First, we do not only picture facts to ourselves. — Fooloso4
===============================================================================2.1 "we picture facts to ourselves"
The picture that comes to mind need not be the result of conscious choice. With regard to the model of the accident the color of the car has no bearing on what is being depicted. What a picture represents is a logical relation: — Fooloso4
'Object' is a pseudo-concept but not all objects are simple objects. Spatial objects such as a chairs tables, and books ( 3.1431) are not simple objects. — Fooloso4
The key word is "imagine". Wittgenstein is using an analogy. He is not saying that tables, chairs and books are Tractarian objects.3.1431 "The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs.
'x' is the variable name for the pseudo concept 'number'. (4.1272) Substituting "a number" for 'x' gives us: "Number is a number" which is nonsense. The variable name 'x' cannot be used for both the pseudo-concept 'number' and 'a number'. — Fooloso4
To say “x is an object” is to say nothing. It follows from this that we cannot make such statements as “there are more than three objects in the world”, or “there are an infinite number of objects in the world”.
4.127 "The propositional variable signifies the formal concept"
Introduction "This amounts to saying that “object” is a pseudo-concept."
Even this on the face of it seems odd to call a "pseudo-concept"...And what about "concepts" like "processes"? — schopenhauer1
4.24 "I write elementary propositions as functions of names, so that they have the form "fx", ∅(x,y)", etc."
If so this itself would be an illustration of a "psychological theory" that goes beyond simply "acquaintance" (showing) the object, thus refuting that "acquaintance" or "showing" is where it must stop. — schopenhauer1
'Object' is a pseudo-concept. A particular object is not. — Fooloso4
'Object' is a pseudo-concept because it says nothing about what is the case, not because it makes up the substance of the world. — Fooloso4
Right, but the issue is whether something that falls under a pseudo-concept is a pseudo-concept. — Fooloso4
Introduction - "This amounts to saying that “object” is a pseudo-concept. To say "x is an object" is to say nothing".
2.02 "Objects are simple"
2.021 "Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite
2.0211 "If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true
2.0212 "In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false)
2.023 "Objects are just what constitute the unalterable form"
Formal concepts are pseudo-concepts. — Fooloso4
Introduction - "This amounts to saying that “object” is a pseudo-concept. To say "x is an object" is to say nothing".
Examples of propositional variables could be: "the sky is blue", "the sky is purple", "grass is green", "grass is orange".4.127 "The propositional variable signifies the formal concept"
4.122 "In a certain sense we can talk about formal properties of objects and states of affairs, or, in the case of facts, about structural properties: and in the same sense about formal relations and structural relations. (Instead of "structural property" I also say "internal property": instead of "structural relation", "internal relation")
4.1272 "Thus the variable name "x" is the proper sign for the pseudo-concept object. Whenever the word "object" ("thing". etc) is correctly used, it is expressed in conceptual notion by a variable name"
That depends on the medium of representation, whether what is being pictured is intended to communicate something to someone else, and what it is that is being represented............2.1 "we picture facts to ourselves" — Fooloso4
2.12 "A picture is a model of reality"
Just as the car does not become the bicycle, it is necessary that whatever it is the represents the car in the picture does not become something else. — Fooloso4
Certainly, this could lead to a regress (definitions of definitions of definitions)....................Surely I can point to these processes that account for object formation in the mind, and how we attach meaning to objects. — schopenhauer1
'3' signifies the value of the concept number. A particular number falls under the concept number in a way analogous to 'table' falling under the concept 'object'. That does not mean that 'table' is a pseudo-concept. — Fooloso4
Wittgenstein seems to not care to discuss mind, but language limits. — schopenhauer1
===============================================================================Now it is becoming clear why I thought that thinking and language were the same. For thinking is a kind of language. For a thought too is, of course, a logical picture of the proposition, and therefore it just is a kind of proposition.
If signs are not signifying a possible states of affairs, they are not picturing anything, and thus cannot be communicated with any sense. — schopenhauer1
1 +1 =2 is not derived from empirical evidence, but as a functioning of how numbers work — schopenhauer1
Surely I can point to these processes that account for object formation in the mind, and how we attach meaning to objects — schopenhauer1
The picture theory of meaning was inspired by Wittgenstein’s reading in the newspaper of a Paris courtroom practice of using models to represent the then relatively new phenomenon of auto-mobile accidents (Grayling 40). Toy cars and dolls were used to represent events that may or may not have transpired. In the use of such models it had to be stipulated which toys corresponded to which objects and which relations between toys were meant to represent which relations between those objects (Glock 300).
