It's worth while to read Plato but when he says the soul is immaterial and that something immaterial like this doesn't come in more or less, he is talking about something he can't know anything about imo

Unexamined, irrational or morally questionable beliefs may indeed be "shameful", but certainly not beliefs in general? — Apollodorus

She says, further to that quote:

it involves a notion of 'belief' that is rather different from contemporary notions. Today, it is a widespread assumption that true beliefs are better than false beliefs, and that some true beliefs (perhaps those that come with justifications) qualify as knowledge. Socratic epistemology offers a genuinely different picture. In aiming for knowledge, one must aim to get rid of beliefs. Knowledge does not entail belief. Belief and knowledge differ in such important ways that they cannot both count as kinds of belief. As long as one does not have knowledge, one should reserve judgment and investigate by thinking through possible ways of seeing things.

This rings true to me.

Katja Vogt is Professor of Classics at Colombia, and the author of the SEP article on ancient skepticism. (I bought the book that the quotes are an abstract from, Belief and Truth, although haven't made a lot of headway with it.)

But to get to the point, here I think she's talking about 'doxai', about the whole mechanism of belief as a cognitive mode. I think 'ancient scepticism' comes from an very different background culture to our own - not only a different culture, but a different period of history, and a different way of being.

I think it is natural to assume many beliefs, and we bring them to everything we look at, whether consciously or not. But I also think this is precisely what is being questioned in these dialogues. However I don't necessarily think this entails unbelief, which is different to scepticism (even though modern scepticism usually means unbelief). It is closer to 'suspension of judgement', epoché - a real sense of not knowing and of not coming to a conclusion based on belief. I think it is based on contemplative insight.

Since our actions reflect what we hold to be true, holding beliefs is potentially harmful for oneself and others. Accordingly, beliefs are ethically worrisome and even, in the words of Plato’s Socrates, “shameful.”' — Wayfarer

I think Vogt is right in saying that there is a difference between true belief and knowledge. I don't know the context in which belief is said to be shameful, but I suspect it has something to do with the philosopher, one who desires knowledge and wisdom. To be content with belief or opinion would be shameful. But the importance of belief in the dialogues should not be overlooked.

The problem is brought into focus by Simmias:

“It seems to me, Socrates, as perhaps to you too, that in these matters certain knowledge is either impossible or very hard to come by in this life; but that even so, not to test what is said about them in every possible way, without leaving off till one has examined them exhaustively from every aspect, shows a very feeble spirit; on these questions one must achieve one of two things: either learn or find out how things are; or, if that's impossible, he must sail through life in the midst of danger, seizing on the best and the least refutable of human accounts, at any rate, and letting himself be carried upon it as on a raft - unless, that is, he could journey more safely and less dangerously on a more stable carrier, some divine account.” (85c-d)

It is not just in the dialogue that arguments are to be exhaustively tested, and in the timeframe of a dialogue it cannot be done. We too much test the arguments. We should never accept what is agreed on as the final word or truth of the matter. To not do so "shows a very feeble spirit".

In addition to finding the best accounts Socrates calculates the risk of holding a belief:

“ For I am calculating - behold how self-servingly!- that if what I’m saying happens to be true, I’m well off believing it; and if there’s nothing at all for one who’s met his end, well then, I’ll make myself so much less unpleasant with lamenting to those who are present during this time, the time before my death.” (91b)

But it is not only his own beliefs he is concerned with. To the extent that myths are persuasive they are so without an argument or account. With regard to accounts he gives some odd advice:

“Then would you not avoid saying that when one is added to one it is the addition and when it is divided it is the division that is the cause of two? And you would loudly exclaim that you do not know how else each thing can come to be except by sharing in the particular reality in which it shares, and in these cases you do not know of any other cause of becoming two except by sharing in Twoness, and that the things that are to be two must share in this, as that which is to be one must share in Oneness, and you would dismiss these additions and divisions and other such subtleties, and leave them to those wiser than yourself to answer. But you, afraid, as they say, of your own shadow and your inexperience, would cling to the safety of your own hypothesis and give that answer. If someone then attacked your hypothesis itself, you would ignore him and would not answer until you had examined whether the consequences that follow from it agree with one another or contradict one another.” (101c-d)

At the same time as he exhorts the would be philosopher to not settle for opinions he is an opinion maker and leads some to believe that his mythologies are truths of the world outside the cave, that is, a world freed of opinion.

Socrates does indeed speak of something like "soul", but, for goodness sake, don't confuse this with the Christian era notion. Whatever he calls it, it should probably be rendered in the usual term "shade", something that even at the time was conceived, even by its most fervent believers, as barely a toehold of being real at all, — Gary M Washburn

The term psyche or "soul" was initially used by Homer in the sense of “departed soul, ghost. But it was also used with reference to “conscious self”, “various aspects of the self”, “moral and intellectual self”, “primary substance and source of life”, “spirit of the universe”, etc.:

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.04.0058:entry=yuxh/

The soul may have been a "shade" at the time of Homer. However, this changed with the development of the concept of paradise-like locations like the Elysian Fields and the Isles of the Blessed whose inhabitants engage in leisure activities such as playing games, holding friendly contests, and playing music. Of course, this was reserved for the select few, the vast majority would be destined for a shadowy existence in the underworld.

What Socrates describes certainly sounds like much more than a "shade".

See also:

By the end of the fifth century — the time of Socrates' death — soul is standardly thought and spoken of, for instance, as the distinguishing mark of living things, as something that is the subject of emotional states and that is responsible for planning and practical thinking, and also as the bearer of such virtues as courage and justice. Coming to philosophical theory, we first trace a development towards comprehensive articulation of a very broad conception of soul, according to which the soul is not only responsible for mental or psychological functions like thought, perception and desire, and is the bearer of moral qualities, but in some way or other accounts for all the vital functions that any living organism performs. This broad conception, which is clearly in close contact with ordinary Greek usage by that time, finds its fullest articulation in Aristotle's theory.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ancient-soul/

Convincing, on the face of it. But seems to confuse two significations. Life, animus, can hardly be rigorously meant as the paradigm of spirit. Soul, surely, is in-animate! I admit to lacking patience with the clerical side. But according to my Liddell and Scott, psyche is breath. Seeing spirit in it seems 'vaporous'. But Plato and Socrates both were not above exploiting such ambiguities, so it seems a bit vapid to insist on the singular sense that suits. In any case, taking psyche to mean soul, as opposed to 'life-force', as eternal as opposed to caught-up in its time, seems question-begging. It is, before after all, the issue Socrates is moderating. And it is not really settled, though only Socrates' equanimity is.

