I’m explaining what I believe most indirect realists believe. Mental phenomena exist and have qualities that are neither identical to nor similar to the mind-independent properties that causally determine them, and so the qualities of metal phenomena provide a misleading picture of the mind-independent nature of the world.

These are the substantial phenomenological and epistemological claims that direct realists dispute, and this dispute can neither be solved nor deflated by arguing that the English phrase “sugar is sweet” means “the chemical structure of sugar activates T1R2/T1R3 GPCR on taste cells”.

It’s a dispute that can only be addressed by a scientific study of the body, the brain, and sugar, and I think the current scientific view favours indirect realism over direct realism; the evidence is quite convincing that, whatever first-person experience is, it is not constituted of the mind-independent properties of distal objects (even if it is causally determined by them).

Mental phenomena are either reducible to neurological phenomena or are emergent. They are what occur when we dream, and what don’t occur when we are unconscious (even if our taste buds are chemically reacting to apples).

These mental phenomena have qualities that, although often causally determined by particular mind-independent properties of mind-independent objects, are neither identical to these mind-independent properties nor similar to them.

Given the distinction and dissimilarity between the qualities of mental phenomena and the mind-independent properties that causally determine them, there is an epistemological problem of perception.

This is what indirect realists, both historical like Locke, and modern argue. And the naive realist, i.e. the phenomenological direct realist, disagrees, rejecting anything like the primary and secondary quality distinction. They claim that mind-independent properties are not just causally responsible for the phenomenology of experience but are actual constituents of it.

The newer semantic direct realists who try to turn the problem into one about language and the meaning of the English phrase “the apple is red” neither absolve naive realism nor refute indirect realism. They’re just addressing an unrelated and unimportant issue. The actual philosophical issue is one that applies to people without a language and/or from 100,000 years ago as well (even if they are not equipped to express the issue themselves), and to non-human animals with different sense receptors who may even see colours and taste tastes that we can’t even imagine.

Yet the deflation is set out before you. — Banno

It's not. It's a red herring that distracts from the actual phenomenological and epistemological questions. Do mental phenomena exist, and if so are its properties the mind-independent properties of things like apples (or do they in some sense resemble them)? If mental phenomena do exist and if its properties do not resemble the mind-independent properties of things like apples then indirect realists are correct and there is an epistemological problem of perception.

You have a penchant for telling naive realists what they think. — Banno

I'm explaining the historical distinction between direct and indirect realism, and how each position addresses the epistemological problem of perception. Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities is a fitting example of indirect realism, with his direct realist opponents rejecting this distinction.

There are legitimate phenomenological and epistemological differences between direct and indirect realism that can only be addressed by a scientific study of the world, the body, the brain, and possibly the mind, and that cannot be "deflated" by some semantic argument that "X is red" means "X causes such-and-such an experience".

This is why I phrased my post carefully, and why I posted the picture I did. The relevant dispute between direct and indirect realism concerns whether or not a) there are mental phenomena and whether or not b) the qualities of these mental phenomena are (also) mind-independent properties of things like apples. If (a) is true and (b) is false as indirect realists claim then there is an epistemological problem.

Being sweet is having a chemical structure that activates T1R2/T1R3 GPCR on taste cells. — Banno

That's not what naive taste realists (or naive colour realists with respect to colour) mean. The historical dispute between direct and indirect realism concerns phenomenology and epistemology, and these problems are neither solved nor dissolved by (re-)interpreting the phrases "is sweet" or "is red" as meaning "having the mind-independent properties to cause such-and-such physiological/mental phenomena in such-and-such organisms".

The phenomenological dispute between direct (naive) and indirect realists concerns whether or not a) there are mental phenomena and whether or not b) the qualities of these mental phenomena are (also) mind-independent properties of things like apples. Naive realists believe either that (a) is false or that (b) is true, and so that there is no epistemological problem, whereas indirect realists believe both that (a) is true and that (b) is false, and so that there is an epistemological problem. And I think that today's science of perception supports the indirect realist view (even if mental phenomena is reducible to neurological phenomena).

It is true that apples have the mind-independent properties to cause me to see particular colours and taste certain tastes, but these colours and tastes are nothing like these mind-independent properties. I can't really grasp these mind-independent properties at all (my vague "understanding" of the Standard Model notwithstanding). All I really grasp is my body's reaction to them.

so isn't all that answered in the physical description of the sequence of events? — flannel jesus

I think so, which is why the Wikipedia article on direct and indirect realism says "indirect perceptual realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is."

