Even with a binoculars, telescope and magnifying glasses and microscopes, there is no such a thing as a Mind-independent world.............If you can see it, can you take a photo of a Mind-independent world, and upload here? — Corvus

Even if I uploaded a photo of a Mind-Independent World, the Solipsist wouldn't believe it.

Where is a Mind-independent world? — Corvus

All around us. It existed before us and will exist after us.
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Again what is the point even talking about something which is unknowable? — Corvus

To show that Berkelian Idealism is incorrect.

In fact, for the day to day survival of humans, there is no necessity to know more than what is perceived in our Empirical World of Phenomena. Any transcendental thought about a Mind-Independent World is out of philosophical interest only.
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If it was unknowable, then how did you know it was unknowable? — Corvus

Kant wrote that Appearances are based on Things in Themselves, even though Things in Themselves are unknown.

And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something. — Prolegomena, § 32 — https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thing-in-itself

Kant uses a Transcendental Argument in the Refutation of Idealism to prove his Theorem that Things in Themselves exist, even though what they are is unknown.

"The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me." B276

No one was claiming Kant said the Thing-in-itself, something that is knowable. — Corvus

When I see the book in front of me, I know the book. I know it is in blue colured cover, it is a paperback book, the title of the book is "CPR" by Kant. I cannot be wrong on that. It is the truths I know about the book in front of me. I don't need to worry anything about Thing-in-itself book of CPR. There is no such thing as Thing-in-itself CPR book, but there is a CPR book in front of me. — Corvus

All this is true, in that you see the book in your Empirical World, the world that exists as Appearance in your Sensibilities. The world as Phenomena.

However, what you are not seeing is any world outside these Phenomena.

In a world outside these Phenomena are Things in Themselves, which are unknowable, and as unknowable, cannot even be thought about.

Even if books existed in a Mind-Independent world, as Things in Themselves they would be unknowable, and being unknowable, we couldn't even know whether they existed or not.

In Kant's Refutation of Idealism, he proposes the Theorem in B276: "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me."

Yes, Kant as a believer in Realism does believe that a Mind-Independent World exists outside us, and within this Mind-Independent World are objects in space, but we only know that there are objects as a generality, we don't know what these objects are in particular

B279 – Here it had to be proved only that inner experience in general is possible only through outer experience in general.

We may know in general that Things in Themselves exist in a Mind-Independent World, otherwise we couldn't be discussing them, but that does not mean we can know individual Things in Themselves.

We may know the book in front of me in my Empirical Word, but we cannot know if there is a Book in a Mind-Independent World, as that would be a Thing in Itself.

Meaning of "Empirical World"

Does the Empirical World exist within Appearances or does it exist the other side of these Appearances, whatever is causing these Appearances?

There are different "Worlds". One exists within the mind and the other exists outside the mind, independent of the mind.

There are two meanings of the word "empirical", i) a person's subjective experience and ii) exterior, objective data (Psychology Today – Gregg Henriques)

"Empirical Realism" is a term coined by Kant in the CPR. On the one hand "Empirical" because it gives the mind an active role in the cognition of empirical objects, an aspect of epistemology in establishing a subjective empirical reality. On the other hand, "Realism", endorsing the view that there is a world that exists outside and independent of the human mind. (Paul Abela Empirical Realism).

In his Theorem for the Refutation of Idealism in B276, Kant argues that objects exist in space outside the mind

The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me.

The IEP article Immanuel Kant: Metaphysics differentiates between an "Empirical World" in the mind and a "Mind-independent World" outside the mind

Kant responded to his predecessors by arguing against the Empiricists that the mind is not a blank slate that is written upon by the empirical world, and by rejecting the Rationalists’ notion that pure, a priori knowledge of a mind-independent world was possible. Reason itself is structured with forms of experience and categories that give a phenomenal and logical structure to any possible object of empirical experience. These categories cannot be circumvented to get at a mind-independent world, but they are necessary for experience of spatio-temporal objects with their causal behaviour and logical properties. These two theses constitute Kant’s famous transcendental idealism and empirical realism.

In summary, there is an "Empirical World" inside the mind, within Phenomena, within Appearances, within the Sensibilities and within the Senses and there is also a "Mind-independent World" outside the mind.

There are different interpretations on this point. — Corvus

Kant wrote that we cannot have knowledge of a Thing in Itself. From Wikipedia Thing-in-itself

And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.— Prolegomena, § 32

Do you have a reference that says that Kant believes that it is possible to have knowledge of Things in Themselves?
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Things-in-themselves are for the objects we have concepts, but not the matching physical objects in the empirical world. We can think about it via concepts, but we don't see them in the phenomena. They belong to Thing-in-itself. — Corvus

You are referring to (negative) noumena, not Things in Themselves.
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If you believe in the existence of invisible particles and forces in space and time, then why do you deny the existence of the physical objects such as the bent stick in the empirical world?
If you had a single particle of the bent stick, would you say that is a part of the bent stick, and it is a stick?
In the absence of humans, sounds a condition that you must clarify before progressing further.
Where does "if something cannot be judged" come from? — Corvus

The discussion goes back to the question of whether, when we perceive a stick in our sensibilities, are we also perceiving the same object external to us in the world. This is something that the Direct Realist would argue is the case. Kant's position is not that of the Direct Realist.

