I think that's a wonderful definition even though I have no idea what it means. Sounds all philosophical and stuff. — T Clark

Quine could generalize the general.

Yes, a true sentence is about what is the case. But note that truth is a property of the sentence, not a property of the rain — Michael

If I said “It is the case that it is raining outside”, I do not mention anything about “truth” Would we need to say “what is the case” is a property of “It is raining outside.”? Or just say “what is the case” is neither a property of a sentence nor the rain? Like those who assert “existence” is not a predicate.

“As against solipsism it is to be said, in the first place, that it is psychologically impossible to believe, and is rejected in fact even by those who mean to accept it. I once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christine Ladd-Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others. Coming from a logician and a solipsist, her surprise surprised me.”

Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits

In summary, the idea of solipsism should not be taken seriously and should be rejected on different soil.

There is a difference between knowing the key is on the desk and being certain that the key is on the desk.

That's kinda the topic of On Certainty.

The justification for a claim to knowledge is the answer to "How do you know?" It will not do here to simple repeat your claim - I know the key is on the table because the key is on the table; I know this is a hand because it is a hand.

This is what is being said in the first few pages of On Certainty. Moore is unjustified in claiming that he knows this is a hand. Yet, it is true that this is a hand; and he is certain that this is a hand. The remainder of the book is an exploration of this oddity. — Banno

Nicely put. How about I know this is a hand because I am pointing to it, we both see it, and we both understand what I am talking about.

You’re making Wittgenstein’s point for him. He sees Moore’s raising of his hand as a performance which is grounded in a picture of the world which cannot be proved more correct than any other. To doubt the truth of this picture is to substitute a different picture, a different language game, just as doubting the picture of the world implied by the rules of chess is to no longer be playing chess. Moore’s demonstration convinces doubters of its certainty by bringing them to look at the world in a different way, not by satisfying them of its correctness. — Joshs

If Moore knows, that would mean there's a sense of "know" that amounts to being unable to doubt. And per Hume, you can't prove what you can't doubt. So Moore would have some kind of unprovable knowledge, which doesn't sound right. — frank

Moore's paper, "Proof of an External World”, is an appeal to common sense. His intuition tells him that a philosophical analysis arriving at a radically skeptical answer is not a source of truth but evidence that something has gone wrong. I believe Wittgenstein would hold the same position as Moore when he says, “I certainly did at the moment know that which I expressed by the combination of certain gestures with saying the words ‘There is one hand and here is another’. I knew that there was one hand in the place indicated by combining a certain gesture with my first utterance of ‘here’ and that there was another in the different place indicated by combining a certain gesture with my second utterance of ‘here’. How absurd it would be to suggest that I did not know it, but only believed it, and that perhaps it was not the case!” However, Wittgenstein seems to think Moore is in error here in a different way. I believe Norman Malcolm summaries this position nicely when he says:

"But, this insight led Moore into an error. (This is the second layer of meaning.). His perception of the absurdity of saying , in that situation, "I don't know if I have clothes on (or have hands)" drew him into the assumption that it would be correct to say "I know I have clothes on." Yet what Moore had actually perceived was that nothing in that situation made a doubt as to whether he had cloths on intelligible. He should have concluded that both "I don't know" and "I know" were out of place in that context. "I know" is often used to express the absence of doubt. But the absence of doubt and the unintelligibility of doubt are very different things. Wittgenstein says in the Investigations, "I know...may mean "I do not doubt...but does not mean that the words "I doubt...are senseless, that doubt is logically excluded." Wittgenstein is referring here to the way that "I know..." is used in ordinary language. He is saying, correctly, that this expression is not used in ordinary language to make a conceptual, philosophical point. But this is kind of point that Moore needed to make, namely, the point that the statement "It is uncertain that I have clothes on" would be a conceptual absurdity in that situation. I suspect that Moore was misled here by the assumption of Excluded Middle: "Either I know it or I don't know it." He perceived that "I don't know it" couldn't be said, and wrongly concluded that "I know it" must therefore by right and true." (Moore and Wittgenstein on the Sense of "I know")

