I take it that you hold that if phenomenal character is a mental phenomenon (not a property of apples, light, or eyes), then it must be something the subject is aware of as an object—an intermediary. — Esse Quam Videri

I don't know what you mean by "aware of as an object".

I will just say that I am aware of phenomenal character, like a red colour or a sweet taste, that this phenomenal character is a mental phenomenon, not a mind-independent property of apples or sugar, and that awareness of apples and sugar is mediated by awareness of these phenomenal characters — certainly in the counterfactual sense that I cannot be aware of apples and sugar without being aware of these phenomenal characters.

This view is a response to the naive view that phenomenal character isn't a mental phenomenon but the mind-independent nature of apples and sugar which are literal constituents of the experience.

The causal chain from apple to retina to cortex can be fully described without concluding that what I'm aware of at the end of the chain is a quale rather than the apple-as-presented. — Esse Quam Videri

I'm not saying that you're not aware of the apple-as-presented; I'm saying that the apple-as-presented is a mental phenomenon and not an apple, with "qualia" being its particular (mind-dependent) qualities, i.e. phenomenal character such as the colour red.

The appearance is the phenomenal character of the intentional act — Esse Quam Videri

Yes, which is a mental phenomenon. Intentional acts and phenomenal character aren't something the apple is, has, or does, aren't something light is, has, or does, aren't something eyes are, have, or do, and (maybe) aren't something the brain is, has, or does; they are the mental phenomena that emerge from neural activity.

I'm sorry, but I just don't know how to continue with this discussion. I know it's an unfair accusation, but I cannot understand your position as being anything other than indirect realism rebranded to sound like direct realism.

I wonder why they don’t want ICE to wear body cams? — NOS4A2

They do. The article literally says:

“Obviously we want them to be wearing body cameras, but we would want restrictions placed on what that information could be used for,” Markey said. “We want to make sure that we have the accountability for how these officers conduct themselves on the streets of our country, but we don’t want it in turn to be used as a way of coming back and suppressing free speech.”

...

House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries and Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer say they want to tack on restrictions to how ICE can use body camera footage, according to a letter sent to Republican leadership on Wednesday night.

“Prohibit tracking, creating or maintaining databases of individuals participating in First Amendment activities,” the letter says.

To add to the Epstein conspiracy theories, here's a draft statement announcing Epstein's death dated a day before he died.

So the question back to you is: what is your positive reason for identifying the appearance with a mental particular, other than the assumption that if perception can fail, appearances must be inner objects? Because the destroyed-apple case doesn't establish that identification — it only establishes fallibility, which my view already accommodates. — Esse Quam Videri

The positive reason is that after disintegration there is still the appearance of an apple even though there is no apple, and so either a) the appearance is the mental phenomena or b) the appearance is some third thing, distinct from both the apple and the mental phenomena. Occam's razor and no positive evidence for b) is reason enough to assert a).

You'll respond: "But after the apple is disintegrated, the 'profile' persists — so it can't be of the apple." — Esse Quam Videri

I don't say that. I say that the profile is of an apple but is not the direct perception of an apple — whether before or after disintegration. Direct perception, as the term means in the context of the dispute between traditional direct (naive) and indirect realists, is not concerned with intentionality but with which things are constituents of first-person phenomenal experience, and the epistemological consequences thereof.

Colour is how the apple presents itself given the kind of perceivers we are, the lighting conditions, and so on. That's a substantive ontological claim, not a grammatical trick. — Esse Quam Videri

We can see colours even without apples or light, e.g. if we're dreaming, hallucinating, or synesthetes listening to music with our eyes closed. What are these colours if not qualia?

But as for the "grammatical trick", what is the difference between these two claims?

1. Colour is how the apple presents itself given the kind of perceivers we are, the lighting conditions, and so on

2. Apples reflect light into our eyes which release glutamate which stimulate neural activity in the visual cortex from which colour qualia emerge

Do (1) and (2) mean the same thing, or is it logically possible for (2) to be true but (1) to be false?