I think the science clearly shows that colour, taste, smell, etc. are the product of our biology, causally determined by but very different to the objective nature (e.g. the chemical composition) of apples and ice creams.

So the traditional phenomenological and epistemological questions are firmly resolved in favour of indirect realism.

The current problem as I see it is that semantic direct realists have muddied the waters by trying to adapt direct realist terminology to mean something very different — something which doesn't actually contradict the phenomenology or epistemology of indirect realism.

My question is, don't we have a scientifically agreed upon sequence of events from "there's an ice cream in front of you" to "you're experiencing the visual sensation of the ice cream in front of you"? Like, the matter that makes up the ice cream is there, it reflects or emits photons, some of those photons hit your eyes, your eyes send signals to your brain, your brain interprets those signals and the context they're in to create your full visual-spacial-objectoriented experience of the ice cream and the space it exists in. — flannel jesus

Yes, and so the relevant questions are; what and where is colour and what and where is taste? The indirect realist says that colour and taste are something like emergent mental phenomena and not qualities or properties inherent in the ice cream (even if those things which are qualities and properties inherent in the ice cream, like its chemical composition, causally determine particular mental phenomena), whereas direct realists like realist colour primitivists say that colour and taste are not (just?) emergent mental phenomena but (also?) qualities and properties inherent in the ice cream, and that our colour and taste perception is veridical if and only if our experience "matches" what's out there.

This may help:

Cover one half of the picture, and then imagine the other half of the ice cream being a mirror of what you can see.

For the indirect realist the ice cream itself has no colour, because colour is not a property that exists outside of experience, and so it's represented as entirely black. The red, dark brown, and light brown colours are then produced by the brain in response to the eyes being stimulated by various wavelengths of light. As alluded to in my previous post, this might be better explained with reference to taste rather than vision; sweetness isn't a property inherent in sugar but a mental quality produced by the brain in response to the chemical reaction between sugar molecules and taste buds.

For the direct realist, the dark red, light red, and light brown colours are inherent in the ice cream, and in the veridical case the colours we experience "match" these inherent colours.

To perceive something is to be in unmediated contact with it. I take that to be a conceptual truth that all involved in this debate will agree on. — Clarendon

I disagree. You seem to be defining perception of X as direct perception of X, and so this would entail that indirect perception of X isn't perception of X, and so the very concept of indirect perception would be a contradiction.

With that in mind, a 'direct realist' is someone who holds that we are sometimes perceive the mind external world. That is, when I look at the ship I am directly aware of the ship itself. Thus, I perceive the ship.

This is as opposed to indirect realists who hold that we are only directly aware - and so only perceiving - mental states of our own, rather than the world out there. — Clarendon

I understand the distinction between direct and indirect realism to be better expressed by this picture (imagine a line down the middle and them to be two separate viewpoints):



Indirect realists accept the distinction between Locke's primary and secondary qualities, and that secondary qualities are qualities that constitute conscious experience and not material objects like apples and ice cream cones, i.e. the left-side of the above picture. Primary qualities like atomic composition and electromagnetic reflectance may causally determine secondary qualities, but it is a mistake to think of these secondary qualities as being properties of the object seen.

This view contrasts with direct realist views, e.g. realist color primitivism, which believe that Locke's so-called secondary qualities are in fact primary qualities, i.e. the right-side of the above picture.

This distinction explains why there is an epistemological problem of perception. If indirect realism is true then how much of the world we experience is a product of our bodies and brains and how much is really "out there", i.e. which qualities are primary and which qualities are secondary? What if even visual distance, shape, and orientation are secondary?

Incidentally I think it's a shame that so much of this discussion focuses on vision and colour at the expense of the other senses and other qualities. I wonder if the realist color primitivist would commit to realist taste primitivism.

Just a quibble but you're misusing the term "brute facts", at least as used by Anscombe and Searle. For Anscombe, a brute fact is a fact that cannot be explained, e.g. photons are massless particles, and for Searle brute facts are contrasted with other kinds of facts like institutional facts, e.g. it is a brute fact that the Earth exists but an institutional fact that Germany (as a nation) exists.

Even if you don't mean to be racist a discussion like this is going to bring out the racists, and I'd rather not have to deal with that fallout. I won't delete it but will close it for now and see what Jamal thinks when he's back on.

Proof of indirect realism and subjectivism and all that stuff obviously

Strange, for me the number under your name says 29.9k.

