The Symposium as a good introduction to Plato's style. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was thinking the Symposium or Phaedo..

Plotinus accepts the Good as a principle of action, bit he cannot reconcile the Good with the One, which is supposed to be an absolute, and eternal potentiality. — Metaphysician Undercover

For Plotinus the Good is associated with Nous, so why would he have to reconcile it with the One?

Any time we talk about the One, duality is already on the scene because the intellect is operating. Any object of thought stands against a backdrop of its negation. (Plato alludes to this in Phaedo). The negation of the One is the Nous and the Soul (sort of).

For Neoplatonists, the All is all three: unity + multiplicity. It's also monistic idealsim, so we have to change worldviews to interpret stuff. This is not Buddhism, although Christian/Buddhist combos did once exist in central Asia. They're amenable to fusion, but they arent identical.

Any time we talk about the One, duality is already on the scene because the intellect is operating. Any object of thought stands against a backdrop of its negation. (Plato alludes to this in Phaedo). The negation of the One is the Nous and the Soul (sort of).

Yes, I know this, I suppose the way I'm talking is in abstraction when using words and thoughts. I do have other ways of relating to the one more directly.

I think of one as already actually two, two is actually three because there are two and the some of them which is one, hence there are three. Three is actually four in the same way. The religious cosmogonies seem to see it this way also. So in a sense one becomes three leapfrogging two.

I think a privation is always of the form, when a thing is less that perfect, so matter is a separate principle from privation. I believe it was the Manicheans and perhaps Gnostics who taught that matter is inherently evil. But I think Plotinus rejected this for a more Aristotelian perspective which holds that good, and privation are proper to the form of a thing, not its matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

Plotinus' matter is devoid of form. It's also evil:

"Considered abstractly and from within Plotinus' system it should be no surprise that matter is the ultimate evil: matter is at the bottom, the Good is at the top. They are opposites. What could matter be, then, other than evil? Matter is not, by consequence, an independent power opposing the Good, however: Plotinus' whole approach to the question of evil consists in explaining its evil nature as its lack of goodness and being, its powerlessness, indefinitenesss..." -- Plotinus, Eyjolfur K Emilsson, 194

"If matter or evil is ultimately caused by the One, then is not the One, as the Good, the cause of evil? In one sense, the answer is definitely yes. As Plotinus reasons, if anything besides the One is going to exist, then there must be a conclusion of the process of production from the One. The beginning of evil is the act of separation from the One by Intellect, an act which the One itself ultimately causes. The end of the process of production from the One defines a limit, like the end of a river going out from its sources. Beyond the limit is matter or evil." --SEP article on Plotinus

I know Plato pretty well, and I don't see this negation of intelligible objects, ideas, in his work, not even in The Sophist. Nor do I see it in any Neo-Platonism. I think you are relying on faulty interpretation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Did you read Phaedo? Based on what you're saying, I don't know what you would make of the argument for the immortality of the Soul.

The reason Kenosha Kid here is willing to die on Dawkins hill is purely religious: Dawkins was an aggressive atheist, while his chief contradictor Gould was a benevolent agnostic who did not fancy attacking religion. And since the Kid is also an atheist, he sees Gould as a "bad guy" who dared to criticize his Atheist hero Dawkins. So he busies himself painting Gould as religious. A " Creationist", he called him, against all evidence. — Olivier5

The irony of course is that if one takes Dawkins' seriously, one would have to subscribe to what amounts to a theological conception of evolutionary theory. From Evan Thompson's Mind in Life:

"Despite its modern scientific garb, the informational dualism expressed in these passages [of Dawkins and Daniel Dennett] is philosophically less sophisticated than the ancient form of dualism. In the ancient dualism of soul and body—as expressed, for example, in Plato's Phaedo—the soul (psyche) and the body (soma) interpenetrate and influence each other in the life led by the self. An impure body corrupts the soul; a pure one frees the soul. In contrast, in the new dualism [Dawkins writes], "information passes through bodies and affects them, but it is not affected by them on its way through." This notion of information as something that preexists its own expression in the cell, and that is not affected by the developmental matrix of the organism and environment, is a reification that has no explanatory value. It is informational idolatry and superstition, not science".

Dawkins is on the side of theology, not science.