I'm saying the phenomenology itself is of the apple — that the qualitative character of perceptual experience is not a property of an inner item but the way the object shows up. So the disagreement between us is phenomenological, not merely semantic. — Esse Quam Videri

I'm confused. This is what you said early in the discussion:

I think where we still differ is that the argument you quote builds in a phenomenological notion of “direct presence” from the outset. On the view I’m defending, epistemic directness is not a matter of what is phenomenally present to the mind at all.

I don’t accept (1), but not because I think mind-external objects are phenomenally present. Rather, I reject the assumption that perceptual justification must be grounded in phenomenology in the first place. Directness, on my view, concerns what our judgments are about, not what appears in experience. — Esse Quam Videri

And here you explicitly say "experience is not object-presentation".

On my view, in the first interval, the redness and roundness I'm aware of are properties of the apple as it shows up for me from this vantage point. — Esse Quam Videri

What does this even mean? Are you saying that these properties are properties that inhere in distal objects, but only when you exist and look at them from a certain vantage point? Because that strikes me as being absurd. I would say that this redness and roundness are subjective qualities of your first-person phenomenal experience, much like non-visual qualities involved in hearing, smell, taste, and touch, but which (erroneously) seem to be properties that inhere in distal objects (explaining why naive colour realism is believed by some).

All I see is a grammatical trick with your wording. The "apple as it shows up for me from this vantage point" just is a mental phenomenon caused by looking at the apple, but which (erroneously) seems to be the apple itself (hence intentionality being "world-directed"). It's what still exists and is seen even after the apple is disintegrated.

For IR to be substantive I think it needs some plausible notion of directness to contrast with. — hypericin

The fleshed out argument is here.

Yes, there is a difference, and it's important. — Esse Quam Videri

Which reaffirms what I have been saying since page 1.

Indirect realism is concerned with phenomenology, and which things in the world we have direct perception of. You're concerned with intentionality, which is prima facie consistent with indirect realism. Again, see Semantic Direct Realism.

Saying “the intentional object is the apple-at-t0” is not time travel; it’s just temporal indexing. — Esse Quam Videri

Is there a difference between these two claims?

1. At t₁ the intentional object of perception is the apple-at-t₀
2. At t₁ I have direct perception of the apple-at-t₀?

Because I would say that (2) makes no sense. I agree with the naive realist that I cannot have direct perception of something that doesn't exist, and the apple-at-t₀ doesn't exist at t₁.

So then the DRist has to bend over backwards to say that hallucination and vertidical perception are fundamentally different process — hypericin

As an aside, this is why I think my example with the apple is actually a stronger argument than the argument from hallucination. Direct realists often do argue that veridical perceptions and hallucinations are fundamentally different (disjunctivism), but this counterargument doesn't seem to work against my example. Having to resort to the claim that we have direct perception of a distal object that no longer exists is much less convincing, and seems to be grasping at straws.

I just find it odd, or telling, that indirect realists never include their neologisms in the noun position of their own propositions. — NOS4A2

Do you not recognise your hypocrisy? If it's not odd or telling that you say "I see an apple" instead of "I see light" then it's not odd or telling that an indirect realist says "I see an apple" instead of "I see sense data".

You're refusing to hold yourself to the same standard that you demand of indirect realists.

None of those are possible unless he first believes he can survive as a disembodied brain, which is a huge leap. — NOS4A2

Then not a brain in a vat but a body in a vat, à la the Matrix. The indirect realist no more has to prove that this isn't the case than the direct realist does. Both just assume that we're not and proceed from there.

Yes it does. One has to assume he is a brain and little more. One has to assume that senses are little more than inputs. These assumptions regarding the identity of the perceiver and his relationship with other objects defines how and what he perceives. — NOS4A2

The possibility of (2) only depends on the possibility of a brain living in a vat and the possibility of a cortical visual prosthesis being able to stimulate the visual cortex in the same way that an eye's neurotransmitters do. I don't have to assume anything about what I am. (2) is no less a problem for direct realists than it is for indirect realists.

I have explicitly stated that I can see mostly everything in my periphery: my own nose, light, apples, foreground, background. — NOS4A2

You said this: "I believe we have indirect visual perception of apples through the direct visual perception of light."

Indirect realists say this: "I believe we have indirect visual perception of apples through the direct visual perception of sense-data".

