers, but once this real is no longer defined in terms of physicality or materiality (whatever these could possibly mean; to me, they are just the reification of a scientist's perspective, an attempt to "solidify" science's claims into a foundation for all issues. But as foundational, they are instantly refutable), then ontological standards are turned on their head: the "out thereness" of physical objects yields to the "presence" of meaning. "Out thereness" doesn't vanish, it is simply understood as a contextually determined concept, which is often used. The salt is "over there" and Jupiter is many miles away.

Anyway, what does this have to do with numbers, concepts and ideas? Keeping in mind that even by a typical physicalist/nominalist's thinking, numbers exist, it's just that they are not numbers. They are reducible to, say, neurological events. I mean, a nominalist has to admit that thinking about a number is not the same as not thinking at all. But your realist (contra nominalists, adn this seems to be your position) wants to say numbers exist AS numbers. I agree with this, for I am convinced that if the number two is not real as the number two, than neither is a house or a chair, for a house is not a house apart from its "eidetic" constitution. The attempt to say the house has a physicality a number doesn't have forgets physicality is just a scientist's biased way of looking at things, and has no real meaning here, and has no foundational justification. Numbers have meaning, and further, meaning is the only real standard for ontology.

But then, all concepts are in essence interpretative entities, and so, a house is not eternally, platonically, a house. It is, as an "intuition of a house", apodictically real, but not in the Platonic sense of forms vs things that "have a share" of the forms. the former simply reduces my thought, talk, remembering, planning about houses, to the actual event of talking, thinking etc. The event did occur! And this is beyond doubt, this actuality of occurrent thinking is absolute. The taking up the givinness of sensible intuitions AS a "house" is no less real than anything one can imagine. BUT, in the way this thinking expresses truth, this becomes arbitrary. Truth in the everyday sense is pragmatic.

You say:

The Buddha (and the Bodhisattvas) are the archetype of all wisdom. And archetypes are, in fact, 'universals', of which individuals are examples or instances. And to my mind, that is how come the Buddhas and the Bodhisattvas are real beyond their particular, individual existence (which I certainly believe is so).


While you can see by the above I don't agree with the Stanford article that says, "universals are occult pseudo-entities that should not be taken seriously by a responsible thinker concerned with ontology," but I do think your claim needs more. Being an archetype of wisdom is something thick with questions, isn't it?
My thinking is very concrete, but the concrete is CERTAINLY NOT what science and its nominalist's take it for.

The point about pure mathematics, is only that it is a real subject, something about which can be completely wrong, yet it contains no empirical percepts whatever. It is a vast area of knowledge - not even to mention applied mathematics, which has had such enormous consequences for our age. And that is the theme of the often-discussed essay by Nobel Laureate, Eugene Wigner, called The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences - actually one of the first articles I encountered via philosophy forums.

And I'm still not seeing how Kant's philosophy of mathematics does justice to this subject, as I put it in this post, although I also recognise that nobody seems to understand what I'm talking about.

So - yes, I understand this approach I'm pursuing is different to yours, and also different to the general preoccupations of phenomenology. I'm trying to understand Platonic realism, which I think is real. I'm heartened by the fact that one of the pre-eminent scholars in that field, Lloyd Gerson, has recently published a book called Platonism and the Possibility of Philosophy, which 'contends that Platonism identifies philosophy with a distinct subject matter, namely, the intelligible world, and seeks to show that the Naturalist rejection of Platonism entails the elimination of a distinct subject matter for philosophy.' All of which is, I suppose, tangential to Kant, but nevertheless Kant is central to it. — Wayfarer

But Plato is metaphysics, Kant tries not to be. He doesn't think, as far as I've read (and this is certainly not everything) we can say anything about our mathematical truths issues from eternity. Plato says the world of becoming has a share of the eternal world of forms. Plato gets awkward when you pull away from things like virtue, justice, the good; see the "third man" arguments, e.g. Is there an eternal form of a cow? A toaster?
But I do see some light on universals in the Platonic sense, but it is not clear to me yet. The argument goes to agency, that is, being a person as an agent that can be aware in the essential way for enlightenment. There IS such a thing as enlightenment, but for this to occur, one has to experience a break with the world. This is another matter.

And Plato himself requires huge erudition to read and interpret. — Wayfarer

Not having erudition and insufficient interest in Plato, I can see why it's a tradition fading away. But the philistines always win, whether you're talking good cinema or classical music. Nevertheless, I share your concerns about the welfare of some aspects of the Western tradition. Platonism is a recondite subject and in my time I have seen grown men (academics) nearly coming to blows over their interpretation of Plato's theory of forms. They were in their 50's when I was 20, so they are likely gone now and replaced by people who bicker over readings of Deleuze.

Are you saying it's hard to find robust Plato scholars who can write from a perspective located somewhere between recherché and accessible pap?

This may also be too breezy, but there's a Neo-Platonist Catholic philosopher on Youtube who who often recommends books on Plato. Check out Pat Flynn and Jim Madden (Benedictine College) - they love Gerson and various others.

