No - in my view, nothing lacks an essence or essential identity (although for non-man-made physical things, the essence is reduced to the fundamental physical stuff). For the first cause, its necessary properties are essential to it. This is to fulfil the PSR at all times and avoid any brute facts.One question: the first-cause/ontological foundation was not designed. Does this mean it lacks essence? — Relativist
No - as per the original response here, it has the essence of a torture device only if the creator designed it for that purpose. Using an object in a way it was not originally designed for does not change its essence. The only case I can think of when the designed object loses its essence is if it can no longer perform its designed function. E.g. a broken paper-cutter.I earlier brought up the fact that a paper cutter could be used as a torture device, even though it wasn't designed for that purpose. I believe you said this changed the essence. — Relativist
I agree that an inherent property must be intrinsic. But I still claim that the function of a designed thing is intrinsic. A paper-cutter, i.e. a thing designed to cut paper, remains a thing designed to cut paper whether we use it to cut paper, use it as a door holder, or don't use it at all.Function is extrinsic (irrespective of whether natural or man-made): it pertains to the way the object interacts with other objects. — Relativist
I suspect the disagreement still comes from the meaning of the term "identity". Yes, a microscopic change means that a thing is not identical to what it had been. But this is different than what I mean by identity. It is in fact closer to what you called "natural kind", and this term falls short only because it contains the word "natural" in it. Perhaps a better term would be "objective kind", where the kind is a matter of fact and not of opinion, but the thing can still be man-made.A microscopic change to an object means it is not identical to what it had been. What makes it the same object? — Relativist
Of course, if natural kind excludes man-made things by its definition, then no property of man-made things would be a natural kind. Man-made things are necessarily mind-dependant since their design comes from our minds. But the function of designed thing is not a matter of opinion. E.g. it is a fact that the function of a paper-cutter is to cut paper; regardless of whether we actually use it for that function or not.[regarding functions of man-made things] It's still not a mind-independent category. — Relativist
That's fine. If we agree that design entails a goal and that voluntary acts are not random but deliberate, then I don't think we need to agree on whether randomness violates the PSR.I agree that design entails a goal (by definition). I do not agree that randomness violates the PSR. — Relativist
Just because a function could be found in natural things, it does not follow that it is not an inherent property of man-made things as well. "3 sides" is an inherent property of triangles, and yet a shape can also have 3 sides and not be a triangle (if the sides are not straight).I also do not agree that a function is an "inherent property" of a designed object. [...] A sharp stone can be produced by natural forces, and it can then be used to cut things - so a function can be found for things even without being the product of design. — Relativist
The heap of parts is not a paper-cutter because it cannot cut paper in that state.I suggest that it's not just the set of physical parts, it's the way they are configured, down to the molecular level. If you take apart a paper cutter, the heap of parts is not a paper cutter. Even so, this works only for point-in-time identity, as I've described. If you use the paper cutter even once, there will be a slight change to its physical make-up at the molecular level. — Relativist
It sounds like we are in agreement in this paragraph. Notwithstanding man-made things, everything that is merely physical is nothing but strings, and any "identity" we assign to complex physical objects is by name only.As you said, everything supervenes on the ultimate foundation of physical reality. [...] — Relativist
What do you mean by "natural kind"?In terms of essentialism, you're treating function as something like a natural kind, although you're not basing it on anything natural. My problem with natural kinds also applies to your definition: all you've done is identify a set of objects (paper cutters). This is a conceptual compartmentalizing out of the full set of objects of existence, so it's arbitrary. You could have categorized it in many different ways (office tools, manufactured devices, sharp objects, objects you own...). — Relativist
What individualizes man-made things with the same function, e.g. 2 paper-cutters, is the individual physical parts or molecules they are made of. They are numerically 2 because they have 2 separate sets of physical parts. But as you said, even if we replace 100% of the parts, they do not cease to be paper-cutters. Thus, even if we can individualize man-made things, it has no consequence on their identity.But the biggest problem is that you haven't addressed the issue of individual identity.. You haven't touched on that at all. — Relativist
