From Naming and Necessity Kripke says, "Let's consider how this applies to the types of identity statements expressing scientific discoveries that I talked about before-say, that water is H2O. It certainly represents a discovery that water is H2O. We identified water originally by its characteristic feel, appearance and perhaps taste, (though the taste may usually be due to the impurities). If there were a substance, even actually, which had a completely different atomic structure from the water, but resembled water in these respects, would we say some water wasn't H2O? I think not. We would say instead that just as there is fool's gold there could be fool's water; a substance which, though having properties by which we originally identified water, would not in fact be water."

He says "It certainly represents a discovery that water is H2O." This is incorrect. Science did not discover that "water is H20". By applying scientific theory, we discovered that liquids we typically call "water" we can detect molecules we call "H2O". "Water is H2O" is more of a philosophical construction, striped of its meaning from ordinary and scientific use. Consequently, we are just left bare with a the logical expression, "a = a".

He says, "We identified water originally by its characteristic feel, appearance and perhaps taste, (though the taste may usually be due to the impurities). If there were a substance, even actually, which had a completely different atomic structure from the water, but resembled water in these respects, would we say some water wasn't H2O? I think not." I think so, this is called D2O.

He says "We would say instead that just as there is fool's gold there could be fool's water; a substance which, though having properties by which we originally identified water, would not in fact be water." Well in fact, D2O is called heavy water, so some water is H2O and some water is D2O."

I will end by quoting Norman Malcom in his article "Kripke and The Standard Meter",

"Kripke presents acute criticisms of theories about names, references, designations, and so, that have been put forward by other philosophers. Judging, however, by two of the principal illustrations of his own theory, namely, heat and the standard meter, that theory too won't hold much water. One may be reminded here of Kripke's nice observation that being wrong "is probably common to all philosophical theories."

The point that Kripke is making is untouched by such quibbles. Kripke is not making any claim about the percentage of NaCl in natural bodies of water. — Leontiskos

Er, it is crucial to understand that Kripke's claim is not merely logical. If it were merely logical then it would not be a posteriori at all. That it is not merely logical is much of the point. — Leontiskos

Certainly, signs used in expression like "a = a" will express their meaning through their use. Where I find Kripke lacking is the usefulness of applying such an idea to the real world. He believes that once science, our knowledge, sets up this identity up, it is an a posteriori truth. But as I explained examining our common usage of the word "water", and how science in practice uses the concept "H20". This identity is not set up. On one side, "water" need not refer to any single thing, and on the other side refers to a scientific construct that currently has some predictive value when particular technology is applied to determine what a observable liquid may contain.

I get what you saying, but he should stick with symbols, a = a. But as soon as you step into this messy world and use words like “water” and “H2O”, the gloves come off.

I don't think that's true, because philosophers have no need of gaining credibility from the sciences -- except where the sciences are valorized and we must make proposals to say why our work will cure cancer, or whatever. — Moliere

My example would be Kripke’s attempt to show “water is H2O” is a posteriori necessary truth. This is not a demonstration of something true of realty but a construction of his imagination that he hopes applies to something in reality.

So if the essentialist says that water will always be H2O, and you're against essentialism, then what do you say water is? Specifically, if you disagree, then when will water not be H2O? — Leontiskos

I've started to think that Plato's ironic stance on philosophy is more correct than Aristotle's scientific stance, tho. In scientific terms I'd only be able to say that water will not be H2O if we manage to find another way to cut nature up that's more useful than the periodic table. — Moliere

Saying “water is H2O” is a bit misleading and may cause confusion. There is the everyday common understanding of “water” that we use, “please go fetch me a bottle of water, I am thirsty”, or “that body of water over-there is Lake Michigan”. What science does is use atomic theory and applied technology to say “this liquid you gave me, you call “water”, well it is 95% H2O, 4% NaCl, and 1% other stuff.” In nature, when we identify a liquid that appears like a liquid we typically call “water” may not contain H2O at all. Also, since liquid that contains “H2O” is consider a universal solvent, it will be present in nature as a mixture, not as a 100% H2O.

