Thanks for two helpful posts. Strauss must have been a good teaher.

Is the way the soul structures reality rational or willful? — Fooloso4

I can't see how the convergence of rational thought with the rational order of the cosmos can be denied. Human reason is not all-knowing but it doesn't mean that it knows nothing. We've weighed and measured the Cosmos. This is why I keep returning to the point about mathematical platonism and the 'unreasonable effectiveness of maths' arguments. I can't see any effective rebuttal. (Incidentally have discovered a contemporary advocate of mathematical platonism, James Robert Brown, who's book is here.)

We do not have a vision of the Forms. — Fooloso4

If we re-imagine forms as moral principles and universals, then surely we do. It permeates the activities of rational thought, it is what makes philosophy possible. As Gerson says, the idea of the intelligible domain is the particular concern of philosophy, as distinct from science, deny it and philosophy has no subject matter.

We do not know the Forms. We do not have a vision of the Forms. The question then is: which way do we turn? Do we turn away from the "human things" in pursuit of some imagined (and it must be imagined if it is not something seen or known) reality or toward it? — Fooloso4

But this is the confusion of contemporary culture. There is no compass, nothing higher, nothing lower, all has been dissolved in the 'acid of Darwin's dangerous idea'. The problem is the entrenched naturalism of modern culture, that only what is 'out there' is real. Seeing through that is not 'going within' except in the sense of being aware of the nature of thought.

This was not Strauss’ own opinion. From Bloom’s encomium to him: “He was able to do without most abstractions .... — Leghorn

So, you want me to read what Strauss says or what Bloom says that Strauss says??? :grin:

Of course Strauss says that Plato’s Theory of Forms is “a fantastic doctrine” and “an absolutely absurd doctrine”. It is in “Plato’s Political Philosophy” and other writings!

As Bloom himself says:

If there are no permanent entities, if everything is in flux, there can be no knowledge. Knowledge, or science, requires universals of which the particulars are imperfect examples; as knowing beings we care only for the universals. The ideas give reality to the universals and hence make it possible to explain the fact that man possesses knowledge. The ideas give reality to the universals and hence make it possible to explain the fact that man possesses knowledge. The ideas are the being of things. They constitute an account of the first causes of things which also does justice to the observed heterogeneity of the visible universe … And it is in the quest for the universal principle that the theoretical man first meets the opposition of the unphilosophic men

- A. Bloom, The Republic of Plato, p. 94

IMO by ridiculing and rejecting Plato’s Forms, Strauss places himself in the camp of the unphilosophic men whom Gerson identifies as anti-Platonists and antiphilosophers ....

The idea that he was a member of some type of Pythagorean cult is nonsense — Metaphysician Undercover

It was not my suggestion that he was. I posted the link as an illustration of how the issue of the "Indefinite Dyad" is treated by some scholars.

Plato does mention a δυάς (dyas) or "dyad" that may lend itself to mathematical and philosophical interpretation and it has been discussed by Gerson and other scholars.

But the question has been mainly raised on the basis of Aristotle's comments.

Even if we were to say, for example, that the One (Monad) is something like "Pure Spirit" and the Dyad something like "Primordial Matter" that is given shape by the Forms, or that sensible objects derive from the One and the Indeterminate Dyad via the Forms or Numbers, this wouldn't change anything.

This is why, personally, I don't see the "Indeterminate Dyad" as a "problem" or "difficulty" at all. On the contrary, I see it as a diversionary tactic deployed by anti-Platonists who have run out of arguments against Plato and who insist on construing his teachings as somehow logically "incoherent" or "problematic".

I believe that Plato should be read on his own terms. — Apollodorus

I agree. This is something I have said to you many times over the months!

And yet you say:

... the One imposes limitation on itself in order to manifest multiplicity from Forms to Mathematical Objects to the multitude of Particulars that make up the sensible world. — Apollodorus

Where does Plato say this?

If you are referring to what Gerson says, he says that according to the Platonic tradition, (not Plato) , the One imposes limit on the indefinite dyad, thereby producing Forms and Numbers. The One, according to this, does not impose a limit on itself, but on the indefinite dyad.

He also says that Plotinus rejected this because the One cannot be a principle of limitation. It is the Intellect that imposes limit on the One:

The denial of the One as a principle of limit follows from Plotinus' rejection of dualism of any sort, especially that which makes the Indefinite Dyad an irreducible first principle of unlimitedness, thereby requiring the One to be a coordinate principle of limit. (From Plato to Platonism)

The last point is important. For Plato the Indeterminate Dyad is "an irreducible first principle of unlimitedness."

... by lifting our gaze upward; and by opening our heart, the eye of our soul, to the Light of the One, — Apollodorus

Such stories may be inspiring and suitable for spiritual contemplation, but they should not be mistaken for Plato's metaphysics.

I think we agree that noesis is higher than dianoia, contemplation is important, as is the imagination, and that what is at issue is not an abstract intellectual exercise. However, in discussing Plato's metaphysics we cannot simply fly away to the land of One.

We spin our stories about things we do not know. You take the story you put together from other stories and take it for the truth.

I think that to say that a Form is a kind, is a misunderstanding of Forms. I am not saying that a philosopher would not divide things into kinds. I am saying that an argument which proceeds in this way could be deceptive. Because of this we have to be very careful to analyze, and carefully understand the proposed divisions, and boundaries, to ensure that they are appropriately created. — Metaphysician Undercover

The misconception of Forms as “kinds” or even “universals” is a standard device employed by anti-Platonists who use Aristotle to attack Plato. Lloyd Gerson correctly calls it “an enduring urban myth in the history of philosophy”.

Moreover, if we pay attention to Plato’s wider theoretical framework we can see that he uses all fields of human knowledge and activity in the service of a higher goal, which is “to become godlike (homoiosis Theo) as far as possible”:

Therefore we ought to try to escape from earth to the dwelling of the gods as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like God, so far as this is possible (Theaet. 176a – b)

Plato uses religious beliefs and ethical principles to elevate the would-be philosopher’s mind to an intellectual and moral level where he can begin his philosophical practice. Similarly, mathematical disciplines are not studied for empirical purposes, but with a view to acquiring an ability for ordered and abstract thinking. The same is true of logic or dialectic. The ultimate telos or goal is always the One. The philosopher can fully understand the world and himself only in the light of the One which is the source of all knowledge and all truth.

If the philosopher is to become “as godlike as possible”, then he must make his mind as similar to the mind of God as he can. The intellectual training he has undergone in the preparatory stages has served the purpose of lifting him out the morass of ordinary human condition. But that training itself must be transcended. He must leave logic and everything else behind in order to have an experience of intelligence itself.

We can see why some forms of logic may be fruitful. Trying to grasp how divine intelligence creates the world, for example, by means of Ideas or Forms that impart their properties and, therefore, being to particulars that make up the sensible world, may help the philosopher to understand how divine intelligence works.

But other forms of logic may be less helpful in what the Platonic philosopher is aiming to achieve. Doing too much dividing and classifying, asking too many questions, raising too many doubts, etc., does not seem to be the best way to make one’s mind godlike.

In other words, there must come a time when thinking or any other mental activity becomes counterproductive. If a higher intelligence does exist and it is changeless, then, in order to catch a glimpse of it, it is necessary to make our mind equally changeless and still, as Socrates says in the Phaedo:

But when the soul inquires alone by itself [i.e., undisturbed by body, sense-perceptions, and thoughts and emotions associated with these], it departs into the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the immortal and the changeless, and being akin to these it dwells always with them whenever it is by itself and is not hindered, and it has rest from its wanderings and remains always the same and unchanging with the changeless, since it is in communion therewith. And this state of the soul is called wisdom (phronesis) (Phaedo 79d)

It is the wisdom acquired through a grasp of the One that enables the philosopher to approach philosophical problems by appealing to first principles. And we can arrive at Plato’s One only through a process of simplification or reduction: the multiplicity of sensible particulars is reduced to intelligible Forms, and Forms are reduced to the One. This is the inner logic of Plato’s metaphysics. Hair-splitting mental exercises may be intellectually interesting, but they lead in the opposite direction, i.e., the direction aimed at by the sophist who (covertly or overtly) denies the existence of metaphysical realities ....