Are you saying it's hard to find robust Plato scholars who can write from a perspective located somewhere between recherché and accessible pap? — Tom Storm

I guess that's what I am saying. Despite my enthusiasm for Buddhism, I seem to have a kind of culturally-instilled Platonism - I sometimes think it might be a past-life memory. (Hey, both Buddhists and Platonists can say that, but Christians can't ;-) )

This may also be too breezy, but there's a Neo-Platonist Catholic philosopher on Youtube who who often recommends books on Plato. Check out Pat Flynn and Jim Madden (Benedictine College) - they love Gerson and various others.

:up: For some reason, I find neo-Thomism and Thomism appealing, even though I have little affinity for the Catholic religion. I guess it's because it's practically the last iteration of the perennial philosophy in the Western tradition. But then, that appeals to a lot of ultra-conservatives, and I don't want to identify with that. Perplexing.

I don't think that Aristotle's metaphysics is consistent with what is today referred to as platonic realism. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is a difference but broadly speaking Aristotle is part of the platonist tradition. (That's why Gerson wrote a book called Aristotle and Other Platonists.) I do understand the distinction between Platonic and Aristotelian realism. But that is beside the point that I was trying to make, so if you could set that particular issue aside, you might consider it on its merits. The metaphysical/ontological issue I'm interested in, is the sense in which numbers, universals, and the like exist.

The (traditional) realist believes that universals are real; nominalists assert that only particulars are real; conceptualists that they exist as concepts in the mind. The latter sounds like a satisfactory compromise, except that it subjectivizes them, makes them the property of the mind. Whereas according to Augustine

Intelligible objects must be independent of particular minds because they are common to all who think. In coming to grasp them, an individual mind does not alter them in any way; it cannot convert them into its exclusive possessions or transform them into parts of itself. Moreover, the mind discovers them rather than forming or constructing them, and its grasp of them can be more or less adequate. Augustine concludes from these observations that intelligible objects cannot be part of reason's own nature or be produced by reason out of itself. They must exist independently of individual human minds.

Compare what Frege says of arithmetical primitives such as number:

Frege believed that number is real in the sense that it is quite independent of thought: 'thought content exists independently of thinking "in the same way", he says "that a pencil exists independently of grasping it. Thought contents are true and bear their relations to one another (and presumably to what they are about) independently of anyone's thinking these thought contents - "just as a planet, even before anyone saw it, was in interaction with other planets." '

I've been quoting both these passages on here for years but I still think they make a fundamental point regarding the reality of intelligibles. So after completing Pinter's book Mind and the Cosmic Order which is solidly grounded in empirical argument, I think I've found a way to commensurate such ideas with current science. And it's because such basic elements of rational thought are literally structures in our conscious experience and our rational grasp of the world. They're neither 'in' the world nor 'in' the (individual) mind, which is the apparent dichotomy on which every explanation seems to founder, in my view.

Consider what Einstein says here:

I believe, for instance, that the Pythagorean theorem in geometry states something that is approximately true, independent of the existence of man. — Albert Einstein

Which I agree with. But it can only be grasped by a human, or at any rate by a rational intelligence. That is the sense in which the Pythagorean theorem is a formal structure within reason. But that doesn't make it subjective, because it is the same for any mind.

It is this "union of knower with known" that is difficult for me because it insinuates a division (knower/known). — Merkwurdichliebe

There is an actual division, isn't there? When I see the proverbial [apple/tree/cup] then there's a distinction between the knowing subject and the known object, surely?

The way it is explained in terms of traditional realism (as I understand it) is that the senses apprehend the material thing, but the rational mind realises the form.

Knowledge presupposes some kind of union, because in order to become the thing which is known we must possess it, we must be identical with the object we know. But this possession of the object is not a physical possession of it. It is a possession of the form of the object, of that principle which makes the object to be what it is. This is what Aristotle means when he says that the soul in a way becomes all things. Entitatively the knower and object known remain what they are. But intentionally (cognitively) the knower becomes the object of his knowledge as he possesses the form of the object, That is why Aquinas says with reference to intellectual knowledge:

Intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings in that the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being is naturally adapted to have also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. — Summa

As expressed by a classics scholar:

Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too.

Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism, 39:00

I'm not saying I believe it but I'm very interested in understanding it, and also in understanding criticisms of it.

Is it as simple as saying humankind has a dual nature (appetitive and rational) which directly relates to the dual nature of reality (the perceptual and the intelligible)? — Merkwurdichliebe

Is that a simple thing to say? Besides, the two principles are generally described as sensible (sense-able) and intelligible, i.e. what can be apprehended by the senses and what can be known by the mind.

And, although they are objects in the metaphorical sense, they have literal existence in the same way a cup does. — Merkwurdichliebe

Ah, but do they? I'm saying that @litewave is glossing over the issue by saying that e.g. 'time and space are objects'. In fact, the nature of time and space are unresolved questions, and arguably not scientific questions at all. Time and space may be regarded as 'objects' (or parameters) for the purposes of mathematical physics but it doesn't make them objects in the literal sense. Same with other intelligible objects. Whereas most empirical philosophers will deny that they have any kind of existence except as mental acts.

Why does Roman writing set our understanding of classical stoicism? — Athena

I think a lot of that can be credited to the destruction of texts from the closing of the Hellenistic time where we can see many sources are referred to but are now lost.

One of the last to view the Platonic legacy in regard to Stoicism was Plotinus. He wrote polemics challenging Stoics in the Enneads but also included elements that recognized many previous arguments,

This essay by Gerson does a good job of contrasting Plotinus from the 'classical' thinkers: Plotinus On Happiness.