Some remarks on this summary

I find it strange to not say "I know here is one hand" in the particular context. Would it also be absurd for Moore to say in front of such an audience of skeptical philosophers that "I know it is raining outside" while looking outside the window while it is raining. Malcom says, "Being perfectly certain (i.e. objectively certain) of something in the sense of regarding it as unintelligible that one might be wrong-is an attitude, a stance, that we take towards various matters: but this attitude does not necessarily carry truth in its wake. (Nothing is Hidden)". But in these contexts, are they not carrying "truth in its wake." How is what Moore is doing, by holding up a hand and pointing to it and saying "Here is one hand" making a conceptual point only? Is this not a way of establishing the truth, or the correctness of what he is saying? Moore is not trying to describe the language game "I know", he trying to get the language game of "I know" right. He is responding to the skeptical philosopher that has taken the language game of "I know" and distorting it in such a way that knowledge becomes a logical impossibility. For Moore, in the example he provides, "knowing that" merges with "knowing how". Moore is aware of the truth, understands the fact that he has two hands by demonstrating that he can point to one hand and saying "Here is a hand." Why can't there be other ways of clearing up philosophical confusion other than describing how words are ordinarily use. For example, why not tidy up the concept itself, narrow its scope, broaden its scope, eliminate its absurdities, etc.

assume this is directed toward me, so I'll respond. We know that much of what Witt was saying was directed at Moore's propositions in his papers Proof of an External World and A Defense of Common Sense, so we're referring to specific propositions that Moore says he knows. Moore believes he has a justification for claiming to know "This is a hand (as he raises it to the audience)." Witt resists this notion, although he starts OC with, "If you do know [my emphasis] that here is one hand, we'll grant you all the rest (OC 1)." It seems clear to me that when Witt refers to hinge propositions or Moorean propositions he's saying that you don't know what you think you know, viz., Moore's use of the concept know doesn't apply because these statements don't fall within the domain of JTB. We don't normally justify these basic beliefs or Moorean statements. There are of course exceptions to this general rule (generally we don't justify them) and Witt points these out. — Sam26

I like to provide a brief defense of Moore's Proof of an External World. I don't claim Moore would agree of my defense, but let's just say I use Moore's position as a spring board to explore what I find as limitations to Wittgenstein approach to Ordinary Language. Let's begin where Moore ends his paper with the following:

“I can know things, which I cannot prove; and among things which I certainly did know, even if (as I think) I could not prove them, were the premisses of my two proofs. I should say, therefore, that those, if any, who are dissatisfied with these proofs merely on the ground that I did not know their premisses, have no good reason for their dissatisfaction."

Throughout the paper, Moore painstaking clarifies what it means by ideas such as "internal to our minds", “external to our minds’ and ‘to be met with in space”. After showing how all these ideas make coherent sense he goes on to provide the proof of "the existence of external things.” Moore thinks he has satisfied the conditions to be a rigorous proof. One of those condition being that a premiss which was something he knows to be the case and not something which only believe to be so. The premiss he cites is "I certainly did at the moment know that which I expressed by the combination of certain gestures with saying the words ‘There is one hand and here is another’. I knew that there was one hand in the place indicated by combining a certain gesture with my first utterance of ‘here’ and that there was another in the different place indicated by combining a certain gesture with my second utterance of ‘here’. How absurd it would be to suggest that I did not know it, but only believed it, and that perhaps it was not the case!”

Moore provides an excellent example where he demonstrates how this is a reasonable example of a proof. He gives the example of someone who is tasked in finding three misprints in a particular book. This individual could be incline to doubt whether three misprints are in the book, but the one giving the task could prove that there is by simply pointing to each one, 'There's one misprint here, another here, and another here.' Interestedly, Moore concludes, "Of course, A would not have proved, by doing this, that there were at least three misprints on the page in question, unless it was certain that there was a misprint in each of the places to which he pointed. But to say that he might prove it in this way, is to say that it might be certain that there was. And if such a thing as that could ever be certain, then assuredly it was certain just now that there was one hand in one of the two places I indicated and another in the other.”

It seems Moore is suggesting that he is not absolutely certain, in some philosophical sense, that "this is one hand and here is another" but nonetheless he knows this to be the case. Does this example need to fall in the domain of "Justified True Belief" to count as knowledge? I believe Moore is showing that we ought to revise this notion of what knowledge should be, what should count as knowledge. Philosophy sometimes can play a normative role, as well as a descriptive role.

