Comments

  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all.noAxioms

    The EPP
    The EPP states that existence is conceptually prior to predication.

    1) You say that this means that there must be existence before there are properties.

    2) But equally, it could be the case that there must be properties before existence.

    Why do you think 1) rather than 2)?

    Why do you think that the existence of x is separate to the properties that x has?

    Existential Quantification
    In the domain of numbers, there is something x that exists that has the properties of being an integer and of being even. This something x exists in the domain of numbers, regardless of whether numbers exist in the world or are non-existent in the world.

    In the domain of literature, there is something x that exists and has the properties of being a detective, of having Mrs Hudson as a landlady and of being a pipe-smoker. This something x exists in the domain of literature, regardless of whether literature exists in the world or is non-existent in the world.

    Something x that exists in a domain that is non-existent in the world could be called "subsisting".
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    We don't ever just perceive the color red..............Judgements involve integrating all percepts into a consistent whole experience of the world.Harry Hindu

    True, both the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist are able to successfully drive through the city centre.

    It is a philosophical question. Both the Indirect and Direct Realist may perceive the colour red at a traffic light, but what exactly is the nature of the thing-in-itself in the world that is causing them to see the colour red?

    This is not something the driver of the car needs to think about. All they need to know when they arrive at the traffic light is whether they perceive red, orange or green.

    It may well be that the thing-in-itself is in reality a yellow leprechaun, but as long as the driver consistently perceives the colour red, they will be able to successfully navigate the world.
    ===============================================================================
    What does a direct realist do when they say the chocolate ice cream is delicious but someone else says it is disgusting? Is the direct realist talking about the ice cream or their mental state when eating it?Harry Hindu

    Exactly. Another reason against Direct Realism and for Indirect Realism.
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    A raw assertion without even a definition of what sort of 'exists' is being presumed. I am looking for justified statements, not opinions.noAxioms

    True. My saying that "thoughts exist" is a raw assertion without any definition of either "thoughts" or "exist".

    But considering books have been written about the nature of thoughts and existence, I think my trying to define these terms would make my post far too long.

    I can only hope that the reader understands what I mean by saying that "thoughts exist".
    ===============================================================================
    So things that are non-mythical determines what exists?............This uses an anthropocentric definition of 'mythical'....................Being nonexistent and being currently extinct are very different things.noAxioms

    I would hope that few would argue with my saying that unicorns are mythical creatures.

    For Meinong, something being mythical makes it subsist.
    ===============================================================================
    Maybe we should let them (in their copious numbers) defend the position then.noAxioms

    Yes, Direct Realists should defend their position on the Forum.
    ===============================================================================
    Perhaps we are speaking past each other. I break my leg. That causes 1) pain, 2) doctor work 3) financial troubles 4) missed days at work 5) cancelled ski trip.noAxioms

    My assumption is that in a deterministic world one cause has one effect and one effect can have more than one possible causes.

    This is the core of my argument against Direct Realism.

    Your example is about one event having more than one effect, which I agree with, as it supports my argument against Direct Realism.

    The question is, can breaking a leg be said to cause cancelling a ski trip. After all, there is no necessary reason to cancel a ski trip just because you broke your leg. Breaking a leg may contribute to your decision to cancel your ski trip, but it would be wrong to say that breaking your leg caused you to cancel your ski trip.

    Books have been written about the meaning of "causation", including the SEP article The Metaphysics of Causation
    ===============================================================================
    You seem to be interpreting the word 'prior' to mean 'at an earlier time', which is not at all what the principle is sayingnoAxioms

    You say "There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all."

    One of the accepted meanings of "prior" is "at an earlier time".

    Do you have a source that establishes the principle that existence is conceptually prior to predication to help me understand how the terms have been defined?
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    Actually, I care little about Meinong's actual views since for one he presumes a classical 'reality'. I was just interested in the implications of the denial of EPP, and all these classification details seem irrelevant to that, a derailment.noAxioms

    EPP = existence is prioir to predication.

    It depends whether existence is referring to 1) the existence of the Universe prior to the predication of an apple, or 2) is referring to the existence of the apple prior to the predication of the apple.

    The Universe

    If 1), then the EPP is accepted, and existence is prior to the predication of an apple.

    The apple

    If 2), then something exists, and that something has the properties of being circular, being sweet and being green.

    It cannot be that case that something exists for a period of time before its properties are attached.

    It cannot be the case that there are properties not attached to something.

    It must be the case that the something that exists must be contemporaneous with its properties.

    Then the EPP is denied, and existence is contemporaneous with predication.

    Existential Quantification

    1) There is something x that exists.
    2) X has the properties of being circular, being sweet, being green.

    The set {being circular, being sweet, being green} may be named "being an apple"

    Therefore, ∃x A (x)

    There is something x that exists and x has the property A of being an apple

    The property of being an apple cannot be prior to x

    X cannot be prior to the property being an apple

    X has the property being an apple

    There is something that exists that has the property of being an apple.

