Philosophy is the fundamental and inescapable activity of creating, analyzing, and assessing belief systems — Sam26

I think you're a bit confused about Witt, but so aren't most people. — Sam26

I think I have been reasonably clear in setting out my understanding where Wittgenstein is correct, incorrect or vague.

Understanding has two aspects. First there is understanding what Wittgenstein wrote about meaning in language, and second there is understanding whether Wittgenstein was correct, incorrect or vague about what he wrote about meaning in language. The first aspect is the role of the historian, the second aspect is the role of the philosopher.

As you say “Philosophy is the fundamental and inescapable activity of creating, analyzing, and assessing belief systems”, but it should be noted that first one must create a belief system in order to be able to analyze and assess other belief systems.

Therefore, I needed to set out my own belief system as regards meaning in language, which I think was reasonably clear, prior to being able to judge Wittgenstein’s belief system for correctness, incorrectness and vagueness.

The first step in avoiding philosophical confusion is in creating one’s own belief system, against which other belief systems may be judged for correctness, incorrectness and vagueness.

Philosophy is the fundamental and inescapable activity of creating, analyzing, and assessing belief systems — Sam26

:up:

This does not sound very Wittgensteinian, who accepted hinge propositions rather than assess them.

I want to speak to something that keeps happening in this thread, because it's a good example of the very confusion Witt's tools are meant to address. — Sam26

A useful post

I will give my solution to meaning in language, and try to show it answers all of your questions.

My solution to meaning in language

As in PI 258, I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of my sensation of sadness. Therefore, every time I have the sensation of sadness, which causes me to cry, I record my crying in my calendar by writing the sign “S”.

The sign “S” cannot point to the private sensation of sadness, which is hidden, but can point to the public behaviour of crying, which is not hidden.

There is no criteria for correctness between the sign "S" and the private sensation of sadness, but there is a criteria of correctness between the sign “S” and public behaviour of crying.

The sign “S” is an ostensive definition that points at the public behaviour of crying, not the private sensation of sadness.

I know that if I feel sadness then I cry, so when I see someone else cry I can infer that they too also feel sadness. I can never know that someone else feels sadness, but I can infer that they do from their behaviour.

For example, if you saw a cat with all the behaviours of being in pain, would you walk on past saying “I don’t know that this cat is in pain” or would you say “I infer that the cat is in pain from its behaviour” and take the cat to the vets?

Therefore, the sign “S” refers to and means the behaviour of crying, from which it can be inferred that the person is experiencing sadness.

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Several responses keep making the same argument but in different forms.......................… without inner feelings there'd be no language games………………..Without oxygen there'd be no fires. From that statement it doesn't follow that "fire" means oxygen — Sam26

Without the sensation of sadness there would be no sign “S”.

You are correct that the sign “S” does not mean the sensation of sadness. The sign “S” means the behaviour of crying, from which the sensation of sadness is inferred.
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If meaning were fixed by private inner objects, you'd need a way to pin the right word to the right inner item privately, with no public check, which is crucial. — Sam26

You are right that there is no criteria of correctness between the sign “S” and the private inner sensation. The criteria of correctness is between the sign “S” and the public behaviour of crying.
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What drives the misreading is the assumption that meaning must work by a word pointing at some thing, and if outer objects are ruled out, then an inner object is all we're left with. — Sam26

Meaning must work by pointing at something, and it is not the case that outer objects are ruled out, as it is the outer object of crying that is being pointed at.
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Meaning doesn't need a hidden referent, inner or outer. It needs a practice, i.e., training, use, correction, context, the possibility of getting it right or wrong in ways others can recognize — Sam26

You are correct that language would not work if the referents of the words were hidden. Language works because the referent of behaviour is not hidden.

Even when the meaning of a word is the referent of behaviour, you are correct that this still needs practice, training, use, correction, context and right or wrong.

It is true that the behaviour of crying may have different causes, such as sadness of losing a family pet or watching a particularly funny comedian, and this is where other factors such as context are needed. Is the person crying looking at an empty dog kennel or looking at someone on a stage.
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When I say "inner states don't fix meaning," I'm not saying they don't exist or don't matter. I'm saying they can't play the specific role that keeps being assigned to them, the role of a private foundation that makes meaning possible by itself, apart from any shared practice. — Sam26

Wittgenstein agreed in PI 304 that there are inner feelings

You are correct that inner feelings cannot make meaning in language possible by itself, because it is the behaviour caused by inner feelings that makes meaning in language possible.

