It might be interesting to look at Malcolm's approach through the lens of one of the formal intuitionist logics. Perhaps relevance logic would be informative. — Banno

Not sure what formal intuitionist logics or relevance logic exactly means but saw some general descriptions and I wonder if the following two examples from Malcolm's body of work is something you have in mind.

From "Kripke and the Standard Meter",

"I have argued that in relation to actual operation of institution or "language game" of measurement with a meter stick, the sentence 'One meter is the length of S' is not a contingent statement. Do I hold then that this sentence expresses a 'necessary truth'? I would not say this either, especially if a 'necessary truth' is supposed to be something that is 'true in all possible worlds'. Certainly there is no requirement to hold that if the sentence is not a contingent statement then it must be a necessary statement. To think that this sentence should be characterized as either contingent or as a necessary statement seems to me to be looking at it in a wrong way. The sentence, 'One meter is the length of S', is correctly characterized as being, in relation to the institution of metric measurement, the definition of 'one meter' and also as a rule for the use of the term 'one meter'. One can also rightly say that this sentence was used to make a fiat or a decree."

From "“Anselm's Ontological Arguments",

"I do not know how to demonstrate that the concept of God-that is, of a being a greater than which cannot be conceived-is not self-contradictory. But I do not think that it is legitimate to demand such a demonstration. I also do not know how to demonstrate that either the concept of a material thing or the concept of seeing a material thing is not self-contradictory, and philosophers have argued that both of them are. With respect to any particular reasoning that is offered for holding that the concept of seeing a material thing, for example, is self-contradictory, one may try to show the invalidity of the reasoning and thus free the concept from the charge of being self-contradictory on that ground. But I do not understand what it would mean to demonstrate in general, and not in respect to any particular reasoning, that the concept is not self-contradictory. So, it is with the concept of God. I should think there is no more of presumption that it is self-contradictory than the concept of seeing a material thing. Both concepts have a place in the thinking and the lives of human beings."

The sceptic's argument is irrefutable, but pointless.) — Ludwig V

Has this been proven to you, "The sceptic's argument is irrefutable".? If so, please let me know what this demonstration looks like.

But I don't quite see why you say both that you don't agree that the sceptic's argument is irrefutable and that it is impossible to prove or disprove. — Ludwig V

Let's see if I can make this a little clearer. I am not saying, I can prove or disprove the radical sceptic's argument. What I am saying is one can't talk about proving or disproving the radical skeptic's argument. Why? Radical Skepticism acts like a work of fiction. A work of fiction does not make assertions to prove or disprove, the very nature of a work of fiction is an absence of any assertion about the world. There is nothing to confirm or falsify in a work of fiction. So, like a work of fiction, there is nothing to confirm or falsify in the skeptic's argument as well.

The sceptic's argument is irrefutable, but pointless.) — Ludwig V

You say the skeptic’s argument is irrefutable, but pointless. We definitely agree it is pointless. However, I am not sure I want to agree it is irrefutable, which I take to mean impossible to disprove. If I present to you a work of fiction, and you assert that this work of fiction is irrefutable or impossible to disprove, what could you mean by such an assertion? I make no claim that it is supposed to be true, nor that it should be entirely coherent. Or was it just to mean, we typically don’t talk about proving or disproving a work of fiction?

From my perspective, the skeptic’s argument is like a work of fiction. The main difference seems to be the intention of what is being present, one being “possibly real” and the other “make believe”. We are not trying to prove or disprove the intentions of the author, but what is being said by the author. And what is being said in both case makes no sense to even talk about proving or disproving.

As Wittgenstein says in the Tractatus,

“6.51 Scepticism is not irrefutable, but obviously nonsensical, when it tries to raise doubts where no questions can be asked. For doubt can exist only where a question exists, a question only where an answer exists, and an answer only where something can be said.”

I don't believe so. The idea is that we learn what some thing is, name it, and then discover that everything we knew about it was false. — Banno

Nice summary of Kripke's view. Let me see if I can make sense of it.

Going back to my example of human beings able to distinguish between fresh water and sea water, you could also say humans have the ability to "pick out" a liquid that is fresh water and "pick out" a liquid that is sea water. As I indicated, this is with their biological machinery. From this perspective, humans do not need "names" or "descriptions" to perform this very act, it is a matter of survival. Again, there may be error along the way, due to sickness or injury (but to understand this notion of error, we need a notion of success). Additionally, we could use "names" and "descriptions" to describe this human act of picking out fresh water which in turn can be used to teach other humans. Nevertheless, if a human successfully "picks out" the fresh water, hydrates themselves, and survives to see another day, don't we want to say he knows how to "pick out" fresh water? If the answer is "yes", in this scenario, what sense can we make that this human could later discover "that everything we knew about it was false"? Seems we are flirting with radical skepticism.