Probably the most poignant moment in all of Plato is when Socrates' friend, Phaedo, despairs of the argument. Socrates warns of becoming 'logophobes'. The problem is that reason requires a synthetic term of which we become convinced as axiomatic to the ensuing analysis, but can only result in recognition of our differing. Is philosophy polemic or dissent? Persuading others of our convictions or testing our own? What if the most persuasive term is the one that frees us from our convictions rather than enforcing them on others? What could be more persuasive than being given reason to be emancipated from our convictions? And what could be more what truth is if we insist upon the highest possible state of rigor in this? And what could be more destructive of rigor, and so more conducive of ignorance, than supposing the end of reason is agreement? Consensus is the end of governing and establishing law amongst a people, but therapeutic dissent is the only justifying context of that consensus. The current state of this Republic is softball against canon fire. Civil war looms. Incendiary polemics can never produce genuine consensus, let alone recognition of the therapy of dissent that is the only genuine context of consensus. But those of us who do recognize that therapy are growing less intimidated by the canon fire surrounding us, and America's future is clearly with them. Those who oppose dissent in principle are losing, and becoming ever more frantic as a consequence. White supremacists and social conservatives really are being superseded, and they will end up subservient to the more flexible and open minded of us, but not because they are under attack. It is because they are attacking that they must lose. Because the future is adaptation to a changing reality, not preserving obsolete norms. While most of us adapt and gradually prosper, the dwindling remnant of logophobes languish in their incapacity to realize that we can only prosper by becoming more competent, more skilled, and more flexible. And this even while the rest of us are trying to help them develop those abilities and that prosperity. Charging us with undermining a way of life that clearly no longer serves their own interests is a lame excuse for resisting the future that so clearly lies ready to embrace us and offer the prosperity we all think we deserve. America has no future unless no one is left behind in that coming prosperity for all, and those who resist that future will themselves be last, and have no one to blame but themselves.

In God
In quasi-ideal Forms that do not subsist in a mind
In a certain geometry of these forms
In innate ideas that represent a previous existence in the realm of Forms
In material objects being either bad, non-existent, or hardly existing at all (like a shadow)
In the body being a vehicle of the soul which is intellectual and has its home in the Forms
In escaping from the phantom world (earth) and returning to ideal existence — Gregory

The God as depicted in Timaeus?

The matter of geometry of certain shapes is presented against the need for dialogue to approach the neighborhood of forms. Which dialogues are you going to put in comparison? Cratylus versus Sophist? Protagoras versus The Republic?

Yes, the reference to "innate" ideas are given as evidence for the existence of Forms in many dialogues. But those references don't explain what they are as themselves.

I don't know which statements you are referring to in regards to material objects. I am going to let you educate me on the matter.

The Phaedo refers to the idea of the body being a vehicle of the soul that does not die. Where in the writings does that make the "soul" a home in the "Forms"? Plotinus reasons in that way but I don't know where Plato does.

The God as depicted in Timaeus? — Valentinus

Yes.

The Phaedo refers to the idea of the body being a vehicle of the soul that does not die. Where in the writings does that make the "soul" a home in the "Forms"? Plotinus reasons in that way but I don't know where Plato does. — Valentinus

It's in his dialogue somewhere. He does say that. The soul originated in the realm of the Forms and returns there.

This follows the allegory of the Sun that I mentioned, since all emanate from God, then we all have the Divine Spark. As such, we all eventually return to Godhead whence we came.

Allan Bloom speculates that Socrates chose death over exile for two reasons: “because he was old [and therefore had little opportunity left for philosophizing], and because it [his death] might just help philosophy.” — Todd Martin

On the first reason, from Xenophon's Memorabilia IV. 8.1:
"If anyone thinks that Socrates is proven to have lied about his daimon because the jury condemned him to death when he stated that a divinity revealed to him what he should and should not do, then let him take note of two things: first, that Socrates was so far advanced in age that he would have died soon, if not then; and second, that he escaped the most bitter part of life, when all men's mental powers diminish."

I am not sure this can be taken at face value. First, we know from the Phaedo that he had a young son, and second, there are no accounts, as far as I know, in either Plato or Xenophon of any infirmity.
,
On the second, does Bloom explain how this might help philosophy?

As you have noted, Machiavelli was primarily speaking to future—not princes, but rather philosophers. — Todd Martin

It is not only would be philosophers who read Machiavelli. Those who seek power find him very helpful. This would not have been unexpected by Machiavelli. In addition, as you pointed out, the rulers establish the conditions for political/public life. By instructing the rulers Machiavelli helps shape the conditions in which the philosopher is free to follow his pursuits.