Sure, Wittgenstein can look to see how the word "knowledge" functions in our forms of life. But sometimes concepts "evolve". I am sure the notion of "knowledge" has change from the Greeks, to the Medieval period, and to our Modern period. I would think if he explored the use of "to know" during these periods that they may be somewhat different. And did he not say in "The Blue and Brown Books",

"Philosophers very often talk about investigating, analyzing, the meaning of words. But let's not forget that a word hasn't got a meaning given to it, as it were, by a power independent of us, so that there could be a kind of scientific investigation into what the word really means. A word has the meaning someone has given to it."

Well, maybe we can view Moore as trying to "evolve" the notion of knowledge. But like all things competing for our attention, may lose out to more appealing notions.

:lol:

Things capable of being seen as red are those with physical surfaces reflecting the appropriate wavelengths of the visible spectrum. A capable creature is one capable of detecting and/or distinguishing those wavelengths. — creativesoul

I would say something else as well. A human community who has a general consensus in color judgment. Without this general consensus, there is no language game of colors.

If Gellner's criticism is that Austin and Wittgenstein are using a term without antithesis, then he has simply failed to read and understand what is going on in each case.

Which is, indeed, the usual response to his work. — Banno

I find Gellner is more complaining than arguing in this book. Ordinary language philosophers are like the parent telling the child you can’t just do anything with language and make sense. Gellner, the child, throws a temper tantrum and thinks he should be able to do anything he wants.

There is no color in light. Color is in the perceiver, not the physical stimulus. This distinction is critical for understanding neural representations, which must transition from a representation of a physical retinal image to a mental construct for what we see. Here, we dissociated the physical stimulus from the color seen by using an approach that causes changes in color without altering the light stimulus. We found a transition from a neural representation for retinal light stimulation, in early stages of the visual pathway (V1 and V2), to a representation corresponding to the color experienced at higher levels (V4 and VO1).

Yep, is “color in a perceiver”? Well, sure if you open the skull to see the brain, it may appear grayish. But I suspect they are saying something rather metaphysical here, unverifiable. And now we are in the “Private Theater” realm. Imagining all sort things we wish we can describe with a private language. But I will agree they are talking about physical stimulus, neurons, and reports of color, a scientific way to describe how a human experiences color.

I don't know what you're talking about. — Michael

Science studies stuff like brains, nerves, cells, molecules, etc… Not sensations and mental percepts. But scientists certainly are free to talk about sensations and mental percepts, anyone can be a philosopher.

With regards to “grammatical fiction”, this is one of Wittgenstein ideas he expressed in PI 307,

“Are you not really a behaviorist in disguise? Aren’t you at the bottom really saying that everything except human behavior is a fiction?” - If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.”

That's it. You are reading something into my words that just isn't there. — Michael

Feel free to keep your grammatical fiction, it may serve you well.

When Michael says that colors are percepts or that we only ever see percepts and never colors, he is in a very real sense committing himself to the position that we only ever see colors indirectly. — Leontiskos

I would say Michael, and others, are committed to a particular metaphysical worldview I like to call “The Private Theater.” In this worldview, they imagine they are in a theater where they alone are watching a series of images being projected onto a screen. Based on their memory, they have been in this theater all their lives. With time they have learned to use language and logic from rather useful pedagogical images. Fortunately, or unfortunately, this language and logic has revealed a rather uncertain existence. Ideas of cause and effect have made them realize that these projected images have some kind of cause of some unknown nature. What could be these images “really” be like they wonder. If only their scientific laws could remove this doubt, but unfortunately no matter how many times they predict future images, the next one could undermine everything. Doubt creeps in again. But if one thing they can gain comfort in is the certainly that what appears to them in the theater is always certain.

This is based on Searle's ontological distinction between modes of existence. Entities like mountains, molecules, and tectonic plates have an existence independent of any experience. They are ontologically objective. Entities like pains, tickles, and itches exist only insofar as they are experienced by a subject (for Searle this is either a human or an animal). They are ontologically subjective.

Yep, I often thought if Wittgenstein wanted to theorize instead of just describe he might have moved in the direction that Searle has.

I will have to take your word about Aquinas as I am only familiar with his arguments for the existence of God.