I don't think we're makiing progress.................So, the point of my threads is to get the information out and let the chips fall where they may. — Sam26

I am doing the same. I believe the points that I am making are correct, even if no one else agrees. But what else can one do? At the very least I am improving my own understanding. If someone accepts my arguments, then that is a bonus.

As long as you are making progress and I am making progress, perhaps that is sufficient, even though our progress is different, even though our language games are different.
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EDIT - I have deleted the rest of the post as it did not add much.

Witt’s reply to the rule following question/anxiety isn’t “custom makes it fine, end of story,” and it isn’t “we vote on correctness.” The point is that interpretation isn't the whole story, because interpretations also need a way of being applied. At some point you master of a technique, you go on without consulting a further interpretation. — Sam26

In PI 201 talks about the rule-making paradox, and as you say, grasping a rule is not an interpretation and it is not custom that makes a rule. However, it is more fundamental than mastering a technique.

As with the hinge proposition, the rule is part of the framework of the form of life, within which is the language game. Customs, interpretations and techniques are part of the content of the framework, and as such have no control over the rules to which they are subject to.

Grasping a rule is living within a framework that is exempt from doubt, not an object of knowledge, not open to rational evaluation and an objective certainty.

One should not say “I know how to use the language game”, but should say “I use the language game”.

You’re raising a bunch of issues, and they get tangled because “form of life,” “hinge,” and “worldview” are being treated as if they’re the same kind of thing. They're not. — Sam26

I agree that a hinge is not the same kind of thing as a form of life, but the hinge is crucial to there being a form of life in the first place.
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Witt’s “form of life” is usually the shared human backdrop of practices that makes language, rule following, correction, and inquiry possible. It’s not typically “theism versus atheism,” “direct versus indirect realism,” or “democracy versus autocracy.” — Sam26

Are theism and atheism different forms of life in Wittgenstein’s terms?

I would say that they are. Wittgenstein's "form of life" refers to the shared cultural practices, activities, and ways of living that provide the context for language and meaning (Wikipedia), and theism and atheism have many practices, activities and ways of living that are not shared.

One’s language is closely linked to one’s form of life, and the more diverse one’s language the more diverse one’s form of life. The theist and atheist certainly have different language games.

PI 19 And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life
PI 23 Here the term language-game is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life
PI 241 “So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?” - It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life.

I am not saying the situation is black and white, In that there are degrees of difference. For example the form of life of a theist is different to the form of life of an atheist, but not as different as the form of life of a human and the form of life of a lion.

However, that the language game of a theist is different to the language game of an atheist, then so must be their form of life.
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We do make choices, shift commitments, and so on, but we’re rarely choosing between forms of life from some meta or neutral standpoint. — Sam26

This is the point I am making. The Wittgensteinian man in the street rarely chooses between forms of life from a meta or neutral standpoint, but this is the role of the philosopher. The philosopher should be trying to choose between forms of life from a meta or neutral standpoint

It is the role of the philosopher, sidetracked by Wittgenstein, to stand outside our language games, forms of life, hinge propositions and rules accepted by custom in order to attempt to understand the bigger picture.

It is the role of the philosopher to break the atheist out of their atheistic language game and the theist out of their theistic language game to arrive at a better understanding of the reality of the world.

So what is going on when the waiter adds up the bill (whether by pushing buttons on a machinie or the old-fashioned way)? — Ludwig V

Yes, that is when someone says “add 2+2”. That is different to someone saying "2+2=4".
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So is it false to say that unicorns don't exist? — Ludwig V

Unicorns exist in fiction.
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He shows how to talk about non-existent entities without referring to them. — Ludwig V

It is impossible to talk about something without referring to it.
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I shall ask how you connect the outward signs to the inner feelings if you have no access to them. — Ludwig V

By inference. If when I feel pain I grimace, when I see someone else grimace I infer that they also are feeling pain.

That's right, and as such the beetles are insufficient as analogous of "a concept". Each person's concept of "beetle" would be private and unique, so there would be no such thing as "the concept of beetle", only a multitude of distinct concepts. — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly, my concept of “beetle” must be different to yours because we have lived different lives in different countries and have had different experiences.

There is no one dictionary definition of “beetle”, only a multitude of distinct concepts.
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First, you argue that if a person simply observes the use of a word, they must have an inner concept of that word. Now, you ague that the meaning of the word is dependent on the person' use of the word. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is the stage of learning the meaning of a word and the stage of knowing a word.

In the learning stage, a child can play with a toy without knowing its name. They gain a concept of the object when they play with the object, ie, use the object. The child then hears their parent say “toy” when the parent picks up the toy. The child can learn to associate the name “toy” with the object toy and their concept of toy.

