• Haglund
    802
    Space does not represent any property of objects as things in themselvesWayfarer

    Space is just the non aetheral stuff particles move in and reach for each other. It contains the means for interaction. It can be considered to be made of the hidden non-local (space!) variables of QM, constituting the link between gravity and QM.
  • Wayfarer
    22.8k
    Space is just the non aetheral stuff particles move inHaglund

    That's what Kant is denying - space is not any kind of 'stuff' or 'thing' or 'object' so is not 'made of' anything.
  • Haglund
    802


    But how can particles then interact? Space is not "the nothing".
  • Wayfarer
    22.8k
    This is another big digression, but those questions are very difficult from a philosophical point of view, aren't they? You seem to be attributing to particles an inherent reality, but you can't assume that sub-atomic particles exist, outside the circumstances in which they're measured. 'No phenomena is an existing phenomena until it's measured'. So your basically advocating a realist stance. But as I said, it's a big digression and I don't claim to be able to adjuticate it.

    Kant doesn't say that space and time are 'nothing' but that they are inextricably bound to our consciousness of them, in other words, they constituted in part in and by our awareness of them. There are academic papers around on comparision of Kant and Neils Bohr's epistemology in respect of the nature of atomic phenomena.
  • Mww
    4.9k
    What can be imagined' is all that's being talked about when we say Nixon might not have been elected or that the universe might have had other laws.frank

    True enough, but at the expense of what we know.
    ————

    You don’t consider actuality/determinism and possibility opposites? Is it not true that if a thing is determined, its being other than that determination, is impossible? And if a thing is merely possible, or a thing is possibly this or possibly that, no determination as yet relates to it?
  • Haglund
    802
    Ah, I understand the glove argument. All relation between the constituents of both gloves are the same. Against Leibniz. So space is more than just the relation between objects, as the two gloves are not the same. Then how the gloves differ? That is only in relation to each other or wrt to an external coordinate frame.
  • Haglund
    802


    I don't know if the nature of space is a digression from cause and effect. Isn't space a logical a priori for them to exist?
  • frank
    16k
    You don’t consider actuality/determinism and possibility opposites? Is it not true that if a thing is determined, its being other than that determination, is impossible? And if a thing is merely possible, or a thing is possibly this or possibly that, no determination as yet relates to it?Mww

    I think you're talking about epistemic possibility.
  • Wayfarer
    22.8k
    I don't know if the nature of space is a digression from cause and effect. Isn't space a logical a priori for them to exist?Haglund

    It's only that once these discussions begin to involve interpretations of quantum mechanics, then they tend to fall into holes from which there is rarely an exit.


    Against Leibniz. So space is more than just the relation between objects, as the two gloves are not the same. Then how the gloves diffeHaglund

    As I understand it, those kinds of arguments of Kant's belong to his pre-critical phase. His mature philosophy is represented in the Critique of Pure Reason and subsequent works.
  • Haglund
    802


    Im not involving QM, insofar the objective existence of space is involved. It's nature. If objects interact doesn't soace have to be an objective medium?
  • Mww
    4.9k
    I think you're talking about epistemic possibility.frank

    With respect to what we’ve been talking about, yes. I can only converse within the limits of my knowledge and this world as I understand it.

    You didn’t answer the question: “you don’t consider.....”
  • frank
    16k
    Did you read the article?
  • jgill
    3.9k
    You have an algorithm that, once begun, leads to an outcome - thus determined. But halfway through the algorithm is a step requiring the input of a random integer between 0 and 9. Is the outcome determined? Random? Both? Neither?
  • Mww
    4.9k


    Yes. Was it supposed to be a wiki thing? That’s what came up.
  • Gnomon
    3.8k
    t's my guess that when matter, particles, are in some nice shape wrt each other, the total mass is someone higher. Or, on a memory chip, if the 1's and 0's show an ordered pattern, the mass of the chip is slightly higher than if they showed randomness. What if the showed total order? Say all 1 or all 0?Haglund
    I'm not sure what you meant by "nice shape", but in information theory it's the relationships that make the "form" or "pattern" or "meaning". So, perhaps the degree & kind of inter-relationship (0% to 100%, angular/linear, etc) defines the properties of the particle. But, I'm also just guessing. Along the same lines, I understand that energy at light-speed is massless, but as light energy slows down, it gains weight (mass). In other words, matter (mass) is just heavy light. Of course, physicists may not appreciate such an over-simplified layman's explanation. But it works for my amateur information-based worldview.

    Regarding "total order" (100% crystalline), defined as completely non-random, there would be no room for motion or change, So the system would freeze-up like a block of ice. Likewise, zero order would be completely random, with no patterns and no forms or meanings. But the human mind is not equipped to even imagine such things, except in the form of metaphors (block of ice). Human logic only works in the normal range, in the middle of the possibility (Bell) curve. When we conjecture at the extremes, the margin for error approaches infinity. :gasp:
  • frank
    16k
    Yes. Was it supposed to be a wiki thing? That’s what came up.Mww

    Yes. This started with Wayfarer saying that X is logically necessary if it's happening by natural laws.

    That isn't true because we can imagine the counterfactual: our universe with different laws.

