But now it seems that there are genuinely different coextensive properties, which would dash the hope of identifying properties with sets. — litewave

We learn the concept of an abstract property, such as redness, by discovering a family resemblance between a set of concrete objects in the world, such as a car, flower, cherry, sunset.

This set of concrete objects, being an abstract concept, is distinct from its concrete objects. In other words, the set is not contained within itself.

So it makes sense to identify properties with sets.

Are there really genuinely different coextensive properties?

Redness, then, is not inside the apple. It is born from the interplay of all three participants. — Astorre

Thing A is predisposed to emit a wavelength of 550nm, and an observer perceives colour X. Thing B is predisposed to emit a wavelength of 630nm, and the same observer perceives colour Y. Thing C is predisposed to emit a wavelength of 700nm, and the same observer perceives colour Z.

Although the observer perceives the colours X, Y and Z as different (there can be different shades of the same colour), the observer also perceives a family resemblance between colours Y and Z (such as the concept of redness).

If a person's intuitive grasp of a family resemblance between colours Y and Z is processual, a dynamic interaction between thing, light and observer, what is there in this dynamic interaction that causes the observer to treat colours Y and Z as being different in some kind to colour X (red rather than green)?

As an analogy, my feeling of pain when touching a hot radiator is not caused by the interaction, but is caused by my internal disposition to feeling pain when touching a hot object. An objective, existing mode of my being.

Now you are assuming a force without acceleration, a force which is counteracting gravity to create an equilibrium. — Metaphysician Undercover

Within general relativity, Einstein's Equivalence Principle shows that being at rest in a gravitational field is equivalent to being accelerated. (Wikipedia - Equivalence Principle)

I suppose one issue might be circularity. How do you know what belongs in a set? — Count Timothy von Icarus

One possible solution to the problem of circularity.

Suppose the property of redness = {red car, red building, red book}. We understand the property of redness by the elements in its set, but we must know the property of redness before we can include an element in the set.

Suppose there are many different objects of many different colours.

It is a feature of the human brain that a person can discover family resemblances in different things. We cannot explain how the brain does this, but we know that it does.

The family resemblance may be the colour red, being large in size, being angular in shape, being distant from the observer, etc.

Family resemblance is a term used by Wittgenstein on his book Philosophical Investigations 1953.

If a person does discover a family resemblance, this becomes a concept, such as the concept of redness, largeness, angularity, etc.

This concept of redness is abstract and singular, and is different in kind to the concrete instantiations in which the brain discovers family resemblances, such as red car, red building, red book, etc. The property of redness is distinct from its set of concrete instantiations.

Calling these objects a set is an acknowledgement that they are parts of a whole, they are parts of the concept of redness.

This can be formalised as redness = {red car, red building, red book}.

In other words, a red car has the property of redness.

The circularity is broken by the ability of the brain to discover family resemblances in different things.

I think we had this discussion before. In general relativity, gravity is not a force. — Metaphysician Undercover

I did not say that in general relativity gravity is a force.

I wrote: "According to general relativity, an apple on a table is subject to a force and because subject to a force is therefore accelerating, actively accelerating."

I am saying that the apple remains on the table because the table is exerting an upward force that stops the apple from falling

Even in general relativity there are forces.

I propose that the set of all red objects is the property "redness" but this property probably does not look red, in fact it probably does not look like anything that could be visualized because it is not an object that is contiguous in space or time — litewave

A football team is a set of football players. An example of a set that does not contain itself.

Football team = {player 1, player 2, player 3,............................player 11)

A football team is a distinct thing to 11 football players. 11 random football players does not make a football team. These 11 football players have to work together in order for there to be a football team.

In naive set theory, sets can contain themselves. However the Axiom of Foundation in Zermelo-Fraenkei set theory states that sets cannot contain themselves, in order to avoid Russell's paradox. An example of a set that would contain itself would be a set of sets.

ZF ensures that things like football teams are more than a random collection of football players.

I will stick to Copilot's analogies.

The football team is like a container within which are football players. Such containers are distinct to what is being contained.

In addition, the football team may be thought of as Frege's sense and the football players as Frege's reference. Sense is also distinct from reference.

In addition, within Wittgenstein's language game, the football team may be thought of as a concept and the football players as the context of the concept. Concepts are also distinct to their contexts.

A football team is an abstract entity, whilst the football players are concrete entities.

Generalising, an abstract thing, such as a football team, is a set of concrete things, such as football players.

