Many Platonists today look to Plato for religious and quasi-religious answers, often of the Christian variety. — Fooloso4

I will acknowledge that I have been much influenced by Christian Platonism, in the context of which Socrates and Plato have been described as ‘Christian before Christ’. But as I’ve also been influenced by Indic philosophical teachings, I’m aware of overtones of non-dualism that can sometimes can be discerned (Thomas McEviilly's book The Shape of Ancient Thought is a rich source of insight into those). But in either case, I don’t see those influences as necessarily in invidious. In fact, I think there's a kind of 'anti-Christian' bias that is often at play - the wish to deny the religious or metaphysical dimension in the dialogues so as to project the kind of Plato that is more harmonious with this secular age. (What did he really mean by 'soul'?)

That said, I too am dubious of injecting phrases such as 'cosmic mind' into the discussion or the interpretation. But on the other hand, as I've already stated, I think that the Greek term 'nous' has to be considered throughout, as it has nuances which are completely foreign to the modern use of 'intellect'.

The terms 'absolute idealism' and 'objective idealism' being polemically opposed to relative or subjective idealism are synonymous, as I understand them. Both terms are definitely applied predominately to Hegel.

I don't deny that Plato's philosophy could, with a bit of judicious massaging, be understood as a form of objective idealism, but I think the term is correctly applied to monistic thinkers who reject any kind of transcendence, or noumenon, which Plato's philosophy (and Kant's, which Hegel was explicitly working against) does not.

I think @Fooloso4 is right to reject the use of what can only be considered anachronistic, unnecessary and unhelpful terminology. Trying to equate Plato's philosophy with neoplatonism would be no different than trying to understand Kant in terms of neokantianism, that is it would be bound to mislead.

Plato's own Greek terms were often varied and indeterminate. Plato deliberately did not employ precise or just consistent meanings throughout his works or even within the same dialogue.

Why? Perhaps his philosophy was a work in progress with many problems and hypothesized solutions still open in his mind. He suggested many alternatives for discussion or debate but certainly not for fixed single-minded interpretation. Although Plato's philosophy can be partially reconstituted for a single dialogue as implied by the setting, events, and characters portrayed. — magritte

I agree. This openness is a reflection of his zetetic skepticism. Knowing that he does not know he inquires. The other half of his openness may at first seem to be its opposite. The dialogues frequently end in aporia.

Where in the dialogue is it? Stephanus number? — Fooloso4

You just posted it.

Where? — Fooloso4

Who is the opponent he is addressing? We talked about this earlier (in regards to why it comes in handy to call Plato's approach idealistic). What is the existing contrast to his approach? You should know this.

See above. As a student of Socrates a case would have to be made that he is conservative. Socrates certainly was not. — Fooloso4

This is a middle work. It's Plato we're hearing here, not Socrates. In what sense was Plato conservative?

None of them speak to your point that the Greeks did not deify Homer. — Fooloso4

Holy crap, man.

Since you asked, quite frankly it indicates that you don't know much about the setting of the work. You're prone to jumping to odd conclusions, and then you refuse to accept facts when they're presented. — frank

I tend to agree with that. Take the example of 85b where, on being asked who Socrates refers to (Apollo or some other master), he replied "I don't know" only to later claim that he "misread" the text and corrected himself after consulting other translations and even that only after I pointed out that his reading is incorrect.

How can you "misread" a text written in plain English?

But he goes even further and baselessly asserts:

But (and with Plato there is always more to it) he goes on to say: "... that I possess prophetic power from my master no less than theirs" Which indicates that it is not Apollo. — Fooloso4

So, he uses his own misreading to infer quite a lot from it. "It is not Apollo" (even when it obviously is Apollo) and, anyways, "with Plato there is always more to it" so let's turn the dialogues into something else, like a "comedy" for example. Plato, after all, was not a philosopher but a playwright.

Plato's criticism of Protagoras must be carefully read in context in order to see what he is and is not rejecting.

The Forms are presented as if they are transcendent truths, but they are hypotheses. — Fooloso4

Yes. Good to clarify.
Plato can be interpreted by those who see only what they want to see.
No wonder the guy is so popular and everlasting...
Arousing passions - heated debates - from those who read him as supporting a particular belief system. Perhaps a central pillar of their life.

