Is reality little atomistic lumps of matter in motion or instead a mathematics of structure and relation? — apokrisis

Kant is now classified as a German Idealist, who trafficked in transcendental notions & a priori concepts. — Gnomon

Physicists just take Laws & Constants for granted, without further explanation. — Gnomon

The Buddha always told his disciples not to waste their time and energy in metaphysical speculation. — Gnomon

Ain't this the place? — Haglund

So, the idea here would be that of intellectual intuition; that in virtue of being the noumenal we can somehow directly know it's nature. The possibility cannot be ruled out, but even if such direct knowing were possible; there could be no discursive "knowing that we know — Janus

So, it seems that what you are looking for is that experience of illumination — Janus

Ironically, Kant's unknowable noumena are the very kind of knowledge that philosophers specialize in : speculation & conjecture into the unknown, and objectively unknowable, mysteries that are not amenable to scientific exploration — Gnomon

Even if there were nowhere anywhere free form this strict physical determinacy, it would still be logically (if not physically) possible that there might have been. And of course, in any case, we don't, and can't know the truth about any of this. — Janus

Whatever the noumenal reality is, I’m a part of it. Not the "me" who is an object of experience—that’s the phenomenal me. And the naïve “phenomenal me” that comes from immediate introspection is no less phenomenal than what scientists look at when they study my brain. What bearing it has on the “noumenal me” remains an open question.

But still, I am what I am—and so in being me (as opposed to putting myself at the objective pole of conscious observation and then studying me) I am being part of noumenal reality. And there may be a way to leverage that fact into some kind of understanding of noumenal reality. That’s what Hegel tries to do in The Phenomenology of Spirit. — Eric Reitan

is Logical Necessity caused by some physical force or entity? Or is it a fundamental principle of Reality? Is it a law of Physics, or a law of Meta-Physics? Are natural Laws (physical regularities) necessary (absolute) or contingent (fortuitous)? If they could be otherwise, what was the prior Cause (the "must") of their necessity for the emergence & evolution of the physical world? — Gnomon

The...thing this discovery illustrates is the ever present gap between theory and verification. The standard model was enormously successful in its account of the basic particles and the forces through which they interact. It was mathematically satisfying and elegantly based on notions of physical symmetry. Yet no one would ever have suggested that it must be correct regardless of any process of empirical verification. Such a process of verification lies at the heart of the scientific method. Theories are not self-verifying but always remain hypothetical constructs, subject to the next round of possible verification or falsification from the data.

This leads to a significant tension in the whole scientific project. Its drive is to seek intelligibility or patterns in the empirical data, to express these patterns in theoretical constructs, yet in the end it must deal with a brute fact of existence, which either verifies or falsifies these proposed patterns.

That reality is intelligible is the presupposition of all scientific endeavours: that the intelligibility science proposes is always subject to empirical verification means that science never actually explains existence itself but must submit itself to a reality check against the empirical data. This existential gap between scientific hypotheses and empirical verified judgment points to, in philosophical terms, the contingency of existence. There is no automatic leap from hypothesis to reality that can bypass a "reality check." — Neil Ormerod

Can you parse Haglund's claim that a parabola "follows" a stone? — Agent Smith

You'll live another 10 years. — Haglund

It hasn't. It's gaining popularity, in fact. — Haglund

this is distracting me from other reading, so interesting though it is, it must wait. — Banno

nature seems to follow mathematically describable laws — Agent Smith

I do not think that there is sufficiently good reason for maintaining the “naturalist” hypothesis about human behaviour and thought.

What sorts of thing would one normally call “irrational causes” for human thoughts? If one is asked this, one immediately thinks of such things as passion, self-interest, wishing only to see the agreeable or disagreeable, obstinate and prejudicial adherence to the views of a party or school with which one is connected, and so on.

Given the scientific explanation of human thought and action which the naturalist hypothesis asserts to be possible, we could, if we had the data that the explanation required, predict what any man was going to say, and what conclusions he was going to form.