There were no such words as "transmale" or "transfemale" in ancient times. — Corvus

Well, the English language as it currently exists didn't exist in ancient times, so it's no surprise that many of the words we use today didn't exist in ancient times.

The people who changed their genders started to show up in the society, and then the word was made up and put on to the people. — Corvus

You should read up on transgender history. Obviously ancient people and ancient languages didn't use the modern English word "transgender", but transgender people have been recognized for thousands of years:

Accounts of transgender people (including non-binary and third gender people) have been identified going back to ancient times in cultures worldwide as early as 1200 BCE Egypt. Opinions vary on how to categorize historical accounts of gender-variant people and identities.

The galli, eunuch priests of classical antiquity, have been interpreted by some scholars as transgender or third-gender. The trans-feminine kathoey and hijra gender roles have persisted for thousands of years in Thailand and the Indian subcontinent, respectively. In Arabia, khanith (like earlier mukhannathun) have occupied a third gender role attested since the 7th century CE. Traditional roles for transgender women and transgender men have existed in many African societies, with some persisting to the modern day. North American Indigenous fluid and third gender roles, including the Navajo nádleehi and the Zuni lhamana, have existed since pre-colonial times.

Some medieval European documents have been studied as possible accounts of transgender persons. Kalonymus ben Kalonymus's lament for being born a man instead of a woman has been seen as an early account of gender dysphoria. John/Eleanor Rykener, a male-bodied Briton arrested in 1394 while living and doing sex work dressed as a woman, has been interpreted by some contemporary scholars as transgender. In Japan, accounts of transgender people go back to the Edo period. In Indonesia, there are millions of trans-/third-gender waria, and the extant pre-Islamic Bugis society of Sulawesi recognizes five gender roles.

In the United States in 1776, the genderless Public Universal Friend refused both birth name and gendered pronouns. Transgender American men and women are documented in accounts from throughout the 19th century. The first known informal transgender advocacy organisation in the United States, Cercle Hermaphroditos, was founded in 1895.

It looks as though you are retreating back to a defense you had already (wisely) ↪abandoned, namely the defense that says, "Ah, but none of these people knew that men's boxing excluded women on the basis of biology." Again, such a position is so implausible as to appear disingenuous. You are trying to claim that John's not knowing that Jane is married is the same as the trans activist not knowing that women's boxing excluded men on the basis of biology. :yikes:

We could draw out other absurd consequences of your view. You apparently think that, as with John, if you were to explain the situation to the trans activist then their course of action would alter. You apparently think that if you explained to the trans activist that women's boxing excludes men on the basis of biology, then they would change their views; or that if you explained to the trans activist that: — Leontiskos

I haven't abandoned anything. I am explaining that you are misrepresenting your opponents' beliefs.

These are different arguments:

1. a) only those whose sex is female ought be allowed to compete in women's sports, b) trans women ought be allowed to compete in women's sports, therefore c) trans women are biological men whose sex is female.

2. a) all those whose gender is female ought be allowed to compete in women's sports, b) trans women are biological men whose gender is female, therefore c) trans women ought be allowed to compete in women's sports.

You are arguing that because (1a) is true and because these people believe (1b) then these people believe (1c), but this is the intensional fallacy. They don't believe (1a) or (1c); they believe (2a) and (2b) — which is why they believe (2c).

Lots of people who say "transmen are men" think transmen should be provided with penises by the government, and they probably also think that transmen "deserve" XY chromosomes, even though they realize that such a thing is not (yet) possible. These are the sorts of facts that your skewing of the issue manages to ignore. — Leontiskos

These are different claims:

1. Biological women who identify as men have XY chromosomes, testes, a penis, etc.
2. Biological women who identify as men ought be provided with state-funded gender-affirming surgery.

Even if many people believe (2) it does not follow that these people believe (1). Again, you are equivocating. Anyone who says "trans men are men" understands that these trans men have XX chromosomes, a womb, and (except those that have had surgery) female genitalia, hence why they used the term "trans men".

So the phrase "trans men are men" obviously means "the gender of trans men is male", not "the sex of trans men is male".