That was what I said, that numbers (or rather equations) are formal concepts because they are not abouts states of affairs of the world. Again, Kant is informative here, it is an analytic a priori statement. — schopenhauer1
4.21 "The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of a state of affairs.
Why is "One is a number" a formal concept and "1 + 1 = 2" not a "formal concept"? — schopenhauer1
"It follows from this that we cannot make such statements as “there are more than three
objects in the world”.................the proposition is therefore seen to be meaningless.........We can say............“there are more than three objects which are red”"
What falls under a formal concept is not another formal concept..................If '3' was a formal concept then every number would be a formal concept. — Fooloso4
Mathematical equations are pseudo-proposiitons , but this does not mean the equation is a concept, either proper or formal. 1+1=2 is not concept, it is a calculation. — Fooloso4
'Number' is the constant form. 1, 100, and 1,000 are variables that have as a formal property this formal concept. — Fooloso4
4.1272 "The same applies to the words "complex", "fact", "function", "number" etc. They all signify formal concepts"
4.1274 "To ask whether a formal concept exists is nonsensical"
4.1272 "This the variable name x is the proper sign for the pseudo-concept object.
4.126 "the confusion between formal concepts and concepts proper"
4.21 "The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of a state of affairs.
4.123 "A property is internal if it is unthinkable that its object should not possess it"
4.124 "The existence of an internal property of a possible situation is not expressed by means of a proposition: rather it expresses itself in the proposition representing the situation, by means of an internal property of that proposition".
"Objects can only be mentioned in connexion with some definite property."
"It follows from this that we cannot make such statements as “there are more than three
objects in the world”.................the proposition is therefore seen to be meaningless.........We can say............“there are more than three objects which are red”"
4.1272 "The same applies to the words "complex", "fact", "function", "number" etc. They all signify formal concepts"
4.126 - "When something falls under a formal concept as one of its objects, this cannot be expressed by means of a proposition. Instead it is shown in the very sign for this object. (A name shows that it signifies an object, a sign for a number that it signifies a number, etc.)"
4.1272 "Whenever it is used in a different way, that is as a proper concept-word, nonsensical pseudo-propositions are the result"
5.535 "This also disposes of all the problems that were connected with such pseudo-propositions"
6.22 "The logic of the world, which is shown in tautologies by the propositions of logic, is shown in equations by mathematics.
4.0312 "My fundamental idea is that the "logical constants" are not representatives; that there can be no representatives of the logic of facts."
4.126 "A name shows that it signifies an object, a sign for a number that it signifies a number, etc"
4.1271 "For every variable represents a constant form that all its values possess, and this can be regarded as a formal property of those values."
Yes, but Kant would simply classify it as analytic a priori. It is a truth that can be grasped through purely reasoning and not experience (equivalent to Wittgenstein's "state of affairs in the world"). But I am perplexed why with all this epistemological history he could have drawn from, he ignores it. — schopenhauer1
4.1272 - "The same applies to the words "complex", "fact", "function", "number" etc. They all signify formal concepts"
4.1274 "To ask whether a formal concept exists is nonsensical"
6.22 "The logic of the world, which is shown in tautologies by the propositions of logic, is shown in equations by mathematics.
4.21 - "The simplest kind of proposition, an elementary proposition, asserts the existence of a state of affairs.
Thus, it seems to be the case for Witt’s theory, 1 + 1 = 2 is formal as it is not a state of affairs per se, but a description of a category of sets that may occur as a state of affairs. It’s a description of a class not of a particular state of affairs that could be true or false. — schopenhauer1
(4.12721) "A formal concept is given immediately any object falling under it is given. It is not possible, therefore, to introduce as primitive ideas objects belonging to a formal concept and the formal concept itself. So it is impossible, for example, to introduce as primitive ideas both the concept of a function and specific functions, as Russell does; or the concept of a number and particular numbers." — Fooloso4
In their monumental Principia Mathematica, Russell and his co-author Alfred North Whitehead attempted to create a logically sound basis for mathematics. In it their primitive proposition ∗9.1 implies that at least one individual thing exists. It follows that the universal class of things is not empty. This is stated explicitly in proposition ∗24.52. Whitehead and Russell then remark: “This would not hold if there were no instances of anything; hence it implies the existence of something.” (Principia Mathematica, Volume I, 1910, ∗24). Here then, logic seems committed to the existence of something.