... if we only benefit them enough to otherwise leave us alone to our austere study? — Todd Martin

The theme of mutual benefit reoccurs throughout the history of philosophy. We see it in the Republic with the ironic definition of justice as minding your own business. But the goal is not simply to make the city safe for philosophy but to make philosophy safe for the city.

many ancients who believed that man was "different" had no idea what they were talking about — 180 Proof

We can agree to disagree, Wayf, we've done it before, but I see no reason we both cannot continue to criticize and object to each others' errors where we see fit to do so — 180 Proof

Sure. But an assertion is not reasoned argument. Neither are claims that the ancients must have it wrong on account of their being ancient. There is a very obvious empirical difference between humans and other animals, which was no less clear in ancient Athens than it is in the modern world: humans are born into a state of self-awareness. They 'bear the burden of selfhood.' They are the 'rational animal' and rationality is a difference that makes a difference. Think of the origin of the Greek philosophical tradition - the breakthrough into being able to discern 'the reason for things', the universal order. It must have been intoxicating. With it comes the hope for something beyond this perishable frame. It's not hard to envisage for those who see an order 'written in the stars'.

Socrates was sentenced to death for atheism. But Socrates was not atheist as we know it, he says in Phaedo he is assured of the immortality of the soul. Was he right? I can't say that I know. I'm one of the characters in the dialogues standing on the sidelines with doubts and questions, but I'm not going to dismiss it.

The ability of the intelligence of man to understand the intelligible order led to the idea that the order itself was intelligent. Intelligence works toward some end or purpose, and so, nature must have some end or purpose. I am not defending that idea, just trying to explain it. — Fooloso4

:up:

what the object of that quest was - the attainment of certain knowledge of the real.
— Wayfarer

I think this project is haunted by an inescapable ambiguity, as argued for by an army of philosophers who I think have made a strong case. — j0e

Yes, but look at the OP. It is concerned with fundamental epistemology, what it means 'to know'. It's a heavy topic! The OP is admirably modest in acknowledging that it only ventures an 'unsatisfactory and partial' answer. Well and good and all credit where due. But, I'm saying, with respect to the subject of the thread, the origin was with Greek philosophy, and specifically the Parmenides, and that those were the terms in which the question of 'the nature of knowledge' was framed - the quest for sure knowledge of the real; the Greek equivalent of the Sanskrit 'Vidya', which carries existential implications that mere 'knowledge' does not.

Parmenides and Plato set the bar very high for what constitutes knowledge. In the Theatetus, many of the proferred answers to the question of knowledge - justified true belief, and so on - end in aporia, un-answered questions, puzzlement and hesitation. Have those problems been solved since? Is it the case that 2,500 intervening years have yielded great progress in addressing those doubts? Very difficult questions, and I'm not going to rush in with an answer. But I think the idea that 'modern science' has, or even can, address, let alone 'solve', those questions, is misplaced. Which is no slight on science. Consider what is involved - they are not questions for science. They are questions we have to grapple with 'alone with the alone'.

(I got that expensive textbook I mentioned - Nature Loves to Hide, Shimon Malin, philosophical commentary on quantum physics. So far, so good - he is wishing to situate the Bohr Einstein debate against the background of Western philosophy with specific reference to Alfred North Whitehead and the Platonist tradition. Not far into it yet but am going to give it a lot of attention. Highly congenial and definitely a legitimate author, not a quantum charlatan.)

Sounds something like the idea of "the great chain of Being." — Manuel

I think the loss of that idea was the loss of something significant. Put it another way: there are degrees of reality, such that what is more real, is also more worthy of being known. It jars with modern philosophy. That's because the idea of 'degrees of reality' was lost from medieval times. It is still retained in 17th C philosophy:

In contrast to contemporary philosophers, most 17th century philosophers held that reality comes in degrees—that some things that exist are more or less real than other things that exist. At least part of what dictates a being’s reality, according to these philosophers, is the extent to which its existence is dependent on other things: the less dependent a thing is on other things for its existence, the more real it is.

Here you can trace the idea of 'the unconditioned', where 'the unconditioned' is 'the source of being' (the To Hen of Plotinus) which emanates or cascades 'downward' to the phenomenal realm; what is 'nearer to it' is more real; hence 'intellect' is more real than the corporeal. That intuition is what has been jettisoned in the transition to modernity, where the idea of 'degrees of being' has been abandoned.

Good point. But if there was this Adam then the myth of anamnesis cannot be taken too seriously, because it would not then rely on recollection from a previous life. — Fooloso4

You could rework it so it only seems like a chain to temporally bound beings. The soul is like a touchstone for multiple lives playing out. Anamnesis is that connection to the eternal.

This is what I thought Plato meant when I first read Phaedo.

I am probably not systematic enough in my reading. I have started a collection of writings on Plotinus, Sartre's 'Being and Nothingness,' and reading several other non fiction ones, and about 3 novels. I have downloaded so many books, about 1500 on my Kindle and I got a free tablet with my phone. I worked out how to download on that and discovered recently that I can't download any more because it has its maximum amount of large files. Fortunately, the majority of the books I got were free. But, I am trying to get through some of my paper books as well. I like to read about 5 books a week, but it does depend on how big they are and what they are. Some books can be read in one sitting, whereas others have to be read slowly.