You are still seeing an object external to you when you see the bend stick in the water jug. — Corvus

Do objects such as "sticks" exist in the empirical world?

In the empirical world are simples.

In the presence of humans, humans may name one particular set of simples "stick". This creates the object "stick", meaning that objects such as "sticks" do exist in the empirical world, but they only begin to exist after being named.

In the absence of humans, as naming is not possible, objects such as "sticks" cannot be created, meaning that objects such as "sticks" cannot exist.

I understand Kant's Thing-in-itself, is not everything outside us in the world. If that was the case, Kant would be an extreme sceptic, who professes everything outside us is unknowable. That would render all our knowledge of external world impossible. In that case, Kant would have been rejected for being an extreme scpetic, and nobody would take him as a serious epistemologist or philosopher. To even suggest that would be a gross misunderstanding of Kant and his philosophy. — Corvus

On the one hand, Kant held that we can never know about Things in Themselves, we can never have knowledge of Things in Themselves. Things in Themselves include everything outside us in the world, meaning that there are not some Things in Themselves that we do have knowledge of whilst there are other Things in Themselves that we cannot have knowledge of.

In philosophy, scepticism is the theory that certain knowledge is impossible.

On the other hand, I agree that Kant was not a sceptic.

To explain why Kant was not a sceptic is the subject of many articles

As a start, the fact that we cannot have knowledge about Things in Themselves does not presuppose that we cannot have knowledge about the world.
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Isn't your perception of the sticks enough evidence they exist? — Corvus

Yes, my perception of a stick is evidence that it exists – evidence that it exists in my mind.

In the same way, my perception of pain is evidence that it exists – in my mind.
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Even when no humans exist, all the material things must exist as they have been...............................Where humans don't exist, of course, there is no perception, no thoughts. But we can still make logical inference (from the human world), that things keep exist as they have done. — Corvus

My belief is in Neutral Monism, in that what exists in the absence of humans are fundamental particles and fundamental forces in space and time.

If the fundamental particles are thought of as "material things", then I agree that "material things" exist in the absence of humans.

However, I don't agree that "sticks" if thought of as a material thing exists in the absence of humans. I agree that a human can judge whether or not something is a "stick", but in the absence of humans, who or what judges that something is or is not a "stick"?

And if something cannot be judged to be either a stick or a branch, then how is it possible to be either a stick or a branch?

What Kant would have said is, that even if your sensibility sees a bent stick in the water jug, your category of concepts and understanding (followed by reading the scientific explanation on why the stick looks bent), would come to a proper reasoning on the experience, and judge the stick is straight in actuality, even if it looks bent. — Corvus

For Kant, a stick in the world outside us is a Thing-in-Itself and therefore unknowable. Being unknowable, it is impossible to judge whether bent or straight.

From the Wikipedia article on Thing-in-Itself.

In his doctrine of transcendental idealism, Kant argued the sum of all objects, the empirical world, is a complex of appearances whose existence and connection occur only in our representations.

Kant introduces the thing-in-itself as follows: And we indeed, rightly considering objects of sense as mere appearances, confess thereby that they are based upon a thing in itself, though we know not this thing as it is in itself, but only know its appearances, viz., the way in which our senses are affected by this unknown something.  Prolegomena, § 32

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What you have been calling as your internal world is nothing more than a figment of representation of the world in your mind via your sensibility from the external world. — Corvus

:100:
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What else do you need for proof that bent sticks exist in the world? — Corvus

First it has to be proved that sticks exist in the world.

There is the world inside the mind and there is the world outside the mind. The word "world" refers to two very different things

We know "sticks" exist in the mind as concepts, as we are discussing them

The question is, do "sticks" exist outside the mind and independently of any mind

Humans can judge when something is a stick and when something is no longer a stick, but in the absence of humans, in the absence of any definition of stick, in the absence of anyone to judge when something is a stick or no longer a stick, what determines when something in the world outside us is a stick or no longer a stick. A god or nature itself?

How can you prove that "sticks" exist in the absence of human thought without using human thought?

By virtue of drawing meaningful correlations between different things, some of which are not "internal to your mind". — creativesoul

There is a world outside the mind, and there is a world inside the mind, of streets with cars and building. The same word "world" is being used to refer to two very different things. The world inside the mind can only be a representation of the world outside the mind.

Kant in his Realism believed that there is a world outside the senses, and information from this world can only get into the mind through the senses, meaning that our only knowledge about an outside world comes through our senses.

The problem is, how can we correlate our thoughts about an outside world with the outside world, when we only know about an outside world by what has been given to us by our senses.