A particular is not necessarily an instance of a universal. — Metaphysician Undercover

But it can be one, no?

My point is that you choose to see the One as a “particular”. I choose not to. And I doubt that Plato does.

You asked me to “demonstrate” that the One is the Good.

I explained to you how I see it. And this is how it is normally seen in the Platonic tradition.

The One is mentioned in the dialogues and it was well-known within the Academy that Plato believed in a first principle of all called “the One”. We have the testimony of Plato’s successor Speusippus and Aristotle among others.

Aristotle himself says:

Now since the Forms are the causes of everything else, he supposed that their elements are the elements of all things. Accordingly, the material principle is the "Great and Small," and the essence <or formal principle> is the One, since the numbers are derived from the "Great and Small" by participation in the One … This, then, is Plato's verdict upon the question which we are investigating. From this account it is clear that he only employed two causes: that of the essence, and the material cause; for the Forms are the cause of the essence in everything else, and the One is the cause of it in the Forms. He also tells us what the material substrate is of which the Forms are predicated in the case of sensible things, and the One in that of the Forms—this is the Dyad, the "Great and Small" (Aristot. Meta. 987b19-988a14)

(A) The One is the cause of the Forms and the Forms are the cause of everything else.
(B) There are only two causes: that of the essence, and the material cause.
(C) There is a material principle called the “Great and Small” and an essence or formal principle called “the One”.
(D) The “Great and Small” or “Dyad” is traditionally identified with what is elsewhere called the “Unlimited and Limit” and with the One.
(E) Therefore the One is the ultimate cause of everything.

The mainstream Platonic position is that: (1) there is a first principle of all and (2) Plato reduces sensibles to Forms and Forms to a first principle called “the Good” or “the One”.

This is also the scholarly opinion:

Plato was in principle committed to the reductivist tendency found in all Pre-Socratic philosophy, and, indeed, in all theoretical natural science. This is the tendency to reduce the number of fundamental principles of explanation to the absolute minimum.

- L. Gerson*, From Plato to Platonism, p. 117

[* Executive Committee, International Plato Society (1998-2004); Board of Directors, International Society for Neoplatonic Studies (2004-2010); Board of Directors, Journal of the History of Philosophy, (2007- ).]

As regards the Divine Intelligence, Plato makes the following statements:

The Creator-God is ever-existing and possesses the powers of joy, will, thought, and action (Tim. 34a, 37c).

He is “good” and the “supreme originating principle of Becoming and the Cosmos” (29e).
He desires that all should be, so far as possible, “like unto Himself” (29e).
He uses an “Eternal Model” that is “self-identical and uniform” (29a) to create the Soul of the Cosmos from a mixture of the Same, the Other, and Being (35a) which are the basic ingredients of intellect.
Having created the Soul of the Cosmos, the Creator-God creates the Corporeal part and fits the two together. And the living Cosmos “began a divine beginning of unceasing and intelligent life lasting throughout all time” (36e).

So, to begin with, I think it is reasonable to regard the Creator-God as a form of Intelligence. And since he creates the Cosmos from the Same, Other, and Being, and according to certain eternal patterns such as Goodness, Order, and Beauty, it stands to reason that these patterns or Forms are within this very Intelligence itself.

The way I see it, it is the Divine Intellect that holds within itself all the Forms in a unified and ordered whole. Without this, the creation of a living, intelligent and ordered Universe emulating a perfect divine model, would be impossible.

As regards the identity of the One and the Good, both are described as “beyond being” or “beyond essence”.

In addition, Aristotle says:

“It is impossible not to include the Good among the first principles” (Aristot. Meta. 1092a14)

For it is said that the best of all things is the Absolute Good, and that the Absolute Good is that which has the attributes of being the first of goods and of being by its presence the cause to the other goods of their being good; and both of these attributes, it is said, belong to the Form of good (Eudemian Ethics 1217b4-5; cf. 1218b7-12)

(A) The Creator-God is above the Cosmos.
(B) The One/the Good is above the Creator-God.
(C) The One is the first principle and cause of all.
(D) Therefore the Creator-God is a manifestation of the One.

Of course, it is arguable that the One being ineffable, unfathomable, and above Being, the designation “the Good” is, strictly speaking, inappropriate for it and that the One becomes “the Good” only in relation to Being and Becoming. In this sense, the Good may logically be said to be subordinate to the One. Ultimately, however, the two are one and the same thing.

It follows that:

When we speak of the Ultimate on its own, we may refer to it as “the One”.
When we speak of the Ultimate in relation to Being and Becoming, we may refer to it as “the Good”.
When we speak of the Ultimate in relation to the Cosmos or Universe, we may refer to it as “Creative Intelligence”, “Divine Intellect”, Creator”, “Father”, etc.

Why do you first say here, that they are participating in Beauty itself, then you say Beauty itself is the unparticipated? — Metaphysician Undercover

They participate indirectly through the likeness of Beauty itself. Beauty itself remains unparticipated, in the realm of intelligibles. The only thing that is participated in in the sensible world is the visible likeness or "enmattered form".

Diotima in the Symposium is talking about the philosopher who has reached the highest level of knowledge. Only he can "see" Beauty itself.

And I can't find your reference in Phaedo. — Metaphysician Undercover

The reference was to the Quality "itself" (e.g. Greatness or Largeness) as opposed to the quality "in us".

Substitute Beauty for Greatness/Largeness.

A Form is not only "one over many" but also "one and many", hence its explanatory function. As itself in itself, the Form is one. As likenesses, copies or instantiations of itself in the particulars, it is many. By analogy, the Sun is one, the reflections of its light in water and other light-reflecting objects are many.

In the Timaeus, Plato clearly distinguishes between (1) imperceptible "self-subsisting Forms" that can be grasped by reason only and (2) their visible counterparts or "copies" (mimemata) in the sensible world that are accessible to the senses and to opinion based on sense-data. The original Forms are eternally unparticipated:

This being so, we must agree that One Kind is the self-identical Form, ungenerated and indestructible, neither receiving into itself any other from any quarter nor itself passing anywhither into another, invisible and in all ways imperceptible by sense, it being the object which it is the province of Reason to contemplate; and a second Kind is that which is named after the former and similar thereto, an object perceptible by sense, generated, ever carried about, becoming in a place and out of it again perishing, apprehensible by Opinion with the aid of Sensation (Tim. 52a).

You are willfully ignoring what I wrote, how Aristotle describes what Plato said, at 987b. This is where the detailed report of what Plato said on this issue is found. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not ignoring it. I am simply making the point that we cannot automatically dismiss all the statements made in the dialogues or elsewhere on the grounds that they are "not Plato's teachings". After all, Socrates himself often agrees with his interlocutors. So, the latter are not always telling lies or talking nonsense.

This is particularly evident in dialogues like the Sophist and we need to think twice before dismissing something just because it comes from the mouth of a sophist. As I said earlier, ever liars may say some things that are true.

At the end of the day, the actual author is Plato, using his characters to convey a message to his readers. Hence the need to focus on him at all times, not get distracted by the characters or anything else.