Man is the measure does not mean that what any man says is thereby true, but it is, after all, man who measures the arguments made by man. A transcendent standard by which to measure is not available to us. — Fooloso4

Absolutely true...
You know before this, I could take or leave Plato - mostly leave.
Now, I am reading him with less of a jaundiced eye but still somewhat cross-eyed :nerd:

I think dialectic is a strange and elusive thing that can mean different things to different people. Sometimes it may be difficult to agree on a definition of it, let alone on the terms on which it is to be conducted. Participants may or may not play a straight bat, etc.

What ought to be certain, though, is that as a minimum requirement when considering the dialogues two rules should be observed, viz. (1) to keep as close to the original text as possible (and in this case it is possible if there is a will to do so) and not insert things that are not there, and (2) to read Plato within his own framework.

For example, if we say, “Yes, the immortality of the soul has been proved and accepted as fact in the dialogue but we don’t need to accept that,” then we abandon Plato’s work and construct our own. In which case we might as well write a dialogue from scratch and not concern ourselves with Plato.
So, I think it all depends on what the "dialectic" is supposed to achieve. Are we discussing what a dialogue is saying, or what we would like it to say?

Thanks. I will disappear for a while to read the Phaedo...
Do you recommend only reading up to a certain point before discussion, or what ?

True, and explicated in detail in the Republic, Analogy of the Divided Line, more so than the Phaedo. However the general point of nous as 'the faculty which sees what truly is', is certainly relevant across all the dialogues.

Once again, according to the dialogue knowledge of the good can only be attained in death if at all. — Fooloso4

I think the multitude, if they heard what you just said about the philosophers, would say you were quite right, and our people at home would agree entirely with you that philosophers desire death, and they would add that they know very well that the philosophers deserve it.”

“And they would be speaking the truth, Simmias, except in the matter of knowing very well. For they do not know in what way the real philosophers desire death, nor in what way they deserve death, nor what kind of a death it is. — Phaedo 64b

I take this to mean that knowledge that is only ‘attained in death if at all’ is not thereby shoved off into an unknowable never-never, although it might seem like that to us. Bearing in mind the later arguments about the fate of the soul and of philosophers and ‘good men’, I think the argument is being made that the philosopher can discern the Good by power of reason as is argued in 79a-d.

That, it seems to me, would be a good reason to read it again. I find that every time I read the dialogues I find something new and different. Certainly I do not the Phaedo now the same way I did when I first read it. — Fooloso4

I am re-reading it. I've read it many times.

I think this section important - his pleasurable release from painful tight chains.
Death might be seen as a welcome release from the physical body with all its discomforts.
The pain of life v the joy of the afterlife ?*
There is a separation. Not here a mingling as felt by Phaedo. — Amity

That release on the last day of his life is important. The inclusion of Xanthippe gives sharp relief to her charge that one last party is planned with his friends. The friends' concern about the subject of death is mixed up with the realization that they won't have Socrates to animate them any longer.

Pardon the lateness of my reply. I am working in meatspace presently so I will participate in a delayed fashion.

I think this section important - his pleasurable release from painful tight chains.
Death might be seen as a welcome release from the physical body with all its discomforts.
The pain of life v the joy of the afterlife ?*
There is a separation. Not here a mingling as felt by Phaedo.
— Amity

That release on the last day of his life is important. The inclusion of Xanthippe gives sharp relief to her charge that one last party is planned with his friends. The friends' concern about the subject of death is mixed up with the realization that they won't have Socrates to animate them any longer.

Pardon the lateness of my reply. I am working in meatspace presently so I will participate in a delayed fashion. — Valentinus

Your reply is most welcome - indeed any considered replies and comments about the text are - no matter when they arrive on the scene.

The themes of pain/pleasure - chains/release - body/soul - fear/desire - bad/good continue throughout. *
From the OP:

As we shall see, opposites will play an important part in Socrates’ stories. — Fooloso4

Later: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/534374

a comedy or tragedy
— Fooloso4
Both ?
— Amity

Yes. The idea of opposites not being mutually exclusive will come up several times. — Fooloso4

Right now, I am struggling to keep up with the reading, now at:
67c - 76e pp12-25 as covered by @Fooloso4 here:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/535924

* p12 67d

Then doesn't purification turn out to be just what's been mentioned for some while in our discussion--the parting of the soul from the body as far as possible, and the habituating of it to assemble and gather itself together, away from every part of the body, alone by itself, and to live, so far as it can, both in the present and in the hereafter, released from the body, as from fetters?