I have read Plato's 'Republic' and 'Phaedo'. I do find overviews helpful and I reread Bertrand Russell's ' History of Western Philosophy' recently. I have been planning to start Iris Murdock's 'Existentialism and Mystics', ever since the thread on mysticism. So, I will be busy, and not enough hours in a day really, especially as I am applying for jobs as well. But, when I was working in the past, I used to try to read for a bit before going to work, because reading can be so meditational.

Fooloso4 started an interesting thread and he presented his position clearly. He certainly taught little me about this dialogue. So he can be a teacher to me. — Olivier5

Thank you. If you are interested in Plato you might want to look at my thread on the Phaedo.

don't think we should read too much into that. — Apollodorus

Turning to the gods (or more precisely priests) to learn what righteousness demands is moral externalism. Things are changing, though.

True, the forms are independent, but we seem to know them by an internal source. Socrates is said to have followed an internal voice, so with Phaedo, Meno, and to some extent Euthyphro, we have a rising tide of internalism: justifications can be found within.

To the east of Athens, the Persians are also headed toward the idea that you're born with the knowledge of good and evil. It could be that Plato knew about that, or it could just be convergent evolution.

Do you agree with any of that?

2.

In the Republic Socrates does not present the Forms merely as a premise, but rather as the things that are, the unchanging beings. They are said to be seen by those who have ascended from the cave to the sight of the Forms and finally to the Good itself. But Socrates never claims to have seen the Forms or to know anyone who has. He presents an image of what knowledge of the things must be like. In other words, he has not now turned back again away from speech to the things themselves. But he does turn the soul to the idea of something more than the changing and confusing things of this world. He provides an image of an unchanging reality governed by the Good. An image of the hypothesised Forms. Another turn. A reversal, for Forms are not what they are in his philosophical poetry. They are not those unchanging beings of which things in this world are images. They are themselves images made by Socrates.

The ability to create such an image of knowledge beyond the cave is not to have escaped the cave. To be told of such things, as if the mystery has been revealed, is not to have escaped the cave. Plato, through the character of Socrates, is, like the poets, a maker of images on the cave wall. We cannot escape the cave, but some can break the shackles and turn around in order to see the images themselves rather than their images, images of images, shadows of the images on the cave wall. In addition they see the image makers, the “puppeteers and the production process of images, the puppets, paraded in front of the fire.

What is said is at best an approximation of what is, but without knowing what is we cannot measure how close an approximation it is. Like the philosopher who is forced to return to the cave, Socrates must return to earth from his flight to the hyperuranion beings. The Forms are an arrangement of things, not an order discovered in nature, they are how things are ordered according to mind. More specifically, according to Socrates’ mind. That they are hypothetical means that they are not caused by Mind rather by a human mind. Socrates’ philosophical poetry unlike the poetry of Homer, Hesiod, and the others, is not inspired by a muse.

Since we do not know the Forms themselves, we must turn back to speech:

If then one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be or perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. On these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is best. (Phaedo 97b-d)

Just as the Good is to the Forms, the hypothesis of the Good is to the hypothesis of the Forms. The hypothesis of the Good is that in light of which hypothesis of the Forms come to be and to be understood.

The question of what is best is inextricably linked to the question of the human good. About what is best we can only do our best to say what is best and why. The question of what is best turns from things in general to the human things and ultimately to the self for whom what is best is what matters most. The question of the good leads back to the problem of self-knowledge.

How about starting a thread on it and get Amity to delete all comments that we choose to disagree with? :grin:
— Apollodorus

Again with this. Boring crap :yawn:
Deletions can only be done by a moderator who judges any full-of-shit posts flagged.
I am not the only one but guess I am now on the tag team's 'hit list'.
Unfortunately, I can't flag this off topic post but I will do others...and this should disappear. — Amity

I appreciate you and others, and there have been several others, for stepping in. They have chosen to make Plato's Euthyphro and Phaedo about me.

I did not get a chance to read the posts that were deleted, but it is certain that they were not substantive or on topic. As you said, it was a moderator who thought they should be deleted.
Unfortunately, you have become a target too. But nothing to them in response.

Wittgenstein said:

When you are philosophizing you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there. (Culture and Value)

The problem is, many who are drawn to philosophy do not feel at home in the confusion of not knowing. They look to philosophy to find answers. Plato seems to provide answers. However, what may seem to be is not what is. Behind the inspiring image of transcendent Forms is, as he says in the Phaedo, hypothesis. But hypotheses do not not satisfy the desire for answers.

Socrates’ Forms stand as the substitute for the myths of the gods. They are a salutary public teaching disguised as an initiation into the sacred mysteries. As the noble lie is to the city in the Republic the hyperuranion beings are to the actual city.