The dark matter can be black holes — Haglund

Its been stated that successful philosophy becomes the sciences. — Philosophim

Thus the two stories combine in the organism. We get the actual semiosis of a material system being organised by its concept of logical rule following. We get physical systems that interact with their worlds by using syntactic mechanism - codes like genes, neurons, words, numbers - and indeed gaining agency as that semiotic interaction is, holistically, a state of interpretance. — apokrisis

The cosmos is a material structure — apokrisis

The only form that genuine reasoning can take consists in seeing the validity of the arguments, in virtue of what they say. As soon as one tries to step outside of such thoughts, one loses contact with their true content. And one cannot be outside and inside them at the same time: If one thinks in logic, one cannot simultaneously regard those thoughts as mere psychological dispositions, however caused or however biologically grounded. If one decides that some of one's psychological dispositions are, as a contingent matter of fact, reliable methods of reaching the truth (as one may with perception, for example), then in doing so one must rely on other thoughts that one actually thinks, without regarding them as mere dispositions. One cannot embed all one's reasoning in a psychological theory, including the reasonings that have led to that psychological theory. The epistemological buck must stop somewhere. By this I mean not that there must be some premises that are forever unrevisable but, rather, that in any process of reasoning or argument there must be some thoughts that one simply thinks from the inside--rather than thinking of them as biologically programmed dispositions. — Thomas Nagel

"quotidian" is a cool word. You've used it a few times recently. Nice.

Perhaps you might comment on the Anscombe article? — Banno

In the end, silence. — Banno

People do maths, not god. — Banno

I get it and within this hints of idealism. — Tom Storm

It's not a surprise that the mathematics we choose to talk about the world happens to fit the world, — Banno

I suppose you are viewing "intelligible objects" from a god-like Rationalist perspective -- from outside the world system. As far as God is concerned, everything in the world is real, and objective. — Gnomon

I'm not a Logical Positivist, but I am aware that most people apply the term "Real" only to what they can see & touch. Any other forms of knowledge are either Un-real or Ideal or spiritual or "ghostly", and consequently their "existence" is debatable. — Gnomon

artificial (synthetic) propositions — Gnomon

synthesis: integration of two opposing representations into one new representation, with a view towards constructing a new level of the object’s reality. Philosophy as Critique employs synthesis more than analysis. On the operation of synthesis in the first Critique, see imagination. (Cf. analysis.)

synthetic: a statement or item of knowledge which is known to be true because of its connection with some intuition. (Cf. analytic.)

It could be though that a particle is the noumenon and the wavefunction the phenomenon. — Haglund

And so we are not appealing to causal or logical necessity when we recognise this determination, and are only appealing to our expectations of nature with respect to this recognisable class of situations. — sime

The ontological distinction between miracles and mechanics begs the principle of sufficient reason, which is but another form of absolute infinity in disguise. — sime

A majority is no proof of being right. — Haglund

Hidden variables make everything determined. The electron in an orbital always has a well-defined position and velocity like this — Haglund

Im not involving QM, insofar the objective existence of space is involved. It's nature. If objects interact doesn't space have to be an objective medium? — Haglund

This difficulty relates to the question whether the smallest units are ordinary physical objects, whether they exist in the same way as stones or flowers.... The mathematically formulated laws of quantum theory show clearly that our ordinary intuitive concepts cannot be unambiguously applied to the smallest particles. All the words or concepts we use to describe ordinary physical objects, such as position, velocity, color, size, and so on, become indefinite and problematic if we try to use them of elementary particles....it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on.

During the coming years, the high-energy accelerators will bring to light many further interesting details about the behavior of elementary particles. But I am inclined to think that the answer just considered to the old philosophical problems will turn out to be final. If this is so, does this answer confirm the views of Democritus or Plato?

I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or — in Plato's sense — Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics. — Werner Heisenberg, The Debate between Plato and Democritus

I don't know if the nature of space is a digression from cause and effect. Isn't space a logical a priori for them to exist? — Haglund

Against Leibniz. So space is more than just the relation between objects, as the two gloves are not the same. Then how the gloves diffe — Haglund

Space is just the non aetheral stuff particles move in — Haglund

Do you know what he tried to establish with his gloves in empty space? — Haglund