Thanks @Wayfarer. I will try to look into those links and see if I can make some sense out of it..

Socrates was a skeptic. Knowing that he and everyone else does not know the truth of such matters poses a threat. If the truth is not known then everything and nothing can fill the gap. So Plato provides a salutary teaching in place of the unknown and perhaps unknowable truth. But in order for this teaching to be accepted it must appear to be the truth itself.

In the dialogue Phaedo, which takes place when Socrates is about to die, the discussion turns to the fate of the soul. Although he is not afraid to die, some of his friends are fearful of death and so he attempts, as he says, to "charm away their childish fears". Someone objects that what he want is the truth. He offers various proofs and stories about the immortality of the soul, and while the careful reader is led to see that all of them fail, to this day some still believe that here we find the truth of the soul's immortality. But no one knows the truth of what happens to the soul at death or even what the soul is. This leads to what is called "misologic". Socrates says that there are some who fall in love with philosophy because they believe it will make them wise, but when it becomes clear to them that philosophy is unable to answer such questions they come to despise it for what they see as its failure. Socrates did not, so to speak, want philosophy to die with him. Those who are to philosophize must eschew childish stories but must not expect philosophy to do what it cannot do. — Fooloso4

Thanks @Fooloso4,

So the secret is that there is no secret? Regular people are just incapable of living with "I don't know"?

Seems reasonable, but I think this idea is more explicitly stated in eastern philosophies (even the horrifically indirect Tao te Ching seems to be more explicit, "the way that can be told is not the true way"). Why are there such high levels of respect for Plato's vague hints? Is it just because it had a big impact on western culture? Kind of like how Columbus was a jerk that did not discover anything, but he certainly triggered the exploration of, and spread to, the "New World"?

Very good!

So we have Socrates at about 70 (Apology 17b) and now a standard of measure for the category of old age via this shield criterion.

As to modern day we can simply look at vital statistics for an life expectancy (probably somewhere in the 78 to 85 range), but here's a bit of a tough nut... how do we get to a modern day standard of measure for 'old age' then subsequently figure out is it a blessing or a curse?

Back to the overview on Plato's time (to check my vague understanding of things)...

Basically we 'start out' as immaterial souls prior to birth (Phaedo 70c-72e) and knew the 'Forms', but due to being in (embodied in) a physical realm we forgot a lot of it.

Being 'damned' to stumble through life in the physical realm we eventually begin to recognize similarities between particulars. This development draws our attention upward towards the similarity and away from the particularity. Over time we experience moments of clarity and as we get older this process becomes more and more frequent; thus if this is correct, then people gain wisdom (or, at least, people ought to have fewer false beliefs) as they age. (I can't remember the reference at the moment, but I believe it's somewhere around Phaedrus 245 - 258 and something in Phadeo in the 70's... possibly elsewhere too)

So why is such a process desirable instead of just living life without this critical thinking?

In my looking up the age of Socrates it placed my attention to the Apology once again after a long long time. What I 'connected' (I'm certain many other have doe the same and far better) might give some insight to Plato's position.

Socrates, famed for knowing he knows nothing, investigated the knowledge of others by his being interrogated by them. Other than the craftsmen, who knew their craft, these 'knowledgeable people' really knew nothing. Socrates has what he considered to be 'human wisdom', but knew it was worthless.

Socrates suggests that as long as we are embodied this form of a human, we are not capable of knowing anything truly. Only the gods and, perhaps, the dead have true wisdom. If the dead have such knowledge, then perhaps death isn’t an evil after all (Apology 40b-42a )

I'm not sure if this is the direction you are heading or if I've basically run off chasing rabbit again.

Also, my knowledge on the topic is certainly not that of a specialist.

One thing I can remember (I believe it was in Republic... maybe) was a dialog between Cephallus and Socrates when Socrates goes to visit him because “the more the pleasures of the body fade, the greater becomes one’s desire and taste for conversation”.

They talk quite a bit (I suppose as old farts do), but what I remember was that Cephalus states that a person with a good character will find it to be a great help to their old age. It is not that old age (per se) is bad or unpleasant, but rather old age coupled with a dreadful past days of youth.

More or less if your character was screwed up as a youth, it'll likely be the same when you are older; thus making old age not so desirable.

I'm quite certain I'm leaving a lot out of this, but it basically what I can remember (the classics were about 35 years ago for me and I'm not really sure my memory is on the mark nor my understanding at the time it was taught)

Back to the present day...

Indeed this sounds like a rather common description of getting old. Not a lot of new concepts here, but how does it relate to the present day and does it really stand to reason?

Of course I might be chasing rabbits and none of this was worth writing, but my take on the issue isn't quite in line with the perspective of either Socrates or Cephallus, but before I bore you more with the 'notions of the Mayor' I kind of need to know if this the tree upon which I should be barking upward?

One of the suggestions in the Phaedo is that what is immaterial can be understood in terms of the ideas. Likewise, what the soul ‘remembers’ are ideas that were understood before birth. And those are principles that are grasped by reason — Wayfarer

Plato solves one problem and makes another.

If your innate knowledge comes from a previous life, then either the chain of people is infinite, or there was an 'Adam' who learned without previous lives.

If this Adam could do it, anybody could. IOW, this Adam is an alternate solution to Meno's paradox, upon which Plato builds his case for anamnesis.

Or maybe the Soul he's talking about isn't like a chain of lives, but instead is an atemporal well. Straight New Age, there.

It's just that you said the philosophers believed in god. I don't think Socrates did. Plato used him as a mouthpiece. Plato wasn't the only one who did that. — frank

Well, in my view, Socrates did believe in God.

According to Socrates, a philosopher's life was a preparation for death. And the only reason for that was that he, and other philosophers, believed in God, soul, justice, etc.