Equivalent examples would be:

A University (an abstract thing) is a set of buildings and teachers (concrete things)
University = {university building 1, university building 2, teacher 1, teacher 2}

The property redness (an abstract thing) is a set of red things (concrete things)
Redness = {red car, red book, red apple}

Am I right in agreeing with you that the property of redness is the set of all red things?

I did say earlier that there are good grounds for saying that the mind is existentially dependent on the brain etc., but that nature of this dependence is not yet clarified. — Ludwig V

My belief is also that the existence of the mind depends on the existence of the brain, and the nature of this dependency is still in doubt, as you say.

My working hypothesis at the moment is panprotopsychism, the view that fundamental physical entities are protoconscious.

From the fact that I am here, I can reliably infer that I was born. I can also infer reliably that I will die.................. In a normal context, the answer would be 93 million miles from the earth...................................What earthly use is a map if you cannot relate it to what it is a map of? Is it perhaps possible to look at the world indirectly? — Ludwig V

As an Indirect Realist, I agree with your inferring. I can infer a cause for my sensations, indirect rather than direct knowledge.

I see a broken window and can infer what broke it.

From the appearance of something bright and yellow and the experience of something hot in my senses I can infer the existence of the sun. From other appearances and experiences, I can infer the existence of an Earth and a Sun that is 93 million distance from this Earth.
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Mental objects such as appearances, experiences, concepts are not physical objects, so do not occupy space. — Ludwig V

It depends on one's position regarding the mind-body problem.

My position is more Physicalism than Dualism.

As Peter Lloyd writes in his article Is the Mind Physical?: Dissecting Conscious Brain Tissue

The mind-body problem has remained essentially unchanged since Descartes put it forward in 1641. The problem is: what is the nature of the conscious mind, and how does it relate to the body?

Today, the prevailing view is that the mind is really a physical phenomenon going on inside the brain. I shall call this view physicalism. It contrasts with two other broad views: dualism – which says the mind is irreducibly different from the brain; and mentalism – which denies the existence of the brain altogether.

The apple is in a static condition, the state of being on the table, for a duration of time. By what premise do you conclude that it also takes part in activity? — Metaphysician Undercover

According to general relativity, an apple on a table is subject to a force and because subject to a force is therefore accelerating, actively accelerating. (Wikipedia - g force)

A set is a different object than any of its elements. But if the box is black then it also contains instances of blackness, not just redness. For example the walls of the box may be black. Your example looks like the property of redness contained in a black box. — litewave

Consider the singleton set containing one element, such as Socrates = {Socrates}.

From Zermelo-Fraenkei set theory, no set can be an element of itself, meaning that a singleton set {Socrates} is distinct from the element it contains, Socrates. (Wikipedia - Singleton (mathematics))

Does this not mean that saying the box can only be black if it contains instances of blackness violates the Zermelo-Frankei set theory, in that the singleton set must be distinct from the element it contains?

IE, thinking about set theory, a black box would then not be distinct from the instances of blacknesses within it.

I don't know, but am curious to know.

I am proposing that we could plausibly identify a property with the set of all things that have this property. — litewave

I am just wondering:

Suppose only three things in the world have the property of redness.

Consider the set {red car, red apple, red book}

It seems that a set is not the same thing as the elements within the set, as a box is not the same as the things inside the box (an analogy given by Copilot). For example, even though all the things inside the box are red, the box itself could be black.

So to say that we can identify a property with the set of all things that have this property may be like saying we can identify the property of redness with something that is black.

Is this valid?

I am proposing that we could plausibly identify a property with the set of all things that have this property. — litewave

This seems a similar concept to using set theory to define the natural numbers.

Frege and Russell proposed defining a natural number n as the collection of all sets with n elements.
Wikipedia - Set-theoretic definition of natural numbers

A static state of existence, even if temporary, is very distinct from an activity. In no way is a static state a part of an activity, as there is a causal relation which separates the two. A cause is required to bring the static thing into an active situation. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are assuming that instants of time, static states of existence, are metaphysically possible.

Henri Bergson is one philosopher who argued that time is not a series of discrete, measurable instants but is a flow of durations. (Wikipedia - Duration (philosophy))

Alfred North Whitehead believed that if we denied the possibility of instants of time, this would solve many philosophical puzzles. (https://whiteheadresearch.org/)

For example, if there are instants of time, and if the apple is on the table at one instant in time, where is the cause that ensures the apple is still on the table an instant of time later. In the absence of any cause, this would mean that time will stop.

It is more likely that there are not instants in time but rather durations of time. It would follow that the apple being on the table is part of an active situation.

