I'm pretty sure that was Kepler, not Copernicus. — Janus

I stand corrected. :pray:

the odd thing is that even if we can have intuitive intellectual knowledge of reality, we cannot be certain that we can, no matter how certain we might feel about it. — Janus

Which brings us right back to scepticism 101.

‘Science as metaphysics’ seems a relevant topic to discuss it, although i suppose strictly speaking this is a subject in philosophy of mind. But I’d be interested in knowing more about what you propose as a physicalist theory of mind, either here or elsewhere.

whatever passes for the consensus of physicists, — wonderer1

I don’t think there is one. There are major gaps and conundrums in physics, even without considering the very tenuous connection it might have with how or if mind ‘emerges from’ neural networks, and the implications of that. I think the sense of what is physical, in this context, is post-Cartesian. This is the view that emerges from first of all dividing the world into the two domains of extended matter and ‘thinking substance’ and then by demonstrating the conceptual difficulties with the ‘thinking substance’ (a.k.a. ‘ghost in the machine’.) So having eliminated that problematical conception of the mind, there is purportedly nothing left other than ‘the physical’ in terms of which mind can be explained.

Do you think that is near the mark?

You'd probably need to start with a definition of 'physical' which I suspect will be very difficult to derive. If I was to pursue that argument, it would be along the lines that any such attempted definition could only be formulated relying on reason, which never appears in the physical data (for instance, images of neural data) but is internal to thought. That we can't arrive at an understanding of reason 'from the outside', i.e. as the consequence of something other than reason. But that would probably derail the thread, so I won't pursue it.

Hence the requirement for noesis, philosophical ascent. The culmination of those states is in 'seeing things as they truly are', of arriving at an insight into the totality, an epiphany or a great 'aha' moment. This is not necessarily confined to mysticism. There are episodes in the history of science where individuals had sudden noetic insights into the nature of things which lead to great breakthroughs in scientific understanding. An example would be Copernicus' realisation that the orbits of planets were elliptical whilst searching for the Platonic ideals in his observational data; Nikolai Tesla's mystical vision of the Sun and the interchangeability of matter and energy which preceeded Einstein's discovery of the same fact. There are no doubt many other examples, at least some of which resulted in the overthrow of the current paradigm. Arthur Koestler's book The Sleepwalkers contains many examples. Another I recall is Neils Bohr's insight into 'complementarity' which he regarded as a novel insight into the nature of reality, so much so that when he was awarded an Order by the King of Denmark, he designed his own coat-of-arms, which features the Ying/Yang symbol:



(source)

Well, perhaps you might expand on this:

Someone who is really idealistic about what is real will not accept an idea that is realistic about what is ideal. — introbert

You seem to be opposing 'real' and 'ideal' here. What exactly do you mean?

It has always been nice to find someone who will engage in a philosophical type of discussion, but sometimes it becomes an argument over misunderstanding. One thing that I have noticed is that the flips and flops of idealism and realism create barriers to someone accepting a fact or claim or idea. — introbert

Totally with you on that. I'm one of the posters on this forum who generally argues for an idealist, or anti-materialist, philosophy, and I know how ingrained the materialist/physicalist viewpoint is in today's culture. What you're describing is called 'talking past one another'. It happens all the time on philosophy forums, due to the widely divergent views of different contributors. It takes patience and persistence to engage on conversations with those who hold opposite views to yourself, but having the skill to do so, is the best thing a medium like this has to offer.

I meant, my wife corresponds to the part of you that is saying you should allocate your time better...

She says, sarcastically, ‘still playing with your invisible friends?’ I do try and point out that discussing philosophy is, you know, not like selling drugs or guns or many of the other egregious things that people do online, but it doesn’t impress her…..

Yes, my wife also says that quite often :wink:

I could equally claim that it is ‘necessary’ that your mind is a thing-in-itself. — Bob Ross

Indeed. And that the mind does not appear among, or as, a phenomenon.