This whole idea “Water is H2O” is a sorry attempt by particular philosophers to gain some credibility from science to demonstrate how their theories have some sort of application to reality.

I don't believe you see the absurdity of your belief in determinism but let us try.

Assertion #1, I assert that I am free from such determinants.

Assertion #2, You assert that you are not free from such determinants.

However as a consequence of determinism, the explanation for both assertions is dependent on prior determinants, genes, environment, law of nature, etc.

No problem so far. But which is true, which is proven? Neither, fundamentally they are not a consequence of rationale justification, but consequences of laws of nature, etc. Truth is a casualty of causation.

My belief that I am a free agent and your belief that you are not is not a consequence of rationale demonstration but a consequence of causation. This conflict cannot be resolved by appealing to determinism and causation.

But a more appealing position is we are free agents that develop rationale arguments based on logic and evidence, and then decide which is more convincing.

In this argument, I assume I am a free agent that can construct such arguments, and as a free agent I decide to conclude "I am a free agent"

I think you have this backwards, it should be “Determinants, constraints, consequences are never free from our choices.” Why? Because we are free to think otherwise. And in fact, we do.

[reply="Harry Hindu;987258"

I have not said “we don’t see the world as it is” in this post. I don't believe I have commented on this, that said, I can.

When someone uses such a phase, I think the onus should be on the asserter as what would the world look like “as is” vs “not as is”. They need to set up the contrast. Descartes demon may be able to perfectly duplicate a world, but runs into the problem of distinguishing between the two. Better yet why not say that we have more of the same world in that case.

In terms of trusting “senses”, you trust your senses until there is a reason not too. This reason is not to reach some abstract position of absolute certainty but to successful cope with the world around you.

To dissolve such a profound question, “how do we know what is real?” with such banality….but as Sraffa demonstrated, a common gesture can make one reconsider their position.

The word “real” serves us with a great function, it sets us up for a contrast that may help us navigate the world.

For example, “That egg is real and that one is not” This may mean that one can be eaten and that one is just used for decoration. But the very same egg used for decoration may be the “real thing” while the other is a mere replicate of the artist original.

So, the same object can be “real” and “unreal”. Wait that is a contradiction. Funny how language works, but feel free to adjust your ideas of language, logic all you want, but remember there could be practical consequences to such creativity.

Thats good, at least we both believe solipsism is a untenable position.

To keep yourself from sliding down the slope into solipsism, you need to come up with an explanation as to how we can know about the world even though "we don't see the world as it is". — Harry Hindu

Since you are asking "how we can know about the world even though "we don't see the world as it is", I will assume you could not keep yourself from sliding, and so you believe solipsism is the case unless demonstrated otherwise.

Ok, if that is your belief, I think we need to get some things straight before we can converse about this topic.

1. Please do not address me as if I exist independent of your mind. According to you I am only an aspect of your mind/consciousness. As such, think of me as another voice in your head. Some psychiatrists would call this auditory hallucinations, but they do not know what they are talking about because they probably are unable to grasp these fundamental rigorous logical arguments about reality.

2. Please do not flirt with indirect realism and say the cause of me exists outside your mind/consciousness because then you are admitting there could be something more than just your mind/consciousness. Remember, I am part of your mind/consciousness.

3. Do listen to what anybody who says you might have a dissociative identity disorder or multiple personality disorder. Those folk don't understand the logical implications that we need to accept when Solipsism is the case. Remember, those folk are just parts of your mind/consciousness as well.

4. To think of it, what if I convinced you that I exist apart from your mind/consciousness, This sounds like I am a contradiction, both existing independent of your mind and dependent on your mind at the same time. And we know contradictions can't exist therefore I only exist as part of your mind. That said, I think I also proved that any argument that would convince you of the opposite could also not be formulated. So, you cannot be convinced to give up solipsism with logic either.

Yours truly, you.

and other people are part of the shadows one experiences. Other people's existence is questioned by questioning the idea that you see the world as it is. Once you start to question your experiences, you question everything's existence - including words and the people that use them. Solipsism logically follows from unfettered skepticism about the reality of an external world. — Harry Hindu

Metaphysical theories like this are hopeless, no evidence can be presented to cure this mental disease, and only demands some sort of persuasion to cure it. I find a good dose of humor can do the trick to expose the absurdity of such a position.