Regarding soul, Socrates in Phaedo, before his death, says: “But now, inasmuch as the soul is manifestly immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom…”

However, Socrates' beliefs are immaterial because Platonic belief in reincarnation goes back to Pythagoras and others so it isn’t dependent on what Socrates (or his detractors) believed.

Moreover, metempsychosis (Greek: μετεμψύχωσις), in philosophy, refers to transmigration of the soul, especially its reincarnation after death. Generally, the term is derived from the context of Greek philosophy where it is closely connected with the concepts of “soul”, “God” and “divine justice”.

The Buddhist theory of reincarnation, in so far as it doesn’t admit of “soul”, “God” and “justice” is a different thing and is less helpful, IMO.

There is no point talking to Fooloso4 because as I said from the start and as has become more than obvious since, he's got a very specific political agenda.

Anyway, εἶδος eidos which Plato uses in his Theory of Forms means “that which is seen, e.g., form, image, shape but also fashion, sort, kind
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/εἶδος

Plato in the Euthyphro introduces the concept of idea (idea) early on, followed by eidos and paradeigma, i.e., exactly what later emerges in the Theory of Forms:

1. Socrates asks “what is the idea possessed by pious things” (5d).

2. Socrates asks “what is the eidos by which all pious acts are pious” (6d).

3. Socrates asks “what is this idea that I may keep my eye fixed upon it and employ it as a paradeigma” (6e).

It is clear that this comes very close to the later and more developed concept of “idea”, “form” or “pattern”.

So, we can identify three basic stages of the concept of forms:

1. As found in deities personifying certain virtues such as Justice, Beauty, etc.

2. As found in more abstract form in the Meno and Euthyphro.

3. As found in more developed form in the Phaedo, Republic, and Phaedrus.

Specifically, his explanation of how Being-for-Itself constantly issues from Being-in-Itself through a process of nihilation. — charles ferraro

Maybe Sartre is nihilist.

Something that this thread lacks so far is the concept represented by 'self-realisation'. In terms of Advaita Vedanta, the self of the individual is indeed the self of all, but is enmired or ensnared in illusion due to its attachment to material form. Realising the unity of the self with the self of all (Brahman) is the fulfilment of the Vedantic philosophy, known as self-realisation. (A similar sentiment of the separation of the soul from the physical body is hinted at in Plato - Phaedo.) Plotinus was said to have attained the 'realisation of unity' only twice in his life, but many scholars believe that this is a direct parallel with the Vedantic teaching of 'union of atman and Brahman'. The underlying insight of all these ideas, found in many forms, is the re-union of the alienated individual self with its original source which is also the source of being. It is not necessarily theistic in orientation, as for instance Advaita teaches in terms of a non-personal absolute (which is therefore anathema to Christian dogma where the source of being is a divine Person.)

For Schopenhauer, ultimate Being was a non-rational, purposeless, blind Will-to-Live that manifested itself throughout the several ascending levels of inanimate and animate nature until it reached its highest manifestation, and achieved full self-awareness through representation in human consciousness. — charles ferraro

However:

According to Schopenhauer, aesthetic perception offers only a short-lived transcendence from the daily world. Neither is moral awareness, despite its comparative tranquillity in contrast to the daily world of violence, the ultimate state of mind. Schopenhauer believes that a person who experiences the truth of human nature from a moral perspective — who appreciates how spatial and temporal forms of knowledge generate a constant passing away, continual suffering, vain striving and inner tension — will be so repulsed by the human condition, and by the pointlessly striving Will of which it is a manifestation, that he or she will lose the desire to affirm the objectified human situation in any of its manifestations.

The result is an attitude of denial towards our will-to-live, that Schopenhauer identifies with an ascetic attitude of renunciation, resignation, and willessness, but also with composure and tranquillity. In a manner reminiscent of traditional Buddhism, he recognizes that life is filled with unavoidable frustration, and acknowledges that the suffering caused by this frustration can itself be reduced by minimizing one’s desires. Moral consciousness and virtue thus give way to the voluntary poverty and chastity of the ascetic. St. Francis of Assisi (WWR, Section 68) and Jesus (WWR, Section 70) subsequently emerge as Schopenhauer’s prototypes for the most enlightened lifestyle, in conjunction with the ascetics from every religious tradition.

...the ascetic consciousness can be said symbolically to return Adam and Eve to Paradise, for it is the very quest for knowledge (i.e., the will to apply the principle of individuation to experience) that the ascetic overcomes. This amounts to a self-overcoming at the universal level, where not only physical desires are overcome, but where humanly-inherent epistemological dispositions are overcome as well. — SEP

Sits oddly with Schopenhauer's supposed atheism, but there it is. Incidentally, the 'repulsion' that is described in the first paragraph has an exact parallel in the Buddhist term nibbida.

Socrates calls the Forms hypothesis in the Phaedo. — Fooloso4

He doesn't call them that in the Euthyphro though. The fact is that the Platonic Forms were simply a way of expressing abstract nouns in the same way Goddess Dike represented Justice before Plato.

Plato merely translates the older, more intuitive concept into philosophical language.

Socrates calls the Forms hypothesis in the Phaedo.
— Fooloso4

He doesn't call them that in the Euthyphro though. — Apollodorus

No he doesn't. He doesn't talk about Forms at all. He talks about one Form and calls it a pattern. He says nothing about instrumental causality, a concept of central importance to Gerson. I suspect you do not understand what you copied and pasted and used as an argument from authority.

The fact is that the Platonic Forms were simply a way of expressing abstract nouns in the same way Goddess Dike represented Justice before Plato. — Apollodorus

You're getting closer. Plato replaces the mythology of the gods with the mythology of Forms.

You're getting closer. Plato replaces the mythology of the gods with the mythology of Forms. — Fooloso4

Socrates certainly describes the Forms as causes in the Phaedo. And he doesn't mean that they are mere hypotheses, what he does is to discuss them hypothetically.