I did check the quote cited above at 94 B, and it is indeed 'psyche' that appears there, though I am not about to reread the whole dialogue to check all other appearances of the notion. Socrates, though, was a fan of Homer, and other oral traditions, and is far more likely to use a term in the archaic sense than as, say, to speak as Aristotle would.

Autos (alpha, mu, tau, omicron, sigma) does indeed open the dialogue, but only to permit the list of persons present, and to note Plato's absence. Claiming this to suggest self-hood as the theme of the dialogue hangs on a pretty slender thread.

Was Soc. a Hindu? He does bring up reincarnation, in the myth of Er, isn't it? But that story has an explicit moral: ambition is dangerous to its owner. It is a dangerous matter, too, to assume Socrates is ever serious about drawing conclusions, other than to discourage them.

By the end of the fifth century — the time of Socrates' death — soul is standardly thought and spoken of, for instance, as the distinguishing mark of living things, as something that is the subject of emotional states and that is responsible for planning and practical thinking, and also as the bearer of such virtues as courage and justice. Coming to philosophical theory, we first trace a development towards comprehensive articulation of a very broad conception of soul, according to which the soul is not only responsible for mental or psychological functions like thought, perception and desire, and is the bearer of moral qualities, but in some way or other accounts for all the vital functions that any living organism performs. This broad conception, which is clearly in close contact with ordinary Greek usage by that time, finds its fullest articulation in Aristotle's theory.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ancient-soul/ — Apollodorus

I think that the soul can be interpreted as 'the principle of unity' which manifests as the 'subjective unity of perception'. This is the fact that, even though the body is obviously manifold, comprising billions of cellular systems in interaction with each other, the self or soul appears as a simple unity. The subjective unity of perception is a topic in its own right, which also appears in neuroscience as an aspect of the neural binding problem: 'enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience.'

(This is also comparable with Kant's and Husserl's conception of the 'transcendental ego'.)

The epistemological issue is that this principle of unity is not something that exists on the objective plane; it is not an object of perception; it can't be discerned objectively. It is conceptually nearer to 'harmony', as has been discussed in relation to the analogy of the lyre, in the sense that it is a consequence of the dynamic balance of a number of otherwise discrete factors to generate a (transcendent) whole, allegorically like the sounding of a chord (hence the allegory.)

Was Soc. a Hindu? — Gary M Washburn

That is not a silly question. No, not a Hindu, but part of an ancient Indo-European culture that had spread across the ancient world into both India and Europe in pre-history, giving rise to those disparate but connected societies. For example, the gods of the Greek pantheon have counterparts in the Hindu pantheon. This is the subject of a very interesting book, The Shape of Ancient Thought, by Thomas MacEvilly, an art historian, which details many such commonalities. Orphism, which was familiar to both Plato and Socrates, is arguably representative of the Indo-European ‘ur-religion’ which also gave rise to the Vedas. Belief in re-incarnation is intrinsic to those religions, and was arguably a source of the ‘myths’ concerning the afterlife that Socrates refers to.

MacEvilly’s views are not mainstream, but he provides abundant scholarly evidence for them.

Don't forget Egypt. Hindus, of course, believed in Karma, but the Egyptian concept of a soul living after death was closer to home for Athenians, and explicitly referenced in at least one dialogue of Plato (Timeus). In my callow youth I had the luck of finding a place across the street from the MFA in Boston, which has an extensive collection of Egyptian artifacts. This may well be a misreading on my part, but it seems to me that much of the art from tombs was crude, as if made by the working people represented in it. If this is right, then it's reasonable to suggest they did this not as an offering only, but also to get a place among the Pharaoh's household, to be elevated into the next life as a necessary entourage. If so, then the great monuments of Egypt were a kind of supplication to win acceptance by the gods as deserving of a place amongst them, and therefore as a sort of social contract to win a place in the afterlife for all who participated in their construction. In any case, elevation to divinity for humans of special note was very much part of the Greek pantheon.

Don't forget Egypt. Hindus, of course, believed in Karma, but the Egyptian concept of a soul living after death was closer to home for Athenians, and explicitly referenced in at least one dialogue of Plato (Timeus). — Gary M Washburn

True. Some time ago, I visited a Theravada Buddhist monastery. The Abbott there gave a talk on his belief that the Indian wisdom schools originated in Egypt (which I was surprised to hear.)

Scepticism' in Plato's culture, is not the same as today's 'scientific scepticism'. — Wayfarer

Unfortunately, this would seem to be the case ....

Although, as Apollodorus pointed out to me, 'the argument from harmony' is actually dismissed in the dialogue.

I fully agree. It's just that when people take for their model the likes of Strauss who wrote:

"Why Plato thought of this apparently fantastic doctrine [of the Forms] is a very difficult question. .." — Apollodorus

It's a very subtle question. My interepretation of the idea of the Forms is that they're not existent - they're like the ideal archetypes of existence. But that doesn't mean they're simply unreal. Consider the 'form of the wing' - that has evolved many times, in ancient pterosaurs, now in birds, bats, and flying lizards. All of the evolutionary pathways are completely different, but if a wing is to fly, then it has to have certain characteristics. But I think, as nominalsm carried the day back in later medieval times, understanding of the idea of 'the ideas' has been so thoroughly extinguised that even famous exegetes misinterpret it.

among all the kinds of forms which can be signified by terms, according to Aquinas, there is no one uniform way in which they exist. The existence of the form “sight,” by which the eye sees, may be some positive presence in the nature of things (which biologists can describe in terms of the qualities of a healthy eye that gives it the power to see), but the existence of the form 'blindness' in the blind eye need be nothing more than the nonexistence of sight‒the form of blindness is a privation of the form of sight and so not really an additional form at all.