Our knowledge of an outside world stops at our senses. We may perceive the colour red through our senses, but it doesn't necessarily follow that the colour red actually exists in an outside world.

It is like saying that you used your camera, and took a photo of the mountain across the field in your town, and then the camera thinks that it has a mountain in its memory card, because it cannot understand why the mountain is out there outside the camera. — Corvus

A mountain could weigh a billion tonnes, so it is hardly surprising that the camera doesn't think it has a mountain in its memory card.

Even people only have a representation of a mountain in the minds, not the real thing. That really would be a load on their mind.

If X doesn't exist outside of RussellA, then X must exist inside of RussellA.
This sounds logically unsound. Groundless premise, and unsound conclusion. — Corvus

True. There is no reason to think that if something doesn't exist outside me then it must exist inside me.
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If X doesn't exist outside of RA? Under what ground do you claim that premise? — Corvus

An expression starting with "if" is not a premise. The expressions "X does exist outside me" or "X doesn't exist outside me" have the form of a premise.
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What do you mean by "X exist"? — Corvus

I see a bent stick. Seeing a bent stick is not proof that bent sticks exist in the world. The bent stick exists as an object in appearance whether or not a bent stick exists as an object in the world.

Similarly, I may see two things. Seeing two things is not proof that there are two things existing in the world.

Similarly, I may see a statue. Seeing a statue is not proof that there is a statue existing in the world.

Kant proposed that we have pure concepts of understanding prior to any possible experience. It would follow that it is the a priori Categories acting on the sensibilities that determine what we experience rather than our sensibilities alone determining what we experience.

For Kant, the experience of seeing a bent stick, the number two or a statue has been determined by the a priori categories acting on the sensibilities rather than by the sensibilities alone.

You have a mental space which is total darkness without your visual perception — Corvus

The light reflected from the stick in the water, passes through the water with the refraction, so it looks like double or bent in the water of the jug. — Corvus

For Kant, the pure intuition of space and time and the pure concepts of the understanding provide the possibility of experience, they don't provide the experience. As you say "You have a mental space which is total darkness without your visual perception".

For example, I may have the innate ability to perceive the colour red, but I cannot imagine the colour red in the absence of any faculty of sensibility, ie, the faculty of getting information through our senses about the world outside us.

You are correct to say that the stick that looks bent does not exist in any world outside me, but as I see a bent stick as clear as day, this means that if the bent stick doesn't exist in any world outside me, it must exist as a representation of a world that only exists inside me.

I agree that I cannot imagine any internal world in the absence of any faculty of sensibility, but because I do have the faculty of sensibility and do get information through my senses about the world outside me, the world I perceive is not directly of any world outside me but is a representation of any world outside me.

As the world I perceive is only a representation of any world outside me, the world I perceive is an internal world that is not necessarily the same as any world outside me.

I agree we cannot imagine a world in the absence of our faculty of sensibility. However, when we do perceive a world because of our faculty of sensibility, as it can only be a representation of any world outside us, the world we perceive cannot be directly of any world outside us, but can only be an internal world that is a representation of any world outside us.

They are external. You can think about it, because you have the concepts in your mind. — Corvus

Yes, this is what Kant is saying, that the pure concepts of understanding is a prior condition for experience.

IE, without these pure concepts of understanding I wouldn't be able to have the experience at all. For example, humans don't have a concept for the colour infrared as they don't have the innate ability to see infrared in the first place.

The street we see in our senses cannot be external to our senses, because the empirical concept of street is no more than the combination of pure concepts that are prior to any experience, and it is these pure concepts that determine the empirical concept of street, rather than anything external to the senses.
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How do you know your pain is real? What if it were just itchy skin, and you might have mistaken the itch sensation for pain? — Corvus

True, I may have misnamed my private sensation.

However, assuming I have correctly named my private sensation, my private sensation is real, even though it only exists in my mind.
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Close your both eyes totally and decidedly for 10 minutes, you will see nothing, but a total darkness. — Corvus

I agree that there must be something the other side of our senses, something that causes the sensations in our senses, because as you say, otherwise "we would see nothing".

I agree that we have the concept of street in our minds, because as you say "You can think about it, because you have the concepts in your mind."

The question is, what exactly is on the other side of our senses.

The Neutral Monist argues that on the other side of our senses there are no streets but only fundamental particles and fundamental forces in space and time.

The Direct Realist argues that on the other side of our senses are streets, cars and buildings.

What reasons are there to believe that the Direct Realist is right and the Neutral Monist wrong?

Just because you have a concept of something in your senses does not mean that the something you have a concept of exists on the other side of your senses. For example, when you see a stick bent in water, are you saying that on the other side of your senses there must be a bent stick in water?

