What causes the stone to fall is gravity. "Force" is not an independent thing in the world which causes anything. "Force" is a mathematical concept, how we quantify the effects of things like gravity. — Metaphysician Undercover

The equation ${s = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ describes the position of a stone above the ground dropped from rest with time under gravity.

We could say "gravity causes the stone to fall".

We can quantify the force of gravity. On Earth, the average gravitational force is about 9.81 m/s². On the Moon, it is about 1.63 m/s².

However, if gravity had zero force, 0.00 m/s², the stone would not fall.

So we cannot say that it is gravity per se that causes the stone to fall, but rather it is the force of gravity that causes the stone to fall.

So really, "it is the force of gravity that causes the stone to fall".

Actually that's untrue, because without ontological commitment to universal quantification over absolute infinity, one cannot distinguish the hypothesis of determinism from its anti-thesis. — sime

I have the belief that ontological Determinism is true, in that all events in the Universe can occur in only one possible way.

But I am not committed to my belief and have not suspended any scepticism towards my belief, because I accept that tomorrow someone using a persuasive argument may change my mind. I doubt it, but who knows.

However, for the moment, for me, ontological Determinism is a good working hypothesis.

Yes, that is perfectly reasonable as an informal description of gravity when describing a particular case of motion in the concrete rather than in the abstract — sime

In language, one can justly say that "the force of gravity causes a stone to move towards the ground". Some of these words are figures of speech, some are concrete and some are abstract.
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as Russell observed, in such cases the concept of causality can be eliminated from the description. — sime

In physics, one can justly write that ${s = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$. This equation predicts the position of the stone with time under a gravitational force. The concept of cause within the equation is redundant.

But a sentence and an equation are very different things. The sentence is about why something happens, "why did the stone fall towards the ground, because of the force of gravity". The equation is about how the stone falls towards the ground, ${s = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$.

It is true that the concept of causality may be removed from an equation, but not true that the concept of causality can be removed from language.
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But determinism takes the causal "determination" of movement by gravity literally, universally and outside of the context of humans determining outcomes — sime

From Britannica - Determinism

The thesis that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable.

There is a difference between what happens and why it happens. Equations are about what happens not why it happens. Equations are about predictions not causes. It is true that Determinism, as Britannica notes, is the thesis that all events are casually inevitable, universally and outside any human observation.

The equation ${s = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ is about what happens, not why ${s = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$.

Why ${s = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ is, according to Determinism, causally inevitable.
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and in a way that requires suspension of Humean skepticism due to the determinist's apparent ontological commitment to universal quantification over generally infinite domains. — sime

That all events in the universe are causally inevitable is the thesis of Determinism. A thesis is an hypothesis, not an ontological commitment. As a thesis, it accepts that it may be proved wrong, in the same way that the equation ${s = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ may be proved wrong. A thesis does not require a suspension of scepticism, which is why it is a thesis.

Both Determinism and the equation ${s = 0.5 * g * t^{2}}$ may be thought of as axioms, statements taken to be true or self-evident, and serve as a premise for further reasoning.

The distance (amount of space) between any two things at some "point in time" is not dependent on perception, even though the measurement of that distance can be said to be so. — Janus

As regards the second point, yes, the actual measurement of distance between two points in space is dependent on human observation.

But as regards the first point, what is the true reality of the space between two points?

What is empty space?

Even if there is no empty space and every part of the universe contains fluctuating energy fields, what is the nature of the space that contains these fluctuating energy fields?

Was Newton right, that space is an absolute existing independently of any objects within it, or was Leibniz right that space is only defined by the relation of objects within it?