In general, distinguishing and qualifying the different ways there can “be” a form present in a thing goes a long way toward alleviating the apparent profligacy of the (Aristotelian) realist account of words signifying forms. ...

Aquinas’s famous thesis of the unicity of substantial forms is an example of another strategy: linguistically I may posit diverse forms (humanity, animality, bodiliness) to account for Socrates being a man, an animal, and a body, but according to Aquinas there is, in reality, just one substantial form (Socrates’ soul) which is responsible for causing Socrates to be a man, an animal, and a body. In this and other cases, ontological commitment can be reduced by identifying in reality what, on the semantic level, are treated as diverse forms. — Joshua Hochschild, What's Wrong with Ockham?

A snippet from later in this essay, which is a defense of scholastic realism

Thomists and other critics of Ockham have tended to present traditional realism, with its forms or natures, as the solution to the modern problem of knowledge. It seems to me that it does not quite get to the heart of the matter. A genuine realist should see “forms” not merely as a solution to a distinctly modern problem of knowledge, but as part of an alternative conception of knowledge, a conception that is not so much desired and awaiting defense, as forgotten and so no longer desired.

Characterized by forms, reality had an intrinsic intelligibility, not just in each of its parts but as a whole. With forms as causes, there are interconnections between different parts of an intelligible world, indeed there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble. In short, the appeal to forms or natures does not just help account for the possibility of trustworthy access to facts, it makes possible a notion of wisdom, traditionally conceived as an ordering grasp of reality.

:clap:

In this case he did more than just turn it around. Simmias' argument did not include a separate soul. Socrates does not deal with Simmias' argument because the result would be that the soul does not endure. — Fooloso4

Saying that the soul is like a harmony, or attunement, is to assume that there is such a thing as "the soul" which is being talked about. .Socrates simply demonstrates that if there is such a thing, it is not like a harmony, and separate. Simmias could have insisted that there is no such thing as the soul, and it makes no sense to talk about the soul, but of course Plato, as the author of the dialogue, is dictating what the characters are saying.

Directing the parts does not mean creating the parts. The soul does not cause the body. — Fooloso4

You don't seem to be grasping the issue. The body only exists as an arrangement of parts, you said so yourself, above. Therefore the thing which directs the parts is necessarily prior to the body, as the cause of it. Not even modern physics has an understanding of fundamental particles, so we cannot say how a body comes into existence, only that the body has no existence until the parts are arranged properly. We cannot say that the fundamental parts are bodies because we do not understand what these parts are. and if we assume that they are bodies, then they would be composed of an arrangement of parts, which would also be composed of an arrangement of parts, ad infinitum.

If so then more and less and same also represents a fundamental breakthrough in the development of abstract consciousness and reason. Only it may not be so abstract. It is something that can be seen. It is a practical skill. Primates can count. — Fooloso4

I am nonplussed when people are inclined to equate h. sapiens reasoning ability with other animals. Crows and monkeys can count insofar as if they see 3 people going into a banana grove and two coming out, they know one is left. But anything more and they can't tell. You can call that counting if you like, but they will never understand the concept of prime.

When h. sapiens evolved to the point of being able to count, reason, speak, tell stories, paint, and so on, then it opens up horizons of being that are not perceptible to other animals. That's why I agree with the Aristotelian designation of man as the rational animal. I see an ontological distinction between humans and animals - not on account of 'special creation', as I fully accept the evolutionary account of human origins, but because of the ability of the human to see beyond the sensable. I think this is deprecated in modern philosophy because it is hard to reconcile with Darwinian materialism. (This is the subject of Nagel's book Mind and Cosmos.)

See Jacob Klein's "Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra". — Fooloso4

I have started on that, courtesy of your previous recommendation. I will have a lot more reading time on my hands soon.

The reference to the living being born from the dead is a clear reference to the indo-european myth of reincarnation in my view. As already discussed this was characteristic of Orphism.

My remarks about Plato and 'this secular age' were not directed at you in particular, it's a general observation. I understand that our interpretations are at odds, but I have appreciated the opportunity of explaining my approach.

I see an ontological distinction between humans and animals - not on account of 'special creation', as I fully accept the evolutionary account of human origins, but because of the ability of the human to see beyond the sensable. — Wayfarer

I see it first as a matter of degree rather than a difference in kind, and second as a difference that grew considerably due to the power of conceptual thinking, which is not simply a matter of difference in capability but of cultural history, In other words, the difference expands not simply because humans are different but because of the power of conceptual thought which develops as a second nature.

I have started on that, courtesy of your previous recommendation. — Wayfarer

Not an easy book but one well worth the effort.

My remarks about Plato and 'this secular age' were not directed at you in particular, it's a general observation. — Wayfarer

Understood. I agree with you that we always bring our own assumptions to our reading of the text. I also think that the Platonic dialogues allow us to examine our assumptions.

I understand that our interpretations are at odds, but I have appreciated the opportunity of explaining my approach. — Wayfarer

I appreciate that our differences can be discussed respectfully.

First, there is no need for something to order the parts. If you assume that the parts together need to be ordered, then each part would also need to be ordered because each part of the body has an order. — Fooloso4

Right, each part needs to be ordered, towards one end, purpose, function, or whatever you want to call it. Each particular has a specific role within that one unity.

How do you proceed toward the conclusion that there is no need for something which orders the parts toward that unity? Do you think that the parts just happen to meet up, and decide amongst themselves, to join together in a unity? The evidence we have, and there is much of it with the existence of artificial things, and things created by other living beings, is that in these situations where parts are ordered together toward making one united thing, there is something which orders the parts.