I will start off with a quote from W.V. Quine from his seminal work "Word and Object." He says, "There are however, philosophers who overdo this line of thought, treating ordinary language as sacrosanct. They exalt ordinary language to the exclusion of one of its own traits: its disposition to keep on evolving." Of all of the criticisms of ordinary language philiosophy I have read, I find this one to be the most compelling. Another criticism often brought up of ordinary language philosophy is that of defining philosophy's role as merely description. For some, this is too narrow of a definition and ignores the fact that philosophy can, should, and/or does have a normative function as well.

I believe these two ideas are essentially what Gellner is ultimately worried about in this book, however, he does not do a great job in expressing it in a succinct manner. For example, pg 78 (section 6 The Contrast Theory of Meaning) he says "In fact, contrast often overlay presuppositions which are worth bringing out, and sometimes worth denying: the contrast between good and bad witches is worth ignoring for the sake of denying that either kind exists. Far from thought generally moving within a tacitly determinate system of contrasts, it often happens that by refining a concept which at the time is contrast-less, a new contrast, a new concept is brought into being." And, pg 78 "The error springs in each case from the failure to realise that thought is not bound and enslaved by any of the language games it employs, but on the contrary that a most important kind of thinking consists of reassessing out terms, reassessing the norms built into them and reassessing the contrast associated with them." Here I believe are a good examples of language evolving, new ideas being created. Additionally, pg 267 (section 4 Failue of Normativeness) he say, "What is conspicuous about Linguistic Philosophy is its abdication of any kind of normative role, both in its practice and in its programmatic announcements." Or pg 72, "Yet this is precisely what philosophy is and should be: The asking, not of specific questions within a category, but of questions about categories as whole, about the viability, possibility, desirability, of whole species of thinking." Here Gellner is speaking of the normative role pf philosophy.

I don't have a copy of Searle, but according to this:

Searle presents the example of the color red: for an object to be red, it must be capable of causing subjective experiences of red. At the same time, a person with spectrum inversion might see this object as green, and so unless there is one objectively correct way of seeing (which is largely in doubt), then the object is also green in the sense that it is capable, in certain cases, of causing a perceiver to experience a green object.

This seems to be arguing that colours are mental phenomena and that the predicate "is red" is used to describe objects which cause red mental phenomena. — Michael

I little more exposition on Searle's view of colors:

From Seeing Things as They Are:

"Color is a bit tricky because of such phenomena as spectrum inversion and color constancy, and we will get into those issues in the next chapter. Let us now examine our visual experience of the red ball. Is the visual experience itself red? Emphatically, visual experiences are not colored. Why not? Colors are observable to all, and visual experiences are not. The color red emits photons of about 6500 angstrom units and the visual experience emits nothing. So it is wrong to think of the visual experience as itself colored. Also, to think that visual experiences are colored is almost inevitably to commit the Bad Argument because one has to ask who is seeing the color."

(The Bad Argument Searle refers to is any argument that attempts to treat the perceptual experience as an actual or possible object of experience.)

He continues, "First, for something to be red in the ontologically objective world is for it to be capable of causing ontologically subjective visual experiences like this. The fact of its redness consists at least in part in this causal capacity (with the usual qualifications about normal conditions and normal observers) to cause this sort of ontologically subjective visual experience. There is an internal relation between the fact of being red, and the fact of causing this sort of experience. What does it mean to say that the relation is "internal"? It means it could not be that color if it were not systemically related in that way to experiences like this. Second, for something to be the object of perceptual experience is for it to be experienced as the cause of the experience. If you put these two points together, you get the result that the perceptual experience necessarily carries the existence of a red as its condition of satisfaction."

Newton: "For the Rays to speak properly are not coloured. In them there is nothing else than a certain Power and Disposition to stir up a Sensation of this or that Colour." — Michael

Alternatively, Newton, From Opticks, said,

“From what has been said it is also evident, that the Whiteness of the Sun's Light is compounded all the Colours where with the several sorts of Rays whereof that Light consists, when by their several Refrangibilities they are separated from one another, do tinge Paper or any other white Body whereon they fall. For those Colours ... are unchangeable, and whenever all those Rays with those their Colours are mix'd again, they reproduce the same white Light as before.”

