Words literally cause mindstates, when heard in certain contexts. — AmadeusD

Unfortunately we haven't even reached this stage. He can't even accept that sound waves cause the cochlea to release neurotransmitters.

And here we have it. The Big Bang begins the process of raising your arm and turning on the lights. So you’ve caused nothing, really. — NOS4A2

I cause many things. Your claim that A causes B only if A is uncaused is false, as is your claim that there are uncaused causes within the human body.

Symbols and symbolic sounds, arranged in certain combinations, can affect and move other phases of matter above and beyond the kinetic energy inherent in the physical manifestation of their symbols. I can use speech to cause the lights to turn on and I can use speech to cause your ears to send neurotransmitters to your brain. This is the reality of physics; not superstition or magical thinking. Your attempt at a defense of free speech fails.

I'll interpret the lack of any rebuttal on your part to everything else I said regarding free speech as an agreement with what I said about free speech. — Harry Hindu

You can take it as me not engaging with an argument that I wasn't addressing.

You can turn on the lights. You cannot move the components of the device, the energy within the system, or heat the filament in a bulb with your voice. — NOS4A2

It makes no sense to say that I cause the light to turn on but don't cause the [whatever] to heat the filament in the bulb given that these are one and the same.

I mean simply that you begin the process of your actions, that your actions find their genesis in you and nowhere else. — NOS4A2

Which makes no sense unless there is an uncaused cause within the human body.

When does physical event A begin and when does physical event B end? At what point in your temporal series does the cause occur? — NOS4A2

This is like asking me how long a piece of string is.

Humans have been hearing for the better part of their lives, even in the womb, and so the process of hearing begins as soon as the organism forms and begins to function in such a way. It doesn’t stop and then begin again in discrete temporal units and at the discretion of external sound waves. — NOS4A2

And it's the case that the sound waves cause the ear drum to vibrate which cause the ossicles to vibrate which cause the hair cells in the cochlea to bend which cause potassium and calcium ions to enter the opening which cause the release of neurotransmitters – and so it's the case that speech causes transduction in the ear.

So then what object or force begins the process of lifting your arm? — NOS4A2

The only beginning is the Big Bang because there are no uncaused events in physics. This is causal determinism:

Causal determinism proposes that there is an unbroken chain of prior occurrences stretching back to the origin of the universe.

...

Causal determinists believe that there is nothing in the universe that has no cause or is self-caused. Causal determinism has also been considered more generally as the idea that everything that happens or exists is caused by antecedent conditions.

Unless eliminative materialism is false and interactionist dualism is true, in which case it's possible that some non-physical volition is the beginning. Are you willing to commit to that?

Then what you're saying is that you and NOS4A2 have gone off-topic — Harry Hindu

Yes. His defense of free speech argues that soundwaves do not cause the hairs in the inner ear to convert mechanical energy into electrical signals. I have only been trying to explain that this interpretation of causation is false, and so his defense of free speech fails.

Yes, you can turn on lights — NOS4A2

So I can turn on the lights by saying "Siri, turn on the lights."

Therefore, I can cause the lights to turn on by saying "Siri, turn on the lights."

Therefore, the spoken words "Siri, turn on the lights" can cause the lights to turn on.

Therefore, "symbols and symbolic sounds, arranged in certain combinations, can affect and move other phases of matter above and beyond the kinetic energy inherent in the physical manifestation of their symbols."

Uncaused cause? No. — NOS4A2

Then what do you mean by "an agent's action originates within the agent" and "Your 'causal chains' begin within the agent"?

For any given physical event A, either some physical event B caused A to happen, in which case A is not the beginning of a causal chain, or A is an uncaused event.

As an example, consider the hair cells in the inner ear converting mechanical energy into electrical signals. This is not an uncaused event. It is not the beginning of a causal chain. It is a causally determined response to this mechanical energy. And this mechanical energy is not an uncaused event. It is not the beginning of a causal chain. It is a causally determined response to soundwaves interacting with the ear drum. And so on.

Then what besides the agent controls the agent’s arm? — NOS4A2

The agent controls the arm.

I am saying that x can have control over a even if x is not the "ultimate source" of a.

As an example, Siri has control over the lights even though its control over the lights is causally determined by other things (such as my commands and an energy supply).