There is no evidence of any parts just meeting up, and deciding amongst themselves to create an organized, structure, though there are instances, such as the existence of life itself, where the thing which is doing the ordering is not immediately evident. So your claim that "there is no need for something to order the parts" is not supported by any empirical evidence, while "there is a need for something to order the parts" is supported by empirical evidence and solid inductive reasoning.

Second, in accord with Socrates' notion of Forms something is beautiful because of Beauty itself. Something is just because of the Just itself. Something is harmonious because of Harmony itself. Beauty itself is prior to some thing that is beautiful. The Just itself is prior to some thing being just. Harmony itself is prior to some thing being harmonious. In each case there is an arrangement of parts.

The question is, why did Socrates avoid his standard argument for Forms? It is an important question, one that we should not avoid. — Fooloso4

I don't see the point here. What you are referring to is the theory of participation, which I believe comes from the Pythagoreans. There is a problem with this theory which Plato exposed, and Aristotle attacked with the so-called cosmological argument. The problem is with the active/passive relation. When beautiful things are portrayed as partaking in the Idea of Beauty, then the thing which partakes is active, and the Idea is passive. Then we have the problem that the Idea is needed to be prior to the particular thing which partakes, to account for the multitudes of thing being generated which partake. But there is no principle of activity within the Idea, which could cause participation, because the Idea is portrayed as passively being partaken of.

So Aristotle associates "form" with "actual". And, by the cosmological argument, he determines that there must be a Form which is prior to any particular material thing, as cause of its existence, being the unique and particular thing which it is. This type of Form is associated with final cause.

So, we have the Form which is prior to the particular thing, and responsible for its existence, but we cannot represent this relationship between the particular, and the Form, with the Pythagorean theory of participation, because "participation" does not provide the required source of activity (cause). The source, or cause of activity must come from the Idea, or Form, rather than from the particular thing, which by the theory of participation is said to be doing the partaking. .

Well, as they used to say on American Bandstand, "Its got a good beat and you can dance to it". So I think this Plato guy just might have a hit or two in him.

Don't know whether Plato had any hits, but he was definitely a hitman! :smile:

As for Socrates:

Aargh, what a terrible thing has befallen me in my last hours, to have me doubt my life's work!
Did I misinterpret the music-dream? What about other dreams? And what of the signs?
What of the people I persuaded, did I point them in the wrong direction?
But no! I won't drag myself into self-doubt, not now, at the very end.
And anyway, it's not like I left anything written, it's all hearsay, thank god for that!

Perhaps Aristotle is referring to the fact that Plato posited Forms for qualities, like Beauty and Just, not for particular things like a house or a ring. — Metaphysician Undercover

Aristotle says that Plato posits Forms for qualities, but not for artifacts.

He says that Plato at Phaedo (100d) affirms that a beautiful thing exists in virtue of its dependence on the Form of Beauty.

Aristotle’s point is that (man-made) objects like house or ring of which Plato and the Platonists hold that there are no Forms are nevertheless generated. And if objects like house and ring are generated without Forms, then other things might also be so generated.

Therefore, he concludes:

Thus it is clearly possible that all other things may both exist and be generated for the same causes as the things just mentioned [i.e. house or ring].

In other words, Aristotle is using Plato’s rejection of Forms of artifacts to attack Plato’s Theory of Forms.

However, Aristotle does not apply to his own comments the same logic that he applies to those he attacks. For, if no Forms are necessary for humans to build houses and make rings, it does not follow that this must apply to naturally occurring things, or to all things.

Moreover, according to Plato, natural objects (and the whole Universe) are not generated by Forms but by the Universal Intelligence (Creator-God) using Matter shaped according to Forms. Aristotle knows this, but he must reject it because in his own system there is no Creator-God.

Therefore, Aristotle's argument may succeed according to his own system, but fails according to Plato’s.

In any case, Aristotle’s statements in the Metaphysics and elsewhere show that Plato holds that there are no Forms of artifacts. As we have just seen, Aristotle sometimes puts a subtle spin on his treatment of Plato’s views to bolster his own. Therefore, we should acquaint ourselves with Plato’s views before we read Aristotle’s comments on them.

However, as I said before, Aristotle does not lie. He could not lie even if he wanted to because his audience knows what Plato's views are. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we may safely assume that he is a reliable witness in this regard.

This is why, as already explained, Socrates’ “Form of Bed” is a purely hypothetical Form that he uses exclusively for the sake of the Painter and Poet Analogy and should not be taken to mean that he (and even less Plato) is committed to Forms of artifacts. Had Plato believed in Forms of artifacts, he would have made this clear. But nowhere does he do so.

As regards the Platonic tradition, the Academy at Athens was closed down in 529 AD (though other Platonic schools continued to function even afterward). Platonists like Alcinous, Plotinus, and Proclus wrote and taught at a time when the Platonic tradition was still alive and well and existed within the wider Greek-speaking, Hellenic tradition.

In contrast, Christians like Aquinas who lived about a millennium later in the West, were cut off from the Platonic tradition. Their knowledge of Greek philosophy was largely limited to Latin translations of Aristotle and the works of Aristotelians like Averroes and Maimonides, who were anti-Platonists.

So, if we are reading Plato through a multi-layered filter of Aristotelianism, Thomism, and anti-Platonism, we may find that there isn’t much of the real Plato left.

Platonists (Platonikoi) in antiquity did not start their study of Plato by reading Aristotle and even less (as is currently the case) by reading translations of the Republic interpreted by non-Platonists and non-Greeks. They normally began with dialogues like the Phaedo and ended with the Timaeus and the Parmenides, in the original Greek, which afforded a much better preparation for a proper understanding of Plato’s true teachings. This is why I believe that we stand a much better chance of correctly understanding Plato if we follow the Platonists, at least in general outline.

Concepts like “the One” and “Oneness” (or “Unity”) are absolutely central to Platonism for a very good reason. They go back to Plato and his Academy (and even before).

