I'm not sure where this leaves us. — Banno

As I read him, James isn’t saying that the “simples” -- of whatever level of simplicity -- are objects of perception at all. Certainly it’s a question for physiologists to decide at what point something is in fact perceivable, but James (and Flanagan, who has updated a lot of James in his own accounts of consciousness) is concerned with something a bit different. His point is that a constitutive or foundational or quiddity-ish description of object X is unlikely to coincide with what we can perceive. Mind you, this is using “perceive” in the way I suggested, as a term for phenomenal experience. There are certainly ways you could use it that would allow for “perceiving” atoms, I guess, but that’s hardly common. What J & F & I find interesting here is the disconnect between “what is X” understood as an ontological question, and “what is X” understood as a question about what I’m perceiving. Just for funsies, I ran this by a physicist friend of mine. He didn’t understand how there could even be a debate here. “The fundamental entities of existence don't look anything like what we perceive with our senses,” was the gist of his reaction. I think that’s what James meant.

As for the question about Jupiter: We don’t do either of the things you’re asking about, it seems to me. We can’t build up Jupiter as such, unless we know its name. What we can build up is a description of what we see, and perhaps get to “an object with characteristics A, B, C...” but a name isn’t perceivable. Upon being told that our object is called Jupiter, we can add that info to our knowledge, and refer to it by name, but no one thinks we can see Jupiter in the same way we see a color. Otherwise, we would have known the name from the beginning. “Jupiter” isn’t a raw feel, an element of (sorry) sense data. The analysis is the same working in the other direction, from Jupiter to the bands and patches.

Not to be repetitive, but this all seems to hinge on disambiguation of what we mean when we say things like “I see Jupiter.” Are we naming a sensible object, or the using the name of a sensible object? Funnily enough, in a way that Austin might well appreciate, the “common man” has no trouble making this distinction whenever it’s needed; we philosophers seem to get in a muddle about it and insist that there’s only one right way to speak.

I agree there are many facts about perception, including scientific observations about how it works, but that wasn't my point: the point was that whether it is 'direct' or 'indirect' is a matter of looking at it from different perspectives, using different definitions of 'direct' and 'indirect'. Perhaps the terms 'mediate' and 'immediate' would be better alternatives. Phenomenologically speaking our perceptions certainly seem immediate. On the other hand. scientific analysis show perceptions to be highly mediated processes. Which is right? Well, they both are in their own ways.

The question arises, as it invariably does: what mediates perceptions?

There's too much going on in all that for a brief treatment. But perhaps we ought be suspicious of distinctions that are seen only by philosophers.

Not a bump, swear. — Antony Nickles

So pushy. :wink:

I'll get to it, soon.

It is possible that more than one way of thinking about things is valid, in one way or another. But surely some sort of selection will be needed sooner or later. — Ludwig V

I'm inclined to see, thinking of things from a variety of perspectves as a matter of ongoing epistemic necessity. I couldn't do my job, without frequently changing the conceptual framework I am using to consider things. Why would some sort of selection be necessary?

I agree there are many facts about perception, including scientific observations about how it works, but that wasn't my point: the point was that whether it is 'direct' or 'indirect' is a matter of looking at it from different perspectives, using different definitions of 'direct' and 'indirect'. Perhaps the terms 'mediate' and 'immediate' would be better alternatives. Phenomenologically speaking our perceptions certainly seem immediate. On the other hand. scientific analysis show perceptions to be highly mediated processes. Which is right? Well, they both are in their own ways. — Janus

Makes sense. Thanks for elaborating.