Not without Siri, apparently. — NOS4A2

With Siri or by clapping my hands or by flicking a switch or by pulling a chord. There are many ways to turn on the lights.

But I can turn on the lights. So causal influence doesn't end at "mov[ing] diaphragms in microphones and flick[ing] switches" as you claim.

Neither. — NOS4A2

If physicalism is true and if hidden-variable theory is true then determinism is true. There's no avoiding this. So if determinism is false then either physicalism is false or hidden-variable theory is false. Which is it? If the latter then that just means that some things are random.

By "ultimate source" I mean an agent's action originates within the agent, and nowhere else. Your "causal chains" begin within the agent. — NOS4A2

So you want an uncaused cause occurring within the human body. This is incompatible with physics. Your position on free will requires a non-physical agent/non-physical agency yet you endorse eliminative materialism. You must relinquish one of these to avoid contradiction.

I’ll copy and paste the full incompatibalist source hood argument and you can let me know which premise you disagree with.

1. Any agent, x, performs an any act, a, of her own free will iff x has control over a.
x has control over a only if x is the ultimate source of a. — NOS4A2

I disagree with "x has control over a only if x is the ultimate source of a."

You can move diaphragms in microphones and flick switches. As far as influence goes, that’s not much. — NOS4A2

And I can turn on the lights.

There are multitudes of events and causes you’re leaving out — NOS4A2

Because they're not relevant to the discussion. It should go without saying that I can only turn on the lights if there is a power supply to my house.

The fact that there are multiple causes does not entail that I am not one of these causes.

A person acts of her own free will only if she is its ultimate source. — NOS4A2

I don't know what it means to be an "ultimate" source.

But, again, the only way to avoid determinism is by arguing for either quantum indeterminacy without hidden variables (in which case some things are just random, but nonetheless the effect of some physical cause) or interactionist dualism. So which is it?

Whose goals are being realized - yours or the hacker's? — Harry Hindu

The hacker's.

Who had more control over what happens when you say, "Siri, open the blinds." You or the hacker? — Harry Hindu

I don't quite understand the question. All I am saying is that I cause the doors to open by saying "Siri, open the blinds."

You seem to be thinking that that is where the story ends. — Harry Hindu

No, I don't. I'm not yet addressing that, because NOS4A2 can't even accept that sounds can cause the ears to send an electrical signal to the brain. He can't even accept that sounds can cause the lights to turn on.

You continue to point everywhere else (at strawmen). — Harry Hindu

I am simply responding to this claim made by NOS4A2:

So the superstitious imply a physics of magical thinking that contradicts basic reality: that symbols and symbolic sounds, arranged in certain combinations, can affect and move other phases of matter above and beyond the kinetic energy inherent in the physical manifestation of their symbols.

His claim is false. I can cause the lights to turn on by saying "Siri, turn on the lights" or by clapping my hands.

I'm not sure. I'm still trying to figure that out. — Harry Hindu

I'm saying exactly what I'm saying, nothing more. You are trying to read something else into it that just isn't there.

What if a hacker hacked your home network and now Siri unlocks your doors instead of opening the blinds? — Harry Hindu

Then saying "Siri, open the blinds" will cause the doors to open.

Who would you call to fix the issue - a linguist, a political scientist, an electrician, or an information technology expert? — Harry Hindu

An information technology expert.

It is only the case that you often do cause the light to turn on by flicking the switch because the intervening technology is reliable - far more reliable than your speech's effect on other people. So how do you explain the discrepancy between the reliable outcome of your light turning on vs the unreliable outcomes of your speech? — Harry Hindu

The "reliable" outcome is that my speech will cause the listener's ears to send an electrical signal to their brain (unless they're deaf). This is where NOS4A2 disagrees, and is the extent of my argument with him (notwithstanding the corollary debate on the nature of free will).

Again, you seem to think I'm saying something I'm not. What do you think I'm saying?

But sometimes Siri does not open the blinds. How do you explain that — Harry Hindu

It’s turned off or broken.

Much like sometimes when I flick the light switch the light doesn’t turn on, perhaps because of faulty wiring or a power cut. But it’s still the case that I can and do often cause the light to turn on by flicking the switch.

What is so difficult to understand about this? You seem to think I’m saying something I’m not and I don’t know what that is.