I take issue with his view of a Platonism 'beyond Socrates' but the stuff about Aristotle was helpful to me.

I think a lot of that can be credited to the destruction of texts from the closing of the Hellenistic time where we can see many sources are referred to but are now lost.

One of the last to view the Platonic legacy in regard to Stoicism was Plotinus. He wrote polemics challenging Stoics in the Enneads but also included elements that recognized many previous arguments,

This essay by Gerson does a good job of contrasting Plotinus from the 'classical' thinkers: Plotinus On Happiness.

I take issue with his view of a Platonism 'beyond Socrates' but the stuff about Aristotle was helpful to me. — Paine

Your link demands some thinking. My first thought is Aristotle didn't deal with Christians who definitely use the Bible for comfort, and how they make themselves feel happy with a fantasy of knowing God and trusting God helps them in all things even though they may be racist bigots.

Neither did Aristotle deal with today's people programmed for PowerPoint presentations and very focused on crass worldly things, like a Roman, not like an Athenian. We might think of the career-focused young as Rome on steroids and far from the more metaphysical and abstractly inclined Athenian,

I can appreciate Aristotle's notion of happiness being the feeling of high morale that we have when we believe we are doing the right thing but this is a refined appreciation of the virtuous life, It is not the human norm. This subject of happiness is pretty tangled up with materialism. Aristotle defined real as something that exists. Piety is real but it is not matter. Piety is of the mind but does not require a lot of intellect. Or what the heck, we can just be practical and go for money and power and enjoy a lot of happiness.

What do you find helpful about Aristotle? I am listing to lectures about his ethics and may have something more intelligent to say in a few days. I am actually fascinated by virtues and how they can improve our lives. I think Stoicism has much to offer. That fascination goes with also being fascinated by how aging changes our thinking. There was a time in Athens when there wasn't much effort to educate those below 30 years of age. The older I get the more I have a sense of meaning and the ability to see the bigger picture.

There's a very big-picture theme behind this line of argument.

I'm very interested by the evaluation of reason in Greek and medieval philosophy. There is a well-known expression of the 'rational soul of man' - the faculty of reason being that which enables the human to intuitively grasp the 'logos' of the Universe. Of course, that sounds medieval, in fact the only places you seem to really encounter it is amongst Christian intellectuals (mainly Catholic and Orthodox). But I'm inclined to think that this is due to their absorption of the Greek philosophical tradition, rather than on explicitly doxological grounds. But note this:

.'...we may be sorrrounded by objects, but even while cognizing them, reason is the origin of something that is neither reducible to nor derives from them in any sense. In other words, reason generates a cognition, and a cognition regarding nature is above nature. In a cognition, reason transcends nature in one of two ways: by rising above our natural cognition and making, for example, universal and necessarily claims in theoretical and practical matters not determined b nature, or by assuming an impersonal objective perspective that remains irreducible to the individual "I".'

~ The Powers of Pure Reason: Kant and the Idea of Cosmic PhilosophyAlfredo Ferrarin

Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too. — Lloyd Gerson, Platonism vs Naturalism

This is actually preserved in Aquinas' epistemology, but it soon dies out in the Western tradition.

I don't find the argument persuasive. — Fooloso4

I find it more than persuasive, I'm compelled by it. And why? Because, in the broadest sense, as soon as you appeal to reason then you're already relying on something very like the knowledge of the forms.

Lloyd Gerson in his seminal paper Platonism vs Naturalism, put it like this:

...in thinking*, [says Aristotle] the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a Form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

*I take this to mean 'thinking' in the sense of discursive reason, not simply idle mental contents.

Another Aristotelian says:

For Empiricism there is no essential difference between the intellect and the senses. The fact which obliges a correct theory of knowledge to recognize this essential difference is simply disregarded. What fact? The fact that the human intellect grasps, first in a most indeterminate manner, then more and more distinctly, certain sets of intelligible features -- that is, natures, say, the human nature -- which exist in the real as identical with individuals, with Peter or John for instance, but which are universal in the mind and presented to it as universal objects, positively one (within the mind) and common to an infinity of singular things (in the real). — Jacques Maritain, The Cultural Impact of Empiricism

Examples could be multiplied indefinitely but these suffice to make my point.

(It's also significant that the arguments all go back to anamnesis, the doctrine of recollection. There is, of course, the suggestion of what the soul knew, prior to 'falling' into this life. But a naturalistic account might be provided by, for example, Chomsky's 'universal grammar', although that's a topic for another thread.)

'argument from imperfection' anticipates Kant's Transcendental Arguments.
— Wayfarer

Sure reads that way. — Mww

I'm beginning to see the connection. Still working on it.

There is for Aristotle no "equal itself" existing by itself timeless and unchanging. — Fooloso4

I’m very aware the ‘problem of reification’ when this discussion comes up. I know that Aristotle is said to have ‘immanetized the Forms’ but I don’t believe that by so doing he denied their reality. But I will do some more reading on it. I think I will also create a new thread on Gerson's essay Platonism vs Naturalism, for which there is a video of his reading of it.

FIrst rate. I have encountered the Comford book before and will re-visit it. (I love the image of the tethered goat although of course Jurassic Park comes to mind which is wildly anachronistic.) But much to chew over there, I will return to those points.

