By contrast, the premise “the mind is only directly aware of the senses” is not a law of logic; it is a substantive epistemological thesis. — Esse Quam Videri

I agree that my premise was wrong.

I am using perception in the sense of cognition, rather than seeing.

We need premises that the IR and DR can agree on, such as:

There is no absolute definition of a word, such as direct or indirect, but usage should be normative within language.
There is a mind-external object.
An object is perceived by the mind.
We can have many different types of perceptions about a mind-external object, such as sight, sound, touch, taste, feel, smell, but all these perceptions are mediated by our senses.
There is a causal chain from the mind-external object to the object perceived in the mind.
The links in the causal chain are of a different kind, in that the perception of a colour in the mind is of a different kind to the neural activity in the brain, is of a different kind to the electrical signal in the optic nerve and is of a different kind to the wavelength of light between the eye and the mind-external object.
The senses mediate between the object perceived in the mind and the mind-external object.
We are not perceiving the links of the chain, we are perceiving the content of the links as an object.
The perception of the object and the links in the causal chain have been caused by the mind-external object.
The links in the causal chain are temporal, in that each link has been directly caused by the previous link.
I cannot directly perceive the cause of a link, as the cause of each link is temporally prior to the link.
Only the present time exists. Therefore, I can only directly perceive the present time and my memories of the past. Therefore, I can only indirectly perceive the past.
The DR believes that they directly perceive an object, and the object they perceive is the same object as the object in the mind-external world.
The IR believes that they directly perceive an object, but there is no reason to think that the object they perceive is the same object as the object in the mind-external world.

Therefore:

As I can only directly perceive the present, any object I perceive must exist in the present. An object can only exist in the mind in the present as a memory.

Therefore, I cannot directly perceive the mind-external object, as the mind-external object was at the beginning of a temporal causal chain, and I cannot directly perceive something that was in the past.

I can say that I have direct cognition of the object because the object that I am directly cognizing is in the present and in my memory. I have indirect cognition of the mind-external object because I cannot have direct cognition of the past.

When I cognize about a mind-external object in my mind, I am cognizing about something that no longer exists, and because it no longer exists, is now an illusion.

I think this makes the disagreement very clear, and it turns on a specific claim you’re making: that it is logically impossible for the human mind to directly know how things are in a mind-external world, because everything we know comes through the senses. — Esse Quam Videri

Your reply gives me plenty of food for thought.

Yes, I am saying that it is logically impossible for the mind to directly know how things are in a mind-external world, whereas you propose that the Direct Realist says that it is possible for the mind to directly know how things are in a mind-external world.

Perhaps it comes down to whether one accepts the rules of logic or not. I agree that logic is beyond justification.

For example, either one accepts the Law of Identity or one doesn’t. No amount of argument is going to prove that “whatever is, is”. No amount of argument is going to prove the Law of Contradiction, “nothing can both be and not be.' No amount of argument is going to prove the Law of Excluded Middle, that “Everything must either be or not be.' Logic is beyond explanation, It is something one either accepts or doesn’t accept.

Taking another example, the premises "Mars is red" and "Mars is a planet" support the conclusion "Mars is a red planet". The premises “the mind is only directly aware of the senses” and “the senses mediate between the mind and the mind-external world” support the conclusion "the mind cannot be directly aware of a mind-external world”.

Yes, it may be that the Direct Realist does not accept the logic that the mind cannot be directly aware of a mind-external world, but no amount of argument is going to persuade them otherwise.

A sensation can prompt, occasion, or constrain a judgment, but it is the judgment that takes responsibility for saying how things are and can therefore be assessed as correct or incorrect. — Esse Quam Videri

There are two aspects to sensations and being truth-apt.

If I perceive a bent stick, then it is always true that I perceive a bent stick, therefore not truth-apt.

But if I perceive a bent stick and that is not how things are in the world, then it is not true that if I perceive a bent stick then in the world there is a bent stick. This is not a judgement. This is about how things are in the world. Perceptions can be truth-apt independent of any judgments made about them.

I can then make the judgement that “if I perceive a bent stick then in the world there is a straight stick”, and this judgement is certainly truth-apt.

As regards epistemic role, not only does a sensation take a responsibility in being about how things are or are not in the world but also judgement takes a responsibility in arriving at a proposition that is either true or false.

I think what’s really at issue here is how we understand truth and directness. On my view, truth doesn’t consist in a resemblance or mirroring between what’s in the mind and what’s in the world, but in a judgment’s being correct or incorrect depending on how things are — Esse Quam Videri

Basically the choice between Indirect Reason and Direct Reason.

The question is, is it logically possible for the human mind to know “how things are” in a mind-external world.

Everything the human mind knows about the mind-external world comes through the five senses, meaning that it is logically impossible to know about the mind-external world independently of the human senses.
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I realize this may sound like I’m simply assuming that judgments can be answerable to the world, but every account of truth has to take something as basic; — Esse Quam Videri

You are assuming the human mind can know about the mind-external world, but how is this logically possible? How is it possible to know what broke the window just by looking at the window? How is it possible to know the cause of our sensation of the colour red just from the sensation itself?

I directly perceive the colour red in my senses.

I reason about a causal chain that has caused my perception, such that in the world is a wavelength of light that enters my eye, and travels up my optic nerve as an electrical signal to arrive at my brain which I then perceive as the colour red.

I know my perception of the colour red directly. I know about the wavelength of light indirectly by looking at the display on a spectrometer. I know about the electrical signal indirectly by looking at the display on an oscilloscope.

Therefore, I only know about the wavelength and electrical signal indirectly by looking directly at a screen. This means that all my direct knowledge is visual, and from this direct visual knowledge I can indirectly reason about the causal chain.

From my direct visual knowledge of my perception of colour and directly looking at the screen of an spectrometer and oscilloscope I can indirectly reason about the causal chain that caused my perception of the colour red using “inference to the best explanation”.

It is logically impossible to directly know the cause of what I perceive, although I can indirectly reason about the cause of what I perceive.

The Indirect Realist uses “inference to the best explanation” to indirectly reason about the mind-external world.

The Direct Realist mistakenly believes that they can directly know the cause of an effect. They believe that they can directly know the cause in the mind-external world of their perceiving the colour red in their mind. Yet for the mind to directly know the mind-external is a logical impossibility.

We can indirectly infer using reason “how things are” in the mind-external world, but it is a logically impossibility for the human mind to directly know “how things are” in the mind-external world.

I mean something closer to this: when we make judgments, we are implicitly adopting standards of correctness (e.g. truth, evidence, coherence, reasonableness). — Esse Quam Videri

The word "judgment" means deciding what is true or false. What is true or false means being answerable to how things are.

