Thanks Paine. It always takes me awhile to get to these because they require more effort than the average TPF posts.

I object to Rorty's claim of what comprises philosophy because it fails as a Logos, not because it fails a litmus test from applying a set of definitions. — Paine

Okay.

My objection is more of a question; What is the benefit of all this taxonomy? — Paine

Isn't philosophy important? If philosophy is important, then on Gerson's thesis, Ur-Platonism is important.

For example your claim was highly Gersonian when you said, "That is a predominantly psychological observation. Where does the philosophy start? Or not?" (). If philosophy is important then it is important to understand what philosophy is, and it is particularly important to be able to ferret out false claims to philosophy. This all seems true to me.

Say, for the purposes of argument, I accepted Gerson's taxonomy. What does his classification have to do with changing future work as he exhorts us to do? He would correctly identify that Rorty is outside the boundary as Gerson has drawn it. Why attach the possibility for philosophy upon one who has just been expelled from it? — Paine

I think this methodology is incredibly sound, and that we utilize it in all sorts of ways, namely elucidating what something is by reference to clear examples of what it is not. We elucidate justice by way of injustices; we elucidate truth by way of falsehood; we elucidate beauty by way of ugliness; we elucidate health by way of sickness. This isn't to say that we should stop there. Of course there should also be positive accounts of the essence of things like justice, truth, etc. Still, I don't really see the critique you are giving.

Further, even if we reject Gerson's account of philosophy I believe we will still need to engage in the same project he is engaged in, and that it is an important project. The alternative seems to be either committing ourselves to the view that philosophy isn't important or else to the view that there is no such thing as philosophy (and therefore nothing which is necessarily not philosophy).

To treat the modern battle as simply a continuance of the first overlooks critical cultural differences. There are champions of the modern and there are detractors. How history is conceived plays a big part in their differences. Take Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, for example. They both refused to shake the pom-poms with team Hegel. But the differences between them obviously extend far beyond what Hegel wrote. All three reference Plato as points of departure. But it is of limited utility to compare them upon that basis alone. All three do think they are doing philosophy. Can the differences be delineated through compliance or divergence from a set of categories? — Paine

The modern and post-modern landscape complicates things, but I don't think it invalidates Gerson's thesis. Gerson is drawing up the boundaries of the playing field of philosophy, and you keep pointing to philosophical bouts. Gerson has no problem with philosophical bouts. The question is whether they are within the boundaries.

I am wondering if a cultural anti-authoritarianism is impeding Gerson's thesis. This anti-authoritarianism says, "Who are you to say what counts as philosophy!?" I don't see this as a substantial critique. Again, the deeper matter for me is the alternative between either committing ourselves to the view that philosophy isn't important or else to the view that there is no such thing as philosophy. It's not hard to read Gerson's thesis as a proposal rather than an imposition, or as an invitation to think through a necessary problem rather than an overbearing authoritarianism.

Dissatisfaction with the modern is expressed by some as the loss of a previously preserved virtue, others by a loss of a means of production, others by a loss of the means to experience life available to ancestors. That is not an exhaustive list of all possibilities, just some pieces that show how various are the attempts to connect those perspectives with our present and future lives. — Paine

Gerson sees all sorts of modern thinkers as Platonists, and I think that's right. I don't know that what is at stake is a confrontation between the pre-modern and the modern.

With that said, where does accepting Gerson's criteria play a part? How does it figure in the struggle for future pedagogy in our lives comparable to the struggle in Plato's time? — Paine

I think we struggle against sophistry in much the same way that Plato struggled against sophistry. For example, the disputes surrounding the DEI programs in the schools and colleges is one way that our pedagogical battles continue on, and Gerson's thesis would surely have a stake in those sorts of questions.

- Okay, I finally caught up in this thread. I think you are talking past me a bit. This is how I see it:

• Leontiskos: You said, "I agree with Gerson that Rorty is too general and reductive in how the practice is conceived" (link). How you would go about opposing this Rorty-esque approach to philosophy?
• Paine: Gerson incorrectly lumps Rorty and Rosenberg together.

I'm not sure what you wrote in your post addresses my question. If you agree with Gerson that Rorty is too general and reductive, then what sort of corrective would you provide to Rorty?

[Gerson] then says:

"What I aim to show is that Rorty (and probably Rosenberg) are right in identifying Platonism with philosophy and that, therefore, the rejection of the one necessarily means the rejection of the other."

In presenting this statement, there is more than a little sleight of hand in play with Gerson joining Rorty and Rosenberg together as fellow "anti-Platonists": — Paine

Has Gerson said that Rorty and Rosenberg are fellow anti-Platonists, or has he merely said that they are right in identifying Platonism with philosophy? It seems to me that he has said the latter, and it does not follow that both are anti-Platonists (or that both are anti-Platonists in the same sense).

[Rorty and Rosenberg are different] — Paine

I agree that they are different, and I don't see that Gerson has claimed they are not. Still, I am curious what corrective you would offer to "this Rorty-esque approach to philosophy" ().

That is a very sharp either/or. I don't know what that does not exclude from the pursuit of natural causes. — Paine

I think it will not exclude a pursuit of natural causes in line with Gerson's five points of Ur-Platonism.

2) Whether you think Gerson's "Platonists" were opposing the same sort of thing in their own day? — Leontiskos

This is where I think Gerson should not quit his day job before becoming a philosopher of history. He establishes himself in that role but not in a way that can be compared with other attempts. That is why I had to agree with your observation about the futility of comparing Ur-Platonism with Heidegger. — Paine

So I take it you don't think Gerson's "Platonists" were opposing the same sort of naturalism in their own day?

The zero-sum game presented here seems pretty objective for someone who eschews absolutes and representations of the real. I recognize that there are different ways of looking at our shared experience. To link them as categorical antagonists, however, has history revealing a psychological truth. But revealing truth is one of the activities Rorty militates against. If the claim is a serious one, he has to abandon his aversion to verification. Sometimes, it seems like he demands admission to a club he denies exists.

If one frees the two perspectives from Rorty's fight to the death, they become more like Nagel's objection to "the view from nowhere", a narrative Wayfinder regards highly. Rorty shares the critical view of science in some places but has complained that Nagel is too mystical in others. So, 'materialist' by comparison but not on the basis of claiming what nature is. He resists saying what that is. As I review different examples of his work, it is confusing to sort out what he objects to from an alternative to such. It is not my cup of tea.

As an American I hear his anti-war view that ideas should not force one to fight. I don't know if he talks about Thoreau but that is the register I hear the objection. A democracy of no. But that is its own discussion, or if is not, that becomes a new thesis. I fear the infinite regress. — Paine

Okay, these are good points and I agree.