I am reminded what Wittgenstein said in "On Certainty",

"If I now say "I know that the water in the kettle on the gas-flame will not freeze but boil", I seem to be justified in this "I know" as I am in any. 'If I know anything I know this',- Or do I know with still greater certainty that the person opposite me is my old friend so-and-so? And how does that compare with the proposition that I am seeing with two eyes and shall see them if I look in the glass? - I don't know confidently what I am to answer here.-But still there is a difference between the cases. If the water over the gas freezes, of course I shall be astonished as can be, but I shall assume some factor I don't know of, and perhaps leave the matter to physicists to judge. But what could make me doubt whether this person here is N.N. whom I have known for years? Here a doubt would seem to drag everything with it and plunge it into chaos."

"Save the surface, and you save all." Sherwin-Williams

From, Pursuit of Truth, W.V. Quine

"Today, as usual, I came into the room and there was the bowl of flowers on the table. I went up to them, caressed them, and smelled over them. I thank God for flowers! There's nothing so real to me as flowers. Here the genuine essence of the world's substance, as its gayest and most hilarious speaks to me. It seems unworthy even to think as erect, and waving on pillars of sap. Sap! Sap!"

O.K. Bouwsma, "Decartes' Evit Genius"

Indeed, if Homer and Charles Dickens (and so Charles Darwin as well) could be speaking of essentially different forms of "water" and "horse" and "tiger," this would cast doubt on any grasp of human history, which in turn should cast doubt on any faith in scientific institutions. — Count Timothy von Icarus

When someone is faced to take the initial plunge into any institution, whether religious, scientific, or philosophical, one can have faith to compel themselves into action to learn what this institution is all about. With time, one begins to learn the history, language, values, and ability to judge in that institution. Along the way. we also can learn its limitations and deficiencies. The next step, I believe, should be pragmatic. This is when faith is left behind and one uses what experiences they have gathered and apply them on how they see fit. There is a challenge in reacting in such a manner. All of these institutions will sometimes instill behaviors that can lead to rigid thinking and intolerance. I could find a religious practice that can calm my anxiety, and a medical technique that is useless. Or, find a philosophical idea inspirational, while a religious doctrine oppressive. Obviously, my tradition has shape me in such a way that I view myself as a free agent who can do this risk/benefit analysis. But even in such a tradition, there are challenges to having this position as well.

And if we discover that water is H₂O, then ☐(water=H₂O). And so on through the many different examples. Notice how each of these is a hypothetical – an "if... then...", in which the antecedent is found a posteriori - by looking around. But all that is being done here is ensuring that we keep our language consistent. Once we fix reference by accepting the antecedent, we are obligated to respect the modal consequences of that act of naming as expressed by the consequent. — Banno

From the same paper, Kripke on Heat and Sensations of Heat, Malcolm says something interesting in his introductory paragraph,

"One thesis of Kripke's is that natural kinds are 'originally identified' by human beings in terms of certain external marks and properties, but that scientific investigations may reveal that none of the properties by which we 'originally identified' a natural kind are essential properties of things of that kind. For example, tigers were originally identified by the properties of being large, feline, carnivorous animals, tawny yellow in color, with black stripes and white belly. But a scientific investigation of the 'internal structure' of tigers might have proved that something could have the all of the 'external appearances' of a tiger and yet not be a tiger because it doesn't have the right 'internal structure'. According to Kripke we might even find out, or have found out, 'tiger had none of the properties by which we original identified them'. This contention seems to me to be exceeding strange."

I as well find this exceedingly strange. Kripke often refers, in Naming and Necessity, to this mysterious "internal structure" that science can discover about tigers, but never mentions what this is specifically. But for me, what is equally mysterious is how does Kripke characterize an activity as a "scientific investigation". I am not sure why he so confidently declares "scientific investigations" as having the final say in what is or is not a natural kind, while human senses are somewhat problematic Take for example "water = H2O". Over millions of years, humans have evolved an exceptional detector of fresh water, called our taste buds and a brain. Our ability to distinguish between fresh water and sea water was essential for survival, the better we can make subtle distinctions of salt level in water, the less damage to our organs, and the less likelihood of dehydration. Without any "scientific investigation", or for that matter any linguistic tools, humans are able to identified fresh water from salt water. Could humans have problems using their fresh water detectors? Of course, injury or illness certainly could play a role in how well we can make this distinction. But, is what we do in a "scientific investigation" significant different? Well, technologically speaking, we need the aid of science to develop some artificial detector made of metal and silicon, combine it with some programming and we can get the instrument to detect H2O in whatever liquid we may inject into the system. Could the instrument malfunction and tells us something in error, of course. But the main difference I see here is one detector is a product of millions of years, and the other is the product of human engineering, but both are fallible.

We establish "natural kinds" because we as humans can agree on definition and judgment as it is applied to our natural surroundings, not because we identified some essence that exists in all possible worlds.

I will let you have the last word for now. I am sure our paths shall cross again about this topic.

This post has taken a few hours to put together, so thanks for the challenge. I hope you find it as interesting as I do. — Banno

Interesting and stimulating, it has put my mind in such a state of agitation.