The quest for the One (on different levels) is a recurrent theme in the dialogues. Plato himself writes:

He who is a first-class craftsman or warden, in any department, must not only be able to pay regard to the many, but must be able also to press towards the one so as to discern it and, on discerning it, to survey and organize all the rest with a single eye to it (Laws 12.965b)

Can any man get an accurate vision and view of any object better than by being able to look from the many and dissimilar to the one unifying form? (Laws 12.965c)

The very same principle is applied by Plato to philosophy as a whole as much as to individual philosophical problems. To begin with, candidates for philosophical life are to be selected on their aptitude for dialectic which is the ability to take a comprehensive or unified view (synopsis):

The chief test of the dialectical nature and its opposite is that he who can view things in their connection (synoptikos) is a dialectician (dialektikos); he who cannot, is not (Rep. 537c)

Dialectics is the only process of inquiry that advances in this manner, doing away with hypotheses, up to the first principle (arche) itself in order to find confirmation there (Rep. 533c).

For Plato, synoptikos = dialektikos = philosophos
(synoptic-visioned man = dialectician = philosopher)

Moreover, Plato is a man of action who does what he preaches. He says that everyone in practicing their respective craft must survey and organize all the elements of that craft with a single eye to one unifying principle.

And this is precisely what Plato is doing in the context of his own craft which is, practicing, teaching, and writing about philosophy. He takes different strands of culture, religion, and philosophy that he regards as the best, the most beautiful, and the truest, and masterfully weaves them into an integrated, sublime whole.

And he can only do so because he is endowed with synoptic vision.

So, Plato may be regarded as the paradigm of the synoptikos, of the man who has a holistic, unified and unifying vision, which is the true philosophical vision.

Indeed, all the terms that a careful reader of Plato finds at the core of Platonic philosophy, such as “awareness” (syneidesis), “understanding” (synesis), “comprehensive view” (synopsis), etc. are based on the concept of bringing together, unifying, making one, and seeing, knowing, and understanding everything as one.

In short, Plato understands that which all philosophers, consciously or subconsciously, strive to understand.

Each thing exists by being one. And there is a universal principle of unity that makes this oneness possible, both at individual and at universal level. In the case of man, it is the soul. In the case of the Universe, it is the Cosmic Soul. And because soul is intelligence, this Principle of Unity is Intelligence.

If we acknowledge our true identity as intelligence (nous), and bring all elements of cognition together, which is the only way we can have a comprehensive view or synopsis, we obtain one cognition and one cognizer, i.e., intelligence consisting of a subjective and an objective element.

If we next complete the unification process by bringing together cognition and cognizer to make them one, so that subject and object are cognitively identical, we obtain the One. And since the Ultimate is One (Hen), oneness (henosis) is the ultimate goal.

This is the inescapable conclusion if we follow the inner logic of the dialogues and, in particular, Plato’s Divided Line representing the cognitive continuum stretching from the multiplicity of sense-perceptions to the vision of a single Reality symbolized by the Sun, i.e., the all-illumining Light of Consciousness which is the Source of all Knowledge and all Life.

This is the fundamental core around which the Platonic framework is built.

Where I disagree with you is in how you present this aspect of Platonism, as being "committed to certain Forms". This would be the way that Forms are related to each other, perhaps as a hierarchy of Forms. Plato presents the good, not as a Form, but as the material thing desired by a man. So there is no equivalence between the One, which is the Form that supports mathematics (for Plato), and the good. — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, we’ll just have to disagree then.

The way I see it, the word “good” can have many different meanings on many different levels. It can refer to a material thing, an ethical value, a Platonic Form, or Ultimate Reality, depending on the context, on how we wish to use it, the purpose for which we use it, etc., etc.

To return to my earlier statement, Aristotle says that Platonists deny that there are Forms of house or ring. In discussing Plato’s Phaedo, he says:

… while many other things are generated, e.g. house, ring, of which we hold that there are no Forms (Meta. 1.991b)

… and many other things are generated, e.g. house and ring, of which they say that there are no Forms (Meta. 13.1080a)

In Peri Ideon (On Ideas/Forms), he says:

For example, carpentry is of bench without qualification, not of this bench, and of bed without qualification, not of this bed. And sculpture, painting, house-building, and each of the other crafts is related in a similar way to the things that fall under it. Therefore there will be an Idea of each of the things that fall under the crafts, which they [the Platonists] do not want (Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Metaph. 80.5)

As a member of the Academy, Aristotle was in a position to know what the general view, including Plato’s own, was, and he clearly agrees with Plato that there are Forms of natural objects but not of artifacts:

In some cases the individuality does not exist apart from the composite substance (e.g., the form of a house does not exist separately, except as the art of building); if it does so at all, it does so in the case of natural objects. Hence Plato was not far wrong in saying that there are as many Forms as there are kinds of natural objects (Meta. 12.1070a)

Alcinous also says that most Platonists rejected Forms of artifacts (Didaskalikos 1.9).

So, there is a tradition going back to the Old Academy according to which Plato and other Platonists reject Forms of artifacts. This is why Platonists like Plotinus and Proclus pay little attention to the Republic 10 passage.

As I said earlier, the passage should not be ignored. First, because it is quite interesting in that it shows how Plato connects human psychology with ontology and metaphysics, which I for one believe to be a key feature of his system. And second, because in my view, a closer reading puts to rest the idea that it commits Plato to Forms of artifacts.

Craftsmen do indeed look to “forms” in the sense of “paradigms” or “templates”, but not necessarily to Forms as eternal Ideas. They can look to paradigms in nature or in the work of other craftsmen. If anything, what craftsmen need for their knowledge is not an Artifact Form such as Form of Bed, Table, or House, but a Mathematical Form like Geometrical Shape or Size that involves exact measurements.

Animals are a different story. For example, some bird species build intricate nests without being shown how to do it. In Platonic terms, it may be argued that they do this as a result of some form of subconscious access to a higher intelligence that contains templates or “forms” related to such activity. Humans have largely lost this instinctive knowledge and need to learn such skills by observing other animals (or humans).

