Comments

  • Direct realism about perception
    ↪Esse Quam Videri


    I think you're equating indirect realism with the sense-datum theory. As I said before, there are two distinct claims:

    1. We only have indirect perception of distal objects
    2. We have direct perception only of mental phenomena

    The sense-datum theory may treat the mental phenomena in (2) as being objects in the substantial sense that you mean, but it does not follow that if they're not then (1) and (2) are false.

    My take is that (1) is true because distal objects and their properties are not "directly present" in the character of first person experience, of the kind that would entail that if some distal object appears blue then it "really is" blue in the naive realist sense, and that (2) is true in the thin sense that I am aware of the character of my first person experience — including its features of pain and pleasure and colour and shape and smell and taste — and that being aware of this is the means by which I have indirect perception of their causes; they are also the things I am aware of when I dream and hallucinate, with dreams occurring when I'm asleep and hallucinations (caused by drugs or illness) lacking the "appropriate" stimuli.

    Regardless, no deference to language or Austin or Wittgenstein is going to resolve this dispute. It's a matter for physicists and physiologists and neuroscientists and psychologists; and I think it's clear that "indirect perceptual realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is".
  • Direct realism about perception
    That John and Jane disagree as to the temperature of the bath is not a fiction; it's something to be explained. This is lost in your account. — Banno

    I very explicitly said that John and Jane agree that the bath water is 37°C but disagree as to whether this 37°C water is hot or cold.

    You seem to be intentionally engaging with a strawman.
  • Direct realism about perception
    Pointing out that such items cannot function as objects or referents doesn’t show they aren’t real; it shows they aren’t the kind of things certain theories want them to be. — Esse Quam Videri

    I think you're reading too much into it. The word "pain" refers to pain, pain is a mental phenomenon, and if I perceive pain then pain is the object of perception. There's no need to think of objects or referents as being anything more complicated than this — and this suffices for indirect realism (although strictly speaking the first part of the sentence is irrelevant). You're welcome to understand objects and referents in another way, but unless you can show that indirect realists mean it in this other way then your objections are guilty of equivocation.
  • Direct realism about perception
    The moment we claim that perception involves “objects of awareness” or phenomenal intermediaries, we are making an ontological claim, and those claims are accountable to criteria of objecthood and individuation. My appeal to semantic normativity isn’t meant to explain perception; it’s meant to constrain what kinds of entities a theory of perception can coherently posit. — Esse Quam Videri

    You are making an ontological claim when you accept that headaches are mental phenomena. Yet you then say that the word "headaches" does not refer to these mental phenomena. Your own reasoning has drawn a clear distinction between a theory of meaning (or reference) and a theory of ontology.

    So you can go on and on about how words like "headaches" and "colours" and "whatevers" cannot refer to mental phenomena; by your own account it would be invalid to then conclude that headaches and colours and whatevers are not mental phenomena.

    As soon I stop quoting words you're left with no ammunition. You say that the word "red" doesn't refer to a mental phenomenon? Fine; red is still a mental phenomenon. It sounds ridiculous but it's a ridiculousness of your own making.
  • Direct realism about perception
    The point here is that the person you need to be discussing this with is the neuro-scientist who can better correct all your claims about neural processing and vision, not a philosopher. — Hanover

    Again, this is exactly what I have repeatedly argued; on the first page quoting the Wikipedia article on direct and indirect realism which says "indirect perceptual realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is"; here where I reference the SEP article on what science tells us about colour; and here responding to you, saying "I said that empirical study trumps armchair theorising, i.e. that if the two are ever in conflict then we ought accept the results of empirical study over the results of armchair theorising".
  • Direct realism about perception
    instruments don’t measure cold — Banno

    Correct, they measure temperature. A thermometer can't tell you if 37°C water is hot or cold.

    disagreements are merely parallel reports — Banno

    Correct, unless these people are naive realists and believe there to be a "right" way to feel things, in which case they are also making false claims about the world.

    learning temperature terms requires introspection — Banno

    For the words "hot" and "cold", yes, but not for "37°C".

