The entire argument equivocates, — Michael

I think you're the one who's equivocating. You're trying to jump back and forth between here and wV. When you're here, you admit that vibranium is an idea. When you're in wV, you say it's real. But you're never in wV. You're only here.

Analyze the argument from where you actually are: here and now:

1. wV is a fictional world.
2. everything in wV is fictional.
3. fictional things are ideas
4. fictional vibranium is an idea
5. wV contains fictional vibranium

Conclusion: wV contains an idea. — frank

Remember, wV is just and idea. Everything in it is fictional. Fictional things are ideas. Everything in wV is an idea.

When you're here, you admit that vibranium is an idea. When you're in wV, you say it's real. But you're never in wV. — frank

I know, and that is why you are equivocating.

In the real world, the film The Santa Claus is a fiction.
You then conclude that within the film The Santa Claus, Santa is a fiction.
Except that is not the case. Within the film The Santa Claus, Santa is a living, breathing person. That is the very premise of the film.

But I've already told you that this has nothing to do with what I have been arguing. I am only arguing that a world without language is a world without propositions is a world without true propositions (truths).

Unless you want to argue that propositions are language-independent (platonism) or that a world without language is incoherent/empty (strong anti-realism), there's nothing else to discuss.

there's nothing else to discuss. — Michael

Okey dokey. :smile:

I think we've had this discussion before. — fdrake

That may be, although I like the story you're telling well enough to have told versions of it myself here on the forum, and pretty recently.

I don't think there's anything particularly wrong with this sort of story, but I keep having the feeling that ― and this may not make sense ― it does less than I want because it does more than I want. It treats the universe as sort of flat and so it tells a story that is sort of flat.

things eat in the same sense as they walk, run, dance, skip, speak, interpret — fdrake

I'm not saying that's wrong, so there's no need to get started on a fix. But I don't always want a framework that doesn't distinguish eating from dancing from speaking, or leaves those distinctions optional, or builds up to them in a similarly generic way (apo).

I think there are other stories we can tell that meet different needs.

@fdrake

Here's one more note ― not a direct commentary on this exchange, but another spanner I can't resist throwing in the works.

There's an interview where Orson Welles says this: "You have to distinguish between realism and truth. Look at Cagney: no one actually behaves like that, but every moment he's on screen is TRUE!"

It treats the universe as sort of flat and so it tells a story that is sort of flat. — Srap Tasmaner

I have a guess at what you mean. One way into that flatness is that I've used "count as" in a single sense in the post, whereas there's so many ways for people to mean things. And it seems more multifaceted than x counts as y in context z. There'll always be a problem of individuating and binding into contexts too. Individuation - what generates the tokens in one context? And binding - is a context demarcated from others? The way I've set up coordinating norms takes a binding for granted - a context of mutual articulation of event sequences to coordinate. And also individuation for granted - that the tokens involved in the coordination are generable as distinct.

The relationship between individuation and binding is, I think, implicated in setting up a coordinating norm as well, because someone can posit an association and run with it, or note a correlation and study it.

so far you haven't offered any replacement for language that allows for propositions in that world. — Michael

There's a reason for that, already given. If all you are going to do is repeat errors that have already been highlighted then there's not much point to continuing.

So what's the ontology of World X? — frank

Possible worlds in modal logic are not the same as possible worlds in physics.

A modal world is stipulated. It is constructed by setting out how it is different from the actual world. So "What if Elizabeth had died in her sixties, leaving us with King Charles thirty years ago?" stipulates a possibly world in which Charles has been king for thirty years. This is a different ontology to physical worlds mooted in multiverse theories, worlds that come into existence during quantum events. They are quite different.

There was at least one very good philosopher who insisted that possible worlds are also actual, just like this world - David Lewis. It's not a generally accepted view.

Modal logic is a tool for working through the consequences of modal stipulations. "What if all life disappeared and everything else stays the same" stipulates a possible world. In that world there will be gold in those hills, since everything else stays the same. There is gold in those hills, hence it is true that there is gold in those hills, and "there is gold in those hills" is true. There are also no people in that world to say "There is gold in those hills". And it is true that there are no people to say such a thing.

Simple enough.