For the purposes of this discussion, I have learned enough to say that Rorty is not one of those who are 'materialist' according to the criteria in Ur-Platonism. Rorty's demand that humans are the measure makes that impossible. I take your point that Gerson is not joining Rorty and Rosenberg at the hip. That allows me to ask what they have to do with each other.

[...]

They require the logic Rorty would expel. It is whatever else that is said that I cannot imagine.

[...]

In my defense, it is not like Gerson explains the sameness. His enemies never change. — Paine

I suppose I am trying to flush out exactly what it is you don't like about Gerson's thesis. I am focusing primarily on his five points of Ur-Platonism. Now someone could surely define nominalism and then divide all of philosophy into nominalist and non-nominalist philosophies. Or they could define nominalism and skepticism and then divide all of philosophy into the four logical categories. It seems that Gerson has defined anti-materialism, anti-mechanism, anti-nominalism, anti-relativism, and anti-skepticism. He calls the conjunction of those five positions pureblood Ur-Platonism (or anti-naturalism). If a philosophy contains only 4/5 then it would be a slightly watered down version of Ur-Platonism, etc. If it contains 0/5 then it is pureblood Naturalism. Ur-Platonism and Naturalism are therefore conceived as two poles sitting opposite one another.

What is objectionable about this? Is the objection that Ur-Platonism doesn't correctly map to Platonism, or to traditional philosophy? Is it that any theory which places Plotinus and Aristotle into the same group must be a false theory, because they are so different? Is it that because Rorty and Rosenberg have both similarities and differences, the theory must somehow fail?

Regarding Rorty:

Anti-materialism is the view that it is false that the only things that exist are bodies and
their properties.

Anti-relativism is the denial of the claim that Plato attributes to Protagoras that ‘man is
the measure of all things, of what is that it is and of what is not that it is not’.

Anti-scepticism is the view that knowledge is possible. Knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) refers to
a mode of cognition wherein the real is in some way ‘present’ to the cognizer. — Gerson, Platonism versus Naturalism

You say:

For the purposes of this discussion, I have learned enough to say that Rorty is not one of those who are 'materialist' according to the criteria in Ur-Platonism. Rorty's demand that humans are the measure makes that impossible.

[...]

But revealing truth is one of the activities Rorty militates against. If the claim is a serious one, he has to abandon his aversion to verification. — Paine

This leads me to believe that, for Gerson, Rorty is not a materialist but he is at least a relativist and a skeptic. He is a relativist on account of his demand that "humans are the measure," and he is a skeptic on account of his aversion to verification and revealing truth.

Regarding the relation between Rorty and Rosenberg, and Platonism and Naturalism, Gerson has this to say:

Rosenberg is in broad agreement with Rorty about what anti-Platonism is, although it may be the case that Rosenberg would disagree with Rorty about the pre-eminence of the natural sciences. But the disagreements among naturalists or anti-Platonists are not my main topic; nor, for that matter, are the disagreements among Platonists. What I aim to show is that Rorty (and probably Rosenberg) are right in identifying Platonism with philosophy and that, therefore, the rejection of the one necessarily means the rejection of the other. But I also propose to argue for an even bolder thesis that this one. . . — Gerson, Platonism versus Naturalism, p. 3

It seems like Gerson is not falling into the traps you suppose. He is not saying, for example, that Rorty and Rosenberg are entirely alike. Perhaps you are opposed to his "bolder thesis," and in particular the claim that, "I would like to show that what I am calling the elements of Platonism—to which I shall turn in a moment—are interconnected such that it is not possible to embrace one or another of these without embracing them all"?

If Gerson is absorbing all of Platonism into his understanding of Plotinus, he does not need the Ur-Platonism for his own purposes. — Paine

Again, maybe he has two (or more) purposes: explicating Plotinus and defending philosophy.

It is no help in distinguishing the difference between Klein and Burnyeat. — Paine

Gerson is very clear that his thesis is not supposed to do such a thing. You seem to be faulting Gerson for failing to do something he says he is not trying to do.

That is more important to me than rooting out miscreants from my City. — Paine

You seem to fall into a strawman on this point again and again, and your caricature here is more evidence of that. If you are unwilling to consider the value of defending philosophy then of course you will not be able to truly assess Gerson's project. And as I said, Plato himself was not above defending philosophy.

Let us agree to disagree. Have the last word if you wish. — Paine

I will just reiterate the central unanswered questions I have already asked you. Have another word if you wish:

But is a proposal to close already an error on your view? I think that both Plato and Gerson seek to bring about a recognition of what is beyond the pale and what is not vis-a-vis philosophy, and I think the only legitimate objections to either of them will be objections to where they draw a line, and not that they draw a line. — Leontiskos

For example your claim was highly Gersonian when you said, "That is a predominantly psychological observation. Where does the philosophy start? Or not?" (↪Paine). If philosophy is important then it is important to understand what philosophy is, and it is particularly important to be able to ferret out false claims to philosophy. This all seems true to me.

...

I think this methodology is incredibly sound, and that we utilize it in all sorts of ways, namely elucidating what something is by reference to clear examples of what it is not. We elucidate justice by way of injustices; we elucidate truth by way of falsehood; we elucidate beauty by way of ugliness; we elucidate health by way of sickness. This isn't to say that we should stop there. Of course there should also be positive accounts of the essence of things like justice, truth, etc. Still, I don't really see the critique you are giving.

Further, even if we reject Gerson's account of philosophy I believe we will still need to engage in the same project he is engaged in, and that it is an important project. The alternative seems to be either committing ourselves to the view that philosophy isn't important or else to the view that there is no such thing as philosophy (and therefore nothing which is necessarily not philosophy).

...

The modern and post-modern landscape complicates things, but I don't think it invalidates Gerson's thesis. Gerson is drawing up the boundaries of the playing field of philosophy, and you keep pointing to philosophical bouts. Gerson has no problem with philosophical bouts. The question is whether they are within the boundaries.

I am wondering if a cultural anti-authoritarianism is impeding Gerson's thesis. This anti-authoritarianism says, "Who are you to say what counts as philosophy!?" I don't see this as a substantial critique. Again, the deeper matter for me is the alternative between either committing ourselves to the view that philosophy isn't important or else to the view that there is no such thing as philosophy. It's not hard to read Gerson's thesis as a proposal rather than an imposition, or as an invitation to think through a necessary problem rather than an overbearing authoritarianism.

...