Subsequent to the learning stage, a person knows the concept of toy and knows its name “toy”, and as when a child are able to use the toy.

A person can have an inner concept of an object prior to knowing the name of the object.

Japanese and Korean language say in the order of "Frog to me pass over." They have different order of saying words in sentences, i.e. the different rules. — Corvus

Yes, each language game needs its own rules

But if you say "Pass me over the frog.", then they will not know what you mean, even if you meant the cup. But your wife will know what you mean, because you two have the private agreement that frog means cup. — Corvus

Yes, the meaning of a word depends on its context. In a zoo, “frog” means “a short-bodied, tailless amphibian vertebrates”, but with one’s wife it could mean “cup”.

And there are rules how a word should be used in a sentence, in that “over pass frog me the” would not be correct English

"the inner cause of someone grimacing" could be taken to refer to the sensation of pain. But the private language argument shows that there's no such thing. — Ludwig V

Wittgenstein never said that we had no inner feelings.

PI 257 What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc)?
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Yes but the sign "+" does not refer to that fact. It is, in effect an instruction to do something, so it can't refer to anything. — Ludwig V

If I hear someone say “it is hot today”, I know it refers to it being hot today. There is no instruction for me to do anything.

If I hear someone say “2+2=4”, I know it refers to two objects being alongside another two objects. There is no instruction for me to do anything.
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Unicorns are mythical creatures, so they do not exist, so "unicorn" cannot refer to them — Ludwig V

“Unicorn” refers to a mythical creature.
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No, Russell's point, as I understood it that propositions that appear to refer to non-existent entities can be assigned a truth value by interpreting "The present king of France is bald" by analysing it as consisting of two claims - 1) that there is a king of France and 2) that he is bald. A conjunction of two sentences is true iff both conjuncts are true. In this case one of the conjuncts is false, because the reference fails, so the entire sentence is false. No non-existent entities required. — Ludwig V

Russell’s definite descriptions allow us to refer to and discuss non-existent entities because we can reduce expressions, such as “the present king of France is bald”, into constituent truth-apt propositions.

Have you never watched a child learn to speak? It is not true that a person "only speaks because they have a prior concept". — Metaphysician Undercover

A child hears their parent say “toy” and sees them pick up a toy. Already the child has a concept of “toy”, because they have heard "toy" and seen a toy.
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And isn't this exactly the type of conclusion which Wittgenstein is trying to avoid? There is no beetle in the box, no concept of freedom in the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein is not saying that there is no beetle in the box. He is saying that because no one can see into anyone else’s box, each person’s beetle could be different.

Despite this, people can still use “beetle” in conversation.

The beetle could be pain. Wittgenstein is not saying that people don’t have inner feelings

A public language allows communication about inner feelings, not directly, in that no one can know another’s pain, but indirectly, on the assumption that inner feelings are linked to outward behaviour. For example, grimacing, which is empirically observable, thereby enabling public conversations about “ pain”.

The meaning of the word “pain” in a public language is directly determined by empirically observable outward behaviour, and only indirectly by an assumed inner feeling.

On the one hand it is true that meaning in language is directly determined by public and observable objective criteria, but on the other hand, there is the assumption within language that outward behaviour has been caused by inner feelings.

It is therefore true that a public language cannot be based on inner feelings alone.

But in real life we don’t add an continuous stack of meta-rules. We get trained into a practice where “following the rule” is already part of the technique, shown in what counts as going on correctly, what's a correction, what's a mistake. It's not a separate agreement; it’s built into what we do......................That’s why rule following isn’t just a vote, it’s a practice with standards that show themselves in use, training, and correction………….They’re norms embodied in shared practices — Sam26

This makes sense within a Form of Life, but the philosophical problem is how do we choose between different Forms of Life.

Within a Form of Life
For a language game to have meaning it must have rules. As you say, “That’s why rule following isn’t just a vote, it’s a practice with standards that show themselves in use, training, and correction”. Following the rule is part of our training within a Form of Life and are norms within shared practices. Meaning is use within this Form of Life (PI 43).

Wittgenstein raises the rule following paradox in PI 201, where no course of action could be determined by a rule as every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule, but dismisses it. He dismisses it because this is what it means to be a Form of Life. He writes in PI 219 "when I obey a rule I do not choose. I obey it blindly" and in PI 198 “I have a custom”. Within the Form of Life we have been trained, customs underpin meaning and we are embedded in a community of language users.

