The implication seems to be that the only purpose of suicide is to somehow be a solution to past suffering. The conclusion follows only from this assumption, but it can be falsified by taking into account future suffering.

Two obvious cases: You're taken prisoner as a spy and have secrets that will be tortured out of you before you are put to death. Or you have a painful form of cancer making what time you have left a hell (and a financial burden) for yourself and your caretakers. You voluntarily choose to eliminate that suffering by taking an early exit.

Second case is dementia. You still have your marbles but know you have say Alzheimer's. In a short time you will no longer be of sufficiently sound mind and body and will doom yourself and your caretakers to the same burdens as above. The time to make the decision is now, not later when the marbles are lost.

Both cases above falsify the assertion made by Cioran. The latter one is more interesting since the time to make the decision is well before the action is to take place. It might be as little as some kind of DNR, but it might be a more proactive action to be taken by what will at that point be an unwilling state.

All of this then implies that it was best to not have this brought about in the first place. — schopenhauer1

Which is not an option open to anyone who's already-born. Preventing new births likewise accomplishes nothing because the already-born continue to suffer; perhaps only reducing net suffering of the already-born is possible, or worth striving for. I rephrase Cioran's insight as

It's not worth the bother of killing yourself or refusing to procreate, since you always kill yourself and go extinct as a species too late.

:fire:

The implication seems to be that the only purpose of suicide is to somehow be a solution to past suffering. The conclusion follows only from this assumption, but it can be falsified by taking into account future suffering.

Two obvious cases: You're taken prisoner as a spy and have secrets that will be tortured out of you before you are put to death. Or you have a painful form of cancer making what time you have left a hell (and a financial burden) for yourself and your caretakers. You voluntarily choose to eliminate that suffering by taking an early exit.

Second case is dementia. You still have your marbles but know you have say Alzheimer's. In a short time you will no longer be of sufficiently sound mind and body and will doom yourself and your caretakers to the same burdens as above. The time to make the decision is now, not later when the marbles are lost.

Both cases above falsify the assertion made by Cioran. The latter one is more interesting since the time to make the decision is well before the action is to take place. It might be as little as some kind of DNR, but it might be a more proactive action to be taken by what will at that point be an unwilling state. — noAxioms

So I get what you're saying if we took Cioran too literally. However, I think there are layers to this quote. We have to follow the implication to the end.

"You always kill yourself too late" Why?
Because you were given a problem(s) to overcome.

The problem was being given the problem to overcome. There is no escape from being in a position of having to deal with in the first place. Even suicide being perceived as the only option is itself problematic.

The fact is being born is a hot potato and you can let your hands burn or pass it, but potatoes keep being tossed in your lap.

Which is not an option open to anyone who's already-born. Preventing new births likewise accomplishes nothing because the already-born continue to suffer; perhaps only reducing net suffering of the already-born is possible, or worth striving for. I rephrase Cioran's insight as
It's not worth the bother of killing yourself or refusing to procreate, since you always kill yourself and go extinct as a species too late. — 180 Proof

The problem is that this means the only way out is through. As I was saying to noAxioms, this itself is the Problem (big P). Creating the need for need. The damage is done and it is inescapable.

Also, combining Cioran with Schopenhauer's quote:

Suicide may also be regarded as an experiment — a question which man puts to Nature, trying to force her to answer. The question is this: What change will death produce in a man’s existence and in his insight into the nature of things? It is a clumsy experiment to make; for it involves the destruction of the very consciousness which puts the question and awaits the answer. — Schopenhauer

Once dead, the relief is not had. No relief is had.

The problem is that this means the only way out is through. — schopenhauer1

Amor fati.

:death: :flower:

But it is the Problem that is created and perpetuated.

Is there no symbolic catharsis? The conclusion doesn't default to thus condoning and embracing the Problem. When things are written as poetry (like Thus Spoke Zarathustra) then manic embracing of the Problem seems charming. But that's not life. That is a simulacrum of life used as a cudgel against the Pessimist (his dear teacher Schopenhauer).