The topic is about perception, not grammar. — Michael

Again from Russell’s Analysis of the Mind Lecture VII The Definition of Perception

“The notion of perception is therefore not a precise one: we perceive things more or less, but always with a very considerable amount of vagueness and confusion.”

Russell’s analysis is a conceptual one, not experimental.

“When a mental occurrence can be regarded as an appearance of an object external to the brain, however irregular, or even as a confused appearance of several such objects, then we may regard it as having for its stimulus the object or objects in question, or their appearances at the sense-organ concerned. When, on the other hand, a mental occurrence has not sufficient connection with objects external to the brain to be regarded as an appearance of such objects, then its physical causation (if any) will have to be sought in the brain. In the former case it can “be called a perception; in the latter it cannot be so called. But the distinction is one of degree, not of kind. Until this is realized, no satisfactory theory of perception, sensation, or imagination is possible.”

From what I gather, Russell is reluctant in calling “mental percepts” perception at all. And seems to want to move in the direction of Quine and just be concerned with brain activity. Again Russell is not performing science here, but has a lot to say what perception is all about in a general sort of way.

On colour, Quine has said this:

But color is cosmically secondary. Even slight differences in sensory mechanisms from species to species, Smart remarks, can make overwhelming differences in the grouping of things by color. Color is king in our innate quality space, but undistinguished in cosmic circles. Cosmically, colors would not qualify as kinds.

Your quote of him is him arguing for eliminative materialism, which I have previously accepted is a possibly correct account of so-called mental phenomena (e.g. pain just is a type of brain activity, and so colours just are a type of brain activity.

Indeed, Quine goes even further say that colours are “neither natural kinds nor any significance to theoretical science.” But if this is the case, why not eliminate this talk of mental percepts of colour, this is not what science is investigating.
— Michael

Russell is not saying what (I think) you think he's saying. When he says "the sensation that we have when we see a patch of colour simply is that patch of colour" he is saying that colour just is that sensation. — Michael

The point of this example is to show that Russell is concerned about the grammar of colour, so we can get it right about what science is actually investigating.

I don't care about how Wittgenstein viewed perception and colours. He was not a physicist or a neuroscientist and so he didn't have the appropriate expertise. To think that somehow an examination of language can address such issues is laughable. Do you want to do away with the Large Hadron Collider and simply talk our way into determining how the world works? — Michael

Since this is a philosophy forum, I will provide some interesting nuance views of color and mental percepts from for philosophers who were admirers of the achievement of science.

From the Analysis of Mind by Bertrand Russell:

“If there is a subject, it can have a relation to the patch of colour, namely, the sort of relation which we might call awareness. In that case the sensation, as a mental event, will consist of awareness of the colour, while the colour itself will remain wholly physical, and may be called the sense-datum, to distinguish it from the sensation. The subject, however, appears to be a logical fiction, like mathematical points and instants. It is introduced, not because observation reveals it, but because it is linguistically convenient and apparently demanded by grammar. Nominal entities of this sort may or may not exist, but there is no good ground for assuming that they do. The functions that they appear to perform can always be performed by classes or series or other logical constructions, consisting of less dubious entities. If we are to avoid a perfectly gratuitous assumption, we must dispense with the subject as one of the actual ingredients of the world. But when we do this, the possibility of distinguishing the sensation from the sense-datum vanishes; at least I see no way of preserving the distinction. Accordingly the sensation that we have when we see a patch of colour simply is that patch of colour, an actual constituent of the physical world, and part of what physics is concerned with. ”

From Word and Object by W. V. Quine:

"If there is a case for mental events and mental states, it must be just that the positing of them, like the positing of molecules, has some indirect system efficacy in the development of theory. But if a certain organization of theory is achieved by thus positing distinctive mental states and events behind physical behavior, surely as much organization could be achieved by positing merely certain correlative physiological states and events instead. Nor need we spot special centers in the body for these seizures; physical states of the undivided organism will serve, whatever their finer physiology. Lack of detailed physiological explanation of the states is scarcely an objection to acknowledging them as states of human bodies, when we reflect that those who posit the mental states and events have no details of appropriate mechanisms to offer nor, what with mind-body problem, prospects of any. The bodily states exist anyway; why add the others?"