Do you think that computers do not deal with numbers and apply logical principles, or do you think that the processes occurring in computers cannot be explained in terms of the interactions of matter, or...? — wonderer1

It's part of a larger argument, that I've tried to develop here and elsewhere.

First, as regards computers, I think their capacities can be explained solely in terms of the physical sciences, but then, they're human artefacts. Humans invented them to perform tasks, and they do that extraordinarily well, mainly through the miracle of miniturisation which has allowed billions of transistors to be accomodated on a chip the size of a fingernail. No argument that they're not physical, but then, they are not beings. They're devices that can now emulate, among other things, some aspects human intelligence (and indeed I am now using ChatGPT on a daily basis). The reason they exist is because we imbue them with some aspects of our own intelligence, and interpret their output by the same means.

The larger argument is that logic comprises solely the relationship of ideas, and cannot be reduced to the physical. Here I am drawing on the argument from reason. The argument from reason challenges naturalism, which is the belief that all phenomena, including human thoughts and reasoning, can be explained solely in terms of natural, physical processes (such as physical interactions). According to this argument, if naturalism were true, reasoning can be explained in terms of neurochemistry, on the basis of material or efficient causation. And it this is true, reason could be described as the output of physical processes, devoid of purpose or intentionality. But the very ability to reason and to engage in rational discourse presupposes the existence of intentionality and purpose, and the ability to grasp abstractions (such as if...then). Reasoning involves judgement, making logical inferences, and seeking truth. If our thoughts were simply the result of physical causation, they would lack the ability to genuinely apprehend truth or to be rationally justified. (I think this is why Daniel Dennett continually teases the idea of humans as moist robots.)

Arguments of this kind have been pursued by Christian apologists such as C S Lewis and Alvin Plantinga, however, I have no interest in using them for any theistic reason, only to show how materialism itself undercuts something essential about the nature of reason. A similar line of argument is found in Thomas Nagel's essay, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion, which argues in a similar vein about ascribing the faculty of reason solely to evolutionary biology:

The only form that genuine reasoning can take consists in seeing the validity of the arguments, in virtue of what they say. As soon as one tries to step outside of such thoughts* one loses contact with their true content. And one cannot be outside and inside them at the same time: If one thinks in logic, one cannot simultaneously regard those thoughts as mere psychological dispositions, however caused or however biologically grounded. If one decides that some of one's psychological dispositions are, as a contingent matter of fact, reliable methods of reaching the truth (as one may with perception, for example), then in doing so one must rely on other thoughts that one actually thinks, without regarding them as mere dispositions. One cannot embed all one's reasoning in a psychological theory, including the reasonings that have led to that psychological theory. The epistemological buck must stop somewhere. By this I mean not that there must be some premises that are forever unrevisable but, rather, that in any process of reasoning or argument there must be some thoughts that one simply thinks from the inside--rather than thinking of them as biologically programmed dispositions. — Thomas Nagel

*'Stepping outside' them means seeking to explain them in other terms, e.g. as the products of evolutionary adaptation or the result of neurochemical interactions.

it did not counter my point which refutes that. — Philosophim

You did not refute it.

I've shown it — Philosophim

You did not show it.

Your arguments are idiosyncratic and you quote no sources.

It’s an extremely complicated matter. Schopenhauer is routinely described as atheist, yet he explicitly praises Indic philosophy and religious asceticism and rejects materialism (which is the aspect of his philosophy that I’m most drawn to.)

Vedanta and Buddhism were mutually antagonistic within their own cultural sphere, although from outside it they seem to have much more in common than either side would acknowledge. (I was a mod on Dharmawheel for some time, and noticed that whenever mention of Vedanta was made, many of the most senior contributors expressed a deep, culturally-engrained hostility towards it. So much for the ‘many paths up the mountain’!)

The OP frequently writes on what is known as ‘antinatalism’ which is apparently a philosophy that stresses it would be better not to have been born or not to exist. Like many traditional philosophies, it sees existence as being inherently imperfect and painful. Gnosticism is another example. It sees the world as the creation of an evil demiurge, usually identified with the OT Jehovah, and the only hope being an escape from the created world and return to the Plelroma through gnostic insight.