How do you know you have a world internal to your mind? — Corvus

When you look at a world containing a street with cars and buildings, if this world was not internal to your mind, how would you be able to think about it?
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Is it a real world? — Corvus

Pain is real yet only exists in the mind, so why cannot your thought of a street with cars and buildings be real even though the thought only exists in your mind?
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How do you know it is the real world or just a imagination? — Corvus

Exactly, how do you know whether the street with cars and building only exists as a thought in your mind or exists outside the mind, when you only know about it through the senses?

Possible worlds, and worlds in your imagination and memories exist in your mind, but they don't cause your perception for the external world. — Corvus

How can you step outside of your concept or intuition? — Corvus

But that is what Kant is saying in the CPR, that the a priori intuitions of space and time and a priori pure concepts of the Understanding, ie the Categories, are conditions for the possibility of experience. Kant is saying that we cannot "step outside of your concept or intuition".

We perceive a world through our senses. You are assuming that there is one world in your mind and a different word that is external to your mind.

How do you know that the world you perceive in your senses has been caused by the world external to your mind rather than the world internal to your mind?

For example, when you perceive in your senses the colour red in the world, how do you know that the colour red exists in a world external to your mind rather than in the world internal to your mind?

Can you justify, for example, that the colour red exists in a world independent of any mind?
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Kant's first premise in the refutation is that he is conscious in time. Some might ask to prove how does he know he is conscious in time? What if he was dreaming, or hallucinating? — Corvus

I would agree with "I am conscious of my existence". The problem is, am I conscious of my existence at this one moment in time, or am I conscious of my existence through time.

If the latter, then I must be existing at two moments in time in order to be conscious of the passage of time. But such a possibility is beyond my powers of comprehension.

I don't think Kant's proof in the Refutation of Idealism is the best.

Surely we perceive the world via our senses doesn't necessarily mean that the world doesn't exist? — Corvus

Yes, if we perceive the world through our senses, then, of necessity, the world exists.

We perceive things in our senses, including touch, taste, smell, sight and hearing.

However, how do you know that these sensations are caused by a world that exists outside your mind rather than by a world that exists inside your mind?
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What is the reasons for George Dicker to claim that Kant's Refutation of Idealism has failed? Does it mean that Idealism prevails in CPR? — Corvus

George Dicker argues that the main difficulty with Kant's argument in B276 is the part "All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception".

The problem is, how can we step outside of time in order to see ourselves existing in time

This doesn't mean that Idealism prevails in CPR, but rather, that Kant should have come up with a better argument to justify his belief that objects exist in space outside us.

I recall this part of CPR. It was about Refutation of Idealism. What was Kan't intention for the proof? Did he succeed in the Refutation? — Corvus

As our only access to a possible outside us is through our senses, how can we prove that there is a world on the other side of these senses when we only know of this possible world through our senses?

Not everyone believes that Kant succeeded. For example, George Dicker in his article Kant's Refutation of Idealism wrote: "I analyse Kant's Refutation of Idealism as he presents it in the Critique of Pure Reason and show that it is a failure".

His "proof" in B276 may be summarised as:
1) I am conscious of my existence though time
2) I can only be conscious of one moment in time
3) Therefore, there must be something outside me enabling my consciousness that I exist through time
However, assuming 2) to be correct, rather than being conscious of my existence through time, I could be conscious of memories at this one moment in time, thereby negating the proof.

I may be able to find justifications that there are objects outside me, but I doubt that a proof is possible. For example, if there are no objects outside me, if there is no world outside me, then I wrote "Anna Karenina", "To Kill a Mockingbird", "The Great Gatsby", "One Hundred Years of Solitude", "A Passage to India" and the "Invisible Man", which, although possible, I find highly unlikely.

What type of knowledge would it be? — Corvus

The knowledge as set out in his Theorem in B276 that objects exist in space outside us.

The "thing in itself" exists beyond the realm of human knowledge and experience. — Wayfarer

I don’t deny that Kant believed there were objects outside us. Only that we don’t know what they really are. — Wayfarer

For Kant, it was more than a belief that objects exist outside us, as from B276 onwards he goes on to propose a proof that objects do exist outside us.

On the assumption that Things in Themselves are objects outside us, then if they were beyond the realm of human knowledge, then it would not be possible to prove that they exist.

I agree that Kant may not know what Things in Themselves really are, but he does know that they do exist beyond our sensibilities.

IE, Kant proposes a proof in the Refutation of Idealism that we do have knowledge beyond our experiences.

Kant posited that human cognition is limited to what appears to us through our sensory perception and understanding. — Wayfarer

He did more than that.

In Bxxxix he writes:

"No matter how innocent idealism may be held to be as regards the essential ends of metaphysics (though in fact it is not so innocent), it always remains a scandal of philosophy and universal human reason that the existence of things outside us (from which we after all get the whole matter for our cognitions, even for our inner sense) should have to be assumed merely on faith, and that if it occurs to anyone to doubt it, we should be unable to answer him with a satisfactory proof.

From B275 onwards is Kant's Refutation of Idealism, where he states that our inner experience is only possible on the presupposition of outer experience.

