How are you defining both 'soul' and 'Soul' ? — Amity

I answered this yesterday but I should have made the problem clearer. According to Socrates "safe" answer it is Life that brings life to the body.

Then, my friend, we were talking of things that have opposite qualities and naming these after them, but now we say that these opposites themselves, from the presence of which in them things get their name, never can tolerate the coming to be from one another.(103b-c)

According to this the correct answer is the presence of Life makes it living. This gives us the opposites Life and Death.

But after the unnamed man's question and the response Socrates gives above he begins again. According to this new beginning it is not Heat that makes a body hot but fire. (105b-c) We can now see why the new sophisticated answer is not a safe answer. In accord with this new beginning Socrates says:

Answer me then, what is it that, present in a body, makes it living?

Cebes: A soul. (105c)

There are two problems with this. Soul brings life to a body as fire brings heat, but just as the body loses heat when the fire dies, the body loses life when the soul dies. Socrates obscures this problem. He says the fire retreats, or the snow retreats, but these are things not Forms. The snow melts, the fire dies. Second, if there is Soul itself what is its opposite? It can't be body because in the presence of one Form its opposite retreats.

Thanks for returning to the question and providing an excellent and thought-provoking follow-up.

Amity Ha ha! I think you've caught me out speculating now. (Remembering an earlier reminder to stick to the text....). — Cuthbert

I encourage you to continue the discussion. It is directly related to the text. Perhaps not what you had in mind but one meaning of from the gut is something known without being taught, inborn knowledge or recollection.

Thank you for the suggestions. Theaetetus is of great interest to me.

The problem with the analysis is that it misses the distinction between forms and particulars. It is the form that cannot admit its opposite and so "flees", not the particular. Socrates uses the example of Snow/snow. The form Snow does not perish but the snow on the ground does not " flee" at the approach of heat it perishes. In the same way, the form Soul cannot admit death and flees, but a particular soul perishes.

What is translated here as the "abstract idea" is the form. The passage continues with the example of Odd. The "something else" that has the name of the form is in this example three. Three is odd but not the Odd itself, that is, not the form or "abstract idea". Three never admits Even.

“So the soul will never admit the opposite of that which it brings along, as we agree from what has been said?” (105d)

The soul brings along Life. The opposite of what the soul brings along is Death. In accord with what has been said, snow brings Cold and three Odd. Snow cannot admit Hot without being destroyed. Three cannot admit Even and remain three. In the same way, soul cannot admit Death and remain soul.

Just as Cold and Odd retreat but not the snow or three, Life retreats but not the soul. Death comes and the soul perishes or is destroyed.

I can’t see how the reading supports that. The body perishes or is destroyed but I simply don’t see how this passage admits this of the soul, also. — Wayfarer

I don't agree with F's interpretation, but I don't think this sort of attitude is called for. There's no reason we can't just exchange perspectives in a civil manner, Wayfarer.

there was nothing uncivil in what I said. Simply putting another view.

there was nothing uncivil in what I said. Simply putting another view. — Wayfarer

You actually directly disagreed, that's more than just "putting another view."

I do disagree but I did so with all due courtesy and respect. I’m genuinely trying to understand and am quite willing to be corrected.

It cannot determine what happens to us when we die. — Fooloso4

Agree. Thanks for the clarification!

I do disagree but I did so with all due courtesy and respect. I’m genuinely trying to understand and am quite willing to be corrected. — Wayfarer

Excellent. Keep up the good work.

Socrates is not trying to convince anyone of anything, except, I suppose, that his imminent death is no reason to freak out and abandon philosophy, or dialectic, as he would say.

Departure is all that is real. And nothing remains. In logical parlance, inference from a premise is an "extension". But this only means it, reason, is no real term. That is, the terms of reason are only real in the discipline that ultimately undoes them. If realness is departure then the only possible recognition of the departed is the terms rigorously effaced in the rigor of their extension.

Those engaged in the dialectic evince who they really are in the quality of their discipline dedicated to the eventuation of departure, of being departed and only known from the character of that discipline eventuating it. We talk. And we show our worth by proving how wrong every premise is that would preserve our convictions. Becoming unconvinced, through a most rigorous exercise, is who we are. The point is, then, to keep the discussion alive even as the end is most near.

One thing should be clear, to take Socrates as making certain assertions is a mug's game.

The point I was making earlier in my reply to Fooloso4 was:

I think you are using the wrong translation.