Yet unlike the ancient world-denying philosophies modern antinatalism seems to have no conception of there being anything corresponding to the ‘release from suffering’. Existence is a mirage, a trap, a painful charade, but there’s nothing higher to aspire to. Only the wan idea that maybe if we don’t procreate, then we’ve made a meaningful gesture towards non-being.

Why the defensiveness? I’m not accusing you, or accusing science, of anything. But at this time it is a conjecture.

Do you think that the dark matter conjecture qualifies as metaphysics? It’s a conjecture based on abductive reasoning, arising from apparent contradictions between theory and empirical observation, positing the existence of an unknown force or substance which has never been, and may never be, directly observed.

Do you think that terms such as mokṣa or Nirvāṇa mean anything? How would you interpret what is meant by them?

:ok:

I think it can plausibly related to enactivism. According to enactivism, subjective and objective aspects arise in the context of the organism's ongoing interactions with its environment. The subject's lived experience is understood as inherently embedded in and shaped by its environment. The environment provides the affordances, or possibilities for action, which influence the subject's perception and behavior.

In this view, subjectivity is not considered as a purely private, inner realm divorced from the objective world. Instead, it emerges through the subject's engagement with the world. The subject's embodied interactions and sensory-motor skills shape its perceptual capacities, leading to the construction of its subjective experience.

That in turn can be traced back to The Embodied Mind. Published in 1991, it explores the idea that cognition is not solely a product of the brain but is grounded in the dynamic interaction between the body, the mind, and the environment. The book draws on insights from various disciplines, including cognitive science, phenomenology, and Buddhist philosophy, to propose a new understanding of the mind that emphasizes embodiment and action.

Hence the tie with Buddhism. It’s a deep subject because it draws on abhidharma, Buddhist philosophical psychology which is a complicated topic. But one striking thing I noticed in studying the early Buddhist texts, is the frequent recurrence of the compound term, ‘self and world’, in dialogues on the nature of the self. Buddhism would put it that self and world ‘co-arise’ - which is the perspective that enactivism draws on. Whereas, you will know if you read many topics on this forum, that the assumed attitude is generally that objective and subjective are clearly differentiated or distinct domains of being.

Thich Naht Hanh used the term ‘inter-being’ to convey the meaning of śūnyatā - because all things exist on account of causes and conditions, and in relationship to others. Whereas the default view of liberal individualism is that the individual ego, the separated self, is the axis around which the world turns, so to speak.

I just find the term unhelpful really. What are you trying to say by it? What is the purpose of labeling it as such? In other words, what are you trying to indicate or imply with it? — schopenhauer1

Nihilism - nothing is real, nothing matters, nothing truly exists. That poem you quote is dripping with it.

Although I am not well versed therein, I don’t find it a feasible solution to say that the objective world is really empty—that is no different, in terms of parsimony, as saying it is all produced by my mind only (to me). — Bob Ross

There is indeed a school of Buddhism called Mind-Only, which is near in many respects to Kastrup’s Analytical Idealism. The reason that it doesn’t end in solipsism, is that Buddhism rejects the sovereignty of the self. In other words, the world is created by the mind of beings. Compatible with enactivism and constructivism.

I have ordered the book I got that quote from, Schopenhauer’s Compass, Urs App. It pays particular attention to his notes on the Upanishads. My observation would be that neither Vedanta or Buddhism are pessimistic. They both declare that existence is pervaded by suffering, but they also declare the release from suffering, and that is not pessimism. My reading of Schopenhauer is that he acutely perceives the unsatisfactory nature of existence (‘dukkha’ in Buddhist parlance) and kind of intuits something beyond that, in his allusions to the value of ascetic detachment. But he didn’t have the examples of actual practitioners or teachers from those lineages which limited his realisation of actuality of release.