From Language, Truth, and Logic by A.J. Ayer:

"To determine, for instance, whether two people have the same color sense we observe whether they classify all the colour expanses with which they are confronted in the same way; and, when we say that a man is colour-blind, what we are asserting is that he classifies certain color expanses in a different way from that in which they would be classified by the majority of people. It may be objected that the fact that two people classify color expanses in the same way proves only that their colour worlds have the same structure, and not that they have the same content; that it is possible for another man to assent to every proposition which I make about colours on the basis of entirely different colour sensations, although, since the difference is systematic, neither of us is ever in the position to detect it. But the answer to this is that each of us has to define the content of another man's sense-experiences in terms of what he can himself observe."

And Lastly, from Seeing Things as They Are by John Searle:

"Question 2 How does the account deal with color constancy and size constancy? I will consider these in order. Imagine that a shadow falls over a portion of the red ball so that part of it is in shadow and part not. Did the part in shadow change its color? Well, obviously not, and it is obviously not seen as having changed its color. All the same, there is a difference in the subjective visual field. The subjective basic perceptual properties have changed. The proof is that if I were drawing a picture of what I now see, I would have to include a darker portion of the part in shadow, even though I know that there has been no change in its actual color. It is extremely misleading to describe this phenomenon as "color constancy", because of course the experienced color is precisely not constant. It is because of my high-level Background capacities that I am able to see it as having the same color even though at the lower level I see it as having in part changed its color. I want to emphasize this point. At the basic level, the color is precisely not constant, neither subjectively nor objectively. It changes. It is just at the higher level that I know, because of my Background abilities, that it still keeps the same color."

Notice no mental percepts needed
— Richard B

Of course they are, else you wouldn't be seeing anything; you'd just have light reaching your eyes and then nothing happening, e.g. blindness or blindsight. — Michael

I think the following two passages provides some insight on how Wittgenstein viewed perception and colors:

From Wittgenstein's "Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology The Inner and the Outer Volume 2",

"Psychology describes the phenomena of color-blindness as well as those of normal sight. What are the phenomena of color blindness'? Certainty the reactions of the color-blind person which differentiate him from the normal person. But certainly not all of the color-blind person's reactions, for example not those that distinguish him from a blind person. - Can I teach the blind what seeing is, or can I teach this to the sighted? That doesn't mean anything. Then what does it mean: to describe seeing? But I can teach human beings the meaning of the words "blind" and "sighted", and indeed the sighted learn them, just as the blind do. Then do the blind know what it is like to see? But do the sighted know? Do they also know what it's like to have consciousness?"

"Indeed he might be astonished when he sees the object, but in order to 'be astonished about the colour', in order for the colour to be the reason of his astonishment and not just the cause of his experience, he needs not just sight, but to have the concept of colour."

We don't learn concepts of "color" and "seeing" by only experiencing colors and seeing. We don't teach children what colors are by sharing are experiences of mental percepts of color, but by using the words under particular circumstance and seeing if the child can do the same. We don't teach what "seeing" means by describing what seeing is, but by using the word in the form of life humans typically engage in. By using these learned words and acting in the appropriate ways, we demonstrate to our fellow humans we do experience such things as colors and seeing.

But not only a percept.

Where are these percepts to be found? — Banno

And what is the common essence of calling these all “percepts”? I guess I can not use family resemblances, or I will be accused of being blinded by Wittgenstein.

Claiming that they do not "really" have these colours is a misunderstanding of the nature of colour.
— Banno

No, claiming that they really have these colours is a misunderstanding of the nature of colour. — Michael

If I put on a pair of color distorting glasses and the tomatoes appear white, do we need to question if the color of the tomatoes are “really” red? Or that the circumstances have changes where the reported color of tomatoes is white. And if I damage my brain in such a way where tomatoes “appear” white, so be it, the circumstances have changed. Notice no mental percepts needed, although we need a human community agreeing on color judgment.

Pragmatism instead is a positive alternative in being based on a willingness to believe - and then test. Belief becomes an inveterate habit if it keeps passing the test. And that same evolutionary credo explains reality as a whole. — apokrisis

Well put

No, that is our disagreement. We agree we perceive the pen as red. Maybe you think the pen is actually red, but I don't.
— Hanover

Ok. So for Hanover, "the pen is red" is not true. I think it is. — Banno

This is insanity. No wonder Wittgenstein saw this as an illness.