Sure. So to correct my view: If physicalism is true, then everything that is not man-made is nothing but strings - this is because every complex natural object is not designed but caused accidentally by the laws of nature. And if man has free will, then everything that is man-made has its identity from its function - this is because man-made things are designed, and what is designed is always designed for a function.This contradicts what you said earlier: — Relativist
True; there are many paper-cutters. But they are all identified as paper-cutters; that's why we call all these unique devices "paper-cutters", and do not give them unique names like we do with people. And only the fact that they are made of unique molecules (and this uniqueness is a non-essential property) makes them unique.It certainly doesn't uniquely identify a specific object, so this isn't an individual identity. — Relativist
A paper-cutter that can no longer cut paper is indeed no longer a paper-cutter. This is reflected in our common language when we speak of those things. It has a new identity which is simply to be a physical object like other non man-made things.So if I have a paper cutter whose blade has become too dull to cut paper, it has lost its identity?! Is this identity lost suddenly at some particular level of sharpness? What if a second function is found for a functional paper cutter (e.g. it can function as a torture device to cut off fingers). Does possessing this newly discovered function give it a new identity? — Relativist
I have not encountered that question before, so I'm thinking out loud here. I'd say only if its creator designed it with that function in mind. It is the designer that gives the man-made object its identity - that's the reason why it exists.What if a second function is found for a functional paper cutter (e.g. it can function as a torture device to cut off fingers). Does possessing this newly discovered function give it a new identity? — Relativist
If I cut my hair, I have changed some of my properties. Does it follow that I have a different identity? I'd say that fundamentally, I am still me. It would also seem that any change that any object encounters, no matter how small, would give them a wholly new identity. Thus there would be no change; only substitutions from one identity to another at any point in time.IOW, 100% of the object's properties must be present for it to constitute that particular object. — Relativist
There would be more things if some things are not physical. E.g. souls or the power of free will. There is also anything that is man-made if man has free will. E.g. a paper-cutter. It is a man-made device designed to cut paper. "Being able to cut paper" is its identity because this is how we identify a thing as being a paper-cutter.You implied that, in this physicalist scenario, ONLY strings have an identity (and only strings have an essence). If only one thing has an identity and essence, why bother with considering identity and essence at all? — Relativist
I know we disagree on this point, but to me, existence would be an intrinsic (or inherent or essential) property of strings. This is to fulfill the PSR and avoid brute facts.Although the bottom layer of reality (strings, in this scenario) exists necessarily, this is de dicto necessity - not an intrinsic property. My impression is that essentialists consider essence to be intrinsic. — Relativist
Yes. Take the paper-cutter example again. Since its identity is to cut paper, then any property that enables it to cut paper (e.g. a blade) is an essential property, and any property it has that does not serve to cut paper (e.g. its color) is a non-essential property. When it comes to strings, having a mass is probably an essential property, whereas having a specific position in space and time would probably be a non-essential property.You also referred to "essential properties". Doesn't this imply there are also UNessential properties? — Relativist
That's what I meant by properties "sticking to an object". In other words, there must be a reason why a particular set of properties belongs to an object.Intrinsic properties are inseparable from the objects that have them — Relativist
Even if physicalism is true, it still means that strings have their own identity or essence, and thus their own essential properties. Since strings would exist necessarily, it means that their existence is an essential property.Per your paradigm, if physicalism is true, then horses are just strings not ontological objects in their own right. There is no point in time at which the strings didn't exist. Doesn't this mean that your view of essence is contingent upon physicalism being false? — Relativist
@WayfarerRegarding parts:why assume something exists without parts? — Relativist
Very well. If we are not making any progress, then we can leave the conversation here. Thanks for the chat!You are circling the drain. Repeating the same claims as if they are truths. — Fooloso4