And of course, as has been noted by many scholars, he mentions Forms at 6e in the Euthyphro. For Plato and his immediate disciples, terms like "idea", "form", and "pattern", meant Forms. They could mean other things in the everyday sense of the word, but on one level they indisputably meant Platonic Forms as you have already admitted. IMO it would be irrational to dispute this.

Unfortunately the single-minded focus on speculative theories about Platonism, regarded as unquestionable established facts, has resulted in the dialogue itself being ignored.

I agree with Gerson when he says about:

over-critical reading of individual dialogues independently of other dialogues — Apollodorus

The dialogues form larger wholes. Two or more dialogues are tied together in various ways, by the chronology of events, such as Euthyphro and Apology or extended to include Crito and Phaedo, or by a central question such as with the trilogy Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman, or Phaedrus and Symposium on eros. That the dialogues are not independent, however, does not mean that they are not each wholes in themselves. They can be seen in this regard as a version of the problem of the one and the many, with each being one, and together being both many and a whole or one. The Forms themselves represent the same problem.

.. among a few scholars... — Apollodorus

I don't know if Gerson identifies these scholars, but we should not mistake a few scholars for all scholars whose reading of the dialogues does not agree with his or your own.

It was primarily a way of life. — Apollodorus

I agree with him on this as well. Socrates' concern with the human things is a concern for a way of life - the examined life.

This leads back to the question of what guides that way of life. Euthyphro thinks it is some notion of piety, but he is unable to say what that is. To say that it is what the gods love does not tell us what it is that the gods love or how we are to determine what the gods love.

The Socratic way is the way of inquiry, engendered by the desire to become wise. It is to lead an examined life. Rather than assume, like Euthyphro, that you know what you do not know, knowing that you do not know you continue to inquire, to examine, to question.

Gerson may be right about Platonism being about building a theoretical construct out of "Ur-Platonism", but if he is, this shows how far the Socratic way of life is from Platonism. I agree with those scholars who think that Plato and Aristotle are Socratic. But Plato and Aristotle know that the Socratic way of life is only for the few. The many need answers, and so, they give them salutary answers that will guide them.

It comes down to whether we put our faith and trust in and hold fast to these answers or if we do not rest content with what we are told and continue to inquire and examine and evaluate.

Their usual method is to start by taking a dialogue in isolation of other Platonic texts — Apollodorus

What is it you hope to accomplish by making such false claims?

Above on this same page:

The dialogues form larger wholes. Two or more dialogues are tied together in various ways, by the chronology of events, such as Euthyphro and Apology or extended to include Crito and Phaedo, or by a central question such as with the trilogy Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman, or Phaedrus and Symposium on eros. That the dialogues are not independent, however, does not mean that they are not each wholes in themselves. — Fooloso4

Their usual method is to start by taking a dialogue in isolation of other Platonic texts, after which they use terms like "irony", "elenchos", "aporia", "skepticism", etc. to arrive at the most preposterous conclusions designed to demonize Plato and Platonists. — Apollodorus

Do you really find it hard to understand why scholars from different schools would use the same terms that are found in the dialogues?

Anyway, if you are not reading scholars like Sedley and Gerson, who are leading in the field, which scholars do you actually read then??? — Apollodorus

I have mentioned them before. I'll start with Leo Strauss and Jacob Klein, both Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany. Their students and students of their students include most notably Seth Benardete, Stanley Rosen, Allan Bloom, Thomas Pangle, Christopher Bruell, Laurence Lampert, Ronna Burger, Charles Griswold, and many others.

None of them "demonize" Plato. He is of central importance to their philosophical work.

*

"So, do we have an adequate grasp of the fact—even if we should consider it in many ways—that what is entirely, is entirely knowable; and what in no way is, is in every way unknowable?" (477a) — Fooloso4

I read recently that a fundamental theme in Plato is 'to be, is to be intelligible'. Bearing in mind the passages in Phaedo about the fact that the ideas have no opposite - then in some fundamental respect, they truly are - as I think the quotations indicate.

There is an expression in Plato's dialogues which I read of recently, but I can't recall what it is or bring it to mind. It's an expression about the status of sensable things - that they neither truly are, nor are not, but are a kind of mixture of being and becoming. Do you happen to recall that term?

“... although the good isn't being but is still beyond being, exceeding it in dignity (age) and power."(509b)

I often read the expression of 'beyond being' in relation to Platonic philosophy and also in Christian theology. However, I think it ought to be translated as 'beyond existence', because I don't think that 'being' and 'existence' are necessarily synonymous terms in the context of philosophy. Transcendent beings, should there be such beings, are not existent in the same sense that phenomena are existent, as they don't arise and pass away, as do phenomena.

A way of life that rejects the complacency and false piety of believing one knows the divine answers. — Fooloso4

Curiously, and again from later Christian platonism, there is a theme of 'unknowing' - for example the mystical meditation guide 'The Cloud of Unknowing'. I think this sense of 'the good being beyond knowing' is rather easily accomodated in that framework.

There's a term in Indian philosophy, 'viveka' which means 'Sense of discrimination; wisdom; discrimination between the real and the unreal, between the self and the non-self, between the permanent and the impermanent; discriminative inquiry; right intuitive discrimination; ever present discrimination between the transient and the permanent' 1 . This is strongly reminiscent of the discussion of the discernment of the Forms in the Phaedo. — Wayfarer

Viveka in the Greek tradition is diakrisis.