In this sense, yes, as definitions can be normative, judgement is here a normative definition.
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That is why judgments — not sensations — belong in the space of reasons. — Esse Quam Videri

Reason could not exist without sensations. The very existence of reason depends on sensations. I can only reason “if I see a red screen in my mind then there is a red screen in the world" if I have the sensation “I see a red screen”.
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Sensation constrains judgment, but it does not itself enter into justification or inference. — Esse Quam Videri

It depends what you mean by “enter into”.

A judgement could not exist without sensations. The very existence of a judgement depends on sensations. I can only judge “if I see a red screen in my mind then there is a red screen in the world" if I have the sensation “I see a red screen”.

When looking at either a ship or a photograph of a ship, both the Semantic Direct Realist (SDR) and Indirect Realist agree that perception is indirect through a causal chain and cognition direct.

Where the SDR and Indirect Realist disagree is where this directly cognized ship exists.

The Indirect Realist believes that the ship they perceive exists in the mind as a particular instantiation of their concept of ship, caused by something that exists in a mind-external world that is unknown.

The SDR believes that the ship they perceive exists in the mind as a particular instantiation of their concept of ship, caused by something that exists in a mind-external world that is the same as what they perceive in their mind.

So in the mind of the SDR is something that weighs 10,000 tonnes, is 200m long, 25 m wide and 30m tall. But this is obviously not the case.

The SDR says that they are directly cognizing the ship in the mind-external world, but if in the mind of the SDR there is no direct cognition of a weight of 10,000 tonnes, length of 200m, width of 25m and height of 30m, then what exactly is the SDR directly cognizing? The idea of a ship?

My claim was not that single judgments are reliable, infallible, or likely to be correct. Epistemic authority is not a matter of probability, reliability over isolated cases, or confidence in one-off judgments. It concerns what kind of act is even eligible to be assessed as correct or incorrect at all. — Esse Quam Videri

Based on the Merriam Webster Dictionary, normative means conforming to norms, and norms means a principle that ought to be followed.

I agree that humans ought to be continually making judgements, such as “if I see an orange screen in my mind then there is an orange screen in the world”.

You use the word “authority”. A judgement cannot give itself authority. Any authority must come from outside the judgement. By what authority ought I to be continually making judgments? Where does this authority come from? What gives me the authority to make judgments?
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Sensation, as you agree, is not truth-apt. Judgments are. — Esse Quam Videri

As you say, a sensation cannot be wrong, is not truth-apt, but a judgement can be wrong, is truth-apt.

Surely, If we are looking to an authority, we would prefer an authority that cannot be wrong, such as the senses, rather than an authority that is more often than not wrong, such as a judgement.

That I see an orange screen in my senses is authoritatively foundational to my subsequent reasoning, yet my judgement that “if I see an orange screen in my mind then there is a green unicorn in the world” has no authority in my reasoning about the world.
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Likewise, the normativity I’m invoking is not the moral norm “you ought to judge,” — Esse Quam Videri

Is not the normal use of the word “normative” a moral norm, such as “you ought not smoke”
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Epistemic authority lies in judgment because judgment alone is answerable to truth — even when, and especially when, it turns out to be wrong. — Esse Quam Videri

The problem is we give no authority to a judgement just because it is a judgement. We give authority to the content of a judgement.

For example, we give no authority to the judgement that “if I see an orange screen in my mind then there is a green unicorn in the world” just because it is a judgement. We give authority to the content of the judgement.

That is also why sensory experience, while indispensable, cannot itself function as an inferential premise. Sensation is not the kind of thing that can be right or wrong. Judgment is. And that difference is where epistemic authority resides. — Esse Quam Videri

It is possible to infer from a single sensory experience, such as “I see an orange screen”, what exists in a mind-external world, but the probability of being correct is remote.

It is also possible to commit oneself to the judgement that “if I see an orange screen then there is an orange screen in the world”, but again the probability of being correct is remote.

I agree that a sensory experience is not truth-apt whilst a judgement is.

As it is unlikely that any inference from a single sensory experience will be correct, it is also unlikely that any single judgement will be correct either.

There is the normative claim “you ought not to be smoking”

There is also the normative claim “I ought to commit myself to making a judgement". I agree that it is not the content of the judgement that is normative but rather the act of committing oneself to making a judgement that is normative.

However, a judgement being normative does not make it any more likely to be correct than a descriptive judgement. There is no reason why a normative judgement that one is committed will be more correct that a descriptive judgement one is not committed to.

Epistemic authority resides neither in a single sensory experience such as “I see an orange screen” nor in a single normative judgement, such as “I ought to commit myself to making a judgement".

We must look elsewhere for epistemic authority.

First, when I speak of normativity, I am not talking about moral norms (e.g. “evil is bad”), but epistemic normativity: truth, falsity, correctness, and justification. To make a judgment is to take on a set of epistemic responsibilities. That normativity is constitutive of judgment, not something inferred from experience or imposed by the will, and it is independent of any moral “ought”. — Esse Quam Videri

Suppose you make the judgement that if you see an orange screen in your mind then there is an orange screen in the world.

Your judgement is true if when you see an orange screen in your mind then there is an orange screen in the world.

What makes your judgement normative rather than descriptive?

In society, the rule “you should not smoke indoors” is normative because it is controlled by the law.

In life, the rule “evil is bad” is normative because it is part of an innate, human nature.

You say your judgement is not normative because of any phenomenal experiences or will of the mind.

Then what exactly makes your judgements normative rather than descriptive?

The indirect realist sees the causal chain and says that perception is indirect. The direct realist sees the chain and point out that the chain is how we know about the ship. — Banno

The indirect realist reads the book The Republic by Plato and says that our knowledge about Socrates is indirect. The direct realist reads the book and says that the book is how we know about Socrates.

Both are true.

Our knowledge about the ship is indirect because it has come directly from the causal chain.

The indirect realist is referring to the ship. The direct realist is referring to the causal chain.

Your reply nicely clarifies the remaining disagreement. — Esse Quam Videri

I may perhaps now understand your position.

Rationalism vs Empiricism

In the grand debate between Rationalism and Empiricism, I would tend to position myself with the Empiricists, such as Hume, where knowledge comes from a combination of sense experience and a reflection on such sense experiences.

I am thinking that you would position yourself with the Rationalists, such as Descartes, where there are significant ways in which our knowledge is gained independently of sense experience.

Nothing is fixed, but the Rationalists tend to align themselves with Direct Realism, as they propose a direct relationship with the world through reason, and the Empiricists tend to align themselves with Indirect Reason, as they rely more on sensory input (SEP - Rationalism vs Empiricism)

However, in that nothing is fixed, I also support Kant’s attempt to bring Rationalism and Empiricism together through Transcendental Idealism.

Evil is bad

As an empiricist, I would tend to judge that “evil is bad” from observations of the world, whereas, as you say, such a judgement should be the normative “I ought to judge that evil is bad” independent of any observations of the world.

I agree that such a normative judgement does not infer Idealism.