It could be argued that we cannot expect "ordinary language" to be adapted to cater for this (relatively) new kind of knowledge - yet — Ludwig V

Just want to clear this up (if I can). The method of "Ordinary Language" Philosophy is not to reduce philosophy to ordinary words (Wittgenstein uses "ordinary" words as his own technical terms all the time: criteria, grammar, sense, use, etc.). It is also not to reduce philosophy to the understanding of the person-on-the-street. Like Socrates, what Austin and Wittgenstein do (which I tried to set out once here) is to look at what people say (sort of like, the phrases they use) in certain situations, like when we say, "I know..." This evidence, or data, allows for a number of things. One is that we see that there are multiple different things going on ("knowing" is not only one thing--Wittgenstein calls these senses, or uses), and in different situations (paying attention to context, and how we expand context to clarify sometimes), but we also see how we judge differently (by criteria that show what matters about it to us), and also depending on the situation. What they sometimes do (Wittgenstein more than Austin) is take a philosophical statement and imagine one or more (even fantasy) situations to reveal what standard philosophy is using for judgment (compared to which, the criteria of their examples are termed "ordinary"--which is not really: ordinary, like the reasons we might use), and what context (if any) could the philosophical statements be placed in for them to be more intelligible (or less, as Austin is more prone to).

@Banno @J @Ludvig @Corvus @javi2541997 @Ciceronianus @frank @wonderer1@Janus

To attempt to clear up the direct/indirect issue, Austin's method, as I said previously, is to look at the opposite part of a dichotomy because how something fails shows us more about how it works (On Excuses is actually about action, and through that, morality.) So when he takes up "indirectly" he is looking at examples of what we say in a situation (his method), here, involving "indirect perception" (though these are not claims nor proposed alternate explanations). Those examples show that any opposite of indirectly does not have the implications (sense) or criteria (rules of judgment) that Ayer wants his "directly" to have, which are that we perceive infallibly, indisputably. Since we do not "directly" perceive, we cannot "not directly" (or "indirectly") perceive in a way that would be opposite to Ayer's fantasy of perceiving directly, say, always personal or flimsy, so ever needing justification, argument, or mutual agreement. This of course is to overlook that perception is not a thing (thus, as shown in Sec. VI that "my perception" is not a thing). True, false, right, wrong, correct, mistake, me, us, do not work this way.

I'm inclined to attribute Ayer's approach to Cartesian scepticism, rather than to any ethical question. — Ludwig V

Austin does not dwell on or spell out the implications as much as Wittgenstein, so Austin is not very well understood because he is assuming he is talking to people who have read philosophy and will see the connections and understand the magnitude of what he is taking on (with Ayers as just a good example), which is basically every philosophy that has addressed skepticism (mind/body, moral, object) and come up with an answer (or accepted it), like metaphysics, or Kant, or positivism, etc. He is not for or against it, but is taking the whole thing apart (Wittgenstein will go to a deeper place).

Ayer seems to back off the radical implications of his theory by denying them — Ludwig V

Now this I either have not gotten to (I am at Sec VI) or don't understand.

Nice thread. Good stuff.

I think it's more a matter of philosophers finding new and novel ways to imagine things; the "problem" only arises when the demand that there be just one "correct" way of viewing things is made.
— Janus

It is possible that more than one way of thinking about things is valid, in one way or another. But surely some sort of selection will be needed sooner or later. — Ludwig V

Hi Ludwig. Aside from this post, I'll likely not add much more. I am not attempting to disagree with anything you've said here. I just wanted to add a bit to what you wrote in response to the sentiment you're addressing above.

It does not follow from the fact that there is more than one notion of perception that all the different ones are on equal footing. It's also worth pointing out that a position, notion, or conception can be both, perfectly valid and false. Seems to me that in cases like this, we can further discriminate between the notions. As Banno and others have hinted at, the notion of perception is in dire need of being precisely put.

However, this thread is about Austin's answer to Ayer's and thus it is about that notion of perception. That would be the correct one in this situation. "Correct" in the sense that that is the one under consideration, so the others are irrelevant here.