In Plato’s Sophist it is compared to the acts of “sifting”, “straining”, “winnowing” and “separating” and it is the basis for purification of body and soul:

Stranger
Then since there is, according to my reckoning, one art involved in all of these operations, let us give it one name.
Theaetetus
What shall we call it?
Stranger
The art of discrimination.
….
Stranger
And yet, in the instance of discrimination just mentioned there was, first, the separation of worse from better, and, secondly, of like from like.
Theaetetus
Yes, as you now express it, that is pretty clear.
Stranger
Now I know no common name for the second kind of discrimination; but I do know the name of the kind which retains the better and throws away the worse.
Theaetetus
What is it?
Stranger
Every such discrimination, as I think, is universally called a sort of purification.
Theaetetus
Yes, so it is (226c-d).

For Socrates (and Plato), the examined life is a constant examination of our beliefs and actions for the purpose of establishing what is true, good, and just.

Awareness of justice or righteousness (dikaiosyne) enables the philosopher to always act in ways that are good for himself and others.

And the faculty by which one distinguishes between what is right and what is wrong is diakrisis, “judgement”, “discrimination”, “discernment”.

Both “righteousness” and “discrimination” passed into the Christian tradition. The Church Fathers taught that “discrimination is a kind of eye and lantern of the soul”, “mother of the virtues and their guardian”, “queen among the virtues”, etc.

However, it is important to understand that Plato did not blindly adopt the religious beliefs of Athenian society. On the contrary, he introduced a new theology with the cosmic Gods ranking above the Gods of mainstream religion, and a supreme non-personal God above the cosmic Gods. — Apollodorus

So he did something similar as, for example, Christian theologians did and do: Adopt a religious foundation and build on it. I see nothing special about this.

Plato's introduction of the Forms and, above all, the Form of the Good clearly elevates religion above personal Gods. In fact, contemplating the Forms requires no religious beliefs whatsoever. Even atheists can do that.

But can atheists do it in a way that will have the same positive, life-affirming results as when religious people contemplate the Forms?
My personal experience is, they can't. Without that religious foundation that had to be internalized before one's critical thinking abilities developed, contemplation of "metaphysical realities" doesn't amount to anything.

And, of course, there is a strong probability that Socrates did practice some form of contemplation or meditation. It would seem strange for someone to advocate the contemplation of metaphysical realities and not practice it themselves.

But what is meant by "contemplation of metaphysical realities"?

I meditate on your precepts
and consider your ways.
Psalm 119:15 (NIV)

Does it not simply mean 'to obey religious decrees' and all the "contemplation" and "reflection" are really just about bearing in mind the extent and the details of the religious decrees?
I don't think it includes contemplating the possibility that the "metaphysical realities" might not be real at all.

The Symposium (220d-e) certainly relates how Socrates one morning remained standing motionless and absorbed in thoughts until next morning when he prayed to the Sun after which he went on his way, and that this was a habit of his. It is not difficult to imagine him in that state of contemplation or inner vision in which the soul has ascended to and entered the realm of the pure, the everlasting, the immortal and changeless where it dwells in communion with the realities that are like itself (see also Phaedo).

But the method, the method of this absorption is not known to us! And this method is crucial for understanding what exactly it was that he was doing when "standing motionless". I can "stand motionaless" but I will have ascended to the realm of the pure as much as a mole hill. Because I don't have the method.

Note how our notion of truth probably entails some kind of relating to others, however "thinking for ourselves" we might otherwise believe ourselves to be. — baker

I think that those who feel that Plato's philosophy "goes nowhere" either misunderstand philosophy or fail in their efforts for some other reasons.

According to Plato, we already have knowledge of higher realities acquired in past lives.

We learn philosophical teachings from more knowledgeable and experienced people.

We intuitively know which philosophical teachings are correct, and when properly put into practice, they awaken our innate knowledge of higher realities.

When the soul contemplates metaphysical realities, it may be temporarily separated from the material world, but it is increasingly in communion with the metaphysical realities that are like itself (Phaedo 79d).

The more the soul advances on the Platonic Way Upward and its knowledge and consciousness expand, the more it is in unity with other souls, until oneness or union (henosis) with the One has been achieved.

I suspect Socrates and Plato wanted it to be that way: ambiguous and open to interpretation. — Leghorn

Your suspicion possibly points in the right direction.

However, my own suspicion would be that Socrates does not only not deny the divinity of Sun and Moon, but positively acknowledges them as “Gods in heaven” as in the Republic (Rep. 508a) and in the Timaeus where the heavenly bodies are said to be divine, in fact, the whole Cosmos is an ensouled, living being:

We must declare that this Cosmos has verily come into existence as a Living Creature endowed with soul and reason owing to the providence of God (Tim. 30b)

Could it be that Plato became so popular precisely because he was not an atheist and that his views resonated with those of the majority of philosophy students?

I wonder: did he ever exclaim, as did his many interlocutors, in any of the dialogues, “by Zeus!”, or, “by Hera!”, or any of the other stock exclamatory theistic formulae? That would be an interesting topic of research. — Leghorn

As it happens, Socrates does use theistic expressions like "by Zeus" (Cratylus 423c; Rep. 345b) and "if God wills" (Phaedo 69d) quite frequently.

They are not always translated literally, but if you look at the Greek text, you will often find "nai/ma Dia", "yes/no by Zeus/God", etc.

I see what you mean and I certainly don’t disagree. :smile:

However, expressions like "in accordance with the things said" may well be just a manner of speech.

Also, there may be a difference between the way Socrates presents his case to the court and the things he says privately to people who are close to him.

I think his statements in the Phaedo shouldn't be ignored. Would he spend the last hours of his life convincing others of things he himself doesn’t believe in?

I do agree that the impression one gets of Plato is that sometimes he simply wants to get people to think and other times he has some message to convey. But if he does have a message, it does not seem to be atheism. Questioning and examining beliefs, yes, because that is his (or Socrates') particular way. But this does not amount to outright rejection or denial.

At any rate, I know of no serious scholars who are taking the stance that Plato is an atheist. Nor is there any independent credible tradition that claims this to be the case. I could be wrong though.