As the axioms do not contradict each other, it is still true that logic is one coherent system. And that logical system is evidently correct: Based on it, we build planes that fly.As any logic system is built on axioms, which are assumptions taken to be true, no one logic system exists necessarily. — RussellA
There is a difference between an existing thing and a thing with inherent existence. An existing thing could have not existed in the past or future. A thing with inherent existence could not have.So, an 'existent thing' is the label for something that exists. Now, by definition something that exists, exists. Everything that exists is an existent thing - there. Have I just explained everything? No, of course not. I've explained precisely nothing. — Clearbury
Yes, if physicalism is true, then everything is nothing but strings. But I don't think it would be absurd. Take a pile of sand for example. Most people would agree this is not an object in itself, but rather it is just grains of sand piled together due to laws of nature like the wind. If so, we could say the same for a rock: a bunch of molecules piled together due to laws of nature. Then the word "rock" only refers to the structure as a whole.But this means, that if physicalism is true, and strings are the bottom layer, then everything is "nothing but" strings - so nothing has an identity other than the strings. This makes no sense. Composite objects, such as rocks and horses, exist. — Relativist
I think the fact that we can say it without contradiction is sufficient for our current purpose. In contrast, we could not say "horses and rocks were not physical prior to that point of time", because horses and rocks are inherently physical things.Sure, horses are ontological objects. No objects that we define as horses existed prior to some earlier specific point of time. Although we can say "horses didn't have existence prior to that point of time", it doesn't mean there's a metaphysical object "horse" that sometimes exists and sometimes doesn't. — Relativist
I'll unpack the explanation: if a thing has necessary or inherent existence, then the proposition "this thing, whose existence is inherent, exists" is a tautology, and tautologies are necessarily true; while their negations are self-contradictory and thus necessarily false. This type of explanation fulfills the PSR.Labelling something a necessary existence does nothing to explain it. — Clearbury
This is because the shadow exists out of causal necessity (reason type 2 in the OP under section "PSR in Metaphysics") and not logical necessity (reason type 1). Things with causal necessity need further explanations because the cause, being a separate thing, must be explained. Things with logical necessity do not need further explanations because there is no other separate thing to explain.The shadow exists of necessity, yet it clearly needs - and has - an explanation. — Clearbury
There are several branches of logic but the science of logic as a whole is one coherent system. E.g. fuzzy logic is a branch that may be more suitable than other branches in some cases, but the different branches of logic do not contradict each other.There are many different type of logic, suggesting that no one logic exists necessarily. For example, there is Propositional Logic, First Order Logic, Second order logic , Higher order logic, Fuzzy logic, Modal logic, Intuitionistic Logic, Dialetheism, etc. — RussellA
Two things.It is because you accept the idea that everything must have a cause and reject the idea that the laws of nature are self-caused that you "deduce" that there must be something that causes the laws of nature. — Fooloso4
The PSR as a first principle of metaphysics has been defended in the OP under section "Argument in defence of the PSR", and as a principle, there cannot be any exceptions.Rather than questioning the principle that there must be a cause you simply posit the existence of one because you believe that there must be one. — Fooloso4
Actually, I take them to be synonymous. But I'll explain what I mean by identity: If we can say "A is nothing but B", then A does not have its own identity and it supervenes on B. E.g. "A rock is nothing but molecules put together", and therefore a rock does not have its own identity. But we cannot say "A is nothing but B" forever. At some point, we reach the bottom. This bottom has its own identity.It's not a synonym. I think you're saying that an identity has a unique essence. — Relativist
It's a supposition, but yes. Being fundamental, these strings do not supervene on anything else, and thus have their own identity. Since we identify these as existing always, existence is an essential property.Suppose there is a fundamental layer of reality, for example: 20-dimensional strings. Everything is composed of them, and they are not composed of anything deeper. These strings exist at all times and locations. Does this fit your paradigm of having "existence" as part of its "essence"? — Relativist
Would a horse count as an ontological object? If so, then we can still say that before horses existed, then they did not have existence. If not, then what do you consider as objects?Events aren't objects; they are points (or intervals) in time. By "object", I'm refering to ontological objects- things that exist. You're conflating concepts (or definitions) with "objects". We can refer to objects in the past, present, or future. — Relativist