    correction becomes impossible except as etiquette — Banno

    Yes, it's a fiction.
  • Direct realism about perception
    That thin notion is harmless for everyday talk, but it cannot support the ontological conclusions you want to draw about sensations being objects of awareness — Esse Quam Videri

    As I keep saying, whether or not perception of distal objects is direct has nothing to do with language. We can quite reasonably ask if plants, non-human animals, human babies, primitive cavemen, or quadriplegic mute hermits have direct perception of their environment. We can even ask if any of these have perception at all, as perception might require the kind of first-person phenomenal experiences that we have but that plants probably don't.
  • Direct realism about perception
    The reason you keep repeating yourself is that your claim is orthogonal to the debate. — Banno

    It's not orthogonal.

    Here are two propositions:

    1. The 37°C water feels cold1
    2. The 37°C water is cold2

    My claim is that "cold1" refers to a sensation and that if (2) means anything it means the same thing as (1).
  • Direct realism about perception
    If there is no unmediated account, there's no unmediated truth. — frank

    Depends on the claim. Something like "being punched is painful"? Sure. Something like "the Earth's mass is greater than Pluto"? I don't think so.
  • Direct realism about perception
    No one is claiming that "headache" does not refer to a sensation. — Banno

    Esse Quam Videri is. I think Hanover is as well. I thought you were too, but happy to be wrong.

    Your argument is that the meaning of "headache" is fixed by reference to a sensation. — Banno

    No it isn't. I'm getting sick and tired of repeating myself. I am only claiming that the word "headache" refers to a sensation.
  • Direct realism about perception
    Simply insisting on a thinner, grammatical use of “refers to” doesn’t engage that theory; it just declines it. — Esse Quam Videri

    That's because this "thinner, grammatical use" suffices. The word "pain" refers to pain, and pain is a sensation. The word "thoughts" refers to thoughts, and thoughts are private mental phenomena. Nothing justifies making this any more complicated.
  • Direct realism about perception
    First, can you see that the grammar of "headache" and the grammar of "cold" are very different? — Banno

    Yes, and? I'll repeat my previous post, as both the part you quoted and the part you didn't quote are still relevant:

    If just one word refers to private sensations then this argument that you and Hanover keep pushing that meaning is just public use, that private sensations must drop out of consideration because we can't know each other's experiences, etc. is shown to fail.

    ...

    But people do say "stop exaggerating, it doesn't hurt that much". This idea you have that our everyday way of talking to each other and about the world has bearing on phenomenology or perception or physics or metaphysics just doesn't hold up.

    If John and Jane both agree on the water's temperature but disagree as to whether this temperature is hot or cold then what is the actual substance of their disagreement? What does it mean for 37°C to be hot or to be cold? What does it mean for an injection to be painful? The common sense and parsimonious answer is that it concerns how such things feel to us, i.e. the types of first person phenomenal experiences they cause. Any "disagreement" stems from the naive (and mistaken) assumption that there's a "right" way for 37°C water or an injection to feel — or it's faux disagreement that ought not be taken literally; they're just describing how the water and the injection feels to them and acknowledging that they feel different to the other.
  • Direct realism about perception
    It claims that reference to an inner state cannot be what fixes meaning. — Banno

    I haven't claimed this. For the umpteenth time, I am only saying that the word "headaches" refers to headaches, and that headaches are a sensation.
  • Direct realism about perception
    The use of the term "private sensations" in my sentence was an example of mention not reference. — Esse Quam Videri

    "private sensations" is an English term that refers to private sensations.

    The first (quoted) use is an example of mention, the second (unquoted) use refers to private sensations. And the above sentence is true.

    Much like: "cats" is an English word that refers to cats.
  • Direct realism about perception
    Point out where I argued indirect realism is false. I've consistently taken an a-metaphysical stance. I've argued it's irrelevant from a perspective of meaning. — Hanover

    What is this "a-metaphysical stance" other than the stance that metaphysical stances are false? This is a discussion about perception, not meaning, so why bring up Wittgenstein and Austin at all unless you think that their analysis of language proves or disproves either direct or indirect realism?

