Imagining Wittgenstein somehow “solves” skepticism or dismisses it, does not take into account that his investigation destroys everything that is built in response to it only to see that part of it is true. There is no fact that will stop things from going sideways, from us turning out wrong about what we thought was right, in following a rule yet still being guilty because whether a rule was followed doesn’t take into account who we are. — Antony Nickles

This "skepticism of meaning" is a sickness of the philosophical minded whose intelligence is bewitched by means of language. Wittgenstein is neither solving it nor dismisses it, but through demonstration dissolving the puzzlement the philosophical minded have created.

Because we have agreement in definition and in judgment, we have a means of communication, this is called a language. This does not mean, at times, things will not go "sideways.", but in principle, must work most of the time. If this agreement does not mostly occur, we do not have a language at all; thus, there is nothing to be skeptical about.

From On Certainty 115 "If you tried to doubt everything, you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty."

and Cavell’s basic claim is that Wittgenstein shows that skepticism haunts us all the time. — Antony Nickles

If "us" refers to humanity, well I think this is a bit of an overstatement about what Wittgenstein is claiming. We can gain some insight if we take a look at a misunderstanding another philosopher had concerning this skepticism.

In the book by Norman Malcolm "Nothing is Hidden", Chapter 9 "Following a Rule", Malcolm presents Saul Kripke's view of the Private Language Argument with the following quote, "Wittgenstein has invented a new form of skepticism. Personally I am inclined to regard it as the most radical and original skeptical problem that philosophy has seen to date." Furthermore, Malcolm goes on to say, "According to Kripke this new form of skepticism carries the astounding implication that 'there can be no such thing as meaning anything by any word.'" Malcolm believes Kripke put forth this idea that Wittgenstein's "new form of skepticism" can be found in PI 201 in which Wittgenstein presents the paradox: "no course of action could be determine by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule." But for Malcolm, Kripke seem to ignore what follows when Wittgenstein continues with "It can be seen that there is a misunderstanding here from the mere fact that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that there is a way of grasping a rule which is a not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we call "obeying" the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases. Hence there is an inclination to say: every action according to the rule is an interpretation. But we ought to retract the term "interpretation" to the situation of one expression of the rule for another." So is Wittgenstein capitulating to this "new form of skepticism"? Malcolm would say No. Malcolm says, "If an interpretation is not sufficient to fix the meaning of a rule, what more is required? Wittgenstein's answer is that what fixes the meaning of a rule is our customary way of applying the rule in particular cases. There is a way of acting that we call 'following the rule'. Indefinitely many other ways of acting are possible: but we do not call them 'following the rule'. Who is this we? It is virtually all of us who have been given the same initial explanation and examples. It is a fact that everyone, almost without exception, will apply the rule in new cases, all agreeing that this is the right way to apply it....If there was no we - if there was no agreement among those who have had the same training, as to what are the correct steps in particular case when following a rule- then there would be no wrong steps, or indeed any right ones."

Malcolm presents further analysis saying that Kripke was incline to think Wittgenstein endorsed this form of philosophical skepticism because he was working under the conception that "when one applies a rule, or a word, one is guided." He quotes Kripke "Normally, when we consider a mathematical rule as addition, we think of ourselves as guided in application of it to each new instance." But the "we" for Malcolm and Kripke is referring to people "when they are engaged in philosophical reflection about rules." Malcom continues "Kripke is trying to do something which, according to Wittgenstein, it is necessary to do in philosophy, namely 'to give a psychological exact account of the temptation to use a particular kind of expression' (PI 254). But as Wittgenstein also says: "Being unable - when we surrender ourselves to philosophical thought - to help saying such-and such; being irresistibility inclined to say it- does not mean being forced into an assumption, or having an immediate perception or knowledge of a state of affair. (PI 299)."

In summary, Wittgenstein is not addressing humanity but the philosophical minded. This "skepticism" is the result of the philosophical minded puzzlement and search for deeper explanations. But all is well with humanity. Because they keep talking, acting, and judging in similar, expected, and harmonious ways; we have meaning and understanding.

As for what is beyond the possible forms of experience - who knows what types of experience are possible? The human psyche is still a vast uncharted ocean, with realms of possibility that we might never dream of. I think it's a mistake to deprecate the imagination, after all, Einstein himself said imagination was more important than knowledge. He discovered the theory of relativity mainly through thought-experiments.