It looks like your justification for (3) is this argument:

P1. Those who say that trans women are women say that because of this trans women ought be allowed to compete in women's sports
P2. Women's sports is restricted to biological women
C1. Therefore, those who say that trans women are women say that because of this trans women ought be allowed to compete in sports restricted to biological women

If so, this analogy should show the fallacy you're committing:

P1. John says that he wants to date Jane
P2. Jane is a married woman
C1. Therefore, John says that he wants to date a married woman

C1 doesn't follow because it's possible that John doesn't believe that Jane is a married woman (and even if he does it's not what he said). You can't just substitute terms in this way.

With respect to trans women in women's sports, it's not that they favour biological males competing in sports restricted to biological women but that they favour women's sports not being restricted to biological women.

And as for your conclusion that "'transwomen are women' means that biological males who identify as women are biological females", once again nobody who says "trans women are women" is saying "biological males who identify as women have XX chromosomes, a womb, and a vagina". To suggest otherwise is to equivocate.

I don't quite understand what (3) means, but it doesn't seem to follow from (1). So even if (3) and (4) are false, it is still the case that (1) is true.

(2) doesn't follow from (1)?

Everyone knew that these separations were made on the basis of biological factors. — Leontiskos

Sure, but the question is: should we continue with this historical separation, or ought our modern society introduce a new separation based instead on gender?

As I pointed out, on your view there simply couldn't be any biological men who compete in biologically female sports. — Leontiskos

Yes, I alluded to this in that second post above.

Given these terms:

man₁ = male sex
man₂ = male gender
woman₁ = female sex
woman₂ = female gender

It is perfectly consistent to accept that all of these are true:

1. Men₁ who identify as women₂ are women₂
2. Men₁ ought not compete in women₁'s sports
3. All women's sports is women₁'s sports, not women₂'s sports
4. Therefore, those women₂ who are men₁ ought not compete in women's sports

The political dispute concerns (3). Should women's sports be women₁'s sports or women₂'s sports?

This is admirably clear, but do you really believe it?

The activist means something like, "This human being who says that he is a man should be viewed by all as a man, both as regards sex and gender." And in a dialogical sense what tends to happen is a motte-and-bailey fallacy, where the bailey encroaches upon sex and the motte retreats back to gender. — Leontiskos

Well I certainly don't think that anyone who says "trans men are men" means to say "anyone who self-identifies as a man has XY chromosomes and a penis".

Carrying on from the above, it's worth pointing out that those in favour of trans rights are also often guilty of equivocation.

Take the following claim:

1. Trans men are men and so ought be allowed to use men's facilities

Given the four distinct terms defined in the previous post, and the proper interpretation of "trans men are men", how is this to be understood?

2. women₁ who identify as men₂ are men₂ and so ought be allowed to use men₂'s facilities
3. women₁ who identify as men₂ are men₂ and so ought be allowed to use men₁'s facilities

These each depend on an implicit premise:

2a. All men₂ ought be allowed to use men₂'s facilities
3a. All men₂ ought be allowed to use men₁'s facilities

Even if (1) means (2) and even if (2a) is true the counterargument is that there is no such thing as men₂'s facilities, and so (1) is moot.

And if (1) means (3) then the counterargument is that (3a) is false.

So the political question is: should men's facilities be men₁'s facilities or men₂'s facilities?

The claim is that there is a distinction between sex and gender and that the English words "man" and "woman" are polysemic, referring either to sex or to gender.

We can make this explicit with:

man₁ = male sex
man₂ = male gender
woman₁ = female sex
woman₂ = female gender

Now if someone says "trans men are men" then which of these do you think they could mean?

1. trans men are men₁
2. trans men are men₂

Given that the sentence starts with "trans men" rather than "cis men" then it is obvious that they mean (2). So it's not ambiguous.

And then perhaps you want to know what "trans man" means? Well, it could mean one of these:

3. women₁ who identify as men₁
4. women₁ who identify as men₂

(3) would be referring to someone hallucinating genitals that don't exist or being delusional about one's chromosomes, etc., and so is limited to those with legitimate psychosis. The ordinary meaning of "trans man" is obviously (4).

So the common sense interpretation of "trans men are men" is "women₁ who identify as men₂ are men₂".

But let's say that some Act of Parliament says "it is illegal to refuse entry to men". Which of these do you think the Act could mean?

5. it is illegal to refuse entry to men₁
6. it is illegal to refuse entry to men₂

It's not obvious which of (5) and (6) is the proper interpretation of the law, and requires some court to rule on the matter.

And it's important to note that the answer to this question has no bearing on the truth of (2). The UK Supreme Court made a point to recognize this in the ruling you alluded to earlier, saying "it is not the role of the court to adjudicate on the arguments in the public domain on the meaning of gender or sex, nor is it to define the meaning of the word 'woman' other than when it is used in the provisions of the EA 2010".