When I read chapter 5, it troubled me; especially when I came to the following sentence, "If dreams were not 'qualitatively' different from waking experiences, then every waking experience would be like a dream; the dream-like quality would be, not difficult to capture, but impossible to avoid. It is true, to repeat, that dreams are narrated in the same terms as waking experiences: these terms, after all, are the best terms we have; but it would be wildly wrong to conclude from this that what is narrated in the two cases is exactly alike."

After a little contemplation, I remember where I got this sense that something is just not right with this passage. From another linguistic philosopher, Norman Malcolm, in is book Dreaming, Chapter 18 "Do I know I am Awake", he says the following:

"'There are recognized ways of distinguishing between dreaming and waking (how otherwise should we know how to use and to contrast the words?)...'(Austin, p133, "Other Minds") I thing Austin says this, not because he knows of any 'recognized ways', but because he assumes he can know he is awake and so must have some way of doing it. His question, 'How otherwise should we know how to use and to contrast the words?', assumes we do know how. This is partly right and partly wrong: we know how to use the words 'I am awake' but not the words 'I am dreaming'. To speak more exactly, we know that 'I am dream' is the first person singular present indicative of the verb 'dream', and that dreaming and waking are logical contraries, and therefore the 'I am dreaming' and 'I am awake' are logical contraries. In this sense we know how to use the sentence 'I am dreaming'. On the other hand, considerations previous mentioned bring home to us that is can never be a correct use of language to say (even to oneself) 'I am dreaming'. In this sense we do not know how to use those words."

In the book, Malcolm shows that saying something like "I am dreaming" or "I am not awake" while asleep is an absurdity because the one who utters such a sentence is demonstrating that they are not asleep. (Note: Malcolm is not saying such sentences as "Am I dreaming" or "I must be dreaming" do not have actual uses, for example, to express surprises, or question whether something is as it seems). He goes on to say that nothing counts for or against the truth of such a sentence, so nothing counts for the truth of a sentence like "I am awake". "If one cannot observe or have evidence that one is not awake, one cannot observe or have evidence that one is awake." What about observation? Could you know by observation? Well is this not a contingent fact, so if by observation you should know if you are awake or not awake. But you cannot observe yourself "not awake" because if you did, you are "not awake". Malcolm goes on to explore the possible of saying "I am awake" could correctly identify my state at the time of uttering the sentence. He says, "there are various states of oneself, each having a name. "Awake" is the name of one of them, 'fear' of another, 'drowsy' of another, and so on. When I apply 'awake' to myself I pick out one state from others having different names. In order to pick it out I must take note of it, I must see it. I think we go wrong in supposing that, when I answer 'I'm awake', I apply the word 'awake' correctly to my state at the time-although that sounds unexceptionable. For what would it mean to apply that word incorrectly to my state at the time? When we say 'I'm awake' we are not distinguishing between states. It is not a matter of 'picking out' anything. When you say 'I'm awake' you are not reporting or describing your condition. You are showing someone that you are awake. There are countless other way of doing this (one way would be to exclaim "I'm not awake'); but the conventionally correct way of doing it with words is to say 'I am awake'.

So for Malcolm, the force of the perplexity from the question 'How can I tell whether I am awake or dreaming?' get it power from two errors:

1. That dreaming and waking might be exact counterpart (qualitatively the same) comes from the confusion of "historical and dream-telling senses of first person singular psychological sentences in the past tense."

2. The idea that one must be able to know, to see, that one is awake.

Austin thinks we must be able to know how to make this determination because we are able to make this distinction in our everyday language. But Malcom tries to show that this has nothing to do with knowledge if one looks at how we use and learn these words.

Does this show that Austin drifted from the pure faith of linguistic philosophy? Or, that he may have other philosophical presuppositions hidden in his closet?