Ultimately, however, the individual selves or intelligences are manifestations of the Universal Intelligence which creates them (v. Timaeus) and therefore dependent on it. It is in this sense that we look to a higher reality in order to acquire certain forms of knowledge. Even when we look to natural objects or animals for inspiration, it is really the Universal Intelligence that we draw inspiration from.

We are normally unaware, and even dismissive, of the individual intelligence’s connection with a larger, collective or universal intelligence until extraordinary circumstances, such as precognitive dreams, force us to acknowledge at least the possibility of such a connection. This realization of the possible (or probable) existence of a higher reality is the first step on the path to knowledge and the beginning of Platonic, i.e., genuine philosophy as understood in Ancient Greece.

Much has been made of Socrates’ admission that he “knows nothing”. In reality, his exact words as related by Plato were:

“I am aware that I am wise neither in great things nor in small things” (Apology 21b)

Those who see nothing here but an admission of ignorance do nothing but demonstrate their own ignorance and lack of understanding. They are like the imitators in Socrates’ Analogy of the Painter. In reality, the key words are not the denial of knowledge but the affirmation of awareness: “I am aware” (synoida emauto). What matters is awareness. Awareness that there are limits to our knowledge implies awareness of the existence of some things that we have no knowledge of.

This is the beginning of philosophy in the Platonic sense. The awareness that there are realities “out there”, i.e., outside our everyday experience and knowledge, that we don’t know and don’t understand and that it is our task, as intelligent beings endowed with awareness and understanding, to inquire into these realities. Some, like Socrates, feel compelled to do so by an “inner voice”, “instinct”, or “guiding spirit” (daimonion) that in itself indicates that there is more to reality than meets the eye.

At the other end of the spectrum, others refuse outright to even contemplate the existence of anything outside the range of their five sense-perceptions.

Socrates himself tells us why this is the case. The soul has two aspects (or forms of intelligence): a higher, thinking one that is receptive to higher truths and always strives toward wisdom (phronesis) and a base, unthinking one that is attracted to what is far from wisdom (Rep. 602c-605b).

Different parts of the soul are attracted to different aspects of reality. This is why, in Socrates' analogy, the thoughtless in whom base intelligence is dominant are taken in by the illusory product of the imitative crafts, whilst the thoughtful in whom higher intelligence is the dominant aspect see the productive crafts as producing what is real. This applies to painting, poetry, science, and philosophic discourse itself.

This explains why Plato is interpreted in many different ways by different readers. Some, like the Straussians, who come from a background of political science, see Plato’s dialogues as having a purely political message with no metaphysical content. Similarly, Jews, Christians, Muslims, and Atheists all have their own interpretation according to the inclination in their soul that happens to be dominant at the time.

Some follow the imitators, i.e., the translators and interpreters of the unthinking kind who have little knowledge of Greek and even less of Plato, and who choose to render phronesis as “prudence”.

My own view is that Platonists understand Plato best. This is because their understanding is based not only on Platonic tradition itself, but also on the realization that Plato is a highly intelligent writer whose entire project starts with intelligence and ends in intelligence.

As Plato puts it, it would be extremely strange not to assign intelligence (nous) to Being:

“What then, by Zeus! Are we to be so easily persuaded that change and life and soul and wisdom are truly absent from what completely is, and that it does not live, or think, but sits there in august holiness, devoid of intelligence, fixed and unchanging?”
“That would be a quite shocking account of things for us to accept” (Soph. 248e-249a)

Similarly, we are told that the Universe is created and ruled by Intelligence:

All the wise agree that Intelligence (Nous) is king of heaven and earth (Phileb. 28c6-8)

The Platonic philosopher’s task is to become aware of the oneness and universality of Intelligence. It is the universality of Intelligence which is One that validates Truth.

Like awareness (syneidesis) which is derived from syn (“with”, “together”) and oida (“know”), understanding (synesis), from syn and hiemi (“bring”), implies a bringing together of cognitive elements resulting in understanding.

Without this bringing together or unification, no understanding is possible. This is why Plato stresses the importance of the cognitive processes whereby intelligence classifies cognitive elements according to the principles of sameness and difference. It is this bringing together or unification of elements of experience into assorted categories and of categories into a unified whole, that makes understanding possible.

Awareness, therefore, is a principle of unification or unity that makes intelligence and life possible, and is itself one. This is why Plato and Platonists refer to Ultimate Reality as “Intelligence” and “the One”.

In Plato, philosophy begins with epistemology and ends with metaphysics, both of which are part of one cognitive continuum as clearly indicated in the Analogy of the Line. The underlying reality of it is intelligence itself, which is why Plato tells us how intelligence works, how individual intelligence mirrors a higher Intelligence of which it is a part, and how philosophy can be used as a practical method of elevating human cognition from the most basic to the highest possible.

It is two different Greek words. I meant to say that with my first comment on the passage and now realize that I did not introduce enough background to make that clear. The wiki is correct when it says: "Also known as the Amelēs potamos (river of unmindfulness)" — Paine

Thank you for the clarification. The words can be synonyms, the change of meaning is a choice of the translator. The introduction of ambiguity is not helpful. English synonyms for 'forgetfulness', depending on context: https://www.wordhippo.com/what-is/another-word-for/forgetfulness.html

The name of a river.
— Amity

I wonder if this aspect is why the two separate meanings got collapsed into one (by some). The reference to the "plain of Lethe" is not given primacy over the "river of carelessness" in the text. The different meanings are related to their effects. Looking at how the mythology is developed; the mapping of the underworld follows the story of the origins of the quality being described. — Paine

Perhaps. But I don't see that 2 different meanings have been collapsed into one. As explained, I see only one river and one meaning or understanding, given the context.

Why would the plain of Lethe be given primacy? Isn't it only part of the journey description and a reason for the 'thirst'? A barren place of hot desolation? 'through burning and choking and terrible heat, for it was empty of trees and earthly vegetation' 621a.
Perhaps in the contrast we can see the river as some kind of oasis. A place of relief. From whence the souls can refresh and rid themselves of the hellishness they have suffered? Forgetting.