How is "several possible futures" consistent with determinism? — Metaphysician Undercover

My intention was that from the viewpoint of a human observer, even in a deterministic world, they cannot know the future.
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Meanwhile, "God's Will" is a sound theory, supported by the experience of every human being who makes choices. And "superdeterminism" is just the pie-in -the-sky clutching at straws of deluded determinists. — Metaphysician Undercover

It depends on whether one believes that there is a divine entity or there is nothing over and above the physical.
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On the other hand, we can say that Newton's first law applies only to the aspects of the universe which our sense capacities allow us to observe................................we have no reason to believe that it behaves in the same way as the part which we can observe. — Metaphysician Undercover

We don't need to know whether Newton's Laws apply to those parts of the Universe that we don't observe, we only need to know that they apply to the parts of the Universe that we do observe.
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That sounds just like "God's Will". However, there is one big difference. "God's Will" is consistent with human experience of choice, free will, the known difference between past and future, and our knowledge of final cause, while "superdeterminism" is not. — Metaphysician Undercover

In Determinism, the changes a human makes to their present are determined by the past.

It seems that in In God's Will, the changes a human makes to their present are determined by the final cause, the unmoved mover. A human's will is free providing they use their will to move towards this final cause, this unmoved mover.

a commitment to determinism looks like a metaphysical commitment to the objective existence of intentional forces of agency (i.e. spirits) that exist above and beyond the physically describable aspects of substances. — sime

A stone falls to the ground under gravity.

Materialism was the old term that just referred to matter, the stone and the Earth. Physicalism is the new term that refers to both matter and force, gravity. Though sometimes Materialism and Physicalism are still used interchangeably (Wikipedia - Physcialism)

The movement of the stone is determined by the force of gravity.

It is part of the nature of language that many words are being used as figures of speech rather than literally, such as "determined". Also included are metaphor, simile, metonymy, synecdoche, hyperbole, irony and idiom.

What is a table to you, is a meal to a termite, and a landing place to a bird. — Wayfarer

True. As an Indirect Realist, I don't believe that tables exist in a mind-independent world, but only exist in the mind as a human concept.

However, some do believe that tables exist in a mind-independent world, and as such are objects rather than relations.

Without wanting to wade into the endless quantum quandries...................................But it seems irrefutable nowadays, that at a fundamental level, physical reality is not fully determined. — Wayfarer

Neither do I. I am sure that science in the future will look back at current knowledge on quantum mechanics as we look back to alchemy.

But today not everyone agrees. Some believe in Superdeterminism, in that there are hidden variables that we do not yet know about.

Superdeterminism - Why Are Physicists Scared of It? - Sabine Hossenfelder

Newton's laws cannot account for the reality of free will, where the cause of motion is internal to the body which accelerates. — Metaphysician Undercover

True. When thinking about the equation f=ma, in determinism force is a physical thing whereas in free will force is a mental thing.

In determinism there is no place for Aristotle's final cause, whereas in free will there is.

In determinism, an object moves because of a prior physical cause whereas in free will an object moves because of a future mental goal.

There is only one past, one present and several possible futures.

In determinism, the one past determines the one present.

In free will, as there is only one present, one of the several possible futures must have been chosen, and it is this choice that determines the one present.

Even in fee will, the present has been determined.

The mind does make mistakes, but it is a lot cleverer than that. It judges the size of distant objects by comparing their height with other objects in the field of vision. It knows the actual height of the other objects, so it can work out the height of the unknown object.
So, yes, it creates a perception, but not necessarily a false one. — Ludwig V

If object A is 1.8 metre in size and object B is 1.7m in size, then there is a relation between their sizes. Does this relation exist in the mind, the world or both?

Every object in the Universe has a size, from a quark to a galaxy, so there is a relation between every possible pair of objects in the Universe.

If there were only 2 objects in the universe there is one relation. If there were only 3 objects in the universe there are 3 relations. If there were only 4 objects in the universe there are 6 relations. IE, in the Universe, there are more relations than objects.

If relations do exist in an ontological sense in the world, then there are more relations than actual objects.

Where did these extra relations come from?

The relation just is the amount of actual space between them. That is, if you allow that space exists mind-independently, which I find it most plausible to think. — Janus

Suppose a table exists mind-independently. A table is an object, not a relation.

Suppose space exists mind-independently. As with the table, then isn't space an object rather than a relation?

And did it occur to you that your understanding that she is bored might be erroneous? — L'éléphant

Exactly.

