That A=A is not dependent on your or my mind, or on your or my assent. But it can nevertheless only be grasped by a rational intelligence. That is why I favour the form of objective idealism which says there are real ideas that are not dependent on our minds, but which can only be grasped by a mind. — Wayfarer

Is that a Kantian notion? Isnt A=A the concept of ideal self-identity, the infinite repeatability of the same? If so, isn’t the category of temporality intrinsic to it?

Is that a Kantian notion? — Joshs

I think it's fundamental to philosophy generally. It's the law of identity. I can't see how temporarility is intrinsic to it or even connected with it (although will acknowledge that my own attitude has been deeply influenced by my understanding of Kant).

Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that that... in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking* is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally. — Lloyd Gerson Platonism v Naturalism

*I would think this means 'rational inference'.

Don't want to go too deeply into this here but am researching the subject of the identity of knower and known.

Hope you don't mind my chipping in here. There are domains of discourse within which meanings are fixed. Those classical domains, such as classical theology or Advaita Vedanta, have deep roots, i.e. their basic terms are defined in terms of fundamental values. The fact that they are so defined doesn't guarantee their veracity, although I think their longevity and adaptability provide support for that. Within those domains, there is what amounts to 'peer review', in that successive generations of adherents of those traditions authenticate the various texts and ideas of the domains. That is also the basis of the idea of lineage. In fact arguably those practices were the origins of peer review in science itself. — Wayfarer

Always welcome, W. Heading towards the intersubjective communities of phenomenology. I should point out that I often ask questions even if I have answers (well, mine anyway) I am interested to hear how others make sense of things - especially when the worldview is not one I necessarily subscribe to. I am always trying to break out of my own perspective. The chances that I have stumbled onto 'truth' being highly unlikely.

I suppose the marvel universe is very effective at providing meaning within its particular domain (let's call that the realm of the imaginary). — emancipate

I think it's more than imaginary. It's metaphor and allegory used to provide comfort and guidance. At least that's what I've seen. And yes, imaginative power can guide or temper behavior in real life.

There doesn't need to be any criteria distinguishing validity or invalidity in this case because they each have their own respective, and different, domains. Choosing the valid/invalid modes would only be needed if science and the marvel universe covered the same domain. Obviously they do not, and no one seriously claims that they do. — emancipate

I agree, but it is tricky. I know of a young man who is guided by Spiderman (as metaphor) when psychology might be more useful. I think it can sometimes be hard to determine which mode to apply to which domain. What are the rules (or practice principles) for determining where science should be and where religion should be for instance?

I think it's fundamental to philosophy generally. It's the law of identity. I can't see how temporarility is intrinsic to it or even connected with it (although will acknowledge that my own attitude has been deeply influenced by my understanding of Kant). — Wayfarer

216. "A thing is identical with itself."—There is no finer example of a useless proposition, which yet is connected with a certain play of the imagination. It is as if in imagination we put a thing into its own shape and saw that it fitted.( Wittgenstein, PI)

thinking* is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally. — Lloyd Gerson Platonism v Naturalism

We see particulars ( objective aspect) under accounts (formal aspect) , but are not these accounts subjective rather than objective? And are the accounts not themselves contingent and changeable?

I think Gerson misses an important circumstance that Aristotle observes in De Anima. For whatever reason it might be possible, we come into the presence of beings who actually exist. Something about how we are constituted allows this to happen through means that retreat from the attention in order to permit the arrival of such beings.

That is different than stating that our means of perception and intellectual processes amount to something equal to what exists beyond those means.

Another aspect of equality in the Aristotelian view is how it suspends the comparisons of 'greater' and 'smaller.' To that extent, the condition is not a step toward 'identity' It points to something that works but we don't know why it works.

"A thing is identical with itself."—There is no finer example of a useless proposition, which yet is connected with a certain play of the imagination. — Joshs

Wittgenstein didn't understand the point. He boasted he'd never read Aristotle. But I've never read Wittgenstein, so I'd better shut up.