If you're still allowed to say "I see apples" then so is the indirect realist. If the indirect realist is only allowed to say "I see sense-data" then you're only allowed to say "I see light".

It isn’t possible that 2 is true unless one already assumes the premises of indirect realism. — NOS4A2

No it doesn't.

Moreover, it is rational to assume that things are the way they seem unless and until one has specific reasons for doubting them. That bar has yet to be reached in this discussion. It seems perceivers are not brains and there appears to be no vat. — NOS4A2

Which is also true for the indirect realist.

Philosophy is a little different than sports, I’m afraid, and requires a little more precision. — NOS4A2

Then I'll respond a different way: you should use language consistent with your theory; for instance, instead of saying that you see an apple you ought maintain that you see light.

Before one considers the indirect realist’s thought experiments he ought to ask how an indirect realist can get from propositions about mental states to propositions about the physical world in the first place, and vice versa. As a first order of business they ought to be required to explain how the existence of a real world is more plausible than being deceived by an evil god or being a brain-in a vat, given that they have zero direct access to any of them.

Perhaps the only route for a realist conclusion that I could find is the Inference to the Best Explanation. But then they have to explain why inference, feelings, and intuition is more reliable than the senses. This ought to be the second order of business. — NOS4A2

You're implying that direct realism avoids scepticism, but that simply begs the question. It's entirely possible that both of these are true:

1. If we are bipedal organisms with eyes and if there are apples that reflect light into our eyes then we have direct perception of apples and/or light
2. We are brains in a vat and a cortical visual prosthesis causes us to have "false" experiences of us being bipedal organisms with eyes living in a world with apples

(1) being true does not make (2) less likely, and so (2) is no less a problem for direct realists than it is for indirect realists. If direct realists can just assume that (2) is false then so can indirect realists.

Perhaps a third order of business is to ask the indirect realist to use language consistent with his theory, for instance that instead of saying he sees an apple, he ought to maintain that he sees a sense-data of an apple. — NOS4A2

There's no "instead of". This is like saying that if I watch a football match on TV then instead of saying that I watched a football match I ought say that I watched moving images on a TV screen.

It’s why Michael and Amadeus require analogies from what they can see in order to describe what they cannot. — NOS4A2

Thought experiments are a legitimate philosophical tool. They can show that a prima facie reasonable theory doesn’t actually work.

For example, you say that the direct object of visual perception is light, but then what if I don't have eyes, only a cortical visual prosthesis? I say that if the technology is sufficiently advanced then a) the visual experience of someone with a cortical visual prosthesis is indistinguishable from the visual experience of someone with eyes, that b) the direct object of perception for someone with a cortical visual prosthesis is the direct object of perception for someone with eyes, that c) the direct object of perception for someone with a cortical visual prosthesis is not light, and so that d) the direct object of perception for someone with eyes is not light.

It doesn't matter that we do have eyes and don't have sufficiently advanced cortical visual prostheses. The thought experiment is a reasonable rebuttal, and so your options are to either deny (b) or to deny (c). A denial of (c) seems untenable given your theory of perception and so a denial of (b) may be your only option, but this implies that you accept that the direct object of perception for someone with a cortical visual prosthesis is neither the apple nor light, and so should hopefully give you a better understanding of what indirect realists mean.

Sorry, I'm not entirely sure what you're saying here. Is there a question? I'll present the argument in full, starting with the naive view of perception:

On [the naive realist] conception of experience, when one is veridically perceiving the objects of perception are constituents of the experiential episode. The given event could not have occurred without these entities existing and being constituents of it in turn, one could not have had such a kind of event without there being relevant candidate objects of perception to be apprehended. So, even if those objects are implicated in the causes of the experience, they also figure non-causally as essential constituents of it... Mere presence of a candidate object will not be sufficient for the perceiving of it, that is true, but its absence is sufficient for the non-occurrence of such an event. The connection here is [one] of a constitutive or essential condition of a kind of event. — Martin 2004

The important points to take from this are:

P1. If I have direct perception of an object then that object is a constituent of the experience
P2. If an object is a constituent of the experience then that object exists
P3. That an object exists does not entail that it is a constituent of the experience

I then consider this thought experiment:

P4. An apple is placed 10m in front of me
P5. The light it reflects travels at 1m/s
P6. The apple is disintegrated after 5 seconds
C1. Therefore, I see an apple for 5 seconds starting 5 seconds after the apple has been disintegrated
C2. Therefore, the apple does not exist during the 5 seconds in which I see an apple
C3. Therefore, the apple is not a constituent of the experience during the 5 seconds in which I see an apple
C4. Therefore, I do not have direct perception of the apple during the 5 seconds in which I see an apple

This then continues with:

P7. If the apple is not a constituent of the experience during the 5 seconds in which I see an apple when the light travels at 1m/s then it is not a constituent of the experience during the 5 seconds in which I see an apple when the light travels at 299,792,458 m/s
C5. Therefore, the apple is not a constituent of the experience during the 5 seconds in which I see an apple when the light travels at 299,792,458 m/s
C6. Therefore, I do not have direct perception of the apple during the 5 seconds in which I see an apple when the light travels at 299,792,458 m/s

Which part do you reject? Colours and shapes as qualia or that I continue to believe that there is an intact red apple 10m in front of me because I continue to see an intact red apple 10m in front of me?

But it doesn’t follow that the perceptual episode itself is an inference from an inner object. — Esse Quam Videri

I don't understand what this means, or how it relates to what I am saying or to indirect realism. I am saying that during the second interval I see shapes and colours and depths and sizes — described as "seeing an intact red apple 10m in front of me" — and that these are visual properties of the qualia/sense-data/mental phenomena, not of some distal object in the environment — given that there is no appropriate distal object in the environment — and that in seeing these shapes and colours and depths and sizes I infer the existence of an intact red apple 10m in front of me — and I am saying that this is exactly what happens even before the apple has been disintegrated.

There's the negative thesis that distal objects and their properties are not the constituents of first-person phenomenal experience and there's the positive thesis that the constituents of first-person phenomenal experience — those things that the naive realist wrongly believes to be distal objects and their properties — are in fact sense data/qualia/mental phenomena. Then there's the plausible epistemic worry that if distal objects and their properties are not the constituents of first-person phenomenal experience then the world might be radically different to how it appears to us.

Nothing about this prima facie entails that perceptions are not "world-directed" or "answerable to correctness/error".

Traditionally, the indirect realist framework is not merely the denial of naïve realism, but a substantive picture on which what is directly given are inner items (sense-data/representations/qualia) and distal objects are known only indirectly by inference. That is exactly what I reject. — Esse Quam Videri

Consider what you said before:

Strictly speaking, insofar as the apple has disintegrated, there is no direct object of perception during the second interval. — Esse Quam Videri

During this second interval I don't know that the apple has been disintegrated. I still believe that there is an intact red apple 10m in front of me because I am still having the first-person phenomenal experience described as "seeing a red apple 10m in front of me". I am inferring the existence of an intact red apple 10m in front of me from the fact that I am having the "appropriate" experience. The belief just happens to be wrong given that the apple was disintegrated. This same inference from the same kind of first-person phenomenal experience also happens during the first interval, before the apple was disintegrated, and just happens to be right given that the apple hasn't yet been disintegrated.

Can I have an example for the sake of comparison? — NOS4A2

An example of first-person phenomenal experience? It's what occurs when the visual cortex is active, whether dreaming, hallucinating, or having ordinary waking experiences, and what doesn't occur when the visual cortex isn't active, whether in deep sleep, having one's eyes closed, or suffering from cortical blindness.

How does one indirectly perceive the light bouncing off an apple? — NOS4A2

By light being causally responsible for but not a constituent of the first-person phenomenal experience that emerges from neural activity in the visual cortex.

I believe we have indirect visual perception of apples through the direct visual perception of light. This shouldn’t matter because the problem of perception is whether we can directly perceive the mind-independent world or directly perceive some mind-dependent intermediary. So why are we trying to keep discussion away from the problem? — NOS4A2

Of course it matters. If we don't have direct visual perception of apples then our ordinary understanding of perception is wrong, and there is an epistemological problem of perception. Having the direct object of visual perception be light rather than sense data is a problem for the sense datum theorist, but having it be light rather than apples is a problem for the traditional direct realist.