“As against solipsism it is to be said, in the first place, that it is psychologically impossible to believe, and is rejected in fact even by those who mean to accept it. I once received a letter from an eminent logician, Mrs. Christine Ladd-Franklin, saying that she was a solipsist, and was surprised that there were no others. Coming from a logician and a solipsist, her surprise surprised me.”

Bertrand Russell

But what about Hoffman and Nagel's speech and written words? Are they something, nothing, or somethings?

Why do philosophers on this forum tend to put language up on this pedestal as if it is somehow separate from the shared world we live in - as if we access language differently than we do the rest of the world. We don't. Any skepticism of how we experience the world would be logically applied to the way we hear and see words because we access words the same way we access everything else - via our senses. If we question what words mean, we question what words are, or even if they exist the same way apples on tables do. — Harry Hindu

The Cartesian theater and Plato's cave are very dark places, but if the occupants still have their sanity and astuteness, they may notice light emanating from an entrance. So, when they boldly choose to exit, they will not find absolute certainty or those majestic eternal forms, but discover a chaotic, treacherous world that brave and ingenious people strive to cope and overcome by sharing their experiences, thoughts, and creations through the vehicle of language.

It would be nice if science worked that way, but it can't get around the fact we all exist in private worlds and other minds are essentially black boxes. I understand what you mean when you describe a sunset and how it makes you feel, but I'm also making a lot of assumptions to derive meaning from what you say: you exist independent of me; you exist independent of me and you're not a p-zombie; you're not a p-zombie and your "red" is the same as my "red", etc. None of these assumptions can be empirically justified. Science has nothing to say about whether solipsism is false. — RogueAI

Private world, an interesting idea, a devise to have a conversation about something that is imagine but like a work of fiction, neither true or false. But for the sake of further discussion, let us give it a little more precision. Because most us react and judge the world most of the time in a similar fashion, we can generally say we experience the world in a similar fashion. But this harmonization has another benefit, we can start to recognize when some of us do not experience the world like most. For example, we can start to recognize when someone is red/green color blind by administering the proper tests. But this is a standard test recognize by a community, not a private testimony by an individual on what the privately experience, that determines whether someone is red/green colorblind.

That said, I am not sure what sense I can make of saying “my experience of red is different than your experience of red” if we don’t appeal to some “outer” criteria.

I think the point is that, even if we can't understand or express what the taste of mint is, we know we taste it. We know we have various, and various kinds of, subjective experiences. — Patterner

Well, I know you taste food if you put it in your month and you say “that was good not too spicy” or I know when you don’t taste your food if you say “I got a bad head cold and I can’t taste anything. And I presume when you say “subjective experience” this may be demonstrated by saying this food you gave me is too spicy while I may feel it is rather mild.

Knowledge is a social phenomenon which is conveyed by language about a share world. A private language used to describe a private world is not a language at all. It is as if we came across a solitary being making occasional sounds and claiming it is a language used to describe the environment. That would be quite a stretch.

And that is the point Wolfram is trying to make against Hoffman’s idea that one can start with conscious as fundamental. Science starts with observers sharing similar reactions and judgments to a public world. Not an unknown private world of a conscious being.

On "The Concept of the Ruliad", Stephen Wolfram's idea of the "entangled limit of everything that is computationally possible: the result of the following all possible computation rules in all possible ways." Stephen characterizes this idea as "something very universal", "a kind of ultimate limit of all abstraction and generalization", "All possible rules", "All possible steps" and "All possible conditions." He finds from such an idea one can derive the laws of physics. He goes on to claim that Ruliad explains why we have the perception that universe has these specific laws that it does. Well his answer is that "we are bounded observers, embedded within the Ruliad. But we don't fully see the Ruliad but only see in the lens of our particular methods of perception and analysis. Here he shares some similarity with Hoffman's views.