    The indirect realist claims that we only have indirect perception of distal objects, mediated by direct perception of other things like mental phenomena — with things like colour and pain being types of mental phenomena — and you respond by saying such things as "[internal states don't] offer explanatory power". What is this response saying if not that the indirect realist's account of perception is false?

    So either you're arguing that indirect realism is false or you're interjecting with a red herring and fabricating a conflict that doesn't exist.

    Either way, my position is that "indirect perceptual realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is" and that "[colors are] a psychological property of our visual experiences when we look at objects and lights, not a physical property of those objects or lights" — as I have made very clear since the first page. If you don't think that either of these claims are false, what are you objecting to?
  • Direct realism about perception
    Private sensations can act as truth-makers, not referents. — Esse Quam Videri

    Yes they can, they're doing it right here. You're using the term "private sensations" to refer to things that you say can act as truth-makers but can't act as referents. It's incoherent. What exactly do you think "reference" means in this context?
  • Direct realism about perception
    That doesn't follow because it assumes a grammatical theory of direct realism speaks at all to the a scientific view of indirect realism. They operate in seperate categories. — Hanover

    Which is another thing I have repeatedly argued. The traditional dispute between direct and indirect realism concerns phenomenology. The new semantic direct realism has reappropriated the term "direct perception" to mean something else — something that prima facie does not contradict indirect realism. I haven't been arguing that semantic direct realism is false; I have been arguing that phenomenological direct realism is false and that indirect realism is true.

    See all the way back to the first page.

    It is you and Banno and others that are using semantic direct realism or something like it to argue that indirect realism is false.
  • Direct realism about perception
    P1: accepted
    P2: rejected     — Esse Quam Videri

    This is incoherent. If a) headaches are private sensations then b) the word "headaches" in (a) is being used to refer to things which are private sensations — those things being headaches. That's what makes (a) true. If the word "headaches" in (a) is being used to refer to something else (e.g. cats) then (a) would be false.

    It is used to pick out a condition people complain of — Esse Quam Videri

    That condition being the private sensation that they are experiencing.

    The sensation realizes the headache — Esse Quam Videri

    The sensation is the headache.

    How could something that you've described as being "essentially private" serve as a standard for correct and incorrect use in an essentially public practice (language)? — Esse Quam Videri

    Why would it be a problem? I don't need to see Genghis Khan for the name "Genghis Khan" to refer to the man who led the Mongols to conquer Asia, so why the insistence that if our experiences are private then our words cannot refer to them? Clearly the phrase "private experiences" does, else you'd have to argue that the phrase "private experiences" is incoherent, and so that there are no such things. It's really not difficult. When I say "I have a headache" the word "headache" is being used to refer to a sensation that I claim to have and when I say "you have a headache" the word "headache" is being used to refer to a sensation that I claim you have (and which I assume is much like mine).
  • Direct realism about perception
    Of course, so what is your thesis here, that philosophy is science? — Hanover

    That our scientific understanding of the world very clearly supports the indirect realist's account of perception over the direct realist's.

    It was that whether it's true or not leaves meaning unaffected and so it has no philosophical role. — Hanover

    That conclusion doesn't follow. If indirect realism is true then indirect realism is true and direct realism is false. Two competing philosophical accounts of perception have been tested, with one shown to be correct and the other incorrect.
  • Direct realism about perception
    You are not addressing the claim that meaning is use at all.

    You are not offering a theory of meaning

    ...

    then we’re simply not having the same argument.     — Hanover

    Yes, I have explained this so many times now. I am concerned with perception and colours and smells and tastes and headaches. I don't give a damn about language because this isn't a discussion about language. It is you and Banno and others that seem to think that language and Austin and Wittgenstein have any relevance here. You can't refute indirect realism or the claim that colours and smells and tastes and headaches are private sensations by saying "nuh-uh, meaning is use and so words like 'red' and 'pain' can't refer to private sensations". This matter is a matter for physicists and physiologists and neuroscientists and psychologists to resolve, not linguists.
  • Direct realism about perception
    Again, where is this word "means' in your proof? — Hanover

    Where have I ever used the word "means"? You keep bringing it up, despite me repeatedly saying that I am only arguing that the word "headache" refers to a private sensation.
  • Direct realism about perception
    ↪Hanover


    The word "rain" refers to the water falling from the clouds, and the word "headache" refers to the sensation I feel having to belabour this very obvious truth.
  • Direct realism about perception
    ↪Esse Quam Videri


    I'll repeat what I said to Hanover.