Response nonetheless:

"116 When philosophers use a word - "knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name" - and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?- What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to the everyday use." Wittgenstein, PI

In this spirit, along with my reaction to your's and others feedback, I believe I need to take a little more creative approach. I like to borrow, roughly, an approach Quine performed in Word and Object around his treatment of time. In previous post I presented three scientific equations:

1. E = Mc²
2. X = vt + Xi
3. 1/2Mv^2 = 3/2RT

Special attention was given to the symbol "=" that I believe gave way to talk of "identity" and "equivalence". After much thought, I started thinking this symbol was creating some problems. One, it was leading one to think there must be some similarity to logicians use of "a = a". Two, this symbol was distracting the actual meaning of these scientific expressions. Lastly, and obviously, its persistent use in mathematics may lead one to think this may be the ultimate meaning of these equations, "numeric value" is equal "numeric value".

Given these concerns, I think it best to leave behind the symbol "=" and use another, "⇔"

1. E ⇔ Mc²
2. X ⇔ vt + Xi
3. 1/2Mv^2 ⇔ 3/2RT

This different symbol is to emphasize what the relationship between both side of the equation. Let's take the simpler of the three equations, #2.

What is this scientific equation trying to express: For experimentally determine values of variables v, t, and Xi, where v is average velocity, t is duration of time, and Xi is the initial object's position, the object's final position is determined by v multiplied by t plus Xi. So, if you determine v, t, and Xi, you can predict X. Consider, equation #3, if you determine the temperature, you can predict the kinetic energy of the gas, or vice versa if you determine the kinetic energy of the gas, you can predict the temperature of the gas. Notice, there is no need to call these expressions as some kind of identity statement. This is just to introduce some metaphysical baggage that is not needed for these equations to function.

Historically, scientists established these equations well before the creation of S5 modal logic. What exactly is Kripke's value in calling them identity statements? That when we of talking about object's initial position and final position, we, by metaphysical necessity, must be talking about the same object. But this seems to be a troublesome expectation. What if the final position is not as we predicted, should we, as you say, "reject counter instances as errors of identification." No, we should proceed as scientists would do in these cases, see if we made some error in measuring, or maybe the instrumentation malfunctioned. But could you not say that you made an error by measuring the incorrect object? Sure, but I also could have measure the wrong object and found the position to be what was expected, and this just demonstrates that this has nothing to do with metaphysical necessity.

"124 Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it in the end only describe it." PI 124

My question is, if we make this change, does the objection you have in mind dissipate? Or are the problems that Malcolm suggests still there? — Banno

Where to begin? Let me take a stab at some Philosophy of Science and see where this goes.

Let us considered three "scientific equations":

1. E=Mc²

2. X = vt + Xi where v is average velocity and Xi is initial position.

3. Kinetic molecular theory is expressed as P = 1/3nMv^2/V and ideal gas law as P = nRT/V, we get the relationship between the two expressed as 1/2Mv^2 = 3/2RT

All three utilize the symbol "=", but should we assume all function as identity statements like the logician's "a = a"?

1. Examining E=Mc², does this express the idea that E is identical to Mc². Often physicists describe such a relationship as different forms of the same fundamental quantity that can be converted into each other. Strange to call this "identical" would you not agree? Yet there is an equal sign between the E and Mc². Seems to me that this symbol "=" means some fundamental quantity can be converted from one form to another and that is it. Can something be the same if they have different forms? I would say no. This is similar to the discussion with H2O and its different forms, steam, water, and ice. I would not say the water is identical with ice, or steam.

2. Is the final position of an object identical with the average velocity multiplied by time plus the initial position of the object? In the case, we are talking about differences in position, based on the initial position and the resulting final position, yet we use an "=" symbol to express such a relationship that an object has with space.

3. The Kinetic molecular theory equation is a theoretical mathmatical expression of the motion of molecules while the ideal gas law equation is more of expression of the actual experimental behavior of gas as measure by pressure, volume, and temperture. In this case, the "=" symbol is showing the proportionality of the average molecular kinetic energy to the absolute temperature is a conclusion drawn by comparing a theoretical expression with an empirical equation which summarizes macroscopic gas facts. As Malcolm says, a correlation is set up showing a relationship between getting hotter and rapid molecule motion.

My conclusion is that all three uses of the symbol "=" have different meanings in the aforementioned scientific equations. Additionally, these uses do not seem to reflect the logician's use in an expression such as "a = a". While I can see the application in Kripkes' examples of "table = table" or "Nixon = Nixon", its application to these so called "identity statements" discovered by scientist, well that is a bridge too far.

Here's the main paragraph concerning the issue from Identity and Necessity:

"In recent philosophy a large number of other identity statements have
been emphasized as examples of contingent identity statements, dif-
ferent, perhaps, from either of the types I have mentioned before. One
of them is, for example, the statement "Heat is the motion of molecules."
First, science is supposed to have discovered this. Empirical scientists in
their investigations have been supposed to discover (and, I suppose, they
did) that the external phenomenon which we call "heat" is, in fact,
molecular agitation. — Banno

"

As I have indicated, and seem to harp on; these identity statements that Kripke likes to use to support his views on a posteriori necessary truths seem to have issues.

