I'm not sure that we have the same view on hinge beliefs. It depends on what you mean by "logical consequences" of a hinge belief. There is no doubt that hinge beliefs have consequences in our acts (linguistic and non-linguistic), and that there is a logical scaffolding to our belief systems. However, we have different views of hinges if you use "logical consequences" as a synonym for correct reasoning (inductive and deductive). Also, hinge beliefs don't depend on some practical effect. A practical effect would give some justification for the belief, which goes counter what a hinge belief is. — Sam26

I definitely want to use “logical consequences” somewhat loosely here, meaning that Euclid and Anselm may not be using some shared universal logic here. Lastly, what I am emphasizing is these “hinge propositions” are a choice, you either use them or you don’t, and whether you use them or not may be because there is a value to them. Whether one can articulate the value is another story. I am sure there are these “hinge propositions” hidden in the background of every day life that most do not question and/or aware of.

Yep, belief/propositions have consequences when one uses them, I do not see how one escapes this existential fact about living in the world. If one goes on doubting one has a hand because of intellectual reasoning, yet keeps using the word in practice like everyone else, what was the point of doubting? Alternatively, if one chooses not to use the word “hands” because of some radical doubt, I pity one’s chances in surviving our world.

What is the nature of a hinge belief? What if someone's world picture includes belief in God as a hinge belief? Or, what if another world picture excludes belief in God as part of their hinge beliefs? Can we just decide whether this or that belief is a hinge? — Sam26

I'm not sure what you mean. — Sam26

Consider the following:

A. From Euclid’s Elements
1. A point is that of which there is no part
2. And a line is a length without breath
3. And the extremities of a line are points

B. From Anselm’s Proslogion
1. You are something than which nothing greater can be thought.
2. And certainty this being so truly exists that it cannot be even thought not to exist.


If I had to characterize “hinge proposition” I would say it is one where a human accepts it and its logical consequences as a whole. This acceptance would not be because it strikes us as true but that it has some pragmatic effect on us that when we put them into practice it brings value and meaning to our lives.

Take example A and definition number 1. Does that strike one as true? You could probably make the case that it is plain nonsense by itself. But if one accepts the definition and moves forward with it, the fruitfulness may be seen. And the same goes example B.

What is the nature of a hinge belief? What if someone's world picture includes belief in God as a hinge belief? — Sam26

Is this not the nexus between the intellect and action, rationalism and pragmatism, where the human leaves the third person intellectual detachment and enters in the first person animal needing to survive and reproduce?

One last tantalizing passage from Wittgenstein and his thinking about concept formation. From Culture and Value:

"Life can educate one to a belief in God. And experiences too are what bring this about; but I don't mean visions and other forms of sense experience which show us the 'existence of this being', but, e.g. sufferings of various sorts. These neither show us God in the way a sense impression shows us an object, not do they give rise to conjectures about him. Experiences, thoughts, - life can force this concept on us. So perhaps it is similar to the concept of 'object'.

This is not about pondering the use of the word "God", but pondering life itself.

What do you think that is? — Fooloso4

Do you have examples or do you have in mind what statements such as the following: — Fooloso4

Part II of the PI is often an overlooked, less quoted part of the book. But I believe it hints at the many directions Wittgenstein was possibly exploring. Lets take a look at some:

In these passages, it is not just analyzing the use of words that Wittgenstein is exploring.

Part II, section I, "One can imagine an animal angry frightened, unhappy, happy, startled. But hopeful? And why not? A dog believes his master will come the day after tomorrow? And what can he not do here? How do I do it? How am I supposed to answer this? Can only those hope who can talk? Only those who masters the use of a language. That is to say, the phenomena of hope are modes of this complicated form of life." I think here Wittgenstein is pondering the relationship between primitive reactions and complex form of life, is he not asking questions and looking for an explanation, and not just wanting to describe the language of hope?

Part II section ii, In saying "When I heard this word, it meant.... to me" one refers to a point in time and to a way of using the word. (Of course, it is this combination that we fail to grasp.) Again Wittgenstein is going beyond just the analysis of the use of a word, but looking also at the relation of reference and time.

Part II section v, "It is like the relation: physical object-sense impression. Here we have two different language games and a complicated relation between them-If you try to reduce their relation to a simple formula you go wrong." Here a fascinating discussion between two different philosophical outlooks one founded on a naturalistic view and the other a more introspective view?

Part II section x "How did we ever come to use such an expression as "I believe.." Did we at some time become aware of phenomenon (of belief)? Did we observe ourselves and other people and so discover belief?" A very interesting question, but will the answer come from analysis of the use of words?

Part II section xi "I shall call the following figure, derived from Jastrow, the duck-rabbit. It can be seen as a rabbit's head or as a duck's. And I must distinguish between the 'continuous seeing' of an aspect and the 'dawning' of an aspect." What is Wittgenstein doing in this passage? In trying to describe a picture, is he exploring how we borrow from our language to describe what seems to be a rather interestingly unique experience and to get another human being to see it as I do?

Lastly, Part II section xii "If the formation of concepts can be explain by facts of nature, would we not be interested, not in grammar, but rather in that in nature which is the basis of grammar? - Our interest certainly includes the correspondence between concepts and very general fact of nature. (Such fact facts as mostly do not strike us because of their generality.) But our interest does not fall back upon these possible causes of the formation of concepts; we are not doing natural science, nor yet natural history-since we also invent fictitious natural history for our purposes.

I am not saying; If such and such facts of nature were different people would have different concepts (in the sense of hypothesis). But: if anyone believe certain concepts are absolutely the correct ones, and that having different ones would mean not realizing something that we realize-then let him imagine certain very general facts of nature to be different from what we are used to, and the formation of concepts different from the usual ones will become intelligible to him."