I think it's more a matter of philosophers finding new and novel ways to imagine things; the "problem" only arises when the demand that there be just one "correct" way of viewing things is made. — Janus

I agree, and what a good phrase. I think what you typed is very intelligent. Philosophy allows us to keep going beyond the limits of our knowledge, and it is one of the main disciplines of humankind. Yet, there will be big debates amongst all the philosophers and their theories to discern who is more right than the other. But, how could it be the nature of philosophy if we don't disagree at all? And I think this is the beautiful debate of this thread and what Austin tried to refute to Ayer humbly.

In Sec. VI Austin is full of so much vitriol and sarcasm it’s hard to gather what the argument is. — Antony Nickles

I agree. I felt the same when I read it. Furthermore, the fact that Austin seems ambiguous to me usually.

(Ayer p. 17 emphasis added) And here I can imagine is where Austin goes ballistic, and rightly so. Why would anyone imagine someone who ignores evidence? — Antony Nickles

I think it is not about ignoring 'evidence', he just plays sarcastically. On page 59 he states: 'If there is here to be any question of truth or falsehood, there must be some disagreement about the nature of the empirical facts.' And the he also says: 'How could anything be a question of truth or falsehood, if anyone can always say whatever he likes? But here, of course, Ayer answers that, sometimes at least, there is real 'disagreement about the nature of the empirical facts'. But what kind of disagreement can this be?'
Ha! I think Austin is throwing a bone to Ayer, and this 'bone' consists on persuading Ayer to pick up a position: Metaphysics or Linguistics?

Instead of attributing that the philosopher is wrong, Ayer chooses that "it is to be inferred that he is assigning to the words a different meaning from that which we have given them." Id. This is why Austin keeps saying that Ayer’s philosopher can agree to the facts, but then say "whatever [they] like" — Antony Nickles

Yeah, and I think this is why Austin states that:'so long as we persist in regarding the issue as one concerning a matter of fact, it is impossible for us to refute him. We cannot refute him, because, as far as the facts are concerned, there is really no dispute between us...'
Yep, ambiguity kicking in again.

However, this thread is about Austin's answer to Ayer's and thus it is about that notion of perception. That would be the correct one in this situation. "Correct" in the sense that that is the one under consideration, so the others are irrelevant here. — creativesoul

I actually second the notion that it is important to understand Ayer’s idea of “perception” and not bring a preconceived notion to our reading, which is a good practice with any terms (or even various senses of words, like believe). Even if, as here, when we have been given no definitions or direct explanation, there is its place in the argument, what role the term plays in relation to others, and the criteria that might be used in making judgments on its identity, application, and mechanics. We can use our imagination to create rational inferences, even with a placeholder, like here, with “perception”. Of course, there needs to be evidence under the scrutiny of judgment. I mean, it’s not like we can just make up anything.

I don't think the bit I bolded is right. Indeed, Austin is at pains to make the point that our perceptions are sometimes direct, sometimes indirect, and that neither is always the case.And this is one of his arguments against the sense data view that all our perceptions are indirect.

Again, it now seems to me that you have missed a rather important part of the argument against sense data. — Banno

Austin's claim seems to be devoid of good evidence or reasoning apart from the fact that it is revealing some aspect of perception from the perspective of the linguistic usages at the time when Austin was alive. I don't think the claim is a strong argument to say that Sense-Data theory is untenable. The claim seems not even relevant in opposing Sense-data theory.

Times have moved on more than a half century since "Sense and Sensibilia", and you must be aware that linguistic usage of so-called "ordinary people" changes considerably along with time.

You still have not answered the question on whether Austin was a direct realist or not. You must also realise that language is not perception. They are related, but one is not the other, and vice versa.

Ayer resigns himself to only be able to be sure of facts about sense-data (to thus be certain by one, fixed standard because only one type of object, without the need of any talk of context). — Antony Nickles

I don't disagree with this. But then he seems to me someone who thinks he has found firm ground to stand on, but actually has positioned himself on a marsh. That is, the idea of direct, immediate experience doesn't do what he thinks it does.