We see particulars ( objective aspect) under accounts (formal aspect) , but are not these accounts subjective rather than objective? — Joshs

There's a good discussion of universals in Russell, 'World of Universals'. The salient point:

It is largely the very peculiar kind of being that belongs to universals which has led many people to suppose that they are really mental. We can think of a universal, and our thinking then exists in a perfectly ordinary sense, like any other mental act. Suppose, for example, that we are thinking of 'whiteness'. Then in one sense it may be said that whiteness is 'in our mind'. ... In the strict sense, it is not whiteness that is in our mind, but the act of thinking of whiteness. The connected ambiguity in the word 'idea'...also causes confusion here. In one sense of this word, namely the sense in which it denotes the object of an act of thought, whiteness is an 'idea'. Hence, if the ambiguity is not guarded against, we may come to think that whiteness is an 'idea' in the other sense, i.e. an act of thought; and thus we come to think that whiteness is mental. But in so thinking, we rob it of its essential quality of universality. One man's act of thought is necessarily a different thing from another man's; one man's act of thought at one time is necessarily a different thing from the same man's act of thought at another time. Hence, if whiteness were the thought as opposed to its object, no two different men could think of it, and no one man could think of it twice. That which many different thoughts of whiteness have in common is their object, and this object is different from all of them. Thus universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.

which is precisely the sense in which I understand it.

I think Gerson misses an important circumstance that Aristotle observes in De Anima. — Paine

In fairness, mine was a paragraph quoted from a long essay (which you can find here or even watch Gerson deliver it as a lecture here, bookmarked to the relevant section.)

The broader point is that whilst Aristotle departed from Plato's depiction of the existence of universals, they are still present in his philosophy as the intelligible forms of things, which becomes the basis of matter-form dualism (hylomorphism). This holds that the idea of the thing is grasped by the intellect, while its material form is the object of the senses.

Probably logging out for Christmas, so Happy Christmas to all.

I respect Gerson, especially as someone who wrestled with the texts of Plotinus.
But I am not convinced that Aristotle is arguing for the neat division you or he suggests.
A discussion for another time, perhaps.

Wittgenstein didn't understand the point. He boasted he'd never read Aristotle. But I've never read Wittgenstein, so I'd better shut up. — Wayfarer

Wittgenstein, AC Grayling tells us, read almost no philosophy at all. Perhaps like J Krishnamurti he was a kind of seer.

I think it's more than imaginary. It's metaphor and allegory used to provide comfort and guidance. At least that's what I've seen. And yes, imaginative power can guide or temper behavior in real life — Tom Storm

I agree.

What are the rules (or practice principles) for determining where science should be and where religion should be for instance? — Tom Storm

Yep it's tricky. Anyway, forget it. I was talking shit last night. I don't know anything.

Wittgenstein, AC Grayling tells us, read almost no philosophy at all — Tom Storm

Sorry for dropping in on a thread I haven't read but...

Where does AC Grayling say this ?
He is wrong but that doesn't surprise me.

It's in this lecture by Grayling on Wittgenstein and Language Games. Don't remember the time - near the end.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PmckTveYNI8

Don't remember the time - near the end. — Tom Storm

Thanks but couldn't find it in the limited time I have for this guy.
No great loss.

What is often missed, is that mathematics itself is a value structure, and is therefore dependent on, and based in "value judgement". What has occurred through the history of humanity is that we have achieved significant levels of agreement, convention, concerning these value judgements of mathematics, and this has produced great confidence in the notion that "objective knowledge" is produced by mathematics. In reality this knowledge is better classed as 'inter-subjective'. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you give an example of how mathematics is a value judgement. I suppose they are very few.

Wittgenstein, AC Grayling tells us, read almost no philosophy at all
— Tom Storm

Sorry for dropping in on a thread I haven't read but...

Where does AC Grayling say this ?
He is wrong but that doesn't surprise me — Amity

From Ray Monk’s biography of Wittgenstein:

“…what Ryle says about Wittgenstein's attitude towards reading the great works of the past is perfectly true. 'As little philosophy as I have read', Wittgenstein wrote, 'I have certainly not read too little, rather too much. I see that whenever I read a philosophical book: it doesn't improve my thoughts at all, it makes them worse.' This attitude would never have been tolerated at Oxford, where respect for things past is in general much stronger than at Cambridge, and where a training in philosophy is inseparable from a reading of the great works in the subject. It is almost inconceivable that a man who claimed proudly never to have read a word of Aristotle would have been given any tutorial responsibilities at all at Oxford, let alone be allowed to preside over the affairs of the department.”