The term "pattern" (paradeigma) refers to Platonic Forms which, as you yourself admitted, were known to Plato and his immediate disciples at the time he wrote the Euthyphro. — Apollodorus

No one disputes that the Forms are often talked about in the dialogues. We went through this already. What is at issue is what they are.

Of course pattern refers to the Forms, that is the point. The dialogue refers to the Form as a pattern, not as an instrumental cause. Socrates calls the Forms hypothesis in the Phaedo. An hypothesis is not an instrumental cause. If you cannot provide textual evidence that a Form is an instrumental cause and not, as Socrates says, a hypothesis, then, despite what you may believe, your interpretation is without grounds.

I think Plato separates the intelligible objects (ideas and Forms) from the visible objecys. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think so too. However, I think that it is essential to understand the terminology used.

The fact of the matter is that the following association of concepts is found throughout the Platonic texts:

“idea/form” + “pattern” + “contemplate” + “seeing” + "eye"

“Invisible” does not mean “absolutely incapable of being seeing or perceived”. It only means invisible to the physical eye. The Forms are seen with the eye of the soul.

There are three kinds of eye/sight, (1) physical, (2) mental (3) spiritual.

“if we are ever to know anything absolutely, we must be free from the body and must behold the actual realities with the eye of the soul alone” (Phaedo 66d – e).

www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DPhaedo%3Asection%3D66e

Socrates asks “what is this idea that I may keep my eye fixed upon it and employ it as a paradeigma” (Euthyphro).

“And the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul perceives and understands and is radiant with intelligence” (Republic).

“... the true analogy for this indwelling power in the soul and the instrument whereby each of us apprehends is that of an eye ...” (Republic).

“... in that state of life above all others, a man finds it truly worth while to live, as he contemplates essential beauty […] there only will it befall him, as he sees the beautiful through that which makes it visible” (Symposium).

It follows that, on a higher level, “contemplation” of the Form is a form of “seeing”.

At that level, we do not see with the physical eye as in everyday life, nor with the eye of the mind as in dreams or imagination, but with the paranormal or metaphysical faculty of sight of the nous which is the "eye of the soul".

It reminds me of William Blake: 'If the doors of perception were cleansed everything would appear to man as it is, infinite.' — Jack Cummins

I think that's exactly it. We may say "doors of perception" or, as Plato does, "instrument or organ of perception":

"It is indeed no trifling task, but very difficult to realize that there is in every soul an organ or instrument of knowledge that is purified and kindled afresh by such studies when it has been destroyed and blinded by our ordinary pursuits, a faculty whose preservation outweighs ten thousand eyes; for by it only is reality beheld (Republic 527d - e).

The way I understand it, the faculty of sight has three basic aspects:

1. Everyday visual perception through the physical organ of sight, i.e. the eye.

2. The inner eye of the mind through which we see things internally as in imagination, dreams, and in particular, lucid dreaming.

3. The eye of the soul, whereby we perceive metaphysical realities.

In reality, it is one and the same organ or faculty operating on different levels of perception.

So, the "door" or "organ" of metaphysical perception, a.k.a. the Platonic "eye of the soul" or "eye of the heart" mentioned in Ephesians 1:18, etc. and of which Augustine and other Church Fathers speak, seems to be what philosophy together with the prayer you have just mentioned aim to cleanse, awaken, train and fortify in order to enable the soul to perceive metaphysical realities.

And chief among these metaphysical realities apart from Ultimate Reality itself, would be the various heavens or realms of spiritual existence together with their inhabitants, viz., the various classes of celestial beings such as the angels.

In 2 Cor 12:2 Paul appears to be referring to a "third heaven" which is the location of what goes by the name of "paradise". And, since presumably, paradise is something that all Christians, including philosophers aim to experience or attain, I think it wouldn't be entirely out of place to look into it and see how it may be understood, analyzed, or explained in philosophical terms. And maybe also look at parallels with Platonic descriptions in the Phaedo and other texts.

Socrates says very clearly that “it turns out that the soul is immortal” (Phaedo 114d) — Apollodorus

Once again, context is important. When taking things out of content they may seem to mean something different than they do.

Socrates is wrapping up a myth he created about the immortality of the soul. Immediately following the myth and before the quote you take out of context he says:

No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places …

and following it:

he should sing, as it were, incantations to himself over and over again.(114d)

"It turns out" refer to the myth, It is a belief he says that one should risk, not to anything that has been established as true. One need not risk believing something established as true.

and that “therefore — Apollodorus

A fine example of your disregard for the arguments in the dialogues. You join two different arguments from two different dialogues as if one follows from the other. And then follow that with another statement taken out of context.