The way I see it, Plato’s idea of reducing sensible particulars to intelligible Forms and intelligible Forms to one irreducible first principle makes perfect sense. This idea was taken up by Speusippus, who certainly believed in the One as a first principle of all as acknowledged by Aristotle (though he may have disagreed on other points).

Aristotle mentions Speusippus at 12.1072b and repeats his views several times. At 5.1092a he says:

Nor is a certain thinker [Speusippus, according to the translator and other scholars] right in his assumption when he likens the principles of the universe to that of animals and plants, on the ground that the more perfect forms are always produced from those which are indeterminate and imperfect, and is led by this to assert that this is true also of the ultimate principles; so that not even unity [lit. “to hen auto” i.e. the One] itself is a real thing [i.e. it is above being] (Meta. 14.1092a)

Gerson comments:

So Speusippus evidently takes the One to be the first principle of all and also takes it to be in some sense “beyond being” or “beyond essence,” the position that Aristotle claims Plato holds as well

- From Plato to Platonism, pp. 135-6

When Aristotle says:

And of those who hold that unchangeable substances exist, some say that the One itself is the Good itself but they consider that its essence is primarily the One (Aristot. Meta. 1091b13-15)

this could well be a view held in the Academy.

I think the belief in one ultimate first principle followed by Forms followed by sensible particulars is compatible with Plato.

Once we admit this principle, the main problem that presents itself is the precise relation (1) between the First Principle and Forms, (2) between Forms themselves, and (3) between Forms and particulars (or Being and Becoming).

As we have seen, Plato taught that particulars have no existence (or essence) of their own. They depend for their existence on “copies” of Forms whose properties they instantiate.

He later developed this idea, introducing the view that sensibles result from the interaction of “form-copies” (homoiotes) and the “receptacle” (hypodoche), which is a form of all-pervading space that serves as a medium for the elements out of which material objects are fashioned. So the objects are made of primary elements shaped by form-copies.

The Forms themselves first seem to be separate both from the material objects and from each other, but are later said to combine with each other in various ways that are classified under certain groups or genera that are in turn subordinate to a higher principle.

Finally, the principles of Limit and Unlimited are introduced to explain how the material Universe or Cosmos is generated: Limit imposes Ideal Ratios (Forms or Shapes and Numbers) on uninformed or unlimited Primordial Matter (the “receptacle” containing the precosmic elements).

However, this is done “through participation in the One”, which may be interpreted to mean that the One, the ultimate first principle, imposes limit upon itself in order to bring forth the world of multiplicity.

Plato may or may not have explicitly held this position, but his teachings, as far as they are known, seem to point in this direction and they were interpreted in this sense by later Platonists.

The writings of Aristotle and other authors indicate that Plato was a serious philosopher, not a novelist, and that members of the Academy took the wider Platonic project seriously.

At the same time, the apparent plurality of views within the Academy suggests that Plato was not a dogmatic teacher and that he allowed some freedom of interpretation.

Given that Plato’s own teachings were not static but were developed by him over time, there is no reason why they cannot be further developed by Plato’s followers, provided that this is consistent with Plato’s own general views.

Certainly, the people who first domesticated the horse would not have objected to the introduction of saddles and stirrups. The inventors of the wheel (originally a solid disc) would not have objected to the introduction of spokes. The inventors of the stone ax would not have objected to the development of axes made of steel, etc.

What Plato really believed is impossible to know with absolute certitude. But the Way Upward he sketched in his dialogues clearly tells us that philosophy consists in inquiring into truth through a constant transcendence of knowledge and experience, whilst always aiming for the absolute highest.

Plato shows us the way or direction and offers us his philosophy as a vehicle for making the journey. It is for us to learn how to drive it, to make improvements on it as required, and for us to decide how far we travel ....

Five fingers does not make one finger, it makes something different, one hand. So by your analogy a multitude of intelligences would not make One Supreme Intelligence, it would make something different. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fingers are part of the hand (or extensions of the palm). The multitude of individual intelligences are part of the Supreme Intelligence or extensions of it just as fingers are of the hand. The analogy may be less than perfect but I think it does give an idea of what is meant.

Well, if "seeing oneself in the other" is metaphorical for something which involves only one, that would be very very strange. — Metaphysician Undercover

In his dialogues, Plato uses the imagery of reflection multiple times to point either to the individual self or to the Universal Self/Ultimate Truth.

For example, in the Phaedo, he compares looking for truth in theories and arguments about things, to studying the image of the Sun reflected in water “or something of the kind” (Phaedo 99e). The phrase “something of the kind” is Plato’s way of alerting the reader to the fact that this is not an exact comparison, analogy, or account.

The metaphor refers to one seer or cognizing subject. Hence the illustration of the mirror. What Plato is saying is that the philosopher must look at himself, i.e., at his own intelligent soul, using his own intelligence as a mirror. This is the path to self-knowledge as well as the path to knowing the Ultimate.

And if this, "seeing oneself in the other", is, as you said, the source of all knowledge, then knowledge cannot be derived from One, it requires more than one. — Metaphysician Undercover

That which “sees itself in the other” and "is the source of all knowledge", is Ultimate Reality which reflects itself in itself. The “Other” and resulting “Many” here is conceptual. When Ultimate Reality which is Pure Intelligence reflects itself in itself it recognizes the “Other”. i.e., its own reflection as itself, not as some other reality different from itself.

In the world of Being, the Creative Intelligence that contains the Forms, for example, is cognitively identical with the Forms and is aware of this identity. The sense of real difference only arises in the world of Becoming, where things are not perceived as different manifestations of one cognizing intelligence but as separate and independent of one another and of the cognizing subject.

But the point I was making was that as Plato does not present his philosophy in a very systematic manner, it is essential to systematize our understanding of it starting from a few basic principles.
In the first place, we need to familiarize ourselves with the wider cultural, religious, and philosophical background behind the Platonic project.

As shown by Lloyd Gerson, Plato and his followers operate within the framework of “Ur-Platonism”, a general philosophical position that combines antimaterialism, antimechanism, antinominalism, antirelativism, and antiskepticism.

Though it emerged before Plato, Ur-Platonism was given shape by Plato and was further developed by later Platonists, especially Plotinus, in line with the blueprint sketched by Plato.

Platonism does not offer a decisive answer to all the problems raised either by itself or by its opponents. However, it does offer a theoretical framework within which philosophical inquiry and practice can be conducted along the lines suggested by Plato in his dialogues.

If we follow the pattern established by Plato and developed by later Platonists, we can avoid most of the misunderstandings or misinterpretations that have arisen especially in more recent times.

The relation between the Good and the Beautiful is a case in point, showing how two apparently distinct things can be ultimately one.

In Ancient Greek, the word “beautiful” (kalos) was already often used not just in the sense of “aesthetically pleasing” but also of “good” in the sense of “useful”. Plato himself states that the divine is Beauty, Wisdom, and Goodness and that by these qualities the wings of the soul are nourished and grow, enabling it to ascend to higher planes (Phaedrus 246e).

This is exactly the meaning of the “Ladder of Love” described in the Symposium. Though the ascent starts as a quest for Beauty itself, what the philosopher ultimately attains is the Good which is Ultimate Truth:

Do but consider, that there only will it befall him, as he sees the Beautiful through that which makes it visible, to breed not illusions but true examples of virtue, since his contact is not with illusion but with Truth. So when he has begotten a true virtue and has reared it up he is destined to win the friendship of Heaven; he, above all men, is immortal (Symp. 212a)

Now, if “beautiful” were to mean “aesthetically pleasing” and nothing else, then “seeing the Beautiful” would be the final goal. But this is obviously not the case. Having seen the Beautiful, i.e., the Good, the philosopher must now “beget virtue”, i.e., good. Only then will he or she become loved by the Gods.