He starts with the Theorem:

"The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me."

From B276 onwards is his proof of the existence of objects outside our sensory perception and understanding.

With Kant, I'm never sure if I'm just not following it or whether it's just not followable. — Hanover

I am sure that not only is it the case that for each paragraph making a substantive point, another paragraph may be found making a contradictory point but also that for each academic’s interpretation of a particular paragraphs, another academic may be found with an opposing viewpoint.

For me, the CPR becomes worthwhile when the individual paragraphs are used in support of a sensible whole rather than trying to take each of them literally, ie, for the CPR to be read in the spirit of the text rather than in the letter of the text.
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the equation of the noumena and thing in itself — Hanover

It seems right to distinguish between two seemingly different aspects of objects as they appear in our sensibilities regardless of what they are named, whether as an abstracted generality or concrete particular, whether epistemological or ontological or whether noumena or Thing in Itself.

For me, there is a similarity between the concepts abstracted generality, epistemological and noumena and there is a similarity between the concepts concrete particular, ontological and Thing in Itself.

The analogy of the colour red

Using an analogy, we perceive the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 700nm.

The object that appears in our sensibilities, the colour red, has been caused by the wavelength of 700nm. Although the colour red and wavelength of 700nm are of two very different kinds, they are two aspects of the same event.

We can think of the colour red and the wavelength of 700nm as "the same concept viewed from two different perspectives" (Wikipedia – Noumenon)

The colour red as an object as it appears in our sensibilities can be thought of as an abstracted generality that has been determined by a concrete particular wavelength of 700nm.

The colour red as an object as it appears in our sensibilities gives us epistemological knowledge about an ontologically existing wavelength of 700nm.

For me, the colour red as an object as it appears in our sensibilities may be described as a (Negative) Noumena, and the wavelength of 700nm may be described as a Thing in Itself.

The (Negative) Noumenon and Thing in Itself are two aspects of our thoughts about objects as they appear in our sensibilities.

I agree that Kant in the CPR never discussed wavelengths of 700nm, but this does not take away the power of an analogy to explain a complex topic.

Do you understand that lies are not true and only truth is included in knowledge? — PL Olcott

Who determines that the semantic meaning of cat is "animal" rather than "very large plant-eating mammals with a prehensile trunk"?

It could be that person A stipulates that "cats are animals" and person B stipulates that "cats are very large plant-eating mammals with a prehensile trunk".

Who determines whether person A or B is correct, if the person making the determination is not allowed to look at the world using their sense data through their their sense organs?

How can there be knowledge that cats are "animals" and not "very large plant-eating mammals with a prehensile trunk" without being able to look at the world?

Only when we clarify that analytic excludes sense data from the sense organs can we know that the full meaning of a {red rose} is excluded from analytic — PL Olcott

I already said that expressions that are not elements of the body of analytical knowledge are excluded. — PL Olcott

Why can't the expression "cats are very large plant-eating mammals with a prehensile trunk" be part of the body of analytic knowledge?

It fulfils both your requirements: i) the expression excludes sense data from the sense organs and ii) being part of the body of analytical knowledge there's no reason to exclude it from the body of analytical knowledge.

I have already stipulated {the body of analytic knowledge} which necessarily excludes {cats are elephants} and includes {cats are animals}. — PL Olcott

You have stipulated the definition of cat as an animal , meaning that the expression "cats are animals" is analytic and true.

I stipulate the definition of cat as "a very large plant-eating mammal with a prehensile trunk, long curved ivory tusks, and large ears, native to Africa and southern Asia", meaning that the expression "cats are elephants" is analytic and true.

You defined analytic expressions as "Analytic expressions are expressions of language that can be verified as completely true entirely on the basis of their connection to the semantic meanings that make them true. Example: "Cats are animals"".

If by "language" you are referring to PL Olcott's private language, then your definition of analytic expressions is true.

But if by "language" you are referring to the English Language, why do you have the authority to stipulate the meanings of words in the English Language rather than me, for example? :smile:

Kingdom: Animalia...We can determine that a {cat} is an {animal} on the basis of the above knowledge tree. — PL Olcott

True, if a cat is defined as part of the Kingdom Animalia , then a cat is an animal, and the expression "cats are animals" is true and analytic.

But then, if a cat is defined as an elephant, then a cat is an elephant, and the expression "cats are elephants" is true and analytic.

The problem is that there are an infinite number of possible analytic expressions including cats. For example, "cats are animals", "cats are elephants", "cats are part of the Kingdom Monera", "cats are part of the Kingdom Protista", "cats are trees", "cats are not anmals", etc.

I accept that analytic expressions are expressions of language that can be verified as completely true entirely on the basis of their connection to the semantic meanings that make them true, and synthetic expressions are expressions of language that also require sense data from the sense organs.

If cats are defined as part of the Kingdom Animalia, then the expression "cats are animals" is analytic and true. If cats are defined as part of the Kingdom Monera, then the expression "cats are animals" is analytic and false.