Edward Conze, a Buddhist Studies scholar, while acknowledging many convergences between Schopenhauer and Buddhist philosophy, describes Schopenhauer’s shortcomings like this:

(A) Schopenhauer fails to appreciate the importance of disciplined meditation. Educated non-Catholic Germans of the nineteenth century were quite unfamiliar with the practice of spiritual contemplation. On the other hand, for relaxation they habitually visited art galleries and went for walks in the countryside. It is no wonder, therefore, that Schopenhauer sees the foretaste of "the exalted peace" of Nirvāṇa, not in trance (dhyana), but in "pure esthetic contemplation." Although the contemplation of beauty has some analogy to the conditions prevailing in trance, it is on the whole an undisciplined faculty, and its results are rather fleeting and have little power to transmute the personality. In this respect, the German bourgeois town-dweller was a lesser man than the Indian man in the forest.

(B) Secondly, Schopenhauer teaches that the Will is the Thing-in-itself, whereas in Buddhism "craving" operates only within the conditioned and phenomenal world, and the unconditioned noumenon lies in Nirvāṇa, which is quite calm as the result of the abolition of craving. Unacquainted with the practice of conteplation, Schopenhauer did not know that at the bottom of every mind there is a calm quietude which is the prototype of Nirvāṇa*. His central metaphysical thesis is, however, incompatible, not only with Buddhism, but also with his own soteriological aspirations. It is, indeed, not only hard to see how any cognitive act can ever reach the Thing-in-itself, but it also remains incomprehensible how thought can ever have the strength to stand up against the Will, and, what is more, how as a part of the purely illusory phenomenal world it can possibly overcome and effectively "deny" it. This was early recognized by Nietzsche and J. Bahnsen, Schopenhauer's immediate successors, and led them, respectively, into nihilism and a pessimism unrelieved by the hope of escape. — Edward Conze, Buddhist Philosophy and its European Parallels

* Although I do note in the preview of Urs App’s book that Schopenhauer dicsussed what he called ‘illuminism’ which he seems to associate with mystical states of quietude. I’ll know better when I’ve read the book.

So there’s the purported origin of pessimism and nihilism which seems to characterise your philosophy also.

Cribbed from public domain sources:

E. A. Burtt's book, "The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science," published in 1924, analyzes the metaphysical and epistemological foundations of science, particularly focusing on the transition from the classical worldview to the emerging scientific worldview of the early 20th century. Burtt traces the historical development of scientific thought from the ancient Greeks highlighting the significant changes in worldview brought about by figures like Galileo, Copernicus, Newton, and others, leading to the rise of modern physical science. Burtt examines the prevailing mechanistic view of the universe that emerged during the scientific revolution. He discusses how scientists started to view the world as a vast machine governed by mathematical laws and how they sought to explain natural phenomena in terms of mechanistic processes and metaphors

He explores the epistemological foundations of science and the centrality of the concept of objectivity. He investigates how the scientific method aims to eliminate subjective biases and opinions in favor of objective observation, experimentation, and the formulation of laws based on empirical evidence.

He critically examines reductionism, the approach of reducing complex phenomena to their fundamental constituents, and materialism, the philosophical position that everything can be reduced to physical matter. He delves into the implications of these philosophical positions on the understanding of reality and the limitations they may impose on scientific inquiry.

He discusses the concepts of causality and determinism in science. He explores how the Newtonian worldview assumed a deterministic universe governed by precise cause-and-effect relationships and how subsequent developments, such as quantum mechanics, have undermined this understanding.

Burtt examines the role of mathematics in modern physics and its significance as a tool for understanding and describing the natural world. He reflects on the relationship between mathematics and reality, considering whether mathematics is merely a human invention or an inherent aspect of the universe.

Throughout the book, Burtt highlights the limitations of scientific inquiry and the boundaries of what science can explain. He emphasizes the need for a broader metaphysical framework that goes beyond science to address fundamental questions about existence, meaning, and values.

—-

Much has happened since the publication of this book, but the themes Burtt addresses are still relevant to the discussion. But I would say that the 1927 Solvay Conference coming shortly after this book was published was the watershed between modernism and post-modernism.

I still can’t draw a line between what you say and nihilism.