The weekend is here, the sun is shining, I am going out...having just finished p14.
Way to go... :cool:

Phaedo librivox

It varies moderately from the text being used here, but I found it useful. — Banno

Thanks. It is useful. Especially if suffering from eye strain.
I downloaded the 8 audio files of Jowett's translation.
Listening to the 1st one (17mins) late at night I fell asleep before the end.
I hear that is one way of absorbing material in to the subconscious - well, for language learning anyway.
For philosophy, methinks tis better to time it for daylight hours...
Then again...

Progress report: *struggling *
Reading from beginning to end, as in a novel, is fine.
However, this text is nested and includes sets of philosophical arguments.
I need to see how everything fits in. Also to look outside the text for help.

So, I looked for an overview and found this helpful
https://iep.utm.edu/phaedo/

Outline of the Dialogue

• The Philosopher and Death (59c-69e)
• Three Arguments for the Soul’s Immortality (69e-84b)
• The Cyclical Argument (70c-72e)
• The Argument from Recollection (72e-78b)
• The Affinity Argument (78b-84b)
• Objections from Simmias and Cebes, and Socrates’ Response (84c-107b)
• The Objections (85c-88c)
• Interlude on Misology (89b-91c)
• Response to Simmias (91e-95a)
• Response to Cebes (95a-107b)
• Socrates’ Intellectual History (96a-102a)
• The Final Argument (102b-107b)
• The Myth about the Afterlife (107c-115a)
• Socrates’ Death (115a-118a)

References and Further Reading
General Commentaries
The Philosopher and Death (59c-69e)
Three Arguments for the Soul’s Immortality (69e-84b)
Objections from Simmias and Cebes, and Socrates’ Response (84c-107b)
The Myth about the Afterlife (107c-115a)
Socrates’ Death (115a-118a)

From the article cited:

"The Hellenistic portrait belongs to another category. The heavy, archaizing locks framing the face, the fillet containing the hair rolled up in the back—also an archaizing trait—and the full, heavy beard all conjure up the majestic aura of a god."

Mention is also made in the Archelaos Relief , also known as, "Apotheosis of Homer":
http://www.hellenicaworld.com/Greece/Art/Ancient/en/HomerArchelaos.html

The point that should not be lost is that Socrates called him the "divine poet" in the Phaedo and in the Ion calls him the "best and most divine".

This is not the place to get into the concept of apotheosis. Here is a short quote from Wiki before I move on:

Apotheosis is the glorification of a subject to divine level and most commonly, the treatment of a human like a god.

And how does this relate to my analysis of the Phaedo?

And how does this relate to my analysis of the Phaedo? — Fooloso4

Since you asked, quite frankly it indicates that you don't know much about the setting of the work. You're prone to jumping to odd conclusions, and then you refuse to accept facts when they're presented.

In some cases, your interpretation is just wrong. The bigger problem is that you seem to think there is one right interpretation.

Think of Phaedo as food for thought.

Perhaps we can discuss that if we move on to The Apology after this (which would seem a logical progression.) — Wayfarer

The hatred of logos is a big part of this dialogue. At the beginning of Phaedo, there is a proposal that that the trial would be played out again amongst those assembled. To that extent, doesn't the topic of corrupting people fall within the parameters of the dialogue under discussion?

And wondered if you had anyone specific in mind. — Amity

I was thinking of passages like this:

And I fancy that those men who established the mysteries were not unenlightened, but in reality had a hidden meaning when they said long ago that whoever goes uninitiated and unsanctified to the other world will lie in the mire, but he who arrives there initiated and purified will dwell with the gods. — Phaedo 69c

The OP says “The question arises as to whether this [Phaedo] is a comedy or a tragedy”. — Apollodorus

There's no comedy or tragedy because it's not a drama. There's no story arc.

Yes, I have. I think Eckhart's teachings come very close to the mysticism within the Platonic tradition. — Apollodorus

He was influenced by Neoplatonism. I think Hegel also came across a brand of it, but that'd be for some other thread.