In the absence of sense data from the world, the expression "cats are animals" can be either true or false.

Only by sense data from the world can the expression "cats are animals" be verified as true, meaning it a synthetic rather than analytic expression.

1) Transcendental, in Kantian philosophy, is that by which pure a priori is the determining condition.
2) From all that, it follows that a transcendental deduction, first, must be purely a priori therefore can have no empirical predication whatsoever
3) Now, with respect to a transcendental deduction of the categories, which is in fact the title of a subsection dedicated to just that, this kind of argument cannot have to do with representations of objects, because, being purely a priori, there are no phenomena hence no representations of objects, but still must be a reduction from the general to the particular in order to qualify as a deduction.
4) If Kant deduces the categories in accordance with logical syllogisms having empirical content, he loses the capacity to enounce the conditions for pure thought of possible objects.
5) A transcendental deduction can never follow from an observation, by definition. — Mww

To my understanding, these comments seem to ignore the importance of the empirical in the nature of Kant's Transcendental Deductions.

My position is along the lines of the SEP article on The Historical Controversies Surrounding Innateness

In this respect Kant agrees with Locke that there are no innate principles or ideas to be ‘found’ in us. Both hold that all our ideas have their origin in experience. But Locke thinks that we build these ideas by abstracting from experience and recombining abstracted elements. Kant holds that such representations or ideas cannot be abstracted from experience; they must be the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.

As regards the principles and ideas that we need to make sense of experiences, Kant does not agree with the Rationalist's innatism, does not agree with Locke that we can abstract such principles and ideas just from empirical experience but does believe that such principles and ideas may be discovered from careful reflection on empirical experiences using transcendental deduction.

However, I suggest that the term "Transcendental deduction" should be treated as a figure of speech rather than literally, as transcendental requires both induction and deduction, both from the general to the particular and from the particular to the general.

From the SEP article Kant's Transcendental Arguments, a Transcendental Argument begins with a strong premise, and then reasons to a conclusion that is a necessary condition for the premise.

As I see it, the transcendental deduction of either a priori pure intuitions of space and time, a priori empirical intuitions of things such as circles or a priori pure concepts of understanding (the Categories), is not possible in the absence of an empirical experience.

I am reasonably sure that Kant's position is that it is not possible to abstract these ideas and principles just from empirical experiences, but rather, transcendentally deduce them from empirical experiences.

I am new to all this. — Debra

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More generally anything that can be encoded in language (including formal mathematical languages) <is> Analytic(Olcott). — PL Olcott

To know whether the expression "cats are animals " is analytic, one needs to know the meaning of "cats", "are" and "animals".

As an example, how is "cats" encoded in language?

Rudolf Carnap derived the basis for Richard Montague to mathematically formalize natural language. — PL Olcott

From the SEP article: Montague Semantics- the most important feature is the principle of compositionality, such that the meaning of the whole is a function of the meaning of its parts.

An example is given:

Consider the two sentences John finds a unicorn and John seeks a unicorn. These are syntactically alike (subject-verb-object), but are semantically very different. From the first sentence follows that there exists at least one unicorn, whereas the second sentence is ambiguous between the so called de dicto (or non-specific, or notional) reading which does not imply the existence of unicorns, and the de re (or specific, or objectual) reading from which existence of unicorns follows.

It seems to me that Montague Semantics is about how expressions are built out of the words used, not whether the expression is true or not. IE, as the expression "John finds a unicorn" may or may not be true, the expression "cats are animals" may or may not be true.

Montague Semantics may be able to analyse how expressions are constructed out of their parts, but not whether the expression is analytic or not.

I would welcome an invitation to participate in a reading group focused on the reading and discussion of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Should a group be formed — Debra

I'm afraid @Shawn was last heard of 11 months ago.

I have never taken part in a Reading group, but I guess this thread is as close to a reading group as there is on the Forum. I know there is a section on the Forum titled Reading Groups, but even those threads are quite loosely organised. A Reading group sounds structured, which Threads on the Forum tend not to be.

Being on the Forum, you don't need an invitation as such to participate in any thread, apart from just diving in. :grin:

All of the words have every slight nuance of their meaning assigned to them by Rudolf Carnap / Richard Montague Meaning Postulates. — PL Olcott

In his article Meaning Postulates in Philosophical Studies, Carnap writes that his Meaning Postulates only refer to a semantical language-system, not a natural language.

Our explication, as mentioned above, will refer to semantical language-systems, not to natural languages. It shares this character with most of the explications of philosophically important concepts given in modern logic, e.g., Tarski's explication of truth. It seems to me that the problems of explicating concepts of this kind for natural languages are of an entirely different nature.

When you write "Analytic expressions are expressions of language that can be verified as completely true entirely on the basis of their connection to the semantic meanings that make them true", it depends whether you are referring to a semantical language-system or a natural language.