Socrates says:
“… when death attacks the human being, the mortal part of him dies, it seems, whereas the immortal part departs intact and undestroyed, and is gone, having retreated from death […] And so, more surely than anything, Cebes, soul is immortal and imperishable, and all our souls really will exist in Hades” 106e -107a

Cebes replies :
“For my part, Socrates, I’ve nothing else to say against this, nor can I doubt the arguments in any way”. 107a

Simmias agrees, but still has some doubts:
“… I’m compelled still to keep some doubt in my mind about what has been said” 107b

Socrates has the final word:
“As it is, however, since the soul is evidently immortal, it could have no means of safety or of escaping evils, other than becoming both as good and as wise as possible”

Concerning the myth he tells of Hades, Socrates says:
“… since the soul turns out to be immortal, I think that for someone who believes this to be so it is both fitting and worth the risk – for fair is the risk – to insist that either what I have said or something like it is true concerning our souls and their dwelling places” 114d

For some strange reason you keep leaving out "However, since the soul turns out to be immortal". — Apollodorus

And, as explained on the other thread, given that Socrates used his account of immortality and afterlife to comfort his friends, it makes no sense to interpret his expression "one must chant this to oneself" to mean that everything is just a myth. On the contrary, its only logical meaning is "keep saying it to yourself", i.e., "believe it and take comfort in it". This was Socrates' last instruction to his followers.

But, like everyone else here, I do my best to understand and I am, of course, willing to be corrected and instructed in the actual truth.

I am not going to go over the same things with you again and again without end. You have stated your position, why repeat it? Why quote yourself repeating it yet again?

...we must follow the argument wherever, like a wind, it may lead us (Republic 394d)

There are two ways of reading the dialogues that move in opposite directions. The first attempts to limit them, to close them off, to put an end to inquiry and discussion. The first was is dogmatic, and sees the dialogues as conforming to and confirming the reader's beliefs. The second allows the dialogues to open up, to give a view of a complex terrain of interrelated questions and problems, or in some cases leading the reader into a labyrinth, and in all cases aporia.

The second allows the dialogues to open up, to give a view of a complex terrain of interrelated questions and problems, or in some cases leading the reader into a labyrinth, and in all cases aporia. — Fooloso4

Well, that's exactly where the problem lies. You are not "allowing the dialogue to open up" at all. You are reading things into it that are simply not there. You are building a Straussian labyrinth (or rabbit hole) and jump right into it and expect others to follow you.

These are your own statements from page 12, are they not?

Immediately following this story Socrates says:

No sensible man would insist that these things are as I have described them, but I think it is fitting for a man to risk the belief—for the risk is a noble one—that this, or something like this, is true about our souls and their dwelling places … (114d)

Myths do not reveal the truth. And yet Socrates tells them myths. They are not a substitute for arguments, but argument has its limits. Simmias was not fully convinced by Socrates’ arguments. He was no longer distrustful of the arguments, but still has some lingering distrust within himself. (107b) Throughout the dialogue Socrates has referred to myth as a means of self-persuasion. Here again he says that one should “sing incantations to himself, over and over again”(114d)
....
Socrates seems to have persuaded himself and wants to persuade others that what is best is to be persuaded that what is is best. — Fooloso4

From what I see, your statement suggests that (1) Socrates is "telling them myths" and (2) has "persuaded himself and wants to persuade others".

But what he actually says is:

"... this or something like it is true concerning our souls and their abodes, since the soul is shown to be immortal..."

Besides, if Socrates' intention is to comfort his friends, why would he tell them at the very end "actually, all this is just a myth"?

It makes no sense whatsoever. And he does not say so.

Incidentally, Socrates does not say "one should sing incantations to himself, over and over again".

The text simply says "There is a need to sing such things to oneself (as to soothe oneself)".

This clearly indicates Socrates' intention to soothe or comfort his friends, not to tell them myths or lies.

Socrates says 'one must chant such things to oneself' — Apollodorus

I think that's a reference to 'mantrayana', repetition of a sacred word of phrase.

@Wayfarer @Apollodorus
Yes,socrates use of mantras shows how a lot of the worlds spiritual and mystical traditions use similiar techniques to obtain union with the divine.

I think that's a reference to 'mantrayana', repetition of a sacred word of phrase — Wayfarer

The verb is ἐπαείδω epaeido “sing to someone as to soothe him” which is the same verb used at 77e in the sense of “sing someone’s fear away”:

https://lsj.gr/wiki/%E1%BC%90%CF%80%CE%B1%CE%B5%CE%AF%CE%B4%CF%89

If it is a "mantra", what exactly would the "sacred word or phrase" be at 114d, 77e, etc?

Socrates says:

“ 'Greece is a large country, Cebes, which has good men in it, I suppose; and there are many foreign races too. You must ransack all of them in search of such a singer, sparing neither money nor toil, because there isn’t anything more necessary on which to spend your money. And you yourselves must search too, along with one another; you may not easily find anyone more capable of doing this than yourselves.' “(78a)

Yes, reading that passage again, perhaps not a reference to mantram. But the symbolic imagery of 'songs' and their restorative power is intriguing. It almost seems an aside, in the context of the overall dialogue.

It definitely isn't a reference to mantrams. It is a Greek expression similar to singing a lullaby to a child to soothe them and is perfectly consistent with 77e where it expressly refers to singing away a child's fear.

Nothing to do with "incantations" or "Socrates convincing himself" of something he believes to be a myth.