In none of the references I have read in the subsequent discussion has the 'noble lie' been said to describe the arguments for the immortality of the soul.

Is it argued elsewhere that these arguments in the Phaedo and Meno can be taken to be examples of a 'noble lie'? — Wayfarer

I think that because the precise nature of "the noble lie" is not well established by Plato, it is just sort of allowed for in principle, through mention, this inclines people to judge anything in Plato which they think might be a dishonest representation (even if this determination might be produced from misunderstanding), as "the noble lie".

In a reversal of the turning of the soul toward the Forms in the Republic, there is a turning of the soul to itself, toward self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is guided by knowledge of our ignorance. We do not know the Forms. We do not have a vision of the Forms. The question then is: which way do we turn? Do we turn away from the "human things" in pursuit of some imagined (and it must be imagined if it is not something seen or known) reality or toward it? Do we deceive ourselves by imagining we have escaped the cave because we can imagine something knowable outside the cave attainable either through reason or revelation? — Fooloso4

That's Straussianism though, isn't it?

As Socrates states quite clearly, when the soul focuses on itself and is itself by itself, then it sees realities that are like itself:

But it [the soul] thinks best when none of these things troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor any pleasure, but it is, so far as possible, alone by itself, and takes leave of the body, and avoiding, so far as it can, all association or contact with the body, reaches out toward the reality (Phaedo 65c)

We do not (yet) have a vision of the Forms, but neither do we have a vision of the self. So, by your logic, we should not even attempt to know ourselves.

Plato does not say that we have a vision of either the Forms or the self, but he suggests ways of how such a vision may be a attained.

If we do imagine something, we may or may not "deceive" ourselves (imagination is not always "deceptive"!). However, no one is talking about "imagining" anything. On the contrary, Plato urges philosophers to inquire into reality by means of pure, unalloyed reason.

Needless to say, they aren't going to get very far .... :smile: — Apollodorus

That though, is debatable. All that is required to dispel the nonsense is an extensive reading of Plato's material. However, this is not an effortless task, and the majority of people in our society approach with a prejudice that ancient writings are outdated, unscientific, irrelevant and unimportant. So, there is no inclination to make that effort, and these people (the majority of people in our society) will simply accept what others say as an appropriate representation. And those who say things which are consistent with that prejudice, which frees one from making the effort, will be the ones who are listened to.

Given that what separates the individual mind from the universal mind is the experience based on identification with the physical body and the thoughts etc. associated with it, we can see why Socrates (or Plato) advises philosophers to intellectually and emotionally detach themselves from the physical body and appurtenances, and inquire into the Forms with the pure unalloyed reason alone, when the soul is undisturbed, “itself by itself” and in the company of realities like itself (Phaedo 65c ff.). — Apollodorus

There is a distinct difference between the hierarchical priority described by you, and the one accepted by modern western culture. In western culture, we see material existence as first, prior, and from this, emerges a living body, and finally a human mind. The Neo-Platonist metaphysics places the universal Soul as first, prior, then the individual living soul, then the material body. So the modern western culture has completely reversed the hierarchy. The difference is that the Neo-Platonist metaphysics is based in solid principles, the metaphysics of modern western culture, by which the hierarchy is reversed, is not.

Such as by reading Machiavelli? — baker

Of course. The West has never produced anything other than Machiavelli. And India does not have its own Machiavellis.

Western spirituality has no equivalent to (serial) rebirth or reincarnation, thus making a person limited to what they have here and now and to what they can do here and now. — baker

Not true.

Some are reborn in the womb, those who are wicked in the underworld, the righteous go to heaven, those who are pollutant-free are emancipated (Dhammapada 22.1)

This is exactly what Plato is saying in his dialogues like the Phaedo:

The impure souls wander until the time when they are bound again into a body by their desire for the corporeality that follows them around (81e).
The soul that has performed an impure act, by engaging in unjust killings or perpetrating other similar deeds goes to the lower regions of Hades where it suffers every deprivation until certain lengths of time have elapsed and the soul is by necessity born into the dwellings suitable for it (108c; 114a).
On the other hand, each soul that has passed through its life both purely and decently receives Gods as companions and as guides alike, and then dwells in the region appropriate to it (108c).
The pure soul goes off into what is similar to it, the unseen, the divine, immortal and wise, where after its arrival it can be happy, separated from wandering, unintelligence, fears, and other human evils ... (81a).

Interestingly, Plato describes reincarnation as an “old doctrine”, which suggests that it had been in circulation for some time.

Platonism of course places less emphasis on reincarnation than Buddhism and Hinduism. But this is exactly what one would expect from a system that focuses on liberation.

To me, India has always first and foremost been a country of cholera and poverty. — baker

I don’t know about cholera, but leprosy and poverty, definitely.

The country itself is beautiful, for sure. Some places are like heaven on earth, even though poverty, disease, and death are never far. But the most shocking of all is the extreme materialism that can surpass even what we see in the West.

Having said that, even Nepal and Tibet aren’t much better. Apparently, before it was annexed by China, Tibet outside Buddhist monasteries was ruled by war lords, bandits, and large packs of stray dogs.

This is one of the reasons why I think that Buddhism’s ability to create an ideal society is more wishful thinking than reality. And if that is the case, claims of Buddhist or eastern “superiority” should be taken with a large grain of salt.

The way I see it, in order to find spirituality you need to be spiritual yourself. In which case you will tend to find spirituality wherever you are.

Realistically speaking, “Nirvana” or whatever we choose to call it, is either (a) unattainable (which is the case in the vast majority) or (b) it is attainable through meditation or introspection.

If (b), then Nirvana or enlightenment cannot be something distant, or different, from the meditator. If it is experienced, then there must be an experiencer. And the experiencer is the consciousness that gradually disengages itself from lower forms of experience until it experiences itself.