Yes. I agree it is interesting to consider the mythology and the mapping.

I wonder if the insistence of the river with a name comes from poets such as Virgil where the role of Lethe is located in the afterlife (and pre-life) and has no role amongst the living. — Paine

Why do you use the word 'insistence'?
I found an interesting site which references and describes the Lethe in different contexts. Symbolism and significance. Literature - Modern Interpretations - Art and Music. Philosophical perspectives.

Lethe: The Spirit and River of Forgetfulness

Lethe has been referenced in many classical literary works. In the Odyssey, Homer describes Lethe as a river that the dead drink from to forget their former lives. The poet Virgil also mentions Lethe in his epic poem Aeneid, where he describes the river as a way for the dead to forget their past lives before being reincarnated. Additionally, in Plato’s Phaedo, Socrates describes death as a release from the body and a return to the realm of pure thought, where the soul can be purified and drink from the river of forgetfulness. [...]

The river itself is often described as having a milky-white color and is said to be shallow enough to wade through. The water is believed to have a sweet taste, and those who drink from it are said to experience complete forgetfulness. The river is also known as the “river of unmindfulness” and is believed to wash away all memories of the past. — Mythical Encyclopedia - Lethe - The Spirit and River of Forgetfulness -

[emphasis added]

Here, 'unmindfulness' means forgetfulness - a state of being unaware. This is different from its other meaning of 'carelessness' or 'heedlessness'.
https://www.wordhippo.com/what-is/another-word-for/unmindfulness.html

Edit: Unfortunately, there is no link to the Phaedo reference. Although, I note this:

We should not forget that in the Phaedrus there is the plain of Aletheia or truth. (248b) — Fooloso4

Aristotle says that Plato posits Forms for qualities, but not for artifacts.

He says that Plato at Phaedo (100d) affirms that a beautiful thing exists in virtue of its dependence on the Form of Beauty.

Aristotle’s point is that (man-made) objects like house or ring of which Plato and the Platonists hold that there are no Forms are nevertheless generated. And if objects like house and ring are generated without Forms, then other things might also be so generated. — Apollodorus

I don't think we can make this conclusion about Platonic Forms, because Forms account not only for the existence of qualities, but also of types. So the Form of Animal is the reason why anything which is an animal is an animal. We could say the same thing for Ring, and House. But I agree that there are many simple little things which Socrates would say we can't assume a Form of this, and a Form of that, until there is a different Form for every distinct individual.

This is a deficiency in Platonic metaphysics which I think Aristotle greatly improved on. Aristotle assumed that every particular thing has a Form proper to, and unique to, itself. And this becomes the principle which his law of identity is based in. He says that the fundamental question of Being, or metaphysics, is not 'why is there something rather than nothing?', but 'why is each thing the exact thing that it is, rather than something else?'.

However, Aristotle does not apply to his own comments the same logic that he applies to those he attacks. For, if no Forms are necessary for humans to build houses and make rings, it does not follow that this must apply to naturally occurring things, or to all things. — Apollodorus

But Aristotle's argument in his Metaphysics is that it is impossible that a thing is not the thing that it is. If it were not the thing that it is, then it would be something other than it is, and this is impossible, (forming the law of identity). Further, since things are generated (come into being), then in order for a thing to come into being as the thing which it is, the form of the thing must be prior to the material thing itself, as the cause of it being the thing which it is. If the form of a thing is not prior to the material existence of that thing, then the thing could come into being as anything, therefore not necessarily the thing which it is, violating the law of identity, by allowing that a thing could be anything.

So Aristotle's argument is that it is necessary to assume that each and every thing has a unique Form which is prior in existence to the material thing, as the cause of the thing which it is. So Plato is seen as not going far enough, by not allowing that every existing thing has a form unique to itself.

Aristotle knows this, but he must reject it because in his own system there is no Creator-God. — Apollodorus

There is a 'Creator-God' responsible for material existence in Aristotle, it's the Divine Mind, described I believe in Bk 12 Metaphysics. In his Metaphysics, I believe it's around Bk 6, he describes how the form of an artificial thing comes from the soul of the craftsperson, and is given to the matter in the act of creation. The matter accounts for the "accidentals", and why the thing created is not exactly the same as the form coming from the soul of the artist. He implies that natural things are created in the very same way, but from the Divine Mind.

The problem which Aristotle sees with Platonic metaphysics is that Forms are only universals, yet material things are particulars. But Plato wanted Forms to somehow be the cause of material things, by causing material things to be the type of thing that each is. However, Plato does not close the gap between universal and particular, to show how one universal Form can cause the existence of many particulars, when each particular is distinct and unique. Aristotle moves to close the gap with the concept of "matter", allowing that matter accounts for the accidentals, and the uniqueness of each individual.

This is why, as already explained, Socrates’ “Form of Bed” is a purely hypothetical Form that he uses exclusively for the sake of the Painter and Poet Analogy and should not be taken to mean that he (and even less Plato) is committed to Forms of artifacts. Had Plato believed in Forms of artifacts, he would have made this clear. But nowhere does he do so. — Apollodorus

So this is why Aristotle portrayed Plato's Forms as conceptually deficient.

In contrast, Christians like Aquinas who lived about a millennium later in the West, were cut off from the Platonic tradition. Their knowledge of Greek philosophy was largely limited to Latin translations of Aristotle and the works of Aristotelians like Averroes and Maimonides, who were anti-Platonists. — Apollodorus

I believe that this is factually incorrect. The early Christian metaphysicians, St Augustine for example were well versed in Neo-Platonism. So Christian theology was based in Neo-Platonism. The fall of the Alexandria library made the work of Aristotle less and less available to the early Christians, though they had access to Neo-Platonist teaching. The Muslims maintained access to Aristotle through other sources, and Averroes and other Muslims worked to introduce the more scientifically inclined Aristotelian metaphysics into the more mystical Neo-Platonist metaphysics which the Christians held. You can see in Aquinas' writings that he was working to establish consistency between the Neo-Platonist principles already held by the Church, and the newly introduced Aristotelian principles. This brought scholasticism to an end, and also came the end of the middle ages

The quest for the One (on different levels) is a recurrent theme in the dialogues. — Apollodorus

Metaphysically, this "quest for the One" is lagging far behind Aristotle, who found "the One", as the particular, the individual, and defined it with the law of identity. The introduction of Aristotle into Christian schools marked a revolution in thinking for the Christians.