"Esse est percipi" is translated as "to be is to be perceived".

But does this mean perceived through the sense, I perceive a loud noise, or perceived in the understanding, I perceive Mary is bored.

In my mind I perceive Mary to be bored. Therefore, from "esse est percipi", if I understand Mary to be bored, then in the world Mary's state of being is that of being bored.

But my understanding may be erroneous, as you say, and in the world Mary's state of being may not be that of being bored.

So I cannot depend on my understanding to know the true state of being in the world.

Therefore, "perceive" in "to be is to be perceived" cannot refer to the understanding but only to the sensibilities.

The point is that universals are not “in the mind” — not mere thoughts or conventions. — Wayfarer

As a Nominalist I disagree. But I don't think we will be able to resolve the debate between Universals and Nominalism in this thread.

There is a spatial relation between a particular atom in the JADES-GS-z14-0 galaxy and a particular atom in our sun.

The relation cannot be in the particular atom in the JADES-GS-z14-0 galaxy.

The relation cannot be in a particular atom in our sun.

The relation cannot be in the space between the JADES-GS-z14-0 galaxy and our Sun.

Then where is this relation?

Very good. What's your criterion for something to exist in the world? Colours, for example, occupy space - admittedly in two dimensions - and have definite locations. — Ludwig V

When someone says that they perceive the colour red, science may discover that they are looking at an electromagnetic wavelength of 700nm.

Where in an electromagnetic wavelength of 700nm can the colour red be discovered?

Your mind is not a spatial object - it occupies no space whatever. The physical substrate of your mind is in your brain (though I prefer to say that it is your entire body). — Ludwig V

The mind is a mysterious expression of the brain, but we know the brain has spatial extension. We know of no example of a brain that has no size.

If the physical brain was removed, we know of no example where a mind would remain.

This suggests that the mind, which depends on a brain, which has a physical size, should be able to cognise spatial relations.
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But then, how can the relationship "next to" be between between the ship and the quay? It is true that we can see that the ship is next to the quay, and you might choose to describe that as having the ship and the quay and the relationship between them in your mind in some sense. But that doesn't mean that your mind has created any of them. — Ludwig V

In the world are two people of the same height, one standing 10 metres away from an observer and the other standing 100 metres away.

The observer perceives that one person appears taller than the other.

The mind has created the perception of a height difference, even though a height difference does not exist in the world.

Where does the relation between their heights exist in the world?

If the relation between their heights existed in the world, then it wouldn't change dependent on how far the observer was standing away form them.

The fact that the relation between their heights is relative to the observer suggests that the relation between their height exists in the observer not the world.

I see that you have decided that the relationship is between the ship and the bollard. — Ludwig V

The fact that I perceive the colour red does not mean the colour red exists in the world.

The fact I perceive a spatial relation between Glasgow and Edinburgh does not mean the spatial relationship exists in the world.

But for me Bradley's mistake is thinking of the relation as if it were an entity in its own right - an object corresponding to R. — Ludwig V

Perhaps that is what I am trying to say. A relation is a concept in the mind rather than an object in the world. Relations exist in the mind, not the world.

So you can be reassured that the ship is securely next to the quay and physics will prevent it from moving. You can decide where the relationship is — Ludwig V

The ship is secured because of physics, the force in the rope between the ship and the bollard.

The ship is not secured because of the relationship between the ship and the bollard, otherwise no rope would be needed.

The actual distinction Kant makes is between empirical realism and transcendental idealism..............................................For Kant, empirical realism means that objects of experience - the phenomena we encounter in space and time - are real within the empirical domain. When we perceive a tree or a rock, these objects have objective reality as appearances. — Wayfarer

Kant's distinction is slightly more than between transcendental idealism and empirical realism, if empirical realism means that the objects we encounter are real within the empirical domain of appearances.

Kant also wanted to make the distinction between transcendental idealism and realism, where realism means that objects exist independently of any perception of them.

In B276 of his Critique of Pure Reason, in his Refutation of Idealism, he attempts the proof of his theorem "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me."

This is more than empirical realism.