Beauty here is treated as an expression of Good. This practical value of Beauty and its identity with Good is consistent not only with Ancient Greek Weltanschauung but also, and above all, with Platonic philosophy.

Having come into contact with Beauty which is also Good and Truth, the philosopher becomes “pregnant in the soul” with things that are beautiful, good, and true, and “gives birth” or produces them.

Thus birth itself has a dual meaning. The philosopher is born to a new world of beauty, goodness, and truth, and in turn, gives birth to things that are beautiful, good, and true.

Socrates himself must somehow be in contact with Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, because he acts as a midwife to those whose minds are “pregnant with fine ideas” (Theaetetus 150b ff.) and (according to Alcibiades) begets beautiful speeches about virtue.

It follows that, as Diotima says, love of Beauty is really love of Good (Symp. 206a): We love Beauty because it is in some sense Good. Love of Beauty is the desire not only to behold Beauty, but to hold it for ever and to manifest it in everything we do in every way we can. The Gods do not judge man by what he sees but by his actions.

Plato clearly equates Beauty with Good and with Truth. Hence the quest for Beauty, Goodness, and Truth and their practical application become central to Platonic philosophy. The philosopher who has attained this triple goal becomes “beloved of the Gods” (theophiles) and “immortal” (athanatos).

The question of Plato’s causality is another problem that can prove intractable if we ignore the wider Platonic framework.

As discussed, Aristotle says that Plato recognizes two causes only: formal and material. The formal one is represented by the One and the material one represented by the “Great and the Small” a.k.a. “the Dyad” (which despite its name is a single principle of materiality).

But this is not supported by the dialogues where there is an efficient cause as well as a final cause. The Forms seem to be efficient causes in the Phaedo, but in later dialogues the efficient cause is Soul, Nous, or Creator-God (Laws 896a). Indeed, it stands to reason that the efficient cause of the Universe is the Creative Intelligence that contains the Forms, rather than the Forms themselves. And the Good is the final cause.

So, Plato has at least four causes. In fact, Proclus identifies six causes: three primary (efficient, paradigmatic, final) and three accessory (material, formal, instrumental) and believes that a detailed analysis would yield as many as 96 (a number with cosmological connotations).

However, all causes are closely interconnected and ultimately one. As Proclus himself puts it:

But let it be the case that multiplicity has its ordering centred on the monad and diversity centred on the simple and multiformity centred on what has a single form and diversity centred on what is common [to all], so that a chain that is truly golden rules over all things and all things are ordered as they ought to be (On the Timaeus 2.262.20).

This is why Platonic tradition refers to Ultimate Reality (or first principle and cause of all) as “the Good” or “the One”. Identifying Ultimate Reality with the Ultimate Good and the Irreducible One is consistent with Plato’s commitment to the reduction of fundamental principles of explanation to the absolute minimum. Insisting that they are not identical, tends to unnecessarily raise problems that are difficult to resolve. Hence even Proclus (who often likes to make complicated analyses of everything) uses the Homeric golden chain as a symbol of the hierarchy of reality ultimately depending on one Supreme Cause.

In any case, it is clear from Socrates’ statements in the dialogues that sciences like mathematics are not to be studied for their own sake but for a higher purpose. The same applies to logic and to philosophy itself.

The Platonic project is not about becoming lost in endless discussions about details. It is about elevating human knowledge and experience to the highest possible plane.

What is particularly interesting about Plato in this regard is the fact that his dialogues can be read or interpreted on more than one level.

For example, we know that seeing occupies a central place in the Ancient Greek worldview where it is closely connected with knowledge.

Aristotle begins his Metaphysics with the following statement:

All men naturally desire knowledge. An indication of this is our esteem for the senses; for apart from their use we esteem them for their own sake, and most of all the sense of sight. Not only with a view to action, but even when no action is contemplated, we prefer sight, generally speaking, to all the other senses. The reason of this is that of all the senses sight best helps us to know things, and reveals many distinctions (Meta. 1.980a)

Plato’s Forms are literally, “things seen”. Not seen by sense-perceptions, imagination or thought, but by pure intelligence. And since according to Plato Creative Intelligence generates the Universe by means of Matter and Form, it may be said without exaggeration that Creative Intelligence “sees” or projects the Universe into existence.

Another important faculty is the faculty of hearing, i.e., of perceiving sound. Plato calls the primary elements of matter (fire, earth, water, air) that make up the material world, “stoicheia”. “Stoicheia” also means elements of knowledge in general, as well as units of speech (including the letters of the alphabet), in particular.

Speech is a form of sound and sound is the product of motion. Plato tells us that the Primordial Matter of the Receptacle has a certain motion like a kind of “shaking” (seismos) or vibration comparable to that produced by a winnowing basket or sieve that makes particles separate or coalesce according to certain patterns (Tim. 52e).

Since for Plato, motion is always associated with soul or spirit, i.e., intelligence, this subtle, inner vibration of Primordial Matter must be caused by the Divine Consciousness itself.

In other words, though motionless, the Universal Consciousness produces an imperceptible vibration and sound that crystalizes into the fundamental elements that form the objects first of intellection and then of sense-perception, that together make up the Universe: the Universe is a manifestation of sound which in turn is a manifestation of the imperceptible inner vibration of the living Divine Intelligence.

However, these are concepts that take human intelligence to the limit of thought, to a point beyond which there is no thought and no language.

This is why Plato refuses to be dragged into details. In the Timaeus he explicitly leaves the first principle of all out of the discussion. Having described the primary elements of matter, he says:

But the principles (archai) which are still higher than these are known only to God and the man who is dear to God (Tim. 53d)

For the same reason, later Platonists like Plotinus refer to the Ultimate as “above being” (hyperousios) and “ineffable” which can mean “forbidden to be spoken”, as in the secrets of mystery rites (Phaedo 62b) or “inexpressible” (Soph. 238c).

At this point, some may be inclined to dismiss Platonism as “mysticism” or whatever. However, if we think about it, there is no reason why we should expect the human mind which deals with limited, measurable, and expressible things, to grasp something that is ultimately unmeasurable, at least by normal standards.

So, Plato’s dialogues are not treatises of pure or formal logic. They are literary pointers to higher truths that the reader must discover for himself and using his own intelligence.

Is that a Kantian notion? — Joshs

I think it's fundamental to philosophy generally. It's the law of identity. I can't see how temporarility is intrinsic to it or even connected with it (although will acknowledge that my own attitude has been deeply influenced by my understanding of Kant).

Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that that... in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking* is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally. — Lloyd Gerson Platonism v Naturalism

*I would think this means 'rational inference'.

Don't want to go too deeply into this here but am researching the subject of the identity of knower and known.

I think it's fundamental to philosophy generally. It's the law of identity. I can't see how temporarility is intrinsic to it or even connected with it (although will acknowledge that my own attitude has been deeply influenced by my understanding of Kant). — Wayfarer

216. "A thing is identical with itself."—There is no finer example of a useless proposition, which yet is connected with a certain play of the imagination. It is as if in imagination we put a thing into its own shape and saw that it fitted.( Wittgenstein, PI)

thinking* is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally. — Lloyd Gerson Platonism v Naturalism

We see particulars ( objective aspect) under accounts (formal aspect) , but are not these accounts subjective rather than objective? And are the accounts not themselves contingent and changeable?

I think Gerson misses an important circumstance that Aristotle observes in De Anima. For whatever reason it might be possible, we come into the presence of beings who actually exist. Something about how we are constituted allows this to happen through means that retreat from the attention in order to permit the arrival of such beings.

That is different than stating that our means of perception and intellectual processes amount to something equal to what exists beyond those means.