Are you saying "is on the table" is an activity? In predication the verb "is" does not express an activity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Even though the verb "is" expresses a state of existence, the phrase "is on" suggests a temporary situation, as in the apple is on the table, the apple is under the table or the apple is on the floor.

The apple currently being on the table is part of an active situation.

What I'm trying to point out is that, whatever mental object you posit in my head, the actual work is done by my mind, interpreting, applying and so forth. Those activities - skills - are what matters. The mental object doesn't actually do anything. — Ludwig V

Yes, to express a complete idea, a sentence needs both a verb (an activity) and generally a noun (object).

There is no complete idea in "apple", but there is in "the apple is on the table".

As Wittgenstein wrote in Tractatus "the world is the totality of facts, not of things", where "the apple is on the table" is a fact because it encompasses relations between things.

If I want to find my way from A to B, I can use a map - a representation of the terrain. But it is no use to me unless I can read the map, and identify what point on the map represents where I am - I have to link the representation to what it is a representation of. — Ludwig V

This is from the viewpoint of a Direct Realist, who looks at both the map and directly at the actual world and compares the two.

But for the Indirect Realist, they only have the map. They cannot directly look at the actual world to compare it to the map.

If we know that we don't know reality, we know it from our concepts, experiences, and what appears to us. Yet that's not what they tell us. All three of these concepts announce, quite clearly that they are about something. We have a concept of tables, our experience are experiences of chairs, and what appears in the morning is the sun. They are not identical with their objects, but they are existentially dependent on them. So denying the reality of those objects, or claiming that we don't know those objects, denies their reality. — Ludwig V

Where is this reality?

There are appearances in our five senses, such as seeing a circular shape. We have experiences through these five senses, such as seeing the colour yellow and feeling hotness.

Our five sense are between our minds and a reality the other side.

We can interpret these appearances and experiences and derive the concept of a sun.

As you say, we accept that our concept of the sun is not identical with its object, in that our mind, contained within our brain, being of the order 30cm diameter, is less than the 1.39 million km diameter of the sun.

As you also say, our concept of the sun is existentially dependent on its object.

The question is, where is this object? Where is this sun?

As an Indirect Realist, from appearances and experiences in my senses I can infer that their cause was the fact of there being a sun in reality. But this can only be an inference.

But you seem to be saying that we don't just infer but know for a fact that there is a sun in reality when you say "So denying the reality of those objects, or claiming that we don't know those objects, denies their reality."

But how can we know without doubt the cause of the appearances and experiences in our senses?

As an Indirect Realist, this is not a problem. I simply name the unknown cause of my appearances and experiences after the appearances and experiences themselves, such that I name the set {appearance of a circular shape, experience of seeing the colour yellow, experience of hotness} as "sun".

As an Indirect Realist, I believe there is an unknown fact in reality that has caused these appearances and experiences in my senses, and this unknown fact in reality I simply name "sun". But this "sun" is no more than the name of the set of appearances and experiences in my senses.

But if you are saying that the sun is a fact of reality, how do you know?

The flow of information in a causal chain is directional. Forwards in time, a single cause determines a single effect. Backwards in time, a single effect may have multiple cases. Forwards in time, a stone breaks a window. Backwards in time, how can anyone know that the cause of a broken window was a stone or a bird when the observer was not present when the window broke?

How can you know the cause of an appearance or experience in the senses when no one cause is necessary but many possible causes are contingent?

Hardly anyone today would defend the crude “objects exist only in the mind” version of indirect realism, or the equally naïve “mind is a passive window” version of direct realism. — Wayfarer

However, I do think that there is a distinct division between some people who believe in an absolute sense that tables and chairs do exist in the world, and who may be called Direct Realists, and some who believe in an absolute sense that tables and chairs only exist in the mind as concepts, and who may be called Indirect Realists.

As an Indirect Realist I also fully support Enactivism, in that the human mind has evolved in synergy with the world. The human mind is not separate to the world, but is a part of the world. But even so, my Enactivism does not change my belief that tables and chairs only exist in the mind as concepts.
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So the “overpopulation” worry—that there are too many relations to count as real entities—may dissolve once we stop treating relations as if they were objects alongside atoms and tables. They're on a different plane altogether. — Wayfarer

Even if we stop treating relations as if they were objects, how should we treat them?

Relations may be on a different plane, but where exactly is this plane?

Has anyone ever seen a relation existing independently of the human mind?