    Therefore, the EPP and Existential Quantification are contradictory
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    If a rock broke the window, the effect is not only that the window is broken but also the location of the object that broke the window.Harry Hindu

    Yes I agree. Whoever sees a broken window can use all their senses, reasoning and available evidence, such as a rock lying on the floor inside the room, to make a judgement as to what actually broke the window. Their judgement might be right or wrong. This would be the same approach for both the Direct and Indirect Realist.

    You are right when you say that we do know the cause of many things

    It is not the case that the indirect realist may never know the cause because we actually do get at the cause on a great many things. If we didn't we wouldn't be able to accomplish tasks with the degree of success that we do.Harry Hindu

    But this doesn't get to the difference between Direct and Indirect Realism.

    Your statement that for the Direct Realist the red apple they perceive is the same red apple on the table gets to the difference between Direct and Indirect Realists.

    Actually, for a direct realist there is no causal process. The red apple on the table is the same red apple they perceive - the cause and effect are one and the same with no intervening process in between.Harry Hindu

    I cannot argue with your claim that God allows us to perceive the world as it really is, and if God exists then this would be a perfectly valid explanation.

    As such, I find that most direct realists seem to be religious in some way or another as their God created them in a way (with a soul) that allows them to perceive the world as it is.Harry Hindu

    However, I am looking at the problem in a secular way, and for me, it is a fact that there is a causal chain from a thing-in-itself in the world to our perception of it in the mind. It is this causal chain that makes the claims of Direct Realism invalid, that the red apple they perceive is the same red apple on the table.

    It is not the case that when perceiving a colour we use all our senses, reasoning and available evidence to make a judgement as to what colour we are seeing. We don't make the judgment that we are in fact seeing the colour red.

    When we perceive the colour red, no judgment is involved. We perceive the colour red.

    It is true that once perceiving the colour red, we can then use all our sense, reasoning and available evidence to make a judgment as to what has led up to our seeing the colour red. We can reason that there has been a flow of information from a thing-in-itself in the world to our perception of it in our mind involving a long and complex causal series of events. We can determine that there is a temporal direction to this flow of information, in that in a deterministic world one cause has one effect whilst one effect may have more than one possible causes.

    We may perceive a red apple on a table, but for whatever reason, a medical problem with our eyes, the light having passed through a stained glass window or there being a sunset, the apple on the table may in fact have been green.

    The Indirect Realist accepts that information may change along any causal series of events, and would not explicitly say that because they perceive a red apple the apple in the world was red.

    However, as you say, for the Direct Realist there is no causal intervening process, and the red apple they perceive is the same red apple on the table.

    Both the Direct and Indirect Realist are the same in using all their senses, reasoning and evidence to try to understand the original cause of their perceptions. But they differ in that for the Direct Realist there is a one to one correspondence between what they perceive and the thing-in-itself but for the Indirect Realist, what they perceive is a representation of any thing-in-itself.

    The asymmetric temporal flow along a causal series of events is an important reason why the Direct Realist's position is incorrect.
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    Direct Realism

    Quite the naive view. Does it have significant support?noAxioms

    I would guess that half of everyone on the Forum are Direct Realists.

    Some of your comments suggest that you are a Direct Realist

    page 2 - 1) a brick hits me in the head. The brick does not depend on our mental abstractions, yet I know about the brick (presuming I'm not knocked out cold).
    page 2 - The "brick" is a total mental abstraction. The brick isn't, and the abstraction lets us know something about the latter, but hardly all of it.
    page 3 - Unlike red and pain, the brick has a potential of being a thing in itself, not just an ideal.

    But other of your comments suggest that you an Indirect Realist

    page 3 - I've been saying that objecthood is no more than a mental abstraction
    ===============================================================================
    Why are not the direct realists in charge of the court system?noAxioms

    The Direct Realist knows that the thing-in-itself is red, rectangular and a brick.

    But this is only possible if there can be a direct flow of information from the present to the past. From the present experiences in the senses to the past causes of such experiences. But this is logically impossible.

    This is one reason what I am not a Direct Realist, but rather an Indirect Realist.

    One consequence of Direct Realism would be that the Detective would know who had carried out the crime, which is clearly not the case.
    ===============================================================================
    A cause typically has many effectsnoAxioms

    If a "cause" has many effects, then by definition it is not a cause. A butterfly flapping its wings in Goa is not the cause of a tornado in Florida.

    Assuming we live in a Deterministic world, then everything that happens in the world is determined completely by previously existing causes. From Wikipedia - Determinism
    Determinism is the philosophical view that all events in the universe, including human decisions and actions, are causally inevitable.

    In a Deterministic world, which I believe we live in, by defintion, one cause only has one effect.
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    Meinong

    How do we know that horses exist and not just subsist?noAxioms

    For Meinong, the unicorn, being mythical, makes it subsist, rather than the horse, which exists.

    From the Merriam Webster
    Horse = a large solid-hoofed herbivorous ungulate mammal (Equus caballus, family Equidae, the horse family) domesticated since prehistoric times and used as a beast of burden, a draft animal, or for riding
    Unicorn = a mythical, usually white animal generally depicted with the body and head of a horse with long flowing mane and tail and a single often spiralled horn in the middle of the forehead

    Both the horse and unicorn have similar properties, apart from the unicorn having the property of being mythical.