And on the subject of taking things out of context, your ill informed Neoplatonist rants refer to your claim Plato should be interpreting through Neoplatonism and what follows from that. And, more importantly, what does not follow, any attention to the arguments themselves.

First, the assumptions that Socrates describes in the Phaedo are the method by which he proceeds. He assumes the existence of the Good and the Beautiful and the rest. He does not say he knows or sees them. This much is consistent with the description of dialectic in the Republic.

Second, it should be noted that the account of dialectic in the Republic differs from the story of transcendence from the cave. The latter was in terms of what is seen by the soul in some transcendent state. The dialectical is via speech, via the assumptions or hypotheses.

Third, the beginning free of hypothesis or assumption that, in some unexplained way, frees itself from hypothesis or assumption is the beginning or principle. It is what is arrived at only when one has completed the dialectical journey. It is for you not a principle you have arrived at, it is something you assume based on trust or faith.

As already stated, all knowledge and all objects of knowledge are emanations of the Good. — Apollodorus

As already stated, this is not something you know. It is something you accept or believe, an opinion. It is for all of us who do not possess this knowledge nothing more than a shadow on the cave wall.

Of course there is no need for the Good "to be responsible for the bad things". — Apollodorus

Then the Good cannot be the cause of the whole.

As explained by Plotinus — Apollodorus

Plotinus is not Plato. In whatever way evil exists it still exists, it is part of the whole, part of the world we live in. No adequate account of the whole can ignore or explain away the existence of bad things. The Good as the cause of existence and being (509b) must be the cause of bad things, for there are bad things, bad things exist.

What you fail to understand is that the dialogues are just brief sketches, not encyclopedic works. — Apollodorus

A non-sequitur. It is not a matter of the dialogues being encyclopedic but of them being self-consistent, both on their own and all together.

use your reasoning faculty — Apollodorus

Noesis is not a reasoning faculty. It is not dianoia. That is the point. We cannot transcend reason by the use of reason. Unless you can free yourself from hypothesis and know the Forms themselves they remain for you hypotheses, assumptions, something you accept on faith, something you believe because someone told you it is true.

don't expect to be spoonfed. — Apollodorus

Apparently, you do not see that this is exactly what is happening. You take statements at face value and go no further, as if the truth has been revealed. It is said and thus it is. Fine for revealed religion but not for philosophy.

It does as described in the analogy of the Sun, that's why I've repeatedly told you to go back to the analogy and read it again. — Apollodorus

And, as I quoted, it does not include the bad. This is why the dialogue needs to be read as a whole not as isolated statements.

As to your claim that Socrates was an "atheist", the dialogues show very clearly that he was not:

“For he says I am a maker of Gods; and because I make new Gods — Apollodorus

Do you really not understand what this means?

If the charge was that he introduced "other new deities", then the logical implication is that he believed in those deities he introduced. — Apollodorus

No, it means he makes them, just as the poets did. Just as Homer, the "divine poet" (Phaedo 95a) did.

Hesiod said:

The muses tell Hesiod that they speak lies like the truth (Theogony 27)

See David Sedley on Plato and Hesiod.

Nothing changes when you repeat your opinions about what you believe the poets believed yet again.

Perhaps. But you have no evidence that this is the case. — Apollodorus

One must follow the argument in order to determine whether there is any evidence. You are unwilling or unable to do that. What more is there to say?

A talk about a reality is a talk about a reality, i.e. a talk about something that is a reality. — Apollodorus

It is not talk about something that is a reality, it is talk about a hypothetical. You seem either unable or unwilling to see the difference. What more is there to say?

If without knowledge we cannot determine whether an opinion is right or wrong then we cannot claim that it is wrong without evidence to show this to be the case. — Apollodorus

We can, however, make a distinction between an opinion about reality and reality. You have denied, that the Forms are hypothetical, and have asserted that they are metaphysical realities. But you now confirm that the Forms are hypothetical. What more is there to say?

If the questions about the Gods are never resolved then you cannot insists that they are. — Apollodorus

That is your issue not mine. Your first post on the Phaedo thread:

According to some, Plato taught "animism" and "atheism". Is that true?

With fanatical frequency you have returned to that question. What more is there to say?

I have told you this many times. — Apollodorus

Right, we have discussed this. What more is there to say?

And if they agree what the theology of the city should be, then there is a theology that is agreed on. — Apollodorus

A theology of false speeches (376e-377a). We have been over this already. What more is there to say?

All of these things have been discussed. You have your opinions, I have mine, and different scholars have theirs as well. Why the obsessive need to repeat your opinions? They do not become more convincing by repetition.