"The problem" is suffering (Buddha, Epicurus, Epictetus, Spinoza, Nietzsche, Zapffe ... Cioran ...), that is, how we use our minds (i.e. metacognitive habits), not "existing" as such.

The Buddha asserts the cessation of all suffering (i.e. Nirvāṇa, which is not mere non-existence). But having been born, the gordian knot which binds beings to existence has to be cut, otherwise existence (and therefore suffering) are bound to continue. So for that reason, seeking the cessation of 'continued becoming' by ending one's own individual life does not actually achieve its end, as the 'drive to become' will always find a way to make itself manifest again.

Speaking of quotes, I have one from Schopenhauer0, to wit:

In order to always have a secure compass in hand so as to find one's way in life, and to see life always in the correct light without going astray, nothing is more suitable than getting used to seeing the world as something like a penal colony. This view finds its...justification not only in my philosophy, but also in the wisdom of all times, namely, in Brahmanism, Buddhism, Empedocles, Pythagoras [...] Even in genuine and correctly understood Christianity, our existence is regarded as the result of a liability or a misstep. ... We will thus always keep our position in mind and regard every human, first and foremost, as a being that exists only on account of sinfulness, and who is life is an expiation of the offence committed through birth. Exactly this constitutes what Christianity calls the sinful nature of man. — Schopenhauer's Compass, Urs App

I suspect Cioran would agree ...

There's no such thing as life without bloodshed. I think the notion that the species can be improved in some way, that everyone could live in harmony, is a really dangerous idea. Those who are afflicted with this notion are the first ones to give up their souls, their freedom. Your desire that it be that way will enslave you and make your life vacuous. — Cormac McCarthy, d. 2023 (today)

It's certainly not worth doing so too early in case it causes one to miss the indefinable positives of life (assuming that the prevention of suffering is good for those who don't exist).

Those who believed in creating a better tomorrow did not necessarily ignore the negetive aspect of reality:

"I do believe that, where there is only a choice between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence... I would rather have India resort to arms in order to defend her honour than that she should, in a cowardly manner, become or remain a helpless witness to her own dishonor.

But I believe that nonviolence is infinitely superior to violence, forgiveness is more manly than punishment. Forgiveness adorns a soldier...But abstinence is forgiveness only when there is the power to punish; it is meaningless when it pretends to proceed from a helpless creature....

But I do not believe India to be helpless....I do not believe myself to be a helpless creature....Strength does not come from physical capacity. It comes from an indomitable will.

We do want to drive out the beast in the man, but we do not want on that account to emasculate him. And in the process of finding his own status, the beast in him is bound now and again to put up his ugly appearance.

The world is not entirely governed by logic. Life itself involves some kind of violence and we have to choose the path of least violence."

—The Mind of Mahatma Gandhi

If "Brahmanism" refers to the Upanishads, then one has to remember that they don't really suggest that existence is completely bad. Instead, they seek to elevate us to a state of existence that is truer/a significant improvement over our current material existence.

Buddhists, too, believe that simply ending life would not accomplish much as rebirth would still occur. Each person's path is going to be different.

Not sure what you mean here.

. So for that reason, seeking the cessation of 'continued becoming' by ending one's own individual life does not actually achieve its end, as the 'drive to become' will always find a way to make itself manifest again.

Speaking of quotes, I have one from Schopenhauer0, to wit:

In order to always have a secure compass in hand so as to find one's way in life, and to see life always in the correct light without going astray, nothing is more suitable than getting used to seeing the world as something like a penal colony. This view finds its...justification not only in my philosophy, but also in the wisdom of all times, namely, in Brahmanism, Buddhism, Empedocles, Pythagoras [...] Even in genuine and correctly understood Christianity, our existence is regarded as the result of a liability or a misstep. ... We will thus always keep our position in mind and regard every human, first and foremost, as a being that exists only on account of sinfulness, and who is life is an expiation of the offence committed through birth. Exactly this constitutes what Christianity calls the sinful nature of man. — Wayfarer

I agree with Schopenhauer here, however, let's not make it a self-fulfilling prophecy either and participate in it. Evolution might bring about suffering beings, but we don't have to.

it is indeed a different ethic to believe one should force others to suffer because there is also good accompanied by that initial force. But indeed, as the quote says, the force was done, and the problem has already been presented. The stoppage of the problem brings no relief post-facto. It is a "gordian knot" indeed. Once in the mess, there is really no "out of it". That's because death is not the opposite of being born. They are incommensurable.