What do relations in a mind-independent world actually do? What purpose do they serve?
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Color doesn’t exist “in the world” in the same way as a wavelength does, but it is also not merely mental — it’s a mind–world hybrid. — Wayfarer

I agree with Kant's concepts of Transcendental Idealism and Empirical Realism.

We may have the subjective experience of seeing the colour red. The scientist may point out that when someone says that they see the colour red, they may be looking at a wavelength of 700nm.

The situation is, as you say, a mind-world hybrid. If there was no wavelength of 700nm we would not see the colour red, and we would not see the colour red if there was no wavelength of 700nm.

But a hybrid mind-world does not mean that the colour red, as we subjectively experience it, exists in the world in any way.

We could define a wavelength of 700nm as being the colour red, but this does not mean that a wavelength of 700nm "is" the colour red, where "is" is that of identity.

What we know as the subjective experience of the colour red may exist in the world, but if it does exist in the world, it must exist as a thing-in-itself, and therefore in Kant's terms, unknowable to us.
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So you’re right to notice that “relations” aren’t as straightforward as they seem, but I’d caution against setting it up as “either in the mind or in the world.” They belong to the very interface where mind and world meet. — Wayfarer

I agree that there is an interface where mind and world meet, but there are two different directions, from the world to mind and from the mind to world.

From the world to mind, I cannot know what is in your mind. I cannot know whether your subjective experience of the colour of a red postbox is the same as mine.

From the mind to world, I only know phenomenological appearances. I cannot know what caused those appearances.

There is an interface between mind and world, but it is an interface that blocks the passage of knowledge across it.

You may say, for example, that we have the knowledge that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, but this knowledge still exists in the mind, not in a mind-independent world.

A table consists of various parts, suitably organized. In the real world, the organization is called a design. — Ludwig V

Does this not mean you can be thought of as a Direct Realist, in that objects such as tables exist in the real world.
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What matters is the "over-population". I don't see why "over-population" is a problem. Where does anything say what number of relations there should be in the world? — Ludwig V

If relations ontologically exist in the world, then between every single elementary particle and force in the Universe there is a metaphysical relation.

As four things give rise to six relations, there are more relations than there are things.

This means there is a vast number of metaphysical relations in the Universe. A significant over-population of metaphysical relations in the Universe.

I agree that over-population in itself is not problematic.

But what exactly are these metaphysical relations doing? What purpose do they serve? Are they needed? Wouldn't the Universe carry on equally as well if there were no metaphysical relations? By Occam's razor, let's get rid of the ontological existence of relations in the world.
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If the relations occupy space, they cannot be in the mind. If relations are even located in space, they are not in the mind. — Ludwig V

As with Kant's things-in-themselves, if relations existed in the world but not the mind, how could we know about them?
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One could even argue that it (physics) is impoverished because it can't recognize colours, etc. — Ludwig V

Does the colour red exist in a mind-independent world?

How can the mind ever know what exists in a mind-independent world?

Physics is only a tool of the human mind. If the human mind cannot logically know what exists in a mind -independent world, then neither can physics.

It is not the case that physics is impoverished, but rather the fact that the mind cannot logically know what exists outside itself.
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Where is the design of the table or chair? — Ludwig V

In the human mind.

Are you saying that tables and chairs exist independently of the human mind?

Even if tables and chairs existed independently of the human mind, their design would still exist in the human mind that created them.
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The distinction between table and chair is not arbitrary — Ludwig V

I agree. They have different functions.

But these functions are human functions,

Suppose a table and chair existed next to each other in a mind-independent world. Assume that they are made up of atoms (in the old sense of fundamental parts).

What in a mind-independent world would "determine" whether a particular atom belonged to the chair or the table?

Suppose an alien visited from Alpha-Centauri, how would they know that one set of atoms should be related together in what we call a table?

Suppose the table lost one atom, would it still be a table? Who would make the judgement in the absence of the human mind?

We don't experience tables and chairs through representations of them. If we can't compare a representation with the original, there is no way to know whether it is truth or illusion. — Ludwig V

As an Indirect Realist, I would say that tables and chairs only exist as concepts in my mind. They are representations of something in the world, as the word "house" functions as a representation.

I agree that as we cannot compare a representation in our mind with the original in the world. There is no way of knowing whether tables and chairs do actually exist in the world.

You say "But I don't think I'm a Direct Realist"

If we don't experience tables and chairs through representations of them, how do we experience them?

Do you think that tables and chairs exist in a mind-independent world?
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The concept of a table is not a table. — Ludwig V

I agree.
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I have never managed to work out what "direct experience" means. — Ludwig V

But you said that "Relations are not unlike the lines of latitude and longitude. If those lines don't exist in the world, how can they enable navigators to know where they are in the world?"