I think this is the most interesting direction Wittgenstein is considering here. The philosophy of concept formation. This is not about describing how we use our words, but exploring how we come to formulate our concepts.

To this end what I regard as most important is not simply getting Wittgenstein right but the attempt to get him right, even if we decide he gets it wrong. If is an exercise in thinking and seeing. — Fooloso4

On Certainty and for that matter PI is an un finished work. I would rather not like to think about “getting it right” as much as a continuation of what he had started. This is more exciting because it could take philosophy is new and interesting directions.

urther, although rejects radical skepticism he does hold a more measured and moderate skepticism.

651. I cannot be making a mistake about 12x12 being 144. And now one cannot contrast
mathematical certainty with the relative uncertainty of empirical propositions.

Empirical propositions do not have the certainty of mathematics. In the Tractatus he says:

6.36311 It is an hypothesis that the sun will rise tomorrow: and this means that we do not know whether it will rise.

We may not doubt whether the sun will rise tomorrow, but whether or not it will is a contingent rather than necessary fact. — Fooloso4

I think Wittgenstein in "On Certainty" is exploring this distinction between contingent and necessary. In some ways in seems to be approaching a view of Quine where our most fossilized propositions can be up for revision. Consider the following:

213 "Our empirical propositions' do not form a homogeneous mass"

217 "If someone supposed that all our calculations were uncertain and that we could rely on none of them (justifying himself by saying that mistakes are always possible) perhaps we would say he was crazy. But can we say he is in error? Does he not just react differently? We rely on calculations, he does't, we are sure, he isn't."

167 "It is clear that our empirical propositions do not all have the same status, since one can lay down such a proposition and turn it from an empirical proposition into a norm description. Think of chemical investigations. Lavoisier makes experiments with substances in his laboratory and now he concludes that this and that take place when there is burning. He does not say that it might happen otherwise another time. He has got hold of a definite world picture - not of course one that he invited: he learned it as a child. I say world picture and not hypothesis, because it is the matter-of-course foundation for his research and as such also goes unmentioned."

447 "Compare with this 12X12 = 144. Here too we don't say "perhaps". For, in so far as this proposition rests on our not miscounting or miscalculating and on our senses not deceiving us as we calculate, both proportions, the arithmetical one and the physical one, are on the same level. I want to say: The physical game is just as certain as the arithmetical. But this can be misunderstood. My remark is a logical and not a psychological one."

613 "If I now say "I know that the water in the kettle on the gas flame will not freeze but boil", I seem to be as justified in this "I know" as I am in any. "If I know anything I know this".- Or do I know with greater certainty that the person opposite me is my old friend so and so? And how does that compare with the proportion that I am seeing with two eyes and shall see them if I look in the glass?-I don't know confidently what I am to answer here.-But still there is a different between cases. If the water one the gas freezes, of course I shall be as astonished as can be, but I assume some factor I don't know of, and perhaps leave the matter to physicists to judge. But what could make me doubt whether this person here is N.N, whom I have know for years? Here a doubt would seem to drag everything with it and plunge it into chaos."

I would say he was exploring this distinction between contingent/necessary and seeing that some empirical proposition can be held as firmly as mathematical propositions, and even these firmly held mathematical propositions we can imagine folk reacting to them differently where notions of "right/incorrect" seem to lose any sense.

Wittgenstein's point is that no justification is required. Certain propositions, viz., hinge propositions are generally outside our epistemological language games. — Sam26

What I am emphasizing here is what Wittgenstein says in On Certainty in the following:

110 “….As if giving grounds did not come to an end sometime. But the end is not an ungrounded presupposition: it is an ungrounded way of acting.”

Note that with a mere belief, one might respond to the question "Why do you believe that?" with the answer "I just do," and that's acceptable as a mere belief; but a claim to knowledge as JTB requires more, it requires that the belief be justified and true. And of course, Wittgenstein in challenging Moore's use by asking what would count as a justification for "I know this is a hand." Wittgenstein is telling us that Moore's use of "I know..." is akin to an expression of a conviction, not objective knowledge as Moore thinks it is. — Sam26

If I was Moore, I would demonstrate my knowledge by showing him traditionally held techniques, actions accomplished by using a hand, and convince him that knowledge as JTB should be revised to demonstrable public action (DPA).

Moore conflates, as many people do, the use of "I know..." as an expression of a conviction, as opposed to an expression of epistemology (JTB). "Suppose I replaced Moore's 'I know' by 'I am of unshakeable conviction' (OC 86)?" — Sam26

It would equally absurd that Moore stand in front of a lecture and say “I, with conviction, have two hands” along with “I know”. The most natural reaction would be to think something is not quite normal here.

OF COURSE, all of this relies on even thinking his Old or New Testament matters or is the right approach.. Something that seems completely off the table to the adherents. You see, you can't directly attack Wittgenstein, only provide either primary sources (from the GURU himself), or from one of his approved sooth-sayers.. — schopenhauer1

You would enjoy Gellner’s Word and Things, he has very similar points throughout his book.

But you are right, Wittgenstein can give one mental whiplash, from solving all of the problems of philosophy to looking at philosophy as a mental disease needing a cure.

I say this too because I notice a tendency whereby when you question Wittgenstein's ideas, the only answer that seems to be legitimate to the majority who jump on these threads is to quote another line from Wittgenstein.. As if you cannot refute Wittgenstein, you can only have varying levels of understanding of Wittgenstein. — schopenhauer1

I would agree with you that it can be very difficult to debate the ideas of later Wittgenstein. But this is likely due to the approach to philosophy he takes where he wants to emphasize description and use of words rather than provide explanation and the theorize. What is there to debate when he is just describing how we commonly employ are language in everyday life. But the next step is where one has to decide if peace can be found in this analysis of words, or continue to be tormented by problems traditional philosophy has presented to us. I think most would agree that most modern philosophers either ignore Wittgenstein and continue on theorizing, or give him respectful nod and continue theorizing.