While I am not a physicalist, I am not assuming that physicalism is false in this discussion. Depending on where the above points end up, I can try to come up with better examples later.You said. "a rock supervenes on fundamental physical elements like matter and energy, and so the rock does not have its own identity but gets its from its fundamental physical elements." If physicalism is true, the same thing can be said about you and me, as you say about the rock. This suggests you're assuming physicalism is false. Is that correct? — Relativist
Something that is fundamental or basic can still meet the PSR as long as it has necessary existence. This would be an internal reason which is valid under the PSR. Now, we said that the PSR is a first principle of metaphysics. This means it exists in all possible worlds, which means it has necessary existence.If the PSR is true - and you think it is - then you can't just say that something is fundamental or basic. Such a status is precisely what the PSR denies. The PSR says that everything - everything - has an explanation. So what's the explanation of it? — Clearbury
As per the OP section "Argument in defence of the PSR", logic (and the PSR) are first principles of metaphysics. This means they exist in all possibe worlds, which means they have necessary existence. Thus, logic and the PSR exist necessarily or inherently. This is an internal reason which is valid under the PSR.What is the reason for the existence of logic? — RussellA
Essence is the same as identity, metaphysically speaking. As per the law of identity, everything has an identity. But sometimes a thing supervenes on more fundamental parts such that it gets its identity not from the whole but from the parts. E.g. a rock supervenes on fundamental physical elements like matter and energy, and so the rock does not have its own identity but gets its from its fundamental physical elements. Since the fundamental physical elements do not supervene on anything more fundamental (by definition of being fundamental), then their properties are essential to their identity.To me, "essence" suggests a set of necessary and sufficient properties that uniquely identify an existing, individual object. [...] Perhaps you mean something else. If so, explain what you mean, and why anyone should accept such a metaphysical framework. — Relativist
Some objects lack existence. Otherwise, the following propositions would not make sense, but they do.Existence isn't a property; that would imply there are objects in the world that lack it - which is absurd. All objects in the world exist. — Relativist
Hmmm. I'll have to think some more about that one. But it can wait as I believe it is not critical to the main discussion.This doesn't imply that an object has "necessary" or "contingent" as an intrinsic property. — Relativist
There can be an internal explanation: the existence of the first cause is explained inherently if its existence is part of its essence. In other words, the proposition "the first cause, whose existence is part of its essence, exists" is a tautology, and tautologies are necessarily true, and their negations are necessarily self-contradictory. In this way, the PSR is kept intact.Should we prefer 1) a vicious infinite regress, in order to keep the PSR intact, 2) entirely reject the PSR because of this, or 3) redefine the PSR to exclude something foundational? I think the latter is the most reasonable option. There can be no explanation for the foundation of existence — Relativist
Very well. Then no need to repeat the conversation, and we can leave this topic here.We have been through this already. — Fooloso4
I am unclear on what you mean by "natural" vs "super-natural". How do you define those two terms?When natural explanations cannot explain why there is anything at all you resort to a super-natural explanation even if you do not use that word. — Fooloso4
What I meant is, "And my conclusion is that a thing whose existence is essential is necessary to explain the existence of all other things, which all happen to be contingent."All other contingent things? Something whose existence is necessary is not something that is contingent. — Fooloso4
The PSR is defended in the OP under section "Argument in defence of the PSR".Why must there be a reason for what is? Positing a principle that there must be is circular and question begging. — Fooloso4
No, nothing is a brute fact under the unrestricted PSR. Logic has a reason for existing, as provided in the OP under section "Argument in defence of the PSR". The section explains why logic is a first principle of epistemology. Then, the reason why logic exists on the metaphysics side is because, being a first principle of epistemology, it is also a first principle of metaphysics; i.e. logic is part of the fabric of reality. With that, the existence of the laws of logic is explained inherently (reason type 1 in the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics").Is logical necessity a brute fact? — RussellA