Just want to clear this up (if I can). — Antony Nickles

I wouldn't disagree with this either. But I'm finding that his project is more complicated than I realized. However, if we pursue those issues here, we may well find that we never get back to the main point.

To attempt to clear up the direct/indirect issue, — Antony Nickles

I'm thinking that there is an argument in the background that is confusing people. It relates to Corvus' question

You still have not answered whether Austin was a direct realist or not. — Corvus

The question has a presupposition, which is in question. So it can't be answered. It's comparable to the traditional "Have you stopped beating your wife?" In this case, whether I answer yes or no, I commit to accepting that direct realism is a coherent possibility. But that's what's in question. If you accept Austin's ordinary language definition of direct and indirect perception, then he does accept that some perceptions are direct and others are not. But the meaning of "direct realism" in Ayer's text is different from that.

Ayer's official position is that all perception is indirect and dubiously realistic. The understanding of Ayer's position that I've come to in this discussion is that there is such a thing as direct perception - perception of sense-data - and the objects of this kind of perception are always real, in the sense that they are what they seem to be, but always unreal in that they are not what we would like to think they are - perceptions of "external" "objective" reality. Austin rejects that idea, not on the ground that it is false, but on the ground that it is incoherent.

Of course, there needs to be evidence under the scrutiny of judgment. I mean, it’s not like we can just make up anything. — Antony Nickles

"Evidence" needs to be interpreted here. It is not a matter of evidence of the kind that's appropriate to deciding whether unicorns exist or the prisoner is guilty. It is a question of the kind of evidence that is appropriate to deciding whether unicorns are possible or whether what the prisoner has done amounts to a crime.

I think it's more a matter of philosophers finding new and novel ways to imagine things; the "problem" only arises when the demand that there be just one "correct" way of viewing things is made. — Janus

You make us sound like SF writers. You can't mean that. But perhaps you mean new and novel ways to think (conceptualize) things. Well, some philosophers certainly do that and it can often be a good idea to break away from orthodox, traditional ways of thought. That's what Austin is trying to do here. Curiously enough, Ayer wrote (Language, Truth and Logic as exactly that. But that doesn't mean anything goes, does it?

My point was that, in thinking about perception in different ways, using different criteria for what would count as 'direct' and 'indirect', perception can be considered to be either direct or indirect. So my question is, given there is no fact of the matter regarding which is the case. what is the problem? — Janus

Well, it's not a question of the (empirical) fact of the matter. That's what makes this a philosophical discussion. I have time for

Phenomenologically speaking our perceptions certainly seem immediate. On the other hand. scientific analysis show perceptions to be highly mediated processes. Which is right? Well, they both are in their own ways. — Janus

This does pose the question what we are to make of, how we are to understand, what we are beginning to learn from physiology and psychology about perception. I think that is a real question. But it still treats perceptions as if they were objects and as if those processes produced a final result, thus allowing Dennett to claim that consciousness is an illusion. What if perception is an activity? What if perceptions are no more objects than a magnetic field or a rainbow or an orbit or heat? BTW, none of those things are events, either.

The question has a presupposition, which is in question. So it can't be answered. It's comparable to the traditional "Have you stopped beating your wife?" In this case, whether I answer yes or no, I commit to accepting that direct realism is a coherent possibility. — Ludwig V

Your statement is based on a fallacy of false dichotomy. Surely there are more perceptual theories than just the two. The question didn't presuppose anything. It could be the case that Austin had no idea on perception theories at all coming from a linguistic background.

After a little contemplation, I remember where I got this sense that something is just not right with this passage. From another linguistic philosopher, Norman Malcolm, in is book Dreaming, Chapter 18 "Do I know I am Awake", he says the following: — Richard B

I had the same feeling about this. Malcolm's take on dreaming has not been popular. Indeed, it has largely met the ultimate rejection - being ignored.

I would be delighted to indulge in a conversation about this, but I'm not inclined to think that he's not quite right about these cases shows that his overall argument is wrong. So I think it is off-topic.