That said, can one criticize Wittgenstein? Of course, even Wittgenstein heavily criticized his early work, the Tractatus, that is pretty much how Philosophical Investigations is set up. And as for Philosophical Investigations itself, I believe even Wittgenstein viewed this work as an incomplete and that it still needed to be improved upon, see Preface to Investigations. As for other philosophers, there have been many interesting attempts, for example:

1. Word and Things, Ernest Gellner
2. The Metaphysics of Meaning, Jerrold Katz
3. The Concept of a Person, essays: "Philosophy and Language" and "Can there by a Private Language", A.J. Ayer

To name of few. But my favorite criticism and one that has stuck with me the most and is very simple and to the point, from Quine's Word and Object:

"There are, however, philosophers who overdo this line of thought, treating ordinary language as sacrosanct. They exalt ordinary language to the exclusion of one of its traits: its disposition to keep on evolving."

agree with you. If the past still exists, why can't we visit it and change it? — Truth Seeker

A problem I see here is what would we call “evidence” to either confirm or deny one of these theories. What would that look like? When I go “back to change” something existing in the past, when I get there, am I changing something which is presently in front me that is supposedly in the past. Is this evidence of presentism or block theory?

It seems this idea of “going back to change” edges in being nonsense.

Also, I think many do not realize that the “God hypothesis” has come back in a stealthy sort a way. Instead of the watch needing a designer, the simulation needs a simulator.

Your are being too kind to call this even “highly improbable”. Just because we can imagine such fanciful scenarios does not mean they are possible.

It's what direct realism always was, e.g. going back to Aristotle. Direct realists believed in things like A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour/primitivism, whereas indirect realists believed that colour is a mental phenomenon (which may be reducible to brain states).

Now that the science shows that the indirect realists are right, it seems that direct realists have retreated to a completely different position, consistent with indirect realism, but insist on calling themselves direct realists anyway. — Michael

Not sure if “science” is much of a friend of indirect realism. When we observe light passing through a prism that reveals multi-colors, scientists were not unraveling its secrets by studying “mental phenomena” or “brain states.” Scientists are studying light, prisms, and colors to see if they fit current scientific theories, or needing new theories. Or, if they notice some folk do not judge colors like most of us, scientists do not study “mental phenomena” to discover what the issues are but maybe examine what physiological differences are between normal and abnormal cases in humans.

Maybe the only utility I could see in imagining “mental phenomena” is to get the scientist to consider human physiology first, and not other factors external to the human body. But, at the end of the day, this construct of “mental phenomena” is only a grammatical fiction.

The way they navigate and talk about the world is the same, and yet the way they see (and smell and taste) the world is very different. — Michael

Only in your imagination. In fact, they see the world the same. When we use the expression “to see the world differently”, we usually referring to how people act/react, judge, express themselves differently in the world.

We experience representations, not objects, in terms of sight. That seems inarguable, and therefore there is no way to pretend what we see is the object. No one but philosophers posit this, anyway, and so we can be fairly sure there's hide-the-ball going on. — AmadeusD

This is an odd use of the word "representations". Do we experience representations? I guess you could if you mean we have experience making solar system models in which different colored size balls represent different planets. Or maybe, we have experience teaching chemistry with sphere and stick pieces that represent atoms and bonds. But I do not think you are suggesting these are example of "experiences of representations".

Obviously, I do not believe you are suggesting that a scientist is observing human brains "experiencing representations" when humans are looking at objects. And would we want to say that when a scientist images brain activity, say with a EEG, fMRI, PET, MEG, CT, or SPECT instruments, while a human looks at a object that these images are representations of an objects? No, I think we would be incline to say that a scientist views these images as representations of the activity of some portion of the brain when the human is exposed to a particular object.

Probably, only philosophers and scientists who get "metaphysical" are inclined to talk about experiencing "representations" and not "objects". They are inclined to want to say we don't experience objects like humans, brains, trees, balls, planets, nerves, colors, screens, EEG, fMRI, PET, MEG, CT, and SPECT, but representations of humans, brains, trees, balls, planets, nerves, colors, screens, EEG, fMRI, PET, MEG, CT, and SPECT.

A brain seems less of a posit, than a representation of a brain.

For example, as an Indirect Realist, I can say "I see a green apple", using the word "green" in a figurative rather than literal sense. — RussellA

Saying that an Indirect Realist is using the word "green" figuratively is a bit odd.

With the help of Chat Smith, let's take a look at some phases that are used figuratively:

1. "Green with envy":Espressing jealously
2. "Green thumb": referring to someone who has natural talent for gardening
3. "Green Light": Signifying permission to proceed or approval
4. "Green around the gills": Describing someone who looks pale or sick
5. "Green-eye monster" Referring to jealously or envy often in the context of romance
6. "Greenback": Informal term for currency
7. "Green with laughter": Describing someone who is extremely amused or entertained

Can we add "Green Apple" to this list? Is this not what is meant by "literal" anyway so we can set-up the contrast with these figurative uses?

I think so.

This would be an interesting road than the well traveled indirect/direct debate, the standard metre

So what more can be added to this experiment so that it supports indirect realism? — Banno

Let me add one more experiment: again the subject is blind-folded but this time the subject has his nervous system numbed. The scientist places the ball in his hands, “in direct contact”. In this scenario the subject never reports out that he has made contact with the ball.

In summary, in one case, the subject does not have contact with the ball yet the causal process is present in the nervous system. In the other case, the causal process is not present in the nervous system even though the subject is in contact with the ball.