Overall I think it's a mistake to dismiss metaphysics. — Wayfarer

I am quoting myself from the Brain in the Vat thread, I think it is applicable:

The role of imagination in scientific theorizing is not in question. Also, I certainty would not say that philosophy cannot offer insights to a scientist. In nice article by John Norton, "How Hume and Mach Helped Einstein Find Special Relativity", provides a nice summary how these two philosophers, belonging to the empiricist/positivist traditions, influenced Einstein's abandonment of the idea of absolute time and simultaneity. However, even in this article, Einstein echoed what I have been saying. In section 3.1, titled "Concepts Must be Grounded in Experiences", he quotes Einstein, "‘Similarly,’ Einstein continued, ‘with the concept of simultaneity. The concept really exists for the physicist only when in a concrete case there is some possibility of deciding whether the concept is or is not applicable."

So while imagination is important, I would say it should be characterize as a fiction until its successful application. This, in turn, tells us something about this world.

So remember, this was specifically a critique of the Private Language argument. Wittgenstein's contention is that the foundation of language is communal, but this doesn't exclude the potential for internal reflection. Nonetheless, if we accept that meaning in language comes from communal understanding and practice, a misinformed or mistaken community could indeed perpetuate misconceptions and faulty language use indefinitely, mirroring the scenario where each individual might harbor a private language incapable of self-correction. — schopenhauer1

But there is more to language, consider PI 242: "If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.-It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement."

I believe you are describing a scenario where we are not talking about a language at all. Will there be mistakes in use, according to the community, of course. Could some mistakes remain hidden, at times, and perpetuated, of course. But to say, if it becomes all encompassing, as the skeptic would, is not to describe an inaccurate language, but to not describe a language at all. And that is similar to the problems with a private language as well, notions of "judging", "mistakes", "accuracy" lose their sense when applied to the private realm. So why even call this a language at all.

don't think this gets past this critique:

Just using Wittgenstein against himself perhaps, what if every person in the community had an idea wrong such that every correction was actually never correct. How would you know any differently than the private sensation case? Diving in further in skepticism, how do you know that every supposedly public correction is not distorted by one’s own view? At some point you can keep drilling downward and you start getting to Decartes Demon again. Using public or practice or community as a way out doesn’t suffice. — schopenhauer1

So am I to assume that you would agree with my characterization that I must trust your personal testimony that whatever you are doing in the hidden recesses of your mind, it is a language and all sort of judgments are occurring. This sounds more like a philosophical mystic preaching his Word from Divine revelations, then serious philosophical discourse.

To address the "past critique", which I must confess, I don't see its relevance to my point, I will say the following:

1. I think this example may be hiding your philosophical assumption. Is this community going around using words, using them to act on, and seeing and judging that it is being used correctly, but somehow never using it correctly. But how is this "never using it correctly" being presented here. That there is a correct use that is established outside the community and if they could just tap into this method of determination they would see that even though there public use is correct, they would come to see it is incorrect. But how? Thru private introspection of "meaning" of words?

I think two Wittgenstein quotes would be useful here from "On Certainty":

204. "Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; - but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game."

613. "If I now say "I know that the water in the kettle on the gas flame will not boil", I seem to be justified in this "I know" as I am in any. 'If I know anything I know this".-Or do I know with still greater certainty that the person opposite me is my old friend so-and-so? And how does that compare with the proposition that I am seeing with two eyes and see see them if I look in the glass?-I don't know confidently what I am to answer here.-But still there is a difference between cases. If the water over the gas freezes, of course I shall be astonished as can be, but I shall assume some factor I don't know of, and perhaps leave the matter to physicists to judge. But what could make me doubt whether this person here is N.N., whom I known for years? Here doubt would seems to drag everything with it and plunge it into chaos."

The public language is founded on private languages — RussellA

How can you call what is happening privately “language” ? Your assurance that you are using it the same way as the language you learned in the public realm? If you agree to this characterization, I would say you face a similar problems as describe in this scenario:

Imagine I produce a bunch of what appears to you as random symbols. And I proceed to tell you that this is a language. If you ask, “how do you use these symbols”, and I reply, “I cannot tell you how to use them, but rest assure I know how to use them in similar ways as how you use your language, and thus it is a language.” I believe you can rightfully say that I have no idea what I am trying to say or express. This also goes for these claims of judging private activities within the mind.

The past criteria of judgement upon whether a word is correctly used (even if it is the individually learned collective wisdom of a community), and the judging itself, is had within a person's internal mental space. — schopenhauer1

But Wittgenstein is going further here. What sense can we make in saying that an individual is “judging” something in internal mental space. This, in principle, cannot be learned from the collective wisdom of a community. There is no criteria to teach someone how to do this. So why even use this terms like “judging” or “using criteria” to try to express anything at all for this private activity.

Imagine I produce a bunch of what appears to you as random symbols. And I proceed to tell you that this is a language. If you ask, “how do you use these symbols”, and I reply, “I cannot tell you how to use them, but rest assure I know how to use them in similar ways as how you use your language, and thus it is a language.” I believe you can rightfully say that I have no idea what I am trying to say or express. This also goes for these claims of judging private activities within the mind.