Socratic dialogues usually end with "see, it just proves we don't know anything. have a good night.", — stoicHoneyBadger

I don't think this is really true. Socrates is not a skeptic. He certainly uses logic to demonstrate established beliefs such as immortality, reincarnation, and the other world, as in the Phaedo.

The point Socrates is making is not that we should hold no beliefs (on the grounds that we know nothing) but that we should avoid holding unexamined beliefs.

In the course of recounting his conversations with others, Socrates says something enigmatic: “About myself I knew that I know nothing” (22d; cf. Fine 2008). The context of the dialogue allows us to read this pronouncement as unproblematical. Socrates knows that he does not know about important things. Interpreted in this manner, Socrates does not appear to be a skeptic in the sense that he would profess to know nothing. Even though some readers (ancient and modern) found such an extreme statement in the Apology, a more plausible reading suggests that Socrates advocates the importance of critically examining one’s own and others’ views on important matters, precisely because one does not know about them (Vogt 2012a, ch. 1). Such examination is the only way to find out.

Ancient Skepticism - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

I recognize way more than can be scientifically or logically verified and I can't understand why you apparently can't see that. — Janus

It's not obvious from your comments.

We know in this other sense through the arts, music and poetry and religious faith and practice; I have never denied any of that. — Janus

No, but you subjectivize it. It is a matter of personal conviction. And I understand that - it's an inevitable consequence of the culture that we live in. I'm not saying you're wrong to think like that. Just to notice it, that's all. What if these forms of higher knowledge really do address a reality, not simply a social or religious convention.

What if 'the common world' is the mind-created projection of the ego, with no inherent reality?
— Wayfarer

I think there is no reason whatsoever to believe that is true. Even if it were true there could be no conceivable way to demonstrate it — Janus

Modern naturalism assumes that nature can be understood 'in its own right', so to speak, without reference to God or transcendent causes. That is why the claim that the sensory domain may be illusory goes against the grain; because for modern naturalism, nature is the only reality, the touchstone of reality. But I think that calling our native sense of reality into doubt is what scepticism originally meant. It's not like today's scientific scepticism - that nothing is real except for what can be validated scientifically. It is a scepticism that comes from the sense of our own fallibility.

'Fallibilism' in philosophy of science is that hypotheses are only held, pending their falsification by some new discovery. Actually what I'm saying is not too far from that, but it has a wider scope. I think that ancient scepticism was sceptical about our human faculties altogether - that 'the senses deceive', or that the world given to common sense is not as it seems. (And that, in turn, is not far removed from the Hindu intuition of māyā, which, although arising in a different culture, was likewise a product of the 'axial age' of philosophy.)

At issue, is the question of epistemology: what is real? What I started out by saying, is that the setting of Plato's philosophy presumes that there is a real good; Socrates presumes that the world is in such a way that 'things will turn out for the good' (Phaedo 99b-c). Perhaps it's naive, perhaps it's superseded, but that is what's at issue. That is why the question of 'what is good' turns out to involve metaphysics (cf Wittgenstein: 'Ethics are transcendental').

I get that what I'm saying is controversial, goes against the grain, and so on - really do. Just exploring these ideas, and thanks for at least entertaning them, even if they're a bit far out. And I recommend Paul Tyson's book, De-Fragmenting Modernity, to those interested.

Modern naturalism assumes that nature can be understood 'in its own right', so to speak, without reference to God or transcendent causes. That is why the claim that the sensory domain may be illusory goes against the grain; because for modern naturalism, nature is the only reality, the touchstone of reality. But I think that calling our native sense of reality into doubt is what scepticism originally meant. It's not like today's scientific scepticism - that nothing is real except for what can be validated scientifically. It is a scepticism that comes from the sense of our own fallibility.

'Fallibilism' in philosophy of science is that hypotheses are only held, pending their falsification by some new discovery. Actually what I'm saying is not too far from that, but it has a wider scope. I think that ancient scepticism was sceptical about our human faculties altogether - that 'the senses deceive', or that the world given to common sense is not as it seems. (And that, in turn, is not far removed from the Hindu intuition of māyā, which, although arising in a different culture, was likewise a product of the 'axial age' of philosophy.)

At issue, is the question of epistemology: what is real? What I started out by saying, is that the setting of Plato's philosophy presumes that there is a real good; Socrates presumes that the world is in such a way that 'things will turn out for the good' (Phaedo 99b-c). Perhaps it's naive, perhaps it's superseded, but that is what's at issue. That is why the question of 'what is good' turns out to involve metaphysics (cf Wittgenstein: 'Ethics are transcendental'). — Wayfarer

I think that's a sound summary. The naturalists I know mostly don't think that the sensory domain is necessarily a true refection of the world, just that it is the most consistently reliable one available to human beings. Naturalism/physicalism is a spectrum of beliefs which, like politics or religion, has a fundamentalist arm and a progressive/reformist one.