I'm posting irregularly at the moment due to work commitments. Appreciate the feedback

Like most of the things that everyone knows about Aristotle, this one is not true.
It is not even close. It is so spectacularly wrong that it blocks the understanding of anything
Aristotle thought.

Lloyd Gerson says exactly the same in his essay 'Platonism v Naturalism'.

The argument from reason is very much a transcendental argument. — Wayfarer

Good to know.

Lloyd Gleeson — Wayfarer

Do you mean Lloyd Gerson? I've read some of his papers.

it delineates the specific questions and subject matter unique to philosophy as distinct from natural science. — Wayfarer

Yes, I am aware of this position. I am simply unable to determine whether any of this scholarship is meaningful or not. My job in philosophy to be aware of the key questions and positions. With no expertise in these areas of enquiry, my own commitments are intuitions and of no real importance.

but really got a lot from a lecture of which I also have the hard copy. I have this quotation in my scrapbook: — Wayfarer

Yes, that's one I found pretty interesting too. Gerson is the go to guy on this subject as I understand it.

Overturning Platonism, then, means denying the primacy of original over copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and reflections.” (Difference and Repetition) — Joshs

That's an interesting call to arms but I guess it's hard for most of us to apprehend how we can do this? Is it an act of will? Pardon my literalism but in glorifying the reign of simulacra, does my Picasso print become equal to the one hanging in the museum?

He may be the go to guy for Platonism, but for that reason not the go to guy for Plato or Aristotle. Of course he and other Platonists would not agree. — Fooloso4

Yes, I meant Platonism.

Aristotle regards living beings as self-sustaining functioning wholes. The four causes are inherent in a being being the kind of being it is, not something imposed on or interfering with it from the outside. Human beings are by their nature thinking beings. This is not an explanation, but a given. It has nothing to do with Gerson's "form 'thought'". Nothing to do with a transcendent realm accessible to the wise.

Rather than an argument from reason, Wayfarer, Plato and Aristotle use reason to demonstrate the limits of reason. — Fooloso4

Thanks and very interesting.

we think of logic as normative, within limits; if P entails Q, and you believe P, then you ought to believe Q. Do people always do what they ought? — Srap Tasmaner

Of course not, but you've already made that point, and I've said that it's not really relevant to the argument at hand.

I want to double back to this early comment to bring out this point.

This [i.e. the OP] appears to be begging the question, by presuming that the exercise of reason is something different than information processing occurring in our brains.

Smuggling in a dualism which isn't part of the materialist view doesn't do anything to contradict a materialist view. — wonderer1

The argument from reason doesn't rely on 'smuggling in' a dualism - it is an explicit appeal to dualism to highlight a fundamental weakness in the type of reducionist physicalism that is being criticized. It is not 'begging the question' but presenting an argument to that effect, which propenents of physicalism are then required to answer.

Naturalism being true only requires beliefs being *caused*, by what at the lowest level are non-rational causes. — wonderer1

Which is exactly what the argument from reason is criticising.

Diverting the thread to AI research and neural networks as a kind of 'general argument for physicalism' is just changing the subject.

Thanks, Javra, I'll mull that over, although I think it's rather more metaphysical than the argument itself warrants. But may come back with some more responses.

Aristotle regards living beings as self-sustaining functioning wholes. The four causes are inherent in a being being the kind of being it is, not something imposed on or interfering with it from the outside. Human beings are by their nature thinking beings. This is not an explanation, but a given. It has nothing to do with Gerson's "form 'thought'". Nothing to do with a transcendent realm accessible to the wise. — Fooloso4

Are the following not characteristic of Aristotle, then?

if happiness [εὐδαιμονία/eudomonia] consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether then this be the Intellect [νοῦς/nous], or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine, either as being itself also actually divine, or as being relatively the divinest part of us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance with the virtue proper to it that will constitute perfect happiness; and it has been stated already* that this activity is the activity of contemplation [θεωρητική/theoria]. — Nichomachean Ethics, Book X, 1177a11

*In 6.7.2-3 Aristotle says that

Wisdom [σοφία] is the most perfect mode of knowledge. A wise person must have a true conception of unproven first principles and also know the conclusions that follow from them. 'Hence Wisdom must be a combination of Intelligence [Intellect; νοῦς] and Scientific Knowledge [ἐπιστήμη]: it must be a consummated knowledge of the most exalted objects.' Contemplation is that activity in which one's νοῦς intuits and delights in first principles."

Surely this does at least suggest 'a transcendent realm accessible to the wise'?

We have no knowledge or experience of any immaterial entity or process. — Fooloso4

My claim is that the perceived dichotomy between material and immaterial is a consequence of Cartesian dualism. Recall that Descartes posited mind as 'res cogitans', literally a 'thinking thing'. This leads to the problem of how the thinking substance interacts with 'material substance' and the so called 'ghost in the machine' argument. It is foundational to the modern mind-matter conceptual division, based on the premisses that physical sciences must provide a mathematically precise quantitative description of an external reality extended in space and time and specified in terms of the primary qualities such as shape, size, and motion, and to laws governing the relations among them. Subjective appearances, on the other hand -- how this physical world appears to human perception -- were relegated to the mind, and the secondary qualities like color, sound, and smell were to be analyzed relationally, in terms of the power of physical things, acting on the senses, to produce those appearances in the minds of observers. It was essential to leave out or subtract subjective appearances and the human mind -- as well as human intentions and purposes -- from the physical world. This is the basis of the modern 'mind-matter problem', and what the argument from reason is aimed at. And within that paradigm, there are no immaterial entities as a matter of definition. That's why I said that whatever we try and conceive of as an immaterial entity will miss the mark , as it will invariably interpreted in those terms, which I'm sure you're doing.