As Carnap writes, a natural language is of an entirely different nature.

There’s no need, no reason a justification be required. — Mww

How does Kant justify that transcendental deduction is possible?

Kant justifies that humans have this ability in giving an example of a Transcendental Deduction in the Refutation of Idealism in B274

However, in assuming that the Categories derive from careful reflection about experiences, rather than the innatism of the Rationalists, he is basing his theory on what is probably an incorrect premise.

The deeper problem remains that he doesn't justify his premise that the Categories derive from careful reflection about experiences rather than the innatism of the Rationalists.
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If the categories, or whatever serves the purpose of them, seem to have a justifiable purpose, then it is the requirement of reason to discover them — Mww

Kant's belief is that the Categories are not innate although they are a prior to experience, and are discovered from a careful reflection about experiences, "the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience" (SEP - The Historical Controversies Surrounding Innateness)

For example, within the the experience of looking at a phenomena, the category of the concept of a circle presents itself within the phenomena as being so necessary and universal that transcendentally conforms the existence of the category itself .

It is not so much that we need to reason in order to discover the categories, but the categories present themselves as being so necessary and universal within our experiences that we have no choice but to accept them.
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Kant is merely calling the discovery of the categories a transcendental deduction of them. — Mww

Though Kant does distinguish between general logic and transcendental logic.

Intro to CPR - After a brief explanation of the distinction between "general logic" and "transcendental logic" - the former being the basic science of the forms of thought regardless of its object and the latter being the science of the basic forms for the thought of objects (A 50-5 7/B 74- 82)

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What is transcendental Deduction

Any object must have Categories as its characteristics if it is to be an object of experience. For example, from the Category of quantity, there is unity in that all swans are white, plurality in that some swans are white and totality, in that Cygmund is white (SEP - Categories).

I see shapes, appearance, phenomena. Where does my concept of all, some and one come from. The Rationalists defend innatism, the Empiricist believes from experience and Kant by using a transcendental deduction on experience.

However, neither the Empiricists nor Kant can explain how when we see a wavelength of 700nm we perceive the colour red, as the colour red is not in the wavelength 700nm. Only innatism can explain that we have the innate ability to perceive the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 700nm

What is a transcendental deduction. If flying over a desert island I see a set of stones on a beach having the same arrangement as the word SOS, it is possible that they could have rolled into that shape by the wind, but the likelihood is remote. Using transcendental deduction, I deduce that on the island must be or has been human life. A Transcendental deduction deduces from an observation something that cannot be seen in the observation yet is essential to the existence of the observation.

In B276 within the section on The Refutation of Idealism Kant gives an example of a Transcendental Deduction

I am conscious of my existence as determined in time. All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception. This persistent thing, however, cannot be something in me, since my own existence in time can first be determined only through this persistent thing. Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself. Now consciousness in time is necessarily combined with the consciousness of the possibility of this time-determination: Therefore it is also necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition of time-determination; i.e., the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me.

Have an enjoyable New Year, and wishing you all the best. :grin:

And, Happy New Year — Wayfarer

Yes, I agree that the Old Year did not cause the New Year, it was just an antecedent. However, without the Old Year there would be no New Year.

Thanks for your wishes, and looking forward to what the New Year brings. :grin:

We can reflect on the general nature of experience or perception and derive the ineliminable attributes. For example, perception of objects is unimaginable without space, time, form and differentiation. — Janus

Yes, we couldn't perceive objects without the footing of space, time, form and differentiation.

But suppose we never had this footing in the first place. Where did this footing come from?
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These categories seem to be Kant's attempt to pinpoint what is essential to the ways we understand things. Do you not think we can reflect on our experience and thinking in order to discover the essential elements? — Janus

Yes, we can look at swans in the world and know that all the swans are white. One question is, where did this ability come from. Who is right, the Rationalist's innatism or Kant's Transcendental Deduction?

Happy New Year :grin:

(This is also the basis of his rejection of accouting for reason in terms of evolutionary adaption - to appeal to successful adaptation as the grounds for reason, attempts to provide a grounding outside of reason itself, thereby undercutting the sovereignity of reason.) — Wayfarer

Aristotle called humans ‘rational animals’, the implication being that while we’re animals in some respects due to the power of reason we’re distinct. — Wayfarer

If human reason cannot be explained in terms of evolutionary adaption, how did it originate?
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Regarding the innate capacities of the mind - ‘capacities’ or ‘categories’ are not the same as ‘innate ideas’. — Wayfarer

Yes, I believe that humans are born with "knowledge how" rather than "knowledge that", using Gilbert Ryle's terminology.

Though the same question, if human "knowledge how" cannot be explained in terms of evolutionary adaption, how did it originate?

The meaning of those terms is the sum total of every detail of all of the general knowledge that applies to those terms (that can be written down using language). — PL Olcott

Can the expression "cats are animals" be analytic?