Heidegger read plenty of Aristotle, but came to conclusions remarkably similar to Wittgenstein.


“ The principle of contradiction and the principle of identity are presupposed to be self-evident, with no questions asked about whether they are actually ultimate.”

It's the law of identity. I can't see how temporarility is intrinsic to it or even connected with it ( — Wayfarer

The proposition A=A only makes sense as a reflection. The second A is being compared to the first in one’s mind and determined to be identical. Reflection is a temporal process, and Heidegger’s argument is that reflection changes what it turns back to by changing the context.

But you're equivocating the meaning of 'value'. In maths,'value' is a number signifying the result of a calculation or function. In ethics and philosophy, values are basic and fundamental beliefs that guide or motivate attitudes or actions. So the meaning of 'value' is different according to the context. — Wayfarer

No equivocation. A value is the estimated worth of a thing, whether the principle of estimation is numerical (providing the basis for quantity), or the principle is moral (providing the basis for ethics). Yes, a numerical value is a distinct type of value from a moral value, like a dog is a distinct type of animal from a human being, here I am talking about the more general "value". And just like dogs and human beings are both examples of the more general "animal", numerical values and moral values are examples of the more general "values".

As I explained, it is the claim that there is a fundamental separation between these types of value, which gives scientism its traction. This proposed separation provides for the appearance that somehow mathematical values are more "objective" than other types of values. This produces the illusion that science creates a higher form of certainty than ethics. In reality though both of these forms of certainty are supported merely by the extent of agreement, or convention, afforded by each. So the idea that science through the means of its mathematical applications, gives us a higher form of certainty than ethics, is just an expression of "mob rules". More people agree therefore it more objective.

Assuredly. That A=A is not dependent on your or my mind, or on your or my assent. But it can nevertheless only be grasped by a rational intelligence. That is why I favour the form of objective idealism which says there are real ideas that are not dependent on our minds, but which can only be grasped by a mind. — Wayfarer

Your expression "A=A" is just a rule, which states that each time the symbol "A" is employed, it must represent the same thing as the last. The reality of equivocation demonstrates that the rule is often not followed. Now, your statement "A=A" is nothing more than an ethical principle, 'what we ought to do' if we do not want to deceive others, and desire to give them a clear understanding of what we're thinking.

So if we want an "objective idealism" we need to start with an objective ethics, because logical proceedings are dependent on people doing what they ought to do in their activities of thinking. When there is no clearly defined rules as to what people ought to do in their logical proceedings, they'll rationalize all sorts of illogical things and try to pass them off as acceptable logic. If there is such a thing as "real ideas that are not dependent on our minds", these ideas must exist as the result of following the appropriate rules of action ("action" includes thinking); as ideas, is how such activity is present to our minds.

Can you give an example of how mathematics is a value judgement. I suppose they are very few. — EnPassant

The symbols used in mathematics represent values, as I described, "2" represents a value. Each time that mathematics is employed in application, there is a judgement as to where to assign which values, just like ethical judgements are judgements as to where to assign moral values. So all applied mathematics involves such value judgements, just like applied ethics involves moral judgements. In the case of theoretical mathematics, what some call pure mathematics, rules are introduced which define the values and describe how to apply them, as moral philosophy does the same with moral values. So all forms of mathematics involve value judgements, always.

It appears as if some people here have kind of (conveniently) forgotten that mathematics deals with values. Influenced by this ignorance, mathematics is distanced from "value", and given the appearance of objectivity.

From Ray Monk’s biography of Wittgenstein: — Joshs

I stand corrected. I respect Ray Monk :sparkle:

The symbols used in mathematics represent values, as I described, "2" represents a value. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see it that way. Numbers are sets that arise out of iteration and partition.
Start with /
Iterate //
Reiterate ///
etc /////////////////////////////...
Partition each step into {/} {//} {///} {////} {/////}...These are sets. Numbers are sets.
In familiar symbols these are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,...
This is how set theory defines numbers. There are no values ascribed here.