This is my first time reading of such a theory but I have to say that I am a bit suspicious of its lofty claims. I think I can summarize around two points:

1. I can imagine him sitting a front of a computer and being overcome by an analogy, as Paley did when being entranced of the inner workings of a watch. Wow, by simply programming steps on a computer, I can simulate an object on a screen to move at a rate across a screen like an object in the real world. Therefore, all laws of physics must be founded on computational principles. Where is Hume when you need him?

2. Stephen, I presume, he is also a "bounded observer who has his own particular method of perception and analysis." If that is the case, does not this idea come from his particular method of perception and analysis? Or, does he have some Platonic insight into of realm of perfect ideas he only sees? I am reminded what Wittgenstein said in Philosophical Investigations, "47. But what are the simple constituent parts of which reality is composed? What are the simple constituent parts of a chair? The bits of wood of which it is made? Or the molecules, or the atoms? "Simple" means: not composite. And here the point is: in what sense 'composite'? It makes no sense at all to speak absolutely of the simple parts of a chair."

[reply="tim wood;985774"

Yep, it is a great discussion. But confusion begets confusion. Notice how Wolfram says to Hoffman you are an N of 1, as if this is reasonable concept to apply to a thing called “consciousness”. But, in comes The Private Language Argument, how could we make sense of “one-hood”, “thing-hood”, “truth-hood” ascribe to something private like consciousness? The underlying assumption Hoffman is convinced he knows is that he has consciousness, but this “knowledge” is occurring in the box, we have no idea if he applies such a concept “correctly”, nor do we even understand what it means to apply such a concept “correctly”.

David Hoffman meets Stephen Wolfram. A long video. Consciouness and a TOE. Fascinating - Wolfram cross-examines Hoffman - in a friendly but challenging wa — tim wood

Wittgenstein’s beetle in the box rears its ugly head again. Not sure if Wolfram knows it but he presents this argument from a philosophy of science meets philosophy of language angle.

We talk like we know what we refer to when Nagel talks about “what it is like to be a bat” or when Hoffman talks about “the taste of mint”, but it could be nothing, something, or somethings, all of which are irrelevant to the meaning of our expressions.

I don't think earlier Wittgenstein would exactly go along with this line of thought. Consider these sections from Tractatus,

“3.02. The thought contains the possibility of the state of affairs which it thinks. What is thinkable is also possible.

3.03 We cannot think anything unlogical, for otherwise we should have to think unlogically.

3.032 It used to be said that God could create everything, except what was contrary to the laws of logic. The truth is, we could not say of an “unlogical” world how it would look.”

And

“2.014. Objects contain the possibility of all states of affairs.”

2.0141 The possibility of its occurrence in atomic facts is the form of the object.”

And

“2.201 The picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of the existence and non-existence of atomic facts.

2.202. The picture represents a possible state of affairs in logical space.”

I think I proposed 2+2=4 as a sort of necessary truth. A whole lot of stuff falls apart if that isn't accepted. — noAxioms

Wow, that sounds pretty serious, if 2+2=4 is not a necessary truth a whole lot if stuff falls apart. What exactly do you have it mind? Maybe, for example, I am a kid at school learning arithmetic and I learn that addition and say to myself, “that is nice, it is true today but maybe tomorrow it will be false”, or that is nice but maybe the teacher is mistaken and it is really false”, and the kid decides to give up learning addition. Maybe if they were taught it was a necessary truth this unfortunate situation might not occur.

Just exploring this idea of “tense” and “affecting” logical form.

I will stop my inquiry into this since this may take the conversation in a direction the post may not have intended.

Sorry, the "that" was ambiguous. Better to have said, "A logical impossibility is so by virtue of its form. And we know that logical form is unaffected by tense." — J

And you know this I presume a priori.

A logical impossibility is so by virtue of its form. That form is unaffected by tense — J

That form is unaffected by tense is impossible because “by virtue of form?” If so, does that really say anything at all?

Fascinating stuff

There are two possible worlds that are accessible from today. In one, the sea battle occurs. In the other, it doesn't.

In no possible world does the sea battle both occur and not occur.

So in no possible world is the law of excluded middle contravened.