Anyway, which part of Phaedo reminds you of Hegel's take on oppositions?

So how would you sum up Phaedo in a few words (if you had to)?

So how would you sum up Phaedo in a few words (if you had to)? — frank

Are you joking or just ignoring what has been said?

How would you package your view? — frank

Very briefly, I see Phaedo as a combination of philosophical discussion as would take place during a symposium and a drama or play. It encourages analytical and critical thinking and points to a higher plane of experience that may be reached by way of reason but that can only be fully "lived" or "realized" in mystical experience. Concepts like soul, immortality, rebirth, forms/ideas etc. all point in the same metaphysical direction but together with moral concepts like virtues and justice have a practical application in the attempt to build a better society.

The best and safest hypothesis according to Socrates is the hypothesis of kinds (eidos or Forms). Two “shares in the reality” of Twoness, one in the reality of Oneness. Recall that the discussion of Socrates second sailing came up from the need for a thorough investigation of the cause of generation and destruction (96a)


Mind arranges things according to their kind, that is, what kind of thing it is. But the arrangement according to kinds is only part of the story. Things are as they are, according to this hypothesis, because it is best that they be this way.

What happens when we use this hypothesis to investigate the cause of generation and destruction? It would seem that living things are alive because they share in the reality of Life and things that are dead because of the reality of Death. It follows that it is best that living things are alive and dead things dead.

There are two problems with this. First, it contradicts the argument that things come to be from their opposites. Second, it undermines what Socrates said about life being a prison and being alive the destruction of the soul by the body (95d). Unless, of course, it is better to be a slave and better that the body destroy the soul.

Socrates introduces the forms Bigness and Smallness.

Now it seems to me that not only Bigness itself is never willing to be big and small at the same time, but also that the bigness in us will never admit the small or be overcome, but one of two things happens: either it flees and retreats whenever its opposite, the Small, approaches, or it is destroyed by its approach. (102 d-e)

At this point an unnamed listener speaks up. Phaedo says he does not remember who it was. (103a) What is the significance of this? Perhaps the anonymous participant is the model for the anonymous reader who does not accept what is said but questions it.

"By the gods, did we not agree earlier in our discussion to the very opposite of what is now being said, namely, that the larger came from the smaller and the smaller from the larger, and that this simply was how opposites came to be, from their opposites, but now think we are saying that this would never happen?" (103a)

Socrates responds:

… you do not understand the difference between what is said now and what was said then, which was that an opposite thing came from an opposite thing; now we say that the
opposite itself could never become opposite to itself, neither that in us nor that in nature. Then, my friend, we were talking of things that have opposite qualities and naming these after them, but now we say that these opposites themselves, from the presence of which in them things get their name, never can tolerate the coming to be from one another." At the same time he looked to Cebes and said: "Does anything of what this man says also disturb you?" (103b-c)

The anonymous man to whom he turns and then turns away from is not given a chance to respond and does not interrupt. While it is true that Socrates was talking about things coming to be and now the Forms themselves, there is the problem of how they are related.

Although it appears that Socrates simply dismisses what the unnamed man said, the conversation moves in that direction. Socrates says:

Tell me again from the beginning and do not answer in the words of the question, but do as do. I say that beyond that safe answer, which I spoke of first, I see another safe answer. If you should ask me what, coming into a body, makes it hot, my reply would not be that safe and ignorant one, that it is heat, but our present argument provides a more sophisticated answer, namely, fire, and if you ask me what, on coming into a body, makes it sick, I will not say sickness but fever. Nor, if asked the presence of what in a number makes it odd, I will not say oddness but oneness, and so with other things. (105b-c)

Why would Socrates have previously gotten them to agree with an answer he now says is an ignorant one? Is Socrates’ new safe answer different from the answers he rejected as a young man because in part they made use of the senses? But how could he now know that fire is hot without the senses?

Before his second sailing Socrates rejected natural causes including heat, cold, and fire. (96b) As well, or so it seemed, to two being the result of adding one to one. He claimed that the safe
answer was caused by twoness. Upon closer reading, however, what he was saying is that neither the one added or the one added to becomes two. (96e) In other words, each one remains one and together they are two.

It is the unit, the one, that makes counting intelligible. We must consider how this relates to the Forms, which are each always one even when combined.