    P1. Headaches are private sensations
    P2. The word "headaches" refers to headaches
    C1. Therefore, the word "headaches" refers to private sensations

    I don't know if you're trying to argue that P1 and/or P2 is false, or that C1 doesn't follow, but nothing you've said has convinced me that this argument isn't sound.

    But really, all this talk about language is irrelevant to the topic of perception. P1 is sufficient to understand what is meant when we say that things like smells and tastes and colours are private sensations.
  • Direct realism about perception
    ↪Hanover
    There are no headaches without the private sensation. — Michael
  • Direct realism about perception
    Can you give me an instance where use does not suffice to provide meaning?

    What is it?     — Hanover

    See above.
  • Direct realism about perception
    then adding private sensation does no semantic work. — Esse Quam Videri

    It does. There are no headaches without the private sensation.
  • Direct realism about perception
    Again, "headache" is not like "hot". — Banno

    If just one word refers to private sensations then this argument that you and Hanover keep pushing that meaning is just public use, that private sensations must drop out of consideration because we can't know each other's experiences, etc. is shown to fail. Clearly you understand what the word "headache" means even though it does refer to a private sensation. You might want to argue that colours aren't like headaches, e.g. take the naive colour realist approach, but no deference to Austin or Wittgenstein (or language) suffices to prove this.

    John and Jane can disagree as to the water being hot, but not as to John having a headache — Banno

    But people do say "stop exaggerating, it doesn't hurt that much". This idea you have that our everyday way of talking to each other and about the world has bearing on phenomenology or perception or physics or metaphysics just doesn't hold up.

    If John and Jane both agree on the water's temperature but disagree as to whether this temperature is hot or cold then what is the actual substance of their disagreement? What does it mean for 37°C to be hot or to be cold? What does it mean for an injection to be painful? The common sense and parsimonious answer is that it concerns how such things feel to us, i.e. the types of first person phenomenal experiences they cause. Any "disagreement" stems from the naive (and mistaken) assumption that there's a "right" way for 37°C water or an injection to feel — or it's faux disagreement that ought not be taken literally; they're just describing how the water and the injection feels to them and acknowledging that they feel different to the other.
  • Direct realism about perception
    ↪Richard B


    To repeat an earlier quote from A Problem with Color:

    One of the major problems with color has to do with fitting what we seem to know about colors into what science (not only physics but the science of color vision) tells us about physical bodies and their qualities. It is this problem that historically has led the major physicists who have thought about color, to hold the view that physical objects do not actually have the colors we ordinarily and naturally take objects to possess. Oceans and skies are not blue in the way that we naively think, nor are apples red (nor green). Colors of that kind, it is believed, have no place in the physical account of the world that has developed from the sixteenth century to this century.

    Not only does the scientific mainstream tradition conflict with the common-sense understanding of color in this way, but as well, the scientific tradition contains a very counter-intuitive conception of color. There is, to illustrate, the celebrated remark by David Hume:

    "Sounds, colors, heat and cold, according to modern philosophy are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind." (Hume 1738: Bk III, part I, Sect. 1 [1911: 177]; Bk I, IV, IV [1911: 216])

    Physicists who have subscribed to this doctrine include the luminaries: Galileo, Boyle, Descartes, Newton, Thomas Young, Maxwell and Hermann von Helmholtz. Maxwell, for example, wrote:

    "It seems almost a truism to say that color is a sensation; and yet Young, by honestly recognizing this elementary truth, established the first consistent theory of color." (Maxwell 1871: 13 [1970: 75])

    This combination of eliminativism—the view that physical objects do not have colors, at least in a crucial sense—and subjectivism—the view that color is a subjective quality—is not merely of historical interest. It is held by many contemporary experts and authorities on color, e.g., Zeki 1983, Land 1983, and Kuehni 1997. Palmer, a leading psychologist and cognitive scientist, writes:

    "People universally believe that objects look colored because they are colored, just as we experience them. The sky looks blue because it is blue, grass looks green because it is green, and blood looks red because it is red. As surprising as it may seem, these beliefs are fundamentally mistaken. Neither objects nor lights are actually “colored” in anything like the way we experience them. Rather, color is a psychological property of our visual experiences when we look at objects and lights, not a physical property of those objects or lights. The colors we see are based on physical properties of objects and lights that cause us to see them as colored, to be sure, but these physical properties are different in important ways from the colors we perceive." (Palmer 1999: 95)
  • Direct realism about perception
    ↪Hanover


    P1. Headaches are private sensations
    P2. The word "headaches" refers to headaches
    C1. Therefore, the word "headaches" refers to private sensations

    I don't know if you're trying to argue that P1 and/or P2 is false, or that C1 doesn't follow, but nothing you've said has convinced me that this argument isn't sound.

    Phenomenal states just aren't irrelevant. There is more to colours and pain than the public use of the words "colours" and "pain"; there is also the phenomenal states that the blind and those with CIPA don't have and that we do.
  • Direct realism about perception
    I'm not clear on what your objection is. — Hanover

    My objection is to your objection to my claim that the words "red", "pain", "cold", etc. refer to the phenomenal character of first-person experiences.

    Do you acknowledge that I can speak with you fully coherently by relying entirely upon the usage of the terms without having any idea what the consitution of the internal referent is? — Hanover

    You can speak about it, but you might not understand it. A blind person "knows" that strawberries are red, but they don't understand colours in the way that you or I do. A person with CIPA "knows" that being stabbed hurts (other people), but they don't understand pain in the way that you or I do. There is more to the meaning of these words than just their "public use". There is also the sensations they refer to.
  • Direct realism about perception
    I was trying to figure out what words meant — Hanover

    I'm saying your introspection can't ground meaning. — Hanover

    I'm talking about reference. The word "headache" refers to the sensation we tend to feel after a heavy night of drinking, the word "cold" refers to the sensation we tend to feel in low temperatures, the word "hot" refers to the sensation we tend to feel in high temperatures, and the word "pain" refers to the sensation we tend to feel if stabbed. This is so obvious that I don't get why there is so much objection. It's really not difficult to understand. You don't need to have access to another person's first-person phenomenal experiences to accept this. It's common sense, and in this case common sense is correct.

    Sensations exist, and our words can refer to them — with the word "sensations" being the most obvious.
  • Direct realism about perception
    1. John says "I feel hot" because John is hot
    is not equivalent to
    2. John says 'I feel hot' means John is hot.     — Hanover

    I’m not asserting (2). I’m asserting (1) and that the word “hot” in John’s utterance “I feel hot” refers to the sensation he feels.

    How could we know we've used the sentence "I feel hot" correctly if we have to rely upon an invisible private state? — Hanover

    My private state isn’t invisible to me. I am intimately familiar with the sensations of feeling hot and cold. I can recognize and name which one I am feeling in any given environment — and even if I’m alone.
  • Direct realism about perception
    What I deny is that this shows that the word “hot” refers to a sensation, rather than that sensations make certain uses of the word “hot” true. — Esse Quam Videri

    The sensation he has makes the use of the word “hot” true because it refers to the sensation he has, and the sensation he has makes the use of the word “cold” false because it refers to the sensation he doesn’t have.

    It certainly has nothing to do with “public norms of assessment” because John can feel hot even if everyone else believes he feels cold.

    You are repeatedly sliding from the claim that sensations make certain reports true to the claim that sensations fix the meaning or reference of the predicates used in those reports. That inference is exactly what’s in dispute. Truth-makers are not meanings. — Esse Quam Videri

    I’ve never used the word “fix”. I’ve only ever said that words like “red” and “pain” and “cold” refer to sensations, just as I say that the word “Michael” (as has been often used in this discussion) refers to me. Am I saying that I “fix” the reference of the word “Michael”? I don’t even know what that means if it means something other than that the word “Michael” refers to me.
  • Direct realism about perception
    ↪Esse Quam Videri


    The sentence “John feels hot” is a true description of John and the sensation he is feeling, and contrasts with the false description “John feels cold”. The word “hot” obviously refers to the sensation John has and the word “cold” obviously refers to the sensation he doesn’t have, which is why the former sentence is true and the latter sentence is false (and regardless of what the rest of the world believes about John).