The alternative offered is that there is gold in those hills, but that truth is a property of statements; and since there is no one in that world to make a statement, "There is gold in those hills" is unstated and so untrue. There are multiple problems with this approach which have been listed over the last twenty or so pages. Perhaps the central one is the claim that there is gold in those hills and yet it is not true that there is gold in those hills, a pretty direct contradiction. So we have modal logic that involves a contradiction, in the presence an alternative that does not. The choice should be easy.

I do think "where the types come from in nature and norm" is a very different question than "under what conditions are sentences true", and a slightly different question from "where does the correlation between nature types and norm types come in". — fdrake

My two bits. Saying things that are true is something we habitually do. Doing otherwise is the exception.

Calling some particular act "eating" is a "counts as..." exercise. Putting it in your mouth, chewing and swallowing counts as eating. I read the PI Wittgenstein as saying that this is just what we do, and that philosophical investigation stops there. We might ask "Why do we call it eating", but this becomes a question for physiologists and etymology.

We should also keep in mind expressions such as 'I'll eat my hat" and "eating humble pie".

Contra Levi-strauss, it's all cooked, by the words we use. We can't step outside language, nor outside our culture into "nature".

"Counts as..." underpins language.

I read as much as I could about David Lewis and needed to go ahead and buy a collection of his papers in order to understand furher, but it was too expensive. Now the fascination has passed. :confused:

We should also keep in mind expressions such as 'I'll eat my hat" and "eating humble pie". — Banno

My two cents worth is that as soon as we stop living and start analyzing, we inevitably end up with gears and springs, wondering how it ever comes back together to create the real.

...to create the real. — frank

I'd be happier if you said "...to construct the real".

"Counts as..." underpins language. — Banno

Yes! Though I think how "counts as" works can be shifted, intentionally or unintentionally. Like your "I'll eat my hat" example. You can say that it works as an expression of incredulity because a hat doesn't count as something which would be eaten - it's more than that of course, but it's part of it. A particularly strong and striking violation of expected word use in one context... becomes an expected word use in another. This isn't quite right. But I think it illustrates the point.

Edit: more vague words - we might disagree about whether "counts as" has a mere functional priority in language, or whether it has a transcendental priority. As in, whether "counts as" is another role of language, behaviour, coordinating norms, or whether it acts as a precondition. Perhaps even an unanalyzable term. I'd side with the former. I think norms modify themselves enough to remove any "a priori" flavour thing from them.

It's a cliché, but "counts as" expresses a hinge, where language and the world meet - "fdrake" counts as a reference to fdrake. It's what we do, a habit, and needs no further explanation.

...to create the real.
— frank
I'd be happier if you said "...to construct the real". — Banno

What's the difference?

Construction requires something to construct from.

Not just any consistent narrative will do. One needs to check that the narrative works.


So sometimes the story surprises us, we come across new things. How could that we if it were only our own creation? And we agree on most of the narrative. How can that be if we each were creating our own? And sometimes we are wrong, but how could we be wrong about something that was no more than our own creation?

Novelty, agreement and error - the trinity of realism. :wink:

It's what we do, a habit, and needs no further explanation. — Banno

Even to learn that the practice of "counting as"? I can certainly set it up like: let's pretend that this calculator is a phone... And it's not just an analogy for counting as, it'a a learnable instance. My suspicion is that because it's learnable, and can even be conceptualised abstractly like we're doing now, there's enough there to make it possible to give an account of it. Because there's clear learnable instances which can coordinate with - and maybe modify! - instances of the concept.

Like if instead of pretending my calculator was a phone, my student instead imagined the calculator was a phone. They'd be counting-as differently, even if they're they're counting-as the same thingy. I'd be able to correct them perhaps - if you sit there doing nothing, you're just imagining rather than pretending. They would have understood a context of treating the calculator as if it were something else regardless.

If my student pointed out to me that they were visualising ringing me with the calculator? They'd correct my correction... correctly.

Another toy example, rather than an argument.

Even to learn that the practice of "counting as"? — fdrake

I take that as a psychological or neurological question. Arguably neural nets are built in order to continue in some pattern - to "predict" is how it is usually phrase.

My calculator is a phone. Puzzling.

But taking on your example, if one were to treat a calculator - not the phone sort - as a phone, there would quickly be certain problems. Lack of reception, for a start.