    The unicorn is mythical because no one has seen one in the world, whereas many people have seen horses in the world.

    However, the fact that no one has seen a unicorn in the world does not mean that they don't exist in the world. After all, the Coelacanth had been thought extinct for 70 million years until one was found in 1938.

    Meinong's terms exist, subsist and absist are useful guidelines, though particular examples can be argued over.
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    What objects belong to the EPP?Corvus

    The EPP (existence is prior to predication) may refer to things other than objects.

    Thoughts exist in the mind. Are thoughts objects?

    Rain exists in the world. Is rain an object?
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    I was just interested in the implications of the denial of EPPnoAxioms

    Properties are predicated of something. From SEP - Properties
    For example, if we say that this is a leaf and is green, we are attributing the properties leaf and green to it, and, if the predication is veridical, the thing in question exemplifies these properties.

    Our only belief about things-in-themselves comes from experiences in our five senses. For example, the colour red in our vision, a silky feel to the touch, an acrid smell, a sweet taste or a grating noise. All these are properties. We can never know about the thing-in-itself that we believe has caused such experiences.

    The EPP states that existence is prior to predication. However, all we can ever know are predications of the supposed thing-in-itself. We can never know about the the existence of any thing-in-itself. Therefore, it is a logical impossibility to say whether existence is prior to predication or not.

    As David Hume argued, existence means no more than the bundle of properties an object has. From Wikipedia - Bundle theory
    Bundle theory, originated by the 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume, is the ontological theory about objecthood in which an object consists only of a collection (bundle) of properties, relations or tropes.

    We experience properties in our mind, such as the colour red, but we can never know about the existence of the supposed thing-in-itself that may have caused these experiences. Therefore, the EPP is unknowable.
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    Oh, I thought it was one of the three things, and not a heirarchy where 'exist' is just a special case of the other two. This contradicts your statement just below.................. For Meinong, as I understand it, numbers are objects that subsist, rather than exist or absist.noAxioms

    For Meinong, exist, subsist and absist are part of a hierarchy. Round squares absist but cannot subsist or exist. Sherlock Holmes can absist but not exist. Horses can exist, subsist and absist.

    In Meinong's domain of understanding, Sherlock Holmes doesn't exist. In my domain of understanding, Sherlock Holmes exists. The question is then raised, how can something that doesn't exist exist. But this question is conflating two different domains, understandably leading to contradiction

    For Meinong to separate thoughts into exist, such as horse, subsist, such as Sherlock Holmes, and absist, such as a round square, seems quite sensible. But the fact that many attack his views makes me believe that I may not really understand what he is saying.
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    We directly experience some things but not others seems to show that the distinction between direct and indirect is simply one of causal complexity - how far removed the effect is from its causes, not a difference in the ontology of perception as we can experience things directly and indirectly.Harry Hindu

    There is another aspect that is critical to the difference between Indirect and Direct Realism, and that is the direction of flow of information in a causal chain.

    One cause can only have one effect, in that if one knows the cause then the effect has been determined by the cause. For example, if a stone hitting a glass window causes the glass to shatter, the same stone under he same conditions hitting the same glass window will always cause the glass to shatter.

    However one effect can have more than one cause, in that even if one knew the effect, it doesn't follow that that one will necessarily know the cause. For example, knowing that has a glass window has shattered is no reason why one will know what caused the glass to shatter. It could have been a bird, a stone, a window cleaner etc.

    There is a temporal direction of information flow in a causal chain. The Indirect Realist accepts this fact, and accepts the fact that one effect may have several different causes. This makes it impossible to follow a causal chain backwards in time. The Direct Realist doesn't accept this fact, and believes that even though one effect may have several causes, it is possible to follow a causal chain backwards in time.

    The Indirect Realist accepts that they may never know what broke the window. The Direct Realist has the position that they will always know what broke the window.
    ===============================================================================
    Red is a property of minds. Ripeness is a property of applesHarry Hindu

    You can only know whether an apple is ripe from experiences through your senses. It may be soft to the touch, it may have a sweet smell, it may have a speckled colour, it may taste bitter and there may be a dull sound when you hit it.

    There is no escaping the fact that you can only know the ripeness of an apple through your senses.

    Take one of these as an example. You experience a sweet smell through your sense of smell. This is no different in kind to experiencing the colour red through your sense of vision. As red is a property of the mind and not the thing-in-itself, a sweet smell is a property of the mind and not the thing-in-itself.

    Ripeness is a set of properties in the mind, not a set of properties of a thing-in-itself.
    ===============================================================================
    What does it even mean to say something is prior to properties?Harry Hindu

    These are the questions @noAxiom wants answering.
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    None of it explains the difference between direct and indirect, which is what I expressed confusion about..On the surface, it seems to ask if I am a realist about mind dependent experiences..................Unlike red and pain, the brick has a potential of being a thing in itself, not just an ideal. So not so similarly.................... whether the pain of another is in the same world as you...........................To say something (apple) is red is seemingly to say that the apple (ding an sich) is experience, quite the idealistic assertion, and realism only of experience, not of actual apples.noAxioms

    From Wikipedia - Direct and indirect realism
    Indirect realism is broadly equivalent to the scientific view of perception that subjects do not experience the external world as it really is, but perceive it through the lens of a conceptual framework. Conversely, direct realism postulates that conscious subjects view the world directly, treating concepts as a 1:1 correspondence.