No, the kinetic energy of your voice moves a diaphragm or some other device in the microphone. That's it. That's as far as your "causal influence" goes. — NOS4A2

It's not as far as the causal influence goes. I turn on the lights by saying "Siri, turn on the lights" or by clapping my hands or by pushing a button.

You seemed to accept this before.

It's a problem I have with the weasel word "causally influence" and the limited knowledge I have of the components of the device. I've already admitted the kinetic energy in the sound waves of your voice can cause something to move in the listening-component (like any other sound wave), but weather you "causally influence" the behavior of the entire machine I cannot fathom because the machine is largely following the instructions of its programming or artificial intelligence, and not necessarily your voice. — NOS4A2

My computer displays these words on my screen as I type them because I type them. It's not a mere coincidence that they correlate. There is a causal chain of events. What is so difficult to understand about this?

For me, the only question that needs be answered is “what object or force determines human behavior?”. If it is the agent, then he has free will. — NOS4A2

Which is consistent with compatibilism.

But if you want to argue that we have free will and that determinism is false then your only apparent options are interactionist dualism (in which case eliminative materialism, and physicalism in general, is false) and quantum indeterminacy without hidden variables (in which case some things are just random, but still the effect of some physical cause).

I'm arguing against this claim of his:

So the superstitious imply a physics of magical thinking that contradicts basic reality: that symbols and symbolic sounds, arranged in certain combinations, can affect and move other phases of matter above and beyond the kinetic energy inherent in the physical manifestation of their symbols.

It's false. I can open the blinds by saying "Siri, open the blinds."

They do address the issue that we’ve been discussing for pages. But you’re causing me to not understand. As far as I know eliminative materialism is the claim that some of the mental states posited thus far do not actually exist. What does quantum indeterminacy and hidden variables have to do with eliminate materialism? — NOS4A2

If eliminative materialism is true then mental states do not exist and everything is physical. If hidden variables explain quantum indeterminacy then all physical events — including human behaviour — are deterministic. If there are no hidden variables then quantum indeterminacy is true randomness, so all physical events — including human behaviour — are either deterministic or truly random.

If some human behaviour is neither deterministic nor truly random then some human behaviour has a non-physical explanation, and so eliminative materialism is false and something like interactionist dualism is true.

You’re speaking about the false analogy of non-agents designed by agents to activate upon certain sounds, mechanistically triggering a limited set of actions. Can you turn the lights on with your voice without saying “Siri”? That’s your causal power of speech in a nutshell. — NOS4A2

The comment I was addressing did not mention agency. It only mentioned “symbols and symbolic sounds, arranged in certain combinations, affect[ing] and mov[ing] other phases of matter above and beyond the kinetic energy inherent in the physical manifestation of their symbols.” That is precisely what happens when I say “Siri, turn on the lights” or “Siri, open the blinds,” and so it is not "superstition" or "magical thinking."

And you don’t appear to have a consistent response to this. You sometimes appear to accept that speech can causally influence machines and sometimes you don’t, explicitly denying that my speech can cause a voice-activated forklift to lift a weight but accepting that my speech can cause the lights to turn on?

I’ve avoided and and am satisfied and for the reasons I’ve stated. — NOS4A2

Your reasons do not address the issue at all. It's quite simple; if eliminative materialism is true and if hidden variables explain quantum indeterminacy then determinism is true. Therefore if determinism is false then either eliminative materialism is false or there are no hidden variables to explain quantum indeterminacy: Therefore if we have libertarian free will then either eliminative materialism is false or free will is nothing more than behaviour influenced by quantum indeterminacy.

But, again, free will has nothing prima facie to do with the involuntary behaviour of our sense organs.

I believe you can cause the lights to turn on, yes. — NOS4A2

So the causal power of speech extends beyond the immediate transfer of kinetic energy. I can cause the lights to turn on by saying "Siri, turn on the lights" and I can cause the living room blinds to open by saying "Siri, open the living room blinds". Therefore, your reasoning below is fallacious:

So the superstitious imply a physics of magical thinking that contradicts basic reality: that symbols and symbolic sounds, arranged in certain combinations, can affect and move other phases of matter above and beyond the kinetic energy inherent in the physical manifestation of their symbols. — NOS4A2

No, humans have invented various mechanisms and lights that can do nothing else but respond to their actions, and therefore their state of on or off is determined by the human being. — NOS4A2

So you accept that the appropriate speech can cause the lights to turn on or cause a voice-activated forklift to lift a heavy weight?