Epistemic norms are conditions for the possibility of inquiry, not constituents of reality. To say that judgment is norm-governed independently of experience is not to say the world is mental, but that knowing has irreducible normative structure.@Esse Quam Videri

The empiricist would tend to the belief that from observing that evil is bad, their descriptive judgement would be that evil is bad.

The rationalist would tend to the belief that an observation of evil must be bad, because their normative judgement is that evil is bad.

The difference is a direction of fit: the empiricist from the world to the mind, the rationalist from the mind to the world.

Orange screens

The empiricist would tend to the belief that when I am seeing orange in my mind then I can infer that there is an orange screen in the world, and then make the descriptive judgement that “I am seeing orange in my mind because there is an orange screen in the world”

The rationalist would tend to the normative judgement that because “I ought to be seeing orange in the mind because there is an orange screen in the world”, then when I am seeing orange in my mind then there should be an orange screen in the world.

As you say, "That is where we part ways."

But inference requires propositional, truth-apt premises. — Esse Quam Videri

I agree.
The major premise is the judgement = the screen is orange in the world if I am seeing orange in my mind.
The minor premise is the senses = I am seeing orange in my mind.
The conclusion is the inference = the screen is orange in the world.
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That leaves you with a dilemma:
If “I am seeing orange” is truth-apt, then it is already a judgment and your staged model collapses.
If it is not truth-apt, then it cannot function as a premise, and the claim that stage-three judgments are inferred from it does not follow. — Esse Quam Videri

The minor premise “I am seeing orange” is not truth-apt. The major premise is truth-apt.
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This is why I’ve insisted that perceptual judgments are not inferred from sensory contents — Esse Quam Videri

I agree.
The perceptual judgement that the screen is orange in the world is inferred from both sensory content in the mind, I am seeing orange, and the judgement in the mind that “if I am seeing orange in my mind than the screen is orange in the world”
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On my view, representation, truth, and epistemic authority belong at the level of judgment, not sensation. — Esse Quam Videri

As regards representation, the orange I see in my mind represents the screen being orange in the world. As regards truth, my judgement that "if I am seeing orange in my mind then the screen is orange in the world" is true if the screen is orange in the world
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o the issue isn’t whether the senses mediate our contact with the world — I agree they do — but whether that mediation is inferential and representational, or whether judgment is norm-governed and answerable to how things are without being derived from inner items. That is the point at which we diverge. — Esse Quam Videri

I judge evil to be bad because of what I observe in a mind-external world

The normative I ought to judge that evil is bad Is made prior to any observations of a mind-external world, which still suggests Idealism.

Sensory experience supplies data that constrains inquiry, but it does not supply premises from which judgments about the world are inferred. — Esse Quam Videri

Inferences

I see a wet umbrella and infer that it is raining outside. In my senses I am seeing orange and infer that in the world the screen is orange.

I see a wet umbrella and I am seeing orange are conceptual, because both umbrella and orange are concepts.

They are neither truth-apt nor judgements, because if I see a wet umbrella then I see a wet umbrella, and if I am seeing orange then I am seeing orange.

It is raining outside and the screen is orange are truth-apt, because either they are true or they are false. It may be that I see a wet umbrella and it is not raining outside. It may be that I am seeing orange and the screen is not orange.

Premises
Major premise - all humans are mortal
Minor premise - Socrates is human
Conclusion - Socrates is mortal

Major premise - Umbrellas get wet in the rain
Minor premise - I see a wet umbrella
Conclusion - it is raining

Major premise - the screen is orange if I am seeing orange
Minor premise - I am seeing orange
Conclusion - the screen is orange

The major premise is the judgement in the mind using reason, and is truth-apt.
The minor premise is what I sense, and is not truth-apt.
The conclusion is a state of affairs in the world, which may or may not obtain as a fact, and so is truth-apt.

Inference requires premises that are truth-apt — Esse Quam Videri

I agree. In order to infer from seeing orange in my senses that the screen is orange in the world, I need to have the major premise “the screen is orange if I am seeing orange”, which is a judgement based on reason, and is truth-apt

So either stage two is truth-apt, in which case it already is a judgment and your staged model collapses, or it is not truth-apt, in which case the claim that stage-three judgments are inferred from it does not follow. — Esse Quam Videri

In stage two of perception, I am seeing orange in my senses. This is not truth-apt, because if I am seeing orange then I am seeing orange.

My judgement that “the screen is orange if I am seeing orange” is my major premise, and is truth-apt, in that the premise may be true or false.

If I am seeing orange in my senses, and have judged that “the screen is orange in the world if I am seeing orange in my senses”, then I infer that the screen is orange in the world.

What I deny is that mediation entails inferential grounding. — Esse Quam Videri

Seeing orange in my senses mediates between my judgement “the screen is orange in the world if I am seeing orange in my senses”, and my inference that the screen is orange in the world.

In this sense, mediation plus judgement is the ground for inference.

The epistemic work is done at the level of judgement itself, not by moving outward from inner representations. — Esse Quam Videri

Judgement by itself is insufficient to know anything about any mind-external world. The judgement “the screen is orange in the world if I am seeing orange in my senses” tells us nothing about any mind-external world.

If I am seeing orange in my senses then, if my judgement is true, the screen is orange in the world.

As the word “house” in language represents a house in the world, my seeing orange in my senses represents an orange screen in the world. A representation links the mind to any mind-external world.

The epistemic work is achieved by judgements about our sensations, which, if true, enables the mind to represent any mind-external world.

So the disagreement isn’t about whether the “bridge of the senses” must be crossed — it’s about what crossing that bridge amounts to: inferential reconstruction from inner items, or norm-governed judgment constrained by experience but not inferentially derived from it. — Esse Quam Videri

From observing many phenomenal experiences I can derive judgements, such as “the screen is orange in the world if I am seeing orange in my senses”. From the principle of “Confirmation Holism”, each judgement must be supported by other judgements in a coherent whole. If my judgements do become part of a coherent set of judgements, then my confidence in each judgement will necessarily increase. All these judgements require the mediation of the senses. All these judgements require “the bridge to be crossed” if any are to have any validity.

There are no normative judgements about what ought to be independent of phenomenal experiences in the senses. My judgement that “the screen is orange in the world if I am seeing orange in my senses” finds its justification in “Confirmation Holism”, where each judgement must be supported by other judgements in a coherent whole. My judgement that “the screen is orange in the world if I am seeing orange in my senses” cannot find its justification as a normative “because it ought to be”.

However, I can understand that normative judgements of what ought to be could exist within Idealism, where reality is a mental construct and there is no mind-external world. Where reality is a mental construct, then we could construct normative judgements about what ought to be.

I can only speak for myself on this, but I do not reject the idea that knowledge is mediated by the senses. — Esse Quam Videri

To my understanding of perception:

Stage one is the mental, introspective, singular, particular phenomenal experience in the senses when the eye is directed at a wavelength of say 630nm. This is neither conceptual nor truth-apt. As you say, it is not a normative act.