    Suppose someone sees a red, rectangular brick. Both the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist would agree that there is a thing-in-itself in a mind-independent world that is causing that person to see a red, rectangular brick (ignoring the special cases of dreams and hallucinations).

    However, the Direct Realist would say that the thing-in-itself is red, rectangular and a brick, as the colour red, the shape rectangular and the object brick exist in a mind-independent world. The Indirect Realist would say that they don't know the true nature of the thing-in-itself, as all they know are their subjective experiences.

    I put my hand in a fire and feel pain. As an Indirect Realist, I say that the pain only exists in my mind and not in any thing-in-itself. I look at a brick and see the colour red. As an Indirect Realist, I also say that the colour red only exists in my mind and not in any thing-in-itself.

    Suppose you have the subjective experiences of pain and the colour red. Presumably you believe that pain only exists in a mind and not a mind-independent world.

    What argument would a Direct Realist make to justify that the colour red exists in a mind-independent world, when their only experience of the colour red is in their mind as a subjective experience?
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    When I see someone in pain, are they and their pain not in this same shared world my mind exists in?Harry Hindu

    We directly see the consequence of pain, such as someone grimacing. We don't directly see the pain.

    Suppose I see the colour red. If I were a Direct Realist, I think that I would say that the colour red exists in a mind-independent world. As an Indirect Realist, I say that something in the world caused me to see the colour red, but whatever that something is, there is no reason to believe that it was the colour red.
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication......................Meinong rejects this principle, allowing properties to be assigned to nonexistent things such as SantanoAxioms

    For Meinong, existence is a property. For the EPP, existence is prior to properties. It seems that two senses of "exist" are being used.

    Meining seems to be naming something "exist", "subsist" and "absist" rather than describing something that is "existing", "subsisting" or "absisting".

    For Meinong, within the mind are intentional acts towards objects.

    Sense one of exist
    The name "horse" can be given to objects having the properties hoofed, a mammal and long mane. "A horse" may be defined as "hoofed, a mammal and has a long mane".

    Meinong gives the name "existing" to objects of intention such as a horse. Therefore, an object of intention such as a horse may be defined as "existing" as well as having the property existing.

    He also gives the name "subsist" to those objects such as Sherlock Holmes, and the name "absist" to those objects such as the round square.

    Because Meinong gives the name "existing" to objects of intention such as a horse, it becomes both a property of and a definition of objects of intention such as a horse.

    In this sense of "exist", exist is a property.

    Sense two of exist
    However, there is another sense of exist, that of the Existential Generalization, whereby Fa → ∃x (Fx). If a is F then there exists something that is F.

    For example, if something is hoofed, a mammal and has a long mane, then there exists something that is hoofed, a mammal and has a long mane.

    Similarly, if something is existing (sense one), then there exists (sense two) something that is existing (sense one)

    In conclusion, it seems that two senses of existing are being used.
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    Meinong's Theory

    As for the three classifications, subsist and absist seem identical except for the whole 'logically possible' distinctionnoAxioms

    That objects that subsist, such as numbers and Sherlock Holmes, are logically possible and objects that absist, such as a square circle or A being not-A, are not logically possible, makes subsist and absist very different.
    ===============================================================================
    What is "has a negation"?noAxioms

    See Russell's Theory of Descriptions 2 - Frege & Meinong

    For "exist", a horse may exist or not exist in the field.
    For "subsist", Sherlock Holmes may subsist or not subsist at 221B Baker Street
    For "absist", as everything absists, there can be no negation.
    ===============================================================================
    Where does combustion fit in?noAxioms

    See Mehrdad Jazayeri

    A thought can be a physical process or a physical part. A car can be a physical process, such as turning the wheel, going from A to B, and doesn't have mass. A car can be a physical part, such as wheels and an engine, which does have mass.

    Then combustion as a physical part would "exist" and combustion as a physical process would "subsist"
    ===============================================================================
    The target may or may not be an object (doing arithmetic is not an object target)noAxioms

    For Meinong, as I understand it, numbers are objects that subsist, rather than exist or absist. This is just how Meinong is defining the meaning of "object"
    ===============================================================================
    An object to instantiate the thought. Kind of presumptuous, but I'll accept it. The wording above suggests that the thought itself is an object and is not simply implemented by one.noAxioms

    For Meinong, the target of a mental act, such as a thought, is an object, even if that object is a number. This is how Meinong is using the term "object".

    From SEP - Alexius Meinong
    Whatever can be experienced in some way, i.e., be the target of a mental act, Meinong calls an object [Gegenstand or Objekt].