Kripke in his 1982 book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language gives his own example of the rule following paradox. Does the symbol “+” mean we follow the rule of addition or the rule of quaddition. For example, both may give the same result for numbers under 1,000 but may give different examples for numbers over 1,000 (@AtticPhilosophy, Wittgenstein and the Rule Following Paradox)

It makes sense that within a Form of Life there are in effect hinge rules that establish the framework of the language Game, such as “god exists”, which as hinge propositions are exempt from doubt.

Hinge propositions
Within a Language Game within a Form of Life, some propositions are exempt from doubt. They are not beliefs, not objects of knowledge, not subject to evaluation, not open to rational evaluation. They are ungrounded presuppositions, immune to enquiry, absent of evidence, objective certainties, not truth-apt and to reject them would be to reject all our knowledge. They are part of the framework of the Language Game, not part of the content of the Language Game, pre-rational certainties. Moore’s mistake was to say “I know there is a hand” rather than “there is a hand” (IEP, Wittgenstein: Epistemology)

The role of philosophy
Kripke was criticised because his is a philosophical solution, whereas Wittgenstein sets philosophy aside. Wittgenstein makes sense as to meaning within a Language Game within its own Form of Life, but avoids the philosophical problem of how do we know which Form of Life we should choose. Should we be part of the Form of Life that “god exists” or part of the Form of Life that “god does not exists”, should we be part of the Form of Life that “Direct Realism” describes reality or “Indirect Realism” describes reality and should we be part of the Form of Life that “democracy is the best form of government” or “an autocracy is the best for of government”.

As you say “That’s why rule following isn’t just a vote, it’s a practice with standards that show themselves in use, training, and correction”. This is true within a particular Form of Life having its own Language Game, but the philosophical question, which Wittgenstein avoids, is why should we choose one set of hinge rules over a different set of hinge rules. Why should we choose the hinge rule that “god exists” rather than the hinge rule that “god does not exist”, for example.

We can make up any rules on anything, and as long as we agree to follow, that would be the rule. — Corvus

Suppose we make any rule, which we agree to follow. But we need another rule that we agree to follow the rules. But we need another rule that we agree to follow the rule that we agree to follow the rules.

Ultimately, rules are no more than social agreements.

There seem many things operating under the rule of random selection or random events. — Corvus

Chess has rules and society has laws that are consciously made by humans

They say that we are living in a rule-governed universe that operates according to the laws of nature, meaning that there are rules and laws operating independently of humans.

Because humans are a part of the Universe, and our concepts are part of us, it may well be that our concepts are rule-governed operating according to the laws of nature. I don’t know.

I don't agree with any of this. I don't believe we have a concept of "freedom". It's just a word that's used commonly, and in a vast variety of different ways, without any real restrictions on usage. One could not locate, or isolate a commonly accepted "concept of freedom".....................you just follow the examples set by others. It's a form of copying, mimicking. This provides one with the basis for acceptable usage without learning any concepts. — Metaphysician Undercover

In language there is the word “freedom”, and although it is commonly used, I agree that it has no publicly accepted meaning, concept or definition.

As regards copying, person A sees person B say “freedom” and be given a sailing boat. Person A wants a sailing boat and therefore also says “freedom” on the expectation that they are given a sailing boat.

Person A copies person B’s behaviour saying “freedom” because they have the prior concept of wanting a sailing boat. Person A would remain motionless if they had no prior concept of wanting a sailing boat. Person A only speaks because they have a prior concept.

Person A may want the sailing boat in order to sail across the Atlantic, and person B may want the sailing boat in order to sail at the weekends. It could be that every member of the linguistic community has a different meaning or concept of “freedom”.

I agree that “freedom” is a word commonly used in a vast variety of different ways.

The expression “freedom” has a meaning in language because it is associated with observable, empirical behaviour, even if everyone’s meaning or concept of “freedom” is different.

The rule of random determination? Can't randomness be considered as a rule? — Corvus

Not as a rule.

But it seems that no rule is necessary for why concepts have rules and logic in them..........................Without the rules and logic in concepts, we wouldn't be able to build sensible statements or propositions. — Corvus

It seems to me that there are two aspects regarding concepts and rules.

I agree that there are rules as to how a concept should be used in language (what a concept does)

However, I don't see that there are rules that determine our concepts. In other words, what rules determines our concept of freedom (what a concept is).

But as you say, where is the rule that says we should use rules.
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We could only say some concepts are a priori, and some are a posteriori. — Corvus

:100:

Witt grants that. Words are sometimes taught by pointing...............“This slab is heavy” isn’t learned by defining slab through heavy and heavy through slab. It’s learned in practice……………..Ostension is one way of teaching — Sam26

I agree that ostension is one aspect of language.