The key issue here is that sensation is not a normative act. This means it is not conceptual and is not truth-apt – it is simply not the kind of thing from which the rest of our knowledge could be inferred.@Esse Quam Videri

Stage two is the introspective awareness that “I am seeing orange”. This is conceptual, as “orange” is a concept. This is not truth-apt, and therefore not a judgement, because if I see orange then I see orange. Stage two is not an introspective judgement.

That’s not to say that we can’t make judgments about sensory content – we can (“I am seeing red”) – but this is not what we ordinarily mean by the word “perception”. Instead, this is a reflexive, second-order kind of judgment more commonly referred to as “introspection”.@Esse Quam Videri

Stage three is the introspective judgement that “the screen is orange”. Such a judgement is conceptual, because “screen” is a concept. The judgement is truth-apt on the assumption that there is a mind-external world where there are such things as screens. “The screen” is referring to something mind-external. I agree that introspective judgements about something mind-external are constrained by sensory content, but disagree that they are not inferred from sensory content. How can we get knowledge about any mind-external world if not from our sensations? What other way is there to get knowledge about a mind-external world if not from our sensations?

By contrast, judgment is conceptual and truth-apt. The act of judgment is part of the norm-governed process of inquiry. So, while judgments are constrained by sensory content, they are not inferred from sensory content. As we argued above, this would be impossible.@Esse Quam Videri

The only information we have about any mind-external world is through our five senses. Therefore our perceptual judgement that “the screen is orange” of logical necessity must be based on our sensations. I agree that we are not making any judgement about the sensory content “I am seeing orange”, because no judgement is needed to know that “I am seeing orange”. But we are making judgements about what the sensory content represents, in that we are judging by inference that “I see orange” in the mind represents in a mind-external world “the screen is orange”. We can only make judgements about things in any mind-external world by inferring from sensory content in the mind.

When we make perceptual judgments we are not making judgments about sensory content. We are making judgments about things in the world (“there is a ship”).

I agree that epistemic authority belongs to judgement about how things actually are. Judgement exists in the mind and how things actually are exists in a mind-external world. Between the mind and a mind-external world are the five senses, meaning that if we are to know anything about a mind-external world it is inevitable that the bridge that is our senses must be crossed.

but epistemic authority belongs to judgment, which is governed by norms of sufficiency, relevance, and answerability to how things actually are.@Esse Quam Videri

From what you say, if there is no need to cross the bridge of our senses, this suggests to me that your position is that of Idealism. There are many kinds of Idealism, but fundamentally, Idealism asserts that reality is entirely a mental construct, which is also why you don’t support the realism of either the direct or indirect realist.

Once that distinction is in view, the need to “bridge” phenomenal experience via IBE (inference to the best explanation) largely dissolves.

I’ve also acknowledged that my own view does not count as traditional naïve realism. My point is that it does not count as traditional indirect realism either.@Esse Quam Videri

All of this is presented as implicitly rejecting the idea that meanings are fixed by hidden reference-makers (phenomenal or physical), and treating meaning instead as constituted by the public criteria governing a word’s use within a practice. — Hanover

Where is the meaning of a word fixed?

Each individual has five senses. All information about anything external to the individual can only pass through the individual's five senses.

The Direct Realist believes each individual has direct cognition of a public sphere with its public language game. The Direct Realist believes that such a public sphere exists independently of any mind.

The Indirect Realist believes that each individual can only infer such a public sphere by reasoning about experiences perceived in their five senses.

Therefore, for the Direct Realist, meaning is fixed in a public sphere independent of any mind. For the Indirect Realist, meaning is fixed in each individual’s mind by reasoning about experiences perceived in their five senses.

Your view seems to reject the representational aspect while still treating experience as epistemically primary, whereas I would want to reject both. — Esse Quam Videri

As an Indirect Realist, it would be illogical to reject any representational aspect, and not sensible not to treat phenomenal experience as epistemically primary.

My understanding is that:

The Indirect Realist avoids external world scepticism by deriving concepts based on consistencies in these phenomenal experiences. Using these concepts, which can represent, the Indirect Realist can then rationally employ "inference to the best explanation” to draw conclusions about an external world causing these phenomenal experiences.

It can be said that there are three temporal stages in perception.

Stage one. Phenomenal experiences, such as when we look at a wavelength of 736nm
Stage two. Mental concepts based on phenomenal experiences, such as perceiving red light
Stage three. Judgements about what these concepts represent, such that red light represents stop.

Sense data is introduced at stage two. As Betrand Russell wrote in The Problems of Philosophy:

Let us give the name of "sense-data" to the things that are immediately known in sensation: such things as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on. We shall give the name "sensation" to the experience of being immediately aware of these things .... If we are to know anything about the table, it must be by means of the sense-data - brown colour, oblong shape, smoothness, etc. -which we associate with the table.

It is in the nature of a judgement in stage three that any judgement could be wrong. This is why it is called a judgement. To negate all judgements because one judgement might be wrong would be to contradict the very meaning of the word.

All three stages are essential to both Indirect and Direct Realism.

As regards stage one, without phenomenal experiences, humans would be imprisoned in a dark and soundless room. As regards stage two, without the prior concept of ship, when looking at the singular instantiation of an object, no one would be able to say “I see a ship”. As regards stage three, no one would be able to judge that a set of perceived concepts represents a ship.

There is phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR), direct perception and direct cognition, and Semantic Direct Realism (SDR), indirect perception and direct cognition.

I would imagine that most Direct Realists on this thread believe in SDR, as few would not admit that when we see a ship we directly see the light entering the eye from the ship, in that, as has been said, we don't directly put our eyeball on the ship.

Both the Indirect Realist and SDR can say “I see a ship”, even though for both it is through the intermediary of light entering the eye, and for both illusions and hallucinations are possible. The linguistic expression “I see a ship” as part of a communal language can be understood by all those using the same language game, regardless of any metaphysical implications. If pressed, the IR may say “I see the wavelength of light as a ship” and the SDR may say “I see a ship by means of a wavelength of light”, but for convenience, to say “I see a ship” is perfectly understandable.

The Indirect Realist and the SDR differ in that the SDR believes that their judgements can transcend their phenomenal experiences, whereas the Indirect Realist doesn’t.

Between the mind and any external world are the five senses. The mind only knows what passes through these five senses. Therefore, for the Indirect Realist, anything we think we know about any external world comes indirectly from “inference to the best explanation”. However, for the Direct Realist, we are able to transcend these five senses and directly know about any external world.

One question for believers in SDR is how they explain their judgements are able to transcend their phenomenal experiences

Yes, that’s broadly how I see it. Phenomenal experience is particular and non-conceptual, and for that reason it isn’t the kind of thing that can represent the world accurately or inaccurately. — Esse Quam Videri

Yes, in this respect, your position and that of the Indirect Realist is the same, in that phenomenal experience is non-conceptual and therefore cannot represent the world at all.