So, basically, avoid pro-creation. Which is of course reflected in ascetic celibacy, although I think their rationale also extends beyond that.

I agree with Schopenhauer here, however, let's not make it a self-fulfilling prophecy either and participate in it. — schopenhauer1

And how can one avoid participation?

It did, up until around the 4th century AD when it was anathematised by the Church on dogmatic grounds. It seems to have been accepted at least in an implicit sense by Plato and Origen (who taught the pre-existence of souls - that the soul was not created by God at the time of conception but existed prior. That was the specific belief that was anathematised by the Church.)

‘Brahmanism’ refers to Vedanta. Both it and Buddhism seek mokṣa or Nirvāṇa, release from the cycle of birth and death. There’s no real equivalent in Western culture.

Another point is that Kant’s assertion that we can’t know things ‘as they are in themselves’ is simply an admission of the limits of human knowledge. It is a modest claim, not a sweeping assertion. As Emrys Westcott says in an excellent Kant primer, 'A more sympathetic reading is to see the concept of the “thing in itself” as a sort of placeholder in Kant's system; it both marks the limits of what we can know and expresses a sense of mystery that cannot be dissolved, the sense of mystery that underlies our unanswerable questions. Through both of these functions it serves to keep us humble.' Whereas the idea that the way things appear to humans, is the way they truly are, amounts to a kind of tacit assertion of omniscience.

I would have hoped that brief excerpt would be of use by itself, in respect of the question of the ‘knowledge of things in themselves’. (Knowledge of The Vedas not required!)

Remember that 60's protest slogan? 'If you're not part of the solution, you're part of the problem'? And the related 'Be the change you want to see in the world'? (But then, I also remember the bumper sticker, popular in the 80's, 'Magic Happens', followed a few years later by the plaintive 'Still waiting for the Magic to Happen.')

https://www.thedailybeast.com/republicans-admit-they-dont-know-if-biden-bribery-tapes-really-exist?ref=home

“Well again, we don’t know really if the tapes exist, we just don’t know that, whether this was just a bluff on the part of whoever the executive was,” the Wisconsin lawmaker (Johnson) said on Wednesday.

It's typical of this lot. All of the promised 'bombshell revelations' about the 'weaponisation of the FBI' have likewise fallen completely flat, relying as they were on disenchanted ex-employees and so-called informants that the panel was unable to actually locate.

As always with Trumpworld fiascos, malevolence throttled by incompetence.

D. T. Suzuki, the eminent scholar of Zen Buddhism, one day made this sarcastic comment on the Christian tradition to his friends, American mythologist Joseph Campbell and psychoanalyst Carl Jung: “Nature against Man, Man against Nature; God against Man, Man against God; God against Nature, Nature against God; very funny religion!” (Daniel Odier) — 0 thru 9

Suzuki represents nondualism. 'Long and short define each other' is a typical non-dualist statement. The principle is that opposites only exist in relation to each other - which you also see in the ying-yang icon, although nondualism proper mainly developed in India and was imported into China with Buddhism.

Nondualism a very subtle philosophical attitude, not generally well-represented in Western philosophy, although you can find it if you know what you're looking for (see Nondualism in Western Thought, Greg Goode, free .pdf copy provided.) I've been studying it pretty well all my adult life in one form or another - I first encountered the Teachings of Ramana Maharishi, then Krishnamurti, then read many Buddhist texts, which are basically anchored in the non-dualist tradition. They arise from meditative awareness, samadhi, which is the rare and elusive state of self-transcendence.

As far as McGilchrist is concerned, I noticed his book Master and Emissary a few years ago - must admit I haven't read it, but read reviews and abstracts and listened to a couple of his talks. On the front page of his website, you read ‘Our talent for division, for seeing the parts, is of staggering importance – second only to our capacity to transcend it, in order to see the whole’. It's that 'holistic vision' that is missing in Western culture, although not altogether, there are individuals and schools of thought that see it. And it is becoming more part of mainstream culture - it's one of the legacies of the 60's generation.