That is to say, does this mean all theorizing stops now because, welp, it's just language games? I think the next move is to present his idea of "No wait, he gives you an out! He gives us the idea of Forms of Life!". But that then seems to indicate all we can do is study the community of language users and their use of words, and not the concepts themselves. — schopenhauer1

Not sure if you are familiar with the book "Words and Things" by Ernest Gellner, but he provides similar arguments you are suggesting in your post. For Gellner, there is a great desire/importance to theorizing, and so he takes great offense that he needs Wittgenstein's therapy. Take for example,

"If these principles(linguistic philosophy) come to be generally respected, the result would be inhibition of all interesting thought.”

or

“It(linguistic philiosophy) is an attempt to undermine and paralyze one of the most important kinds of thinking, and one of the main agents of progress, namely intellectual advance through consistency and unification, through attainment of coherence, the elimination of exceptions, arbitrariness, and unnecessary idiosyncrasies.”

Additionally, Jerrold Katz, in "Metaphysics of Meaning", presents a theory of meaning that tries to resist the many criticism of Wittgenstein. He believe that Wittgenstein criticism mainly addresses those theories proposed by Frege, Russel, and those presented in Tractatus,

"For Wittgenstein to be successful in his radical critical purpose, he has to show how to eliminate all theories of meaning on which metaphysical questions are meaningful.”

For those interested in comprehensive criticisms on Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, these two books I would recommend.

To theorize or not to theorize, that is the question....

Perhaps I see more value in considering thought experiments than you do? Einstein's thought experiments played an important role in human understanding of relativity theory. Suppose we consider the merits of thought experiments, as a technology for stimulating human minds to look at things from a different perspective? — wonderer1

The role of imagination in scientific theorizing is not in question. Also, I certainty would not say that philosophy cannot offer insights to a scientist. In nice article by John Norton, "How Hume and Mach Helped Einstein Find Special Relativity", provides a nice summary how these two philosophers, belonging to the empiricist/positivist traditions, influenced Einstein's abandonment of the idea of absolute time and simultaneity. However, even in this article, Einstein echoed what I have been saying. In section 3.1, titled "Concepts Must be Grounded in Experiences", he quotes Einstein, "‘Similarly,’ Einstein continued, ‘with the concept of simultaneity. The concept really exists for the physicist only when in a concrete case there is some possibility of deciding whether the concept is or is not applicable."

What scientist are you referring to? Under this scenario your belief in scientists would be a function of what the mad scientist (god to you) is feeding you in the way of perceptions, so any beliefs about brains that you have would be a function of the virtual reality presented by the mad scientist tending your vat.

The mad scientist might have fed you sensations that resulted in you having a notion of a brain that is utterly unlike what is in the vat. You don't have knowledge of what is in the vat or even the physics of vat world, so you can't have a scientific proof of the impossibility of the thing in the vat in vat world. — wonderer1

How about this scenario: I can imagine a witch that can cast a spell in which they make some poor soul believe that they are experiencing a world I which they are an autonomous agent thinking for themselves. Is this a logical possiblity? If you say no because it does not fit in with our ideas of causality and scientific world view, this can just be turned around by skeptic where they say "well that's because the witches's spell is making you think that." I would like to say that while this can be imagine it is not possible based on our understanding of causality and scientific world view. For the BIV example, the same goes, if we come to find that the BIV is physical impossible, meaning it can't function like we think, not only is it physical impossible, it would be impossible in general. Basically, experience and testing would show that the idea was ill formed. Whether BIVs, dreams, evil demons, witches, etc., any of these used to demonstrate some radical skeptical position is at its core faulty, useless thinking. This thinking resembles what authors do when they produce fictitious narratives, borrow from their real life experience and make up fantasy tales with no intention of claiming that they are talking about real life events. This type of philosophical thinking is doing the same, but with the delusional attempt in trying to potentially say something of the world we live in.

Wittgenstein's "On Certainty" said it best, "505. It is always by favor of Nature that one knows something."

his is not to say that it is metaphysically possible that you are a BIV , but how could you justify the proposition that it is epistemically impossible? — wonderer1

How does it show that you’re in 2 and not 4? — Michael

1. Simply, if the scientist showed that it is physically impossible to have a functional BIV, BIV is not possible. This demonstration might be carried out by use of experiments in which actual brains are studied. These would be the same kind of brains we have studied empirically to understand the role they have biologically in the interaction with the world. This knowledge of the brain is then used by philosophers to construct their thought experiments based on the idea of how brain's function. But if philosophers want to make a claim that the brain placed in an artificial enviorment could function in such a way that would produce simulations, they are obligated to submit themselves to the scientific criticism that comes with the territory.