But the question was actually this:

This is because it is my dogmatic belief that matter does not act, but is only acted upon.
— Wayfarer
If "matter does not act", then "matter" "is only acted upon" by what? — 180 Proof

In order to try and illustrate the alternative way of approaching it, I provided text of a couple of readings, apparently too long. So to try and paraphrase what I think the first reference is getting at: the non-material or non-physical factor involved is life itself. Living beings, even the very simplest beings, display attributes and characteristics that actually can't be accomodated in the mind-body duality that is embedded in the modern worldview. Steve Talbott's biological philosophy is that organisms are expressions of meaning. They're not mechanisms to which we have to attribute a spooky 'elan vital' to account for the uncanny abilities which life manifests. As soon as life begins to manifest, then we have the emergence of an order which can't be reduced to, or explained in terms of, only physical processes; organisms have their own reasons for acting as they do. At the very beginning there is the appearance of the 'epistemic split' of self-other, the beginning of cellular memory and genetic inheritance, and a very primitive form of subject-hood. So the subject, the mind, is not the accidental by-product of a material process, but way in which agency appears in the earliest forms of life. And, to appeal to Indian philosophy, tat tvam asi, 'thou art that'.

And in a broader sense, many of our intellectual processes rely on immaterial entities, such as numbers, ratios, laws, and so on. Humans are situated between two worlds, so to speak - the physical world, governed by the laws of physics, but also the world of ideas and reasons, 'the space of reasons' as it has been called. That is the argument of the second book, Rational Causation by Eric Marcus. I don't know if that book talks about the argument from reason as such (haven't had the chance to read it yet) but it seems to operate from similar premisses.

So by 'immaterial' I don't mean spooky ghosts in machines, or some 'ethereal realm of ideal forms'. But as soon as physicalism is questioned, that is what comes to mind, isn't it?

The arguments in Aristotle do not follow this line of reasoning. The "identity" with the object is not a simple correspondence of "forms". — Paine

Sure, you might be right. But in context, Gerson's point was this: 'when you think you see—
mentally see—a form which could not in principle be identical with a particular, including a
particular neurological element, a circuit or a state of a circuit or a synapse, and so on. This is so
because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally. For example,
when you think ‘equals taken from equals are equal’ this is a perfectly universal truth which you
see when you think it. But this truth, since it is universal could not be identical with any
particular, any material particular located in space and time.' Which makes perfect sense to me.

Let's say that reason can not be explained by naturalism.

What follows from this, for you? — Tom Storm

The crux of this whole thread was an un-answered question:

I can see you have not been persuaded by the argument thus far and probably won’t be, until you can see a reason why you should accept. At that point, you might typically say 'I see'. So - what is it that you see? (Or in the other case, what is it you’re not seeing?) Whatever it is (or isn’t) it won’t be seen as a consequence of anything physical that has passed between us.

What do you make of that?

But I have read enough text to question Gerson's assertions and look forward to challenging anyone who would champion his position as a scholar. — Paine

That's very interesting. What do you think his project is, then? Is he a tendentious advocate of Platonism at the expense of fidelity to Plato? His name comes up a lot amongst enthusiasts of Platonism.

To some extent, I think Gerson is reverse engineering what Plotinus assumed to be the case. — Paine

Got ya. Thanks.

Yours is a fair challenge. I will try to gather a proper response as I can. In the meantime, I can ask about something in your statement:

For example, I would want to say, "What matters is whether the identity implies the requisite immateriality, not whether it is a simple correspondence of 'forms'." — Leontiskos

Aristotle puts a lot of emphasis on the priority of the being one encounters. The generality of being a kind of thing is a pale shadow of the actual being. If that is the case, how 'forms' work in hylomorphic beings is different in the various "Platonic" models.

I figure that should be discussed before getting into Gerson's interpretation.

I frequently cite in support include Bertrand Russell's chapter on The World of Universals, the transcript of a lecture by Jacques Maritain The Cultural Impact of Empiricism, a book section about Augustine on Intelligible Objects, a book called The Theological Origins of Modernity by Michael Allen Gillespie. And this excerpt from a book on Thomistic philosophy which re-states, I think, the same argument Gerson refers to in respect of the immateriality of nous. — Wayfarer

A digression via some questions. Plato seems to regard nous as the highest form of understanding - the ability to contemplate the ultimate nature of reality via the Forms. Do you consider this to be approximately the same as enlightenment? Or something not quite as elevated? And is the idea that reasoning or intellectual intuition can help us to access a higher realm of knowledge - i.e., the reality behind the world of appearances? I'm interested in how this access is theorised to work. A rational process. I understand we can get there through anamnesis 'remembering' as we become reawakened through dialogue and learning.

What does having direct access to the Forms do for the perceiver?