I went to the very first Science and Nonduality conference, in 2009, in San Rafael, near San Francisco (you can find their website here https://www.scienceandnonduality.com/). Also attended a few subsequent conferences, it's become a regular fixture. They now have hundreds of recorded lectures on youtube. There's a ton of material out there now - too much, in fact! It's like getting a glass of water from a fire hydrant. Nevertheless, much great material to discover and explore.

Sure, for subjective reasons you like to believe that logical laws are independent of human reason, but you don't like to believe that material objects are. — Janus

My reasoning is not subjective. I take it as axiomatic that the basic laws of logic are consistent everywhere. You will find they hold as much in Indian philosophy as in Greek.

The issue with the independence of the objects of perception is another matter. I've already pointed out the issue with this statement:

Subjective consciousness creates a subjective reality. Subjective reality does not alter objective reality. — Philosophim

but I got nowhere with it. Suffice to refer to enactivism. 'Enactivism rejects the traditional dualistic view that separates subjective and objective aspects of experience. Instead, it proposes an embodied and situated perspective, where subjectivity and objectivity are intertwined and mutually constitutive.' Subjects and objects co-arise and are mutually dependent.

our logic is derived from generalizing from the analysis of our experience of material objects, — Janus

So empirical philosophers say, but the counter to that is that we would not be able to generalise or abstract without the prior existence of the rational faculty to count, compare, abstract and reason

I stand by the basic claim that numbers, logical principles, and the like, cannot be explained in terms of the interactions of matter. That reason comprises the relationship of ideas, not the relations between material entities.

In the case of 7=7 could I not also say H20=H20, or "real physical properties" = "real physical properties"? Since real physical properties are equal to real physical properties, this is known apriori, or independently of experience right? — Philosophim

Notice in all those examples, you're appealing to the law of identity. But (as per the argument in the Phaedo) you already need to have the concept or idea of 'equals' in order to make that comparison. You can say that the weight of two 500 gram apples equals the weight of one 1Kg melon, but that's because you're mathematically literate and can grasp the meaning of 'the same as' or 'equal to'. It's those intellectual operations, which we rely on for all manner of reasoned inference, which I say can't be explained in terms of matter and energy.

So agency - if we must use the word - boils down to a capacity to make choices. — apokrisis

I think we must, as we're agents. Choice doesn't come into what crystals do, but it comes into what the most basic organisms do, even if in a very simple manner. That's the sense in which life introduces new horizons of possibility.

We don’t have to invoke any kind of divine inner spark. Just a molecular switch that flips the spiralling flagella from entangled straight line motion to disentangled and tumbling mode. — apokrisis

Bacteria will not reflect on their situation, but we are able to do that, so it has significance for us. And the analogy is a misleading one, in that a switch has absolutely no agency, it is both constructed and operated by an external agency, whereas the choices an organism makes are determinative of its continued survival. Doesn't matter to a switch, what happens, but it matters a hell of a lot to an organism. This whole question of agency and physical causation is one of the central philosophical dilemmas. To turn over the whole question to impersonal laws, like thermodynamics or atomic physics, is in a way to dodge the question that our particular point in the evolutionary cycle has brought us to. It's to wash our hands of the responsibility we must take for our own choices.

:up:

However the more important matter is that consciousness is a process that occurs in a specific brain, — wonderer1

So is my idea of ‘7’ different to yours? (Better not be, else it might be hard to do business.)

The Universe wants to entropify....the Cosmos itself wants a planet like Earth — apokrisis

But:

It would [be] woo to suggest that the Cosmos actually has a mind, or a designer. — apokrisis

However:

Darwinian evolution is the agency — apokrisis

Is it though? I question whether evolution is an agent at all. Natural selection acts to prevent things happening, to filter things out, but it doesn't create. The only agents involved are organisms. If anything, the attribution of agency to evolution is a remnant of theism, where now instead of the Divine Architect, agency is attributed to the process that has ostensibly replaced Him.

P.s Iain McGilchrist makes a good case how we came to this point in his book Master and Emissary. — TheMadMan

:100: Just the book I would have mentioned.