The Indirect Realist avoids external world scepticism by deriving concepts based on consistencies in these phenomenal experiences. Using these concepts, which can represent, the Indirect Realist can then rationally employ "inference to the best explanation” to draw conclusions about an external world causing these phenomenal experiences.

My understanding is that, traditionally, indirect realism has held that phenomenal experience (1) does not justify our knowledge because (2) it functions as an inaccurate representation of the world — Esse Quam Videri

I may have a phenomenal experience, which is a singular, specific and particular experience. Some call it a “qualia”, which may or may not be a useful term.

I may perceive a red circle, and this red circle may represent stop, where red, circle and stop are all concepts. Only a set of concepts may represent another concept.

As a phenomenal experience is not a concept it cannot represent anything, whether accurately or inaccurately.

There are different types of judgements. — Corvus

:100:

The burning pain and colour red are totally different things. The pain is your feeling, but the colour red is in the space out there. The perception of the colour red in your mind is your judgement, nothing to do with the colour red out there in the space. — Corvus

Pain is a feeling. As you say, when I feel pain, I don’t need to think about it for a while and judge that I feel pain.

Are you saying that when you see the colour red you have to think about it for a while and then make the judgement that you are seeing red rather than green, for example.

This is different to naming your feelings, which does require a judgement.

I would have thought they neither seeing a red colour nor feeling a burning pain require any judgement. Both seeing the colour red and feeling a burning pain must be immediate feelings and not judgements.

If that is the case, and both are feelings, why should one feeling, burning pain, not exist in the external world yet another feeling, the colour red, does exist in an external world?

Put another way, if you believe that the colour red exists in the external world outside the mind, then how do you know that a burning pain does not exist in the external world outside the mind?

The external objects such as chairs, tables, cars and postbox and colour of reds don't exist in your mind. You are just thinking, imagining and remembering about them. — Corvus

You see the colour red. You feel a burning pain.

You don’t think that the burning pain exists outside of a mind. Why do you think that the colour red exists outside of a mind?

What exists outside of a mind is the cause of a burning pain in your mind, which is not a burning pain.

Similarly, what exists outside of a mind is the cause of the colour red, which is not the colour red.
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I know you are seeing red, because we said you are seeing red. — Corvus

You know that I am seeing the colour red, because I say I am seeing the colour red. You know that I am feeling a burning pain, because I say I am feeling a burning pain

How do you know that I am telling the truth? How do you know what is in my mind?

Seeing red from the traffic light, and stopping is a similar type of perception and judgment / action, as getting pinched on your cheek by your wife, and screaming "ouch" from the pain. It doesn't involve any thought process, reasoning or relationships. — Corvus

I have had to learn that “red” on a traffic light means “stop”. Once I have learnt that “red” on a traffic light means “stop”, and have driven often, then, yes, stopping may require minimum thought or reasoning.

The meaning of a symbol has to be learnt.

Our linguistic community must have stipulated that “red” on a traffic light means “stop” before we know we have to stop at a "red" traffic light.

Similarly our linguistic community must have stipulated that a particular set of shapes and colours perceived in the mind represent a “ship” before we are able to talk about "ships".

IE, when we talk about “ships” we are referring to a particular set of shapes and colours perceived in the mind, not something mind-external.

We can then extend what we perceive in the mind to a mind-external world using “inference to the best explanation”.

We are only discussing driving license and traffic lights because you seem to think sometimes red colour exists in your mind. Hence I gave inductive reason how the license is issued to only to people who have normal mind set and normal perception. — Corvus

Where does the colour red exist
Within the language game of our community, the top light of a traffic light has been named “red”. Therefore, when I see the top light and perceive a colour, the name of the colour I perceive is “red”. Similarly, when you see the top light and perceive a colour, the name of the colour you perceive is also “red”.

But as you said:

But I don't know what you are actually seeing in your mind. I can only guess you are seeing same colour as when I see "red".

We agree that the colour we both perceive has the name “red”, even if the colour I perceive in my mind is not the same colour as you perceive in your mind.

That we both use the same name “red” when seeing the same thing makes us normal members of our linguistic community.

Indirect Realism and Epistemic Structural Realism
It should be remembered that the name “red” includes wavelengths from 625nm to 750nm, meaning that there are an infinite number of shades of the colour “red”. So when we perceive a colour in our mind that has been named “red”, we are perceiving only one particular instantiation of an infinite number of possible shades of “red”.

It should also be remembered that in order to be able to say “I see the colour red”, we must have previously learnt the concept “red” by taking part in our community's language game.

Henceforth, when we perceive a particular instantiation of a colour in our mind, and already know the concept under which that colour falls, we can then talk about “the colour red”.

Indirect Realism avoids scepticism about a mind-external world by “inference to the best explanation” within the broader topic of Epistemic Structural Realism (ESR). Judgements about any possible mind-external world are thereby based not only on the perception of a particular instantiation of colour in the mind, but also on knowing that this particular instantiation of colour falls under the concept that has the public name “red”.

Similarly, we can talk about “ships” within a public language because not only are we able to think about a particular instantiation of a ship but also know that this particular instantiation of ship falls under the concept that has the public name “ship”.

The Indirect Realist can make judgments about a mind-external world using “inference to the best explanation” within Epistemic Structural Realism. These judgments are based not only on perceptions in the mind of particular instantiations but also on knowing the public linguistic concept that these particular instantiations fall under.

Driving licenses are issued under the untold presumption that the drivers will think the colours of the traffic lights are in the traffic lights, not in the drivers mind. Indirect or Direct realism doesn't come to the issue. — Corvus

In a traffic light what is important is as much the relationship between the lights, top, middle, bottom, as the colours of the lights, red, amber, green. The rule to stop if the top light is on is as useful to the driver as the rule to stop when the red light is on. Perhaps more useful, as even if some people may not be able to distinguish red from green they are unlikely not to be able to distinguish top from bottom.

Our judgements are often based more on the relations between things than the things themselves. The sun is hotter than the Earth, a car is larger than a bicycle, an apple is sweeter than an avocado, a mountain is heavier than a hill, etc.

If there were no relations of any kind between our perceptions we would be unable to make any judgements. For example, spatial relations, temporal relations, causal relations, relations of colour, relations of texture, relations of sound, etc.

Causal relations are central in our judgements about our perceptions. Mary Shepherd 1777 to 1847 developed this idea as part of her Structural Realism. As an Indirect Realist, she justified her belief in realism through an “inference to the best explanation”, accepting that we are denied direct sensory access to mind-external objects. From observations about our sensibilities we can reason about causal relations within any external world. Not only causal relations within such an external world, such that when the wind blows a tree moves, but also causal relations between an external world and us, such as when the wind blows we feel the sensation of coolness.

In Structural Realism, the Indirect Realist makes judgements as much from relata as from relatum.