Norman Malcolm, in his paper "Kripke on Heat and Sensations of Heat", nicely articulates some of these issues with calling "Heat is the motion of molecules", an identity statement. He says,

A remark repeated by Kripke again and again is that heat is identical with rapid molecular motion. I find this a puzzling assertion. It looks like a metaphysical proposition than a scientific one. I don't doubt that as the water in a pan becomes hotter the motion of the water molecules increases in rapidity, and as the water cools the rapidity of molecular motion decreases. Although science could establish this correlation, how could it establish that heat is identical with rapid molecular motion? Actually, I don't even understand the assertion either that heat is, or that it is not, "identical" with rapid molecular motion. Or rather, I think I do understand it if "identity" here just means the same as "correlation'. But if "identity" is supposed to mean something that is in addition to correlation, then I am completely puzzled as to what sort of scientific observation could determine either that heat is, or that it is not, identical with rapid molecular motion. Therefore, I doubt whether it is meaningful to say either that this supposed identity holds or that is doesn't hold; and, a fortiori, I doubt that it is meaningful to say that it holds necessarily."

In a foot note, Malcolm provides a reference from Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science" where he explains Boyle-Charles law from the kinetic theory of gases. Malcolm nowhere finds any indication that this law is establishing an identity statement based on Nagel's exposition.

I think we can both agree that the observations to establish "heat" on one side of the identity statement is very different when compared the observations to establish "motion of molecules" on the other side of the identity statement. So, it is difficult to imagine how observations will determine identity.

What about "correlation"? Correlation is typically defined by a relationship between two or more variables, where changes in one variable are associated with changes in another. It indicates that variables tend to move together, either in the same or different directions, but it doesn't necessarily imply one variable causes the other. One might say that science looks for natural correlations.

There is another type of correlation, one might call conventional. For example, the relationship between English language and the language of Morse code is one of isomorphism, based on one-on-one correlations, settled by arbitrary stipulation. I don't believe Kripke thinks he is nor scientists are stipulating that "heat is motion of molecules."

So, if the scientist is not discovering the identity statement, and Kripke is not stipulating the identity statement, how is this identity statement being established. Does common sense establish it? Does our intuition establish it? How does one go from "a = a" to "Heat is motion of molecules"? Just assume "Heat" and "Motion of molecules" refer to the same thing and all will make sense. O.K., but what was that "a posteriori" suppose to be establishing again in that "a posteriori necessary truth"

John Searle is a unique and interesting philosopher. He is a scientific realist who tip toes ever so close to being an idealist/indirect realist, while simultaneously and rebelliously rejecting later Wittgenstein's creed that philosophy should only describe and not theorize. You could say he is an internalist when it comes to meaning, aka "Meanings are just in the head".

I just realized, when it comes to pondering the phenomena of memory, are you basically saying we should forget about it? — Fire Ologist

Yes, welcome to Wittgenstein's therapy and watch your philosophical problems dissolve away.

Not sure what you are getting at, but I think a summary of what John Searle is doing in Intentionality may help to develop some understanding.

In the Introduction, Searle states, "One of the objectives is to provide a foundation for my two earlier books, Speech Acts, and Expression and Meaning, as well as for future investigations of these topics. A basic assumption behind my approach to problems of language is that the philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of mind. The capacity of speech acts to represent objects and states of affairs in the world is an extensions of the more biologically fundamental capacities of the mind (or brain) to relate the organism to the world by way such mental states as belief and desire, and especially through action and perception. Since speech acts are a type of human action, and since the capacity of speech to represent objects and states of affairs is part of a more general capacity of the mind to relate the organism to the world, any complete account of speech and language requires an account of how the mind/brain relates the organism to reality."

Isn’t the above similar to just saying: “if we define our terms we can say whatever we want.” — Fire Ologist

Not quite, but in Speech Acts John Searle says, “I take it to be an analytic truth about language that whatever can be meant can be said.”

Let me immediately clarify this: I’m not asking whether a memory is automatically verified as accurate. Let’s put “memory” in quotes, to mean an alleged or purported memory, and I can still pose the question I’m posing: When I identify something as a “memory,” how do I know? What’s the difference between a “memory” of, say, London Bridge, and a mental image of London Bridge? Why is it that confusion between the two is extremely rare? — J

Why not question whether there needs to be some process of recognition or identification at all. We humans have natural responses we call memories, dreams, and imaginations. This differentiation becomes evident in the stream of life, not by an introspective process of comparing and judging images an individual privately performs to achieve some sort of accuracy.