That’s why I’m incompatiblist. — NOS4A2

But you also believe that we have free will and are an eliminative materialist. So how do you maintain these three positions? Is it because we could have done otherwise? If eliminative materialism is true then we could have done otherwise only if quantum indeterminacy factors into human behaviour (and only if there are no hidden variables), but does this stochasticity really satisfy your agent-causal libertarian free will? Either way, it's still the case that A caused B to happen, even if A could have caused C to happen, and it's still the case that D caused A to happen, even if D could have caused E to happen, and so on and so forth (eventually involving events external to the body).

There's simply no avoiding this without rejecting eliminative materialism in favour of interactionist dualism. But even then, interactionist dualism would only apply to conscious decision-making, not to the involuntary behaviour of the body's sense organs.

I was asking specifically in 2025 what gender stereotype do people have to conform with? — Malcolm Parry

Nobody has to do anything (other than obey the law). But there are still expectations, e.g. men propose and women take their husband's surname.

Does the soundwave have some other causal power over-and-above that transfer? — NOS4A2

I can turn on the lights by saying "Hey Siri, turn on the lights" or by clapping my hands or by pushing a button.

Or are you going to argue that no human has ever turned on a light because no human is capable of discharging electricity from his body?

You keep repeating it, telling me I’m misguided, but i have yet seen any reason why I should believe otherwise. You won’t even mention any other forces, objects, and events “causally influencing” subsequent acts.

Rather, what you leave me to picture is a cause A that causes both B and not-B, and I can’t wrap my brain around it. The joke caused me to laugh and the other guy to not laugh, for example, without admitting the reasons for the different effects, the reasons for B and not-B. I wager that is why you wish to stick to more predictable causal relations like button pushing and explosions, so you don’t have to mention the actual causes of, and reasons for, varying responses, for example if the bomb didn’t explode or if the Venus flytrap didn’t close. — NOS4A2

If the bomb isn't wired appropriately then pushing the button won't cause it to explode, but if it is then it will.

To my mind there is nothing non-physical about it. — NOS4A2

So how do you avoid determinism? Again, as it stands I don't see how your position is incompatible with compatibilism.

Is it because we could have done otherwise? If eliminative materialism is true then we could have done otherwise only if quantum indeterminacy factors into human behaviour (and only if there are no hidden variables), but does this stochasticity really satisfy your agent-causal libertarian free will? Either way, it's still the case that A caused B to happen, even if A could have caused C to happen, and it's still the case that D caused A to happen, even if D could have caused E to happen, and so on and so forth (eventually involving events external to the body).

There's simply no avoiding this without rejecting eliminative materialism in favour of interactionist dualism. But even then, interactionist dualism would only apply to conscious decision-making, not to the involuntary behaviour of the body's sense organs.

His position that words cannot cause actions in others defeats his position that laws cannot limit and must protect freedom of speech. — Fire Ologist

He's also arguing that soundwaves cannot cause sense organs to send electrical signals to the brain. It's this argument of his that I have primarily been addressing. If we can't even agree on this then there's no point in even starting a discussion on free speech.

I’ve already conceded that the environment stimulates our sense organs, simply due to the fact that they collide, and have factored it in. But that’s where their influence ends. in the case of hearing or reading, the words do not exert enough force on the body to move it in the way you say it does. It has neither the mass nor the energy to do so. All the energy and systems required to move the body comes from the body. That’s why hearing and reading are capacities of the body, and not soundwaves. That’s why I say words cannot determine, govern, or control our responses. — NOS4A2

And this is a misguided understanding of causation, as I have been at pains to explain. Causal influence doesn't simply end after the immediate transfer of kinetic energy. I can cause a bomb to explode by pushing the appropriate button. Your reasoning is a non sequitur when applied to machines and a non sequitur when applied to biological organisms.

What I believe is that each of us are the source of our own actions — NOS4A2

Which is a very vague claim. As it stands it's consistent with compatibilism and so consistent with determinism.

Yet you said before that you endorse agent-causal libertarian free will, but that is inconsistent with eliminative materialism. From here:

Accounts of libertarianism subdivide into non-physical theories and physical or naturalistic theories. Non-physical theories hold that the events in the brain that lead to the performance of actions do not have an entirely physical explanation, and consequently the world is not closed under physics. Such interactionist dualists believe that some non-physical mind, will, or soul overrides physical causality.