As I wrote:

It seems to me that the Augustinian view is necessary for the meaning of certain core individual words and the PI view is necessary for the combinations of these core words into meaningful propositions.

However I disagree that Augustinian ostension may be totally ignored by language, as inferred by Wittgenstein's “the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” (PI 43)

I may have misunderstood you when you wrote:

It’s for resisting the idea that words get their meaning by pointing to hidden objects, inner items, or metaphysical entities. — Sam26

Ostension cannot work alone because it cannot cope with fiction and figures of speech, and Wittgensteinian meaning as use cannot work alone because of its circularity. Only a combination of the two can work.

You said the rock was hidden, but, assuming that it did break the window, it can be revealed. There is nothing that would count as revealing the hidden pain. — Ludwig V

I agree that it is sometimes possible to know the cause of a broken window, in that someone may have filmed it, but it is impossible to know the inner cause of someone grimacing.
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Lewis Carroll wrote "'Twas slithy and the mome raths outgrabe". — Ludwig V

Something can be part of a language even if it is meaningless to me.

For example, the fact that I may not know what “Je veux deux pommes” means does not mean that it is not part of a language
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What I actually asked is 'What does "plus" as in "2+2=4" refer to?' — Ludwig V

In the world, there are a total of four things if two things are alongside another two things.
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There is no king of France, so it refers to no-one - that is does not refer to anyone. — Ludwig V

There are no unicorns, but the word “unicorn” still refers to something
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Quite. So not all words refer. — Ludwig V

Does “nothing” refer to nothing. This is the problem of referring to non-existent entities.

The Merriam Webster dictionary accepts that we refer to nonexistent things

Equipment must endure subzero storage, while fuel and workers face remote transport via inadequate ports and nonexistent roads, WoodMac’s analysts wrote.

Betrand Russell distinguished between phrases that refer to non-existent entities and those that refer to actual objects. For instance, "the present King of France" refers to a non-existent entity, while "the present King of England" refers to a specific, existing individual. (Wikipedia) So we can refer to both existent and non-existent things.

I still don't understand what you could mean by "concept". Sure we can all use words such as those of your examples, "freedom, tree, happiness, colour or more/less" but unless there are definite rules of usage, how can you assume that there is any concept involved with these words? — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that we have the concept of “freedom” and there are rules as to how the word “freedom” is correctly used in language (rules as to what the concept does).

But there are no rules as to why we have the concept “freedom” in the first place (rules as to what the concept is)
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Why would you think that being able to use the word implies that there is such a thing as a concept of freedom. — Metaphysician Undercover

How could you use the word “freedom” in a sentence if you did not know what freedom meant, did not know the concept of freedom.

The concept of stone has the inherent meaning what stone is, which implies and states the clear logic and formal rule. — Corvus

It depends what rules you are referring to.

I agree that we have the concept of “stone” and there are rules as to how the word “stone” is correctly used in language (rules as to what the concept does). But there are no rules as to why we have the concept in the first place (rules as to what the concept is)

Concepts are logical structure and have formal rules. A human is not a cup. Consciousness is not unconsciousness. A fool is not wise. Socrates is mortal. etc. — Corvus

As there is a difference between what a rock is and what a rock does, there is a difference between what a concept is and what a concept does.

I agree that the concept “Socrates is mortal” has a logical structure, but this is what the concept does.

Another question is, does a concept, in the sense of what it is, have a logical structure.

A simple example from this thread is when someone (sorry RussellA) takes PI 43, meaning is use, and turns it into a premise in a formal proof, then objects that it’s circular. That move treats meaning as if it must be a detachable item attached to a word, and treats Witt’s reminder as if it were an axiom. — Sam26

Not a problem, I am appreciating the opportunity to learn more about Wittgenstein.

On the one hand is the Augustinian view of ostensive definition, whereby each word corresponds to an object that is its meaning and on the other hand is the Philosophical Investigation (PI) view, whereby the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

I don’t think either is sufficient in itself, although both are necessary.

The Augustinian view cannot cope with fiction and figures of speech.

The PI view cannot cope with an unavoidable circularity. For example, in the expression “this slab is heavy”, the meaning of slab is understood within the context of being heavy, and the meaning of heavy is understood within the context of being a slab. I don’t see how PI gets around this problem.

It seems to me that the Augustinian view is necessary for the meaning of certain core individual words and the PI view is necessary for the combinations of these core words into meaningful propositions.