I think we struggle against sophistry in much the same way that Plato struggled against sophistry. — Leontiskos

- Well Heidegger is tricky, but for starters I would want to say that both Gerson and Heidegger could offer a true lens, even if those two lenses are mutually exclusive. So for example, Heidegger could acknowledge that Gerson has made a real distinction with his Ur-Platonism. Whether he can go on to "share that same view of the world," depends on what it means to take a view of the world. I think Heidegger would say that Gerson's distinction, even if true, is not very important or relevant. Presumably Gerson thinks his lens is better than Heidegger's, and Heidegger would think his lens is better than Gerson's.

So then I think the question is: How do you call into question the aptness of a lens, short of denying it altogether? This is where I wonder if you are barking up the wrong tree, because the comprehensiveness of Gerson's lens makes it hard for those who agree with him to see a contrasting picture. So long as you are "short of denying it altogether," I don't think this is Gerson's fault. It might be the fault of the person who understands Gerson but does not really understand Heidegger. For that person Gerson wins by default, but also because he has managed to capture the person's interest and motivations in a way that Heidegger has not. Thus you have a legitimately difficult task in disrupting Gerson's thesis, but the way you are going about it with Plotinus and Aristotle seems reasonable to me.

Lloyd Gerson’s Aristotle and Other Platonists is a thought-provoking work that challenges long-held assumptions about the relationship between Aristotle and Plato. Gerson in my opinion makes a compelling case that Aristotle, far from being an anti-Platonist as traditionally portrayed, should be seen as a kind of Platonist himself. Gerson begins by addressing the historical context in which Aristotle’s works were written, emphasizing the fluid intellectual environment of ancient Greece. He argues that the sharp division often drawn between Plato and Aristotle is a modern construct rather than a reflection of their true philosophical positions. Gerson asserts that Aristotle’s philosophy can be better understood as a continuation and development of Platonic themes rather than a complete departure from them.

One of the key strengths of Gerson’s work is his detailed comparative analysis of the core doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. He examines their views on metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, highlighting numerous points of convergence. For example, Gerson explores how Aristotle’s concept of the unmoved mover can be seen as an adaptation of Plato’s theory of the Forms, rather than a rejection of it. Similarly, he discusses how Aristotle’s ethical theory retains a teleological framework that is deeply rooted in Platonic thought. Therefore, I like to think that only a true Platonist can grasp the work of Aristotle and a true Aristotelian is interested in the "mysticism" of Platonism. The overall text in my eyes makes the argument that Plato and Aristotle are supposed to compliment each other rather than contradict. Gerson also tackles the interpretative challenges posed by Aristotle’s critiques of Plato, suggesting that these criticisms are often more nuanced than they appear. He posits that Aristotle’s objections are directed at specific aspects of Plato’s formulations rather than at the underlying principles. This approach allows Gerson to present a more integrated view of ancient philosophy, where the lines between different schools of thought are more blurred and interconnected. Gerson’s reinterpretation of the relationship between Aristotle and Plato invites readers to reconsider the foundations of Western philosophical tradition. His book is not only a valuable resource for scholars but also for anyone interested in the enduring dialogue between these two towering figures of ancient thought.

That fairly points to the limits of my thought experiment. — Paine

Okay, so from the "Aristotle's Metaphysics" thread:

Before going into the details of what Aristotle said or did not say, I would like to think about Rorty as the poster child for what Gerson militates against. Rorty is baldly "historicist" in his description of the 'end of philosophy'. I agree with Gerson that Rorty is too general and reductive in how the practice is conceived. But is Rorty the best exemplar of what Gerson opposes? I have been questioning the unity imparted by Gerson upon classical texts in previous discussions. The assumed unity of what is being opposed by Gerson needs some consideration. — Paine

From this I am led to believe that you agree with Gerson's larger project, but disagree regarding his specific means. So I am wondering 1) How you would go about opposing this Rorty-esque approach to philosophy, and 2) Whether you think Gerson's "Platonists" were opposing the same sort of thing in their own day?

Since we are all talking about other people at the moment, I want to talk about ways past discussions intersect with this one for me. I first became aware of Gerson because Apollodorus and Wayfarer appealed to him for support of their theological views of Plato. I then found out that this appeal to Gerson has been going on for years before my start.

My education included reading Plotinus. There were many arguments about where he differed from the Platonic beginnings, but no disagreement emerged concerning whether Plotinus was using the myths of the past as parts of his system of "realities". The language of approximation and stories, so vivid in the Timaeus, is now the way things are. There are limits to the realm of the "discursive." One had best get with the program.

The next book we read was City of God. That certainly tempers my understanding of Plotinus, for better and worse, depending upon different points of view.

Having been introduced to Ur-Platonism on this forum, I started reading Gerson's scholarly papers. That is when I started objecting to his interpretations of texts, for example, here and here as well as the example given upthread. As it concerns this thread, the clear preference for Plotinus shown in those commentaries is not represented as such in the Ur-Platonist stuff. This gives a bit of three card monte flavor to the scene. Is there a bait and switch play between the two enterprises?

I am glad to have had to discuss Schleiermacher's resistance to Systems because I am willing to acknowledge that is the lineage I come from. The most important element is the individual participating in the dialogue being witnessed. That theme is also echoed in the Dialogues in many ways that are not shy and retiring. So, I freely admit to an aversion to Gerson's efforts to assemble a system to fight modern foes on the basis of that point of view.

To sum up, I have two lines of resistance to Gerson that are separate in origin and form. Because of that condition, I want to address:

Burnyeat's criticism of Strauss in many ways parallels your own criticism of Gerson. — Leontiskos

Burnyeat was claiming he was on to Strauss' magic trick. That is a valid way to characterize persuasion and I don't fault Burnyeat for trying it. He took his chance with it. I don't know what Gerson's trick is. But he proposes to close what I think should not be.

Having been introduced to Ur-Platonism on this forum, I started reading Gerson's scholarly papers. That is when I started objecting to his interpretations of texts, for example, here and here as well as the example given upthread. As it concerns this thread, the clear preference for Plotinus shown in those commentaries is not represented as such in the Ur-Platonist stuff. This gives a bit of three card monte flavor to the scene. Is there a bait and switch play between the two enterprises? — Paine

I would simply wonder if Gerson is doing two different things simultaneously.

I am glad to have had to discuss Schleiermacher's resistance to Systems because I am willing to acknowledge that is the lineage I come from. The most important element is the individual participating in the dialogue being witnessed. That theme is also echoed in the Dialogues in many ways that are not shy and retiring. So, I freely admit to an aversion to Gerson's efforts to assemble a system to fight modern foes on the basis of that point of view. — Paine

In a similar way, I wonder if Plato could be doing two different things at once. Plato is obviously crucially interested in individual participation, but he seems to also be interested in repelling sophistry. The dialogues themselves don't seem to present all players as being situated within the same boundaries on the field of philosophy. While granting that Gerson's anti-sophistry—in his case anti-naturalism—is a great deal more clumsy, I would still affirm a similarity between the two.