If he does believe it to be a myth, why would he try to convince himself? And why would he say "since the soul turns out to be immortal", etc.?

Rather, the fact is that Socrates simply tells the story - mythos can perfectly well mean "story" or "account" - to comfort his friends (and perhaps to overcome his own fear) as would be entirely normal in the situation. After all, he was only human.

It is about your claim that Socrates at 114d is telling his friends that "one should “sing incantations to himself, over and over again”, which is not true. — Apollodorus

It is a direct quote. Here's another translation:

... and he ought to repeat such things to himself as if they were magic charms ...

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0170%3Atext%3DPhaedo%3Apage%3D114

mythos can perfectly well mean "story" — Apollodorus

Right. You are catching on now. It was your own incorrect assumption that for the Greeks myths meant lies.

The quote continues:

which is the reason why I have been lengthening out the story so long.

It is a direct quote. Here's another translation:

... and he ought to repeat such things to himself as if they were magic charms ... — Fooloso4

Right. So "again and again" is not in the Greek text!

And neither is "as if they were magic charms".

The text simply says "sing to oneself". And the verb used is ἐπαείδω epaeido "sing to" which is the same verb used at 77e in the sense of “sing someone’s fear away”.

But, obviously, you can't read Greek and you always use translations that suit your Straussian agenda.

In any case, the story about "chanting incantations again and again" is your own invention.

So "again and again" is not in the Greek text! — Apollodorus

If you want to quibble over the difference between 'again and again' and 'repeat' then go ahead.

The text simply says "sing to oneself". And the verb used is ἐπαείδω epaeido "sing to" which is the same verb used at 77e in the sense of “sing someone’s fear away”. — Apollodorus

According to Liddell and Scott:

2 sing as an incantation, ἃ αἱ Σειρῆνες ἐπῇδον τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ X.Mem.2.6.11; χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ Pl.Phd.114d, cf. 77e; ἐ. ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον Id.R.608a; ἐ. τινί sing to one so as to charm or soothe him, Id.Phdr.267d, Lg.812c, al.:—Pass., Porph.Chr.35: abs., use charms or incantations, Pl.Tht.157c; ἐπαείδων by means of charms, A.Ag.1021 (lyr.), cf. Pl.Lg.773d, Tht.149d.

Your compulsive obsession with finding some point, however insignificant, to argue against, is, if not pathological, small minded.

Socrates argues that the soul cannot be an attunement if the tuning existed prior to what is tuned. But there is an argument that Socrates neglects to pursue. 'Tuned and Untuned'. The tuning of a lyre exists apart from any particular lyre. It is the same relationship between the Equal and things that are equal, and the Beautiful or Just and things that are beautiful or just. In accord with that argument the Tuning of the Lyre still exists, but the tuning of a particular lyre does not endure once that lyre is destroyed. Why does he neglect this? The consequence would be the death of the soul along with the body.

The Tuning of the Lyre exists apart from any particular lyre. The Tuning is the relationship between frequencies of the strings. It is this relationship of frequencies that is used to tune a particular lyre. Analogously, the Tuning of the body exists apart from any particular body, it is the relationship of bodily parts, but the tuning of any particular body suffers the same fate as the tuning of any particular lyre.

Soul, however, is a special exception. If upon the approach of death it were (b) to perish, it would also (c) take on the opposite property to the one it bears, that is, become a dead soul. Therefore in the special case of soul, perishing is ruled out, and on the approach of death there is only one thing left for it to do: it retreats … — Apollodorus

The claim that the soul is "special" and therefore what applies to other things he gives examples of as snow and three does not apply to it weak. It does not become a "dead soul" any more that snow becomes hot or three things becomes even. Neither the snow nor the three things retreats, they perish. If the soul is not like those examples then the argument still fails because the cases used in the argument are not comparable.

If you want to quibble over the difference between 'again and again' and 'repeat' then go ahead. — Fooloso4

If you want to invent things that are not in the original text and believe in your own inventions, then go ahead. But in that case don't expect anyone to take you seriously. :grin:

According to Liddell and Scott:

2 sing as an incantation, ἃ αἱ Σειρῆνες ἐπῇδον τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ X.Mem.2.6.11; χρὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὥσπερ ἐπᾴδειν ἑαυτῷ Pl.Phd.114d, cf. 77e; ἐ. ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον Id.R.608a; ἐ. τινί sing to one so as to charm or soothe him, Id.Phdr.267d, Lg.812c, al.:—Pass., Porph.Chr.35: abs., use charms or incantations, Pl.Tht.157c; ἐπαείδων by means of charms, A.Ag.1021 (lyr.), cf. Pl.Lg.773d, Tht.149d. — Fooloso4

Yes, "sing to one so as to soothe him". Exactly as at 77e where Socrates says:

You must sing to him every day until you drive it [the fear] away

Socrates' intention is to soothe or comfort his friends with a narrative that he believes in, not to tell them lies and also them them that he is telling them lies.

Your claims are illogical and absurd and stand refuted.