Had I been schooled in the Classics I would have a much better knowledge of the texts. Regrettably it was not part of my education, a lack that I have only come to regret much later in life, and one which I don’t think I will ever really overcome. All I have are a few straws to grasp at, grounded on the scattered readings I have done. And also the intuition that many contemporary readings of Plato downplay or redact out those elements which are incompatible with the type of naturalism which prevails in today’s academia. That is in line with what I believe is the forgetting or occlusion of the qualitative dimension of existence which begins to become apparent in Hume - the loss of the ‘vertical axis’.

One of those straws is the belief that the parable of the cave does indeed present an allegory for a kind of intellectual illumination or an insight into a higher domain of being, and that those who have ascended to it see something which others do not, as I think the allegory plainly states. (I’m of the view that this is what is represented by the later term ‘metanoia’ which is not found in the Platonic dialogues but which means in this context an intellectual conversion or the breakthrough into a new way of seeing the world.) I suppose one secondary source I could refer to for support is this SEP entry on ’divine illumination’ in Greek philosophy.

My revisionist interpretation of the basic issue revolves around the question of the reality of universals, numbers, and other such intellectual objects (such as logical laws etc). I have the idea that number (for example) does not exist in the sense that phenomenal objects exist, but it is nonetheless real. Hence this is an important ontological category that this applies to, that is constitutive of rational thought, but which is not phenomenally existent. I think this understanding is kind of implicit in Platonic epistemology with the distinction between different levels of knowledge in the Analogy of the Divided Line. Platonic realism developed into Aristotelian realism, which was maintained up until scholastic realism, after which it was overthrown by nominalism and later by scientific empiricism. (This is the subject of the book I mentioned, The Theological Origins of Modernity.)

About the only contemporary representative of those kinds of views is Edward Feser (and also maybe Gerson who we already discussed.) I’m trying to fill in the very many blanks in this account, but to date I haven’t encountered anything which would cause me to think it’s entirely mistaken.

I appreciate your efforts to compare the texts.

I think Sui Han's points are Important and will look into his writings.

Thus, for the antimaterialist, the question "Is the soul a body or a property of a body?" — Lloyd P. Gerson, From Plato to Platonism, 11

In the portion I quoted, Plotinus separates 'embodiment' from matter. What is at issue is how to understand properties.

I would like to nominate Jules Evans for inclusion. His website says 'I research wisdom practices from different eras and cultures, explore them in my life, and interview others to see how they helped or harmed them'. Other contemporaries might include Mark Vernon, writer and columnist, Alain Du Bouton, and Karen Armstrong all of whom write on philosophy as a way of life to some extent.

The idea would require a lot of thought, pulling nuggets of wisdom from several sources from both antiquity and modernity: Plato, Aristotle, the Cynics, the Stoics, Plotinus and the Neoplatonists, Confucius and the Neoconfucians, Buddha, Lao Tzu, Mencius, Aquinas, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Kant, Locke, Scheler, amongst others. — Dermot Griffin

We might contemplate the question: who or which amongst these individuals and schools share the convictions of contemporary naturalism? Perhaps the stoics - hence the resurgent interest in stoicism - and Nietzsche. But, according to Lloyd Gerson's most recent book, Platonism vs Naturalism: The Possibility of Philosophy, there are fundamental incompatibilities between philosophy (qua 'footnotes to Plato') and naturalism (qua 'natural science'). Accordingly the judgement of what 'living well' comprises might be subject to divergent criteria amongst these various sources.

Footnote: Who were the 'therapeutae'?

The third and final part will discuss how these positions are similar to Orthodox Christianity and ultimately conclude with what Catholic and Protestant thought are lacking in and that is an emphasis on mystical theology.

What do you mean by "mystical theology?" I find this to be a tricky term. Is mysticism just "experience of God?" Something like "knowing God the way a biographer/historian knows a person" (theology) versus "how their spouse knows that person," (personal/mystical)? This was Jean Gerson's expansive view in the 14th century, one used by some modern scholars, e.g. Harmless.

Or is mysticism about ecstasies, peak experiences, and visions, as William James would have it?

Or is this the "mystical theology," of Pseudo Dionysus (Saint Denis), an apophatic revelation of the "Divine Nothingness?"

It seems to me like the mystical tradition is generally much weaker in Protestantism. When it does manifest, it is much more often as more concrete, supernatural experiences: exorcisms, healing, visions, etc. I tend to be skeptical of these, both because of the historical ways they have been revealed to be hoaxes and because of my personal experiences with people who seem to be more living out a sort of self-serving fantasy life for themselves in this way, although I'm sure this isn't always the case.

However, the Catholic tradition still seems to have a fairly robust concept of mysticism. You have guys like Thomas Merton, James Finley, and of course the active orders of contemplative monks and nuns who still attract new novices.

It isn't always strong in individual churches, but it seems to be a decently strong undercurrent in the tradition. The communal praying of the Rosary is itself the sort of thing that is common in mystically oriented traditions, and I see the even at my local church. Although, only in the cathedrals of Latin America (Quito in particular) and Rome have I seen people in apparent ecstasies before the altars.

The Orthodox tradition I am less personally familiar with. It does seem to have a large focus on mysticism, perhaps more than the Catholic tradition, which has made room for a great deal of rationalism (Saint Thomas's "two winged bird" and all. But then again, the Orthodox Churches also seem to get more tied up in nationalism and performative tradition, particularly in Russia.