I believe in a God who is Omnipresent, Omniscient, and Just (by Just I mean It delivers Good and Evil in the right proportion). Therefore, I think that life is Just. — MoK

But does not God create humans to have free will? And if so, can choose in such a way to create an unfair and unjust world?

The "common-sense" naive view falsely posits that colours-as-we-experience-them are mind-independent properties of objects, but the science shows us that they are not; they are mental percepts related to neural activity in the visual cortex. — Michael

The “common-sense” naive view truly posits that colors are mind independent properties of objects because when I change the color of my room’s wall and get another bucket of paint with a different color, not a different mental percept. A scientific view truly posits that there is a correlation of brain activity when I look at my room’s wall color, and how that activity changes when I change its color.

Mental percept drops out of the conversation.

don't think the OP, for example, is asking if atoms reflecting light is mind-independent. He's referring to the mental percept and asking if it's a mental percept or (as the naive colour primitivist believes) something mind-independent. — Michael

It is strange to ask if mental percept are mind-independent, seems like we have already defined it as mind-dependent by calling it “mental”. You keep mentioning that science supports such notion, but I don’t see it. As you mentioned in previous posts, you are not clear if you are committing to some sort of dualism. If you don’t , are you saying mental percepts are identical with brain states. Problem with this is you are no longer talking about mind dependent concepts but mind independent (brain neurons etc I would think you would call mind independent). But if you go the dualism route, you out of the science realm and moving into the metaphysical realm, and we both know the many problems with this view since Descartes.

Well, I would say that the stick that looks bent is not, just pull it out of the water. And the same with dreams/hallucinations, what appears to have happen has not. Additionally, when a colorimeter instrument gets a color wrong, I don't posit that it is hallucinating the wrong mental percepts, I would fix it to ensure it detects the right colors.

But we do not teach what the meaning of "hallucinations" and "dreams" are by pointing out "mental percepts", but by teaching these words to someone who reports events that are not the case in particular circumstances.

Yet another reason to not to posit them.

We can use the adjective “red” to describe a mind-independent pen that has properties that are the cause of red colour percepts. But the noun “red” refers to that colour percept, not a mind-independent property of the pen. — Michael

So "black" is an adjective and a noun because not only does it describe the property of the object (absorbs all colors of light) but it picks out the object from other objects of color (There is no color percepts to refer to). But if "black" is adequately described in this way, it is hard to see why we could not extend this to "red", "blue", etc... as well. There is no practical reason to refer to "mental percepts" at all, or for that matter, it seems more parsimonious not to.

As such there is no (visible) light to stimulate the rods and cones in our eyes, and so the V4 neurons are not fired, and so no colour percepts are produced.

It’s certainly not the case that black is some mind-independent property of objects that is seen by the absence of (visible) light. That just makes no sense at all. — Michael

Yet, I can see black objects. I can pick out an object that is black from other objects that are colored. Why can't we say it lacks the property of color? What makes less sense is to say I pick out a black object because it has no mental percepts. I pick it out because it was black.

Disdain for scientific metaphysics: talk about material substance, naturalism or physicalism, as if these were primordial concepts. — Constance

Here, I see some agreement with scientific metaphysics, in particular on how this is manifested in the debate of determinism and freedom. That said, in your very first post you said:

"My thinking is this: Religion rises out of the radical ethical indeterminacy of our existence. This simply means that we are thrown into a world of ethical issues that, in the most basic analysis, are not resolvable. Yet they insist on resolution with the same apodicticity as logical coercivity. Meaning, just as one cannot but agree with something like modus ponens or the principle of identity in terms of the pure logicality of their intuitive insistence, so one cannot resist the moral insistence of moral redemption."

This smells of the odor of "determinism" from my humble nose. How does "freedom" and "logical coercively" exist where I can continue to feel human and not like the Mac I am typing on.

I haven't said that mental phenomena aren't just particular brain states. I'm not necessarily arguing for any kind of dualism. I'm leaving that open. Maybe pain just is the firing of C-fibers, as Churchland argues. Maybe colours just are the firing of V4 neurons.