For Plato I don't see the two things as wholly separate. Anyone who loves something will also fight to protect it, and the philosophy that Plato loves—including the individual participation—requires certain nurturing conditions in order to thrive. It is a temptation for any thinker to blur the line between what is legitimate and what is their own doctrine, and obviously Gerson blurs this more than Plato, but I would recognize the same broad dynamic operating in Plato and I would again affirm this dynamic as laudable.

Burnyeat was claiming he was on to Strauss' magic trick. That is a valid way to characterize persuasion and I don't fault Burnyeat for trying it. He took his chance with it. I don't know what Gerson's trick is. But he proposes to close what I think should not be. — Paine

But is a proposal to close already an error on your view? I think that both Plato and Gerson seek to bring about a recognition of what is beyond the pale and what is not vis-a-vis philosophy, and I think the only legitimate objections to either of them will be objections to where they draw a line, and not that they draw a line.

As I understand it from my research, Aristotle and Other Platonists is part of a series of books in which Gerson presents his thesis about the continuities between Plato and Aristotle, the others being From Plato to Platonism (published prior to the above) and Platonism and Naturalism: The Possiblity of Philosophy (published later). The final book in the sequence is in some ways a culmination of the series, and argues for the claim that Platonism *is* philosophy proper, and that it is in broad terms incompatible with naturalism.

(Gerson's books are addressed mainly to an academic audience, as they must be in a contested field such as this. There are details of disputes over interpretations going back centuries, often taking up pages of footnotes. I wish there were an edition for the general reader, as I can sense the outlines of Gerson's arguments, but the way they're written makes them very difficult for the non-specialist.)

Edward Feser has a useful blog entry on Gerson. He summarises the key themes like this:

In From Plato to Platonism, Gerson suggests that the common core of “Ur-Platonism” can be characterized in negative terms, as a conjunction of five “antis”: anti-materialism, anti-mechanism, anti-nominalism, anti-relativism, and anti-skepticism. Together these elements make up a sixth “anti-,” namely anti-naturalism. Thinkers in the Ur-Platonist tradition spell out the implications of this conjunction of “antis” in ways that differ in several details, but certain common themes tend to emerge, such as the thesis that ultimate explanation requires positing a non-composite divine cause, the immateriality of the intellect, and the objectivity of morality. ...

In Aristotle and Other Platonists, Gerson proposed a positive characterization of the tradition, as comprising seven key themes: 1. The universe has a systematic unity; 2. This unity reflects an explanatory hierarchy and in particular a “top-down” approach to explanation (as opposed to the “bottom-up” approach of naturalism), especially in the two key respects that the simple is prior to the complex and the intelligible is prior to the sensible; 3. The divine constitutes an irreducible explanatory category, and is to be conceived of in personal terms (even if in some Ur-Platonist thinkers the personal aspect is highly attenuated); 4. The psychological also constitutes an irreducible explanatory category; 5. Persons are part of the hierarchy and their happiness consists in recovering a lost position within it, in a way that can be described as “becoming like God”; 6. Moral and aesthetic value is to be analyzed by reference to this metaphysical hierarchy; and 7. The epistemological order is contained with this metaphysical order. — Join the Ur-Platonist Alliance!

That resonates with me, as it mirrors the kind of philosophical spirituality that I've always pursued. Making the case in detail with reference to Plato's dialogues and other texts is hard labour, though.

How you would go about opposing this Rorty-esque approach to philosophy, — Leontiskos

Gerson starts with:

Rorty advanced the astonishing thesis that Platonism and philosophy are identical.

And then says:

What I aim to show is that Rorty (and probably Rosenberg) are right in identifying Platonism with philosophy and that, therefore, the rejection of the one necessarily means the rejection of the other.

In presenting this statement, there is more than a little sleight of hand in play with Gerson joining Rorty and Rosenberg together as fellow "anti-Platonists":

Rosenberg is the one who locates "naturalism" as the product of scientific activity:

I think naturalism is right, but I also think science forces upon us a very disillusioned “take” on reality. It forces us to say ‘No’ in response to many questions to which most everyone hopes the answers are ‘Yes.’ These are the questions about purpose in nature, the meaning of life, the grounds of morality, the significance of consciousness, the character of thought, the freedom of the will, the limits of human self-understanding, and the trajectory of human history.

This could be Wittgenstein saying: "We feel that even when all possible scientific questions have been answered, the problems of life remain completely untouched." Tractatus 6.52

But Rorty is not talking about that boundary when he condemns all of philosophy to be Platonism. He was a self-identified pragamatist. As such, he said things like:

In what follows, I shall be arguing that it helps understand the pragmatists to think of them as saying that the distinction between the past and the future can substitute for all the old philosophical distinctions — the ones which Derrideans call ‘the binary oppositions of Western metaphysics’. The most important of these oppositions is that between reality and appearance. Others include the distinctions between the unconditioned and the conditioned, the absolute and the relative, and the properly moral as opposed to the merely prudent. (Philosophy and Social Hope)

Rorty said contradictory things that Nick Gall does a good job of drawing out the problems of such declarations.

In any case, the project described as being: "the distinction between the past and the future can substitute for all the old philosophical distinctions" is clearly not equivalent to what concerns Rosenberg. Rorty is radically historist. Rosenberg offers no opinion about that sort of thing in the provided quote. "Plato", as a set of ideas, does not concern either in the least.

Gerson's synthesis of these different views is his philosophy of history, his theory of how we got to where we are now:

This is the thesis that most of the history of philosophy, especially since the 17th century can be characterized as failed attempts by various Platonists to seek some rapprochement with naturalism and, mostly in the latter half of the 20th century and also now, similarly failed attempts by naturalists to incorporate into their worldviews some element or another of Platonism. I would like to show that what I am calling the elements of Platonism—to which I shall turn in a moment—are interconnected such that it is not possible to embrace one or another of these without embracing them all. In other words, Platonism (or philosophy) and naturalism are contradictory positions.

That is a very sharp either/or. I don't know what that does not exclude from the pursuit of natural causes.

Whether you think Gerson's "Platonists" were opposing the same sort of thing in their own day? — Leontiskos

This is where I think Gerson should not quit his day job before becoming a philosopher of history. He establishes himself in that role but not in a way that can be compared with other attempts. That is why I had to agree with your observation about the futility of comparing Ur-Platonism with Heidegger.

It is low hanging fruit to point at the difference between results of an active scientific practice with questions over whether it would anger the gods to ask too many questions.