No, this is a logical necessity only because it describes its own definition, which is man-made. "A triangle, defined as a shape that has 3 sides, has 3 sides". A=A.is the logical necessity that "A triangle has three sides" a brute fact? — RussellA
Very well. Then we can drop this topic.We're going on circles. — Clearbury
I have provided the reason why we know that logic exists on the epistemology side. Then the reason why logic exists on the metaphysics side is because, being a first principle of epistemology, it is also a first principle of metaphysics; i.e. logic is part of the fabric of reality. With that, the existence of logic is explained inherently (reason type 1 in the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics").You haven't answered the question. What explains it [logic]? — Clearbury
What is questionable about the PSR?What is deduced from a questionable principle is questionable. — Fooloso4
I did not use the word "super-natural". We should simply try to follow the rules of the PSR to its logical conclusion. And my conclusion is that a thing whose existence is essential is necessary to explain the existence of all other contingent things, including the laws of nature. If you can point out an error in the reasoning, then fair, and if not, then the conclusion stands.Positing a super-natural being in order to explain what you cannot explain is question begging. It assumes what is in question, that there must be a comprehensive reason for what is. — Fooloso4
Sure. The reason I used the example of a triangle is because it is easy to understand its identity or essence, and thereby also understand its essential and non-essential properties.Triangles are abstractions, and don't exist in the real world. — Relativist
If I understand correctly, you say that the first cause's existence is necessary, but only because there is no prior cause and not because its existence is an essential property of its identity. But then, how do you explain the fact that its existence is necessary, if not inherently? If this fact is left unexplained, then it violates the PSR.No internal reason is needed for a first cause to exist necessarily. A first cause cannot exist contingently, because it is logically impossible for it to be contingent upon anything*. So there's no need for the (ad hoc) contrivance of treating a term in logic as an ontological property. — Relativist
Logical necessity is a type of sufficient reason. It is reason type 1 in the OP section "PSR in Metaphysics".You also give the examples of things that don't have a sufficient reason, but rather logical necessity, such as "All bachelors are unmarried". — RussellA
That's the PSR on the metaphysics side. The PSR on the epistemology side demands that explanations be no more than necessary. This is because the PSR is so strict that it not only demands a reason for the data, but also demands a reason to posit the explanation itself. Thus, the explanation is posited to account for the data, and the data must support the explanation. If the explanation is more than necessary, it means it is not supported by the data, and thus it fails the PSR.What the principle of sufficient reason says is that there were causes sufficient to bring P about. Causes sufficient to bring about P can be much more than is necessary. — Clearbury
Logic is a first principle of epistemology. This is defended in the OP under section "Argument in defence of the PSR", steps 1 to 4. As a first principle of epistemology, an appeal to logic is a valid form of reasoning that fulfills the PSR.But the principle of sufficient reason - which says that everything has an explanation - must now be applied to the law of non-contradiction. What explains why it is true? — Clearbury
Sure, but in the same way, necessity also applies to things with essential properties. E.g. "3 sides" is an essential property of a triangle. Thus, if a thing is a triangle, it logically or necessarily follows that it has 3 sides. Therefore, we can call essential properties "necessary properties".The concept of "necessary" applies to logic: e.g. in a valid deductive argument, the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. — Relativist
Would this mean that this type of first cause exists without a reason, and thus would violate the PSR? Whereas my first cause, the being whose existence is an essential property, has a sufficient reason to exist: it is an internal reason, that is, its existence is explained logically or inherently.Why think "necessary" is an ontological (de re) property of any being? [...] I suggest that any first cause (including a natural one) would exist necessarily: it exists autonomously, and without a cause that could account for its contingent existence. — Relativist
I agree, but in this case it is not arbitrary. The existence of a being whose existence is an essential property is deduced directly from the PSR. Since the PSR demands a reason for everything that exists, and since external reasons (i.e. causes) cannot sufficiently explain everything because we run into an infinite regress, then it is necessary to have an internal reason, that is, a being whose existence is an essential property.Something does not exist because you posit its existence as necessary. — Fooloso4