Doesn't that mean that navigators have "direct experience" of the lines of latitude and longitude existing in the world?

How can the navigators know about the lines of latitude and longitude existing in the world if they don't have "direct experience" of them?
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That we can perceive objects-in-the-world, and how they are related does not mean that they exist in the mind. — Ludwig V

Perceive can mean i) perceive in the mind, as in "I perceive Mary is bored" ii) perceive through the senses, as in "I perceive a loud noise".

I agree. For the Indirect Realist, that we can perceive through the senses appearances of things-in-the-world does not mean that these things-in-the-world exist in the world. For the Indirect Realist, the concept of tables exists in the mind even if tables don't exist in the world.

However, in order to perceive the appearances of things-in-the-world, something must exist in the mind.

This relates to the homunculus problem. A machine making an image of an image would lead into infinite regress. I agree that the machine does not need to form an image of an image in order to recognise it. Similarly with humans, in that I don't need to form a representation of a representation in order to perceive it.

Are you saying that can we perceive things-in-the-world without something needing to exist in the mind?
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To be continued:

Just because you might have perceived erroneously that Mary is bored, it doesn't follow that you cannot depend on your understanding. — L'éléphant

"Esse est percipi" may be translated as "to be is to be perceived".

Presumably, "to be" is referring to the world

But there are two main meanings of "perceive". Something in the mind "I perceive that Mary is bored" and something through the senses "I perceive a loud noise". From Merriam Webster Dictionary, "perceive" may mean i) to attain awareness or understanding of ii) to become aware of through the senses

Is "is to be perceived" referring to something in the mind or something through the senses?

Problems arise if "is to be perceived" is referring to something in the mind rather than through the senses.

Just because I perceive something in my mind doesn't mean that it is a fact in the world. I perceive that Mary is bored and I may be right or I may be wrong. There is no logical reason to believe that just because I perceive something in my mind then it must be a fact in the world .

It seems more likely that "is to be perceived" is referring to something through the senses.

The answer depends on what you mean by your question......................................However, one might start by asking whether A and B exist in the mind, the world or both. — Ludwig V

"Esse est percipi" may be translated as "to be is to be perceived". Are the relations we perceive perceived only in the mind or perceived of the world through the senses?

Do relations exist in the mind, the world or both?

If relations existed in the world but not in the mind, as with Kant's things-in-themselves, we would not be able to discuss them, as we would not know about them.

For the Indirect Realist, objects such as tables and chairs only exist in the mind and not the world. The Indirect Realist believes that they don't experience the world as it really is, but only through representations of it.

For the Direct Realist, the experience of tables and chairs in the mind is a direct experience of the same tables and chairs that exist in the world. The Direct Realist believes they experience the world directly, and there is a direct correspondence between their concept of a table and the table in the world.

An object such as a table exists as a relation between the parts that make it up.

For the Direct Realist, if the table exists as an ontological object in the world, then the relations between the parts that make up the table must also ontologically exist in the world. If ontological relations did not exist in the world then neither would the table ontologically exist in the world.

For the Indirect Realist, relations exist in the mind otherwise they would not have the concept of table, but relations between the parts in the world are unnecessary. There need be no ontological relations between parts in the world in order for the Indirect Realist to have the concept of tables and chairs.

The Direct Realist needs the ontological existence of relations in the world, whereas the Indirect Realist doesn't.

If it can be shown that ontological relations don't exist in the world, then Direct Realism is no longer a valid belief.

As you say "Counting relations is not as straightforward as it looks." A relation suggest two things. There is the relation between a table and a chair. But there is also a relation between the table top and its legs. But then again there is a relation between the atoms that make up the table top. And there is a relation between the elementary particles and forces that make up an atom. There is an "overpopulation" of relations.

As you say "Existing in both the mind and the world is hardest of all to understand. Does it mean that there are actually two relations? Which of them is the real one?" This is a problem for the Direct Realist as the relations in the world are duplicated in the mind, a case of "over-determination". For the Direct Realist, which are the real relations, the ones in the world or the ones in the mind. But this is not a problem for the Indirect Realist, in that the real relations are the one that exist in the mind.

You ask "Relations are not unlike the lines of latitude and longitude. If those lines don't exist in the world, how can they enable navigators to know where they are in the world?" The colour red exists as a subjective experience in the mind but not the world. Scientists point out that when someone says they see the colour red, in the world can be a wavelength of 700nm, and in a wavelength of 700nm no colour red can be found. A driver sees a red traffic light and stops. Relations don't need to ontologically exist in the world in order for there to be lines of latitude and longitude as the colour red does not need to ontologically exist in the world in order for there to be traffic lights.