So aren't pretending and imagining different to "counting as..."? When we count as, we "carry on" in the same way. We say this paper counts as money, and use it for transactions in an ongoing fashion. But pretend money or imaginary money - say a toy dollar note or a dream of a lottery win - can't do this.



One of the astonishing things I've learned on this forum is that there are folk who didn't learn to "Carry on..." in the requisite sense. Or perhaps they do carry on, but deny that they can.

How can that be if we each were creating our own? — Banno

I don't think you're just hanging around creating the world. The division between you and world arises from reflection on events. Less realism, more mysticism.

I take that as a psychological or neurological question. Arguably neural nets are built in order to continue in some pattern - to "predict" is how it is usually phrase. — Banno

I suppose we could quibble about the boundary between philosophy, psychology and neurology. I suspect there isn't too much of one. Considering the degree of interdisciplinary collaborations involving the disciplines.

My calculator is a phone. Puzzling. — Banno

Hah.

So aren't pretending and imagining different to "counting as..."? When we count as, we "carry on" in the same way. We say this paper counts as money, and use it for transactions in an ongoing fashion. But pretend money or imaginary money - say a toy dollar note or a dream of a lottery win - can't do this. — Banno

I think they're species of counting as.

Your paper money counts as money in its ordinary social role. You could use it in its traditional business role as a straw. Or as tinder for a fire. It really does count as paper money in its ordinary social role. But the paper money isn't necessarily counting as money when it's tinder, or a straw. Part of what makes the paper money money is its ongoing use as money (including what it looks like, who created it etc).

You wouldn't refer to it as a straw or as tinder though, as the object isn't baptised that way. Things tend to keep their name from their primary context of use in the broader society - like my plastic crate keeps being called my plastic crate despite its primary use in my home being as a calf raise platform. Which it absolutely counts as for appropriate exercises.

It treats the universe as sort of flat and so it tells a story that is sort of flat.

...

But I don't always want a framework that doesn't distinguish eating from dancing from speaking, or leaves those distinctions optional, or builds up to them in a similarly generic way (apo). — Srap Tasmaner

I got a degree in computer science a few years before formally studying philosophy. Some years later as I was reading Plato I finally popped out of the flat paradigm, and it was a bizarre experience.

For the computer scientist (and the analytic philosopher) everything is computer- and computation-centric. The computer is the operating element, and it is just doing things with inputs. Labeling them, classifying them, ordering and combining them in different ways. This looks to be a consequence of the Kantian shift, where everything began to orbit around anthropos. On my view the flatness of such a conception lies in the idea that all inputs are prima facie equivalent (e.g. eating, dancing, speaking, thinking, classifying...). It presupposes the autonomous subject freely interacting with static and rationally manipulable inputs. The knowledge does not go beyond these rational manipulations and comparisons.

While reading Plato that day I finally understood the pre-Kantian and pre-modern view, which is dynamic through and through (in subject and object). Eating, dancing, speaking, and everything else that we encounter are ineliminably distinct and unique. It's a bit like when a psychologist has a tidy personality theory that is supposed to encapsulate all persons. But then they may encounter a string of people who do not at all fit their schema, and come to recognize that the schema is highly artificial. The attempt to make all objects commensurable vis-a-vis the computational motherboard now strikes me as a highly artificial endeavor. It can be done to one limited extent or another, but in the end it is in vain.

This Kantian shift gobbles up conceptions of correspondence, even before pragmatism hits the scene. An Analytic thinks of correspondence between sentence and reality, and looks for some corresponding content. For the pre-modern correspondence of the intellect is something like a shapeshifter taking on the form of different species. To be/know a giraffe is much different than to be/know a woman, or an Indian, or a river. It is not a static relationship between mind/computer and object/input. At the end of the day it is not merely sentential. Knowledge/truth is more than a set of sentences. There is a very important sense in which substances are incommensurably different, and they dynamically interact with us in ways that we cannot anticipate or control. But the solipsistic tendency to take a static-computational paradigm for granted is very natural in our time. In always holding substances at arm's length and requiring them to be commensurable and static we limit our knowledge of them, and we limit our conception of knowledge (indeed, even to speak of substances rather than objects is to shift).