The problem with introducing Gods or transcendent causes as potential collaborators in our understanding of 'truth' or 'reality' is that this just adds further mystification since neither God or the transcendent can readily be defined or understood (enlightened sages and visiting messiahs notwithstanding). Or even agreed upon. If we think senses are fallible, try giving conceptual shape and words to the numinous and the ineffable. Have fun meditating.

I've spent a little time in the company of Donald Hoffman's thesis on the nature of reality which is kind of relevant to this discussion. I find it strangely compelling but of course its focus is on the potential flaws inherent in assuming the natural world is real while it provides no solutions I could find as to what reality actually may be and why it matters. And Hoffman's math are beyond me.

I wonder if so much speculative metaphysics is useful and whether or not this is a distraction from the fact that we do seem to have evolved to identify and happily work within a particular version of reality (contested though its parameters might be) that we are right to be skeptical about but can only ignore at our peril. But that's a different matter.

I think that what you are getting at in the first part is two-fold. One, do not make the all to common mistake of thinking that argument and philosophy are the same. Second, and this becomes clear when considering the passage from the Phaedrus where Socrates admits he cannot give an account of what the soul really is. Socrates regarded the inability to give an account as an indication that one lacks knowledge, as can be seen for example when he interrogates the poets in the Apology. His main contention with the poets in several of the dialogues is their inability to distinguish a likeness from what it is a likeness of. Any yet here in the Phaedo, instead of saying what the soul is, he presents a likeness. How are we to know that it is a true likeness without knowledge of the thing itself? We are left with a dispute of words.

If what is being talked about is indescribable then the only sensible thing to do is to remain silent. Ironically, those who proclaim indescribable truths are those who have the most to say, although they do become silent when asked how they know about such things as the immortality of the soul and Forms, thinks that cannot be said but only seen. The contradict themselves by retreating and quoting things that are said.

Socrates himself prior to admitting that he cannot give an account of the soul presents an argument for the immortality of the soul:

First, then, we must learn the truth about the soul divine and human by observing how it acts and is acted upon. And the beginning of our proof is as follows: Every soul is immortal.(245c)

.

He cannot say what the soul is but argues that the truth is it is immortal. It is a physical argument based on motion. He goes on to say that a living being, compounded of soul and body is mortal. (246c) We are mortal beings. Some may believe stories about things we have no knowledge of, but they are for us images that we cannot measure against a purported reality. Where Plato points to the limits of our knowledge some mistakenly think he is pointing beyond them.

It doesn't sound like we will be getting tans outside the cave any time soon. — Valentinus

It is very often the case that readers mistake the images Plato creates on the cave wall for their escape from the cave.

Returning to a conversation that has undergone the rigors of the dialectic in order to form better opinions can be a starting place for a new conversation. — Valentinus

Good point. Dialectic is mutually beneficial. Sooner or later, however, we have to address the claim that we can use hypothesis to free ourselves from hypothesis.

So much so that I am uncertain about what counts as divine or not within it. Thus my previous concerns about comparing different models. — Valentinus

In the Phaedo Socrates calls Homer divine. In the Iliad Homer call salt divine (9.214)

In addition to the question of what counts as divine with it there is the question of whether there is anything divine outside of the whole. Or if the whole is itself divine.

Calling things you know nothing about "metaphysical realities" illustrates the problem. We know nothing of life before or after death. We know nothing of the separation of body and soul. The examined life requires at least enough honesty and self-awareness to admit this.

Plato did not "teach" ignorance and aporia. These are things that one must come to know on their own. The problem is, as Simmias says in the Phaedo:

“It seems to me, Socrates, as perhaps you do too, that in these matters certain knowledge is either impossible or very hard to come by in this life; but that even so, not to test what is said about them in every possible way, without leaving off till one has examined them exhaustively from every aspect, shows a very feeble spirit; on these questions one must achieve one of two things: either learn or find out how things are; or, if that's impossible, he must sail through life in the midst of danger, seizing on the best and the least refutable of human accounts, at any rate, and letting himself be carried upon it as on a raft - unless, that is, he could journey more safely and less dangerously on a more stable carrier, some divine account.” (85c-d)

Not knowing is not the goal, it is the condition within which one begins to philosophize. What is sought is the best and least refutable “human accounts”. But it is a way that is fraught with danger. And so, Socrates tells stories in the guise of "some divine account" for those who are unable to navigate the dangerous waters. Stories that will guide them in their ignorance of their ignorance. Stories that are grabbed hold of like a life saving raft, as if they have become privy to "metaphysical realities".