‘Brahmanism’ refers to Vedanta. Both it and Buddhism seek mokṣa or Nirvāṇa, release from the cycle of birth and death. There’s no real equivalent in Western culture.

‘Brahmanism’ refers to Vedanta. Both it and Buddhism seek mokṣa or Nirvāṇa, release from the cycle of birth and death. There’s no real equivalent in Western culture. — Wayfarer

There is no real equivalent in Western culture because the speculative notion of rebirth has never played a significant part in that culture.

:up:

'One suffers much more from one's attitude towards suffering than from the mere fact that one can / does suffer.' That is what I meant – paraphrasing the insights of thinkers I listed in my previous post. And IME I've found that this is more often than not the case.

It did, up until around the 4th century AD when it was anathematised by the Church on dogmatic grounds. It seems to have been accepted at least in an implicit sense by Plato and Origen (who taught the pre-existence of souls - that the soul was not created by God at the time of conception but existed prior. That was the specific belief that was anathematised by the Church.)

I agree with Schopenhauer here, however, let's not make it a self-fulfilling prophecy either and participate in it. — schopenhauer1

And how can one avoid participation?

One suffers much more from one's attitude towards suffering than from the mere fact that one can / does suffer.' That what I meant – paraphrasing the insights of thinkers I listed in my previous post. And IME I've found that this is more often than not the case. — 180 Proof

I’m more interested in the inextricable nature of being caught in this inescapable situation than how people are just “overblowing suffering” and should just “get over it”. But the fact that one has to get over it is the whole point. The problem(s) have already been put into motion. There is no escaping one has to overcome in the first place.

The pre-existence of the soul is not the same idea as metempsychosis. I am not sure if the latter idea is explicitly espoused by Plato, or even the Neoplatonists. My familiarity with their works is too scant, but I suspect that just a few references even to the pre-existence of the soul were made in Plato's works through the voice of Socrates, and that even there it was treated more as a speculative possibility than an established fact. Pythagoras seems to be the only strong proponent of the idea, but even there I believe we only know his ideas as far as they were referenced by later thinkers. I'm open to being further educated on all this though, since I'm certainly no scholar of ancient Greek thought.

Whatever may be the case regarding Plato and the Neoplatonists, I don't think it was a belief that captured the minds of a significant part of the culture, as there were always rival schools of thought: for example, Aristotle, the Stoics, the Skeptics, the Cynics, the Epicureans, so what I am saying is that it never became a central cultural motif in the West.

And how can one avoid participation? — Wayfarer

Don’t throw more people into it. Nature will make people suffer. Therefore, I will make more people that will suffer does not compute. Not saying you’re saying that, but I can see the idea that suffering is going to happen no matter what so therefore I can do X thing that makes people eventually suffer being some sort of justification.

So, basically, avoid pro-creation. Which is of course reflected in ascetic celibacy, although I think their rationale also extends beyond that.

Yes. The ascetics have it. They veer away from it when they do summersault justifications like, "Humans are needed so they can break samsara, thus making more humans to suffer to escape suffering..." I just see it as a post-facto and circular justification.

I still can’t draw a line between what you say and nihilism.

I still can’t draw a line between what you say and nihilism. — Wayfarer

Nihilism doesn't have any ethics. Pessimism is more fitting.

I have ordered the book I got that quote from, Schopenhauer’s Compass, Urs App. It pays particular attention to his notes on the Upanishads. My observation would be that neither Vedanta or Buddhism are pessimistic. They both declare that existence is pervaded by suffering, but they also declare the release from suffering, and that is not pessimism. My reading of Schopenhauer is that he acutely perceives the unsatisfactory nature of existence (‘dukkha’ in Buddhist parlance) and kind of intuits something beyond that, in his allusions to the value of ascetic detachment. But he didn’t have the examples of actual practitioners or teachers from those lineages which limited his realisation of actuality of release.