Bertrand Russell has a chapter called World of Universals in his early Problems of Philosophy, which I often refer to. — Wayfarer

Bertrand Russell: Consider such a proposition as 'Edinburgh is north of London'. Here we have a relation between two places, and it seems plain that the relation subsists independently of our knowledge of it.

I agree that it it seems plain that Edinburgh and London exist in different places independently of our knowledge of them.

The concept "relation" certainly exists in our mind, in that I know that Edinburgh is to the north of London.

But is it the case that relations exist independently of the mind?

I see this as a similar problem Bertrand Russell approached in his article On Denoting, where he wanted to show that the puzzles of identity, Law of Excluded Middle and non-existence were problems of language.

For example, "Socrates is a philosopher" logically means that "there is something that is a person, seeks wisdom, tries to understand fundamental questions regarding existence, knowledge, and values and is named philosopher"

Relations is also a problem of language, in that we could remove the word from our language and still be able to communicate.

Rather than say "Edinburgh is north of London" we could say "Edinburgh is at 55.9533 deg N, -3.1883 deg W and London is at 51.509865 deg N, -0.118092 deg W".

In language we could remove relational words such as north of, to the left of, above and replace them by existent spatial locations.

I agree that this may make language cumbersome, but this shows that relations is a problem of language rather than a problem of any mind-independent world.

That's why I say that all forms of realism are grounded in idealism. — Metaphysician Undercover

Kant in Critique of Pure Reason would agree that realism is grounded in idealism, in that the pure intuitions of space and time and pure concepts of understanding are the a priori conditions of experience.

But Kant would also agree that idealism is grounded in realism, in that there have to be experiences before they can be categorized by the pure intuitions and pure concepts.

Idealism and realism are two sides of the same coin.
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When a body is caused to accelerate, it may continue to accelerate long after that cause has ceased acting. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think that this is the case. From Newton's Second Law, F = ma. If there is no force, then there can be no acceleration.

So everything in our world except for rock, water and gas, was created by our cousins and ancestors. Their minds literally created/caused these things. — Punshhh

The first living organisms on Earth were bacteria, which had no minds, so It cannot be that life was created by the mind.

The first living organisms on Earth were one-celled organisms known as prokaryotes, which emerged between 3.5 and 4.1 billion years ago.
https://www.naturalhistory.si.edu/education/teaching-resources/life-science/early-life-earth-animal-origins

The issue isn’t whether the dinosaur existed before humans. It’s that the meaning of ‘T. rex’, it’s place in our world, is a product of our engagement now. That’s the intertwining I’m pointing to. Empirical knowledge is not a passive representing of what’s out there. — Joshs

Introduction
As a supporter of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, I agree that "Empirical knowledge is not a passive representing of what’s out there."

I also agree with Enactivism, the idea that the human brain has evolved in synergy with its environment (Wikipedia - Enactivism)

I am also an Indirect Realist, in that I don't believe that I experience the external world as it really is, but only through representations of how the external world really is.

It follows that I believe in Realism, in that there is a realty that exists independently of the mind.

It also follows that I believe in Anti-Realism, the idea that what we perceive as the world is dependent upon and has been constructed by our minds, whether in language or concept.

Therefore, believing in both Realism and Anti-Realism, my approach is similar to the pragmatism as described by Evan Thompson, who wrote that "the world is both found and made: it is made in the finding and found in the making". In the terms of Kant's Transcendental Idealism, the world is found in Realism, in his belief that a world exists independently of the mind, and the world is made in Idealism, through a priori pure intuitions of space and time and a priori pure concepts of understanding.

Heidegger's "Being-in-the-World"
The story goes back to Heidegger's "Being-in-the-World", a statement that I have no trouble with. My question is, where does this world exist, something Wittgenstein avoided engaging with.

There are two worlds, the world as we perceive it and the world that has caused the world we perceive.

The world we perceive is a representation of the world that has caused the world we perceive, not a mirror image.