What I believe this shows indirect realism does not get support from science as much as they would think. Certainly, there is not enough support to revise the way we talk about every objects like balls, trees, etc…. What science can do is described how the nervous system works under a variety of conditions.

For touch, the middle man (by analogy, rather than "this is my position") is the nervous system, surely?
— AmadeusD

Can this be filled out? Would you say that you don't touch the wall, you touch your nervous system? That doesn't seem right. — Banno

To keep on adding to this point:

Let us imagine a case where a scientist would like to understand how the nervous system works when a subject interacts with an everyday common object. The scientist proceeds to "hook up" a subject to a machine, gives the subject a ball, and records the activity of the nerves to the brain. The scientist solicits a reply from the subject that he is in contact with a ball. Next, the scientist uses the information from the prior experiment to stimulates the nervous systems of a blind-folded subject that results in the subject saying, "I am in contact with that ball again."

In both cases, the scientist basically replicates what they observed in the nervous system in the first experiment. The subjects nervous systems(their brain) is stimulating them to saying "I am in contact with a ball." Thus, whether one is in contact with a ball or not does not depend on one's state of their nervous system, but if and only if one is contact with a ball or not.

They say DNA is the blueprint for a human being. Well let's look at this idea of "blueprints" and maybe we can exorcise some of these essentialist demons.

We plan to construct a building. We will name it the "Nakatomi Tower". Before we begin we draw our design plans of Nakatomi Tower. In the course of planning we develop three plans, Blueprint A, Blueprint B, and Blueprint C. Each design is slightly different, maybe more rooms, different plumbing, etc. One plan has an extra floor, and another has one floor less. All three Blueprints are for the building we plan to construct and name "Nakatomi Tower." The plan location will be at the corner of 5th and Main. At first we settle on Blueprint A and began construction. However, we began to run out of money quicker than we thought, so we have to take some elements from Blueprint B and C as well as eliminate some floors al together. Finally, after years of construction the building was finished. At the opening ceremony, the owner of the building announced the name of the building "Nakatomi Plaza." After many decade, many new additions to the building were added, modifications were performed, and eventually the building took on the name of just "The Plaza".

As Wittgenstein said in The Blue Book, "Philosophers very often talk about investigating, analyzing, the meaning of words. But let's not forget that a word hasn't got a meaning given to it, as it were, by a power independent of the word of us, so that there could be a kind of scientific investigation into what a word really means. A word has the meaning someone has given to it."

Well, he wants to diagnose why anyone would have taken Zeno's problem seriously - and, by the way, Zeno also took this problem seriously in that he believes that all change, including motion, is an illusion. — Ludwig V

Yes, Zeno's problem is purely theoretical not, in some sense of the word, real. Which is why it is so tempting to simply declare the winner. — Ludwig V

I do not believe Ryle should have taken this paradox serious, nor anyone else for that matter. And if we are going to talk about "temptation", it should be to ask why would anyone be tempted to take this serious to begin with. Just because one presents a picture that is cogent does not mean it has any application in the real world. And it was Ryle who describe one kind of dilemma as "In the simplest cases, their solutions are rivals in the sense that if one of them is true the others are false." Here I argue that that this is a simple case of one line of thought as "true" and the other "false". How can anyone argue it has any application to the world we experience? Why is the appeal of our experiences not the deciding factor that drive us to say that this is a simple case that easily decides on "which is true" and "which is false"? Do weneed Ryle to take the extra step to "clarify the language" that this is actually an "abstract platitiude"? We can't trust our experience to dismiss Zeno, we need the extraordinary insight of Ryle to show us out of the fly-bottle so to speak.?

If I show Ryle a film of a race between Achilles and the Tortoise in which the Tortoise gets a lead, and by strategic camera angles and editing shows the Tortoise winning even though Achilles looks faster. The film certainly is not a logical impossibility. Do I need Ryle to help us understand that there should not be any confusion with what actually happens in such event?

Lastly, to say Zeno's problem is purely theoretical, I think is a bit incomplete. Zeno's argument is to show that all change/motion is an illusion, but this is not some fantasy world for Zeno, it is the actual world around us that seems to have change but is illusionary.

All I am saying is experience settles some questions not just lingustic analysis. And in this case, experience should be arbiter.

Nice summary.

This is my reaction to Lecture III.

Ryle writes at the very beginning of Dilemmas, “One familiar kind of conflict is that in which two or more theorists offer rival solutions of the same problem. In the simplest cases, their solutions are rivals in the sense that if one of them is true the others are false.” It is strange that Ryle would not include the conflict found in Achilles and the Tortoise as an instance of rival theories having a clear winner. He says on p 36, “It is quite certain that a fast runner following a slow runner will overtake him in the end” and “Nothing could be more decisively settled” if you consider the speeds of each contestant and the ground in which they cover. How closer to the truth must we get? Our experience of such an event as well as our mathematical description of such an event is decisive. Clearly, we have an answer to the problem of who will win the race between Achilles and the Tortoise.

However, Ryle has something else in mind. He says, “Yet there is a very different answer which also seems to follow with equal cogency from the same data.” But what “data” is that? Surely not the data experimentally collected by watching a race between two such opponents. He must mean the data generated based on the hypothetical of an infinite number of steps bisecting and never reaching unity. Now if Ryle stopped here, I could understand because in a way one theory is beholden to an outcome of an actual race, while the other is beholden to the thought experiment where coherence and consistency rule the day. So, this goes along with Ryle’s idea that “There often arise quarrels between theories, or, more generally, between lines of thought, which are not rival solutions of the same problem, but rather solutions or would-be solutions of different problems, and which, none the less, seem to be irreconcilable with one another.”