    If you can’t agree with this then once again we’ve reached an impasse, because your continued appeal to “no it’s about norms of public assessment etc.” is utterly unconvincing.

    I can understand theism and moral realism and even direct realism - even though I disagree with them - but I cannot understand this approach that you and Banno are taking. It just seems so patently absurd.
  • Direct realism about perception
    It feels hot, but it isn’t — Esse Quam Videri

    Which means what?

    1. John feels hot1 in the water
    2. The water is hot2

    Are you saying that "hot1" does not refer to the sensation John feels in the water?

    Are you saying that "hot1" and "hot2" do not mean the same thing? If so, then what does "hot2" mean? We've already established that being hot2 is distinct from being of a certain temperature — given that John and Jane "disagree" over whether 37°C water is hot2 or cold2 — so what other property does the word "hot2" refer to, i.e what does the neutral third-party scientist have to look for to either verify or falsify John and Jane's "conflicting" claims?
  • Direct realism about perception
    They are evaluative predicates — Esse Quam Videri

    Yes, and this evaluation is inextricably tied up in the sensations they cause us to feel. That's why even Banno says "John feels cold in the water" and "Jane feels hot in the water". What do the words "hot" and "cold" mean in the phrases "feels hot" and "feels cold"? You appear to accept that the sensations occur but then for some reason think that they have nothing to do with the meaning of the words we use. And I think that's ridiculous. We can talk about anything in the world — and even things that aren't in the world. Sensations are no exception. The word "sensations" is proof enough of this.
  • Direct realism about perception
    If “hot” and “cold” referred only to private feelings, then disagreement, correction, and error about temperature would be impossible. — Esse Quam Videri

    Both John and Jane agree on the temperature. Is 37°C hot or cold? What do the words "hot" and "cold" mean in either case? I think it quite obvious that they refer to the different sensations that 37°C water causes John and Jane to feel.
  • Direct realism about perception
    Jane can agree that John feels the water is hot, and maintain that she feels the water is cold, and vice versa, without inconsistency. — Banno

    Yes, and the word "hot" in "John feels the water is hot" refers to the sensation John feels when sitting in the water and the word "cold" in "Jane feels the water is cold" refers to the sensation Jane feels when sitting in the water. It's certainly not the case that the words "hot" and "cold" refer to two mutually exclusive properties such that the water either has one or the other and that either John or Jane is feeling it wrong.

    This is why their "disagreement" is over a fiction (assuming it isn't a faux disagreement). They act as if the way the water feels to them is something else; something "really" true of the water. It's naive, and it's wrong, and the fact that they "argue" over which of "the water is hot" or "the water is cold" is true does not entail that the words "hot" and "cold" don't refer to the sensations they feel in the water.
  • Direct realism about perception
    But disagreement exists only because words do not refer solely to private sensations. — Banno

    This is false. The words "hot" and "cold" refer to the sensations that John and Jane feel when sitting in the bath and yet they disagree on whether the bath is hot or cold. This is a very straightforward and common sense proof that we can disagree even when our words refer to private sensations. Rather than accept this as proof against your interpretation of language, you blindly commit to your interpretation of language and deny the obvious.
  • Direct realism about perception
    The very notion of conflict about the bath would evaporate. — Banno

    As it should, because the words "hot" and "cold" really do refer to each person's private sensations. John says "the bath is hot" because he feels hot sitting in it and Jane says "the bath is cold" because she feels cold sitting in it. Both are correct. Their "disagreement" is a fiction. We have a tendency to think that the way we experience the world is "right" and so anyone who experiences the world another way is experiencing it "wrong". It's the naive view that any person educated in physics and physiology should reject when considering the science and philosophy of perception. Your continued appeal to ordinary language and ordinary norms just doesn't work as a refutation of indirect realism.
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