Does this show that Austin drifted from the pure faith of linguistic philosophy? Or, that he may have other philosophical presuppositions hidden in his closet? — Richard B

Coming back to it now, I'm not sure how pure the faith of linguistic philosophy ever was.

Your statement is based on a fallacy of false dichotomy. Surely there are more perceptual theories than just the two. — Corvus

Well, at the time, sense-datum theory was a staple of philosophy and was taught to and discussed by almost all analytic philosophers. In a sense, since Austin is rejecting the terms of the question, the third alternative would involve neither rejecting not accepting them

But still, if you know of another philosophical theory of perception, perhaps you could identify it?

Quick search brings up Computational Theory of Perception.

If Austin was not a direct realist, then it would disappoint me. Because then it implies that he didn't even have his own belief in perceptual theory, but was just after attacking Sense-data theory on the basis of shallow linguistic perspective.

Philosophers... always finding problems where there are none. — javi2541997

That accurately sums up this thread. I would say that it is going nowhere, slowly.

If philosophers would respect the fact that there is always a medium between the thing sensed (sometimes called external), and the sensation of the individual (sometimes called internal), most of these silly problems could be avoided.

First, we could understand very clearly how there is no direct, or even indirect cause/effect relation between the thing sensed and the sensation, due to the intermediary activity of the medium. Further, we could apprehend the fact that most of the intermediary activity is the activity of a living organism, as an agent, and is therefore causal in the sense of purposeful actions. Then we could simply dismiss all these misguided problems of direct vs. indirect, and apprehend the living being as a biological agent which creates its own sensations. This would provide a much better starting point for wannabe philosophers.

It could be the case that Austin had no idea on perception theories at all coming from a linguistic background. — Corvus

Interesting. I haven't seen it in that way, but it reminds me of you a phrase on page 47, when Austin states: In that sentence Ayer uses, not indeed for the first time, the term 'perceptions' (which incidentally has never been defined or explained).
When I read it, I thought Austin was arguing that Ayer lacks of clarity on what 'perceptions' actually are, not that maybe he is missing a comprehensive concept or definition. And this also reminds me of the problem of universals and the nature of meaning. I have been reading your post carefully, and I guess - If I am not terribly lost - we both agree on the fact that Austin criticise 'direct' and 'indirect' due to the lack of sufficient linguistic background.

Did I make a good try?

Austin is at pains to make the point that our perceptions are sometimes direct, sometimes indirect, and that neither is always the case.And this is one of his arguments against the sense data view that all our perceptions are indirect.

Again, it now seems to me that you have missed a rather important part of the argument against sense data. — Banno

Ludwig V says that Austin might not have had any idea on Perception. In that case, I am wondering on what Philosophical ground Austin was opposing Sense-data theory apart from some ordinary people's linguistic uses of 1930-1950s in England.

According to what you are saying, if Austin had any theory of perception of his own, it would have been called "sometimes direct, sometimes indirect, and that neither is always the case"-ism. It sounds too mouthful, and is empty in content.

Yes, good point actually. But then does Austin defines what perception is? His analysis on Delusion and Illusion is interesting.

I feel what Austin was forgetting was that perception is a subject process. Perception happens in one's mind which has no access by other minds. But he keeps stating problems on Ayer's account on Sense-data, Delusion and Illusion from 3rd point of view.

Something is only Delusion and Illusion when you know that why the perceived object is either delusion or illusion from 3rd party point of view. To the perceiver who doesn't know why the object appears as it does, but appears as it does, it is how an object appears in his mind, and that is the perception. What is described by 3rd party mind as delusion or illusion is not the perception, but explanation of why it is not real perception. In other words, to Austin the bent straw was an illusion, but someone who doesn't know why it appears as bent, the bent straw is a legitimate perception until he knows why it appears as bent, but straight when taken out from the water.