We may not be in a position to say what is beyond that, but I think all forms of meditation, Platonist, Buddhist, or Hindu, must logically lead to a point where consciousness experiences itself qua consciousness, i.e., not thoughts or consciousness of things.

If we posit a reality other than consciousness, we need to explain what that reality is, which is an impossible task especially in non-materialist terms. Even if we were to deny the existence of consciousness we would merely confirm it, as consciousness is needed to conceive that denial.

Such as by reading Machiavelli?
— baker

Of course. The West has never produced anything other than Machiavelli. — Apollodorus

You misread my tone.

The topic was Westerners who went East and what they have to offer being an enhanced feeling of inner happiness and peace (and perhaps a certain degree of self-importance), all of which may be equally achieved with practices that are available closer to home.
I think that much of what goes on under the heading of "religion" and "spirituality" is actually right-winger mentality. I'm not sure it is even possible to be religious/spiritual without being a right-wing authoritarian.

It's not clear it's even possible to get "an enhanced feeling of inner happiness and peace" from studying Plato and acting accordingly. Or from following the principles in De Imitatione Christi. The Prince, on the other hand, seems a more likely source. It's not a conicidence that religious/spiritual people tend to associate with right-wing political options, and that right-wing political options tend to associate with religion, insofar said religion has been a majority religion in the region for a long time (and that can be Roman Catholicism in traditionally Catholic countries, or Buddhism in traditionally Buddhist countries). Most Western Buddhists I know fit the right-wing profile, some are even vocal supporters of Trump.

And India does not have its own Machiavellis.

I don't appreciate your tone and you ascribing to me some kind of secret admiration for the East, or specifically, India. I've thought about writing you a long list of things I resent about the East, or, specifically, India. I decided against doing so. But if you persist, I might change my mind.

My only interest is in the Pali Canon, and because of this, I'm actually resented by Easterners and Westerners alike.
This is the type of attitude one usually gets if one is interested in the Pali Canon.

Western spirituality has no equivalent to (serial) rebirth or reincarnation, thus making a person limited to what they have here and now and to what they can do here and now.
— baker

Not true.

Some are reborn in the womb, those who are wicked in the underworld, the righteous go to heaven, those who are pollutant-free are emancipated (Dhammapada 22.1)

This is exactly what Plato is saying in his dialogues like the Phaedo:

The impure souls wander until the time when they are bound again into a body by their desire for the corporeality that follows them around (81e).
The soul that has performed an impure act, by engaging in unjust killings or perpetrating other similar deeds goes to the lower regions of Hades where it suffers every deprivation until certain lengths of time have elapsed and the soul is by necessity born into the dwellings suitable for it (108c; 114a).
On the other hand, each soul that has passed through its life both purely and decently receives Gods as companions and as guides alike, and then dwells in the region appropriate to it (108c).
The pure soul goes off into what is similar to it, the unseen, the divine, immortal and wise, where after its arrival it can be happy, separated from wandering, unintelligence, fears, and other human evils ... (81a).

The passage is too short to be able to discern much from it. It seems to be compatible with some more secular, "generous" versions of Christian doctrine, but it's not clear how far it is compatible with Buddhism.

Platonism of course places less emphasis on reincarnation than Buddhism and Hinduism.

Folk Buddhism "places a lot of emphasis" on rebirth. In the suttas, rebirth is mostly part of cautionary tales.

But this is exactly what one would expect from a system that focuses on liberation.

How does one achive liberation according to Platonism?

Does Platonism have a teaching on dependent co-arising?

This is one of the reasons why I think that Buddhism’s ability to create an ideal society is more wishful thinking than reality.

What a strange idea. The Buddhism of the Pali suttas is not concerned with creating a society at all, ideal or not. It gives some pointers on how to make do when living in a society, but its aim is to leave the process of rebirth (and with it, social life) altogether. The Buddhism of the Pali suttas is, essentially, a self-terminating project.

In the course of this thread (or a similar theme), people have posted links to articles talking about secular Buddhism and how it can contribute to society, or help create a better one, and such.
I have no interest in such "Buddhism". I do not believe that Buddhism can in any way create a better society or help toward it. Given its origin, I think it's actually rather bizarre that it had become a major religion in the world.

The way I see it, in order to find spirituality you need to be spiritual yourself. In which case you will tend to find spirituality wherever you are.

I generally dislike the term "spiritual", "spirituality". I do not consider myself "spiritual". I feel sickened if I read about "spirituality".

Realistically speaking, “Nirvana” or whatever we choose to call it, is either (a) unattainable (which is the case in the vast majority)

What do you mean by "which is the case in the vast majority"? That most people cannot attain nirvana?

or (b) it is attainable through meditation or introspection.

If (b), then Nirvana or enlightenment cannot be something distant, or different, from the meditator. If it is experienced, then there must be an experiencer. And the experiencer is the consciousness that gradually disengages itself from lower forms of experience until it experiences itself.

We may not be in a position to say what is beyond that, but I think all forms of meditation, Platonist, Buddhist, or Hindu, must logically lead to a point where consciousness experiences itself qua consciousness, i.e., not thoughts or consciousness of things.

If we posit a reality other than consciousness, we need to explain what that reality is, which is an impossible task especially in non-materialist terms. Even if we were to deny the existence of consciousness we would merely confirm it, as consciousness is needed to conceive that denial.

Again, back to dependent co-arising.

Since you spoke approvingly of phenomenology, I was asking where you thought it fit in Gerson's schema where 'Platonism' or 'Naturalism' are the only possible approaches and the attempts to find 'rapprochement' between the two are a fool's errand" — Paine

Here, once again, we can see how it is useful to separate Plato from Platonism.