    The target of a mental act is an object. As the target of a mental act cannot be itself, a mental act cannot be an object.
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    I never really got the distinction between direct and indirect realism. Sure, I know what the words mean, but 'direct' makes it sound like there's not a causal chain between the apple and your experience of it.noAxioms

    Both the Indirect and Direct Realist believe that there is a direct causal chain between the thing-in-itself in the world and the experience of it in your mind.

    You see the colour red. Assume that this is not a dream or hallucination, but that there is a thing-in-itself in the world that directly caused you to experience the colour red. Would you say that because you experience the colour red, the colour red must exist in the world?

    Similarly, because you experience pain, would you also say that pain exists in the world?

    Similarly, because you experience the appearance of a brick, would you say that bricks exist in the world?
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    Existence

    By what definition of 'exist' does the horse exist?......................Does an absisting thing need to be contradictory? If not, then why not pick a less contradictory example such as Tom Sawyer?...............................More to the point, he also says that there are things not in reality that nevertheless have properties. A square circle is round for instance.....................Meinong seems to confine the usage of the word to things designated as 'objects' that have a property (among others) of location.noAxioms

    I thought I knew what was happening until I started to read www.ontology.co/meinonga.htm

    For Meinong, Tom Sawyer would be an example of "subsist".

    I assume that "reality" is being used to refer to a mind-independent world, even though thoughts can be described as real and take place only in the mind.

    As I see it, for Meinong, an object either exists, subsist or absists. All objects have properties.

    This division seems sensible to me, yet generally attacked, which makes me think I don't understand Meinong's Theory. For example, Bertrand Russell attacked Meinong's Theory by saying that an object being both round and square would break the law of Non-contradiction. Yet Meinong never said that a round square exists, he said that a round square absists, and there is no reason why a round square cannot absist. It all depends on what "absists" means.

    Sense 1 - exist.
    i) such as a horse, ii) has a negation, iii) temporal and spatial, iv) Meinong must be using the word "exist" to refer to objects in the world. I would say that "thoughts exist", but Meinong is using the word "exist" in a particular way.

    Sense 2 - subsist
    i) aka as being, ii) such as Sherlock Holmes, numbers, iii) non-existent, iv) has a negation, v) non-temporal and non-spatial, vi) "subsist" must refer to objects in the mind, such as Sherlock Holmes. Objects that don't exist in the world, but objects that are logically possible in the world.

    Sense 3 - absist
    i) such as the round square, ii) non-existent, iii) as every possible object absists, there can be no negation, iv) non-temporal and non-spatial, v) "absist" must also refer to objects in the mind, such as the round square. Objects that don't exist in the world, because logically impossible in the world.

    Meinong said that existence is a property. However, this leads to a contradiction in sense 2 of subsist. As Bertrand Russell pointed out, an object that subsists doesn't exist, but it still has properties, and if existence is a property, then this means that an object that doesn't exist must exist.

    Meinong is using the word "exist" in a particular way, as something that obtains in the world rather than mind.
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    Knowledge

    It originates from our experiences, which in turn originate from what has caused them. This wording presumes that our experiences are caused, already a bias.noAxioms

    As an Indirect Realist, I don't know that some mind-independent thing-in-itself caused my (EDIT) experiences, but I believe that they did. This is my working hypothesis until proved wrong.

    Yes, I want a definition consistent with a model, and not based on the knowledge that led to the model.noAxioms

    Are you saying that on the one hand you want a definition of "existence" consistent with your knowledge of what you experience yet on the other hand you want a definition of "existence" not based on your knowledge about your experiences.

    This breaks the Law of Non Contradiction.

    The "brick" is a total mental abstraction. The brick isn't, and the abstraction lets us know something about the latter, but hardly all of it.noAxioms

    In your mind the "brick" is a mental abstraction, a concept. When you see a brick, you are directly observing an appearance. You are not directly observing the thing-in-itself that caused the appearance. You are directly observing one particular instantiation of your concept of a "brick".
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    Properties

    You brought up 'thoughts', a good example. They're not objects, nor are they distinct. They do have properties.noAxioms

    For Meinong, the target of a mental act, an intentional act, is an "object" (Wikipedia - Alexius Meinong)

    Suppose I thought about the object the Giza Pyramid. The Giza Pyramid has the property of being heavy. Does that mean my thought about the Giza Pyramid must also be heavy?

    That the object of thought has a property doesn't mean that my thought has a property.

    Good, We agree on that.noAxioms

    It depends on whether we are talking about Meinong or everyday life.

    In the context of Meinong, all our mental intentions are of objects, meaning that there cannot be any absence of objects.

    In the context of everyday life, one can imagine a space in which there are no objects. It seems to me that space has the property of extension and time has the property of duration, meaning that even in the absence of objects there will still be properties

    It depends on the definition of "object"
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    Properties can be assigned to nonexistent objects such as Santa, God and time.Corvus

    It seems to me that, when discussing Meinong, the word "exist" is only used when referring to the world, not the mind. I would say that thoughts exist, but this doesn't seem how the word "exist" is being used.

