It looks like your justification for (3) is this argument:

P1. Those who say that trans women are women say that because of this trans women ought be allowed to compete in women's sports
P2. Women's sports is restricted to biological women
C1. Therefore, those who say that trans women are women say that because of this trans women ought be allowed to compete in sports restricted to biological women

If so, this analogy should show the fallacy you're committing:

P1. John says that he wants to date Jane
P2. Jane is a married woman
C1. Therefore, John says that he wants to date a married woman

C1 doesn't follow because it's possible that John doesn't believe that Jane is a married woman (and even if he does it's not what he said). You can't just substitute terms in this way.

With respect to trans women in women's sports, it's not that they favour biological males competing in sports restricted to biological women but that they favour women's sports not being restricted to biological women.

And as for your conclusion that "'transwomen are women' means that biological males who identify as women are biological females", once again nobody who says "trans women are women" is saying "biological males who identify as women have XX chromosomes, a womb, and a vagina". To suggest otherwise is to equivocate.

I don't quite understand what (3) means, but it doesn't seem to follow from (1). So even if (3) and (4) are false, it is still the case that (1) is true.

(2) doesn't follow from (1)?

Everyone knew that these separations were made on the basis of biological factors. — Leontiskos

Sure, but the question is: should we continue with this historical separation, or ought our modern society introduce a new separation based instead on gender?

As I pointed out, on your view there simply couldn't be any biological men who compete in biologically female sports. — Leontiskos

Yes, I alluded to this in that second post above.

Given these terms:

man₁ = male sex
man₂ = male gender
woman₁ = female sex
woman₂ = female gender

It is perfectly consistent to accept that all of these are true:

1. Men₁ who identify as women₂ are women₂
2. Men₁ ought not compete in women₁'s sports
3. All women's sports is women₁'s sports, not women₂'s sports
4. Therefore, those women₂ who are men₁ ought not compete in women's sports

The political dispute concerns (3). Should women's sports be women₁'s sports or women₂'s sports?

This is admirably clear, but do you really believe it?

The activist means something like, "This human being who says that he is a man should be viewed by all as a man, both as regards sex and gender." And in a dialogical sense what tends to happen is a motte-and-bailey fallacy, where the bailey encroaches upon sex and the motte retreats back to gender. — Leontiskos

Well I certainly don't think that anyone who says "trans men are men" means to say "anyone who self-identifies as a man has XY chromosomes and a penis".

Carrying on from the above, it's worth pointing out that those in favour of trans rights are also often guilty of equivocation.

Take the following claim:

1. Trans men are men and so ought be allowed to use men's facilities

Given the four distinct terms defined in the previous post, and the proper interpretation of "trans men are men", how is this to be understood?

2. women₁ who identify as men₂ are men₂ and so ought be allowed to use men₂'s facilities
3. women₁ who identify as men₂ are men₂ and so ought be allowed to use men₁'s facilities

These each depend on an implicit premise:

2a. All men₂ ought be allowed to use men₂'s facilities
3a. All men₂ ought be allowed to use men₁'s facilities

Even if (1) means (2) and even if (2a) is true the counterargument is that there is no such thing as men₂'s facilities, and so (1) is moot.

And if (1) means (3) then the counterargument is that (3a) is false.

So the political question is: should men's facilities be men₁'s facilities or men₂'s facilities?

The claim is that there is a distinction between sex and gender and that the English words "man" and "woman" are polysemic, referring either to sex or to gender.

We can make this explicit with:

man₁ = male sex
man₂ = male gender
woman₁ = female sex
woman₂ = female gender

Now if someone says "trans men are men" then which of these do you think they could mean?

1. trans men are men₁
2. trans men are men₂

Given that the sentence starts with "trans men" rather than "cis men" then it is obvious that they mean (2). So it's not ambiguous.

And then perhaps you want to know what "trans man" means? Well, it could mean one of these:

3. women₁ who identify as men₁
4. women₁ who identify as men₂

(3) would be referring to someone hallucinating genitals that don't exist or being delusional about one's chromosomes, etc., and so is limited to those with legitimate psychosis. The ordinary meaning of "trans man" is obviously (4).

So the common sense interpretation of "trans men are men" is "women₁ who identify as men₂ are men₂".

But let's say that some Act of Parliament says "it is illegal to refuse entry to men". Which of these do you think the Act could mean?

5. it is illegal to refuse entry to men₁
6. it is illegal to refuse entry to men₂

It's not obvious which of (5) and (6) is the proper interpretation of the law, and requires some court to rule on the matter.