Norman Malcolm, in Memory and Mind, presents a thorough defense of such a view. Is his chapter called "Mental Mechanism of Memory", he summarizes such a view:

"I do not wish to claim that brute-fact explanations are never acceptable. Far from it. What is objectionable is a maneuver that, in seeking to avoid a brute-fact explanation of memory responses, invents a mythology of mental items belonging to "the present occurrence of remembering," and then accepts a brute-fact account of the relation between those fancied items and our memory responses. If the memory theorists permit an appeal, as they do and must, to what our nature is, to how we are constituted, then it would seem that they have no adequate rationale for generating their philosophies of memory in the first place. Why should they not be content with accepting at face value the connections between past experience and our memory responses, that are verified by daily experience? Why not admit that if a normal person is shown a green object and ordered to bring another of the same color from the next room, he is able to comply without the assistance of a mental mechanism? Why not accept, simply as a fact, that some people are gifted with memory of music and others not, without trying to explain this difference by holding the the former must be guided in their playing or singing by auditory imagery which the latter lack? Why not concede that the influence of past training and experience is frequently direct, in the sense that it does not work its effect producing in us an apparatus of images and feeling, which in turn control our responses? The philosophers have been unable to believe what is before their eyes--that, for example, a person who witnessed an event can later give an account of what he saw. "There must be more to it than that," they think. They cannot accept, as a brute fact, that a person who has witnessed an event is subsequently able to describe it. They feel that there must be a memory-process which explains this ability. But the memory-process, consisting of some complex of imagery and feeling, which they interpose the original perception and the memory response, does not make the ability any more intelligible than it was before. The memory theorist makes a useless movement. He invents a memory process to fill what he thinks is an explanatory gap; but his own explanation creates its own explanatory gap."

There are numerous other examples. The upshot is that most philosophers who care now reject description theories. — Banno

Interestingly, John Searle takes a sort of descriptivist internal approach in his book “Intentionality”. He says, “The external causal chain plays no explanatory role whatever in either Kripke’s or Donnellan’s account, as I will explain shortly. The only chain that matters is a transfer of Intentional content from one use of an expression to the next, in every case reference is secured in virtue of descriptivist Intentional content in the mind of the speaker who uses the expression.”

Not exactly — Moliere

Not sure what you are referring to but I will take a wild swing.

One of my favorite passages from Naming and Necessity, “Don’t ask: how can I identify this table in another possible world, except by its properties? I have the table in my hands, I can point to it, and when I ask whether it might have been in another room, I am talking, by definition, about it. I don’t have to identify it after seeing it through a telescope.”

Obviously, in the case “Water”, you may be pointing to one thing or a multitude of things. Sometimes you might be referring to nothing in particular at all. As for H2O, it is not about pointing at all but theorizing and testing (Also, not quite like viewing something thru a telescope).

But what I find revealing in Kripke’s passage is his interaction with the conceptual/abstract and the actual/concrete. Once there is certain stage setting with the world, he shows that we should feel confident in moving between talk of ideas and talk of actual things.

I think one could take your argument and claim that Aristotle and Lavoisier were not pointing to the same thing at all with the term "water." There was complete equivocation. Aristotle was pointing to the stuff found in rivers and lakes, whereas Lavoisier was pointing to H2O, and as Richard B argues, there is effectively nothing in common between the two and therefore "water is not H2O". — Leontiskos

The term “water” can refer to many things, while “H2O” seems to be referring to something very precise. It seems to me Kripke wants to say “water” precisely refers to one thing as H2O.

I find the quote from Chomsky’s Cartesian Linguistics useful:

“This is because, as Chomsky suggests, in the domains of mathematics and the natural sciences, one finds strong ‘normative’ constraints on same-use, constraints not found in the use of natural language, where people employ and enjoy linguistic creativity. Everyday speakers are not engaged on a unified project. And as Chomsky also points out, it is no surprise that Fregean semantic theories – those that suppose a community with shared thoughts and shared uniform symbols for expressing these thoughts, and an assumed constraint to be talking about the same thing whenever they use a specific symbol – work quite well with mathematics and the natural sciences. But they do not work with natural languages, a hard lesson for the many philosophers and semanticians who try to adapt Fregean semantics to natural languages.”

Ok, let’s explore extension.

Can we say water is necessarily H2O, D2O, HDO and T2O? (Because all of these naturally occurring in nature when analyzing water)

Or would we say no because I can imagine a possible world where water is just H2O?

Or is the rebuttal, no you can’t imagine water without the others.

Water is necessarily H₂O. — Banno

Are you saying H2O is necessarily H2O, or Water is necessarily H2O? If the former, sure; but the later, well I guess it depends on how you use the term “water”. And is this not where all the confusion and debate occur?