If, however, I say: "There are three horses" then the number of horses is not expressed as the variable 'x', which could mean any number of horses, but as '3'. — Fooloso4
I think Wittgenstein is saying that an "object" like the number 1 has a sense if it is an object or a description. — schopenhauer1
It follows from this that we cannot make such statements as “there are more than three objects in the world”, or “there are an infinite number of objects in the world”. Objects can only be mentioned in connexion with some definite property. We can say “there are more than three objects which are human”, or “there are more than three objects which are red”
See 4.12721. The concept of a number is a formal concept. Particular numbers are not. They fall under the concept of a number. — Fooloso4
A formal concept defines how the variables "T" and "x" are to "behave" or perhaps a better way to say it, is how they are to be understood. These aren't like "proper concepts", such as "red", "hard", etc. which settles the external properties of complex objects. — 013zen
We cannot, for example, input a proper number to which corresponds the formal concept of number for say, a simple object. — 013zen
So, while we can say: "There are two red fruits" this analyzes into:
∃x(P(x)) ∧ ∃y(P(y) ∧ (x≠y)) There is no sign corresponding to the formal concept "number" despite what appears to be a number presented in the proposition. — 013zen
An unhappy apple is an illogical proposition not an illogical object. An apple on the table or inside the sun is not a combination of objects it is a relation of the objects apple and table (on) or apple and sun (in). — Fooloso4
I don't know if you are attempting to interpret the Tractatus or argue against it. He makes a distinction between proper concepts such as grass and formal concepts such as 'simple object'. — Fooloso4
Book is not a formal concept. — Fooloso4
There are no ‘logical objects’ (4.441) — Fooloso4
As part of a propositional analysis apples and tables can function as simples. — Fooloso4
Conceptual atomism is a radical alternative to all of the theories we’ve mentioned so far is conceptual atomism, the view that lexical concepts have no semantic structure (Fodor 1998, Millikan 2000). Conceptual atomism follows in the anti-descriptivist tradition that traces back to Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, and others working in the philosophy of language (see Kripke 1972/80, Putnam 1975, Devitt 1981).
At 4.126 Wittgenstein introduces the term "formal concepts". — Fooloso4
we have observed that physical processes can form complex objects without human intervention, such as trees — amber
Eliminativism is the thesis that relations are mental abstractions that are not a part of external reality.
A picture theory, however, would allow speculation, as long as you’re positing possibilities that logically follow from experience — 013zen
I can't think of an object in space without a shape — 013zen
It is exhausting to have philosophers not explain themselves well..................I think Wittgenstein has just particularly been mythologized. — schopenhauer1
The problem here is where Schopenhauer (and previously Leibniz) actually laid out their reasoning for their premise and built a foundation, Wittgenstein simply asserts it to build his linguistic project of atomic facts and propositions that can be stated clearly. — schopenhauer1
Edit to add — Paine
At any rate, I agree with, like 90% of your post. Its just specifics we differ on, right now. — 013zen
One can say that he is castigating all the metaphysicians and epistemologists that came before. — schopenhauer1
I, actually, take Wittgenstein to be attempting to break away from this tradition (epistemology and metaphysics) — 013zen
His early work was influenced by that of Arthur Schopenhauer and, especially, by his teacher Bertrand Russell and by Gottlob Frege, who became something of a friend.
His philosophical education was unconventional (going from engineering to working first-hand with one of the greatest philosophers of his day in Bertrand Russell) and he seems never to have felt the need to go back and make a thorough study of the history of philosophy. He was interested in Plato, admired Leibniz, but was most influenced by the work of Schopenhauer, Russell and Frege.
The article is an attempt at explaining the category of logical form used by Ludwig Wittgenstein in his Tractatus logico-philosophicus by using concepts from Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s The Monadology.
Schopenhauer was the first and greatest philosophical influence on Wittgenstein, a fact attested to by those closest to him. He began by accepting Schopenhauer's division of total reality into phenomenal and noumenal, and offered a new analysis of the phenomenal in his first book, the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus.