The proposition A=A only makes sense as a reflection. The second A is being compared to the first in one’s mind and determined to be identical. — Joshs

I really don't believe that is the point. I think the point is that the expression '=' or 'is', strictly speaking is only completely accurate in the case of A=A. In other arithmetical expressions, the "=" sign denotes an exactness which is never the case for empirical objects. Mathematical statements have an exactitude which is never truly characteristic of the sense-able realm. Statements about the empirical world are always approximations, because the objects of empirical analysis always consist of an admixture of being and becoming. The reason that 'the law of identity' is being dismissed as a trivial tautology is because this is not seen. It goes back to Parmenides' discussion of the 'nature of what is'.

For Spir the principle of identity is not only the fundamental law of knowledge, it is also an ontological principle, expression of the unconditioned essence of reality (Realität=Identität mit sich), which is opposed to the empirical reality (Wirklichkeit), which in turn is evolution (Geschehen). The principle of identity displays the essence of reality: only that which is identical to itself is real, the empirical world is ever-changing, therefore it is not real. Thus the empirical world has an illusory character, because phenomena are ever-changing, and empirical reality is unknowable. — Wikipedia entry on Afrikan Spir

I think the fundamentally unknowable nature of empirical reality is hinted at by the conundrums of modern physics. (There's a very well edited PDF of Spir's book Thought and Reality available on archive.org, which I've downloaded for further study. He is a little-known neo-Kantian of Russian origin.)

A value is the estimated worth of a thing, whether the principle of estimation is numerical (providing the basis for quantity), or the principle is moral (providing the basis for ethics). — Metaphysician Undercover

Not buying, sorry. I think this obliterates a distinction of the first order.

I don't see it that way. Numbers are sets that arise out of iteration and partition.
Start with /
Iterate //
Reiterate ///
etc /////////////////////////////...
Partition each step into {/} {//} {///} {////} {/////}...These are sets. Numbers are sets.
In familiar symbols these are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,...
This is how set theory defines numbers. There are no values ascribed here. — EnPassant

What you are demonstrating is that the set {///} has the value signified by 3. Do you not accept the fact that mathematics works with values? If "{///}" means the same as "3", and "3" means the same as "{///}" then you have a vicious circle of definition. But clearly this is not the case in set theory. Sets have all sorts of different values like cardinality, extensionality, etc.. To say "there are no values ascribed here" is rather ridiculous.

I really don't believe that is the point. I think the point is that the expression '=' or 'is', strictly speaking is only completely accurate in the case of A=A. In other arithmetical expressions, the "=" sign denotes an exactness which is never the case for empirical objects. Mathematical statements have an exactitude which is never truly characteristic of the sense-able realm. Statements about the empirical world are always approximations, because the objects of empirical analysis always consist of an admixture of being and becoming. The reason that 'the law of identity' is being dismissed as a trivial tautology is because this is not seen. It goes back to Parmenides' discussion of the 'nature of what is'. — Wayfarer

This is a good point. When A=A is meant to express the law of identity, i.e. "a thing is the same as itself", then the "=" sign represents a very special sort of exactness, the relationship which a thing has with itself. And this goes beyond the capacity of a human being to judge. Human beings do not really know, nor are they capable of judging the relationship which a thing has with itself. It is simply asserted, as the law of identity, that such a special, and exact relationship exists, and is something real.

But when the "=" sign is used to express equality, as is the case with mathematical equations, then the relationship between the two things related by the sign is a matter of a value judgement, and this does not obtain that degree of exactness which is expressed by the law of identity. It is less exact because it is always a judgement of some value, therefore some specified property. So two groups of two things for example, are "equal" in the sense that they both have the quantitative value of two, and so they are the same in that respect. But they might be different in every other respect, yet still equal, being each a group of two.

Not buying, sorry. I think this obliterates a distinction of the first order. — Wayfarer

What's this "distinction of the first order" you are talking about? I've never seen "first order" used in this way.

Clearly they are both "values", under the same general definition of "value", meaning "a thing's estimated worth". When we see a group of objects and assign the value "10", this is the group's "estimated worth", within the quantitative value system we use when we apply a number to the group. Likewise, when we judge the morality of a human act, we are assigning an "estimated worth" to that action. Why deny this basic fact concerning human judgements? All such "value judgements" are related to each other in this way.