Now it may be that you just don't know what "male gender" means as distinct from "male sex", but that's a separate issue – and not an issue for Philosophim as he has accepted this distinction.

In the wider world not only is it ambiguous, there are legal battles trying to sort out its ambiguity. — AmadeusD

Here are two different claims:

1. Trans men are men
2. Under this Act, it is illegal to refuse entry to men

The phrase "are men" in (1) is unambiguously referring to gender identity, even if the term "men" in (2) is ambiguous (and even if it is referring to biological sex).

In the context of this discussion I have only ever been addressing (1). I don't deny that there are legitimate legal disputes about the meaning of (2).

And it is fallacious to argue that if (2) does not protect trans men then (1) is false, just as it would be fallacious to argue that if (1) is true then (2) protects trans men. Both sides of the political debate are often guilty of such equivocation.

This misunderstands (and as I see it, willfully so) the crux of what's being said. — AmadeusD

I don't think it does. I think you are continuing to equivocate. Here are a few different claims:

1. Men can become women
2. Biological men can become biological women
3. Humans with an active SRY gene can become humans without an active SRY gene
4. Humans born with an active SRY gene can become humans born without an active SRY gene

I doubt any (sane) person believes (4) as that would require time travel and likely introduce a paradox.

Some people may believe that (3) is possible in the future, but almost certainly know that it is beyond our current technology.

Even if "many people" believe (2) as you claim, they almost certainly don't believe (3) or (4), and so the obvious conclusion is that when they use the phrase "biological man" they don't mean "a human [born] with an active SRY gene" (as I believe you mean by the phrase).

It doesn't take much to take a step back and ask ourselves if someone really means what a superficial interpretation of their words would mean to us, or if it's more rational to accept that they probably mean something else.

Unless you prove that everyone who uses the phrase in a way different than you feel its to be read is an idiot or dishonest, this in no way proves the sentence isn't ambiguous. — Philosophim

You are misunderstanding me again. I'll try to be even clearer:

P1. Michael says "trans men are men".
C1. Therefore, Michael is saying (and believes) that humans with XX chromosomes who identify as men are humans with XY chromosomes.

Unless there are good reasons to believe that Michael is suffering from something like schizophrenia, it should be common sense to any rational person that C1 is false. Therefore, it should be common sense to any rational person that when Michael says "trans men are men" he does not mean "humans with XX chromosomes who identify as men are humans with XY chromosomes".

You're not an idiot or dishonest if you use the phrase "trans men are men" in a different way to Michael, but you are an idiot or dishonest if you infer C1 from P1 and so believe or assert that C1 is true.

With respect to "male" and "female" brains, the notion is that most biological men have a broadly similar brain structure, that most biological women have a broadly similar brain structure, and that the brain structure of the typical biological man is dissimilar in notable ways to the brain structure of the typical biological woman. So we can putatively determine someone's biological sex with a high probability by examining their brain structure, hence a so-called "male" or "female" brain.

The claim then is that transgender women have a brain structure more similar to the typical biological woman than to the typical biological man, and that transgender men have a brain structure more similar to the typical biological man than to the typical biological woman, hence transgender women having a "female" brain and transgender men having a "male" brain.

Although as referenced in a few articles above, there are studies that suggest that the transgender person's brain structure is dissimilar to both the typical "male" brain and the typical "female" brain.

Men have delusions that they are women. — Malcolm Parry

Is this your reasoning?

P1. Men are humans with XY chromosomes, testes, a penis, etc.
P2. Women are humans with XX chromosomes, ovaries, a vagina, etc.
P3. No human with XY chromosomes, etc. is a human with XX chromosomes, etc.
C1. Therefore, no man is a woman
P4. Some men believe that they are women
C2. Therefore, some men falsely believe that they are women
P5. A delusion is a false belief
C3. Thererefore, some men have delusions that they are women

And yet that doesn't address my point that it could also be because its ambiguous. — Philosophim

If a phrase could possibly mean one of two things, but one of those things is utterly absurd, then unless you believe that the person who said it is suffering from psychosis then you ought use a little common sense and understand that they mean the non-absurd thing, and so this polysemic phrase isn't actually ambiguous.

So if I say "trans men are men" then you ought recognize that I'm not saying "humans with XX chromosomes who identify as men are humans with XY chromosomes".