When one finds out, that what he was perceiving was an illusion or delusion, then he would know that it was an illusion, but before that it was a perception. Therefore perception is not just seeing something, identifying an object as something, and the end. But it goes on to further mental certification and judgement process of confirmation, correction and reconfirmation.

Yes, good point actually. But then does Austin defines what perception is? His analysis on Delusion and Illusion is interesting. — Corvus

Yes, it is very interesting, indeed. I agree with your post entirely, and it is well written and explained. In addition to your point, I feel that analysis on Delusion and Illusion by Austin has not been appreciated in the debate of this thread, because the core seems to be whether this author embraces realism or not, or why 'direct' and 'indirect' debate is too twisted amongst the philosophers themselves. Also, the confrontation of 'perceive' and the 'perceiver', etc.

:cool: :clap::100:

”There are recognized ways of distinguishing between dreaming and waking… deciding whether a thing is stuffed or live” — Richard B, quoting Austin

Austin is not talking about the words awake, and dreaming: what their explanations or definitions are, how to use them in a sentence (or gather the science of sleep). Austin is pointing out that we, our society, have ways of distinguishing between dreaming and waking (and, let’s presume, being awake). They come with their own means of judgment—their criteria, that are reflected in what we say at those times (in examples of the type of things we say when we are trying to differentiate between the two).

He is not saying that our judgment in this leads to the same “level” of knowledge—with foundation and certainty—as Descartes wants for the self. However, we do distinguish between the two, say, when we experience something surprising and someone comes in the room and, when told, they ask “were you dreaming?” Or, when I go to tell someone about a surprising thing and they tell me I was just asleep and must have dreamt it, and I say, “But it was sooo real!”. One insight is that we only report dreams past tense, afterwards (most of us). These are evidence (examples) only of the rational ways these cases (events) can be decided—you are the judge of them yourself: are these rational criteria for the use of distinguishing between dreaming and being awake in these particular situations? No? well if you wanted you could probably come up with some expressions that might satisfy your reservations, which would prove their rationality, and maybe teach me something important about the world (the rationality of say, seeing, or thinking). The fact that ways to distinguish are possible is proof of Austin’s claim. Descartes was trying to pull the same stunt in setting the goal before investigating the field. In Other Minds, here, it is that whether something is real or not, always has to have a suspicion it is a phony, abnormal.

To attempt to clear up the direct/indirect issue,
— Antony Nickles

I'm thinking that there is an argument in the background that is confusing people. It relates to Corvus' question

You still have not answered whether Austin was a direct realist or not.
— Corvus — Ludwig V

It is a fantasy-world question, dreamed up by Ayer’s desire to have fixed, certain (direct) access to the world, even if he has to make up the terms, like “sense-data”, so something can be “real” (which is the singular standard which sets up this whole kind of answer from the start—old as Plato).

If you accept Austin's ordinary language definition of direct and indirect perception, then he does accept that some perceptions are direct and others are not. — Ludwig V

He is not talking about perception, he is discussing indirect and direct (here as they relate to seeing, reflecting, etc.); he accepts none of that. I must be a terrible writer.

The understanding of Ayer's position that I've come to in this discussion is that there is such a thing as direct perception - perception of sense-data - and the objects of this kind of perception are always real, in the sense that they are what they seem to be, but always unreal in that they are not what we would like to think they are - perceptions of "external" "objective" reality. Austin rejects that idea, not on the ground that it is false, but on the ground that it is incoherent. — Ludwig V

We want so desperately to have something certain (“objective”) that we even set it off the table (“in that they are not what we would like to think”) but go through somersaults to keep it as the standard. (Kant anyone?) I haven’t seen anything that would make me think Austin would concede that it was not false. His use of it should be qualified with “I’m just using this term to try to figure out what Ayer might mean by it. No luck so far.”