If the concrete principle is “don’t touch a hot stove”, then the principal concept involved is "do not touch", and that itself looks to me like a formal rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that some concepts can be rules, such as “do not touch”, but some concepts are not rules, such as freedom, tree, happiness, colour or more/less.
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I think concepts are logical structures with formal rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is a difference between what a concept is and what a concept does.

I agree that as regards what a concept does, it can be a rule or not be a rule, but as regards what a concept is, I don’t see that a concept is something with a logical structure or formal rules.

Wittgenstein's remarks on private language in PI were partly in relation to Frege's private language arguments, and part of the later Wittgenstein's attempt to reduce Frege's third realm of sense to an interaction between the psychological realm (Frege's second realm) and the physical realm (Frege's first realm). — sime

I’m curious how Wittgenstein can reduce the third realm of sense (presumably language) to an interaction between the second realm of psychology (presumably inner feelings) and the first realm of the physical (presumably the world)?

On the one hand, the second realm of inner feelings drops out of language (the analogy of the beetle) and on the other hand the first realm, any correspondence with the world, also drops out of language (as the meaning of a linguistic expression is its use in language).

Yes, of course you can. But you can then discover the rock that caused the damage, show it to you, lodge it as evidence, as so forth. There is nothing that you can do with pain that is equivalent to that. — Ludwig V

That there is a rock lying on the floor is not proof that the rock caused the window to break. It may be evidence, but not conclusive evidence.

That someone grimaces is not proof that they are in pain. It may be evidence, but not conclusive evidence.

These seem quite equivalent.
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What does "nothing" refer to? — Ludwig V

The fact that “ouch” is in quotation marks shows that it is part of language.

“2+2=4” refers to 2+2=4
“The present king of France” refers to the present king of France
“Nothing” refers to nothing.
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Grimacing and "I am in pain" are connected to pain, and provide me with grounds for saying that "S is in pain". I wouldn't say they are clues exactly, because the connection is not empirical - can't be empirical, because we can't demonstrate the connection with pain as we can demonstrate the connection between rain and rainbows. — Ludwig V

I agree that grimacing and "I am in pain" are connected to pain, and provide me with grounds for saying that "S is in pain"”

As you say, the connection is not empirical, as is the connection between rain and rainbows.

But seeing a dog writhing on the floor in what seems to be in pain, no one would not try to help the dog. Few would say that because there is no empirical connection between the dog’s behaviour and its inner feeling, one may as well walk on by.

An axe is also a mass of metal at the end of a handle, so is a mace (as used in battle). All these objects were constructed so that they could be used in certain ways. The fact that one could use a spanner or a rock as a hammer does not contradict that. What something is and what it does are intertwined and not usually separable in the way you suggest. — Ludwig V

On the one hand, a rock can hammer in a nail, such that what a rock is is different to what a rock can do.

On the other hand, as you point out, a hammer was designed for a purpose, and it is true that what a hammer is is as a result of what a hammer does.

But even though what a hammer is as a result of what a hammer does, once the hammer has been created, the hammer exists as it is independently of any use, of what it can do.

For example, once the hammer has been created, it can be used in many different ways, of which knocking a nail into wood is only one. What the hammer is is not limited by one particular use, is not limited by only one thing that it can do.

Wittgenstein is saying the same thing, in that the meaning of a word such as “slab” depends on its context. Wittgenstein in PI is saying that what a word is not fixed by one thing it can do.

Doesn't, "an abstract idea that serves as a foundation for more concrete principles", say to you, "logical structure with formal rules"? What else, other than a logical structure with formal rules, could serve as a foundation for concrete principles? — Metaphysician Undercover

Let the concrete principle be “don’t touch a hot stove” and the abstract concept be “touching a hot stove causes pain”. A logical structure can be thought of as synonymous with formal rules.

Where are the formal rules in the abstract concept that touching a hot stove causes pain?

Think of it like chess. If you don’t know chess, you can’t use the move castling. You can treat it as something happening in the game, ask what it is, watch, imitate, get corrected, and finely learn. The meaning of castling just is its role in the game, but you only grasp that role by learning the game. — Sam26

In PI 43, Wittgenstein wrote “the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” We could apply this to chess and say “the meaning of the rule of castling is its use in the game of chess”

When playing chess, there are two stages a person goes through. First as a beginner learning castling and then as an expert using castling.

You support the idea of “meaning as use”.

To simplify matters for the moment, I will only look at a chess player who already knows the rules of chess.