It's really simple. I don't know how you ever manage to communicate with other people if you don't understand this. You don't need to be a mind-reader to figure out what people are trying to say.

or be the straw man guy who's claiming that everyone who uses the phrase incorrectly must be an idiot or dishonest. — Philosophim

Again, this is not what I said. Try re-reading that post again.

You ought to stop using the implicit claim that anyone who doesn't use the phrase exactly as you say it is , is an idiot. — Philosophim

That's not what I've said.

What I've said is that if I say "trans men are men" and you think to yourself "Michael believes that humans with XX chromosomes who identify as men are humans with XY chromosomes" then either you're an idiot or you're being intentionally dishonest.

I am stating "At least one person who has used this phrase has used a different interpretation." — Philosophim

I suspect that for all phrases there is at least one person who has used a different interpretation to what is ordinary, but that doesn't mean that all phrases are ambiguous. The existence of schizophrenics, the illiterate, and those otherwise unfamiliar with English is not a good reason to avoid a little common sense to understanding widespread language-use.

A rational person should understand that people who say "trans men are men" are not saying "humans with a vagina who identify as men are humans with a penis" or "humans with XX chromosomes who identify as men are humans with XY chromosomes". You ought stop stubbornly insisting on this straw man.

Already pointed out that I've encountered people who intend this. There are some trans gender individuals who do use the word 'men' to indicate they have changed sex, not merely gender. You cannot know from the phrase alone what they intend without further clarification, therefore it is ambiguous. — Philosophim

So let's take an incredibly reductive approach and say that a biological man is a human with a penis and a biological woman is a human with a vagina.

You've encountered people who believe that humans with a vagina who identify as men are humans with a penis?

I don't believe you have.

No, brain scans on transgender people prior to any medical intervention have brains that are no different than non-transgender brains. — Philosophim

The first three studies in a Google search disagree.

Brain Sex in Transgender Women Is Shifted towards Gender Identity

Transgender individuals (TIs) show brain-structural alterations that differ from their biological sex as well as their perceived gender

Rather than being merely shifted towards either end of the male-female spectrum, transgender persons seem to present with their own unique brain phenotype

It's ambiguous even with most contexts. — AmadeusD

It's really not.

No person who says "trans men are men" is saying "biological women who identify as men are biological men".

That the sentence starts with the term "trans men" is all the context any rational person needs to understand that the ending phrase "are men" is referring to gender and not biological sex.

It's quite absurd that this needs to be repeated and that this discussion has reached 19 pages.

@Philosophim would have a much stronger position if he were to just claim that without further context the sentence "John is a man" is ordinarily understood to mean "John is a biological man", but he's opted not to take this approach.

I don't understand the point of your question, but to explain why NotAristotle is wrong, let's consider all possible permutations of two coin tosses and their prior probabilities of occurring, which are equal:

HH = 0.25
HT = 0.25
TH = 0.25
TT = 0.25

If the first coin lands heads then we just rule out two of the four permutations, with each of the other two remaining equally likely:

HH = 0.5
HT = 0.5
TH = 0
TT = 0

That’s a terrible analogy. A more appropriate one is the gambling addict who asks to be banned from a casino.

if a coin lands Heads and is flipped a second time, is it more likely to land Tails on the second flip? — NotAristotle

No, that’s the gambler’s fallacy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gambler's_fallacy

What proof do you have of any of this? — Outlander

Proof that he's an adult or proof that he told us that he wants to be banned?

This is the proof that he told us that he wants to be banned, from the discussion I linked to above:

I do think it's rude that I explicitly asked Jamal also to be banned more than once, and for whatever reason he kept questioning me about it, in which I felt compelled not to respond just because I already answered the question. I have recently realized how much irritates me when people keep asking me to repeat myself.

So there: i did what was asked of me, now I'm going to ask that I get banned from this message board so that it's no longer a source of confusion and anxiety. Thank you. — ProtagoranSocratist

And this is the proof that he's an adult:

It's usually inconsequential, but during one college course i had a long time ago... — ProtagoranSocratist

I don't understand what either you or javi2541997 are expecting of us. For us to refuse to ban someone who asks to be banned because we clearly know better than them what's best for them? That would be incredibly condescending.

He's an adult who told us what he wanted. I'm not going to infantilise him.

Banned @ProtagoranSocratist because he asked us to: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/16297/i-dont-think-the-site-overall-is-very-well-designed/p1