    Therefore, for Meinong, as regards the world, although Santa is non-existent, Santa does have "being". Properties can be assigned to objects that have being, such as Santa.
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    Can there be existence of properties where there is absence of object? For instance, time?Corvus

    For Meinong, in the world an object may exist, such as a horse, may subsist, such as a number or absist, such as a round square. Objects have properties. Therefore, there is no instance in the world where there is not an object, where there is an absence of objects, an absence of properties.

    Otherwise, one can imagine a space empty of objects, where this space passes through time. Space has the property of being extended. Time has the property of duration. Therefore, in the absence of objects there will still be properties.
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    The impossibility of knowing the thing-in-itself

    It is said that reality is stranger than can be conceived, and I get that. I am after a consistent model, not proof of any ding-an-sich.noAxioms

    Everything we know about the "world" comes from our experiences. From these experiences we can make a consistent model of the "world". But this model originates from our experiences, not from what has caused our experiences.

    I agree when you say "I am after a consistent model, not proof of any ding-an-sich" but this is at odds when you say "Such an argument requires an epistemological/empirical definition of existence, and I am attempting a discussion on a metaphysical definition."

    We can only ever know our experiences, never the thing-in-itself independent of our experiences.

    As the consistent model exists in our minds, any understanding we have of existence must also exist in our minds. This makes it impossible to be able to understand the nature of existence independently of how we understand the nature of existence in our minds.

    1) a brick hits me in the head. The brick does not depend on our mental abstractions, yet I know about the brick (presuming I'm not knocked out cold).noAxioms

    Through your visual experiences you experience on a number of different occasions a rectangular shape that is red. Because of the consistency in your visual observations, a rectangular shape that is red has the name "a brick".

    On one particular occasion you see one particular instantiation of "a brick" and feel a pain in your head. You know the concept "a brick" and you know the relation between a pain in your head and seeing one particular instantiation of "a brick".

    All these exist in your mind. The "brick" is a concept, a mental abstraction.
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    Does Meinong's "being" mean anything?

    Subsist: Seems mostly abstract: Numbers, mathematics, and such. Meinong seems to give them a sort of being of their own, mind-independent, so the word isn't idealistic in nature. Still, is subsistence prior to mathematical truths? What would he say?.................................He allows predication on nonexistent 'objects' such as Santa.noAxioms

    For Meinong there are three kinds of objects. Those that exist, those that subsist and those that absist. All these objects have properties.

    Those objects that subsist, such as numbers and Santa have non-existence and being.

    There is a problem with Meinong's meaning of "existence". Presumably the word "existence" is being used to describe things in a world independent of the mind rather than being used to describe things in the mind. However, I would say that "thoughts exist", and I have always used the word" exist" to refer to things that exist not only in the mind but also in the world. However, it seems that in any discussion about Meinong, the word "exist" is being restricted to things in the world.

    For me, it seems clear that Santa exists in the mind and doesn't exist in the world. But Meinong says that although Santa doesn't exist in the world, has a non-existence in the world, Santa has "being" in the world. This makes no sense to me. Just because I say "the moon is made of blue cheese" doesn't mean that the moon is made of blue cheese. Just because Meinong might say "Santa has being in the world" doesn't mean that Santa has being in the world.

    Anyone can say anything, Sometimes they say true things and sometimes they say false things. Perhaps this is the case for Santa's being in the world.
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    Is a lack of properties a property?

    Anything requires predication, since a lack of properties is itself a property, and a contradictory one at that...self-referencing properties have always had the potential for paradoxnoAxioms

    The statement "a lack of properties is itself a property" breaks the Law of Non-contradiction. From the Law of Non-contradiction, A cannot be not A. Let A be the presence of a property.

    Then the absence of a property cannot be the presence of a property.

    This presumes EPP.noAxioms

    For Meinong there are three types of objects. Objects that exist, such as horses. Objects that subsist such as numbers. Objects that absist such as the round square.

    Therefore, for Meinong, everything in reality is a kind of object. There is nothing in reality that is not an object. All these objects have properties. Therefore there is nothing in reality that doesn't have a property.

    Therefore, for Meinong, in reality there cannot be an absence of properties.
  • Why is it that nature is perceived as 'true'?
    But in UK, the public and the law seem to regard them as just usual perks of the job. Would it be the case?Corvus

    In case a moderator is reading this, the OP needs an understanding of what is true and what is false, what is better and what is worse. The OP is about the morality of man's behaviour. The following is an example of morality.

    The politicians always argue that these perks are within the "law" which may well be the case, but I am sure that the public find such behaviour disgraceful.

    Who would not buy their own glasses!

    The issue that has emerged with these particular glasses in recent days is that they were not bought out of Starmer’s own pocket. He received a donation in May — while still in opposition — to the tune of £2,485 from Waheed Alli, a businessman and Labour peer, for “multiple pairs of glasses”.

    That being legal doesn't make it moral.
  • Why is it that nature is perceived as 'true'?
    Genuine practice of democracy is rare. Due to the fact, most preachers of democracy give impressions of false pretense and their ignorance.Corvus

    Yes, on the one hand Keir Starmer said 4 January 2024 that he would clean up politics.