The Philokalia does have more stuff focused on mysticism than a Catholic reader might, but the Catholic tradition will still have Augustine's beatific vision, Pseudo Dionysus (a well spring for both, along with Gregory of Nysa), Saint Bonaventure and the vision of Saint Francis and the Seraphim, Saint Bernard of Clairvaux, or Hildegard.

Apparently, in terms of tradition, the Oriental Churches and the Eastern Catholic Churches, e.g. the Chaldean Church, have the closest liturgy and worship setting to the early church. A good deal dates to the 4th century. I find it interesting how some of these had an easier time rejoining the Roman Catholic church than the more similar Eastern Orthodox churches in light of that. But they've kept their traditions despite the merger.

You push these ideas that I'm not doing philosophy, but yet, I am — Christoffer

And thanks for your well-considered reply. I will try and keep my response brief as possible.

Not you, in particular, but our culture in general. Lloyd Gerson, who is a Platonist scholar, has a book Platonism and Naturalism: the Possibility of Philosophy. It's a pretty specialist text, but his argument is that Philosophy just is platonism, and that if you deny Platonism, there is no conceptual space for philosophy proper. And, he says, Platonism is irreconciliable with naturalism, which is the mainstream view by default.

I think naturalists tend to turn the kinds of dialectical skills that philosophy has inculcated into our culture against philosophy proper. Daniel Dennett is an example. His more radical books, like Darwin's Dangerous Idea, say that evolutionary theory is like a 'universal acid' that dissolves the container that tries to hold it - that 'container' being Western culture, and one of the things being dissolved, philosophy as philosophers have always understood it.

I can only formulate my world view on what we can actually prove or at least speculate as logical based on facts as we define facts. — Christoffer

We generally define facts scientifically, but existential issues are not necessarily tractable to scientific analysis.

What Buddhism is about is still such a process. It starts with the painful questions about our existence and evolves into an exploration of ideas to comfort against that sense of darkness and lack of meaning. — Christoffer

Not true. It is not about 'ideas' at all. It is about a hard-won transformative insight.

I personally believe that we need to follow science more than illusions and fantasy — Christoffer

So how can you deny the accusation of 'scientism' on the back of statements like this?

What I'm advocating for is to align everything towards an experience that rejects illusions and fantasy but can still reach such comforting results — Christoffer

What 'comforting results' are you referring to? If the illusions of religion are put aside, then what constitutes a real solution to the predicaments of human existence, other than comfort and standard of living?

the fact that religion exist universally across culture and history can easily be explained by analyzing human behavior — Christoffer

Which is reductionist, 'explaining away'. I have studied religion through anthropological, sociological and psychological perspectives in comparative religion, but it's not reducible to those categories, even if they provide very useful perspectives.

I cannot accept ideas and theories when I have knowledge that counters it. — Christoffer

All due respect, I don't believe you have 'knowledge that counters it'. What you have is a firm conviction.

Not you, in particular, but our culture in general. Lloyd Gerson, who is a Platonist scholar, has a book Platonism and Naturalism: the Possibility of Philosophy. It's a pretty specialist text, but his argument is that Philosophy just is platonism, and that if you deny Platonism, there is no conceptual space for philosophy proper. And, he says, Platonism is irreconciliable with naturalism, which is the mainstream view by default.

I think naturalists tend to turn the kinds of dialectical skills that philosophy has inculcated into our culture against philosophy proper. Daniel Dennett is an example. His more radical books, like Darwin's Dangerous Idea, say that evolutionary theory is like a 'universal acid' that dissolves the container that tries to hold it - that 'container' being Western culture, and one of the things being dissolved, philosophy as philosophers have always understood it. — Wayfarer

I think that's taking it too far. Contemporary philosophy, at least how it appears today, exists right at the edge of science. The difference today is that science has forced philosophy to focus even more on a composition of logic and rational reasoning. I.e there's less room for the purely speculative and the things that are speculative still requires a rational component.

While I do think that its problematic for philosophy to drive wild concepts in metaphysics due to how much more effective science is in that area, we still have areas of thought that need philosophy. Ethics is still very much alive and I think the main area for philosophy today has to do with our place in the universe, meaning, how we live in an ever growing explained universe.

With just how much philosophy has changed the last two hundred years, it may just be that philosophy goes through the same tidal shifts as the rest of the world, changing faster and faster. But there's a difference to concluding something dead and concluding something changing or shifting.

We generally define facts scientifically, but existential issues are not necessarily tractable to scientific analysis — Wayfarer

Our personal experience may not, but we can explain more and more of the roots of our emotions and components of our mind and body generating experiences. And some of those factors are root causes of some existential experiences. As an example, that the existential dread we feel may be something we can never overcome and that comfort against it (as I described it) is vitally required for us to function as a human consciousness. If that is the case, how do we deal with that without hiding truths from people or fall into addictive replacements like materialistic life-styles?

How I see it, there's a lot more than people seem to realize, that can be explained utilizing a combination of different scientific areas for a holistic explanation of a phenomena. It's easy to look at a specific and isolated field in science and conclude it fully unable to explain something, but when combining many fields together there are logical conclusions that start to emerge. As I see it, this should be the role of contemporary philosophy. Scientists to be specialists, philosophers to be generalists.