One of the rules of chess is castling. There are two aspects to castling, what it does and what it is.

What something does is different to what something is. For example, a hammer does jobs such as knock nails into wood but is a mass of metal at the end of a handle. What a hammer is is prior to what a hammer does. The hammer did not become a mass of metal at the end of a handle because it was used to knock nails into wood, the hammer was a mass of metal at the end of a handle before it was used to knock nails into wood.

What something is is prior to what it does.

What castling does is external to castling. Castling has a use in the game of chess, it has a role in the game of chess and is one of the rules of the game of chess. Castling has a meaning within the game of chess because it has a use within the game of chess.

What castling is is internal to castling. Castling means moving the king two squares towards a rook and then moving that rook to the square the king crossed over. But the rule of castling exists within the game of chess even if never used within a game. The rule of castling exists prior to any use.

What castling does is different from what it is. It is true that as regards what it does, it has a meaning because of how it is used in the game of chess. But as regards what it is, castling has a meaning even if never used within a game of chess.

I would not use the word "concept" here. I think concepts are logical structures with formal rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

From Wikipedia - Concept

A concept is an abstract idea that serves as a foundation for more concrete principles, thoughts, and beliefs. For example, a basic-level concept would be "chair". A concept is instantiated (reified) by all of its actual or potential instances, whether these are things in the real world or other ideas.

I have never thought of a concept as a logical structure with formal rules. For example, if I think of the concept of a slab, there is no logical structure to my thoughts of slabs and there are no rules limiting my thoughts of slabs.

If "I am in pain" refers to hidden inner pain, then, surely, it is not hidden. — Ludwig V

It is possible to refer to hidden things. For example, if I see a broken window, I can say that something caused it to break. What caused the window to break may be unknown, but I can still refer to this unknown something.
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"Ouch!" isn't part of language, so it can't refer to anything. — Ludwig V

I agree that uttering ouch is not part of language, but saying “ouch!” must be part of language. As it is the nature of language that every expression must refer to something, “ouch!” must also refer to something.
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"S is in pain" — Ludwig V

As regards language, there is form and content. How does language work?

The form of language, the symbols used, is as much a physical thing in the world as grimacing, and both are empirically observable. The form of language is as empirically observable in the world as a person’s behaviour, such as grimacing. It is the form that gives clues to the content, in that observing someone grimace gives clues to their being in pain. If, when I feel pain, I instinctively grimace, then when I observe someone also grimacing, it is a reasonable assumption that they also are in pain.

As the form of grimacing gives clues to the inner feeling of being in pain, the form of the linguistic statement “I am in pain” must also gives clues to the inner feeling of being in pain.

This suggests that is the form of the linguistic expression “I am in pain” that gives us clues about the speaker’s inner feelings rather than the content of the linguistic expression “I am in pain”.

So, yes, the meaning of "beetle" preceeds you, and you learn it, and then you know it, and based on that knowledge you use it. — Dawnstorm

Person A sees a beetle in the world which causes a thought in their mind of a beetle. It may be that when they see a beetle in the world they also see alongside it in the world the name “beetle”. They can then begin to associate their private thought of a beetle with the public name “beetle”.

Person B sees the same beetle in the world which causes a thought in their mind of a beetle. It may be that when they see a beetle in the world they also see alongside it in the world the name “beetle”. They can then begin to associate their private thought of a beetle with the public name “beetle”.

Person A can then say “I saw a beetle” to person B, who will then know what person A means.

It may well be that my-red-is-your-green, and the beetle in person A’s mind is different to the beetle in person B’s mind, but as regards language this doesn't matter because the common factor is the beetle in the world, which is the same for both persons A and B.

Language is not communicating the private thought of person A to person B, because their private thoughts may be different, but is communicating the knowledge to person B that person A is thinking of the same observable, empirical fact in the world.

Language can be used to communicate knowledge between people because public facts have private meanings.
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When you know that the water in this tub is 36° Celsius, then that knowledge has no influence at all on the temperature. — Dawnstorm

If there is a beetle in the world, this is a public fact, independent of private thoughts.
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When you know the word "beetle" means [beetle] (square bracket for the private meaning that - according to Wittgenstein - drops out - if I'm not mistaken), then you use the word "beetle" to mean {beetle} (squiggly brackets for a token in a language game). — Dawnstorm

On the one hand the private beetle drops out of the language game, but on the other hand the private beetle cannot drop out altogether otherwise the mind would be an empty blankness, and there would not be any language game at all.