Possible world semantics provides a formalisation of such questions that allows is to avoid the sorts of issues Aristotle and Quine feared. Logic moves on. — Banno

It would be nice to see a post on the tension between temporal possible world semantics and scientific determinism. Or maybe there was?

Words can only be general because they denote universals. But universals are not things that exist. They are not objects as such. Designating them as 'things' is precisely the reification that you and Austin are complaining about. But because of Austin's presumptive naturalism, he will say that only things can exist.

Note again from Russell:

the relation 'north of' does not seem to exist in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist. If we ask 'Where and when does this relation exist?' the answer must be 'Nowhere and nowhen'. There is no place or time where we can find the relation 'north of'. ....it seems plain that the relation subsists

Universals are real, not as existing objects among objects, but as the indispensable constituents of the rational structure of reality - the 'ligatures of reason' - grasped by the mind, and necessary for intelligibility, yet not themselves located in space and time. — Wayfarer

So, there are things that exist and things that do not exist. If those things do not exist, it might subsists. If it subsists, it is real. If it does not subsists, it is not real.

The question I have, if it does not exist and does not subsists, and thus not real, what is it? Can you provide an example of something not existing or subsisting?

It reminds me of what Quine said in "On what there is", "Wyman's overpopulated universe is in many ways unlovely. It offends the aesthetic sense of us who have a taste for desert landscapes, but this is not the worst of it. Wyman's slum of possibles is a breeding ground for disorderly elements. Take, for instance, the possible fat man in the doorway; and, again the possible bald man in that door way. Are they the same possible man, or two possible men. How do we decide? How many possible men are there in that doorway? Are there more possible thin ones than fat ones? How many of them are alike? Or would their being alike make them one? Are no two possible things alike? Is this the same as saying that it is impossible for two things to be alike? Or, finally, is the concept of identity simply inapplicable to unactualized possibles? But what sense can be found in talking of entities which cannot meaningfully be said to be identical with themselves and distinct from one another?"

I believe that one has to take seriously his discussion in the whole section. — boundless

Indeed, and one should take seriously the point of the whole book. That is to distinguish between what has sense and what is nonsense, what can be said and what is shown. To draw the limits of language and remain silent, to say nothing except what can be said.

“6.53 The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other person—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—this method would be the only strictly correct”

So solipsist asserting “they alone exist in the world” or any other such permutation, asserts nothing all at.

As for later Wittgenstein, while his approach differs from his earlier work, would be equally dubious of the solipsists assertions, This was done by showing how the solipsist abuses our ordinary use of language.

Ironically, Wittgenstein's Tractatus can also be invoked to support the view that one can't go outside one's perspective (see TLP 5.6-5.641...here a link). And in fact, one can cite the later Wittgenstein's view that sense can be pragmatic in nature. Even if my picture is wrong, then, if it still has pragmatic use, I don't see why it would be 'nonsense'. — boundless

I think these sections are serving the purpose of putting the implications of Wittgenstein view of language and how we make sense of the world, deciding on what can be said and what can be shown. In these sections, solipsism is not something that can be said, but only shown.

5.64 Here it can be seen that solipsism, when its implications are followed out strictly, coincides with pure realism. The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it.

In H.O Mounce’s Wittgenstein’s Tractatus An Introduction, puts it nicely when he says, “For the solipsist in wishing to deny the independent reality of the world, in maintaining that only he and his ideas are real, has the idea of his self as an object standing, as it were, over and against an unreal world. But when he realizes the confusion in this, when he sees that there can be no such object as he takes his self to be, the world reappears as the only reality in which his self can manifest itself.”

To add a quote of a much forgotten book, Mill’s On Liberty, he analyzes in Chapter II Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion, “We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still.”

Quite an ideal to live up to!

I think it is quite clear that those who suggest censorship, de-platforming, the heckler’s veto, cancel culture, etc. are of the intolerant variety, and the tolerant ought not to tolerate their behaviors. — NOS4A2

I think the beauty of a society that has this freedom is the transparency it can offer. You know where your fellow citizen stands and they know where you stand. The risk I see is any attempt to eliminating the voice might send it into hiding, and this poises many dangers to society. So, if both parties are attempting to shut out each other’s voices, what is left? A society uncertain where folk stand or think, paralyze in fear, developing some sort of paranoid suspicion.