So, why did Ryle not just declare a winner and be done with it? I believe Ryle is committed to showing that Zeno’s paradox does give us some kind of knowledge, although a more rationalistic kind. However, during this analysis, Ryle seems to oscillate between rationalism and empiricism. For example, take his interesting example of dividing up a cake, p 39:

“But now suppose that the mother of a family chooses instead to circulate an uncut cake round the table, instructing the children that each is to cut off a bit and only a bit of what is on the plate; i.e. that no child is to take the whole of what he finds on the plate. Then, obviously so long as her instructions are observed, however far and often the cake circulates, there is always a bit of cake left. If they obey her orders always to leave a bit, then they always leave a bit. Or to put it the other way round, if they obey her orders never to take the whole of the last fragment, a fragment always remains untaken.”

What is Ryle referring to here? To actual cake, or some abstract object call “a cake”? This is where I think Ryle presents a confusing picture. From p 40, “The plate never stops circulating. After each cut there remains a morsel to be bisected by the next child. Obviously, the children’s patience or their eyesight will give out before the cake gives out. For the cake cannot give out on this principle of division.” In one breath he seems to present an example that should reflect actual reality of bisecting a cake by children and is practically limited by the child’s eyesight and patience. Yet, in the very next sentence talks about “a cake” that cannot give out on this principle of division. However, if it was an actual cake, and depending on how heterogeneous the cake was and how easily it can be divided, each morsel may not be the cake anymore, but a piece of fruit, sugar, salt, etc. At some point, it may become the actual ingredients we used to make the cake to start with. So, from this perspective, “the cake” gives out on the principle of division. But an idea of “a cake” that represents the general concept of “object” may be another story. Similarly, to how I described the Zeno paradox “dilemma”, one is beholden to the concept of division, and the other to the experiment of cutting up a heterogenous mixture of stuff.

Ryle concludes his analysis of the Zeno paradox with “…nor can he grasp the other abstract platitude that the portions cut off something at no stage amount to the whole of that thing. (p48)” So, I guess we ended up in the same place in that Zeno is not answering the question “who will win the race.” But Ryle wants to say something additional, Zeno is putting forth an abstract platitude. But I say Zeno parades a metaphysical fiction disguised as a scientist hypothesis.

I can't say this thread is working very well, but if two or three people are interested and actually reading the book, I'm perfectly happy to continue — Ludwig V

Certainly if one can introduce these lectures succinctly and clearly express what Ryle’s main point is, this may help a little with engagement. His particular style of writing feels like a lot of foreplay without a crescendo.

Here is a common attempt:

Determinism is true. So folk cannot be responsible for their criminal actions. Thus, we ought not punish folk for their criminal actions.

Not a knock-down case, but Austin, of course, was writing without the benefit of access to Wittgenstein's work, so it is no surprise that he doesn't place much emphasis on distinguishing one's own case from the communal case. It probably did not occur to him that folk might read it as you have. — Banno

Not bad. However, I am not convinced of your or my argument. There is a nice youtube video titled “John Searle on Austin and Wittgenstein.” One rather humorous story Searle recollects was when he discussed the private language argument with Austin. From Searle's point of view Austin did not understand Wittgenstein’s point when the beetle in the box was brought up. Austin’s response was something like, “see the beetle is a something and a nothing, a clear contradiction.” It is a short video but funny and shows how very different these two philosophers were as people.

It seems perhaps Malcolm is creating his own opponent, but I don’t think it is Austin. — Antony Nickles

Malcolm is not creating his own opponent, but is addressing an assortment of historical figures, for example:

Descartes, "all the same thoughts and conceptions which we have while awake may also come to us in sleep"

Aristotle, "'the soul' makes 'assertions' in sleep, giving in the way of example a dream that 'some object approaching is a man or house' or that 'the object is white or beautiful'"

Kant, "In deepest sleep perhaps the greatest perfection of the mind might be exercised in rational thought. For we have no reason for asserting the opposite except that we do not remember the idea when awake. This reason, however, proves nothing."

Moore, "We cease to perform them only while we are asleep, without dreaming; and even in sleep, so long as we dream, we are performing acts of consciousness"

Russell, " What, in dreams, we see and hear, we do in fact see and hear, though, owning to the unusual context, what we see and hear gives rise to false beliefs."

All of these quotes are from his book Dreaming.

So, should we count Austin amongst this very esteem group? Let's take a look at another quote about dreams from Sense and Sensibilia, pg 42

"And we might add here that descriptions of dreams, for example, plainly can't be taken to have exactly the same force and implications as the same words would have, if used in the description of ordinary waking experiences. In fact, it is just because we all know that dreams are throughout unlike waking experiences that we can safely use ordinary expressions in the narration of them; the peculiarity of the dream-context is sufficiently well known for nobody to be misled by the fact that we speak in ordinary terms."

In this paragraph, he states the we "know" dreams are unlike waking experience, and we know "the dream-context" sufficiently to not be confused. As stated before, in "Other Minds", he states, "There are recognized ways of distinguishing between dreaming and waking..." But the problem here is that he does not specify these "recognized ways". This has not gone unnoticed by a Barry Stroud, in his book, The Significance of Philosophical Skepticism, "Austin does not say much about what he thinks the 'procedures' or 'recognized ways' of telling that one is not dreaming actually are. He seems content with the idea that there must be a procedure or else we would not be able to use and to contrast the words 'dreaming' and 'waking' as we do".

What could be these 'procedures' or 'ways'? I think it would be useful to understand how we come to learn such a concept as 'dreaming'. Malcom describes it as such, "If after waking from a sleep a child tells us that he saw and did and thought various things, none of which could be true, and if his relation of these incidents has spontaneity and no appearance of invention, then we may say to him 'It was a dream'. We do not question whether he really had a dream or if it merely seems to him that he did." and "That this question is not raised is not a mere matter of fact but essential to our concept of dreaming."