We perceive the colour red even though the colour red does not exist in a mind-independent world. However, there must be something in a mind-independent world that has caused us to perceive the colour red. This something in a mind-independent world may be different to what we perceive, but it would be invalid to argue that because it is different it cannot exist.

Heidegger's "Being-in-the-World" agrees with our everyday experiences, but ignores the obvious question. Does "world" refer to the world as we perceive it to be or does "world" refer to a world that has caused the world we perceive.

Something has caused the world we perceive, and even though it may be very different to the world we actually perceive, whatever it is, it is still a world.

To ignore this fundamental question, what caused the world we perceive, as Wittgenstein did, may be pragmatic, but not very philosophical.

Well of course, a belief is not evidence of the thing believed..........................However, beliefs do influence the way that we behave. And, I argue that this is in a non-deterministic way. — Metaphysician Undercover

You believe you argue in a non-deterministic way, but as you say yourself "a belief is not evidence of the thing believed."
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I will argue that all forms of realism are reducible to, or dependent on Platonic realism, for ontological support. So, if you are a realist, you are a Platonist. — Metaphysician Undercover

Philosophical Realism is the view that some things have a mind-independent existence (Wikipedia - Philosophical Realism)

It is possible to be a Philosophical Realist and a Nominalist, which is the view that universals and abstract objects do not exist in a mind-independent world (Wikipedia - Nominalism)

Platonism is the opposite of Nominalism, as it affirms the existence of abstract objects (Wikipedia - Platonism)
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It's very evident here, that you have no idea what "force" actually means...Very clearly it is a human creation. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does anyone really know what a force is?

"Force" is a word and clearly a human creation. However, a body would not accelerate if there were no external force acting on it, and this force is clearly not a human creation.

From the Britannica article on Force:

(Newton's) second law says that when an external force acts on a body, it produces an acceleration (change in velocity) of the body in the direction of the force. The magnitude of the acceleration is directly proportional to the magnitude of the external force and inversely proportional to the quantity of matter in the body.

That's a silly question. It is presumably an attempt to explain what Bradley meant, but it is very unhelpful, amounting to mystification. It can't be what Bradley was saying. — Ludwig V

As regards the existence of ontological relations in the world, a human may know that Glasgow is west of Edinburgh.

But where in Glasgow is the information that it is to the west of Edinburgh?

Where in Edinburgh is the information that it is to the east of Glasgow?

Where in the space between Glasgow and Edinburgh is the information that Glasgow is at the west end of this space and Edinburgh is at the east end of this space?

As the SEP article on Relations writes:

Some philosophers are wary of admitting relations because they are difficult to locate. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh. This tells us something about the locations of these two cities. But where is the relation that holds between them in virtue of which Glasgow is west of Edinburgh? The relation can’t be in one city at the expense of the other, nor in each of them taken separately, since then we lose sight of the fact that the relation holds between them (McTaggart 1920: §80). Rather the relation must somehow share the divided locations of Glasgow and Edinburgh without itself being divided.

Is it that he never gave his opinion, or that his answer is implicit in his later work, but has been missed by many because they are still looking for answers within the old binary: either mind or world, either inside or outside? — Joshs

I cannot accept that there are no binaries, and everything is a formless soup of amorphousness.

I cannot accept that Tyrannosaurus rex did not have an existence outside the human mind, a real, living and breathing existence outside of our concept of it.

I cannot accept that there is no binary between the mind and a mind-independent world, even if I accept that discovering it is philosophically difficult.

Like I explained, there is a big difference between fundamental particles, and fundamental forces. One is matter, the other is concepts...So, are you saying that "forces" only exist in the mind, since forces are relations expressed mathematically?....................................But "forces" are relations between particles, and as such they only exist in the mind, by your principles......................................"Forces" refers to conceptualized relations between material objects. Consider the traditional formula, f=ma. — Metaphysician Undercover

Physicalism vs Materialism
Historically, Materialists thought that everything was matter, but today, physics has shown that forces such as gravity are physical but not material in the traditional sense.