Explanations of libertarianism that do not involve dispensing with physicalism require physical indeterminism, such as probabilistic subatomic particle behavior.

...

In non-physical theories of free will, agents are assumed to have power to intervene in the physical world, a view known as agent causation.

You have no control or will over anything. Isn’t that so? — NOS4A2

No, I'm a compatibilist.

Your position, though, is unclear. You're a free will libertarian but also an eliminative materialist. I assume, then, that you believe that libertarian free will is made possible by quantum indeterminancy? So we "could have done otherwise" only because the applicable human behaviour operates according to probabilistic causation rather than determinism?

Your sense organs send electrical signals to your brain. — NOS4A2

And the infrared sensor sends electrical signals to some other part of the TV. But it's still the case that I cause the TV to turn on by pushing the appropriate button on the remote. Your reasoning is a non sequitur, even despite your assertions that humans, unlike TVs, have "agency" – because this "agency" does not factor into the behaviour of our sense organs in response to stimulation, e.g. I can't just will myself to be deaf (even if I can will myself to cover my ears).

I’ve already stated my reasoning. The effects cannot be shown to reach as far as you say they do. The objects, structures, and energies responsible for such movements, responses, and actions are not the same as the ones you claim they are. — NOS4A2

And as I have explained, this is a misguided understanding of causation. I cause the bomb to explode by pushing a button, I cause the machine to turn by telling it to, the fly causes the Venus flytrap to close by moving its hairs.

The relationship between each pair of events isn't merely correlation. It's not an accident or happenstance or coincidence. It's causal.

My sense organs send electrical signals to my brain because they have been stimulated. If they do so for any other reason, e.g entirely caused by internal, biological activity, then that's a sign of an injury.

So you don't accept that the fly's movements cause the Venus flytrap to close its jaws and you don't accept that spoken words can cause a voice-activated machine to lift some weight.

This just isn't the "superstitious imply[ing] a physics of magical thinking that contradicts basic reality" as you accuse it of being. It's the truth, and common sense. And if this is your best defence of free speech absolutism then so much the worse for your position.

If the action potential is in the plant, then yes, the biology of the flytrap causes it to close if and when such a stimulus happens. — NOS4A2

And the fly causes it to close. The two are not mutually exclusive. Exactly like with machines.

I can and will hand wave it until you can show that something else in the universe beats the heart. Until then there is nothing else that can be shown to determine the heart beat. — NOS4A2

You're not addressing what I'm saying. I’m saying that even if we have libertarian free will, this could-have-done-otherwise agency does not apply to our heartbeats and does not apply to our sense organs, and so there’s no good reason to say that the behaviour of our sense organs is not causally determined by some stimulus and its source.

I do not accept it. — NOS4A2

Why not? Do you reject the claim that my speech can cause a voice-activated forklift to lift a heavy weight?

That means they are not autonomous.

...

But the fact that we have to build them, program them, etc negates their autonomy. — NOS4A2

Autonomous robot.

So the superstitious imply a physics of magical thinking that contradicts basic reality: that symbols and symbolic sounds, arranged in certain combinations, can affect and move other phases of matter above and beyond the kinetic energy inherent in the physical manifestation of their symbols. — NOS4A2

Taking a step back for a moment, and re-addressing this, do you at least accept that my speech can cause a voice-activated forklift to lift a heavy weight, and so that the above comment of yours is completely misguided?

Venus flytraps, yes, but machines no. — NOS4A2

Are you saying that the fly walking inside a Venus flytrap does not cause the Venus flytrap's jaw to close?

Machines are designed, built, and operated by human beings. — NOS4A2

So?

They cannot change their own batteries or plug themselves in. — NOS4A2

They can if we build them that way. But also: so?

I never said it was an application of agency. I used “agency” to distinguish between the human being and your analogies. But the fact remains that the heart beat and digestion is caused by this same agent. So it is with the operation and maintenance with everything else occurring in the body. — NOS4A2

But the heart beat is not an application of agent-causal libertarian free will. And neither is the sense organ's response to stimuli. So there is no good reason to claim that the behaviour of the sense organs in response to stimulation is any less determined than the behaviour of a radio receiver in response to stimulation. You can't simply hand-wave this away by saying that in other circumstances the organism does have agency.