What else could it possibly be? We could entertain that the laws of nature are caused by prior laws, but this only pushes the problem one step back. To avoid the risk of infinite regress, the fundamental laws must be explained by something that requires an explanation but not a cause.This thing whose existence you posit designs the laws of nature that cannot be explained naturally. — Fooloso4
As described in the OP, reason in the context of epistemology can be interpreted as explanation or justification for a claim be true; and reason in the context of metaphysics can be interpreted as cause or grounding for a thing existing.Isn't reason a product of human mind? Reasons don't exist out there in the external world. There are only matter, energy and changes in the world. Reason is an operation of human mind seeking for the causal explanations on the existence and changes. — Corvus
I agree. The PSR would say that everything that exists has a sufficient reason (or cause or grounding) even if some of these reasons are not known to us.For the proper operations of the inductive reasoning, human observations do need the data to draw the reasoning for the conclusions. Therefore there are many events and existence which have the reasons, and many are unknown due to lack of the data. — Corvus
Sure. In other words, the content of mapmaking describes the terrain; and likewise, principles of metaphysics describe the things in fundamental reality. I accept the distinction.Fallacy of misplaced concreteness (i.e. mapmaking =/= terrain). At most the PSR is, "like logic", a foundational property of reason. — 180 Proof
Yes that's a clearer way of putting it. It avoids the confusion of whether we speak of a reason why we know something is true versus a reason why a thing exists. So we could rephrase the PSR as: For any claim that is true, there is a sufficient reason for it to be true; and for any thing that exists, there is a sufficient ground for it to exist.in terms of metaphysics, I think grounding is a more suitable term. — Relativist
Yes I agree. I would add that reason is powerful enough to know its own limitations. Reason knows that induction gives inferences that are the most reasonable yet not certain.Rather: reason directs us toward truth. Induction doesn't necessarily fund truth, but it tends to lead in the proper direction. — Relativist
I would still say that logic has value because it reflects outcomes in reality. E.g. logic tells us that 2+2=4; and empirical demonstration shows us that if we put 2 spoons in an empty box and add another 2 spoons, we count 4 spoons in total. But suppose that, for whatever reason, we sometimes counted 3 spoons in total. This would undermine the value of using logic as a tool for finding truth.This sounds like you're reifying logic; logic is semantics- it applies to propositions, not to reality. — Relativist
The Principle of Parsimony: the simplest explanation that accounts for all the data is the most reasonable one.No, the principle of sufficient reason says that everything that exists has a sufficient explanation of its existence. It says nothing about simplicity. Note, the more complicated of two explanations is still sufficient to explain. (I think you're conflating sufficiency with efficiency) — Clearbury
Not all explanations are external to the thing explained. Here are examples of things that are explained by an internal reason, that is, out of logical necessity or inherently.The first is to insist that some things exist 'of necessity' and hope that this will somehow pass as an 'explanation' of why the thing exists. — Clearbury
The traditional answer is: we can posit the existence of a First Cause which has existence necessarily or as an essential property. The existence of this First Cause is grounded by logical necessity (reason type 1 in the OP) because to deny the existence of a thing with necessary existence is a contradiction. Then this First Cause also serves to explain the existence of everything else as their cause, direct or indirect. This summary should serve to explain why there is anything at all.This is question begging. It assumes what is in question, namely whether everything in existence can be explained. These three types of reason are based on the existence of things. They do not explain why there is anything at all. — Fooloso4
Well, if we rejected the idea that there is a reason then we would not look for for one, but it does not follow that there must be one. — Fooloso4
Rejecting the idea that there is a reason would go against our reasoning process, specifically induction which demands sufficient reasons.That is the point. Where is the data that is sufficient to conclude that everything must have a reason? — Fooloso4
I did not give the specific explanation but I gave the guidance on how to find the explanation. Here are the quick steps to work out the specific explanation:It does not explain why there are laws of nature. — Fooloso4
The laws as we currently know them may be only descriptive, but as per the PSR, there still must be a prescriptive explanation for why matter and energy behave as described by those laws.does not demonstrate that those laws are prescriptive rather than descriptive. — Fooloso4