Another aspect of equality in the Aristotelian view is how it suspends the comparisons of 'greater' and 'smaller.' To that extent, the condition is not a step toward 'identity' It points to something that works but we don't know why it works.

I respect Gerson, especially as someone who wrestled with the texts of Plotinus.
But I am not convinced that Aristotle is arguing for the neat division you or he suggests.
A discussion for another time, perhaps.

the idea of being as encapsulated in its most ideal and exact form in A=A is an abstraction derived from a pragmatic act of reflective comparison — Joshs

You see how that subjectivizes and relativises the idea of reason. Reason becomes a product of an evolved brain, with no inherent reality beyond adaptive utility.

My interest in the reality of universals goes back to an epiphany I had into the reality of number. I suddenly saw that the reasons that ancient philosophers esteemed number, was because unlike phenomenal objects, it did not arise and perish, and was not composed of parts. Yet it are the same for any intelligence capable of counting.

Neoplatonic mathematics is governed by a fundamental distinction which is, indeed, inherent in Greek science in general, but it is here most strongly formulated. According to this distinction, one branch of mathematics participates in the contemplation of that which is in no way subject to change, or to becoming and passing away. This branch contemplates that which is always such as it is and which alone is capable of being known: for that which is known in the act of knowing, being a communicable and teachable possession, must be something which is for once and for all fixed. — Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra

That realisation got me interested in mathematical platonism, from a recent essay on which we read:

“I believe that the only way to make sense of mathematics is to believe that there are objective mathematical facts, and that they are discovered by mathematicians,” says James Robert Brown, a philosopher of science recently retired from the University of Toronto. “Working mathematicians overwhelmingly are Platonists. They don't always call themselves Platonists, but if you ask them relevant questions, it’s always the Platonistic answer that they give you.”

Other scholars—especially those working in other branches of science—view Platonism with skepticism. Scientists tend to be empiricists; they imagine the universe to be made up of things we can touch and taste and so on; things we can learn about through observation and experiment. The idea of something existing “outside of space and time” makes empiricists nervous: It sounds embarrassingly like the way religious believers talk about God, and God was banished from respectable scientific discourse a long time ago.

Platonism, as mathematician Brian Davies has put it, “has more in common with mystical religions than it does with modern science.” The fear is that if mathematicians give Plato an inch, he’ll take a mile. If the truth of mathematical statements can be confirmed just by thinking about them, then why not ethical problems, or even religious questions? Why bother with empiricism at all? — What is Math?

(I've tracked down the book by that philosopher. Difficult read but a good book.)

The underlying issue, as I see it, is that if intelligible objects are real in any sense, then this undermines philosophical materialism - that the only real things are the objects of the physical sciences. That is what ie behind the palpable fear expressed in that rhetorical question. There's a deep issue here which hardly anyone I know of seems aware of. I'm working through Gerson's three recent books on Platonism v. Naturalism

He goes on to suggest that 'this strategy, the very dangerous trap inherent in this mechanistic, resigned-to-living-in-denial-of-the-human-condition — Jack Cummins

You won't find a more persistent critic of reductionism on this forum than me. See again the quote in this post about the barbarism of reductionism.

I encountered Griffith's book decades ago, I even corresponded with him once, but couldn't understand him, although I had a sneaking suspicion he might be a crank.

becoming to me connotates teleology: This becomes that, such that “that into which this becomes” is the Aristotelian final cause of the becoming; the process of becoming moves toward its end. — javra

As I understand it, which is not well, Aristotle's ideas were developed in response to the conundrums posed by Parmenides and Zeno, which attempted to show that change must be illusory.

He's challenging to read for the non-specialist. He's the leading professor of Platonist Studies and so his writings are situated in the context of classical studies, and many of his arguments are replies to or arguments against views of other eminent specialists, with constant allusions to the classical corpus and also many highly-compressed versions of philosophical arguments. A 'Gerson reader' for the non-academic audience would be very useful. But that essay you mention, that I quoted, and which is also available as a video lecture by him, is a good starting point. I have the e-edition of From Plato to Platonism and have just discovered his latest, Platonism and Naturalism - the Possibility of Philosophy. I'm starting to get used to his style and intend to persist with reading his books despite the challenges.

Thanks for mentioning Gerson. Based on online reviews (not Amazon), his From Plato to Platonism interests me – seems to challenge my 'anti-platonic naturalism' – the most. :cool:

Point:

when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular — Lloyd Gerson, Platonism v Naturalism

Counterpoint:
“....No image could ever be adequate to our conception of a triangle in general. For the generalness of the conception it never could attain to, as this includes under itself all triangles, whether right-angled, acute-angled, etc., whilst the image would always be limited to a single part of this sphere....”
(CPR, A141/B180)

These two guys cannot both be right. Or....under what conditions could they both be right. Granting the validity of mental seeing in both cases, is seeing the form in the first the same or not, as imaging in the second?

Inquiring minds......

:up: Great quote. 'George Bernard', I presume.

Agree, with the caveat that how we nowadays understand 'existence' is very different to how it is understood in those texts, which is animated by the sense of there being levels or a hierarchy of being. In the absense of that 'vertical dimension', nothing about those quotes makes any sense. Take a look at Eirugena's 'Five Modes of Being and Non-Being'. (Also noteworthy that Eirugena's theology is suspected as being too near to pantheism for the authorities - New Advent says 'the errors into which Eriugena fell both in theology and in philosophy were many and serious'.)

I really don't understand why you think I deny hylomorphism. It seems like you might not have a clear understanding of it. — Metaphysician Undercover

Because of statements such as this. You quote this passage:

"if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality". This is from Thomistic Psychology: A Philosophical Analysis of the Nature of Man, by Robert E. Brennan S.J., which I take to be a reputable source.

But you repudiate that:

It's a mistake to separate "intellectual knowledge" from "sense knowledge" in this way. — Metaphysician Undercover

So, you're saying that Brennan and therefore Aquinas are 'mistaken' in this analysis, are you not?

Previously, you also say:

Consider, that reasoning and abstract thinking are the way that we apprehend the immaterial, but this does not mean that reasoning and abstract thinking are themselves immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

When the 'rational soul' is precisely said to be 'incorporeal' in nature, as I've already demonstrated with references, and which the quotations from @Apollodorus also support.

This is the process whereby the formulae and essences receive actual existence. Prior to this they only exist potentially. We might say that the intellect creates them, Aristotle calls them "constructions". — Metaphysician Undercover

Your basic conflict is that you adopt the modern (for most here, the superior) point of view, that the mind is the product of evolution. There is no way in your view to understand how 'ideas' or anything of that nature could pre-exist evolutionary development. So ideas are 'a product of' that evolutionary process - which is where we started this debate. You can't see (quite logically, I suppose) how there could be ideas before there were any people around to have them.

This shows, basically, the sense in which evolutionary naturalism and Platonist idealism are basically incommensurable - as Lloyd Gerson says. You're trying to accomodate Platonism from a point of view which assumes that naturalism really has displaced Platonic idealism, and then re-interpreting it through that naturalistic perspective. That's how I interpret your interpretation.

Whereas I am trying to re-interpret the Platonic doctrine of ideas in such a way that it is not incommensurable with the facts of evolution (which I do not dispute).

the contrary idea, that the active intellect is completely immaterial and directly united to the soul, is refuted. — Metaphysician Undercover

The active intellect's immateriality, immortality, and independence in relation to the body-soul is not refuted at all, it is affirmed as the passages I quoted clearly show, and as acknowledged by scholars like Gerson.

You said that “there is no such thing as "pure, unaffected intelligence" in human beings.”
Yet Aristotle says that the intellect is “pure (unmixed) and unaffected”.