On this view, water = H₂O is a necessary truth, discovered empirically. Profound metaphysical stuff. — Banno

To keep whittling away, or should I say quibbling away, at this idea that "water is H20", I like to provide a quote from Sketches of Landscapes by Avrum Stroll,

"The discussion brings us to the category mistake argument. To simplify the discussion, I shall speak only about the collection of H2O molecules. The most important point to be made in this connection is that not all collections of such molecules are water. It depends on the nature of the collection, and this to a considerable degree is determined by such factors as air temperature and atmospheric pressure. Some collections are rigid, hard, and cold to the touch (ice I through ice VII). Some are liquid, tepid, and not solid. Ordinary persons call the latter aggregations "water" and the former "ice". It is a category mistake to infer from the fact that a particular collection of H2O molecules is water that every such collection is water. This seems to be the mistake that Putnam and Kripke have made throughout their discussion of water.

It leads to another. "Water' does not mean H2O, as they assert. For if it did and because water and ice are both composed of H2O, it would then follow that the meaning of "water" would be ice. But this is clearly false. Since ice and water have different properties, the former being rigid and the latter nonrigid, the two are not identical. Therefore, if "water" meant "ice, "water" could not mean water. Once again, we see that Kripke and Putnam are misled by their identity thesis into an incorrect linguistic theory."

I think Kripke and Putnam seem to be saying that each and every water molecule is H2O. But expression like this seems tautologous and insignificant, not profound metaphysically. I am reminded of what Wittgenstein said in the Tractatus,

"5.5303 Roughly speaking, to say of two things that are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all."

From Naming and Necessity Kripke says, "Let's consider how this applies to the types of identity statements expressing scientific discoveries that I talked about before-say, that water is H2O. It certainly represents a discovery that water is H2O. We identified water originally by its characteristic feel, appearance and perhaps taste, (though the taste may usually be due to the impurities). If there were a substance, even actually, which had a completely different atomic structure from the water, but resembled water in these respects, would we say some water wasn't H2O? I think not. We would say instead that just as there is fool's gold there could be fool's water; a substance which, though having properties by which we originally identified water, would not in fact be water."

He says "It certainly represents a discovery that water is H2O." This is incorrect. Science did not discover that "water is H20". By applying scientific theory, we discovered that liquids we typically call "water" we can detect molecules we call "H2O". "Water is H2O" is more of a philosophical construction, striped of its meaning from ordinary and scientific use. Consequently, we are just left bare with a the logical expression, "a = a".

He says, "We identified water originally by its characteristic feel, appearance and perhaps taste, (though the taste may usually be due to the impurities). If there were a substance, even actually, which had a completely different atomic structure from the water, but resembled water in these respects, would we say some water wasn't H2O? I think not." I think so, this is called D2O.

He says "We would say instead that just as there is fool's gold there could be fool's water; a substance which, though having properties by which we originally identified water, would not in fact be water." Well in fact, D2O is called heavy water, so some water is H2O and some water is D2O."

I will end by quoting Norman Malcom in his article "Kripke and The Standard Meter",

"Kripke presents acute criticisms of theories about names, references, designations, and so, that have been put forward by other philosophers. Judging, however, by two of the principal illustrations of his own theory, namely, heat and the standard meter, that theory too won't hold much water. One may be reminded here of Kripke's nice observation that being wrong "is probably common to all philosophical theories."

The point that Kripke is making is untouched by such quibbles. Kripke is not making any claim about the percentage of NaCl in natural bodies of water. — Leontiskos

Er, it is crucial to understand that Kripke's claim is not merely logical. If it were merely logical then it would not be a posteriori at all. That it is not merely logical is much of the point. — Leontiskos

Certainly, signs used in expression like "a = a" will express their meaning through their use. Where I find Kripke lacking is the usefulness of applying such an idea to the real world. He believes that once science, our knowledge, sets up this identity up, it is an a posteriori truth. But as I explained examining our common usage of the word "water", and how science in practice uses the concept "H20". This identity is not set up. On one side, "water" need not refer to any single thing, and on the other side refers to a scientific construct that currently has some predictive value when particular technology is applied to determine what a observable liquid may contain.

I get what you saying, but he should stick with symbols, a = a. But as soon as you step into this messy world and use words like “water” and “H2O”, the gloves come off.

I don't think that's true, because philosophers have no need of gaining credibility from the sciences -- except where the sciences are valorized and we must make proposals to say why our work will cure cancer, or whatever. — Moliere

My example would be Kripke’s attempt to show “water is H2O” is a posteriori necessary truth. This is not a demonstration of something true of realty but a construction of his imagination that he hopes applies to something in reality.

So if the essentialist says that water will always be H2O, and you're against essentialism, then what do you say water is? Specifically, if you disagree, then when will water not be H2O? — Leontiskos

I've started to think that Plato's ironic stance on philosophy is more correct than Aristotle's scientific stance, tho. In scientific terms I'd only be able to say that water will not be H2O if we manage to find another way to cut nature up that's more useful than the periodic table. — Moliere

Saying “water is H2O” is a bit misleading and may cause confusion. There is the everyday common understanding of “water” that we use, “please go fetch me a bottle of water, I am thirsty”, or “that body of water over-there is Lake Michigan”. What science does is use atomic theory and applied technology to say “this liquid you gave me, you call “water”, well it is 95% H2O, 4% NaCl, and 1% other stuff.” In nature, when we identify a liquid that appears like a liquid we typically call “water” may not contain H2O at all. Also, since liquid that contains “H2O” is consider a universal solvent, it will be present in nature as a mixture, not as a 100% H2O.