As you wrote "Analytic expressions are expressions of language that can be verified as completely true entirely on the basis of their connection to the semantic meanings that make them true."

To know that cats are animals I need to know the meaning of both cats and animals.

I cannot know the meaning of the word "cat" just from the word itself, but from the Merriam Webster Dictionary:
"cat" = "a carnivorous mammal (Felis catus) long domesticated as a pet and for catching rats and mice"

I cannot know the meaning of the word "carnivorous" just from the word itself

"Carnivorous" = "subsisting or feeding on animal tissues"

I cannot know the meaning of the word "subsisting" just from the word itself

"Subsisting" = "to have or acquire the necessities of life (such as food and clothing)"

However, as knowing the meaning of a single word ends up as an infinite regression, there can be no finite description of any word, meaning that no expression in language can be known to be analytic or not

The problem is that the "sum total" is infinite, negating the possibility of any analytic expression within language.

Analytic(Olcott) is a lot like the conventional meaning of {Analytic} in that every expression is verified as completely true entirely on the basis of its meaning. — PL Olcott

Consider "cats are animals".

However, there is no absolute meaning of "cat" and no absolute meaning of "animal", in that no two dictionaries will have the same definition, and even within the same dictionary the definition will change with time.

Therefore, if the expression "cats are animals" can only be analytic on the basis of the meanings of the words "cat" and "animal", but there is no absolute meaning of either "cat" nor "animal", then the expression cannot be analytic.

It is true that the National Geographic" wrote "As mostly nocturnal animals, cats have excellent vision and hearing, with ears that can turn like satellite dishes", but this is a synthetic judgement rather than an analytic truth.

Thomas Nagel says in his book The Last Word that there are thoughts or principles that one cannot "get outside of," meaning they are so basic to our understanding and reasoning that we cannot meaningfully doubt or reject them from a position outside of them. — Wayfarer

(This is also the basis of his rejection of accouting for reason in terms of evolutionary adaption - to appeal to successful adaptation as the grounds for reason, attempts to provide a grounding outside of reason itself, thereby undercutting the sovereignity of reason.) — Wayfarer

Kant doesn't believe that we have innate principles or ideas, but discover them from careful reflection on experience.

From the SEP article on The Historical Controversies Surrounding Innateness

In this respect Kant agrees with Locke that there are no innate principles or ideas to be ‘found’ in us. Both hold that all our ideas have their origin in experience. But Locke thinks that we build these ideas by abstracting from experience and recombining abstracted elements. Kant holds that such representations or ideas cannot be abstracted from experience; they must be the product of careful reflection on the nature of experience.

This seems similar to Nagel's position that it is not because of evolution that humans are able to reason.

For Kant, the source of pure reason is reason itself.

Intro to CPR

Kant says that "The transcendent principles are principles of the subjective unity of cognition through reason, i.e. of the agreement of reason with itself"; "Objective principles are principles of a possible empirical use." This suggests that whatever exactly the use of the transcendent principles of pure reason is, it is not to obtain any knowledge of external objects, which can only be achieved through the empirical use of the concepts of understanding, their application to representations in space and time for the exposition of appearances.

If reason itself is the transcendental source of being able to to reason, and not a consequence of evolutionary adaptation, why isn't it the case that other reasoning animals, such as cats, don't have the same ability of reasoning as humans?

The chess rules could be changed, just as we might think the laws of nature that determine that the Sun rises in the east could change. In fact it is far easier to see how the rules of chess might be changed. — Janus

Yes, this fits in with Hume.

The problem is with Kant. How can he discover what is necessary and universal just from experiences using transcendental deduction?

I think we already use the categories to make sense of experiences. It is on the basis of reflection upon how experiences must be for us in order that we can make sense of them that the synthetic a priori is generated, as I understand it. — Janus

Yes, we use the Categories to make sense of experiences.

However, Kant's transcendental deduction derives the Categories from these very same experiences.

How is this not circular?

Justifying possibility makes no sense. — Mww

Kant distinguishes transcendental deduction from empirical deduction

A85 - I therefore call the explanation of the way in which concepts can relate to objects a priori their transcendental deduction, and distinguish this from the empirical deduction, which shows how a concept is acquired through experience and reflection on it, and therefore concerns not the lawfulness but the fact from which the possession has arisen.

Many are not convinced that transcendental deduction is possible.

How does Kant justify that transcendental deduction is possible?

Every element of the body of analytic knowledge can be verified as true in that it is either an axiom of {BOAK} or is deduced from the axioms of {BOAK}.

The {body of analytic knowledge} (BOAK) is the subset of expressions of analytic truth that are known to be true. — PL Olcott

There is circularity here.
From 1): if an expression is part of a Body of Analytic Truth (BOAK), it is true and analytic.
From 2): if an expression is true and analytic, it becomes part of a Body of Analytic Truth (BOAK)

Given the proposition "X is Y", how do we know whether this is part of the Body of Analytic Truth (BOAK)?