And it's important to note that the answer to this question has no bearing on the truth of (2). The UK Supreme Court made a point to recognize this in the ruling you alluded to earlier, saying "it is not the role of the court to adjudicate on the arguments in the public domain on the meaning of gender or sex, nor is it to define the meaning of the word 'woman' other than when it is used in the provisions of the EA 2010".

Now it may be that you just don't know what "male gender" means as distinct from "male sex", but that's a separate issue – and not an issue for Philosophim as he has accepted this distinction.

In the wider world not only is it ambiguous, there are legal battles trying to sort out its ambiguity. — AmadeusD

Here are two different claims:

1. Trans men are men
2. Under this Act, it is illegal to refuse entry to men

The phrase "are men" in (1) is unambiguously referring to gender identity, even if the term "men" in (2) is ambiguous (and even if it is referring to biological sex).

In the context of this discussion I have only ever been addressing (1). I don't deny that there are legitimate legal disputes about the meaning of (2).

And it is fallacious to argue that if (2) does not protect trans men then (1) is false, just as it would be fallacious to argue that if (1) is true then (2) protects trans men. Both sides of the political debate are often guilty of such equivocation.

This misunderstands (and as I see it, willfully so) the crux of what's being said. — AmadeusD

I don't think it does. I think you are continuing to equivocate. Here are a few different claims:

1. Men can become women
2. Biological men can become biological women
3. Humans with an active SRY gene can become humans without an active SRY gene
4. Humans born with an active SRY gene can become humans born without an active SRY gene

I doubt any (sane) person believes (4) as that would require time travel and likely introduce a paradox.

Some people may believe that (3) is possible in the future, but almost certainly know that it is beyond our current technology.

Even if "many people" believe (2) as you claim, they almost certainly don't believe (3) or (4), and so the obvious conclusion is that when they use the phrase "biological man" they don't mean "a human [born] with an active SRY gene" (as I believe you mean by the phrase).

It doesn't take much to take a step back and ask ourselves if someone really means what a superficial interpretation of their words would mean to us, or if it's more rational to accept that they probably mean something else.

Unless you prove that everyone who uses the phrase in a way different than you feel its to be read is an idiot or dishonest, this in no way proves the sentence isn't ambiguous. — Philosophim

You are misunderstanding me again. I'll try to be even clearer:

P1. Michael says "trans men are men".
C1. Therefore, Michael is saying (and believes) that humans with XX chromosomes who identify as men are humans with XY chromosomes.

Unless there are good reasons to believe that Michael is suffering from something like schizophrenia, it should be common sense to any rational person that C1 is false. Therefore, it should be common sense to any rational person that when Michael says "trans men are men" he does not mean "humans with XX chromosomes who identify as men are humans with XY chromosomes".

You're not an idiot or dishonest if you use the phrase "trans men are men" in a different way to Michael, but you are an idiot or dishonest if you infer C1 from P1 and so believe or assert that C1 is true.

With respect to "male" and "female" brains, the notion is that most biological men have a broadly similar brain structure, that most biological women have a broadly similar brain structure, and that the brain structure of the typical biological man is dissimilar in notable ways to the brain structure of the typical biological woman. So we can putatively determine someone's biological sex with a high probability by examining their brain structure, hence a so-called "male" or "female" brain.

The claim then is that transgender women have a brain structure more similar to the typical biological woman than to the typical biological man, and that transgender men have a brain structure more similar to the typical biological man than to the typical biological woman, hence transgender women having a "female" brain and transgender men having a "male" brain.

Although as referenced in a few articles above, there are studies that suggest that the transgender person's brain structure is dissimilar to both the typical "male" brain and the typical "female" brain.

Men have delusions that they are women. — Malcolm Parry

Is this your reasoning?

P1. Men are humans with XY chromosomes, testes, a penis, etc.
P2. Women are humans with XX chromosomes, ovaries, a vagina, etc.
P3. No human with XY chromosomes, etc. is a human with XX chromosomes, etc.
C1. Therefore, no man is a woman
P4. Some men believe that they are women
C2. Therefore, some men falsely believe that they are women
P5. A delusion is a false belief
C3. Thererefore, some men have delusions that they are women

And yet that doesn't address my point that it could also be because its ambiguous. — Philosophim

If a phrase could possibly mean one of two things, but one of those things is utterly absurd, then unless you believe that the person who said it is suffering from psychosis then you ought use a little common sense and understand that they mean the non-absurd thing, and so this polysemic phrase isn't actually ambiguous.