But I don't want to make a specific claim in that regard. As expressed elsewhere, I wonder about how a history of philosophy relates to an account of what is, without qualification, as Aristotle might say.

your view of what happened from then and now is more reliant upon recent scholarship than those who see no reason to question previous descriptions. — Paine

I've been upfront about my motivation and background, which is that I came to philosophy from a counter-cultural perspective, the quest for philosophical or spiritual illumination. My view is that some form of Platonism (specifically, realism about universals) is the real mainstream of Western philosophy, but that the tradition has been hijacked or subsumed by philosophical materialism. Hence my response when I saw the abstract of Gerson's Platonism and Naturalism (which I'm still only half-way finished):

Gerson contends that Platonism identifies philosophy with a distinct subject matter, namely, the intelligible world and seeks to show that the Naturalist rejection of Platonism entails the elimination of a distinct subject matter for philosophy. Thus, the possibility of philosophy depends on the truth of Platonism. From Aristotle to Plotinus to Proclus, Gerson clearly links the construction of the Platonic system well beyond simply Plato's dialogues, providing strong evidence of the vast impact of Platonism on philosophy throughout history. Platonism and Naturalism concludes that attempts to seek a rapprochement between Platonism and Naturalism are unstable and likely indefensible.

Consequently, I'm with 'the friends of the forms', whereas I think the predominant voice in modern philosophy is that of the 'earth-born ancestors'. As a result, much of what is taught in philosophy departments is in conflict with classical philosophy per se. (Which is why I said that Gerson is a 'dissident voice' in respect of many of his academic peers.)

Here's Gerson presenting the core of the ideas in that book, for those interested.

I'm not sure what you wrote in your post addresses my question. If you agree with Gerson that Rorty is too general and reductive, then what sort of corrective would you provide to Rorty? — Leontiskos

When Rorty says "the distinction between the past and the future can substitute for all the old philosophical distinctions", he is going to have to tell a story about it. One story he tells is:

Insofar as a person is seeking solidarity, she does not ask about the relation between the practices of the chosen community and something outside community. Insofar as she seeks objectivity, she distances herself from the actual persons around her not by thinking of herself as a member of some other real or imaginary group, but rather by attaching herself to something which can be described without reference to any particular human beings. — Rorty, Solidarity or Objectivity?

The zero-sum game presented here seems pretty objective for someone who eschews absolutes and representations of the real. I recognize that there are different ways of looking at our shared experience. To link them as categorical antagonists, however, has history revealing a psychological truth. But revealing truth is one of the activities Rorty militates against. If the claim is a serious one, he has to abandon his aversion to verification. Sometimes, it seems like he demands admission to a club he denies exists.

If one frees the two perspectives from Rorty's fight to the death, they become more like Nagel's objection to "the view from nowhere", a narrative Wayfinder regards highly. Rorty shares the critical view of science in some places but has complained that Nagel is too mystical in others. So, 'materialist' by comparison but not on the basis of claiming what nature is. He resists saying what that is. As I review different examples of his work, it is confusing to sort out what he objects to from an alternative to such. It is not my cup of tea.

As an American I hear his anti-war view that ideas should not force one to fight. I don't know if he talks about Thoreau but that is the register I hear the objection. A democracy of no. But that is its own discussion, or if is not, that becomes a new thesis. I fear the infinite regress.

For the purposes of this discussion, I have learned enough to say that Rorty is not one of those who are 'materialist' according to the criteria in Ur-Platonism. Rorty's demand that humans are the measure makes that impossible. I take your point that Gerson is not joining Rorty and Rosenberg at the hip. That allows me to ask what they have to do with each other.

In that vein, I agree with:

quote="Leontiskos;911088"]I think it will not exclude a pursuit of natural causes in line with Gerson's five points of Ur-Platonism.[/quote]

They require the logic Rorty would expel. It is whatever else that is said that I cannot imagine.

So I take it you don't think Gerson's "Platonists" were opposing the same sort of naturalism in their own day? — Leontiskos

I do not. But I need to think about how to frame the question as its own thing. In my defense, it is not like Gerson explains the sameness. His enemies never change.

first became aware of Gerson because Apollodorus and Wayfarer appealed to him for support of their theological views of Plato — Paine

Thanks for that post, it helps me understand your approach. As I've explained, my background was syncretistic - I studied comparative religion and various strands of perennialism. Platonism has a place in that pantheon, specifically the Christianised Platonism of the mystics - Dean Inge and Evelyn Underhill. That is where I learned about Plotinus, although I never went into him in depth. But I would not describe my approach as 'theological', for the same reason that comparative religion is a very different discipline to 'divinity'. I used to think of the comparative religion department as the 'Department of Mysticism and Heresy'. (I might also add, I learned of both Leo Strauss and Lloyd Gerson from this forum or its predecessor.)

Getting back to Gerson:

If Plato’s philosophy is a version of Platonism, what Platonism is it a version of? And where can we find it? Since Platonism is not limited to Plato’s views as found in his dialogues, nor to other philosophers’ presentation of them (primarily Aristotle’s), nor to later philosophers’ contribution to what is found in Plato’s works, "Platonism", as a term, must be flexible enough to signify the above three aspects severally and collectively. To distinguish this all-inclusive meaning of Platonism from each of the individual renditions above, Gerson hypothetically construes the term Ur-Platonism as a matrix-like collection of all possible meanings of Platonism. In his words, Ur-Platonism “is the general philosophical position that arises from the conjunction of the negations of the philosophical positions explicitly rejected in the dialogues” (p. 9). These positions are anti-materialism, anti-mechanism, anti-nominalism, anti-relativism, and anti-skepticism. — Review of From Plato to Platonism

The predominant strains of naturalism are generally materialistic, mechanist, nominalist, relativist and skeptical. They are always well-represented on TPF.

Another thing that Gerson said in his lecture on Platonism versus Naturalism struck me as profound and important:

Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.

….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too.*

So what? Well, the "objects" of the intellect are immaterial, and as we're able to perceive them, we too possess an immaterial aspect - what used to be called the soul. We're not simply mechanisms or organisms. Of course, all Socrates' arguments for the reality of the soul in Phaedo can be and are called into question by his interlocutors but they ring true to me.

---

* I suspect that what is translated as 'thinking' in the above excerpt is not what we generally understand as 'thinking' as an internal monologue or stream of ideas.

One thing that bothers me about the Ur-Platonism idea, apart from the specific issues being discussed, is that there have been centuries of thinkers who have self-identified with belonging or not belonging to particular groups and here comes this bloke telling you where you belong.

I accept that there is a lot of nuances in how that gets expressed. When Aristotle refers to the 'Platonists', he may be that and something else at the same time.