From the Timaeus:

So then, Socrates, if, in saying many things on many topics concerning gods and the birth of the all, we prove to be incapable of rendering speeches that are always and in all respects in agreement with themselves and drawn with precision, don’t be surprised. But if we provide likelihoods inferior to none, we should be well-pleased with them, remembering that I who speak as well as you my judges have a human nature, so that it’s fitting for us to be receptive to the likely story about these things and not search further for anything beyond it. (29c-d).

His imprecision is seen here as well:

As for all the heaven (or cosmos, or whatever else it might be most receptive to being called, let us call it that) … (28b).

Why not be more precise? Isn’t it imperative to be precise in matters of metaphysics and cosmogony?

We are human beings, capable of telling likely stories, but incapable of discerning the truth of such things. In line with the dialogues theme of what is best, Timaeus proposes it is best to accept likely stories and not search for what is beyond the limits of our understanding.

Socrates approves and urges him to perform the song (nomos). Nomos means not only song but law and custom or convention. In the absence of truth there is nomos. But not just any song, it is one that is regarded as best to accept because it is told with an eye to what is best. One that harmonizes being and becoming.

In several places Socrates calls the Forms hypothetical. In the Phaedo he combines a hypothetical account based on Forms together with an account based on physical causes.

In short, Plato cannot be situated on either side of Gerson's schema.

Starting with the Presocratics, Greek philosophers were very sceptical of mythology. Plato (and probably Socrates) thought the ideal republic ought to curtail the teaching of myths. — Jamal

We should make a distinction between myths and what is called "mythology". Plato makes frequent use of myths. Some are his inventions, some are reworked from existing myths, some are said to be of foreign origin. In the Republic myths serve a necessary function, but they are taken from the poets and put in the hands of the philosopher-kings. Put differently, the philosopher-kings are philosopher-poets.

In the Phaedo the limits of reasoned speech leaves them in danger of misologic. The truth is, we do not know the truth of what happens when we die, and so Socrates turns to myths. The myths are intended to "charm away" their fears and to persuade them to live just lives.

I think Plato the puppet-master is well aware that there will always be those who fool themselves into believing that having read about the cave that they have thereby escaped it.

It should be noted that there are several stages on the road to freedom from the cave. The image of a transcendent reality outside the cave remains a shadow on the cave wall. Perhaps the best we can do is to become aware of the image-makers, those who shape our opinions, and not mistake our images of the truth for the truth itself.

@Shawn As to the question of martyrdom and guilt, escape from the cave is escape from the city. Socrates was a citizen of the city in the double sense of place or Chora.

The term chora in its original sense means the territory outside the city proper. The Phaedrus is the only Platonic dialogue in which Socrates appears outside the city. In the country he says he has nothing to learn (230d). I will leave the question of whether he could or did learn anything "from the trees" open.

Socrates is atopos, out of place. With regard to the city proper he is out of place because his thinking is cosmopolitan rather than provincial. But outside the city proper he is also out of place. On the one hand he demonstrates his allegiance to the city of Athens, but on the other his philosophical practice is transgressive. This inbetweenness is characteristic of Plato's chora.

The city in its broadest and most general sense is society, the space of human life, our place. In this sense it is not this city or that city, not Athens or Sparta, in which we might find our place. But this place is neither here nor there. At its heart is an indeterminacy. We can argue in favor of or against his choice and why he made it without coming to a clear conclusion. One thing is clear, however, he acted decisively. The ambiguity of life did not lead him to paralysis. However much they may be at odds we must both reason and act.

He did not live his life in fear of or avoidance of death. Here too, however much they are at odds with each other, it is not simply a choice of one or the other. In his jail cell as he is about to die Socrates says:

Other people may well be unaware that all who actually engage in philosophy aright are practising nothing other than dying and being dead. (Phaedo 64a)

Alongside the dyads of reason and action and life and death is the dyad of comedy and tragedy. We should not miss the comic element in the above statement to his friends about philosophy and death.

I don't see that at all. I get a lot from Fooloso4's posts, but mainly I get how little I know about Plato, and the Herculean task of becoming more familiar with the labyrinthine layers of meaning.

A general question I have is this: I think there is a widespread mistake in the understanding of the term 'Forms'. I think it's almost universally taken to be something like shape - after all, in English, 'shape' and 'form' are very close in meaning. But I would have thought that a better modern interpretation would be something like 'principle'.

For instance, there's an argument in the Phaedo (which I don't recall being discussed in the thread on that dialogue) called The Argument from Imperfection (reference). Basically this revolves around the 'idea of Equals'. It points out that there is no physical instantiation or example of 'Equals'. It argues that things that we see as equal - two sticks, or two stones - are not really equal but merely alike. Plato argues that the ability to grasp 'Equal' amounts to grasping the Form of Equal, which is something that is done solely by the Intellect, not by sensory apprehension.

That argument has intuitive appeal to me, because I believe that it is indeed true that 'Equal' has no physical instantiation, and yet it is a fundamental element of mathematical and indeed general reasoning.

What are the advantages of doing that? It seems absurd at face value. — frank

The advantage is versatility. This versatility is what allows things to be "equal in one respect and unequal in another", as Socrates points out in Wayfarer's quoted passage. Two things can be equal in weight, or height, or width, or type, or duration, whatever you want.

The perfect, ideal equality, which Socrates refers to as "abstract equality", gets reformulated by Aristotle as the law of identity, which is indicated by .

As Socrates argues in the Phaedo, no two things, being different by the very fact that they are two things, can obtain ideal equality. Therefore, as you argue, we as human beings have an idea of perfect equality which no two things can possibly display to us. So Aristotle looks at this idea of perfect equality, and determines that it can only describe something real if it describes the relationship which a thing has with itself. This is the law of identity, a thing is the same as it itself.

This provides us with the difference between "equal" and "same" (when we adhere to a strict definition of "same"). "Equal" is a relation between two distinct things. "Same" is proposed as the relation between an object and itself. It is important to notice that "same" is artificial, a human designation derived from the a priori, and it is not proper to say that an object establishes a relation with itself, as if it were two distinct objects. This is the problem with using "relation" to speak of identity, it implies two objects, when the law of identity is meant to strictly enforce the ideal identity, the separate and independent One.