Clearly they are both "values", under the same general definition of "value", meaning "a thing's estimated worth". — Metaphysician Undercover

I already gave the two different definitions of value, numerical and qualitative. Numerical values originate with counting, 'how many'. Qualitative values originate with judgement. 'Assigning an estimated worth' is simply a judgement of one in terms of the other. The results of quantitative counts are invariant, but value judgements can vary wildly. Imagine a scenario where you have a re-discovered Picasso painting evaluated. If it's found to be genuine then it's worth a hundred millions bucks. If it's a fake it's worth nothing. But it's still exactly the same thing.

Likewise, when we judge the morality of a human act, we are assigning an "estimated worth" to that action. — Metaphysician Undercover

An insurance company can put an estimated value on a human life for the purposes of paying out a policy, but to say a life is worth some monetary amount in absolute terms is a mercenary attitude.

You're deeply muddled here, MU, but as it's Christmas, Happy Christmas :party:

. Numerical values originate with counting, 'how many'. Qualitative values originate with judgement. ' — Wayfarer

Counting, "how many", is a judgement. How could you think it is not?

Subject and object cannot be separated, the physical world is object and cause to all organisms, all organisms are reactive creatures. Truth is what your body tells you it is. Where there is a difference in biology in kind or in the state of health, there is a difference in that organism's apparent reality, read that organism's truth. That said, this processing of the natural world is not infallible, mainly because biology is not infallible. All experience is true to its biology, even where it disagrees with objective reality, and the judgment of that experience can be judged against objective reality, but, not with the same biology or biological state that made the judgment in the first place.The world appears to you the way it does because your biology is just so. change the biology, and you change the apparent world.

Counting, "how many", is a judgement. How could you think it is not? — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not a value judgement.

Wittgenstein [ ... ] boasted he'd never read Aristotle. But I've never read Wittgenstein, so I'd better shut up. — Wayfarer

:clap: :roll:

:up: :sparkle:

Counting, "how many", is a judgement. How could you think it is not? — Metaphysician Undercover

One thinks not because "counting" is a practice; "judgment", however, consists in participating or not participating in a practice.

What you are demonstrating is that the set {///} has the value signified by 3. Do you not accept the fact that mathematics works with values? If "{///}" means the same as "3", and "3" means the same as "{///}" then you have a vicious circle of definition. But clearly this is not the case in set theory. Sets have all sorts of different values like cardinality, extensionality, etc.. To say "there are no values ascribed here" is rather ridiculous. — Metaphysician Undercover

But you are talking about subjective value: something that can be open to disagreement. How can there be disagreement about the cardinality of a finite set? And if there was disagreement about the cardinality of infinite sets it would not be because of subjective opinion it would be highly technical and concerned with Godel's undecidable issues - such as the cardinal in the continuum hypothesis which was shown, by Cohen, to be undecidable.

At the moment, one book which I am reading is 'Freedom: The End of the Human Condition', by Jeremy Griffith and he points to the problem of reductionism in science. He says, 'Science has necessarily been 'reductionist' and 'mechanistic'. It has avoided the overarching whole view of life that required having to confront the issue of the human condition and instead reduced its focus to only looking down on the details of the mechanisms of our world...'.

He goes on to suggest that 'this strategy, the very dangerous trap inherent in this mechanistic, resigned-to-living-in-denial-of-the-human-condition, fundamental dishonest approach is that it could become so entrenched that those practising it could resist the human-condition-confronting, truthful explanation of the human condition when it was finally found and continue to persevere with the dishonest strategy to the point of taking humanity to terminal alienation and extinction.'

One particular writer Griffith seems particularly wary of is the sociobiologist, Edward O Wilson, whom he quoted, 'There is no grail more elusive or precious in the life of the mind than the key to understanding the human condition'. It is hard, I feel, to know to what extent science should be criticised in itself, but the problem may be where it ends up making people feel that their lives and those of other humans and other lifeforms don't matter and are without value, as insignificant.

It is not a value judgement. — Wayfarer

It only seems that way to those who ignore the fact that numerals signify values. You think that numerals signify some type of Platonic object, called a number, so you have complete disrespect for the fact that numbers are really quantitative values, which are assigned by human beings in practice, rather than some type of eternal object. Such disrespect for reality is rampant in modern philosophy of mathematics.