It is tyrannical to have them all wearing the same neckerchief. — Paine

Sorry, I know I need to respond to your post in the Metaphysics thread, but Gerson is dividing philosophers into two camps. It is legitimate to ask questions about the rationale and rigor of that division, but certainly when Aristotle speaks about "Platonists" and Gerson speaks about "Platonists" they are speaking about two different things. For Aristotle Platonists are one camp among many; for Gerson they are one camp among two. I don't think equivocation is occurring given the way Gerson sets out his thesis.

It does come across that way sometimes.

Leaving all that to the side, the topic here is a particular thesis put forward by Gerson. How can that view be challenged by a different view? Are there other ways of viewing the question that differ from Gerson's suppositions?

What makes asking that question very difficult in the present situation is that Gerson is a highly respected participant in a difficult area of study. His decision to make his claim is different from the years of his life as a scholar. Or if they are not different, that is not a component of the theory.

It makes challenging the theory difficult because the problems of interpretation get mixed with theories of history. So, for example, when I question Gerson's reading of a text, that is not equivalent to challenging his view of history.

This leads me to believe that, for Gerson, Rorty is not a materialist but he is at least a relativist and a skeptic. He is a relativist on account of his demand that "humans are the measure," and he is a skeptic on account of his aversion to verification and revealing truth. — Leontiskos

It should be noted that Rorty made efforts to differentiate his idea from those charges. That demonstrates a general acceptance of the negativity of those qualities as generally understood. That separation may not really work but it is different from being a champion for those qualities. I object to Rorty's claim of what comprises philosophy because it fails as a Logos, not because it fails a litmus test from applying a set of definitions. A mid-wife tested if the creature would live and did not give any words of encouragement or hope for a future.

What is objectionable about this? Is the objection that Ur-Platonism doesn't correctly map to Platonism, or to traditional philosophy? Is it that any theory which places Plotinus and Aristotle into the same group must be a false theory, because they are so different? Is it that because Rorty and Rosenberg have both similarities and differences, the theory must somehow fail? — Leontiskos

My objection is more of a question; What is the benefit of all this taxonomy?

I don't see the value of "Platonists" as a recognizable kind except when it serves as a place holder in the context of specific comparisons. When Aristotle uses the term so prominently throughout his work, it does not change the fact he is deeply engaged with Plato's writing and developing those ideas into his own expression. For one example, compare the language of the latter part of the Sophist with De Anima.

There are many places where Aristotle explains what Plato meant without identifying himself as against it. We on the sidelines can ponder if such statements are the last word on the matter. A recent example of that is the discussion of Timaeus in the Metaphysics thread. That is a drop in the ocean of academic work devoted to drawing such distinctions between the two.

Many centuries later, Plotinus arrives in a land crisscrossed with the paths of self-identified Stoics, Academicians, Cynics, Peripatetics, etcetera. There is also an infusion of "Syncretic" thinkers who shop a la carte from others. In this rowdy crowd, Plotinus sought to create his own Ur- Platonism. The Gnostics are to be expelled from the empire and the citizens who remain will work within a shared view of what "Platonists" means when challenging each other's opinions. This imposition of order is how Augustine responded to Plotinus as what led him to turn away from Manicheism. The structure of Heaven was built with this architecture.

There are components of that order that reveal influences from sources before Plato and those he militated against. There is a deep pool of scholarship in that aspect of Plotinus that I have only treaded water in. My mind is tiny.

In the arena of Plotinus building from Plato and Aristotle or diverging from them, there is an asymmetry upon display. Plotinus does not acknowledge himself as anything more than an explainer of Plato's meaning. Aristotle accepts responsibility for both the convergence and the divergence. When we on the sidelines wish to see a difference between Plotinus's and Plato's text, a tendency to argue upon the basis of authority has to be wrestled with. That is what I dislike about Gerson, too. It is a quality I dislike quite independently with whether I agree or disagree with either writer in specific cases (which I have done).

I hope that touches on the mapping and inclusion questions. I am confused how the similarity or differences between Rorty and Rosenberg are components of a thesis that could be defended or challenged. I only can discern a motley beast.

Say, for the purposes of argument, I accepted Gerson's taxonomy. What does his classification have to do with changing future work as he exhorts us to do? He would correctly identify that Rorty is outside the boundary as Gerson has drawn it. Why attach the possibility for philosophy upon one who has just been expelled from it? The limitation is self-imposed. The "naturalists" whoever they may be, won't notice a change in the rules. For those devoted to reading the original texts, it presumes too much of what is still worth proving.

I would simply wonder if Gerson is doing two different things simultaneously. — Leontiskos

If Gerson is absorbing all of Platonism into his understanding of Plotinus, he does not need the Ur-Platonism for his own purposes. The 'via negativa' is for persuading others that the only philosophy is his understanding of Plato and that anything that differs from it is not philosophy. That excludes a lot of philosophy.

I know that you don't find any of my objections to be persuasive. I don't find your counter arguments for Gerson's position to be compelling or benefit me in the comparison of different views. It is no help in distinguishing the difference between Klein and Burnyeat. That is more important to me than rooting out miscreants from my City. I gave Gerson a college try over several years. I am done.

Let us agree to disagree. Have the last word if you wish.

being disembodied means you are dead. — Paine

However, the Gerson paper you linked to 'The Unity of Intellect in Aristotle' (and thank you for it) says right at the beginning 'This (i.e. 'agent') intellect is, in Aristotle's view, all the things he repeatedly says it is, including immortal.' (However, I will continue with that paper.)

I understand the passage as demonstrating the vast difference between Plato and Plotinus when they speak of the philosopher's return to the cave. — Paine

Here is that passage again:

For instance, he will not make self-control consist in that former observance of measure and limit, but will altogether separate himself, as far as possible, from his lower nature and will not live the life of the good man which civic virtue requires. He will leave that behind, and choose another, the life of the gods: for it is to them, not to good men, that we are to be made like. — Ennead 1.2. 30, translated by Armstrong

Doesn't this plainly disparage the notion of 'civic virtue' and 'living the life of the good man' in favour of 'leaving that behind' and 'choosing another' - the 'life of the Gods' - and that we are to strive to be 'like them' and not simply 'good citizens'? The meaning seems very clear to me, without any external references. As mentioned, there are direct parallels to other schools of renunciate spirituality that characterised the ancient world, Eastern and Western.

And are there 'vast differences' between Plotinus and Plato? I readily grant at every juncture that your knowledge of the texts greatly exceeds my own, but I had thought it well-established that Plotinus saw himself as no more than a faithful exegete of Plato.