    No. I say to all my fellow politicians – Labour and Tory – to change Britain, we must change ourselves. We need to clean up politics. No more VIP fast lanes. No more kickbacks for colleagues. No more revolving doors between government and the companies they regulate. I will restore standards in public life with a total crackdown on cronyism.

    On the other hand, he accepted gifts from Labour peer Lord Alli.

    Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer received an additional £16,000 worth of clothes from Labour peer Lord Alli, it has emerged. The donations, first reported by the Guardian, external, were initially declared as money for his private office as leader of the opposition. The gifts - of £10,000 in October 2023 and £6,000 in February this year - were declared on time, but will now be re-categorised as donations in kind of clothing.
  • Why is it that nature is perceived as 'true'?
    Hence the reason why you should keep distance from the fallacy of authority or majorityCorvus

    The will of the majority is the worst form of government there is apart from for all the other systems of government which have been tried.

    "Democracy Is the Worst Form of Government Except For All Others Which Have Been Tried"

    Winston Churchill 1947:

    Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except all those other forms that have been tried from time to time; but there is the broad feeling in our country that the people should rule, continuously rule, and that public opinion, expressed by all constitutional means, should shape, guide, and control the actions of Ministers who are their servants and not their masters.
  • Why is it that nature is perceived as 'true'?
    The contents and states of one's subjective and private mental experience cannot be presented as the basis of the objective evidence in the argumentsCorvus

    If in a room of 100 people, 1 person says that they see the ghost of Napoleon, but the other 99 say that they don't, then this is objective evidence that that 1 person is suffering an hallucination.

    I agree that the subjective mental experience of a single person cannot be presented as objective evidence, but the subjective mental experience of 99 people in agreement can be presented as objective evidence.

    The more people in agreement, the less subjective the evidence and the more objective.
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    A thing having a property is an entirely different subject than something's knowledge of a property. Whether the property is conceived of or not seems off topic.noAxioms

    But how can you know about the properties of a thing-in-itself if you have no knowledge of the thing-in-itself?

    Going down this path is once again why the disclaimer is there in the OP. I see no productivity to it.noAxioms

    Our only knowledge comes from mental abstractions.

    Metaphysically speaking, how can we know something that doesn't depend on our mental abstractions? If metaphysically impossible, the disclaimer in the OP makes the OP unanswerable.
  • Why is it that nature is perceived as 'true'?
    So, it is not bad thing to have the strict legal system in some aspect, would you not agree?Corvus

    I agree, as long as society thinks that a strict legal system is moral.

    Hallucination is not extreme case. It is a subjective case.Corvus

    The Argument from Hallucination against Direct Realism is making an objective case against Direct Realism.
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    Anything requires predication, since a lack of properties is itself a property, and a contradictory one at that.noAxioms

    I don't think that it is grammatically correct to say that a lack of properties is itself a property.

    Both the EPP and Meinong accept that properties are attributed to objects. A property is any member of a class of entities that are capable of being attributed to objects (Wikipedia - Property (philosophy). The EPP means that the existence of an object is prior to the object's predication. Meinong said that there are three types of objects, those that exist, those that subsist and those that absist.

    Objects have properties. In the absence of properties there must be an absence of an object. In the absence of an object there must be an absence of properties. Therefore, in the absence of properties there must be the absence of any property

    For the EPP, the lack of properties means the lack of any property. For Meinong, the lack of properties means the lack of any object, which means the lack of any property. Therefore, the lack of properties cannot be a property.
  • Why is it that nature is perceived as 'true'?
    It wouldn't be accepted as valid or meaningful arguments on the basis of either non relevant or highly unlikely example.Corvus

    Hardly highly unlikely. "In the 21st century, hudud, including amputation of limbs, is part of the legal systems of Brunei, Iran, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen" (www.studycountry.com)

    Again, the other party can reject the arguments on the basis of highly unlikely example or irrelevant example for the main point.Corvus

    Direct Realists may reject the Argument from Hallucination, but many Indirect Realists accept it as a valid argument.
  • Why is it that nature is perceived as 'true'?
    Appealing to Extremes is a formal fallacy.Corvus

    Being an extreme case doesn't in itself make a logical fallacy.

    I agree that an extreme case, where an argument is exaggerated to such a hyperbolic degree that it distorts the argument, would be a logical fallacy.

    However, an extreme case, where an argument is not exaggerated to such a hyperbolic degree that it distorts the argument, would not be a logical fallacy.

    The Argument from hallucination deals with an extreme case and is used as an argument against Direct Realism. That it is an extreme case does not mean that it is not a valid argument.
  • Why is it that nature is perceived as 'true'?
    Isn't the law formally accepted legal system by the people of the society?Corvus

    I don't think that society would willingly accept a legal system that was immoral. I have no evidence, but I am sure that this is the case.

    Isn't this an appeal to extreme case fallacy?Corvus

    Being an extreme case doesn't make it a fallacy.
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    Good point, so long as 'properties' isn't confined to your experience.noAxioms

    The problem is that it is impossible to talk about properties independent of our experiences of them.