(Edit) In a similar vein, in linguistics, closely related to both Indirect Realism and Semantic Direct Realism, Jacques Derrida developed the concept of "différance", which explored how meaning comes from the relationship between signs, as much as the signs themselves (Wikipedia, Jacques Derrida). Using reason, we can discover meaning from the relationships within our sensibilities.

The red light is always in the traffic light, not in the drivers' mind in reality. Hence indirect realists are wrong, and shouldn't be allowed to drive? — Corvus

Doesn’t the fact that a driving licence makes no reference to the driver’s belief in either Indirect or Direct Realism show that an Indirect Realist (phenomenal experience is indirectly determined by mind-external objects) can function in ordinary life just as well as a Direct Realist (phenomenal experience is directly determined by mind-external objects).

From inductive reasoning, under the same condition of lighting, and when the same red was seen by ordinary folks, it should appear the same red to all of them. Otherwise the traffic light system wouldn't work. — Corvus

Suppose, when the top light is illuminated, I perceive the colour green and you perceive the colour orange, will the traffic light system still work?

Why not, as long as we both know that when the top light is illuminated we stop.

The traffic light system will successfully operate regardless of whether the driver is an Indirect or Direct Realist.

But I don't know what you are actually seeing in your mind. I can only guess you are seeing same colour as when I see "red". — Corvus

:100:
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Why do you call it "mind-independent"? Why is it not just a world? — Corvus

There is the world (Wikipedia - The world is the totality of entities, the whole of reality, or everything that exists) and within this world are minds. Whatever exists between these minds must be mind-independent.
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In daily life, no one will understand what you mean by wave length 700nm. — Corvus

Hopefully on this thread they do.
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I meant that I know the alien will know colour red is same as wave length 700nm by reading the internet info. — Corvus

:100:

Direct perception has to be - by definition - a relationship that has two relata: the perceiver and the perceived. — Clarendon

It seems to me that all the defenders of Direct Realism in this thread are Semantic Direct Realists rather than Phenomenological Direct Realists. There is a strong overlap between SDR and Indirect Realism.

As an Indirect Realist, I cannot deny that direct perception is the relationship between perceiver and perceived. However, for me the perceived is internal to the perceiver rather than external to the perceiver.

Many supporters of “Direct Realism” also place the perceived internal to the perceiver as intensional content rather than external to the perceiver as a mind-external object.
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My point is that when we perceive a mind-external ship, — Clarendon

This is the problem. How do you know that what you perceive is a mind-external object rather than intensional content, when the perception of a mind-external object will be identical to the perception of intensional content?

As you say:

To return to my desire analogy: let's say I desire a $10 note and there is a $10 note on the table. Well, then that $10 satisfies my desire. But imagine it is not a genuine $10 note but a perfect forgery. Well, then it does not satisfy my desire, even though I might well think it does as a perfect forgery is indistinguishable from the real deal. What is phenomenologically indistinguishable from having a genuinely satisfied desire for a $10 note? Receiving a perfect forgery of one.

If the genuine $10 note is identical to a forged $10 note, and the genuine $10 note satisfies your desire but the forged $10 does not, how do you know that one note is genuine and the other is a forgery?

How do you know you perceive a genuine note when the perception of a genuine note will be identical to the intensional content of a forged note?
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Only minds can have desires. But to have a desire - which is to be in a certain sort of mental state - is to desire 'something'. That something doesn't have to itself be something mental. If I desire a ship, then that relationship has two relata: me and a mind external ship. — Clarendon

In the mind are desires and beliefs. As you say, only minds can desire something. Also, only minds can believe something.

Suppose the content of my desire, the intension of my desire, is a ship.

Suppose the content of my belief, the intension of my belief, is that there is a mind-external ship.

Then my desires and beliefs coincide, and can then act on them, such as moving a leg or raising an arm.

You have moved from a belief that there is a mind-external ship to knowing without doubt that there is a mind-external ship.

If your belief in a veridical mind-external ship is identical to your belief in an illusory or hallucinatory mind-external ship, on what grounds do you justify that your belief is veridical rather than illusory or hallucinatory?

You might argue that you not only see the ship, but you might also smell it, hear it, touch it and taste it. It is true that you can reinforce your belief that there is a mind-external ship using sensations through your five senses. But this not take away from the fact that sensations through your senses only exist in your mind. You may combine all these sensations through your senses and reason that there is a mind-external ship, but again, reason, as with belief and desire, only exists in the mind.

Ultimately, everything we know about any mind-external ship exists in the mind, meaning that there is only an indirect link from our mind to any mind-external object. This is why the concept of Indirect Realism is more satisfactory than Direct Realism, which ignores the fact that everything we know about any mind-external world can only come through our five senses, of necessity introducing an indirectness between the mind and any mind-external world.

The only reason I know you perceive it as red, is because you claim that you perceive it as red. — Corvus

In our language game a wavelength of 700nm has been named “red. In another language game it could have been named “rouge”.

Therefore, when I look at a wavelength of 700nm, I know that within our language game, regardless of my particular mental perceptions, I can say “I see the colour red”.
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What is a "mind-independent world"? Where is it? — Corvus

All around us.
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If the alien has been surfing the internet, and saw the colour red is wave length of 700nm, and thought it was true, then he would. I know it by inductive reasoning. — Corvus

Yes, in our language game a wavelength of 700nm has been named “red”. Therefore, when you look at a wavelength of 700nm, by inductive reasoning, you know that the name of the colour you perceive is “red”, regardless of what colour you actually perceive in your mind.

Ordinary folks don't come across this type of problems in daily life. — Corvus

But then, we are not ordinary folks.
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You have already perceived the colour of the postbox, and it appears "red" to you, and you are making your personal judgement "The postbox is red." — Corvus

In the world is a postbox and within the language game the colour of the postbox has been named “red” in a JL Austin performative utterance kind of way.

Henceforth, everyone playing the same language game agrees that “the postbox is red”.

However, this is regardless of what is in our minds. I may perceive the postbox as green and you may perceive the postbox as orange. But we both agree that in our language game “the postbox is red".
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The colour is not in your mind or in my mind. It is on the postbox — Corvus

How do you know that colour exists in a mind-independent world?

Science tells us that a wavelength of 700nm travels from the postbox to our eyes. Our only knowledge of the colour of the postbox, if it has any, is the information arriving at our eyes, which is 700nm .

In what sense is a wavelength of 700nm the colour red?

If an alien from the Andromeda Galaxy sees a wavelength of 700nm, are you saying that you know that they will also perceive the colour red? How do you know?

My gripe is with direct realists — Clarendon

Specifically, are you against Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR) or Semantic Direct Realism (SDR).

The Indirect Realist would agree with SDR that there is an indirect perception of the ship, whilst accepting a direct cognition of it. The term “direct cognition” already presumes a mental state, whether a model, picture or concept. As you say, most SDR are probably Indirect Realists in disguise.