I don't see the value of the broad generalities offered by Gerson, Perl, Fraser, and the like. — Paine

I agree that we're talking past one another. That's why I've tried to explain my perspective on the topic. I'm not reading it as a classicist, comparing and contrasting various interpretations of ancient philosophy in which you're plainly better versed than am I (and I am learning a lot from it!) But I see Perl, Gerson, and Feser, as being concerned with retrieving what was and remains vital about classical philosophy as a living truth, not as museum pieces to be compared and contrasted. Many here among us will simply take it for granted that we're physical beings, no different in essence to other species, although considerably more dangerous due to our numbers and technology. But what if the truth were that we are 'immortal souls housed in corporeal bodies'?

Like Macbeth, Western man made an evil decision, which has become the efficient and final cause of other evil decisions. Have we forgotten our encounter with the witches on the heath? It occurred in the late fourteenth century, and what the witches said to the protagonist of this drama was that man could realize himself more fully if he would only abandon his belief in the existence of transcendentals. The powers of darkness were working subtly, as always, and they couched this proposition in the seemingly innocent form of an attack upon universals. The defeat of logical realism in the great medieval debate was the crucial event in the history of Western culture; from this flowed those acts which issue now in modern decadence. — Richard Weaver, Ideas have Consequences, Pp2-3

I sense I have worn out my welcome. — Paine

Not at all. The fact that we keep coming back to contesting Gerson's interpretations indicates that this thread has stayed on-topic.

Are you saying that Gerson's interpretation of Plato is through his reading of Plotinus? That seems right to me. — Fooloso4

One thing that is verifiable is that Gerson's criticism of Aristotle is a repetition of Plotinus, almost verbatim:

In calling it an Unmoved Mover and characterizing it as ‘thinking about thinking’, he failed to see that thinking is essentially intentional and that for this reason alone his first principle could not escape the complexity found in thinking plus an object of thinking. In other words, the absolute simplicity of the first principle of all precluded thinking from being that principle. In addition, Aristotle erred in his hypothesis that the primary referent of ‘being’ is ousia. The main reason for this is that ousia or essence or ‘whatness’ is distinct from the existence of that essence, in which case complexity is once again introduced. So, Aristotle was in fact a dissident Platonist, but a Platonist after all. — Platonism Versus Naturalism, Lloyd P Gerson

If we look at the dramatic chronology of the dialogues Plato places Parmenides criticism of the Forms at an early stage of Socrates own philosophical education. This raises doubts as to whether Socrates own criticism of Forms should be explained away as the result of Plato having changed his mind in a later stage of his development. — Fooloso4

In view of that chronology, Plato seems to hold those cards close to his chest. Socrates is heard joining the criticism of Heraclitus but does not explain why he won't criticize Parmenides except to say he was wise.

When I look under the hood of Gerson's writing, he adopts the perspective of Plotinus in an uncritical fashion. In that regard, he is too inclusive and sees everything through the goggles of Plotinus. That is what I have been trying to address in the Metaphysics thread.

Take, for example, Gerson's essay on the agent intellect. The following statement appears in the conclusion:

A good deal of the obscurity in this chapter is owing ultimately to the difficulty in identifying the subject of cognitive activities on the basis of the previous hylomorphic account of the human being. Is it the composite that thinks or the soul or the intellect? In my view, the key to resolving this difficulty rests upon the principle that a person is essentially a self-reflexive thinker. When disembodied, that self-reflexivity is expressed in pure imageless thinking. When embodied, that self-reflexivity is variously expressed, for example, when one says, 'I am perspiring', 'I am walking', 'I am aware that I am walking', and 'I am thinking about the health benefits of my walking'. In the first case, one identifies oneself with a body; in the second, with the composite; in the third and fourth, with the soul. The identification consists in the awareness of oneself as diverse subjects. One could not identify oneself with any of these subjects unless one were essentially self-reflexive, that is, unless one were ideally an intellect — Gerson, The Unity of Intellect in Aristotle's De Anima

This view of being "disembodied" is thinkable within Plotinus' model of the soul. From what I understand Aristotle to say about "particular individuals", being disembodied means you are dead.

In that regard, he is too inclusive and sees everything through the goggles of Plotinus. — Paine

It is no surprise that when seen through the interpretive lens of the Platonist Plotinus Plato and Aristotle are regarded by Gerson as Platonists. Central to Gerson's Platonism is the intelligible world. Perhaps the world is intelligible, but that does not mean it is intelligible to us. Gerson acknowledges this distinction. For example, in a

review of a book on Plato's Timaeus he says, with regard to Timaeus' likely stories:

Likelihood is in principle the best we can aim for in dealing with a likeness, though, if we had direct knowledge of the eternal model, we could no doubt give a better account. As it is, the best we can aim for is “conviction” ( pistis) not “truth” ( aletheia) ...

This likely account is, therefore, a muthos as well as a logos, a muthos for humans. From the divine perspective, however, there would undoubtedly be a genuine logos of creation, because from that perspective the purposes of creation would be transparent.

The philosopher, like the poets and theologians, deals in likely stories. They too are myth makers. They do not bring truth and light to the cave, They too are puppet-makers, makers of images that by the light of the cave cast shadows on its walls.

I will leave it to others who are more familiar with Plotinus and other Platonists to say how closely the philosopher as myth-maker aligns with their teachings.

The list of negatives is drawn up by his reading of Plato. What comprises what is "firmly rejected in the
dialogues either explicitly or implicitly", is a matter of contention, especially the "implicit" part. — Paine

I think Gerson is on the right track, so I probably see it as less controversial than you do.

Relegating differences between thinkers as participants in the proposed larger container of agreement to a secondary concern removes any of the testimony of others to be possible challenges to the existence of said container. — Paine

First I would say that Gerson's thesis does not preclude challenges to this thesis. You yourself tend to offer these challenges. Second, to apply a particular lens to philosophical taxonomy does not prevent us from applying other lenses. I don't see Gerson's lens as exclusive.

The thesis was developed as a response to modern expressions of "anti-Platonism" and modern views of nature. As a philosophy of history, it is claiming that the conditions Plato emerged from are the same as those we live in. This battle between the two Titans seems to take place outside of History, in some kind of eternal now. — Paine

Yes, perhaps.

The thesis certainly does not help illuminate how Plotinus emerged in his time. — Paine

I don't know a lot about Plotinus, but I suspect you are correct.

Presumably Gerson thinks his lens is better than Heidegger's, and Heidegger would think his lens is better than Gerson's. — Leontiskos

My not-very-well-informed understanding is that Heidegger attempted a critique of classical metaphysics, saying that from Plato onwards, Parmenides was misrepresented or misunderstood. That this culminated in the decadent metaphysics of Western culture such that what is required was to go right back to the origin and really 'hear' what Parmenides had to say.