This whole idea “Water is H2O” is a sorry attempt by particular philosophers to gain some credibility from science to demonstrate how their theories have some sort of application to reality.

I don't believe you see the absurdity of your belief in determinism but let us try.

Assertion #1, I assert that I am free from such determinants.

Assertion #2, You assert that you are not free from such determinants.

However as a consequence of determinism, the explanation for both assertions is dependent on prior determinants, genes, environment, law of nature, etc.

No problem so far. But which is true, which is proven? Neither, fundamentally they are not a consequence of rationale justification, but consequences of laws of nature, etc. Truth is a casualty of causation.

My belief that I am a free agent and your belief that you are not is not a consequence of rationale demonstration but a consequence of causation. This conflict cannot be resolved by appealing to determinism and causation.

But a more appealing position is we are free agents that develop rationale arguments based on logic and evidence, and then decide which is more convincing.

In this argument, I assume I am a free agent that can construct such arguments, and as a free agent I decide to conclude "I am a free agent"

I think you have this backwards, it should be “Determinants, constraints, consequences are never free from our choices.” Why? Because we are free to think otherwise. And in fact, we do.

[reply="Harry Hindu;987258"

I have not said “we don’t see the world as it is” in this post. I don't believe I have commented on this, that said, I can.

When someone uses such a phase, I think the onus should be on the asserter as what would the world look like “as is” vs “not as is”. They need to set up the contrast. Descartes demon may be able to perfectly duplicate a world, but runs into the problem of distinguishing between the two. Better yet why not say that we have more of the same world in that case.

In terms of trusting “senses”, you trust your senses until there is a reason not too. This reason is not to reach some abstract position of absolute certainty but to successful cope with the world around you.

To dissolve such a profound question, “how do we know what is real?” with such banality….but as Sraffa demonstrated, a common gesture can make one reconsider their position.

The word “real” serves us with a great function, it sets us up for a contrast that may help us navigate the world.

For example, “That egg is real and that one is not” This may mean that one can be eaten and that one is just used for decoration. But the very same egg used for decoration may be the “real thing” while the other is a mere replicate of the artist original.

So, the same object can be “real” and “unreal”. Wait that is a contradiction. Funny how language works, but feel free to adjust your ideas of language, logic all you want, but remember there could be practical consequences to such creativity.

Thats good, at least we both believe solipsism is a untenable position.

To keep yourself from sliding down the slope into solipsism, you need to come up with an explanation as to how we can know about the world even though "we don't see the world as it is". — Harry Hindu

Since you are asking "how we can know about the world even though "we don't see the world as it is", I will assume you could not keep yourself from sliding, and so you believe solipsism is the case unless demonstrated otherwise.

Ok, if that is your belief, I think we need to get some things straight before we can converse about this topic.

1. Please do not address me as if I exist independent of your mind. According to you I am only an aspect of your mind/consciousness. As such, think of me as another voice in your head. Some psychiatrists would call this auditory hallucinations, but they do not know what they are talking about because they probably are unable to grasp these fundamental rigorous logical arguments about reality.

2. Please do not flirt with indirect realism and say the cause of me exists outside your mind/consciousness because then you are admitting there could be something more than just your mind/consciousness. Remember, I am part of your mind/consciousness.

3. Do listen to what anybody who says you might have a dissociative identity disorder or multiple personality disorder. Those folk don't understand the logical implications that we need to accept when Solipsism is the case. Remember, those folk are just parts of your mind/consciousness as well.

4. To think of it, what if I convinced you that I exist apart from your mind/consciousness, This sounds like I am a contradiction, both existing independent of your mind and dependent on your mind at the same time. And we know contradictions can't exist therefore I only exist as part of your mind. That said, I think I also proved that any argument that would convince you of the opposite could also not be formulated. So, you cannot be convinced to give up solipsism with logic either.

Yours truly, you.

and other people are part of the shadows one experiences. Other people's existence is questioned by questioning the idea that you see the world as it is. Once you start to question your experiences, you question everything's existence - including words and the people that use them. Solipsism logically follows from unfettered skepticism about the reality of an external world. — Harry Hindu

Metaphysical theories like this are hopeless, no evidence can be presented to cure this mental disease, and only demands some sort of persuasion to cure it. I find a good dose of humor can do the trick to expose the absurdity of such a position.

“As against solipsism it is to be said, in the first place, that it is psychologically impossible to believe, and is rejected in fact even by those who mean to accept it. I once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christine Ladd-Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others. Coming from a logician and a solipsist, her surprise surprised me.”

Bertrand Russell

But what about Hoffman and Nagel's speech and written words? Are they something, nothing, or somethings?