What we can see, or at least what I think we can learn from this, is that Plato (Socrates) segregated the ideal, abstract "equality" from all the actual instances of usage of "equal". it's a perfection, or ideal, which falls outside the scale of usage. In a way it marks the limit to the scale of perfection, but it also leaves the scale unlimited because nothing which is measured by that scale can obtain that perfection, but anything can be measured. This is similar to the traditional us of "infinite" as an ideal. Then Aristotle takes this ideal, which doesn't appear to refer to anything real by Socrates' argument, only a phantom intuition in the mind coming from God knows where, and he assigns something very real to it, the particular, as expressing perfect equality by being "the same" as itself. Now the particular, an individual, independent object, as a unity, can be apprehended as the real ideal, One.

In this way the existence of such ideals, which neither Plato nor Socrates could explain, as appearing to come from somewhere within (through recollection), are validated as having a real and true referent. Aristotle does the same thing with the ideal "infinite". He shows how the sense of "infinite" employed by mathematicians lacks in perfection, being a potentiality rather than an actuality. This is similar to the way that the mathematician's use of "equal" lacks in perfection as shown by Socrates. Each use of "infinite" is derived from a failure to meet the true ideal infinite, which is "eternal". Then he separate "eternal" as the ideal, from "infinite" as the imperfect representation occurring in common usage, and shows how the "eternal" is real and actual as implying what is outside of time.

I found that puzzling, given that, so far as I know, he never abandoned the doctrine of reincarnation. — Ludwig V

Plato does not have a doctrine of reincarnation.Socrates tells some problematic myths. One problem is that if we start with the premise that knowledge is recollection of what was learned in a previous life then there would never be a time when knowledge was learned. But, on the other hand, if it was learned then it could not have been in that case that knowledge was recollected.

In the Phaedo the immutable human soul can become the soul of donkeys and other animals of this sort, or wolves and falcons and hawks, or bees or wasps or ants. (82a -b)

The problem is obvious. What happens to the human soul? The soul of these animals is not a human soul. Such transformation is contrary to the claim of an immutable human soul.

Socrates is well aware of the weakness of his arguments:

“Certainly, in many ways it’s still open to suspicions and counterattacks - if, that is, somebody’s going to go through it sufficiently. “(84c)

His hint should not be overlooked. If you go through the argument sufficiently then its weakness becomes apparent.

Plato's idea of an account in the Theaetetus is what we might call an analysis of whatever we are giving an account of in terms of its elements. — Ludwig V

An analysis of an account is itself an account, but the Greek term logos, is much broader than analysis. Perhaps @Paine can point to the passage from the dialogue.

Thanks Tom.

I can't help but hold the view that reality is an act of constructionism - we can't identify absolute truth (which is likely a remnant of Greek philosophy and Christianity) and philosophical positions we might hold appear to be culturally located. — Tom Storm

Plato begins to look very different once we separate Plato and Platonism. A couple of quick points: in the Phaedo the Forms are identified as hypotheses. This is not a break with, but rather a continuation of what is said about hypothesis in the Republic and Parmenides. In the Timaeus the arche or origin and ordering of the cosmos is a "likely story". Here the Forms are criticized for being stable and unchanging and thus inadequate as a causal explanation.

Also important is the activity of the imagination. The term 'constuctivism' is not used but poiesis meaning to make is.

I think we can still create tentative notions of 'the good' based on secular mechanisms — Tom Storm

I agree. This is the antidote to nihilism.

To paraphrase Bertrand Russell, we model the world mathematically not because we know so much about it, but because we know so little.
— Wayfarer

That's very nice, but there's a lot more to say. We only can know a little because of the creatures we are. Bandwidth is small and reality is big. — Srap Tasmaner

I think you're downplaying the faculty of reason here. 'Bandwidth', obviously a technological analogy, refers to the rate at which information can be transferred. But that may not have much to do with the question of why 'the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics'.

One passage from Plato's dialogues that I have recently re-discovered is the 'argument from equals' in the Phaedo. To paraphrase: At 74b, Socrates asks, "do not equal stones and sticks sometimes, while remaining the same, appear to one person to be equal and to another to be unequal"? The point being that sticks of equal length appear both equal and unequal, i.e., they appear to be and to not be equal.

Sticks that appear to be equal and unequal are imperfectly equal. However, the recognition of the sticks as imperfectly equal requires knowledge of perfect equality - otherwise, in virtue of what are they being recognized as imperfect? "Whenever someone, on seeing something, realizes that that which he now sees wants to be like some other reality but falls short and cannot be like that other since it is inferior, do we agree that the one who thinks this must have prior knowledge of that to which he says it is like, but deficiently so?" (74d)

This knowledge must be acquired before the recognition of the sticks as imperfectly equal, i.e., before sense perception; therefore, acquired before birth.

It is traditionally said from this and numerous other passages that Socrates (and Plato) hold that this faculty is acquired before birth, in line with belief in the pre-existence of the soul. In today's terms, however, I don't think it would be too outlandish to say that the faculty is innate. But even that is controversial: the empiricist dogma of 'tabula rasa' still has a very strong hold on naturalism. (This is why, I think, there is such controversy about platonism in mathematics.) The empiricist account will generally be 'well, we see many things that are equal or near equal, so we acquire the idea of equality from experience'. But the rationalist rejoiner might be that, were we not able to perceive the abstract 'equals' by reason, then no amount of experience will convey that insight. Furthermore that this is simply one example of the innummerable kinds of cases where we are able to derive conclusions based on foundational notions of 'equals', 'not equals' 'same as', 'different to', foundational to logic and mathematics.