2. The problem I am seeing here is the philosopher wants to talk about ideas but they also want it to be about the world. So they pull a fast one, they talk about real world objects like brains and vats, accept our empirical understanding of the function of the brain, then use this language to come up with imaginary experiments and suggest all sorts of fanciful outcomes that they claim could really be true.

3. Consider this scenario: An individual claims they have designed a machine that can create energy. When he plugs the machine in he claims that when 100 Joules is inputed to the machine, he will get 200 Joules as output. He claims this is possible based on his design. He plugs it in and the output was 50 Joules. He says to himself, "I guess it was not possible for this machine to create energy." Upon hearing this, a scientist chimes in and says, "this was never possible because it would have violated the law of conservation of energy." Just because you could imagine a design of machine with potential outputs of energy, does not mean it is possible to be realize in the actual world. But some want to insist in saying, "but it is logically possible!" I want to say it is not possible at all but feel free to imagine what you like.

4. I like to say that the idea of BIV is vague at best or nonsense at worst. Basically, what is the scientist suppose to figure out if the idea is too vague and/or nonsense? If you say the scientist is suppose to create a lifetime of a human simulated in the brain, what does that mean? Who are you suppose to talk with to understand this request? If you say the scientist should create an artificial world exactly like our real world, are you comparing an inner world that was pick out by inner ostensive definitions to some external world? But how does this occur? Are we not moving in the territory of what Wittgenstein calls grammatical fictions?

5. Our understanding of the world comes from our use of language in a human community. We have common expressions/reactions to the world. We make similar judgments about objects and events in the world. And language is our vehicle to understand this world. All of this is accomplished through our interactions with other human beings. It is not by observing neuron activity in brains of our fellow human beings. The BIV treats brains like tape recorders, grey matter is the material we record bits of information and play back when we feel like. We don't believe tape recorders, film projectors, computers have rich inner lives, nor should we believe the grey matter in the BIV would also.

Another interesting perspective regarding BIV is psychological.

There is a disorder that is called “Thought insertion.” Wikipedia defines it as such, “ Thought insertion is defined by the ICD-10 (International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems) as the delusion that one's thoughts are not one's own, but rather belong to someone else and have been inserted into one's mind. The person experiencing the thought insertion delusion will not necessarily know where the thought is coming from, but makes a distinction between their own thoughts and those inserted into their minds.”

Even more fascinating is the therapy. Again from Wikipedia, “In other words, the patient would speak his thoughts out loud in order to re-give themself the feeling of agency as he could hear himself speaking and then contributing the thought to himself.”

I wonder if such metaphysical reasoning around BIVs could bring on such a disorder as Thought Insertion.

We can’t have empirical evidence that rules out 4. — Michael

I disagree. When one demonstrates that BIV is physically impossible, scenarios 3 or 4 were never a logical possibility. What was conceptualize from actual functional brains was demonstrated to be false.

Just because one can say or imagine something does not make it possible.

But as a fictitious narrative, one does not need to worry about the support of empirical evidence.

If a neuroscientist gave you evidence that a brain could not be stimulated in such a way so as to produce simulated percepts, would you be convinced that the brain in a vat hypothesis is impossible? — NotAristotle

Many are willing to accept the scientific evidence of what the brain does to kick start the thought experiment that we could be BIVs. But as soon as you discuss the possibility of introducing scientific evidence to show that a BIV is not possible, it suddenly is “begging the question”, or that evidence was somehow fabricated in the scientist’s mind.

I would agree that the act of saying "ouch" names a behaviour, but I would not agree that the word "ouch" names a behaviour. — Luke

I agree that the word "ouch" has to be in context. It could be the Organisation for the Understanding of Cluster Headache, a BBC website reflecting the lives and experiences of disabled people, a term in the dictionary or a speech act from someone having a rock dropped on their foot. As Wittgenstein said "The question is: "In what sort of context does it occur?" — RussellA

I think Norman Malcolm in "Turning to Stone" helps clarify what is being discuss here. He says:

"Wittgenstein's argument has established that there is an essential connection between the meaning of first-person psychological language and the primitive expression of fear, anger, pain, in human behavior. But how does this connection make its appearance in the teaching of language? Wittgenstein puts the question like this: 'How does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations?-of the word "pain" for example"(PI 244). In a familiar passage he suggests what seems to be the only possibility:

Words are connected with the primitive, the natural, expression of the sensation and put I'm their place. A child has hurt himself and cries; and now the grown-ups talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behavior.
'So you are saying that the word "pain" really means crying?' On the contrary, the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it (PI 244)

The suggestion does not mean that adults get the child to identify sensation of his as pain. This would only reintroduce the untenable notion of 'inner ostensive definition'. Nor does the suggestion mean that the word 'pain' stands for or refers to crying-which would be a form of behaviorism. What the suggestion says is that the adults coax the child into replacing his crying with words such as 'hurts' or 'pain'. The crying was a primitive expression of pain. The uttered words, by taking the place of the primitive expression, become an expression of pain. Uttering those words becomes, for the child, a new form of pain-behavior; and for others it serves as a criterion for the child's being in pain."