I certainly don't know if Gerson would agree at all with Heidegger's critique although he might have commented on it - he comments on very many philosophers in his books. I'm not aware. I've always been wary of Heidegger partially because of his reputation as being difficult and obscurantist, and also because of his association with Nazism, although there are certainly many things I have read about him that ring true to me.

I now regret mentioning Wittgenstein because his remarks do not change my observation that Gerson is defining "naturalism" by means of Rosenberg saying:

I think naturalism is right, but I also think science forces upon us a very disillusioned “take” on reality. It forces us to say ‘No’ in response to many questions to which most everyone hopes the answers are ‘Yes.’ These are the questions about purpose in nature, the meaning of life, the grounds of morality, the significance of consciousness, the character of thought, the freedom of the will, the limits of human self-understanding, and the trajectory of human history.

That precisely outlines what science cannot provide and certainly cannot be described as "Platonist." But the statement is not "anti-philosophical" because it recognizes we have questions beyond what science tries to answer

Gerson gets this to be considered "anti-Platonist" by yoking it together with Rorty's campaign against Plato as emblematic of all that is wrong with Western metaphysics. The argument is specious. The two do not share a view of nature they have both signed off on. They do lack qualities that Gerson's view of nature require.

By that method, I could combine any two thinkers I disagree with.

I am more familiar with Gerson as a commentator upon ancient writing than his thesis upon Ur-Platonism. He is also often cited by others doing the same work of interpreting texts.

Gerson has often objected to the term 'Neo- Platonism' because it prejudices the perspective of what differs between later scholars and the original expressions. I grant that he makes a good point about classification. But this is why I keep harping about Plotinus as the elephant in the room. In the essay I linked to above, no mention is made of using Plotinus cosmology to comment upon Aristotle's De Anima. He just uses it. In such cases, where will the differences be found from which to make comparisons?

I haven't read enough Gerson to form a clear opinion, but what I have read in the passages quoted in these forums make him look somewhat like a thinker with a predetermined agenda. — Janus

As a question of the future, I don't know what accepting his either/or would look like. We are being asked to stop mixing the two modes. I wonder if he has talked about the replacement somewhere.

Gerson's central focus, as a scholar, has been upon Plotinus and his contemporaries (broadly speaking). — Paine

Are you saying that Gerson's interpretation of Plato is through his reading of Plotinus? That seems right to me.

Beyond the role of the mid-wife taking precedence over that of recollection, Socrates is heard defending Parmenides who also criticizes the Forms (in that named Platonic dialogue). — Paine

If we look at the dramatic chronology of the dialogues Plato places Parmenides criticism of the Forms at an early stage of Socrates own philosophical education. This raises doubts as to whether Socrates own criticism of Forms should be explained away as the result of Plato having changed his mind in a later stage of his development.

In his role as mid-wife he says he is able to help others bring their ideas to birth but is himself barren and without wisdom.

One thing that is verifiable is that Gerson's criticism of Aristotle is a repetition of Plotinus — Paine

In following Plotinus I think Gerson misrepresents both Plato and Aristotle. Plotinus' first principle, the arche of the Whole, is the Good or One. He tries to resolve the problem of the One and the Many in this principled way, but neither Plato or Aristotle do this. For them the problem stands as a limit of human understanding.

Socrates is heard joining the criticism of Heraclitus but does not explain why he won't criticize Parmenides except to say he was wise. — Paine

An interesting observation. Plato's Timaeus begins with a devastating criticism of the Republic. It is radically incomplete. It is a city created by intellect without necessity, that is, a city without chance and contingency. A city that could never be. The fixed intelligible world is unintelligible. Heraclitus rather than Parmenides seems to have the last word.

This is Gerson's thesis in a nutshell:

Here I briefly sketch a hypothetical reconstruction of what I shall call ‘Ur-Platonism’
(UP). This is the general philosophical position that arises from the conjunction of the negations
of the philosophical positions explicitly rejected in the dialogues, that is, the philosophical
positions on offer in the history of philosophy accessible to Plato himself. It is well known that
Plato in the dialogues engages with most of the philosophers who preceded him. Some of these,
like Parmenides and Protagoras, exercise his intellect more than others, including probably some unnamed ones as well as some unknown to us. All of these philosophers, with the exception of Socrates and Pythagoras, are represented as holding views that are firmly rejected in the dialogues either explicitly or implicitly. I am not claiming that anyone, including Plato, simply embraced UP. I am, however, claiming that Platonism in general can be seen to arise out of the matrix of UP, and that Plato’s philosophy is actually one version of Platonism, as odd as this may sound. So, in a manner of speaking, UP is a via negativa to Plato’s philosophy. To be a Platonist is, minimally, to have a commitment to UP. It is only a slight step further to recognize that this basic commitment is virtually always in fact conjoined with a commitment to discover the most consistent integrated positive metaphysical construct on the basis of UP. Disagreements among these same Platonists are, I believe, best explained by the fact that this systematic construct does not decisively determine the correct answer to many specific philosophical problems raised especially by opponents of Platonism. That is, UP is largely underdetermining for some specific philosophical doctrines or answers to specific philosophical questions.

The elements of UP according to my hypothesis are: anti-materialism, anti-mechanism,
anti-nominalism, anti-relativism, and anti-skepticism. — Gerson, Platonism Versus Naturalism

The list of negatives is drawn up by his reading of Plato. What comprises what is "firmly rejected in the
dialogues either explicitly or implicitly", is a matter of contention, especially the "implicit" part.

Relegating differences between thinkers as participants in the proposed larger container of agreement to a secondary concern removes any of the testimony of others to be possible challenges to the existence of said container.

The thesis was developed as a response to modern expressions of "anti-Platonism" and modern views of nature. As a philosophy of history, it is claiming that the conditions Plato emerged from are the same as those we live in. This battle between the two Titans seems to take place outside of History, in some kind of eternal now.

The thesis certainly does not help illuminate how Plotinus emerged in his time.

Far too often, we seem to read the modern rationalist vs empiricist debate back into Plato and Aristotle, which misses their deep connections. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Very true, just as, in an even more extreme way, many of the Wittgenstenians in these parts assume that if you disagree with them you must be following Russell.

Interestingly, he points to Ockham and Scotus as the end of the classical metaphysical tradition and the birth of "subject/object" thinking and "problems of knowledge"... — Count Timothy von Icarus

There is probably a complementarity here between Gerson and Perl given the way Gerson will identify those later themes in earlier thinkers (e.g. materialism in the atomists).