So if I say "trans men are men" then you ought recognize that I'm not saying "humans with XX chromosomes who identify as men are humans with XY chromosomes".

It's really simple. I don't know how you ever manage to communicate with other people if you don't understand this. You don't need to be a mind-reader to figure out what people are trying to say.

or be the straw man guy who's claiming that everyone who uses the phrase incorrectly must be an idiot or dishonest. — Philosophim

Again, this is not what I said. Try re-reading that post again.

You ought to stop using the implicit claim that anyone who doesn't use the phrase exactly as you say it is , is an idiot. — Philosophim

That's not what I've said.

What I've said is that if I say "trans men are men" and you think to yourself "Michael believes that humans with XX chromosomes who identify as men are humans with XY chromosomes" then either you're an idiot or you're being intentionally dishonest.

I am stating "At least one person who has used this phrase has used a different interpretation." — Philosophim

I suspect that for all phrases there is at least one person who has used a different interpretation to what is ordinary, but that doesn't mean that all phrases are ambiguous. The existence of schizophrenics, the illiterate, and those otherwise unfamiliar with English is not a good reason to avoid a little common sense to understanding widespread language-use.

A rational person should understand that people who say "trans men are men" are not saying "humans with a vagina who identify as men are humans with a penis" or "humans with XX chromosomes who identify as men are humans with XY chromosomes". You ought stop stubbornly insisting on this straw man.

Already pointed out that I've encountered people who intend this. There are some trans gender individuals who do use the word 'men' to indicate they have changed sex, not merely gender. You cannot know from the phrase alone what they intend without further clarification, therefore it is ambiguous. — Philosophim

So let's take an incredibly reductive approach and say that a biological man is a human with a penis and a biological woman is a human with a vagina.

You've encountered people who believe that humans with a vagina who identify as men are humans with a penis?

I don't believe you have.

No, brain scans on transgender people prior to any medical intervention have brains that are no different than non-transgender brains. — Philosophim

The first three studies in a Google search disagree.

Brain Sex in Transgender Women Is Shifted towards Gender Identity

Transgender individuals (TIs) show brain-structural alterations that differ from their biological sex as well as their perceived gender

Rather than being merely shifted towards either end of the male-female spectrum, transgender persons seem to present with their own unique brain phenotype

It's ambiguous even with most contexts. — AmadeusD

It's really not.

No person who says "trans men are men" is saying "biological women who identify as men are biological men".

That the sentence starts with the term "trans men" is all the context any rational person needs to understand that the ending phrase "are men" is referring to gender and not biological sex.

It's quite absurd that this needs to be repeated and that this discussion has reached 19 pages.

@Philosophim would have a much stronger position if he were to just claim that without further context the sentence "John is a man" is ordinarily understood to mean "John is a biological man", but he's opted not to take this approach.

I don't understand the point of your question, but to explain why NotAristotle is wrong, let's consider all possible permutations of two coin tosses and their prior probabilities of occurring, which are equal:

HH = 0.25
HT = 0.25
TH = 0.25
TT = 0.25

If the first coin lands heads then we just rule out two of the four permutations, with each of the other two remaining equally likely:

HH = 0.5
HT = 0.5
TH = 0
TT = 0

That’s a terrible analogy. A more appropriate one is the gambling addict who asks to be banned from a casino.

if a coin lands Heads and is flipped a second time, is it more likely to land Tails on the second flip? — NotAristotle

No, that’s the gambler’s fallacy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gambler's_fallacy

What proof do you have of any of this? — Outlander

Proof that he's an adult or proof that he told us that he wants to be banned?

This is the proof that he told us that he wants to be banned, from the discussion I linked to above:

I do think it's rude that I explicitly asked Jamal also to be banned more than once, and for whatever reason he kept questioning me about it, in which I felt compelled not to respond just because I already answered the question. I have recently realized how much irritates me when people keep asking me to repeat myself.

So there: i did what was asked of me, now I'm going to ask that I get banned from this message board so that it's no longer a source of confusion and anxiety. Thank you. — ProtagoranSocratist

And this is the proof that he's an adult:

It's usually inconsequential, but during one college course i had a long time ago... — ProtagoranSocratist

I don't understand what either you or javi2541997 are expecting of us. For us to refuse to ban someone who asks to be banned because we clearly know better than them what's best for them? That would be incredibly condescending.

He's an adult who told us what he wanted. I'm not going to infantilise him.