You say "I'm very puzzled by the question where relations - even spatial ones - are. I don't think there is an answer to it. But it doesn't make any sense to me to deny that they are in space (the clue is in the name), even if we can't assign an exact location to them." This raises one problem. How can we know that relations exist in the world if we don't know where they are. If there is a relation in the world between A and B, and the relation cannot be found in A, the relation cannot be found in B and the relation cannot be found in a section of space between A and B, then why should we think that there are relations in the world at all.

In summary, the ontological existence of relations in the world is unnecessary, as Indirect realism, a valid theory of perception, does not require them. In addition, if relations did ontologically exist in the world, further problems would arise, including mereological overpopulation, the arbitrariness of determining the existence of objects, the question of whether a relation can exist independently of what it is relating and any scientific explanation of their nature alongside fundamental particles and forces.

Therefore your proposed analogy is false. — Metaphysician Undercover

Probably. My basic idea is sound, but I am making a hash of explaining it. I will take a break and have a re-think. :smile:

I don't think so. "2+3" has its meaning, and "5" has its meaning. The two are distinct. The left side of an equation always means something different from the right side, or else the equation would be totally useless. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly, fulfils the definition of a metaphor.

A metaphor is a figure of speech that describes one thing as if it were another.

For example, saying "time is a thief" or "2+3=5".

Berkeley's Absolute Idealism
"Esse est percipi" may be translated as "to be is to be perceived". Abstract perceptions in our minds, such as "I have an indescribable inchoate feeling", may be made concrete by perceptions through our senses, such as "I feel I am aimlessly drifting". Making the abstract concrete is a function of the metaphor.

The metaphor
We understand abstract ideas by making them concrete, as described by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their book Metaphors We Live By 1980. For example, we understand the abstract concept of argument by making it concrete, as in "argument is war". We understand an abstract feeling by making it concrete, as in "I am feeling low".

We understand the abstract concept of 2+3=5 by the concrete picture of 2 pebbles next to 3 pebbles and seeing a total of 5 pebbles. We can formalise the addition of pebbles on the ground using set theory, such that {2} + {3} = {2 + 3} = {5}.

Set theory
Frege and Russell proposed defining a natural number n as the collection of all sets with n elements. Set theory is foundational to mathematics. Set theory provides a framework whereby operations such as addition can be built from first principles (Wikipedia - set theory)

The abstract addition of the natural numbers 2 and 3 can be achieved within the framework of a set theory that is built on concrete first principles, similar to the function of the metaphor.

Huh? I only see one thing, "the combining of sets". And that is how you defined "+". Where is the other thing, which makes it metaphorical? — Metaphysician Undercover

The most basic interpretation of addition is in the combining of sets.

When two or more sets are combined into a single set, the number of objects in the single set is the sum of the number of objects in the original sets (Wikipedia - addition).

Addition is a metaphorical concept, because one thing, namely 2 + 3, refers to a different thing, namely 5.

do the fundamental particles and forces contribute to the higher order of a 'table'? If no, then the forces and particles aren't really doing anything... — Barkon

If fundamental particles and forces did not exist in the world, there would be no concept of "table" in our mind.

Our mind projects our concept of "table" onto the material of the world, as you project the concept of the letter "E" onto a set of points.

The letter "E" does not exist in these points, though you would not see the letter "E" if it were not for these points.

Similarly, the table does not exist in the fundamental particles and forces, but you would not see the table if it were not for these fundamental particles and forces.

right, so you saying table is concrete and photon is not is... not quite it then is it? — flannel jesus

I'm trying to distinguish between the word "table" which exists in language and a table which I don't believe exists in the world.

I believe that what does exist in the world are fundamental particles and forces, such as electrons and photons.

Similarly, I believe that the word "photon" exists in language and photons exist in the world.

It takes the word out of the context of mathematics, it doesn't bring metaphor into mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover

As with Berkeley's Absolute Idealism, ideas exist in the mind and the material world only exists as ideas in the mind.

You mentioned multiplication. Addition is also a fundamental concept in mathematics, and as a concept only exists in the mind.

What does "+" mean?

It doesn't literally mean +, as this would be a tautology. It must mean something other than it is. The most basic interpretation of addition is in the combining of sets.

When two or more sets are combined into a single set, the number of objects in the single set is the sum of the number of objects in the original sets (Wikipedia - addition).