So let them have their voice, so at least you know who you have to stand up to.

So what.
the punishment is proportional
— Richard B
An eternal punishment for a transient sin is proportional? Not seeing it. — Banno

I know for a non-believer, yep.

But for a believer, there is a rule given by the creator, and the creator decrees there is one eternal sin that cannot be forgiven.

This is accepted or not. Sort of like accepting Euclid’s axioms and seeing what follows. For example, “A point is that of which there is no part.” What hell is that? O.k. I will accept it and see where this goes.

One commits an eternal sin according to God not a transient sin according to Lewis.

I would characterise the thread quite differently. You can read Lewis' argument and comment on it. The punishment of the damned is infinitely disproportionate to their crimes. — Banno

Well according to the Bible :

Mark 3:28: "Truly, I say to you, all sins will be forgiven the sons of men, and whatever blasphemies they utter".
Mark 3:29: "But whoever blasphemes against the Holy Spirit never has forgiveness, but is guilty of an eternal sin".

These are the rules of the game for the believer. The believer recognizes the book as authority for their religious life. This sin stated as an “eternal” sin, not a “finite” sin. Thus, the punishment is proportional.

A problem here, I believe, is that you are assuming that there must be some kind of correspondence of our mental constructs of the world and the world in itself. The structure of the model must somehow reflect the structure of the world. But how can we verify this assumption? — boundless

I think Wittgenstein’s Tractatus may offer a solution here. That is in order for us to make sense of the world, that is to avoid speaking non sense, our language, mental construct, and the world must be isomorphic. This is not an outcome of empirical verification but of logical analysis.

God should have hired David as his publicist, since he did such a better job of articulating the process of eternal damnation than the Bible, maybe there would have been less sin in the world. At a minimum, Lewis may have demonstrated the concept of God as a “omnipotent influencer” is not a necessary property.

This is quite counter-intuitive. But imagine it is but it is true theory. This prevents us from substantivizing information and treating it as an entity that passes from one side to the other. Which has many consequences for information theory like the ilusion of transmission. — JuanZu

Quite a claim, that there is an illusion of transmission when we substantivizing information.

If a l wrote a letter to my friend providing information on directions to my house. I can say I have transmitted this information by means of a letter. What was transmitted to him if he arrived at my house? The incorporeal information or material letter? Sending just the paper does not ensure the visit but the information in the letter.

My love for my county was transmitted thru generations by my sacrifices on the battlefield. Do I need a theory to tell me that love cannot be transmitted thru history even though love may not be a substance? Your theory may be true but at the expense of limiting our use of language.

he idea does bug me, the thought that if it's all just chemicals then there would be no real reason to not plug into it. What difference is there if we can just replicate everything? — Darkneos

Interesting criteria for choice, “it’s all just chemicals”. Well putting aside what goes on in your brain for a moment, are those “real objects” in front of you just chemicals as well? Or those “chemicals” got some special ontological status for you? And those “chemicals” in the brain, I guess just, are just chemicals of what? Something unknown?

So I guess you are worried about the causes of the “chemicals” in your brain. You seem to want those causes to be “outside” your brain. But the causes of an experience machine are outside your brain.

Maybe reading Sartre might help when it comes to making a choice in life. But maybe not, thats a choice as well.

Thus, the existence of humans is designed — A Christian Philosophy

Yep, this seems to be making a come back. When we all thought Hume buried the design argument, philosophers are starting to defend it again, see Chalmers, Reality+: virtual worlds and problems of philosophy. Since virtual reality is simulated to resemble our reality maybe we are just simulation ourselves. But now this demands a simulator. While this concept does not resemble the Christian concept of God, it opens the door yet again.

Yep, especially if notions of time and space come into existence and have sense emerging from the big bang. Thus, asking questions of “cause” may have little sense. But our imaginations do not want to be bound by any thing physical, thus we our doomed to ask disguised questions that seem intelligible but are really are distress calls for new conceptions.