I believe Austin may be thinking that we know the concept of dreaming from 'one's own case'. From 'one own case' we know, somehow, that this case cannot be the case of a waking experience. However, Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigation attack this notion that one learns what thinking, remembering, mental images, sensations, and so on, are from 'one's own case'. Malcolm says the following:

"One may think to overcome these difficulties by allowing that the descriptions that people give of their private states provides a determination of what those states are and whether they are the same. But if one takes this line (which is correct) one cannot then permit a question to be raised as to whether those descriptions are in error or not-for this would be to fall back into the original difficulty. One must treat the description as the criterion of what the inner occurrence are. 'An "inner process" stands in need of the outward criteria' (Wittgenstein, PI 580)."

However, could Austin believe that the 'recognized way' of knowing comes from remembering how we learned "dreaming' in the first place. That we wake up with the impression of having done certain things, and understanding that they are not true. But is anything really being compared here? Are we contrasting the dream experience with an awake experience, or are we simply applying the concept of dreaming in the way we learned it?

However it seems to me that there is a difficulty in Malcolm's notion of consciousness, or rather unconsciousness. As I understand, he envisions consciousness as either on or off. That's not my experience, nor what I understand from others. — Banno

Just to clarify what Malcolm actually examines and says in his book, "Dreaming". One, he is mostly examining the use of "I am asleep" or "I am dreaming". He spends less time considering "I am unconscious", and views this sentence as different than the aforementioned sentences. He says, "Here there is a similarity between 'I am asleep' and 'I am unconscious': neither sentence has a use that is homogeneous with the normal use of the corresponding third person sentence. It would not occur to anyone to conclude that a man is asleep from his saying "I am asleep' any more than to conclude that he is unconscious from his saying 'I am unconscious', or to conclude that he is dead from his saying 'I am dead'." Two, he does provide some further clarification of the relationship between dreaming and a conscious experience. He says, "I was inclined at one time to think of this result as amounting to a proof that dreaming is not a mental activity or mental phenomenon or a conscious experience. But now I reject that inclination. For one thing, the phases 'mental activity', 'mental phenomenon', 'conscious experience', are so vague that I should not have known what I was asserting." He goes on further to explain, "If a philosopher uses the phrase 'mental phenomenon', say, in such a way that dreams are mental phenomena by definition, then obviously no argument is going to prove to him that they are not. I avoid this way of stating the matter. What I say instead is that if anyone holds that dreams are identical with, or composed of, thoughts, impressions, feelings, images, and so on (here one may supply whatever other mental nouns one likes, except 'dreams'), occurring in sleep, then his view is false." And lastly, "And someone may have as his grounds for classifying dreams as 'conscious experiences' the fact that we speak of 'remembering' dreams, or the fact that in telling dreams we say that we 'saw' and 'heard' various things. There is nothing wrong with these decisions, if they do not cause one to be mislead in other respects."

While Malcolm gives a little here, there is not much left over to compare whether a conscious experience of a dream is "qualitatively" similar or different to a conscious experience of being awake.

Check out these Ngrams, just out of interest. — Banno

Neat stats, if it was just reverse maybe we would have had less talk of Qualia.

The life of philosophy is debate, which requires a puzzle or a question. — Ludwig V

I think linguistic philosophy tends to be less about debate and more of this:

Show this use, and this use, and this use, and this use, etc… now give up all your talk of sense datum. No? look at how we learned these words…now give up all your talk of sense datum…No? see these words have no contrast…now give up all your talk of sense datum…No, don’t you find your philosophical worries dissolve away?

If the linguistic philosopher gets lucky, their analysis goes places where they make “final” proclamations such as “this is nonsense” or “this is incoherent”.

n conversations, I found a reluctance to take scientific research on board. The problem here is partly that being a scientist does not make one immune from philosophical mistakes. What makes it even more difficult is that the distinction between ordinary language and science is distinctly permeable. REM is in some ways a technical, theoretical concept, but in others is a common sense observation. — Ludwig V

In "Dreaming" Malcolm does not ignore scientific considerations regarding dreams. He says the following:

"The interest in a physiological criterion of dreaming is due, I believe, to an error that philosophers, psychologists, physiologists, and everyone who reflects on the nature of dreaming tends to commit, namely, of supposing that a dream must have a definite location and duration in physical time. (this is an excellent example of what Wittgenstein calls a 'prejudice' produced by 'grammatical illusions') It might be replied that a dream is surely an event and that event must have a definite date and duration in physical time. But this gets one nowhere, for what justifies the claim that a dream is an event in that sense?"

But Malcolm takes this one step further, and suggests that maybe scientists are just proposing a new concept of "dreaming". What would be the consequences of this stipulation, that REM means that a human was dreaming. One, "...if someone were to tell a dream it could turn out that his impression that he dreamt was mistaken-and not in the sense that the incidents he related had really occurred and so his impression was not of a dream but of reality. The new concept would allow him to be mistaken in saying he had a dream even if his impression that he had seen and done various things were false. Another consequence is that it would be possible to discover that a man's assertion that he had slept a dreamless sleep was in error; and here one would have to choose between saying either that he forgot his dreams or that he had not been aware of them when he dreamt them. People would have to be informed on waking up that they had dreamt or not-instead of their informing us, as it now is."

He ends his chapter in a rather un-antithetical view of science when he says, "Physiological phenomena, such as rapid eye movements or muscular action currents, may be found to stand in interesting empirical correlations with dreaming, but the possibility of these discoveries presupposes that these phenomena are not used as the criterion of dreaming."

I understand folk like to say Malcolm is denying that we have experiences such as dreams, but I think we one needs to understand he is studying how we understand the concept of "dreaming" and what we can and cannot say about such a concept.