The significance of the unnamed man’s challenge now becomes evident.

Answer me then, he said, what is it that, present in a body, makes it living?

Cebes: A soul. (105c)

It is not, as the ignorant answer would have it, Life that makes a body living but soul.

Now the soul does not admit death?—No.
So the soul is deathless?—It is.
Very well, he said. Shall we say that this has been demonstrated, do you think?
Very sufficiently demonstrated indeed, Socrates. (105e)

But has it?

Well now, Cebes, he said, if the uneven were of necessity indestructible, surely three would be indestructible?—Of course.
And if the non-hot were of necessity indestructible, then whenever anyone brought heat to snow, the snow would retreat safe and unthawed, for it could not be destroyed, nor again could it stand its ground and admit the heat?—What you say is true. (106a)
Socrates is now doing exactly what he criticized the unnamed man for doing, mixing things and Forms of things. The Form Uneven can never become even, but three things are not indestructible. When the Hot is brought to snow it does not retreat safe and unthawed, it melts. The Form Cold, however, if the Forms are indestructible, would not be destroyed when the snow is.

One might object that the Forms “Triad” and “Snow” are indestructible, but this points to the problem of Socrates’ distinction between Forms and things. When it snows it is not the Form Snow that snows.

Must then the same not be said of the deathless? If the deathless is also indestructible, it is impossible for the soul to be destroyed when death comes upon it. (106b)

The Cold in snow is indestructible, but snow is not. If the soul is like snow then it too would be destroyed. But Socrates has confused Cebes, and no doubt some readers.

So the Soul will never admit the opposite of that which it brings along, as we agree from what has been said? (105d)

The opposite of what the soul brings along is Death. In accord with what has been said, snow brings Cold and three Odd. Snow cannot admit Hot without being destroyed. Three cannot admit Even and remain three. So, soul cannot admit Death and remain soul.

Then when death comes to man, the mortal part of him dies, it seems, but his deathless part goes away safe and indestructible, yielding the place to death. (106e)

According the examples, when the opposite approaches - Hot or Even, the Cold in snow and the Odd in three retreats. But if it is the soul in body that retreats then what is the opposite of soul that approaches?

Socrates has not been able to navigate the ship to safety. They are in treacherous waters, in danger of being shipwrecked, just as Simmias feared.

Here's another translation:

“Now it would not be fitting for a man of sense to maintain that all this is just as I have described it, but that this or something like it is true concerning our souls and their abodes, since the soul is shown to be immortal, I think he may properly and worthily venture to believe; for the venture is well worth while"

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=plat.+phaedo+114d


μὲν οὖν ταῦτα διισχυρίσασθαι οὕτως ἔχειν ὡς ἐγὼ διελήλυθα, οὐ πρέπει νοῦν ἔχοντι ἀνδρί: ὅτι μέντοι ἢ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα περὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις, ἐπείπερ ἀθάνατόν γε ἡ ψυχὴ φαίνεται οὖσα, τοῦτο καὶ πρέπειν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ ἄξιον κινδυνεῦσαι οἰομένῳ οὕτως ἔχειν—καλὸς γὰρ ὁ κίνδυνος—καὶ χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ, διὸ δὴ ἔγωγε καὶ πάλαι μηκύνω τὸν μῦθον. ἀλλὰ τούτων δὴ ἕνεκα θαρρεῖν χρὴ περὶ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῇ

I don't think the eschatology is by any means worked out or finalised. — Wayfarer

Sedley & Long make the following observation:

“And that the souls of the dead exist in Hades was a well-entrenched popular belief too, with its roots in Homer (Odyssey I I). Socrates’ aim in the Phaedo is to establish both the scientific respectability and the real meaning of these traditions [immortality and reincarnation]. The soul’s survival in Hades and its eventual reincarnation start out with the credibility that ancient tradition is assumed to confer on a belief, and Socrates’ central strategy is to establish scientific laws (as we might call them) to which these particular beliefs confirm. Arguments which fail as complete proofs of a thesis may nevertheless have considerable corroborative force when used in this way.”

Indeed, but the Timaeus is a whole other can of worms! I think it would be useful in this thread to confine ourselves to intepretive questions raised by the Phaedo. Maybe in future we can do some of the other dialogues, I would certainly be interested in it.