From SEP - Physicalism

Physicalism is sometimes known as ‘materialism’. Indeed, on one strand to contemporary usage, the terms ‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’ are interchangeable. But the two terms have very different histories.
As the name suggests, materialists historically held that everything was matter — where matter was conceived as “an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist”
But physics itself has shown that not everything is matter in this sense; for example, forces such as gravity are physical but it is not clear that they are material in the traditional sense

Fundamental particles and fundamental forces are both physical in the world, even if we have concepts for them in the mind.

Measuring something in the world does not remove that something from the world

The fact that we can use mathematics to describe the Eiffel Tower as 330 metres tall does not mean that the Eiffel Tower has no spatial extension in the world.

The Eiffel Tower has an existence in the world regardless of any measurements we may make on it.

Force is not the same thing as relation

That there is a relation between my feeling thirsty and my thinking about getting a drink does not mean that there is a literal force between my thoughts.

The force on the Moon because of the Earth does not depend on our knowing the spatial relation between the Moon and the Earth.

The equation f = ma is a human assumption that has been found to work through numerous instances. We know the equation works, but we don't know why it works . It is an axiom. It could well be that tomorrow it stops working, unlikely but possible. The equation f = ma is a conceptualized relation that has been found to describe what we observe in the world. It doesn't describe why f = ma

Therefore, it's very reasonable not to reason through anything, but just do what you feel like doing, if you believe in a deterministic world. — Metaphysician Undercover

Suppose the world is deterministic. Then one's beliefs have been determined, whether one's belief is that the world is deterministic or one's belief is that of free will.

Suppose the world is not deterministic and one has free will. Then one's beliefs have been freely chosen, whether one's belief is that the world is deterministic or one's belief is that of free will.

Your particular beliefs is no evidence either for or against your living in a deterministic world.

It is possible to believe in free will even in a deterministic world.

Was he saying that relations don't really exist? Or just that they don't really exist in the physical world? — Ludwig V

That relations don't really exist in the physical world.

From SEP - Relations

Bradley concluded that we should eliminate external relations from our ontology.
But Bradley’s argument is intended to establish that we cannot understand how it is possible for things to be related.
Bradley’s eliminativism{/quote]

Relations certainly exist in the mind, in that I know the apple is to the left of the orange, but in what sense does the apple "know" it is to the left of the orange.

In my opinion, we have gone too far, wandering in all sorts of classifications or approaches. — Astorre

Yes, fixing one's definitions adds complexity to an already complicated topic, such as establishing the differences between being and becoming, ontology and epistemology, realism and idealism, static and dynamic, substance and process, presence and absence, mind and world.

Even if we agreed that "Dasein is more radically in the world" we may not agree as to where this world is. Does this world exist within the mind or external to the mind? Is our world the construction of our mind. As Schopenhauer wrote "The world is my representation". As Abai Qunanbaiuly wrote “A person’s mind is the mirror of the world. If the mirror is clouded, the world appears distorted.” Wittgenstein avoided such a problem by never giving his opinion where his "world" exists. A strategic decision that does not seem to have affected his reputation.

As you say "And since philosophy speaks about the world relying solely on language, this creates difficulties for both the researcher and the reader."

I will try to be more specific to your text.

And if we think of "physical matter" in this way, we get the appearance of an infinite regress, because each time we find what looks to be the fundamental elements, we then find out that they can be broken down into further spatial relations. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not an infinite regress, as we eventually arrive at the (indivisible) fundamental particles and forces.

There are four fundamental interactions known to exist: Gravitational force, Electromagnetic force, Strong nuclear force, Weak nuclear force.
https://alevelphysics.co.uk/notes/particle-interactions/
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There is a strong argument for the ideality of spatial relations......................................The developing problem, is that as described above, the "spatial relations" are ideal, conceptual mathematics and geometry — Metaphysician Undercover

There is also a strong argument that ontological relations don't exist in the world but only the mind. As numbers and mathematics only exists in the mind (are invented not discovered), these relations are expressed in the mind mathematically.

FH Bradley made a regress argument against the ontological existence of relations in the world

From SEP - Relations:

Some philosophers are wary of admitting relations because they are difficult to locate. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh. This tells us something about the locations of these two cities. But where is the relation that holds between them in virtue of which Glasgow is west of Edinburgh?