You're committing an association fallacy if you think that having the direct object of perception be just any mind-independent thing suffices as a solution to the problems of perception.

Yet you keep limiting it to the visual. — NOS4A2

Yes, because it's important. This is the proposition under consideration:

1. We have direct visual perception of apples

According to most direct realists, (1) is true. According to you, (1) is false.

If (1) is false then one of these is true:

2. We do not have visual perception of apples
3. We only have indirect visual perception of apples

Therefore, according to you, either (2) or (3) is true.

So if you consider visual perception indirect because there is distance and other objects between apples and the eye — NOS4A2

This isn't my claim. This is the consequence of your claim. I am simply pushing you to acknowledge this.

According to your theory of perception we do not have direct visual perception of apples.

So your so-called "direct realism" is very different to what is ordinarily understood by the term.

Perception isn’t just visual. Do you agree or disagree? — NOS4A2

Yes, but I'm specifically talking about visual perception. But if you want me to be explicit, then according to your theory of perception, our perception of apples for the five main modalities are:

1. Sight: indirect
2. Hearing: indirect
3. Smell: indirect
4. Taste: direct
5. Touch: direct

So according to your theory, we only have direct perception of apples when it comes to taste and touch; but when it comes to sight, hearing, and smell, our perception of apples is only indirect.

Yes, and many sense organs can touch apples. — NOS4A2

But our eyes don't, which is why you must accept that we do not have direct visual perception of apples; that either we only have indirect visual perception of apples or we don't have visual perception of apples at all.

It seems we disagree over whether the causal story is sufficient to cash out intentionality and epistemic normativity sufficient for an adequate theory of perception—i.e. perception as world-directed and answerable to correctness/error. — Esse Quam Videri

I'm not saying that the causal story is sufficient to cash out intentionality and epistemic normativity. I'm saying that distal objects and their properties are not constituents of first-person phenomenal experience, and so perception is not direct in the way that naive realists say it is, and that because of this the epistemic worry that distal objects and their properties might be nothing like how things appear to us, with some of their supposed properties in fact being Locke's secondary qualities (e.g. colour), is warranted — and that physics, physiology, neuroscience, and psychology confirm all of this.

I think this is probably the crux of our disagreement. — Esse Quam Videri

I think the crux of the disagreement is that I don't think there is a disagreement, as I have been trying to explain since page 1. We both agree with the causal story, we both agree that naive realism is false — i.e. that distal objects are not constituents of experience — and we both agree that we have knowledge of the distal objects that cause our experiences.

So other than me calling this "indirect" perception and you calling this "direct" perception, what exactly are we disagreeing about?

I'm simply asking for your positive account of how people come into possession of knowledge of distal objects. — Esse Quam Videri

By them causally affecting our bodies, or causally affecting energies that causally affect our bodies, and then our bodies causally affecting our minds.

Isn't this exactly what you think too? You just call this "direct" perception because our experiences are "answerable" to distal objects and I call this "indirect" perception because distal objects are not "constituents" of experience.

What enables these people to get any epistemic purchase on distal objects such that their claims about such objects can be correct or incorrect? — Esse Quam Videri

The same thing that enables the people with bionic eyes to do this? Unless you can point out exactly what the problem is I don't know how I can answer the question.

No, but it's hard to understand how knowledge of atoms can get off the ground unless perception can underwrite the correctness of the practices through which that knowledge is obtained. — Esse Quam Videri

Indirect realism doesn't say that it doesn't?

You're reading something into indirect realism that I just don't understand. The people wearing the visors all have indirect perception of the wider world but can still do science just as well as we can.

But the fact remains that your argument depends on P4 - the apple does not exist during the second 10 seconds. So if we change or even just delete that premiss, your conclusion does not follow. Without that premiss, you cannot assert C1 or C2 or C3. — Ludwig V

Well, yes, that's how all arguments work?

I can see no reason why the apple cannot be a constituent of the experience during the first 10 seconds and not a constituent of the experience during the second 10 seconds. — Ludwig V

So now you reject P3? Here you said "I would then point out that the relationship of the apple to the light signal during the first 10 seconds and the second 10 seconds is identical. You have no ground for distinguishing between the two."