But of course if we are brains in a vat then it may be that “real” physics isn’t exactly like the fabricated physics that we are being programmed to experience, and so one cannot really use physics to disprove the physical possibility of brains in a vat without begging the question. — Michael

Is the unseen scientist fabricating you to think that this is plausible, or the unseen scientist fabricating me to say it is not plausible to fabricating these thoughts? But this sounds strange, are you saying that we are not free agents making rational arguments for or against this idea of the BIV? Sounds like we are mere tape recorders for some unseen entity. This entity can fabricate physics and fabricate logic, I guess what follows would be that it would difficult to have a conversation with such an entity. Damn, never mind, that was fabricated too.

To use the world we experience as empirical evidence that brains in a vat are physically impossible is to beg the question and assume that we are not brains in a vat. — Michael

Nicely put, but I would have to disagree here. If a physicist says it is physically impossible for something to travel faster than the speed of light, are they begging the question? In this scenario, the scientist is not assuming we are not brains in a vat, they would be empirically demonstrating that the idea of a brain in a vat cannot function the way a brain in human does with its natural environment.

It is the philosopher bringing in its own metaphysical baggage that gets them all tied up in a knot. The scientist is trying say something of this world, the philosopher is pretending to, but in the end they are just creating fairy tales.

think it may even be physically possible. It is in principle much like a Boltzmann brain, and physicists seem to accept that they are physically possible.

But of course if we are brains in a vat then it may be that “real” physics isn’t exactly like the fabricated physics that we are being programmed to experience, and so one cannot really use physics to disprove the physical possibility of brains in a vat without begging the question. — Michael

I will not address the Boltzmann brain (as there is another thread for that) but go with the current scientific theory that human brains are a product of millions of years of evolution. What if scientists biologically demonstrate that the BIV cannot function like a brain with a human body (the brain just degrades when artificially stimulated). However, as you put it, this does not refute the possibility that this experience of “scientists demonstrating the BIV cannot function” was not fabricated in some BIV. But why should we say logical possibility trumps physical impossibility? Ours ideas are derived from our experiences of physical brains. The manifestation of a functional brain is a human being who articulates what is possible and impossible against a background of an external world. How should we think of an idea that says, “it was fabricated in a BIV to think it was fabricated in a BIV.”? This idea has all the qualities of a fiction, not either true/false or possible/impossible. This is where this type of metaphysical reasoning fails, it starts out trying to say something about the world in which we live in, but quickly degrades into phantasm where it logically excluded any verification, falsification, confirmation gathered by our experiences.

I am reminded of a quote from David Hume from Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion; where he thoroughly criticizes the metaphysical design argument for the existence of God, “A total suspense of judgment is here our only reasonable resource.”

I do not believe BiV is possible. I believe semantic externalism doesn't prove that BiV is impossible; I think BiV is impossible for other reasons. — NotAristotle

And what are those reasons?

For Wittgenstein:
1) The word "ouch!" replaces a behaviour.
2) Naming means attaching the word "ouch!" to a behaviour, ie, the word "ouch!" names a behaviour.
3) Therefore, "attaching" a word to a behaviour means "replacing" a behaviour by a word. — RussellA

This is not what Wittgenstein is saying. “Ouch” is an expression of pain, not naming the behaviors that commonly associated with pain. If my arm is stabbed, I do not grab my arm and look at my face wincing in a mirror and say “that behavior is ‘Ouch’. Alternately, I may just say “Ouch” without any of the pain behaviors, or the behavior varies from event to event.

If BiV is phenomenally the same as not-BiV, then I don't see how semantic externalism can do any work. Even someone who is not-BiV would not know what they meant by real and not real. — NotAristotle

Given that if metaphysical realism is true then something like us living in the Matrix is possible, Putnam's argument is that metaphysical realism and semantic externalism are incompatible, and because he believes that semantic externalism is true he concludes that metaphysical realism is false. — Michael

To be the same principle the body would in some way need to be silenced, or asleep, or unconscious, as in the movie Matrix. Of course, in these states he wouldn't be seeing or hallucinating anything, but dreaming. If the rest of the body is included, awake, and in full working order it would notice that it is in a vat, that it cannot move, is suspended in some sort of liquid, and so on, and his words could directly refer to the environment. — NOS4A2

I am curious, do you all believe that a "BiV" is possible? If so, why do you believe it is possible? Just because you can imagine it?