    Epistemic possibility has nothing to do with that.
  • frank
    16k
    Random numbers are generated by a deterministic system. In a computer it's a quartz oscillator.
  • jgill
    3.9k
    Random numbers are generated by a deterministic system. In a computer it's a quartz oscillatorfrank

    Suppose my random number comes from an observation of unpredictable minute changes in atmospheric pressure?
  • frank
    16k
    Suppose my random number comes from an observation of unpredictable minute changes in atmospheric pressure?jgill

    Those changes shouldn't be unpredictable to Laplace's demon.
  • jgill
    3.9k
    Wiki:
    Laplace's demon was based on the premise of reversibility and classical mechanics; however, Ulanowicz points out that many thermodynamic processes are irreversible.

    Gotta move up to the 21st century, buddy.
  • Gnomon
    3.8k
    There’s nothing ‘ghostly’ about mathematical logic applied to physical processes. That enables us to peer into the domain of pure possibility and actualise something we see in material form. That’s how inventions happen!Wayfarer
    It was just a metaphor. We can imagine logical relationships, but we can't see or touch them. So, we talk about logical relationships as-if they were physical connections. Those metaphors & analogies allow us to "peer into" un-actualized possibilities. And, by following the implicit Logic, to make some of those not-yet-real concepts/patterns become real physical things (inventions). "Spirit! Reveal yourself!" :joke:

    The Experiment at the Institut Metapsychique, Paris :gasp:
    434px-1926-history-of-spiritualism-cassell-14.jpg

    PS__For clarity of exposition, I try to keep mental stuff (ideas) and physical stuff (matter) separate. If we refer to Ideals as-if they are Real, confusion ensues. They are not the same thing, but they are related as varieties of Information.
  • frank
    16k
    Gotta move up to the 21st century, buddy.jgill

    Laplace's demon has been upgraded with the latest software by David Chalmers.
  • jgill
    3.9k
    I've often wondered how the aether affects ectoplasm.
  • frank
    16k
    I've often wondered how the aether affects ectoplasmjgill

    Depends which guage shotgun you shoot it in the head with.
  • jgill
    3.9k
    Laplace's demon has been upgraded with the latest software by David Chalmersfrank

    The guy who believes rocks have feelings?
  • frank
    16k
    The guy who believes rocks have feelings?jgill

    So philosophy's not your cup of tea. Nothing wrong with that. Have a good evening. :eyes:
  • jgill
    3.9k
    So philosophy's not your cup of teafrank

    More a form of entertainment. :cool:

    Have a good eveningfrank

    You too. :smile:
  • Metaphysician Undercover
    13.2k
    It is the bounding limit on curvature.apokrisis

    Right, so to actually be at that limit, as in having zero curvature, would be contradictory to having any degree of curvature at all. Kind of like dead is the bounding limit to life, and to actually be at that limit would be contradictory to being alive.
  • Wayfarer
    22.8k
    Im not involving QM, insofar the objective existence of space is involved. It's nature. If objects interact doesn't space have to be an objective medium?Haglund

    This is where there are some philosophically difficult questions to consider.

    With respect to LaPlace's Daemon - the accepted wisdom is that Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle forecloses the possibility of absolute determinism, because there's an inbuilt degree of uncertainty at a foundational level of atomic physics. Banno posted an academic paper challenging the accepted wisdom somewhere upthread, but I confess I haven't had time to read it.

    @Gnomon - I parse the entire subject of the reality of ideas differently. My view is that proper 'intelligible objects' such as natural numbers, scientific principles, and the like, are real, but they're not existent things - they don't exist in the same way that regular objects do. They are strictly speaking noumenal - meaning 'objects of mind', although the sense in which they are 'objects' is debatable.

    Where that presents difficulties, is that there is no provision in most people's minds for things to exist in different ways - in other words, things either exist, or they don't. The number 7 exists, the square root of 7 does not. Horses exist, but unicorns do not. But that doesn't allow for the fact that the sense in which 'the number 7' exists, is not the same sense in which horses exist, as it's a real abstraction, if you like.

    Heisenberg says something similar in his lecture on Plato and Democritus. It's important to note that Heisenberg was a lifelong student of Platonism and a defender of proper philosophical idealism.

    This difficulty relates to the question whether the smallest units are ordinary physical objects, whether they exist in the same way as stones or flowers.... The mathematically formulated laws of quantum theory show clearly that our ordinary intuitive concepts cannot be unambiguously applied to the smallest particles. All the words or concepts we use to describe ordinary physical objects, such as position, velocity, color, size, and so on, become indefinite and problematic if we try to use them of elementary particles....it is important to realize that, while the behavior of the smallest particles cannot be unambiguously described in ordinary language, the language of mathematics is still adequate for a clear-cut account of what is going on.

    During the coming years, the high-energy accelerators will bring to light many further interesting details about the behavior of elementary particles. But I am inclined to think that the answer just considered to the old philosophical problems will turn out to be final. If this is so, does this answer confirm the views of Democritus or Plato?

    I think that on this point modern physics has definitely decided for Plato. For the smallest units of matter are, in fact, not physical objects in the ordinary sense of the word; they are forms, structures or — in Plato's sense — Ideas, which can be unambiguously spoken of only in the language of mathematics.
    Werner Heisenberg, The Debate between Plato and Democritus

    (Bolds added.)
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