You said “it is impossible for an intellect to exist without a soul”.
Yet Aristotle says that the intellect is separable from body and soul, and immortal.

You said that “the higher intellect depends on the lower intellect”.
Yet Aristotle says that it is the lower (thinking or reasoning) intellect that depends on the higher intellect (that only “thinks” or “contemplates” itself).

You said that you "do not deny the postexistence of intellect".
Yet you say that Aristotle refutes it.

Etc., etc.

Aristotle clearly says that the intellect is truly itself only when separated from the body and that man must “put on immortality” by self-identifying with the immortal intellect, for the obvious reason that there is no other way of becoming immortal and supremely happy.

The very definition of intellect according to Aristotle is “that which thinks itself” as stated at Meta. 12.1074b and as quoted earlier.

So there can be no question of the intellect “depending” on anything other than itself.

This is precisely why Aristotle refers to the first principle of all as an intellect.

You said yourself that you are dismissing Aristotle's own statements:

So I would dismiss this point as inconsistent with his overall logical structure. — Metaphysician Undercover

And it looks like you are also dismissing the views of respected scholars.

So the question seems to be whether you are dismissing a point as inconsistent with Aristotle’s overall logical structure or as inconsistent with your interpretation of it ....

We nowadays best interpret nous as intellect. Intellect to us most always connotes thought as reasoning, — javra

That's exactly where the problem is. Reading Plato and Aristotle was always done in the Greek original, even in the Roman Empire and later of course in the Greek-speaking Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantine Empire) down to modern times.

The problem started with attempts to translate Ancient Greek terms into Latin that (even more than modern English) had no equivalent philosophical terminology. In fact, many Latin words were calqued on Greek ones, not always with the best results. This is how we ended up with English "intellect". French "esprit" or German "Geist" is much closer, denoting the intelligent life principle in man that has a wide range of faculties aside from thinking or reasoning.

"Nous" in Ancient Greek has a wide range of meaning, including consciousness, intelligence, reason, mind, understanding, soul, etc., always depending on the context. Among other things, nous is also the soul's faculty of intuition, insight, contemplation, and higher perception or experience.

This is why it is best left untranslated, otherwise we get results that are more confusing than enlightening, as with phronesis, another term with no equivalent in modern languages which is more like "wisdom" but is often rendered as "prudence"!

My advice would be not to try to translate it but to try to understand it. So yes, "understanding" is the key to it in that sense.

It sounds like you are saying the Nous, as a principle, is a substance of some kind. — Paine

Depending on how you define "principle" and "substance", nous can be either, none, or both. However we choose to define it though, Aristotle calls it "immortal", "eternal", "separable" (from the body-mind compound), etc.

What you say here, "to correctly understand Aristotle" is not really true, because you latch on to a small point here, the immortality of the intellect, which is inconsistent with all the parts that I pointed at, and you claim that this is the correct understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's why we must agree to disagree.

No one argues that Aristotle and Plato are identical. The point is that there is similarity and a high degree of harmony between their views, as shown by Gerson and others, not to mention the whole Platonic (or "Neo-Platonic") tradition.

Some key points in common are:

1. Priority of intelligibles to sensibles.
2. Eternality of Forms.
3. Forms (eide) are not the same as universals (katholou). (There are similarities and differences.)
4. Forms in the intelligible realm.
5. Form instances or “images” (eikones) in the sensible realm.
6. Forms make cognition possible.
7. The cognizing subject is the “intellect” or nous.
8. Immortality of “intellect” (nous).
9. Identity of “intellect” or nous and man’s true self, etc.

Though philosophy aims to attain knowledge or wisdom (sophia or phronesis), the ultimate goal of philosophy is the source of knowledge or wisdom itself which is consciousness.

Consciousness is always aware of itself and this self-reflexive awareness is an activity of consciousness that is already there as the background of other activities of consciousness.

In other words, normal activity involves change. The self-awareness of consciousness is an activity that does not involve change as the awareness is of the same changeless consciousness.

When self-aware consciousness (that is already "active" in an act of self-reflexive awareness) becomes active in the ordinary sense, e.g., as in an act of sensory perception, there is awareness of (1) perception, (2) perceiving subject, (3) means of perception, and (4) (external or physical) object of perception.

The perception is the equivalent of knowledge, and consciousness qua consciousness the equivalent of the source of knowledge.

At the highest level of perception (knowledge) consciousness is cognitively identical with the perception. Therefore, the highest form of knowledge is self-knowledge which is knowledge of oneself as consciousness or nous.

This means that the source of knowledge can be discovered only through introspective inquiry or internalization of consciousness. This is not only logical, but also a matter of experience as detailed in my previous posts.

If consciousness is the source of knowledge, then that source is to be found within consciousness itself, at the center of experience which is logically within us as conscious beings. And the way to that center passes through the same states of consciousness we experience naturally, i.e., waking, dreaming, and deep sleep, with self-aware consciousness always in the background of all experience.

Whether we like it or not, because they are an important (and usually neglected) aspect of consciousness, dreams will become more prominent in this process, especially lucid dreams, precognitive dreams, and dream-visions. This is why all philosophers in the Platonic tradition, for example, from Socrates to Proclus and others had precognitive and other dreams in which certain truths were revealed to them.

The bottom line is that humans and other intelligent beings are communicative because the consciousness or intelligence in us is communicative. If we pay attention to consciousness and communicate with it, it will communicate with us and teach us things we did not know before. In any case, we have nothing to lose and everything to gain.

If, on the other hand, we insist on claiming that consciousness does not exist, or that the way to truth is through the study of physical matter, or through the consciousness of lower forms of life, then it's a different story. Either way, as I said before, the choice is yours. Nothing to do with me.

What is clearly stated in Aristotle is an interest in understanding causes of events and the reality of actual beings. There is a consideration of the sciences of the first things and the cosmology of eternal objects. But the study of nature as Fusis is also accorded the rank of a theoretical science. Experience in the world is a necessary condition of knowledge. — Paine

Forms clearly play a role in human intellection and cognition:

Now, if thinking is analogous to perceiving, it will consist in a being acted upon by the object of thought (noeton) or in something else of this kind. This part of the soul [the nous], then, must be impassive, but receptive of the Form (eidos) and potentially like this Form, though not identical with it … Therefore it has been well said that the soul is a place of Forms (eide): except that this is not true of the whole soul, but only of the soul which can think, and again that the Forms (eide) are there not in actuality, but potentiality … (De Anima 429a15 ff.).

Of course Aristotle is also concerned with the sensible world. But the fact remains that the intelligible world is higher than the sensible, and the higher part of the soul is higher than the lower. What is higher takes precedence over the lower. This is why Aristotle urges the philosopher to identify with the higher element (nous) in him:

But we ought, so far as in us lies, to put on immortality, and do all that we can to live in conformity with the highest that is in us [the nous which is immortal and divine] (Nicomachean Ethics 1177b30).

Identification with the highest element in man is the whole point of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy. The highest happiness comes from the highest activity which is contemplation (theoria):

The activity of the Gods, which is supremely happy, must be a form of contemplation; and therefore among human activities that which is the most akin to the Gods' will be the happiest (Nicomachean Ethics 1178b20).

According to both Plato and Aristotle the main function of nous, in addition to self-awareness, is contemplation of higher realities.

This means that once the nous has become separated on the death of the body-mind composite, and is “itself by itself”, there will be little activity left other than contemplation.

As the act and experience of contemplation of higher realities is the same in all cases, this means that “personality” in the normal sense of the word ceases to exist.