Why do philosophers on this forum tend to put language up on this pedestal as if it is somehow separate from the shared world we live in - as if we access language differently than we do the rest of the world. We don't. Any skepticism of how we experience the world would be logically applied to the way we hear and see words because we access words the same way we access everything else - via our senses. If we question what words mean, we question what words are, or even if they exist the same way apples on tables do. — Harry Hindu

The Cartesian theater and Plato's cave are very dark places, but if the occupants still have their sanity and astuteness, they may notice light emanating from an entrance. So, when they boldly choose to exit, they will not find absolute certainty or those majestic eternal forms, but discover a chaotic, treacherous world that brave and ingenious people strive to cope and overcome by sharing their experiences, thoughts, and creations through the vehicle of language.

It would be nice if science worked that way, but it can't get around the fact we all exist in private worlds and other minds are essentially black boxes. I understand what you mean when you describe a sunset and how it makes you feel, but I'm also making a lot of assumptions to derive meaning from what you say: you exist independent of me; you exist independent of me and you're not a p-zombie; you're not a p-zombie and your "red" is the same as my "red", etc. None of these assumptions can be empirically justified. Science has nothing to say about whether solipsism is false. — RogueAI

Private world, an interesting idea, a devise to have a conversation about something that is imagine but like a work of fiction, neither true or false. But for the sake of further discussion, let us give it a little more precision. Because most us react and judge the world most of the time in a similar fashion, we can generally say we experience the world in a similar fashion. But this harmonization has another benefit, we can start to recognize when some of us do not experience the world like most. For example, we can start to recognize when someone is red/green color blind by administering the proper tests. But this is a standard test recognize by a community, not a private testimony by an individual on what the privately experience, that determines whether someone is red/green colorblind.

That said, I am not sure what sense I can make of saying “my experience of red is different than your experience of red” if we don’t appeal to some “outer” criteria.

I think the point is that, even if we can't understand or express what the taste of mint is, we know we taste it. We know we have various, and various kinds of, subjective experiences. — Patterner

Well, I know you taste food if you put it in your month and you say “that was good not too spicy” or I know when you don’t taste your food if you say “I got a bad head cold and I can’t taste anything. And I presume when you say “subjective experience” this may be demonstrated by saying this food you gave me is too spicy while I may feel it is rather mild.

Knowledge is a social phenomenon which is conveyed by language about a share world. A private language used to describe a private world is not a language at all. It is as if we came across a solitary being making occasional sounds and claiming it is a language used to describe the environment. That would be quite a stretch.

And that is the point Wolfram is trying to make against Hoffman’s idea that one can start with conscious as fundamental. Science starts with observers sharing similar reactions and judgments to a public world. Not an unknown private world of a conscious being.

On "The Concept of the Ruliad", Stephen Wolfram's idea of the "entangled limit of everything that is computationally possible: the result of the following all possible computation rules in all possible ways." Stephen characterizes this idea as "something very universal", "a kind of ultimate limit of all abstraction and generalization", "All possible rules", "All possible steps" and "All possible conditions." He finds from such an idea one can derive the laws of physics. He goes on to claim that Ruliad explains why we have the perception that universe has these specific laws that it does. Well his answer is that "we are bounded observers, embedded within the Ruliad. But we don't fully see the Ruliad but only see in the lens of our particular methods of perception and analysis. Here he shares some similarity with Hoffman's views.

This is my first time reading of such a theory but I have to say that I am a bit suspicious of its lofty claims. I think I can summarize around two points:

1. I can imagine him sitting a front of a computer and being overcome by an analogy, as Paley did when being entranced of the inner workings of a watch. Wow, by simply programming steps on a computer, I can simulate an object on a screen to move at a rate across a screen like an object in the real world. Therefore, all laws of physics must be founded on computational principles. Where is Hume when you need him?

2. Stephen, I presume, he is also a "bounded observer who has his own particular method of perception and analysis." If that is the case, does not this idea come from his particular method of perception and analysis? Or, does he have some Platonic insight into of realm of perfect ideas he only sees? I am reminded what Wittgenstein said in Philosophical Investigations, "47. But what are the simple constituent parts of which reality is composed? What are the simple constituent parts of a chair? The bits of wood of which it is made? Or the molecules, or the atoms? "Simple" means: not composite. And here the point is: in what sense 'composite'? It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the simple parts of a chair."

[reply="tim wood;985774"

Yep, it is a great discussion. But confusion begets confusion. Notice how Wolfram says to Hoffman you are an N of 1, as if this is reasonable concept to apply to a thing called “consciousness”. But, in comes The Private Language Argument, how could we make sense of “one-hood”, “thing-hood”, “truth-hood” ascribe to something private like consciousness? The underlying assumption Hoffman is convinced he knows is that he has consciousness, but this “knowledge” is occurring in the box, we have no idea if he applies such a concept “correctly”, nor do we even understand what it means to apply such a concept “correctly”.