Why would touching be considered impossible? Touching is by many considered an object coming into contact with another, which perhaps requires the objects occupying the same space. And occupying the same space is considered impossible by nearly everyone. — elucid

Let's try these examples of occupying the same space:

1. Consider Matryoshka dolls. This is a good example of each smaller doll occupying the same space of the prior larger doll.

2. Take a 1 cubic meter container and add an equal mixture of two inert gases and close it. Wait a moment and I have two gases occupying the same space in the container.

3. I draw a square object and overlap it with a circle object, then color in the space where they overlap. Conclusion: The colored space where the two shapes overlap occurs in the same space.

It seems occupying the same space is not impossible.

As opposed to how well philosophy doing right now at being relevant? Every time I go into a book store I check out the philosophy section and it invariably is tiny and has just a few copies of books by the same 4-6 authors. Philosophy has become so scared of error that it's afraid to be relevant. Sometimes I even think the arcane vocabulary becomes a hiding mechanism. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Thank Descartes for telling us it is all a dream but don't worry God would not want to fool us.

The Age of Enlightenment at its best.

Oh for sure. But when someone say's "does touch really exist," I assume they mean: "from the standpoint of fundemental physics or metaphysics," simply because the question is silly in any other context.

This is an example where the understanding wrought by the linguistic turn seems to backfire. "Take language the way it is commonly used," is all well and good advice in some cases, but it missteps when it assumes that people don't ever think about metaphysics in their day to day lives. This just doesn't seem to be the case. Books on this sort of thing wouldn't sell millions of copies and churches wouldn't be packed each weekend if these sorts of questions only interested a few egg heads. In our ordinary, everyday lives we still sometimes ask deep metaphysical questions of this sort. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Maybe, but then philosophy flirts with the risk of being viewed as irrelevant, a joke, a psychological disorder, a fictitious narrative, a new religion, etc.

Of course, just because we can't disprove an idea it does not make it true. It does not make it false either. It is an untestable idea. — Truth Seeker

This is what we call an imagination producing a fiction. For example, I can enjoy a novel of fiction where the author has a rich history of some made up land. But there is no proving that this fictional history is true or false.

It is possible that what I perceive is either a dream or a hallucination or an illusion or a simulation and not objectively real. — Truth Seeker

I would disagree with this assertion. In order for one to understand what is a dream, hallucination, illusion, or simulation, one must contrast this with what it is not. This is the world in which we interact with, talk about, act on, born into, communicate with others, learn from others; basically, the background in which we accept and act in. For example, one typically learns the concept of "dreaming" from their parent when upon waking up from sleeping they begin to report strange accounts that never happened with a subsequent reassuring from the parent that all was a dream.

am sure we do. I agree that because humans have similar biologies we judge colour the same, and I am sure that your subjective green is the same as my subjective green. I believe this, but I don't know it, as I cannot see into another person's mind — RussellA

Consider On Certainty(OC) 504, "Whether I know something depends on whether the evidence backs me up or contracts me. For to say one knows one has pain means nothing. "

The same goes for private sensations of color, for to say one knows one has the sensation of green means nothing.

Or, OC 548, "A child must learn the use of colour words before it can ask for the name of a colour." Again, the emphasis here is language use, not recognition of color sensations.

In today's terms, Wittgenstein's approach in PI is that of an Indirect Realist rather than a Direct Realist, whereby a name is a label for an object in the world than rather than a description of it. — RussellA

Consider OC 505, "It is always by favor of Nature that one knows something." Notice he is not saying it is by the favor of our awareness of private sensations that one knows something. This is evidence he would not support Indirect Realism.

I will leave this discussion with one more quote from Wittgenstein from "Culture and Value" which suggest the importance of what can and cannot be said, "Couldn't one actually say equally well that the essence of colour guarantees its existence? As opposed, say, to white elephants. Because all that really means is: I cannot explain what 'colour' is, what the word "colour" means, except with the help of a colour sample. So in this case there is no such thing as explaining 'what it would be like if colors were to exist'.

I agree. But to avoid any ambiguity, does the sentence mean i) what appears green to us science has discovered has a wavelength of 550nm or ii) science has discovered that a wavelength of 550nm is green independent of any observer ? — RussellA

What it means is human beings collectively will call the green standard sample "green", and current scientific technology will measure the light reflected off such a standard sample as 550 nm.