What I had in mind was more like the difference between the dictionary definition of a word, and what the word actually means in any particular set of circumstances (context). — Metaphysician Undercover

If I understand:

My concept of “slab” must be similar to yours, but cannot be the same as yours, because we have experienced different Forms of Life.

Because we have learnt our concepts of “slab” through an extensive personal Form of Life, our concepts are too complex to be defined.

Our concepts of “slab” probably generally overlap, but it is unavoidable that sometimes my concept of “slab” will be different to yours.

Your objection assumes you need meaning first and then use, but the actual learning process runs the other way, you enter the use through training, and that’s what we later call “knowing the meaning.” — Sam26

That is true, there needs to be a learning process in order to learn what an utterance means.

On the first day, the builder says “niletee ubamba” to the assistant. The assistant does not know what this utterance means, it is only a sound. The builder then physically brings a slab and again says “niletree ubamba”. The assistant guesses that the builder wants him to bring a slab, and so the assistant brings a slab to the builder.

The next day, when the assistant hears the builder say “niletree ubamba”, the assistant already knows what it means, and immediately brings a slab to the builder.

Once the assistant knows that the utterance “niletree ubamba” means bring a slab, the assistant knows that the utterance is being used to bring a slab.

We learn the meaning of an utterance by comparing the utterance to observed behaviours, and once we have learnt the meaning of the utterance, as you rightly say, we are “knowing the meaning”.

Once the assistant knows the meaning of the utterance “niletree ubamba”, rather than just being a sound, this ensures that language now has a use.

I think you ought to consider that "use" has two principal meanings, one referring to the universal, the other the particular. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see what you mean.

There is the universal aspect, in that the function (meaning) of a word is to be used in a language game and there is the particular aspect, in that the meaning of a word is its use in the language game.

Suppose someone says to you “niletee ubamba".

There is the universal aspect, in that the function (meaning) of the expression is to be used in a language game. I assume there is agreement about this.

The problem is the particular aspect. The problem is, how can you respond to an utterance if you don’t know what the utterance means. You must know what the utterance means before being able to respond to it.

The language game would not work if we did not know what utterances meant prior to being able to respond to them.

The problem is the picture behind your P2. “Language is a set of words with meanings” treats meanings as already attached to words and then collected into language. Witt’s move is the reverse, language is a practice, a way of using signs in activities with teaching, correction, and going on, and in that practice, we speak of words/concepts as having meanings, often just their use. — Sam26

If some says to you “niletee ubamba", how do you use that statement, act on that statement, if you don’t know what it means?

Can you give a practical example of how you use the utterance “niletee ubamba” without knowing what it means?

If Frank and Russell are treating meaning as an inner object or a foundation that must be supplied first, then yes, that’s the confusion. — Sam26

If someone says to you “niletee ubamba”, how do you know If you are meant to act, and if you know you are meant to act, how do you act?

Because I know that “niletee ubamba” means “bring me a slab", I know exactly what to do, take them a slab.

But what exactly is the mechanism for you knowing what to do if the meaning of the utterance “niletee ubamba” is irrelevant?

(Edit) If you don't know what "niletee ubamba" means, then how do you know what to do?

We say a word has meaning insofar as it can be learned, applied, explained, corrected, and understood. — Sam26

There is a problem here with language, similar to Cargo Cult Thinking, where a person might mimic the usage of a word without understanding the underlying concept.

I can learn that a quark is “any of a class of six fundamental fermions” without it having any meaning to me.
An AI when asked can apply the expression “a quark is any of a class of six fundamental fermions” without knowing what it means’
I can explain that “a quark is any of a class of six fundamental fermions” without knowing what it means.
I can correct someone when they say that “a quark is any of a class of two fundamental fermions” without knowing what it means.
I can understand that “a quark is any of a class of six fundamental fermions” without knowing what it means.

It is a more general epistemological problem. How do we know what “quark” means?

First, P2 is not Wittgenstein’s view. — Sam26

P2 was intended to be Wittgenstein’s view, but I can reword:
P2 Language is a set of words having meanings, where the meaning of a word is its use in language
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P1 isn’t a premise in any Wittgensteinian argument, — Sam26

From PI 43

For a large class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ the word “meaning” it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

I would have thought that P1 “The meaning of a word is its use in the language” is quite central to Wittgenstein’s argument.
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Wittgenstein's view seems to be:

P1 The meaning of a word is its use in language
P2 Language is a set of words having meanings, where the meaning of a word is its use in language
C1 The meaning of a word is its use in a set of words having meanings, where the meaning of a word is its use in language

This still seems a fallacious circular argument.