A metaphor is a figure of speech that in mentioning one thing actually refers to another thing. For example, the symbol "+" in mathematics refers to the combining of sets.

Even the word "set" in set theory is a metaphor. In set theory a set is a collection of distinct objects considered as a whole.

As a metaphor is a figure of speech that in mentioning one thing actually refers to another thing, a collection of distinct objects refers to these distinct objects being considered as a whole.

The concept of addition can be used outside mathematics, as in "it doesn't add up" but can also be used within mathematics, as in addition is the combining of sets.

The only way a set of distinct objects can be thought of as a whole is metaphorically.

I actually think a table is MORE abstract than a photon. — flannel jesus

My belief is in Nominalism, in that "table" only exists as the name of a concept.

My belief is also in Realism, in that there is something in the world that caused us to see a "table", and this something is real, and is made up of elementary particles, such as electrons.

sorry buddy, "table" is a concept in the English language, and concepts are something abstract. — flannel jesus

But then again, the concept of a table may be an abstract thing, but the content of the concept is a concrete thing, a table.

So give me an example of something material. — flannel jesus

If the meaning of the concept "table" is about something material, then the meaning of the concept "thought" is about something immaterial.

This fits in with the Merriam Webster definition of material as "relating to, derived from, or consisting of matter" and immaterial as "not consisting of matter".

Surely mathematical concepts cannot be classified as metaphorical. — Metaphysician Undercover

Taking one example, that of the mathematical concept of zero.

A metaphor is a figure of speech that in mentioning one thing actually refers to another thing, such as "all the world's a stage".

As with Derrida's concept of différance, absence is as important as presence. It is the absence of meaning that allows the presence of interpretation to emerge (Wikipedia - Jacques Derrida).

Zero is metaphorical in that it turns absence into presence. Zero refers to nothing, but it has the sense of something.

Words need boundaries. Words without boundaries are usually words without meaning. If everything is immaterial, the designation "immaterial" has no weight. — flannel jesus

In a language of abstract concepts, there are still boundaries, Such as between chair and non-chair, material and immaterial.

As with Derrida's "différance", the meaning of "material" arises from its relationship with "immaterial".

Sure, BUT if you're calling photons "immaterial" as if to compare them to something abstract, I think that's a mistake. Matter or not, mass or not, they're a part of physics. — flannel jesus

But "photon" is a concept in the English language, and concepts are something abstract.

The sense of a concept is abstract. Its reference may be concrete, even if we never know the concrete reality.

From SEP - Concepts

An alternative conception of concepts takes concepts to be abstract objects of one type or another.

I think "photon" is a concept created in an attempt to explain the photoelectric effect. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is the nature of language, where concepts are about the sense of things in the world rather than refer to things in the world (Frege).

Scientific language is full of figures of speech. Andrew May in Metaphors in Science 2000 makes the point that even Newton's second law is probably a metaphor.

"In his article on the use of metaphors in physics (November issue, page 17), Robert P Crease describes several interesting trees but fails to notice the wood all around him. What is a scientific theory if not a grand metaphor for the real world it aims to describe? Theories are generally formulated in mathematical terms, and it is difficult to see how it could be argued that, for example, F = ma "is" the motion of an object in any literal sense. Scientific metaphors possess uniquely powerful descriptive and predictive potential, but they are metaphors nonetheless. If scientific theories were as real as the world they describe, they would not change with time (which they do, occasionally). I would even go so far as to suggest that an equation like F = ma is a culturally specific metaphor, in that it can only have meaning in a society that practices mathematical quantification in the way that ours does. Before I'm dismissed as a loopy radical, I should point out that I'm a professional physicist who has been using mathematical metaphors to describe the real world for the last twenty years!"

In other words, "force" is purely conceptual. It is only one of a number of conceptions which can be applied toward representing the effects of gravity, but not the only one. "Force" doesn't represent gravity, it is a method of categorizing the effects of gravity. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are two ways of looking at it.

One way is that "gravity is a force". "Gravity" and "the force of gravity" are synonyms, as the hotness of a body is the motion of its constituent parts.

The other way is that "gravity has a force". Gravity can be quantified by a force, as the hotness of a body can be quantified by temperature.
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I made no conclusion about God. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think that the following is still relevant to Berkeley's Idealism and ‘esse est percipi’.

A photon is an example of a massless particle.

A massless particle may be defined as immaterial.

I agree when you say "and suggested that if a person believes in the real existence of massless particles, then they believe in the real existence of the immaterial"

I believe in the real existence of the immaterial.