By the sentence "a device that detects colour", do you mean i) a device that is able to directly detect the colour green independent of any observer or ii) a device that is able to detect the wavelength 550nm, and has been programmed by a human that a wavelength of 550nm is named green ? — RussellA

What it means is a device that can detect light with a wavelength of 550 nm light, and humans collectively has established that light of such a wavelength is called "green", and the device can be programmed to report out the name of the color.

I am sure we do. I agree that because humans have similar biologies we judge colour the same, and I am sure that your subjective green is the same as my subjective green. I believe this, but I don't know it, as I cannot see into another person's mind — RussellA

I think this is where Wittgenstein would say this philosophical discussion is "going off the rails" so to speak. The language game is learned in a community from color language users that can judge color samples the same, and use the color names in the same way. This is how they know they see the same color of an object. This is all we have and it is all that matters when discussing color.

It then comes down to arguments for and against Indirect and Direct Realism. — RussellA

I would say Wittgenstein is not supporting either Indirect or Direct Realism since both are philosophical theories in which language goes on a holiday.

If green exists in the world independent of the mind, then what exactly has science discovered in such a world that relates 500nm to 550nm but not to 580nm ? — RussellA

1. The color of an object is determined by which wavelengths of light it reflects. For example, plants appear green because they contain the pigment chlorophyll. Chlorophyll absorbs all other wavelengths of light. Green is reflected so it is green light that hits our eyes. Science discovers that the green light has a wavelength of 550nm and not 580nm, and yellow light has a wavelength of 580 nm and 550 nm.

2. If you have no problems with a device that detects color by utilizing scientific theories of light and not positing the device having private color sensations, why not humans that have evolved biological apparatuses to do the same without private color sensations?

3. To get poetic, you seem to picture the color experience as if you are in a room with no doors or windows but just a TV set with a wire coming from the wall that you presume is sending signals from an outer-world that you can’t be so sure if it accurately reflects reality. I, on the other hand, have an open window with a clear view. If the is a metaphysical dispute, I like to be optimistic and believe we are seeing the same thing. And maybe that is the more reasonable position because we have similar biologies, judge color the same , use the same words, and inhabit the same world.

If philosophy was meant to be fun, it would be being promoted at the Edinburgh Fringe Festival. :smile: — RussellA

Well, we always have Monty Python if an ounce of levity is needed.

We have devices that can detect the wavelength of 550nm emitted by a variety of objects. The device doesn't know the name of the wavelength of 550nm prior to it being named green by a human. — RussellA

1. Scientists are not naming the color green "550 nm." Scientists are characterizing the color green with the property of 550 nm based on the latest scientific theories of light. This can only be done if there is general agreement by humans on what they judge to be green. This is done be utilizing standard samples that we all would agree are called "green."

2. The device will be calibrated to detect particular wavelengths of light from a standard object that human beings collectively judge to be green. This shows the device is working as intended. The device is not calibrated by the color that exists in someone's mind. We need the device to detect the color of an object that is independent of a human but will detect and report the color as humans do.

3. If I want to determine a particular color of a swatch, I may send it out to a company who has sensitive device that can provide a very nuance color determination. So I put it in an envelop and mail it in and in a few days get a report on its color. I am not sending a color that exists in my mind in the mail.

4. The human brain is like the device that detects color. It has evolved to sense and discriminate different wavelengths of colors. This is demonstrated by humans collectively judging and naming colors of particular objects. If a human being has a problem with judging color like the community, scientists may take an interest to understand what is happening in the brain. Maybe with this knowledge they may even attempt to help the human harmonize more.

5. If colors exist in the mind, why did scientist study light and color that is independent of the human? Because it exist independent of them. What scientists may want to study is how the brain reacts to color and light. What they do not study is what color the human is "actually' experiencing. And the reason for this is not technological limitations, but what is being expressed in language is incoherent.

What I want to show with this discussion is this philosophical theory that "color exists only in the mind" has no relevance to how humans use color language in the everyday life and in the pursuit of science. But as a story of entertaining fiction, I do get a good laugh.

As the colour of the wavelength 550nm can only be determined by the mind, the colour green can only exist in the mind. — RussellA

We have devices that detect colors on a variety objects that will agree with human judgement. These devices are not detecting color in the minds of humans but on objects. Additionally, if you use the device on the human brain you will be getting the color of the brain not what the brain is sensing.

This simply shows this view colors only existing in the mind is confused and unfruitful.