Gerson writes:

The activity of intellect in both Plato and Aristotle is impersonal only in the sense of being nonidiosyncratic. The contents of intellect’s thinking when it is thinking that which is intelligible is the same for everyone. If I am nothing but an intellect, then, ideally, I differ from you solo numero. Emotions, appetites, memories, and sensations are not just numerically distinct for different embodied persons, they are idiosyncratic as well, insofar as they depend on a unique body.
The identity between a subject of intellection and a subject of the idiosyncratic states of embodiment is deeply obscure. I do not want to suggest that either Plato or Aristotle has anything like a satisfactory explanation for this. But I do wish to insist they share a conviction in general about how to bridge the gap between the embodied person and the disembodied person.
By ‘gap’ I mean the natural disinclination most embodied persons have to embrace the destiny of a disembodied person so described. The shared conviction is that philosophical activity has a transformative effect on embodied persons. As one becomes habituated to the philosophical life, one comes to identify oneself with ‘the better part’. I do not suppose that Plato or even Neoplatonists of the strictest observance believed that such identification could be perfectly achieved while embodied. But as Plato urges in Republic, quite reasonably enough, it is better to be closer to the ideal than to be further away. In any case, for Plato, and, as I have argued, for Aristotle as well, that is the ideal, like it or not (Aristotle and Other Platonists, p. 286).

At the end of the day, the ultimate goal of philosophy is self-knowledge. If self-knowledge is the highest form of cognition, and the philosopher is serious about achieving his or her true identity, then this can be done only through some form of introspective inquiry or self-reflexive thinking that has the nous (i.e., self-aware consciousness or intelligence) itself as its central focus.

By way of a footnote, even though Christian theology appropriated many of Plotinus’ philosophical views in support of its own, it always distinguished between the supposedly impersonal union with the One described by Plotinus (henosis) and the divine union of Christ (kenosis). — Wayfarer

If there is a distinction to be made between "impersonal union" and what the Christian view proposes, what is to be made of Gerson's reference to a 'disembodied person?'

It's a deep question, and I've only read snippets of Gerson. When I encountered it was in studying comparative religion, and readings about Christian mysticism - notably Dean Inge and Evelyn Underhill. Inge was a leading Christian Platonist around the early 20th century, an old-school classics scholar and popular exponent of classical mysticism. I think it was in his writings that I encountered the purported distinction between Plotinus' depiction of mystical union, and how it differed from the Christian account. Plotinus' mysticism was said to be impersonal, the invidual literally surrendering or loosing his/her identity in merging with the Absolute, whereas in Christianity it is supposed that personal identity is retained. But, those readings were decades ago and I would have to revisit them to brush up on the arcane details. You can find Inge's lectures on mysticism here.

(It's also worth noting that the supposedly 'impersonal' nature of enlightenment in Buddhism was frequently employed in Christian polemics against that religion, even by Pope John Paul II in his somewhat controversial depiction of Buddhism in Crossing the Threshhold of Hope.)

Well, you seem to have some kind of fixation with Aquinas. The reality, of course, is that Aquinas is a Christian who is trying hard to put his own spin on Classical authors. Plato and Aristotle are not Christians. There may be similarities, but their systems are NOT the same as Christianity. IMO it is delusional and dishonest to claim otherwise. — Apollodorus

Aquinas offers what I believe to be by far the most comprehensive interpretation of Aristotle, and possibly Plato as well, with comparison to numerous other ancient philosophers. He makes Gerson appear to be speaking from an introductory level of education. I'm sorry for being blunt, but it's rather obvious, and your comment implies that you do not notice this.

And no, there is no inconsistency in saying that the powers of disembodied nous are the same as those of embodied nous. — Apollodorus

You might assert this as many times as you like, but until you address the arguments, your assertions have no significance, impose no influence, and bear no fruit.

It is absurd to claim that embodied nous does not have these powers and only acquires them on becoming disembodied. If this were the case, (1) man wouldn't be human and not even alive, and (2) the analogy of the entombed or imprisoned soul would be nonsense and no one would speak of "release" and "liberation" as there would be nothing to release or liberate .... :smile: — Apollodorus

What you have stated there, are the features of the embodied intellect, "consciousness, happiness, will-power, knowledge and action". What is absurd is to say that an immaterial existence, eternal and immutable, has these same features.

I think he solves a problem (the two intellects versus one) that was never a problem if one understood identification of causes as Aristotle intended. — Paine

The assumption that there are "two intellects" occurs about as frequently as the assumption that there are "two (or more) kinds of knowledge" or "three parts of the soul", etc. Gerson does indeed debunk many of these misconceptions.

On the "two intellects", he says:

The general point of this chapter [De Anima, Gamma 5)] is frequently represented as the introduction of two intellects: the passive (παθητικός) intellect and the productive or active or agent (νοιητικός) intellect. But as has been often noted, Aristotle does not use the latter term and the former is used only here, predicatively ... Aristotle's general account of intellect leads him to distinguish the actuality of cognition that is the presence of an intelligible form in the intellect and the further actuality that is the awareness of the presence of that form. And as we have also seen, this twofold actuality belongs to a unified intellect (Aristotle and Other Platonists, pp.153-4).

You, Appolodorus have opted for the belief that the intellect , or "mind" is an immaterial power .... — Metaphysician Undercover

This isn't about me "opting" for anything. The nous is described as immaterial by Plato and Aristotle, and as having the powers mentioned in my comment.

You have admitted that intellect is immaterial and that it has the power of knowledge:

immaterial intellect, (a divine intellect), has a superior knowledge which is completely different from the knowledge of the human intellect, which is tainted by the human intellect's dependence on the material body. — Metaphysician Undercover

And you are contradicting yourself by denying that the intellect has those powers:

What you have stated there, are the features of the embodied intellect, "consciousness, happiness, will-power, knowledge and action". What is absurd is to say that an immaterial existence, eternal and immutable, has these same features. — Metaphysician Undercover

As for your dogmatic insistence on reading Plato and Aristotle through Aquinas, what can I say? Plato lived from 428 to 348 BC. Aquinas lived from 1225 to 1274 AD, i.e., more than a millennium and a half after Plato. It is absurd to claim that ancient readers of Plato and Aristotle were ignorant of what they were reading and had to wait more than fifteen centuries for Aquinas to tell them!

It is evident from Plato’s Timaeus (30a ff.) that Intellect (in the form of Creator-God) possesses the powers of consciousness, happiness, will, knowledge, and action.

1. It has consciousness as it is aware of the pre-cosmic chaos.
2. Will-power as it makes a conscious and purposeful decision to impose order on the chaos and create the universe.
3. Knowledge of the divine model on which he creates the universe.
4. Power of action which it uses to create the universe.
5. Power of happiness as it rejoices at its own creation.

Incidentally, the Creator-God’s divine model is often described in translations as an “intelligible animal”, “intelligible creature” or "living animal". However, the fact is that the word “zoon” here does not mean animal at all but model, this being the term normally used for an artist’s real-life model. The artist himself in Greek is called “zographos” (zoos-graphos), literally, one who paints or draws from real life (as opposed to one who draws from imagination). Therefore, the correct translation of noeton zoon (30c) is “(real) intelligible model”.

In any case, it is obviously incorrect to say that the immaterial and eternal has none of the powers that even embodied intelligence (nous) has.

Aristotle himself says that the Intellect’s activity is the cause of the universe (Physics 198a10-13), that the activity of the Gods which is supremely happy is a form of contemplation (Nicomachean Ethics 1178b20), etc., etc., all of which clearly indicates that intelligence has those powers, indeed, it is those powers.

As Aristotle puts it:

It is this intellect which is separable and impassive and unmixed, being in its essential nature an activity … It is, however, only when separated that it is its true self, and this, its essential nature, alone is immortal and eternal (De Anima 430a23).