If not the agent, then what causes the heart beat and digestion? Is the Sinoatrial node a foreign parasite or something? Like I said, abstract nonsense. — NOS4A2

You're equivocating. It is true that the human organism is responsible for its heart beat and digestion but it is not prima facie true that its heart beat and digestion is an example of agent-causal libertarian free will, comparable to the supposedly could-have-done-otherwise decision to either have Chinese or Indian for dinner.

The point I was making is that even if humans – but not plants and machines – are agents, our agency does not prima facie apply to everything our body does.

You need to do more than simply assert that humans are agents to defend the claim that the behaviour of the sense organs is not a causal reaction to stimuli.

It just means autonomy: the energy and force required to move is provided by that which is moving, generated by itself, and wholly determined by the biology, not by external forces. — NOS4A2

And the same is true of the Venus flytrap and the remote control car (albeit with machinery in place of biology). Yet their internal behaviour is still causally influenced by some stimulus and its source. So this reasoning is a non sequitur.

I’m not a dualist. The behavior of the sense organs, the brain, the nervous system etc. is the behavior of the whole. I reiterate this because pretending one and then the other are discreet units outside of the scope and control of the whole is abstract nonsense. — NOS4A2

And the same is true of the Venus flytrap and the remote control car (albeit with machinery in place of biology). Yet their internal behaviour is still causally influenced by some stimulus and its source. So this reasoning is a non sequitur.

In the case of human sensing, the transduction of one form of energy to another, as in the conversion of outside stimulus to internal chemical and electrical signals, is performed by the human organism. No external system involved in the event of listening performs such an action. And when I look at what changes the force of a soundwave can possibly cause inside the human body the effects are exactly the ones I said the were and no more. Past the transduction, that force is simply no longer present and therefor neither is its “influence”. There is no soundwave or words banging around in there like billiard balls.

All subsequent movements occur due to the potential energy stored in the system itself, in this case the body, as determined by the internal process by which your body expends energy and burns calories. The energy and ability to move, or do the work involved in listening, or speaking, or any activity, is converted, stored, and used by the body and no other system. It determines any and all activity involved, and in fact is physically identical to that activity. — NOS4A2

And the same is true of the Venus flytrap and the remote control car (albeit with machinery in place of biology). Yet their internal behaviour is still causally influenced by some stimulus and its source. So this reasoning is a non sequitur.

I consider the body to be one holistic system. It is only this system in its entirety that decides, or can decide. — NOS4A2

You can’t simply assert that because the human organism as a whole can “choose to do otherwise” then the behaviour of its sense organs is not causally influenced by a stimulus and its source.

Even the interactionist dualist accepts that some of the body’s behaviour is not “agent-caused”, e.g our heartbeats and digestive systems.

I’m inclined towards sourcehood arguments and agent-causation of libertarian free will. — NOS4A2

And how do you maintain this whilst endorsing eliminative materialism? Agents are physical systems and agency is a physical process and like every other physical system and physical process in the universe its behaviour can be and is causally influenced by physical systems and physical processes external to itself, whether that be deterministic causation or probabilistic causation (e.g quantum indeterminacy).

Physical systems vary in properties and behavior. Why would that be irrelevant? — NOS4A2

Because these differences do not allow it to escape being causally influenced by things external to itself. Organic compounds still react to the environment in deterministic ways. So saying that the internal behaviour of the TV can be causally influenced by an external stimulus because it is a metal machine but that the internal behaviour of a human cannot because it is a living organism is a non sequitur.

You might as well try to argue that because a plant is not a machine then its behaviour cannot be causally influenced by the sun.

I don’t need to believe in non-physical substances to believe objects can move on their own accord. — NOS4A2

What does it mean to “move on their own accord”? Does the Venus flytrap closing its jaws “move on its own accord”? Does the robot left to its own devices to navigate a maze “move on its own accord”?

You keep throwing around these vague phrases as if they somehow avoid determinism. As it stands I don’t see how this is incompatible with compatibilism.

It didn’t grow organically and learn to deal with the environment and others through years of experience and learning — NOS4A2

Why is that relevant? Matter is matter. All physical systems operate according to the same physical laws.

You are engaging in special pleading when you assert that “the entity takes over” applies to human organisms but not machines (and not plants?).