Banned @ProtagoranSocratist because he asked us to: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/16297/i-dont-think-the-site-overall-is-very-well-designed/p1

6. AI Autofill / Autocomplete
Offers context-aware writing suggestions to help users complete sentences or refine ideas as they type. — Jamal

As a programmer this is the only feature of Cursor that I use. I've never once asked it to generate code for me. I'm stubbornly old-fashioned.

Many, MANY people are assuming that 'men' in isolation is referring to sex. Calling them idiots is not an argument. — Philosophim

It's not idiotic to believe that the word "men" only means "biological men". But if a very large number of people say things like "trans men are men" then there are two possible responses:

1. People who say "trans men are men" are suffering from a psychosis and believe that biological women who identify as men are biological men.
2. People who say "trans men are men" mean something else by "are men".

It's idiotic to assert or believe (1).

Yes, some people aren't fluent in English or might not understand the distinction between sex and gender, but Philosophim isn't one of those people. He is arguing that the sentence "trans men are men" is ambiguous, showing that he clearly understands that the word "men" is a homonym and yet seems incapable or unwilling to use the rest of the sentence to sensibly resolve the appropriate meaning of the word as he would do with the sentence "bats are flying mammals".

So on this, I'm not sure there is anything more to be said. However what did need to be said was the answer to my question. You don't even have to agree on the way most people will interpret the phrase, but it is clear there is more than one way to interpret the phrase, and as such it is ambiguous. One of the essential tenants in philosophy is a disambiguation of terminology to allow clear thinking and rational thought. Anyone who is against getting rid of ambiguity in phrasing is being dishonest and manipulative in a discussion if they are not ignorant or rationally deficient. — Philosophim

The sentence "trans men are men" isn't ambiguous, just as the sentences "bats are flying mammals" and "bats are used in baseball" are not ambiguous. Anyone who isn't being intentionally dense can figure out the most plausible meaning of a homonym by just considering the sentence as a whole.

It is a very obvious strawman to interpret "trans men are men" to mean "biological women who identify as men are biological men", just as it is a very obvious strawman to interpret "bats are flying mammals" to mean "metal clubs are flying mammals".

It’s very simple. Nobody who says “trans men are men” believes that biological women who identify as men are biological men. It’s absurd that this needs to be explained to you.

The only coherent objection to the claim “trans men are men” is to argue that they are misunderstanding or misusing the word “men” — that it only means “biological men” — but this objection, although coherent, is demonstrably false.

The English language, like every other natural language, has its ambiguities and homonyms, and it’s incorrect to claim that it doesn’t and pointless to insist that it shouldn’t. If it concerns you that much then go learn Lojban.

It’s common sense that there is no widespread mass psychosis about the sex organs of transgender people. This is most obvious given that these people are referred to as “transgender” rather than as “cisgender”. The very words people use proves beyond all reasonable doubt that they are not hallucinating or delusional.

You’re just doubling down on a completely unreasonable accusation, and then shifting the burden of proof.

There are delusional people who believe this. — Philosophim

That some people suffer from psychosis does not justify your position. Common sense is sufficient to understand that most people aren’t suffering from hallucinations or delusions, and so the only rational conclusion is either a) other people misunderstand the (singular) meaning of the word “man” or b) the word “man” doesn’t just mean the singular thing you believe it to mean.

Again, if you interpret the phrase “trans men are men” as “trans men are biologically male” then that’s on you.

Do you honestly believe that people who say this are delusional about someone’s sex organs? Do you honestly believe that trans men hallucinate themselves to have a penis? Common sense and even the smallest principle of charity should make it obvious that you’re addressing the most absurd strawman.

I think that if you interpret the phrase “trans men are men” as “trans men are biologically male” then that’s on you. Given that the sentence starts with “trans men” it is immediately obvious that they are referring to those who are biologically female, and so the context of the ending phrase “are men” should be self-evident.

Late to this debate, but I take it that despite all the heat of the public debate, this is just an issue in metaphysics. — Clarendon

I don’t think it’s anything so complicated. It’s just people thinking that words have some singular meaning.

The English words “man” and “woman” can refer to (usually) straightforward biological properties but they can also refer to something psychological or cultural or social that is less easy to pigeonhole.

Arguing that trans men aren’t men because they don’t have XY chromosomes is as confused as arguing that chiroptera aren’t bats because they’re not metal clubs.

I'm not sure what you mean this scenario to be. It's possible you mistyped something. — Pierre-Normand

A 3-sided die is rolled.
If it rolls a 1 then she is woken once on Tuesday.
If it rolls a 2 then she is woken once on Monday.
If it rolls a 3 then she is woken once on Monday.