As I said, remove those powers from disembodied intelligence and you succumb to materialism. That’s where your “interpretation” of Plato and Aristotle takes you to. But do carry on, by all means .... :grin:

And you live in 2022. Why should I listen to anything you say about these ancient writers then? — Metaphysician Undercover

I never said you should listen to what I say. What I did say is that the original texts should be read as they are:

It is simply a matter of reading the original texts as they are, without putting a spin on them or dismissing whole chapters for being "inconsistent" with the reader's preconceived ideas. — Apollodorus

By your own admission, you are dismissing everything in the texts that is inconvenient to your preconceived opinion:

So I would dismiss this point as inconsistent with his overall logical structure. — Metaphysician Undercover

these statements of immortality of the intellect are inconsistent with the logic of Aristotle's overall conceptual structure, and ought to be dismissed as oversight, or mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I said already, these statements of immortality of the intellect are inconsistent with the logic of Aristotle's overall conceptual structure, and ought to be dismissed as oversight, or mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

Therefore these passages you have quoted, which were derived from that intuition, ought to be dismissed as misguided. — Metaphysician Undercover

Etc., etc.

IMO it is simply wrong to dismiss whole passages and chapters as "mistakes" and to call the author "misguided".

A more logical approach is to look into whether the passages you are choosing to dismiss can be read in a way that makes them consistent with the rest of the text. This is what Platonists like Plotinus and Proclus are doing and so do scholars like Gerson (see Aristotle and Other Platonists).

Unfortunately, you are unable to do that because you are committed to an "interpretation" of the text that requires dismissing too many parts of the text. This is why you aren't convincing anyone.

So, frankly, I think you are flogging a dead horse there. But, as I said, feel free to carry on. I’ve got other things to do …. :smile:

The matters are clear to you, so my objections are merely proof of my incapacity. I have no objection to that sort of rhetoric as such. I would have continued on that basis if I understood what you are convinced of.

When I piece together what you ascribe to Aristotle, I don't understand it as a thought by itself.

By way of contrast, I disagree with many things Gerson asserts. He is not around to answer my challenges, but I understand what he is saying. I don't understand what you are saying. You have a vivid image of something and I cannot make it out.

Hey, that's philosophy. When an author states unacceptable principles, we reject them, regardless of how revered the person is. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, you can twist it as much as you want. :smile:

The fact is I wasn't talking about "unacceptable principles". I was talking about your admitted method of dismissing passages from one author because they are "inconsistent" with your spurious interpretation of other passages from the same author, while disregarding the very real possibility that the cause of the "inconsistency" may lie in your faulty interpretation.

Gerson shows how such misinterpretations can arise and how they can lead to passages or chapters being dismissed by those who misinterpret them. This has nothing to do with "philosophy" but with an inability (or unwillingness, in some cases) to correctly understand the authors in question.

More generally, you are using Aristotle to attack Plato, Aquinas to attack Plato and Aristotle, etc. This is a pattern we’ve seen before and I think we know where it is coming from ....

The fact is I wasn't talking about "unacceptable principles". — Apollodorus

I was talking about unacceptable principles. When an author whom a person respects to a great level, proposes unacceptable principles, like eternal circular motions for example, then one must dig deep within that author's work to uncover the reasons for that mistake.

You can approach this with the attitude that eternal circular motions is completely consistent with all of Aristotle's work, in which case we'd have to reject all his work as being based in an unacceptable principle, or we can look to see where this principle is inconsistent with the rest of his work, and keep the rest. Or do you happen to believe that eternal circular motions is an acceptable principle?

I was talking about your admitted method of dismissing passages from one author because they are "inconsistent" with your spurious interpretation of other passages from the same author, while disregarding the very real possibility that the cause of the "inconsistency" may lie in your faulty interpretation. — Apollodorus

The fact that I back up my so-called "spurious interpretation' with reference to other well respected philosophers, and you do not, indicates that it is more likely that your interpretation is faulty, rather than that mine is faulty. And this is exactly the problem. You imply that referencing Aristotle when explaining Plato's philosophy, and referencing Aquinas when explaining Aristotle's philosophy, a procedure which indicates a well educated interpretation, is more likely to produce a faulty interpretation than a completely uneducated reading.

Gerson shows how such misinterpretations can arise and how they can lead to passages or chapters being dismissed by those who misinterpret them. This has nothing to do with "philosophy" but with an inability (or unwillingness, in some cases) to correctly understand the authors in question. — Apollodorus

It's possible that there is a misinterpretation, but it's also possible that the author is mistaken. Therefore, we refer to other well educated philosophers to consult with their interpretations. You seem to think that it's wrong to consider the possibility that the author is mistaken, and therefore wrong to consult the interpretations of others.

More generally, you are using Aristotle to attack Plato, Aquinas to attack Plato and Aristotle, etc. This is a pattern we’ve seen before and I think we know where it is coming from .... — Apollodorus

This is nonsense, pure and simple. Each and every philosopher makes some good points and some bad points. We are all only human, and no human being can have perfection in one's philosophy. So we take the good points and we reject the bad. However, the good and the bad must be demonstrated as such, and this is called justification. That a philosopher like myself accepts the majority of another philosopher's work, yet rejects some fringe aspects, and produces demonstrations as to why these fringe aspects are inconsistent with the majority of the work, does not constitute a matter of attacking the other philosopher. It's just a realization, and acceptance of the fact, that no human being is perfect in one's philosophy. So we need to proceed with due diligence in our justifications.

Did he really talk about a never ending circular motion? — Raymond

Well, Aristotle argues that time and motion are imperishable. And since any motion other than circular would have a beginning and end, imperishable motion must be circular and the cause of that motion must be some immaterial principle such as an “unmoved mover”.

Obviously, there are many ways Aristotle can be interpreted (and misinterpreted). But here is a good article that elucidates some of the points involved:

Aristotle's Circular Movement as a Logos Doctrine – JSTOR

Or, if you have the time and inclination for a broader perspective, you can try Gerson's Aristotle and Other Platonists.

Yep. Aristotle was Plato's pupil for twenty years so there must have been some influence. Gerson argues that Aristotle was essentially a Platonist:

Francis Cornford famously wrote about the theory of Forms and the immortality of soul as the “twin-pillars of Platonism” … With the appropriate qualifications made, I think it is fair to conclude that the “twin pillars” also support Aristotle’s Platonism.
Is Aristotle just a Platonist? Certainly not. In this regard, I would not wish to underestimate the importance of the dispositional differences between Aristotle and Plato.
This dispositional difference is in part reflected in Aristotle’s penchant for introducing terminological innovations to express old (i.e., Platonic) thoughts. In working through the Aristotelian corpus with a mind open to the Neoplatonic assumption of harmony, I have found time and again that Aristotle was, it turns out, actually analyzing the Platonic position or making it more precise, not refuting it.
In addition, I do not discount in this regard the fundamental thesis, advanced by Harold Cherniss, that Aristotle is often criticizing philosophers other than Plato or deviant versions of Platonism. It is not a trivial fact that most of Aristotle’s writings came after Plato’s death and after Plato’s mantle as head of the Academy had passed to Speusippus and then to Xenocrates.
In my view, however, it would be a mistake to conclude that Aristotle in not au fond a Platonist. Even when Aristotle is criticizing Plato, as he does in De Anima, he is led, perhaps malgré lui to draw conclusions based on Platonic assumptions.
The main conclusion I draw from this long and involved study is that if one rigorously and honestly sought to remove these assumptions, the ‘Aristotelianism’ that would remain would be indefensible and incoherent. A comprehensive and scientifically grounded anti-Platonic Aristotelianism is, I suspect, a chimera (Aristotle and Other Platonists, pp. 289-290).