It cannot choose to do otherwise should it desire to do so. — NOS4A2

Okay, so now we might be getting somewhere.

Firstly, are you arguing against determinism and in favour of libertarian free will? If so, how do you maintain this whilst also endorsing eliminative materialism?

There are in general two types of free will libertarians. One type argues for interactionist dualism and the second type argues.that our “choices” are really just the random outcomes of quantum indeterminacy, which to me doesn’t seem much like libertarian free will at all.

Which are you endorsing? If the latter then we’re still dealing with causal influence, albeit probabilistic causation.

Secondly, where does decision-making occur? In the inner ear? Or later in the “higher-level” brain activity? If the latter then you must at least accept that the causal power of stimuli extends beyond the immediate interaction with the sense organs, being causally responsible for the signals sent to the brain and the behaviour of “lower-level” neurons.

You can say that if you want, but that has no bearing on our conversation — Harry Hindu

Then “our conversation” has only ever been your monologue as I’ve never said anything to the contrary.

You don’t mention that it is the body that does the listening. In fact, the body does all the work: produces all the components required, converts all the energy, guides the impulses to their destination, directs each and every subsequent bodily movement long after the sound wave has had any impression. Sound waves do none of that stuff. — NOS4A2

The same is true of the machine with a radio receiver, but it’s still the case that if I send it a radio signal then I can causally influence its behaviour.

The fact that the human body and sense organs are organic matter does not entail that they don’t follow the same principles of cause and effect.

Then I have no idea what you're saying, as usual. — Harry Hindu

I am saying that NOS4A2's claim that speech has no causal power beyond the immediate transfer of kinetic energy in the inner ear is a complete misunderstanding of causation.

Okay.

How is that relevant to anything I'm saying?

So what about my argument are you objecting to? You seem to think I'm saying something I'm not.

You not taking this understanding that there is a difference in our brains and applying it to the issue, is the issue. — Harry Hindu

I am.

Address the other points I made in the post you cherry-picked. — Harry Hindu

What points? Your question asking me who deserves a medal? I don’t know why you’re asking me that as it has nothing to do with anything I’m arguing.

Our brains do not have the same information. — Harry Hindu

What does that mean?

Brains are just a bunch of interconnected neurons sending electrical and chemical signals to one another. There’s nothing above-and-beyond this.

How the brain responds to its environment (e.g signals sent from the sense organs) is determined by the nature of these connections.

Different brains have different connections, and so respond differently to the same stimulus.

If that were the case, we would all be responding the same way — Harry Hindu

No we wouldn’t because our brains are not identical.

How is saying some words and getting no reaction the same as pressing the "A" key and getting a reaction? — Harry Hindu

There is always a reaction (unless they’re deaf). It’s just that not all reactions involve the muscles. Just as not all the computer’s reactions involve displaying a character on the screen, e.g for security when typing a password on the CLI nothing is displayed.

Is a person that hears some inciting words and is not inciting to a riot malfunctioning? — Harry Hindu

No.

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It’s really not clear what your issue is. Do you just object to physicalism? Do you think that human behaviour is explained by interactionist dualism?

Carrying on from this, I can't know what it feels like to give birth but I know that there is such a feeling, I know the public occasions that elicit such a feeling, and I know that the phrase "what it feels like to give birth" refers to that feeling.

The private language argument against private sensations has got to be one of the most unconvincing arguments I've encountered.

The difference lies in the reason why we observe a difference in behaviors when multiple people hear the same speech. For determinism to be true, which I believe it is, you have to provide a theory to explain what we observe in that multiple people react differently to the same speech. What is your theory? How do you explain what we observe? — Harry Hindu

I already explained it with the analogy of the computers. How each computer responds to someone pressing the "A" key is determined by its internal structure. But its response is still caused by someone pressing the "A" key.

How the human body (including the brain) responds to some given stimulus is determined by its internal structure. But its response is still caused by the stimulus.

The inverted spectrum problem is still alive and well. No brain scans or neural activity measurements will ever convince me that your experience of red is the same as mine. — RogueAI

Strictly speaking the inverted spectrum problem doesn’t even require qualia. Even if colour experiences are reducible to particular neural activity it is possible that the same wavelength of light triggers different neural activity in different people such that the neural activity that I describe as “seeing blue” is the same as the neural activity that you describe as “seeing red”.