    The question is about the relationship between existence and properties. But what do we mean by "properties". You raise the problem as to how we can know something that is outside our experiences.

    However, you present an impossible task when you say "Good point, as long as "properties isn't confined to your experience", in that how can we discuss something that we have never experienced. We can only talk about things we have experienced. We cannot talk about things we haven't experienced. We can only talk about those aspects of properties that we have experienced. We cannot talk about those aspect of properties that we haven't experienced

    Kant made the point when he said that we cannot discuss things-in-themselves, as they are the other side of anything we experience. Something outside our experiences is an unknown, and if unknown, we cannot talk about it. It is impossible to know about something about which we have no experience. It is impossible to know how those aspects of properties we have experienced relate to those aspects of properties we haven't experienced.

    When we do discuss properties, we can only discuss those aspects of the property that we know about, and we can only know something by experiencing it. There may well be aspects of the property that we haven't experienced, but these aspects must remain unknown to us. Being unknown, we cannot talk about them. Everything we know about our experiences we can describe in words as part of language. The properties we describe in language only includes those aspects of properties that we have experienced.

    We only know about properties because of our experiences. Because we have experienced the colour red, we are able to talk about the property of redness. We are only able to describe the properties we have experienced in words, within language, and this surely is the distinguishing feature of what we know about properties. Everything we know about properties can be described in words. For us, a property is a description. We can only describe what we have experienced.

    A property is a description in language of something we have experienced. A property is not something that exists independently of the human mind in the mind-independent world. Such a thing would be a thing-in-itself, an unknown unknown.

    What we mean by "properties" is of necessity confined to our experiences, and exist as propositions within language.
  • Why is it that nature is perceived as 'true'?
    Morality only judges the moral actions of the folks. Legality judges the acts and also hand down the punishments according the law, hence legality precedes morality.Corvus

    The law could state that the punishment for stealing anything valued up to £50 was the amputation of the right hand.

    You are right that the law judges the act and hands down a punishment according to the law.

    Are you arguing that a particular law must be followed by a society even if that society believes that that particular law is morally wrong?
  • Why is it that nature is perceived as 'true'?
    Isn't it itself an act of moral wrongness to break the law, revolt and overthrow the system?Corvus

    No, as only moral laws are valid. It is not morally wrong to break a law that itself is not moral.

    I agree that it is the moral thing to do to follow the laws of the country.

    However, the assumption is that laws are founded on moral principles. Only laws founded on moral principles are valid laws. If a law is not founded on moral principles then it is an invalid law. Therefore, the moral thing to do is to follow valid laws, and valid laws are founded on principles of morality. It is not immoral to not follow invalid laws, those laws that are not based on principles of morality.

    Breaking a law not founded on moral principles is not morally wrong.

    You have options to get adjusted to the system whatever system you live in, and flourish under the system knowing it and abiding by itCorvus

    Even if the system is morally wrong? In abiding by a system that is morally wrong, then one is condoning it, meaning that abiding to a morally wrong system is in itself an immoral act.
  • Meinong rejection of Existence being Prior to Predication
    There is the commonly held principle (does it have a name? "EPP" if not) that existence is conceptually prior to predication, prior to it having any property at all. So an apple is red only if the apple exists Santa is not meaningfully fatnoAxioms

    What does prior in "existence is prior to predication" mean?

    From SEP - Existence

    There are two sets of reasons for denying that existence is a property of individuals. The first is Hume and Kant's puzzlement over what existence would add to an object. What is the difference between a red apple and a red existing apple? To be red (or even to be an apple) it must already exist, as only existing things instantiate properties

    The thing's existence is prior to any predication to it and so it is incoherent to think of existence as a property had by the thing. This thought is behind Aristotle's thesis that existence is not a further feature of a thing beyond its essence.

    Hume argued (in A Treatise of Human Nature 1.2.6) that there is no impression of existence distinct from the impression of an object, which is ultimately on Hume's view a bundle of qualities.

    From Merriam Webster, "prior" may mean i) earlier in time or order ii) taking precedence (as in importance).

    For an apple to be red, the apple must exist.

    It cannot be the case that an apple exists and at a later time the property "is red" is added, so meaning i) is not relevant.

    In Hume's view, existence is no more than a bundle of properties. Therefore for Hume, ii) is not relevant.

    We can only know about the existence of something in the world by observing its properties. If we never observed the property red we could never know about the existence of an apple in the world.

    In what way does the existence of something take precedence over its properties, when that something cannot exist without properties?

    Looking at it the other way round, in what way do the properties of something take precedence over the existence of that something, when there would be no properties if that something didn't exist?

    It seems, that the word "prior" is not the correct word in relating the existence of something with the properties it has. Perhaps the phrase should be "existence requires predication"?
  • Why is it that nature is perceived as 'true'?
    Humans are more important.Patterner

    For humans, humans are more important than cats.
    For cats, cats are more important than mice.
    For mice, mice are more important than cockroaches
    For cockroaches, cockroaches are more important than bed bugs.

    Philosophically, is it right that one part of nature is more important than another part of nature?
×
We use cookies and similar methods to recognize visitors and remember their preferences.