It seems to me that you're moving the goalposts and contradicting yourself, and so this rejection of P3 is an ad hoc rationalization to avoid the conclusion, which seems rather dishonest.

So the acceptance of (5) would seem to be at odds with any interpretation of (1) - (4) that would rule out the ability of perception to provide us with knowledge of distal objects and their properties. — Esse Quam Videri

That's not what's claimed? The claim is that the world might be very different to how it appears — and I think science has proven that it is.

Science doesn't require that we have direct perception of atoms for us to have knowledge of atoms.

P3. If the apple is a constituent of the experience during the first 10 seconds then it is a constituent of the experience during the second 10 seconds
P4. The apple exists during the second 10 seconds
C2. Therefore, the apple is a constituent of the experience during the first 10 seconds — Ludwig V

C2 doesn't follow.

in what sense can science correct perception without presupposing that perception is already world-directed and normatively answerable to reality? — Esse Quam Videri

Who says it's not? It's entirely possible that all these are true:

1. Distal objects and their properties are not constituents of first-person phenomenal experience
2. Qualia/sense data are the constituents of first-person phenomenal experience
3. Colours as ordinarily understood are qualia/sense data, not mind-independent properties of a distal object's surface
4. The mind-independent nature of the world is very different to how things appear to us
5. Perception is "world-directed and normatively answerable to reality"

Admittedly I still don't quite understand what (5) is supposed to mean, but prima facie (and consistent with our previous arguments), I don't see any inconsistencies with the above. (1) - (4) suffices as indirect realism, as I understand it, and is the scientific view of perception.

But then we should be clear that this is no longer (or not yet) a theory of perception in the philosophically relevant sense. It’s a theory of phenomenal constituency. — Esse Quam Videri

It's very relevant, and drives the epistemological problem of perception. The worry is that if distal objects and their properties are not constituents of first-person phenomenal experience then the mind-independent nature of the world might be very different to how things appear to us, e.g. things might be coloured differently, or not coloured at all (à la Locke's secondary qualities). In the more extreme case we might be unable to deny transcendental idealism, with distal objects being noumena.

OK. Now I ask you whether you think that we have indirect perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds. — Ludwig V

Yes. Given that I have perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds but don't have direct perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds it follows that I have indirect perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds.

I figured this was quite clearly implied when I said: "The experience during the first 10 seconds ... is still the experience of an apple; it just isn't the direct perception of an apple."

Here 's a variant of your argument, making a different assumption about the fate of the apple.
P4a. The apple exists during the second 10 seconds
C1a. Therefore, the apple is a constituent of the experience during the second 10 seconds
C2a. Therefore, the apple is a constituent of the experience during the first 10 seconds
C3a. Therefore, I do have direct perception of the apple during the first 10 seconds
I think, on that different assumption, C3a follows. — Ludwig V

What premises are you deriving C1a from?

But see also P5 and C4 of my argument. In that scenario we see an apple be disintegrated almost in real time, just as we would in real life. The apple exists for almost the full 20 seconds we see it (take a fraction of a millisecond, given that the speed of light isn't infinity) but it still follows that we do not have direct perception of it.

X is the mind-independent world. — NOS4A2

You're committing an association fallacy.

As apparently I need to be even more explicit:

P1. We have direct perception of X iff our sense organs are in direct physical contact with X
C1. Therefore, we have direct visual perception of apples iff our visual sense organs are in direct physical contact with apples
P2. Our visual sense organs are not in direct physical contact with apples
C2. Therefore, we do not have direct visual perception of apples

Either C2 is true or P1 is false. You can't avoid this.

I have been arguing that we have direct perception of the mind-independent world, of which apples and light are constituents. — NOS4A2

Your argument rested on the premise that we have direct perception of X if and only if our sense organs are in direct physical contact with X, but if this is true then we only have direct visual perception of light, and so either a) we do not have visual perception of apples or b) we only have indirect visual perception of apples.

You're contradicting yourself in denying the consequences of your premise, and so your argument fails.

The indirect realist makes the ridiculous claim that even when you are at the Rod Laver Arena, you do not see the tennis, but an image of the tennis. — Banno

No, the claim is that we do not directly see the tennis. We still indirectly see the tennis, much like when watching it on TV.

And it's not ridiculous.