Regardless of what mental phenomena are, pain and colours are mental phenomena; they are not mind-independent properties of fire. — Michael

I believe sense can be given to saying colors are brain-independent and brain-dependent. For example, I am looking at a multi-color object in front a me and report out the different colors. Next, I put on some glasses and now the object appears black. I call this part of the process of seeing colors, brain-independent. Another example, I have an operation on my brain where the doctor removes the neurons associate with color perception. I look at that multi-color object again and it is black. I call this part of the process of seeing colors, brain-dependent. I think you would agree to this.

That said, this brings up the interesting idea of whether black is a color or, from a scientific point of view, the absence of color. If it is an absence of color, like science says, are you compelled to admit that black is a mind independent property of an object? But how could you, can't I dream of black objects which is mental phenomena? Alternately, can't I order a can of paint with the color black contra science?

Language, it can be so messy.

One's sees the same in Quine: "there’s mystery at the bottom of every question ultimately." When the priority is science and clarity at the level of basic questions, one finds Quine's indeterminacy staring back at you, and there is the abiding Kantian making way for faith through a kind of apophatic method of seeing where thought has its limitations. I have always had contempt for this kind of thinking, and I don't think Wittgenstein is right to dismiss ethics and value from meaningful philosophy, which I think addresses your thoughts. Analytic philosophers, at least in Quine's time, really did have that "What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem" style of Fideism, and Witt has been said to be just like this. — Constance

I have to say your position is a bit of a mystery. It seems you have a particular disdain for science, or dare I say jealousy of its status in modern life. Yet you are a bit annoyed of Wittgenstein's rather egalitarian attitude that religious needs no rationale foundation from philosophy or science, that it can stand on its own to freely be engaged in what matter a group of human so choose.

Yes. Mental phenomena are either reducible to brain activity or are caused by brain activity. We dream/hallucinate/see (in colour) when the visual cortex is active. — Michael

Imagine we discover an unknown tribe of humans from some remote island. After several months of studying their ways, we discover that they are particular skilled at gathering local fruit at night in a very dense tropical forest. When we go along with the tribe it is near impossible for us to find this fruit, but for the local tribe, no problem. After several more months of study, we learn that this tribe of humans has a unique layer of cells in their eyes that is not seen in other humans. We begin to suspect that this may be a reason for their skill at night in locating local fruit. After great effort, we are able to create a synthetic version of these cell in the form of a contact lenses. We put the lenses on, and go out at night to gather fruit. To our surprise, the colors of the fruit are now vibrant neon colors.

In this example, are the contact lenses causing new mental phenomena? Or, are they just allowing us to see the colors the fruit had all the time. The mental phenomena is not the cause of us seeing the colors of the fruit, the cause is the addition of the contact lenses. You mention that you need mental phenomena to make sense of hallucination. But I don't see that from a scientific point of view. For example, a person took a hallucinogen which put the brain in a particular physical state, and thus caused the hallucination. Is this not enough to explain what is happening without appeal to mental phenomena?

The relevance is that many human beings do not report dreams, hallucinate, etc, so are we compelled to say they have no mental phenomena. Mental phenomena seems to be contingent on whether a human being reports experiences that do not occur (dreams/hallucinations), or problem with discernment of colors compared to normal performance. But, I have the impression that you believe that all human beings have mental phenomena, regardless if they have dreams or not, hallucinations or not, etc

To put it another way, if I imagine a world full of beings who do not dream, hallucinate, etc, I do not need to posit mental phenomena for these being.

Again, this is the only way to make sense of dreams, hallucinations, synesthesia, and differences in colour perception – all of which are real. — Michael

Do you really believe that the only way to make sense of dreams, hallucinations, etc is to posit mental phenomena. Definitely science does not need to posit such things, they can go on investigating "real" things like brains, neurons, cells, etc. Some people do not report out dreams, most people do not have hallucinations, have synesthesia, or problems judging and reporting out colors. Would you actually commit your self to say that if a human being did not experience dreams, hallucinations, synesthesia, or problems with color discernment they have no mental phenomena, or this is evidence they have no mental phenomena, or I do not need to posit mental phenol phenomena for this type of human being (or are you willing to change the definition of such a being as a "zombie"). I am interested in see how you carry out the implications of "the only way to make sense" comment.