These are clearly different experiments:

1. If a D3 rolls a 1 then she is woken once on Tuesday, else she is woken once on Monday.

2. If a D2¹⁰⁰ rolls a 1 then she is woken 2¹⁰¹ times on Monday, else she is woken once on Tuesday.

And these are clearly different questions:

a. What fraction of interviews does she expect to be Monday interviews as the number of experiments approaches infinity?

b. How confident is she that her current interview is a Monday interview if she knows that the experiment is only performed once?

Everyone agrees that the answers to (1a) and (2a) are the same: $2\over3$.

The paradox concerns (1b) and (2b). Intuitively, she ought be more confident in (1) than in (2), but if Elga’s reasoning is sound then she ought be equally confident. This counter-intuitive conclusion can't be justified simply by reinterpreting the question in such a way that (b) means the same thing as (a). Although in many cases the answer to (a) determines the answer to (b) it is a mistake to conflate the two, and I believe the paradox is peculiar precisely because this usual determination does not hold.

Given the common-sense interpretation of (b) she ought be fairly confident that her current interview in (1) is a Monday interview and almost certain that her current interview in (2) is a Tuesday interview (and so dismiss the answer to (2a) as being a red herring). Any other degrees of belief just aren’t warranted, and arguments to the contrary seem to misrepresent the paradox and equivocate.

I don't know if it's quite comparable but it reminds me of the Boltzmann brain paradox. Although the probability of a Boltzmann brain forming is vanishingly small, given sufficient time they would dwarf the number of "real" brains.

Should I then believe that I am most likely a Boltzmann brain?

Although perhaps this is best comparable to the variation where both a) the experiment is repeated 2¹⁰¹ times and b) I am made to forget which experiment I'm on. I think only then could the long-term average ratio of awakenings factor into my credence.

(1) I believe that awakening episodes such a the one I am currently experiencing turn out to be (i.e. are expected by me to be) 1-awakenings (i.e. awakening episodes that have been spawned by a die landing on "1") two thirds of the time on typical experimental runs. — Pierre-Normand

Which is true.

But I believe the step from this to "therefore, my credence that this is a 1-awakening is $2\over3$" is a non sequitur.

This extreme example is a reductio ad absurdum that shows that given the peculiarities of the Sleeping Beauty experiment it is irrational for one's credence to be determined by the long-term average ratio of awakenings.

So it doesn't matter that (1) is true. Any rational person being subject to this experiment should be almost certain that a) the die didn't roll a 1, and so that b) this is not a 1-awakening.

I take SB's expected value to be a function of both her credence and of the payout structure. — Pierre-Normand

So then what is this calculation using pounds and pence?

I, however, don't take her credence to be a well defined value in the original Sleeping Beauty problem due to an inherent ambiguity in resolving what kind of "event" is implicitly being made reference to in defining her "current epistemic situation" whenever she awakens. — Pierre-Normand

I disagree that there's any ambiguity.

This is an "$n$-sided die rolled a 1" awakening if and only if this is an "$n$-sided die rolled a 1" experiment.

Therefore, a rational person's credence that this is an "$n$-sided die rolled a 1" awakening must equal their credence that this is an "$n$-sided die rolled a 1" experiment, because anyone who claims both of these isn't rational:

1. I believe it most likely that I am in a "die rolled a 1" awakening
2. I believe it most likely that I am not in a "die rolled a 1" experiment

And anyone who claims both of these isn't rational:

1. If I get to place a new bet each time I wake up then I believe it most likely that the die rolled a 1
2. If I only get to change my original bet each time I wake up then I believe it most likely that the die did not roll a 1

(on this point: what is your credence if you don't know the payout structure or if you don't get to place a bet at all?)

I really just think that there's only one correct answer, regardless of "interpretation" or payout structure (whether or not there even is is one, and whether or not it is known), and that answer is most obvious when we consider the 2¹⁰⁰-sided die; a rational person's credence is $1\over{2^{100}}$, never $2\over3$.

Yes, it sure is close. But not exact. — JeffJo

So you're willing to commit to the conclusion that Sleeping Beauty's credence that the 2¹⁰⁰-sided die rolled a 1 is $\approx {2\over3}$, i.e. she should be fairly confident that the die rolled a 1?

Because I take that as a reductio ad absurdum. If Sleeping Beauty is rational then her credence should be $1\over{2^{100}}$, i.e. she should be almost certain that the die didn't roll a 1.

The waking-day ratio is a red herring.