Of course, there needs to be evidence under the scrutiny of judgment. I mean, it’s not like we can just make up anything.
— Antony Nickles

"Evidence" needs to be interpreted here. — Ludwig V

The point is that there is not one kind of evidence (direct or not; real or not). There are different kinds of evidence for each thing, for what counts as evidence of dreaming, or being awake, or seeing something. Now it is true that these will be different kinds of evidence, but just depending on the thing. Evidence does not need to be shoe-horned into the standard of “objective” too. Part of what Ayers has done is imagine the world as unintelligible, a scene of competing wills, with nothing true, because of his prerequisite.

If philosophers would respect the fact that there is always a medium between the thing sensed (sometimes called external), and the sensation of the individual (sometimes called internal), most of these silly problems could be avoided.

What is the medium?

He is not talking about perception, he is discussing indirect and direct (here as they relate to seeing, reflecting, etc.); he accepts none of that. I must be a terrible writer. — Antony Nickles

I'm afraid it is me that is the terrible writer. I should not have allowed myself to use that term, though I meant by it no more than seeing/hearing/....

The point is that there is not one kind of evidence (direct or not; real or not). — Antony Nickles

Certainly. I should have put the point in a different way to make that plain.

I haven’t seen anything that would make me think Austin would concede that it was not false. — Antony Nickles

There's another tricky word. I'm only gesturing at the point that what's in question is not "ordinary", contingent falsity, but something more radical, in that Ayer uses "direct" and "indirect" in an incoherent way.

Ludwig V says that Austin might not have had any idea on Perception. I — Corvus

I'm glad you found a way of understanding what I was trying to say.

"sometimes direct, sometimes indirect, and that neither is always the case"-ism — Corvus

is indeed a mouthful. I would still resist calling that a theory and I would have included the proviso "if you accept his use (I don't say definition) of "direct" and "indirect"." Part of the issue is whether Ayer's use of those terms is coherent.

↪J I'm not onboard with the James quote, for two reasons. First, what counts as a simple is down to context, and here I'm thinking of the later Wittgenstein: and second, I'm not certain of the implied physiology - that we build our sensorium up from patches strikes me as overly simplistic. Do you see the red patch and the bands and build Jupiter from them, or do you see Jupiter and then by being more attentive divide off the patch and the bands? Or some combination? These are questions for physiology, not philosophy. — Banno

Not sure about James, but I think Dewey would say that context is all important, and the tendency to ignore it, which is to say to treat perception as a philosophical issue, is at the bottom of most of the so-called problems of the external world, other minds, mind body dualism, appearance versus reality, etc.

In fact, in most cases we don't bother to think about what we see or sense generally, simply because questions don't arise that can't be addressed adequately by "common sense" as it were, except in special circumstances. Very few are unable to distinguish between dreaming and what takes place when we're awake, for example. Nobody would think a stick in a glass of water is "bent." It doesn't occur to us even to focus on the cup we use to drink let alone wonder if we see it or something else.

What philosophers have done is, in a sense, unnatural, by which I mean disregarding how we actually live and treating our experience as made up of isolated instances to be subjected to analysis as if they are separate, but then, perversely as it were, extrapolating from them general conclusions to apply in all cases.

There, I said it. Philosophy is unnatural and perverse. Must do a thread on that.

I'm only gesturing at the point that what's in question is not "ordinary", contingent falsity, but something more radical, in that Ayer uses "direct" and "indirect" in an incoherent way. — Ludwig V

I agree here, but the radical nature of it is not that Ayer is incoherent; he was chosen because of his putting the case as well as one can. Austin is going after the desire for classic analytical philosophy to need a certain standard or “certain” knowledge, without context. The wish for that is a fear of any chance of error, instead of seeing that our practices are rational and any errors have means of resolution, even when that is only rational disagreement (in the moral or political realm). Our fears and desires are isolating us as the only way to maintain something certain (by pulling back from the world); but we don’t need everything to meet the criteria of certainty.