As those who believe in PDR are probably as rare as those who believe in a flat Earth, you may have trouble finding someone willing to defend PDR.
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I think indirect realism is false as an account of what it is that we're perceiving in normal cases of perception. When I look at a ship in the harbour it is the ship, not a 'ship in the harbour-like' mental state that I am seeing if, that is, it is to be true that I'm perceiving the ship. — Clarendon

In what sense can the Direct Realist say we directly see a ship, something that could weigh 100,000 tonnes, be 300m in length, contain 3,000 guests, have restaurants, bars, cafes, an engine room, propeller, etc when all we may be seeing through our eyes is a set of coloured shapes.

When you see a ship in the harbour, what are you actually seeing? You are seeing a variety of coloured shapes, such as a white horizontal rectangle, a smaller central red vertical rectangle and an upper black line.

In our language game, such a combination of coloured shapes is known as a “ship”. This allows us to talk about ships, such as saying “there is a ship in the harbour. Even if we have only seen a ship from a distance, we can still talk about ships, in the same way we can talk about the Sun even if we have never been there.

So in what sense is the Indirect Realist wrong in thinking that a set of coloured shapes that we know as a “ship” is not the same as directly looking at a ship?
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Maybe they could say that the experience - the mental state - is constitutive of the two place perceptual relation between the perceiver and the perceived. — Clarendon

What you say seems along the lines of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism in his Critique of Pure Reason, where he attempts to combine Empiricism with Rationalism. In our case, the Empiricism of the Direct Realists who believe they directly perceive the ship and the Rationalism of the Indirect Realists who believe they directly perceive the concept of a ship.

A transcendental solution is needed, because we cannot know we are looking at a ship without the prior concept of a ship, and we cannot know the concept of a ship without a prior look at a ship.
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So, crudely, I take indirect realists to think we're looking at pictures of the world and (the current crop) of direct realists to think we're looking through windows onto the world. — Clarendon

Indirect Realism makes sense that we are looking at pictures of the world, but a Direct Realist’s analogy that we look at the world as if through a window is hard to justify.

For the Direct Realist, where exactly is this window, in the eye or in the mind? In neither case can the window have no effect on what passes through it. If the eye, on one side is a wavelength of 700nm and on the other side is the colour red. If the mind, on one side is the instantiation of a ship and on the other side is the concept of a ship.
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But it seems to run into problems accounting for hallucinations. — Clarendon

Yes. We see a ship, but if a veridical experience is identical to an illusory or hallucinatory experience, how can we ever know whether our experience is veridical, illusory or hallucinatory. The Direct Realist argues that they do know. But how exactly?

I think you may have a difficulty finding someone who supports PDR, whilst, it seems to me, SDR is Indirect Realism in disguise.

Then, why are you an indirect realist? — Corvus

As an Indirect Realist, when I look at the colour red, I am directly looking at the colour red. I am not indirectly looking at the colour red.

When I feel pain, I directly feel pain. I don’t indirectly feel pain.

Both the Direct and Indirect Realist would agree that we directly look at the colour red. They would, however, disagree where this colour red exists. The Direct Realist would say that the colour red exists in a mind-independent world. The Indirect Realist would say that the colour red exists in the mind.

If the Indirect Realist did say that they only indirectly see the colour red, then they would fall into the homunculus problem, and trap themselves into saying that they are seeing a representation of a representation of a representation, etc.

I see the colour red because a wavelength of 700nm entered my eye, not because the postbox is red. It may be that when you look at a postbox and a wavelength of 700nm enters your eye, you see the colour purple, but this I will never know, as I can never know what exists in your mind.

We both look at the same postbox and the same wavelength of 700nm enters our eyes. I see the colour red and you see the colour purple. How do we decide whether the postbox is actually red or purple?

I think that direct realism 'proper' would have to be the view that perceptual relations have 2 and only 2 relata: the perceiver and the perceived......................I am interested in hearing any objections to this 'proper' form of direct realism — Clarendon

There seems to be two main forms of Direct Realism. There is Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR), a direct perception and direct cognition of the object ship as it really is in a mind-independent world. There is also Semantic Direct Realism (SDR), an indirect perception but direct cognition of the object ship as it really is in a mind-independent world.

Your “proper” direct realism seems to be PDR, although many direct realists support SDR.

For the SDR, language is crucial. For example, David Armstrong, who emphasised the role of language in understanding reality, and Michael Dummett, who emphasised the link between language and the world.

I agree that Indirect Realism and SDR overlap in many ways.

However, PDR is far more difficult to justify, and it may be that few Direct Realists actually support PDR.

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The mistake they accuse indirect realists of making is to confuse a 'vehicle' of awareness with an 'object' of awareness.........................Fair enough that the indirect realists are making a mistake. — Clarendon

I don’t think that Indirect Realists are making this mistake. For example, as an indirect Realist, when I look at a pixel on my computer screen that is red, I am well aware that I am directly looking at the colour red.

As an Indirect Realist, I am also well aware that it is the pixel that is red. If there were no pixel I would not be able to see the colour red.

How can you say that the past is fixed, when what I remember as past is changing all the time? — Metaphysician Undercover

It cannot be the case that in December 2025 “Caesar crossed the Rubicon” and in December 2026 “Caesar did not cross the Rubicon".
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A "judgement" as your example of something which occurs "in the present", takes a lot longer than Plank time. The average human reaction time is 25 one hundredths (,25) of a second. — Metaphysician Undercover

0.25 seconds is a period of time. Similarly, one week is a period of time and one decade is a period of time.

To call 0.25 seconds a present moment in time would be like calling a decade a present moment in time.
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The issue is that you cannot believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, and also believe that it is possibly in Reno, without implied contradiction — Metaphysician Undercover

I can believe one thing and imagine another thing.

Believing is not the same as imagining.

Premise that only the present exists
My premise is that the world only exists in the present. It may be there is a minimum duration of time, such as Planck's time, It may be that even though clocks show a different time when either near a mass or accelerating, and even though the “present” may be different for each clock, it remains a fact that for each clock there is only one present. In this present we can remember the past but not the future.

Free will vs determinism

This is why we ought not extend the fixedness of the past into the present. Doing this produces a determinist perspective ("perspective" being present), and obscures the truly dynamic nature of the present..........................
If we consider the present to always be a duration of time, we ought to allow that not only does part of the present share the properties of the past (fixed), but we need to allow that part shares the properties of the future (not fixed). This is necessary to allow that a freely willed act, at the present, can interfere with what would otherwise appear to be fixed. — Metaphysician Undercover

That we can remember the past but not the future means that for us there is an arrow of time. Between the past we remember and the future that we cannot remember is the present, the “now”.

Both the past and present are fixed, in that we can only remember one past, and by the Law of Non-contradiction there can only be one present. Therefore, both the past and present must be static rather than dynamic.

As regards the future, also by the Law of Non-contradiction, the future that will exist must be fixed, and thereby static rather than dynamic. As we cannot remember this future, we don’t know what this future will be. However, we do know from the laws of logic, necessary and universal, that this future will be fixed, static rather than dynamic.