I like to suggest a different view on "What is Truth." Instead of appealing to Platonic Essences, psychologism, or analytical formulations, I like to take a roughly thought-out Naturalistic position. Truth is just a manifestation of the brain's interaction with its environment through language, to put it as general as I can. It is not a property of propositions, sentences, the world, the mind etc... The human brain has the ability to recognize stimuli "as true" because it has evolved over many eons the innate ability to condition itself to respond to environmental stimuli in ways that have proven valuable for the host. The brain recognizes its conditioning in particular ways, which in turn, we get a manifestation of this recognition in language by saying, "that's true." From this recognition, the host may act as it sees fit.

Let's look at the example, "1 + 1 = 2". All of us who have learned mathematics would say, yep this is a true statement. But not because we all have some strange ability to look into the Platonic realm of Ideas and see that it is true. But because we have conditioned ourselves to react to the symbols "as true". A child has no idea before learning mathematic what these symbols mean, but after proper conditioning, the recognition of it "as true" happens.

Could the brain mess-up, of course. Could the brain set-up conditionings that are not useful, of course. And that is what we exactly see in humanity.

The expression "Truth" may be as primitive as the expression "Ouch".

I disagree that Wittgenstein would agree that words, such as, right, accurate, judgment, etc lose their sense, if that's what you're indeed saying. — Sam26

They lose their sense in terms of talking about private sensations like they are public objects. For example, “I correctly recognize my past sensation is the same one as my current sensation” vs “I correctly recognize the person in the picture is my neighbor.”

another.

Wittgenstein's Beetle in the Box is an argument against Direct Realism. — RussellA

The Beetle in the Box is not to put forward a philosophical theory or to show support for indirect realism theory but to show that the model of “object and designation” is irrelevant to the meaning of the terms expressed in the language game of pain.

In fact he does not even support indirect realism, consider PI 304, “The conclusion was only that nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said.”

An indirect realist would not say this. They would say that there are “somethings” and these somethings are private sensations and we have much to say.

Again, recognising the private sensation will help one to use the language appropriately, but language does not describe one person's private sensation. — Luke

I think Wittgenstein would say that recognizing a private sensation does not assist in using a word appropriately. Think of PI 265, the train time-table example. He might say using language correctly shows we recognize the private sensation (or maybe ….we experience the private sensation).

Notice that it's trivially true that feeling just is not concept. — plaque flag

Agreed, feelings are not concepts, but if you want to talk about feelings to your fellow human being there is a lot of set up that needs to take place. We simply do not take a literal picture of what is going on inside and give it to another person and say “see this is how I feel.” We need words associated with particular circumstances; we need a common language to understand those circumstances; we need our fellow human being to react similarly to those circumstances, or at least imagine how they would react, etc… with any luck we get understanding and empathy.

What accurately means depends on context. So if we give people the same color patches and they describe them using the same I words I use, then what more is needed to say they've described the colors accurately, and that they are seeing what I see? For all practical purposed their descriptions are accurate. There's no good reason to think they are seeing different colors. It's a problem without a difference. — Sam26

As Wittgenstein pointed out in PI 258, there is a problem talking about the accuracy of private sensations, he says towards the end, “But in the present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would like to say: whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right’.

What goes wrong with some much talk of private sensations is it borrows so much from the language of the public shared reality that words begin to loose their sense, like “right” “accurate”, “judgment”, “remember”, “something” etc… How much do you cut off a tree where it is no longer a tree but a stump?

At the very least I can say they are private experiences/sensations, and we often do describe such sensations accurately. — Sam26

What could “accurately” mean in such a case of private experiences/sensations. One, no one, in principle, can verify the truth of such an assertion, so why even call it is an assertion. Two, we learn what “accuracy” means by learning the techniques of determining the accuracy of whatever is under examination. Thus, no one can teach another how to determine the accuracy of a private experience/sensation. Lastly, Wittgenstein does not deny one have these experiences but only what can be said, which is not much at all. Just like if someone is in a completely dark room and someone ask “what do you see?” And one replies, “It is dark.”

When you see a "red" object your private subjective experience may be of the colour blue. — RussellA

I think this idea is confused based on the very idea on how we learn the language of color and language is general. Please consider this example:

For simplicity sake let us assume we are in a world with just two colors, red and blue. In my tribe, we learned when we see a red object we call it “red” and when we see a blue object, we call it “blue”. One day we travel to an island and we meet another tribe that surprisingly has a very similar language like ours with the exception that when they see a red object they call it “blue” and when they see a blue object they call it “red”. What are we to think in this situation? That they actually see a blue object where we see a red object, or that they simply call a red object “blue” in their language? We can easily ask for the red object by saying “Can you fetch me that blue object” in which they bring me the red object. Would it not be more reasonable to believe our words for “blue” and “red” are “inverted” not how we experience those objects? If this is so, how is this any different when someone says to me, I see that red object but I really see it as “blue.” It is not that we will never know what one actually experiences, but that we are going beyond what the language of color can express.