Edward Conze, a Buddhist Studies scholar, while acknowledging many convergences between Schopenhauer and Buddhist philosophy, describes Schopenhauer’s shortcomings like this:

(A) Schopenhauer fails to appreciate the importance of disciplined meditation. Educated non-Catholic Germans of the nineteenth century were quite unfamiliar with the practice of spiritual contemplation. On the other hand, for relaxation they habitually visited art galleries and went for walks in the countryside. It is no wonder, therefore, that Schopenhauer sees the foretaste of "the exalted peace" of Nirvāṇa, not in trance (dhyana), but in "pure esthetic contemplation." Although the contemplation of beauty has some analogy to the conditions prevailing in trance, it is on the whole an undisciplined faculty, and its results are rather fleeting and have little power to transmute the personality. In this respect, the German bourgeois town-dweller was a lesser man than the Indian man in the forest.

(B) Secondly, Schopenhauer teaches that the Will is the Thing-in-itself, whereas in Buddhism "craving" operates only within the conditioned and phenomenal world, and the unconditioned noumenon lies in Nirvāṇa, which is quite calm as the result of the abolition of craving. Unacquainted with the practice of conteplation, Schopenhauer did not know that at the bottom of every mind there is a calm quietude which is the prototype of Nirvāṇa*. His central metaphysical thesis is, however, incompatible, not only with Buddhism, but also with his own soteriological aspirations. It is, indeed, not only hard to see how any cognitive act can ever reach the Thing-in-itself, but it also remains incomprehensible how thought can ever have the strength to stand up against the Will, and, what is more, how as a part of the purely illusory phenomenal world it can possibly overcome and effectively "deny" it. This was early recognized by Nietzsche and J. Bahnsen, Schopenhauer's immediate successors, and led them, respectively, into nihilism and a pessimism unrelieved by the hope of escape. — Edward Conze, Buddhist Philosophy and its European Parallels

* Although I do note in the preview of Urs App’s book that Schopenhauer dicsussed what he called ‘illuminism’ which he seems to associate with mystical states of quietude. I’ll know better when I’ve read the book.

So there’s the purported origin of pessimism and nihilism which seems to characterise your philosophy also.

So there’s the purported origin of pessimism and nihilism which seems to characterise your philosophy also. — Wayfarer

Nihilism is multi-faceted. It's like "realism". Art realism? Metaphysical realism? Epistemic realism? Etc.

I just find the term unhelpful really. What are you trying to say by it? What is the purpose of labeling it as such? In other words, what are you trying to indicate or imply with it?

In the quote it looks like nihilism is basically the "suffering" part of Buddhism but with no escape. Is that it?

E.M. Cioran, who is quoted in the OP, can be considered a sort of resignationist. That is to say, there is nothing to do and nowhere to go, so sit back. There is a sort of an inertia in his writings. That any move is pointless. See here:

-To get up in the morning, wash and then wait for some unforeseen variety of dread or depression. I would give the whole universe and all of Shakespeare for a grain of ataraxy.

-My faculty for disappointment surpasses understanding. It is what lets me comprehend Buddha, but also what keeps me from following him.

-I am enraptured by Hindu philosophy, whose essential endeavor is to surmount the self; and everything I do, everything I think is only myself and the selfs humiliations.

-In the fact of being born there is such an absence of necessity that when you think about it a little more than usual, you are left—ignorant how to react—with a foolish grin

-The same feeling of not belonging, of futility, wherever I go: I pretend interest in what matters nothing to me, I bestir myself mechanically or out of charity, without ever being caught up, without ever being somewhere. What attracts me is elsewhere, and I don't know where that elsewhere is.

-Better to be an animal than a man, an insect than an animal, a plant than an insect, and so on. Salvation? Whatever diminishes the kingdom of consciousness and compromises its supremacy.

-There was a time when time did not yet exist. ... The rejection of birth is nothing but the nostalgia for this time before time. — E.M. Cioran, The Trouble With Being Born