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This is why space itself needs to be understood as real active substance. — Metaphysician Undercover

Current scientific thinking seems to be that fundamental particles and forces exist in the world. Accepting that ontological relations between these fundamental particles and forces only exist in the mind, there is no necessity for space to be understood as a real active substance.
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Now we have a second possible intuition. Perhaps there is no fundamental matter at all, and the activity is simply the activity of space. What was represented as particles of matter existing in 'changing spatial relations', may actually be just 'changing spatial relations' without any real particles of matter. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I see it:

The fundamental particles and forces exist in the world as ontological Realism

The relations between these fundamental particles and forces exist in the mind as ontological idealism

In effect, you are telling me to forget about having any freedom — Metaphysician Undercover

In a deterministic world, looking forwards in time, the earthquake off the coast of Cotabato in 1976 determined a tsunami in the Moro Gulf.

In a deterministic world, looking backwards in time, the reason for the tsunami in the Moro Gulf in 1976 was an earthquake off the coast of Cotabato.

You are at lunch and wonder whether you should have a glass of Merlot.

You reason it through. If you have a large glass then you will feel tired. If you feel tired then you may miss the train. If you miss the train then you may be stuck in the city. If you get stuck in the city then you will have to pay for a hotel. But you have no money on you. You therefore conclude that you will stick to a glass of water.

As with the Philippines example, the fact that you have a reason for having a glass of water does not mean that having a glass of water was not determined at the moment you wondered what you should drink.

The direction of reason is from the future to the past, even though the future is determined by the past.

Do you see the distinction being made between reasons and causes? — Wayfarer

I put my hand between the white ball and the red ball. If I have free will, then I have a reason. In determinism, there is a cause.

From Britannica - Reason

Reason, in philosophy, the faculty or process of drawing logical inferences.

Logic in a narrow sense is equivalent to deductive logic. By definition, such reasoning cannot produce any information (in the form of a conclusion) that is not already contained in the premises.

However, sooner or later, reason breaks down, as premises are assumed to be true, not proved to be true.

When asked "why did you put your hand between the white ball and the red ball?", at the end of the day it comes down to "no reason, because I wanted to".

Right, but these are peculiar forms of Idealism. — Joshs

Yes, Idealism is an extensive topic, as the SEP article on Idealism indicates.

Heidegger has "Being-in-the-World", but this may be a similar problem with Wittgenstein and the world. Where does this world exist, within the mind (Idealism) or external to the mind (Realism). Wittgenstein never says.

As the Wikipedia article on Ontology notes:

According to philosopher Rudolf Carnap, for example, ontological statements are relative to language and depend on the ontological framework of the speaker. This means that there are no framework-independent ontological facts since different frameworks provide different views while there is no objectively right or wrong framework

Provide a link to the person who made this classification and where you can read more about it — Astorre

As a start, there is the SEP article on Idealism and the SEP article on Realism.

Of course, but the question is how. Do they consist of matter, or do they exist in some other way? — Metaphysician Undercover

Words exist in a mind-independent world in two ways, in the same way that 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 exists in two ways.

They exist as physical matter, whether as electrons or the pixels 0 and 1, and they exist as spatial and temporal relations between these electrons or pixels.

Your mind perceives not only the pixels on your screen but also the spatial relations between these pixels on your screen

Even when not looking at your screen, these pixels and spatial relations between them exist on your screen.
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If it is something which is determined, by a deterministic world, then I'll just forget about making that stressful annoying effort. — Metaphysician Undercover

To forget about making an effort assumes free will. In a deterministic world, your decision to forget about making an effort has already been determined.

But the issue is, how do these things, words in this example, exist in that medium between you and me? Is the concept of "matter" required to explain that medium? — Metaphysician Undercover

Words must physically exist in some form in the physical space between where you exist and where I exist, otherwise we would not be able to exchange ideas.
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To say "I had no choice but to put my hand between the white and red ball" is not a good answer. It denies the usefulness of deliberation, which is not a good thing to do. — Metaphysician Undercover

In a deterministic world, you had no choice but to put your hand between the white and red ball.