A reality that is fixed must be deterministic, meaning that free will must be over and above any deterministic fixed reality, and within a meta-reality. By its very nature, a meta-reality must be unknowable within any deterministic reality. Similarly, the meaning of a language cannot be discovered within the language itself, but can only be known in a meta-language external to the language itself. As we cannot use language to discover meaning within itself, but only through a meta-language, we cannot use a deterministic reality to discover free will within itself, but only through a meta-reality.

Whether one believes in a meta-reality enabling free-will in our reality is a matter of faith rather than logic.

Memories

The reason i am making this distinction is because we experience the present as active, and changing, so we ought not think of it as "fixed".................
"The present" is very difficult because things are always changing, even as we speak. ……………….
Then the statement “there is a truck coming round the corner” is judged to be true, or stated as true, based on that observation which is now past. — Metaphysician Undercover

We experience the present and have memories of the past. If the present has a duration, then it may well be of the order of Plank’s time, but certainly not much more than that. I observe a truck coming round the corner, which quickly becomes a memory. I can then make a judgement, such that the truck was travelling too fast, but this judgement was made in the present and based on a memory of the past.

Imagination

If the Eiffel tower is in Reno, then it is not in Paris. If I believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, then it is implied that I also believe it is impossible that it is in Reno, which is somewhere other than Paris. Therefore to believe that it is possible that it is in Reno, implicitly contradicts my belief that it is in Paris. — Metaphysician Undercover

I see an apple on the table and imagine a yoghurt in the fridge. It is not a contradiction to observe something and imagine a different thing. Similarly, I can see the Eiffel Tower in Paris and imagine the Eiffel Tower in Reno. Neither is this a contradiction.

Here is a state of affairs: John walked from the entrance to the park to the exit. There simply is no requirement that a state of affairs must be a temporal instant. We can talk about a state of affairs at an instant or a state of affairs over time. — Banno

I have been assuming that a state of affairs is to be understood as something existing in the world rather than in the mind.

If states of affairs exist in the mind, I can understand that in the mind there can be a state of affairs over a period of time, such as “John walked from the entrance to the park to the exit.” We do have memories of the past. I understand that we can talk about a state of affairs at an instant and over time if it is a concept in the mind. If states of affairs exist in the mind, they can be both static and dynamic.

But how can a state of affairs exist in the world over a period of time when in the world a period of time does not exist. In the world only the present exists. In the world the past and present don’t exist at the same time. If the past and present don’t exist at the same time, there can be no existent period of time in the world. If states of affairs exist in the world, they can only be static.
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So all the seemingly profound "Past events cannot exist in a world that only exists in the present" says is that if we only talk about the present, then we can't talk about the past. — Banno

Even though we only exist in the present, we can talk about the past because we have memories of the past.

I have a memory of being at the entrance of the park and have another memory of being at the exit of the park. This allows me to say “I walked from the entrance of the park to the exit of the park”.
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And the odd result of stipulating the restriction of putting all our sentences int he present tense is that a simple sentence such as "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" ceases to have a truth value... no small problem. — Banno

My memory allows me to put my sentences in the past. I remember that “I was at the entrance to the park”.

The proposition “I was at the entrance to the park” is true because I remember that I was at the entrance to the park.

Propositions in the past tense still have truth values because of present memories.

We think about what we want and how to get it, without necessarily thinking about the way things are. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have the thought that there is an apple on the table.

If I did not believe that there was not a correspondence between my mind and the way things are in the world, I would not attempt to pick the apple up.
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You contradict yourself. If, in your mind the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, you contradict yourself to say that in your mind it is also possible that the Eiffel Tower is in Reno. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is possible to think about different states of affairs in the world.

I can believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris, whilst also imagining the Eiffel Tower being in Reno. These are not contradictory thoughts.

Allowing that counterfactuals are possibilities violates the principle of truth as correspondence in a fundamental way. — Metaphysician Undercover

Using your term “ontological possibility”. As regards the proposition “there will be a truck coming round the corner”. In the present, we cannot know whether this proposition will be true or not. However, we can know that either it will be true or won't be true. This is a future possibility

Using your term “epistemic possibility”. As regards the proposition “there is a truck coming round the corner”. In the present, it may be that we don’t know whether this proposition is true or not. However, we can know that either it is true or is not true. This is a present possibility.

You base your claim on counterfactuals. You say “but they are not truly "possible" in any rational way, so they need to be excluded, as not possibilities at all.” It is true that both the past and present are fixed. The present is as fixed as the past. If there is a truck coming round the corner then it is true that “there is a truck coming round the corner”

There are two senses to the word “possible”, one used in logic and one used in ordinary language.

In the sense of logic, if “the truck is coming round the corner” then it is not possible that “the truck is not coming round the corner”. This would break the Laws of Non-contradiction and Excluded Middle.

In the sense of ordinary language, if “the truck is coming round the corner” then it is possible that “the truck is not coming round the corner”. In ordinary language we use possibility all the time. It depends on whether present facts are necessary or contingent. It is certainly not the case that it is a necessary fact that “the truck is coming round the corner”, as the driver could have over-slept, been caught in a traffic jam, had a flat tyre, etc.

It may be argued that counterfactuals which violate the laws of nature, such as “the truck was travelling faster than the speed of light” must be necessary and therefore not possible, whilst counterfactuals which don’t violate the laws of nature, such as “the truck is not coming round the corner” are contingent and therefore possible.

Counterfactuals don’t necessarily violate the principles of truth if they are contingent rather than necessary.

If we have a true (by correspondence) world, the other proposals which contradict are false, and they cannot be considered as possibilities. — Metaphysician Undercover

That my thoughts do correspond with my actual world is the very basis for enabling me to think about other possibilities.

In my mind is the thought that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris. In my actual world the Eiffel Tower is in Paris.

There is a correspondence between the thought in my mind that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris and the fact that in my actual world the Eiffel Tower is in Paris

In my mind is the thought that it is possible that the Eiffel Tower could be in Reno. In a possible world the Eiffel Tower is in Reno.

There is a correspondence between the thought in my mind that it is possible that the Eiffel Tower is in Reno and a possible world where the Eiffel Tower is in Reno

That there is a correspondence between my mind and my actual world does not nullify any correspondence between my mind and a possible world.

That my thoughts do correspond to my actual world (I think that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris and in fact it is in Paris), is the very basis for enabling me to think about other possibilities (I think that the Eiffel Tower could be in Reno).

But the state of affairs that snow is white doesn't sound right. — Ludwig V

In Wikipedia State of affairs (philosophy)

For example, the state of affairs that Socrates is wise is constituted by the particular "Socrates" and the property "wise".

I have been assuming that a State of Affairs is something like “Socrates is wise”

I cannot see a reference to States of Affairs In SEP Possible Worlds 1.1. Do you mean 2.2.1. But 2.2.1 is part of 2.2 Abstractionism.