The fact that ways to distinguish are possible is proof of Austin’s claim. Descartes was trying to pull the same stunt in setting the goal before investigating the field. — Antony Nickles

Austin seems to be saying that we somehow know the dream experience is "qualitatively" different than the waking experience, because as he says "How otherwise should we know how to use and contrast the words. He further inserted a footnote saying "This is part, no doubt only part, of the absurdity in Descartes' toying with the notion that the whole of our experiences might be a dream." But Malcolm is saying that this idea that dreaming is an experience where we question, reason, perceive, imagine is an incoherent one, so there is no sense to say we are comparing experiences to determine they are qualitatively similar or not.

had the same feeling about this. Malcolm's take on dreaming has not been popular. Indeed, it has largely met the ultimate rejection - being ignored.

I would be delighted to indulge in a conversation about this, but I'm not inclined to think that he's not quite right about these cases shows that his overall argument is wrong. — Ludwig V

I think you could say the same thing about Austin. His arguments have been largely ignored because the philosophical community continues to talk about qualia, what-it's-like-ness experiences, or the ontological subjective.

My main point in this post is to show how two linguistic philosophers supposedly analyzing the same ordinary language we all use, seemingly coming up with some fundamentally different conclusions.

When I read chapter 5, it troubled me; especially when I came to the following sentence, "If dreams were not 'qualitatively' different from waking experiences, then every waking experience would be like a dream; the dream-like quality would be, not difficult to capture, but impossible to avoid. It is true, to repeat, that dreams are narrated in the same terms as waking experiences: these terms, after all, are the best terms we have; but it would be wildly wrong to conclude from this that what is narrated in the two cases is exactly alike."

After a little contemplation, I remember where I got this sense that something is just not right with this passage. From another linguistic philosopher, Norman Malcolm, in is book Dreaming, Chapter 18 "Do I know I am Awake", he says the following:

"'There are recognized ways of distinguishing between dreaming and waking (how otherwise should we know how to use and to contrast the words?)...'(Austin, p133, "Other Minds") I thing Austin says this, not because he knows of any 'recognized ways', but because he assumes he can know he is awake and so must have some way of doing it. His question, 'How otherwise should we know how to use and to contrast the words?', assumes we do know how. This is partly right and partly wrong: we know how to use the words 'I am awake' but not the words 'I am dreaming'. To speak more exactly, we know that 'I am dream' is the first person singular present indicative of the verb 'dream', and that dreaming and waking are logical contraries, and therefore the 'I am dreaming' and 'I am awake' are logical contraries. In this sense we know how to use the sentence 'I am dreaming'. On the other hand, considerations previous mentioned bring home to us that is can never be a correct use of language to say (even to oneself) 'I am dreaming'. In this sense we do not know how to use those words."

In the book, Malcolm shows that saying something like "I am dreaming" or "I am not awake" while asleep is an absurdity because the one who utters such a sentence is demonstrating that they are not asleep. (Note: Malcolm is not saying such sentences as "Am I dreaming" or "I must be dreaming" do not have actual uses, for example, to express surprises, or question whether something is as it seems). He goes on to say that nothing counts for or against the truth of such a sentence, so nothing counts for the truth of a sentence like "I am awake". "If one cannot observe or have evidence that one is not awake, one cannot observe or have evidence that one is awake." What about observation? Could you know by observation? Well is this not a contingent fact, so if by observation you should know if you are awake or not awake. But you cannot observe yourself "not awake" because if you did, you are "not awake". Malcolm goes on to explore the possible of saying "I am awake" could correctly identify my state at the time of uttering the sentence. He says, "there are various states of oneself, each having a name. "Awake" is the name of one of them, 'fear' of another, 'drowsy' of another, and so on. When I apply 'awake' to myself I pick out one state from others having different names. In order to pick it out I must take note of it, I must see it. I think we go wrong in supposing that, when I answer 'I'm awake', I apply the word 'awake' correctly to my state at the time-although that sounds unexceptionable. For what would it mean to apply that word incorrectly to my state at the time? When we say 'I'm awake' we are not distinguishing between states. It is not a matter of 'picking out' anything. When you say 'I'm awake' you are not reporting or describing your condition. You are showing someone that you are awake. There are countless other way of doing this (one way would be to exclaim "I'm not awake'); but the conventionally correct way of doing it with words is to say 'I am awake'.

So for Malcolm, the force of the perplexity from the question 'How can I tell whether I am awake or dreaming?' get it power from two errors:

1. That dreaming and waking might be exact counterpart (qualitatively the same) comes from the confusion of "historical and dream-telling senses of first person singular psychological sentences in the past tense."

2. The idea that one must be able to know, to see, that one is awake.

Austin thinks we must be able to know how to make this determination because we are able to make this distinction in our everyday language. But Malcom tries to show that this has nothing to do with knowledge if one looks at how we use and learn these words.

Does this show that Austin drifted from the pure faith of linguistic philosophy? Or, that he may have other philosophical presuppositions hidden in his closet?

To give myself a different challenge, I like to take on Austin's linguistic philosophy. More specifically, with an attack developed by Ernest Gellner. In his book, Word and Things, he defines the Four Pillars of Linguistic Philosophy as follows:

1. The Argument from the Paradigm case - This is the argument from the actual use of words to the answer to philosophical problems, or from the conflict between the actual use of words to the falsity of a philosophical theory.

2. The habit of inferring the answer to normative, evaluative problems from the actual use of words.

3. The contrast theory of meaning, to the effect that any term to be meaningful must allow at least for the possibility of something not being covered by it.

4. The doctrine I shall call Polymorphism. This doctrine stresses that there is very great variety in the kinds of use that words have, and that with regards to any given word, there can be great variety in its particular use.

To start, I would ask, would you characterize Austin's philiosophical approach as Gellner does?