Deliberation is part of a process that is determined in a deterministic world.
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The law of identity denies the possibility that two distinct clocks, named as A and B, are identical. So your example, although referring to the law of identity, really violates it. — Metaphysician Undercover

My main point is that the clocks A and B will continue to show the same time, not because of any external connection between them, but because of their particular internal structures. IE, there need not be a universal time in order for these two clocks to show the same time.

The question of how to approach the ontology of being that which exists beyond language and thought—is a central one in philosophy, since language and thought inevitably shape our perception of reality. — Astorre

It depends which line of enquiry you are considering.

There are two distinct lines of enquiry, the ontology of being within a Realist framework and the ontology of being within an Idealist framework.

Ontological realism of being is the view that being exists independently of our language and thoughts. Ontological idealism of being is the view that being is fundamentally of the mind, where reality does not consist of mind-independent particles or forces, but is grounded in consciousness and reason.

Husserl's phenomenology is certainly that of ontological idealism, where any belief in the world's independent existence is put aside to focus on human experiences.

Heidegger's Dasein is also about ontological Idealism. It is about "being-in-the-world", in that we are not detached observers of the world but embedded in our experiences.

Kierkegaard's "leap of faith" is within ontological Idealism, where truth is an inward movement towards a lived experience.

Zen Buddhism has similarities to Husserl's phenomenology, and again ontological idealism.

Philip J. Bossert wrote:

I believe that a discussion of this issue of language and paradox might provide a fruitful point of comparative philosophical dialogue between Zen Buddhism and phenomenological philosophy.

For Taoism, the ontology of being is possibly a meaningless question, in that it emphasises direct experience rather than any metaphysical speculation.

Are you considering ontological being just from the viewpoint of idealism?

I had to make some simplifications to explain things to Russell. — Astorre

It really is not necessary to simplify your ideas for me to understand, I will try to keep up.

I am interested in the other question: whether there is something that is regardless of whether we speak of it, think of it, or conceptualise it. This is the difference between epistemology and ontology. — Astorre

I was just wondering how we can approach the ontology of being, something that is external to our language and thoughts, without using language or thoughts.

The claim "esse est percipi", to perceive is defined and explained clearly in many of the philosophers' passages. Berkeley's is no different -- to perceive is to use the 5 senses and of course the understanding of this perception. — L'éléphant

"Esse est percipi" may be translated as "to be is to be perceived".

We both perceive through our sense of vision that Mary is wearing a yellow jacket.

Therefore for Berkeley, in the mind of God, Mary is wearing a yellow jacket.

However, I may perceive Mary is bored because she is wearing bright clothes and you may perceive that Mary is not bored precisely because she is wearing bright clothes.

If perception refers to understanding, the situation becomes very unclear. How can anyone know what is in the mind of God if everyone's perceived understanding of the same situation is probably different. How can anyone ever know Mary's true state of being.

Mary's "to be" can never be known if "is to be perceived" means perceived in the understanding.
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I think you must be conflating physicalism with "matter" which we call substance that is independent of tangible things and perceptible qualities. — L'éléphant

Some say that "Physicalism" is interchangeable with "Materialism".

Materialists held that everything was matter, an inert, senseless substance.

But Physicalists point out that not everything is matter, in that a force such as gravity is physical but not material in the traditional sense.

Both Materialists and Physicalist believe that there are things in the world existing independently of any observation by either human or god.

From SEP - Physicalism

Physicalism is sometimes known as ‘materialism’. Indeed, on one strand to contemporary usage, the terms ‘physicalism’ and ‘materialism’ are interchangeable. But the two terms have very different histories.
As the name suggests, materialists historically held that everything was matter — where matter was conceived as “an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist”
But physics itself has shown that not everything is matter in this sense; for example, forces such as gravity are physical but it is not clear that they are material in the traditional sense
I will adopt the policy of using both terms interchangeably.