One thinks not because "counting" is a practice; "judgment", however, consists in participating or not participating in a practice. — 180 Proof

That's nonsense. A "practice" consists of a conglomeration of many activities, and judgements are required at many points along the way throughout any practice. To practice something is to exercise your capacity to make such judgements, it does not remove the need to make the judgements. Suppose you have a pile of apples, and you want to count how many are ripe, leaving the underripe. Each apple must be judged as to whether it qualifies or not. And if you are simply counting, not counting any specific objects, just expressing an order of numerals, you need to make the judgement at each step, as to which numeral comes next.

Perhaps, when one gets really good at some practice, counting from one to ten for example, they simply ignore the fact that they are making these judgements, as the decision making process becomes very rapid and habitual. Then the person might insist that the practice doesn't involve any sort of judgement. This type of ignorance seems to be the prevalent attitude toward mathematics. But ignorance makes poor philosophy. And it is clearly indicated by legal principles that habit does not absolve one from the responsibility of habitual judgements. So your implication that practice is somehow independent from judgement is just ridiculous.

This is exactly the problem with the "mechanistic" reduction refers to. It is a fundamental, basic denial of the reality of the very significant and important role of "free will" in the process of conceptualization. To remove the element of free will from the essence of the concept, portraying the concept as an eternal Platonic object, is a self-deceptive denial of the reality of the "human condition".

But you are talking about subjective value: something that can be open to disagreement. How can there be disagreement about the cardinality of a finite set? — EnPassant

What I am saying is that all opinion is subjective (of the subject). Agreement produces a sort of "intersubjectivity", whereby we say one's opinion is the same as another's. But intersubjectivity is still dependent on subjects, so it cannot support a definition of "objective" (of the object) which extends beyond the existence of subjects.

And if there was disagreement about the cardinality of infinite sets it would not be because of subjective opinion it would be highly technical and concerned with Godel's undecidable cardinals - such as in the continuum hypothesis. — EnPassant

This is an example of a difference in opinion. These issues are related to a difference in opinion concerning the definition of "infinite" which existed when set theory was younger. As time passed, and new hypotheses were proposed, mathematicians obtained a higher degree of consensus. That something is "undecidable" is an opinion.

What I am saying is that all opinion is subjective (of the subject). Agreement produces a sort of "intersubjectivity", whereby we say one's opinion is the same as another's. But intersubjectivity is still dependent on subjects, so it cannot support a definition of "objective" (of the object) which extends beyond the existence of subjects. — Metaphysician Undercover

What then about proofs that are independent of the subject? Proofs in Number Theory that are demonstrably true? For example $\phi(n), \tau(n), d(n) etc$ are indisputable values. They are what they are beyond any subject's opinion of them.

That something is "undecidable" is an opinion.

Godel's theorem demonstrates the reality of undecidables.

the point is that the expression '=' or 'is', strictly speaking is only completely accurate in the case of A=A. In other arithmetical expressions, the "=" sign denotes an exactness which is never the case for empirical objects. Mathematical statements have an exactitude which is never truly characteristic of the sense-able realm. Statements about the empirical world are always approximations, because the objects of empirical analysis always consist of an admixture of being and becoming. The reason that 'the law of identity' is being dismissed as a trivial tautology is because this is not seen. — Wayfarer

The law of identity is being critiqued because of a change in the way certain approaches to philosophy think of ‘being’ thanks to the work of Nietzsche , Wittgenstein and the phenomenologists.
Their claim is that rather than a dualism between being and becoming, becoming is prior to being. Put differently, the idea of being as encapsulated in its most ideal and exact form in A=A is an abstraction derived from a pragmatic act of reflective comparison. Use is prior to , and makes possible all thought of being as self-identity. Empiricism is no longer seen as representation , approximation or adequation but instead as production. Exactitude is measured by relevance rather than by the pure stasis of identity.

“ the ontological presuppositions of historiographical knowledge transcend in principle the idea of rigor of the most exact sciences. Math­ematics is not more exact than historiographical, but only narrower with regard to the scope of the existential foundations relevant to it.”(Being and Time)