Not true. It is not about 'ideas' at all. It is about a hard-won transformative insight. — Wayfarer

I meant in the context of the discussion. The reason for its existence still emerge out of those questions. The rise of any religion starts by the unknown trying to be known by man. But it extends beyond religion, it's a core driving force of our consciousness. The unexplained scares us and we comfort ourselves by trying to explain it. But even the act of finding harmony with not explaining it is still part of the same process of dealing with it. What I meant here boils down to a simple rhetorical question of, how did Buddhism begin, or rather "why" did it begin?

So how can you deny the accusation of 'scientism' on the back of statements like this? — Wayfarer

Because scientism have problems with handling holistic speculation, even if those speculations are rooted in rational logic. I.e scientism has problems coexisting even with contemporary philosophy. It's too rigid. It also does not function well with emergentist conclusions, even if emergentism is a large part of many fields of science. Because scientism is largely functioning on reductionism and a specialist approach, not holistic reasoning.

What I meant by that statement is that if I say that we should handle society and our collective space based on scientific conclusions, I mean that we should not let religious claims define our world. For instance, laws in society. As soon as we use religious beliefs as a foundation for how we shape our principles of a shared world, we open the door to conflicts over different made up concepts. It ends up being as ludicrous as if people start a knife fight over which console, Xbox or Playstation is the best. Emotional attachments to the concept that comforts.

To follow science more is about collectively agreeing that, what can be proven for all, we agree by. Not arbitrary or unsupported claims that can never coexist between people of different cultures and beliefs. A shared world, shared existence requires a shared primary world view. If that can be combined with individual religious beliefs, sure, but so far I've yet to be convinced that the people of this world are able to co-exist with such powerful forces of psychology pulling their very experience of reality in such different ways compared to others.

What 'comforting results' are you referring to? If the illusions of religion are put aside, then what constitutes a real solution to the predicaments of human existence, other than comfort and standard of living? — Wayfarer

"Comfort", as I've explained in this discussion is primarily about ways and strategies to handle the dread and terror of meaningless existence. And what constitutes a real solution beyond religion and the materialistic? That's the solution I try to explore and formulate. One thing that I've found hints at such solution is the question; why cannot nature and the universe, as it is, be enough? Why does there have to be some divine purpose and meaning for us, in order for us to feel comfortable in existence? While Camus gives as an answer on how to live in the absurd, I'm asking, why not the opposite? To be curious about nature and the universe as it is and embrace it for what it is. Many Native American traditions follow a simple idea of harmony with nature around them. Removing the spiritual and religious claims in their traditions still leaves a practice that embrace our bond to reality and nature for what it is. A dedication to the ebb and flow of the ecological bond we have to the environment around us.

I see no major attempts to formulate a way of living outside religious beliefs in such a sense, I only see desperation and quick fixes. People won't explore, they want answers fast. That's why the materialistic has easily replaced religion for many people today, and why some double down into their religion as we can see in radicalized movements, or why many accumulate into extreme groups like Maga followers and cults like Qanon. Even the "Xbox vs Playstation" brawls follow the same path and psychological pattern.

In a sense, you hit on an important distinction with Buddhism. The problem I have is that there are still many religious components in Buddhism that muddy the clarity of its practical use. But it is further away from the religious and dogmatic claims that religions with a God component has. Which is why I say that religious practices in themselves has importance for our lives, I just think that we can accept existence for what it is, no more fantastical than we can rationally speculate, no less profound than what it already is. And live with practices that produce a meaningful experience without any fantasy components included.

Which is reductionist, 'explaining away'. I have studied religion through anthropological, sociological and psychological perspectives in comparative religion, but it's not reducible to those categories, even if they provide very useful perspectives. — Wayfarer

But they paint a pretty rational explanation for the emergence of different religious beliefs and claims, and that makes it hard to view such emergence of religion in history as having divine intervention. People are too susceptible to self-manipulation into fast explanations of the unexplained and too prone to solidify such inventions into larger patterns of meaning, in forms like mythology. The less proven facts that exist to explain anything, the easier people invent myths that grow into accepted facts.

Point being that the emergence of religion, especially sharing traits between cultures, has so many explanations in psychology and human behavior that it's hard to ignore all that and instead conclude the emergence of religion to be something more magical than it seems to be. We can also see the emergence every time we find a cult that has formed today. The same driving forces, the same inventions out of desperation for answers, but before the long term formation of myths becoming religious "facts".

All due respect, I don't believe you have 'knowledge that counters it'. What you have is a firm conviction. — Wayfarer

In this I refer to when such knowledge exists. Like for instance, we have proven evolution to be true, we have proven general relativity. If someone makes a religious or other claim that acts in opposition to it, I won't act like there's some grey area to it, in those cases they are wrong, provable wrong. If there's a psychological explanation for a certain behavior, I cannot ignore that component when analyzing a concept. What my point was, is that religious claims considered "facts" by believers, but that has more rational explanations is not something I can ignore and just play along. When people start out their claims with a demand to accept something that has more provable or rational explanations than they provide, their entire argument falls apart and this is why I argue for a clear line drawn between religious belief, its fantasy/illusions, and the practices in religion that has clear provable value for our experience. To formulate a living beyond religious beliefs but retaining aspects that comfort against the dread.