Plato says that philosophy is a preparation for death. When we start asking philosophical questions in our teenage years, this is exactly what we are looking for: an intellectual refuge from the complexity and size of a reality that encompasses us, and that we do not control in any way. This is what so-and-so calls the search for truth when it is the other way around. It is the search for a refuge, therefore, the search for intellectual security against the complexity of the real. It is only after dedicating yourself to this activity for some time that you begin to feel a little more protected, inasmuch as you accept your own state of unprotection and no longer seek protection. Then the subject calms down and, one day, discovers that there is something called reality. I did not invent it, it is not an object of my thinking. It is something I am in and it is, without a doubt, much more interesting than anything I have thought of.

The encounter with this reality is the mark of what we can call intellectual maturity

Intellectual maturity is when we no longer seek that conceptual, doctrinal scheme, or that belief that will defend us against reality, but when we seek to adjust our intelligence to the reality we are living, that is, we no longer want to escape reality . We want to enter it and experience it with all the measure of its complexity, its wealth, in such a way that we are sure that our actions in our modality of existence represent a conscious experience of this reality that we will never embrace or dominate, but in which we want to make sure that we were, that is, we want to make sure that we were awake, living in the reality that surrounds us and not within a world of ideas that we ourselves created to defend ourselves. This is the maximum measure that human intelligence can achieve: conscious and lucid participation in a reality that it cannot embrace. In other words, we do not know what the limits of reality are, what the whole picture is, nor the final answer, but we know where we are, what we are doing here and we know what is happening.

I often have this feeling, even when it is depressing in nature. If we are suffocated under problems, if there is misery, fear, persecution, etc., it is better to know what is happening than to ignore it. Because otherwise, we will be like a bunny that is running in the middle of the bush and suddenly gets shot and doesn’t even know where that crap came from.

The difference between human and animal suffering is this. The pet suffers and has no idea why. And we can (as far as we can), within the very experience of suffering, take an image of our dignity, of beings who have access to the truth. And this is the most we can achieve in this life. When Aristotle said that the higher form of life is the contemplative form, that is what he meant. It is to understand what is happening. If instead of trying to understand, one seeks only to defend oneself from the situation, seeking pleasure and avoiding pain, one does exactly what a pet does. Now, if the pet also doesn’t understand the situation, it is evident that when he seeks pleasure, he finds pain and when he runs away from pain, he finds even more pain.

The cognitive attitude towards this creates, not a state of beatitude, but a kind of superior tranquility. And this is the attitude with which Socrates faces death. He says: “I don’t know exactly what death is but I know more than you do. I have some idea what’s going on and what’s going to happen to me. That’s why I’m not afraid”. This is, at the same time, the beginning and the culmination of philosophy. Philosophy cannot go beyond that. And all these magnificent intellectual constructions that we see in modernity (Descartes’, Spinoza’s, Leibniz’s metaphysics, the Enlightenment, this whole thing) are often just an escape, a defensive attitude of individuals who want to build a intellectual building within which they can be closed. It is clear that the construction of all these apparatuses, instead of calming the fear, increases it. In addition to having to face the pressure, the difficulties, the humiliations of normal life, these individuals have to hold the building to prevent it from falling over by covering it with a stick here, a glue there, with a spit, to prove that they are right, that that view of the universe is the true one and all the others are false. All of this is an idiot occupation because, where do they go when they die? Are you going inside that conceptual building you created? There is not a single case of experience of a state of clinical death in which people say that they died and went into Aristotle’s or Spinoza’s metaphysics. Nobody went to one of these places! These things only existed in the minds of Aristotle and Spinoza, they are not the real world and neither is the real answer.

When Plato says that philosophy is a preparation for death, that is what he is talking about. Whatever can be obtained in the doctrinal construction will always be less than the soul of the listener. Because the listener’s soul will have Eternal Life and these intellectual constructions will not! The most the philosopher can do is try to give his listeners those moments of clarity that are the expectation of Eternal Life. Remembering Eternal Life is the philosopher’s ultimate function: to understand transient life, the moment that passes and the real situation in which we live, and to draw the soul from the living consciousness of the situation to remember the hope of Eternal Life (which is more than hope, it is certainty). This consists of all philosophy, and this is brutally compacted in these two texts that I am recommending to you: Socrates’ Apology and the Phaedo. For the time being you understand this in my formulation, in a little while you will not only understand within the formulation in which you are listening, but in the formulation that Plato gave you in these two magnificent texts.

In Plato's Phaedo, in replying to the query of Cebes that why he is composing lyrics in prison to which he never paid attention in his whole life Socrates mention about his recurring dream in which he was directed to make and cultivate music. So in obeying in its literal sense he is is writing and composing hymns. Can anybody put light that is it a rational behavior to give so much importance to dreams and to act according to content of dreams.

This is my favorite. I look forward to reading your thoughts on it.

This is my favorite. I look forward to reading your thoughts on it. — frank

And I look forward to a dialogue about this dialogue.

Do you recommend only reading up to a certain point before discussion, or what ? — Amity

I recommend reading at your own pace, moving forward and backwards with the eventual goal of seeing the whole.

moving forward and backwards with the eventual goal of seeing the whole. — Fooloso4

To read to get the gist, for simple pleasure - followed by a slower, more analytical read. Perhaps zooming in on something I find interesting or puzzling. Sounds about right for me.
Look forward to hearing more from you, as and when...

Do you recommend only reading up to a certain point before discussion, or what ? — Amity

The next section will cover up to and including 64a.

I will take up issues as they occur in the text.