Let's say there are many prime numbers which have never been identified. If I utter a proposition that says that some X is a prime number the truth or falsity of that proposition is pre-determined. That seems to throw a spanner in the works for the idea that truth is exclsueively a property of uttered propositions.

If I utter a proposition that says that some X is a prime number the truth or falsity of that proposition is pre-determined. That seems to throw a spanner in the works for the idea that truth is exclsueively a property of uttered propositions. — Janus

Why?

If I paint a red ball accurately then is the accuracy of that painting "pre-determined", and so evidence that painting-accuracy is not exclusively a property of painted paintings?

What kind of property is accuracy or truth? Like if we weren't around to say the painting is accurate, it wouldn't have that property. We magically make the painting have a property. Then after we're extinct, the property disappears

It makes you wonder if accuracy is just something people say about the painting.

It makes you wonder if accuracy is just something people say about the painting. — frank

Yes, and "true" and "false" are adjectives that we use to describe a sentence. I think Wittgenstein's account of language is more reasonable than any account that suggests that our utterances are somehow associated with mind-independent abstract objects and properties (related somewhat to this, this, and this).

I think that language is behavioral and psychological, not something more as platonism would seem to require.

Yes, and "true" and "false" are adjectives that we use to describe a sentence. I think Wittgenstein's account of language is more reasonable than any account that suggests that our utterances are somehow associated with mind-independent abstract objects and properties (related somewhat to this, this, and this).

I think that language is behavioral and psychological, not something more as platonism would seem to require. — Michael

I was talking about paintings. How the property of accuracy isn't about the painting so much as about us.

I think we've covered the platonism angle as much as we're going to. I don't disagree with your conclusion, I disagree pervasively with the way you got there, because you just aren't interested in even looking into why propositions still hold a prominent spot in AP and phil of math.

you just aren't interested in even looking into why propositions still hold a prominent spot in AP and phil of math. — frank

I don't have a problem with propositions. I have a problem with mind-independent propositions, à la platonism.

Even a mathematical platonist like Quine rejects mind-independent propositions, which seems to set up the interesting case where numbers are mind-independent abstract objects but that equations aren't.

And as for maths, I'm not a mathematical platonist, and I don't think that this is the discussion to discuss the merits of mathematical platonism.

It's weird how accuracy appears to be a property of objects, but it's really coming from us. It's like the way redness is a property of roses, but it doesn't really belong to the rose.

We project out our thoughts onto the world when we say the painting is accurate. We sort of ordain the painting.

- :up:

Why?

If I paint a red ball accurately then is the accuracy of that painting "pre-determined", and so evidence that painting-accuracy is not exclusively a property of painted paintings? — Michael

I'm talking about prime numbers and you change the subject to paintings. Why? It's not an apt analogy. For a start paintings do not enjoy pre-existence prioir to their being painted, and thought as pre-existents they are not determinate objects like prime numbers are. Also, it is an observable object—the painting—which will be assessed for accuracy once it exists. What exactly is it that will be assessed for primeness?

I don't have to propose anything I can simply present some number: say 579,836,642,549,743,762,649 and there is a truth about whether or not that number is prime. No proposition required. In the case of the painting, it is an existent particular—the painting—that determines the truth regarding whether it is accurate.

Also, accuracy is not a precisely determinable quality. What is it in the case of the number whose primeness is yet to be identified, which determines the truth about its primeness; a truth which is precisely determinable?

For a start paintings do not enjoy pre-existence prioir to their being painted, and thought as pre-existents they are not determinate objects like prime numbers are. — Janus

You appear to be assuming mathematical platonism?

Also, it is an observable object—the painting—which will be assessed for accuracy once it exists. What exactly is it that will be assessed for primeness? — Janus

The proposition "X is a prime number" is assessed as accurate/true when uttered.

I don't have to propose anything I can simply present some number: say 579,836,642,549,743,762,649 and there is a truth about whether or not that number is prime. No proposition required. — Janus

But "a truth" means "a true proposition", and so you are saying "there is a true proposition about whether or not that number is prime; no proposition required".

Also, accuracy is not a precisely d;eterminable quality. — Janus

Then neither is the truth of the proposition "the painting is accurate".