But you also said "In the first example there is thoughts, conception etc., and in the second there is God. Each case uses "Immaterial" in the same way, by the same definition."

So, both photons and God are immaterial, where immaterial means the same thing.

But if a person believes in the real existence of photons then they believe in the real existence of the immaterial.

But if a person believes in the real existence of the immaterial, and God is immaterial, then should not a person believe in the real existence of God?

That article also says unambiguously that photons are STUFF, like matter. So if we're going by that article, photons are material, as are electrons and protons and neutrons — flannel jesus

Yes, Strassler's article says that photons are material (stuff).

But energy is not itself stuff; it is something that all stuff has.
Photons are stuff; energy is not.

But, today, matter is commonly defined as something that has mass, meaning that a photon must be immaterial.

In classical physics and general chemistry, matter is any substance that has mass and takes up space by having volume (Wikipedia - Matter)

Whether a photon is material or immaterial depends on one's particular viewpoint.

If matter just is energy then, then photons are material. Are electrons, protons and neutrons material in your opinion? — Janus

I don't know.

Some physicists say that matter is just stable energy. For example, Wilhelm Ostwald regards energy as a form of substance.
https://readfeynman.blogspot.com/2017/04/section-41-what-is-energy.html

Other physicists say that matter is categorically distinct from energy. For example, Matt Strassler.
https://profmattstrassler.com/articles-and-posts/particle-physics-basics/mass-energy-matter-etc/matter-and-energy-a-false-dichotomy/
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That would be an invalid inference. — Janus

This is my point.

So we have two very different ways to conceive what you call "gravitational force". One is as a force, the other as a property of spacetime. The latter is distinctly not "a force" — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, there are at least two ways to think of gravity. One is as a force and one is as the curvature of space-time caused by the presence of mass energy.

The NASA article refers to the first way

Gravity is the force by which a planet or other body draws objects toward its center. The force of gravity keeps all of the planets in orbit around the sun.

The article on General Relativity refers to the second way

Gravity isn't a force, it's the curvature of space-time caused by the presence of mass-energy.

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Can you agree that a person can know one's past and cannot know one's future, and because of this we ought to conclude that there is a real difference between past and future? — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree, there is a real difference between past and future.
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I don't think those two examples constitute two different meanings. They are applying the same definition of "immaterial" to refer to different things......................................And if such things are believed to be real, independent and not merely conceptual, then we'd have a belief in the real existence of the immaterial. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think you are are making a logical leap too far.

The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines "immaterial" as "not consisting of matter".

As photons don't consist of matter, they can be considered immaterial.

The article Immateriality of God writes

The immateriality of God simply means that God is not composed of material.

Premise 1 - God is immaterial
Premise 2 - Photons are immaterial
Premise 3 - Photons have a real existence

Conclusion - as some immaterial things have a real existence and as God is immaterial then God has a real existence.

If a human observer cannot know the future, but can know the past, this implies a real difference between future and past. How can a determinist adequately account for this difference? — Metaphysician Undercover

Even someone who believes in Determinism may know their past but cannot know their future.
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If the determinist laws (the laws of physics which support one's belief in determinism), are not believed to extend to all parts of the universe, then how is the belief in determinism supported — Metaphysician Undercover

In the same way that mathematicians have a belief in the axioms they use, statements assumed to be true as a starting point for further reasoning.
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Wouldn't it be possible that nondeterministic activity reigned in some part of the universe, and there could be some interaction between the various parts? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, it is possible, but so far science does not seem to have found such nondeterministic activity.
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The question is, what supports the belief that the supposed hidden variables are deterministic. — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not a physicist, but I do know that there are some physicists that I trust, such as Sabine Hossenfelder, who do believe in Superdeterminism.
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A person who believes in free will, and the reality of the immaterial in general, does not allow that Newton's first law extends to a living body moved by final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

On the one hand, some believe in Physicalism, that everything is physical, and there is nothing beyond the physical realm.

On the other hand, some believe in the immaterial.

It depends what is meant by the word "immaterial".

The article What Sorts of Things Exist, & How? writes

But the immaterial things are the philosophically more interesting. These include consciousness, thoughts, words, meanings, concepts, numbers, emotions, intentions, volitions, moral principles, aesthetic experiences, and more. What would philosophy be without them?

However, the article Immateriality of God writes

The immateriality of God simply means that God is not composed of material. In other words, God is not made of any kind of matter, material, or substance which entails that he cannot be seen.

There are different meanings to "immaterial".