1. Examples of names (the simple symbols for objects) are: "x,y,z,etc.
2. Examples of elementary propositions are functions such as: "'fx'', 'ϕ(x, y)', etc. — 013zen
We might be able to infer that an atomic fact, for something like this, might be something like: "v=d/t". I wonder. This could also explain why Witt lists: "time" as a "form of an object". — 013zen
These limits of what is said versus what is shown are a question for me in how this work is presented as solving particular issues for the future. But I think it puts 'idealism versus realism' into the diagram rejected in 5.6331. — Paine
Wittgenstein’s view of what philosophy is, or should be, changed little over his life. In the Tractatus he says at 4.111 that “philosophy is not one of the natural sciences,” and at 4.112 “Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts.” Philosophy is not descriptive but elucidatory. Its aim is to clear up muddle and confusion.
I don't see how saying: "no part of our experience is at the same time a priori" could be an expression of idealism. — Paine
The single mention of "pure realism' probably comes from it being a thought experiment appended to saying: — Paine
This difference between images built up through thoughts and words and what they show is evident throughout the book. — Paine
He does engage with the issue: — Paine
The problem here is Wittgenstein's muddling of epistemological and metaphysical concepts without clear distinction or marking what is what. — schopenhauer1
The problem here is Wittgenstein's muddling of epistemological and metaphysical concepts
It just looks like axiomatic assertions without much explanation that one must either accept or not.
Are objects actual entities or are they simply functional as a role?
One is a "realism" whereby the world exists independently of facts, and the other is an idealism of sorts whereby the world is simply the logical coherence of the world.
Objects become denuded of any of its usual attributions, other than its function to support atomic facts.
The ideas become anemic on their own (without the reader doing the heavy-lifting).
Your claim was that about his removal of relations and properties from his ontology. If ontology is about what exists, and properties and relations are shown, then even if they cannot be described they exist. — Fooloso4
He is not interested in the particular state of affairs that are modeled, but the possibility that is can be modeled. — Fooloso4
It is the substance of the world not the facts in the world that prevents this: — Fooloso4
One can perhaps understand Wittgenstein as a coherentist and not a correspondent theorist — schopenhauer1
He doesn't. — Fooloso4
It is impossible, however, to assert by means of propositions that such internal properties and relations obtain: rather, this makes itself manifest in the propositions that represent the relevant states of affairs and are concerned with the relevant objects.
Every object in the world is composed of simple objects. These simple objects are in this sense universal. — Fooloso4
And yet, the meaning is often not understood. Your reading of Wittgenstein is a case in point. If we must infer what is meant then it is not evident from the outward form. — Fooloso4
Objects are particulars. A universal property of objects is to combine with other objects. — Fooloso4
From the outward form, how the thought is expressed, we do not see the logical form that underlies it. — Fooloso4
1.13 - The facts in logical space are the world — Fooloso4
Here Wittgenstein draws an analogy between "clothes" and "a body" with "language" being the clothing and "thought" being the body that is clothed. So, there is a distinction that is made between the two — 013zen
These are examples of propositions, not elementary propositions, though. — 013zen
In contemporary mereology, a simple is any thing that has no proper parts. Sometimes the term "atom" is used, although in recent years the term "simple" has become the standard.
What does it mean to say that an object is simple? One thing Wittgenstein seems to mean is that it cannot be analyzed as a complex of other objects. This seems to indicate that if objects are simple, they cannot have any parts; for, if they did, they would be analyzable as a complex of those parts.
A proposition in some sense contains a thought, but a thought is not identical with a proposition............................Wittgenstein says it is becoming clear to him why he thought that thinking and language were the same. He didn't say that its become clear that they are the same — 013zen
I don't believe that an isomorphism necessarily suggests a certain independence between each structure, but in practice I admit it is used to talk about independent structures. — 013zen
Wittgenstein writes in unequivocal terms that we cannot think what we cannot think and therefore what we cannot think we cannot say either. It means what cannot be thought cannot possibly be spoken about either. These entries suggest that thinking and language (speaking) are coextensive.
First of all...why did you say grass is red and not green? xD Secondly, I don't take "Grass is red" or "Grass is green" or anything of the sort to be representative of an elementary proposition for Witt. These are examples of propositions. — 013zen