What I feel remains to be explored further is the process of "finding our feet with them", say, as a matter of imagining ourselves as them, getting at why one might want to judge as they do. Maybe: in taking them seriously; allowing another's reasons to be or become intelligible; respecting their interests by taking their expressions as a commitment of their self, their character as it were (what "type" of person they are). I take this not as a matter of critique, but of letting them be "strange" to us without rejection (tolerating but not assuming/resigned to difference); with open curiosity, (cultural) humility (that my interests and context are not everyone's). In a sense: understanding as empathy; understanding in the sense of: being understanding (Websters: vicariously experiencing the [interests] of another; imagining the other's attitudes as legitimate; the imaginative projection of [myself] into [the other] so that [they] appear to be infused with [me, being a person]). — Antony Nickles

I am a little unclear what you mean by "Wittgenstein's strange people", but based on the cited paragraph, it could mean people who you may find difficult to understand.

In "On Certainty", sprinkled through out the book, Wittgenstein imagines meeting with all sorts of "strange" people. In these passages, the people hold positions, reasons, beliefs, ideas that differ or conflict with the positions he holds. Here are just some I came an across: 85, 92, 106, 108, 231, 239, 336, 338, 430, 608-612, 667, and 671. In these examples, the positions under examination are fundamental to how one looks at the world, that guides how one acts and reacts in the world. For example,

OC 92 "However, we can ask: May someone have telling grounds for believing that the earth has only existed for a short time, say since his own birth? Suppose he had always been told that, - would he have any good reason to doubt that? Men have believed that they could make rain; why should not a king be brought up in the belief that the world began with him? And if Moore and this king were to meet and discuss, could Moore really prove his belief to be the right one? I do not say that Moore could not convert the king to his view, but it would be a conversion of a special kind; the king would be brought to look at the world in a different way. Remember that one is sometimes convinced of the correctness of a view by its simplicity or symmetry, i.e. there are what induces one to go over to this point of view. One then simply says something like: "That's how it must be."

or

OC 231 "If someone doubted whether the earth had existed a hundred years ago, I should not understand, for this reason: I would not know what a person would still allow to be counted as evidence and what not."

In both of these cases, it is difficult to comprehend how empathy is going to lead to understanding. How we view the world, how we react to the world and to others, how we make judgments in particualr circumstances, can differ dramatically. Understanding through language would be almost or just impossible in these scenarios. But what about "understanding as empathy"? The problem I see here is if I am to picture myself in the other person's "shoes", what am I to think about the picture? I can't utilize my concepts to articulate what I think, they may have no application whatsoever. What we have here is simply a conversion to another way of life. We would need to start over again, as a child who is born into this world, to wipe the slate clean so to speak and start anew.

That someone has a “mind” is not the picture of the other I am arguing for; what I am doing is continuing on from Wittgenstein’s investigation into why philosophy looked at it that way, and from Cavell’s reading of him that that desire (for knowledge to be the “answer”) actually shows something about our situation as humans and thus affects our ordinary relation to other people. — Antony Nickles

One area I believe we can agree on is Wittgenstein's pointing out the importance "of natural actions and reactions that come before language and are not the result of thought." From Wittgenstein: A Religious Point of View, Malcolm says the following:

"A leading problem of philosophy for many centuries has been the existence of other minds. Here it has seemed that it requires very sophisticated reasoning for a person to assure himself that those other 'walking and speaking figures' have minds and souls, just as he himself has. But in fact a normal human being does not have this doubt that those other creatures, which resemble him, might be automatons; nor does he go through subtle reasoning to remove doubt. Wittgenstein dismisses the famous 'argument from analogy':

'You say you take care of a man who groans, because experience has taught you that you yourself groan when you feel such-and-such. but since in fact you don't make any such inference, we can abandon the argument from analogy' (Zettel, 537)

Instead of this supposed reasoning, which could be carried out in language, Wittgenstein calls attention to natural actions and reactions that come before language and are not the result of thought.

'It helps here to remember that it is a primitive reaction to tend to treat the part that hurts when someone else is in pain; and not merely when oneself is - and so to pay attention to the pain-behavior of others, as one does not pay attention to one's pain behavior.'(Zettel, 540)

The notion that those people around me might be automatons without minds or souls cannot get a foothold with me. I react to the expressions in their faces of fear, joy, interest-without the mediation of any reasoning."

However, Wittgenstein goes on to see that the workings of our relationship to others is not one of knowledge, but that the desire (for our relation to be based on something other than me) is a basic human response to (the fear of) the fact that we are separate from others, that this is part of the human condition (and not just an intellectual problem). — Antony Nickles

I like to make a couple points here. First, Wittgenstein is not commenting on the human condition, but focuses on the intellectual problem the philosophical minded get themselves into. For example, from On Certainty 467, "I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again "I know that that's a tree", pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: "This fellow isn't insane. We are only doing philosophy." Notice, he did not pull this "someone" over and explain, "hey, this discussion we are having, it is really important to understand, it leads to the truth of skepticism, and because of that we just have to accept an unknowable world and acknowledge other minds." Second, how this idea of "our relationship to others is not one of knowledge" that Wittgenstein supposedly puts forth, is a bit misleading. For example, from On Certainty 10 "I know that a sick man is lying here? Nonsense! I am sitting at his bedside, I am looking attentively into his face.- So, I don't know, then, that there is a sick man lying here? Neither the question nor the assertion makes sense." Again, this is another clue that Wittgenstein is not accepting "the truth of skepticism." What he is doing is showing how the concept "to know" does not make sense in this circumstance. Additionally, I do not think he is carrying out some sort of psychological investigation that when people are faced with the truth of skepticism of other minds that they will become detached from their fellow human beings, he is performing a philosophical investigation.