You’re engaged in a philosophical dialectic. If you don’t understand the terms of common use within the context of that dialectic, you shouldn’t be here.

Ok, if you say so.

To me, it looks like the goalposts are now clear out in the parking lot.

Morality is subjective, the consequence of morality, which is not in itself morality, is objective.

Dichotomy both absolutely necessary, and philosophically preserved.

You know, Hume, 1740, insists our morality is based on emotion not reason. Slave of the passions and all that. Kant 1788, on the other hand....what else....insists the opposite.

But I will grant emotive moral statements are better than empty ones.

Then I revert to epistemic ignorance, with respect to what would be the case for objective reality or continuance of meaning if all humans were to disappear.

I know people attribute their morality to what they believe. I know I have no such inclination, because belief, while subjectively sufficient, has no objective validity, which is exactly what morality demands.

I made a comment somewhere about moral feelings, because no one seems to attribute any important, or even relevance, to them. I’m not sure about reducible to, but they have to be accounted for somehow because they can be said to exist in a moral system. Feelings are not cognitions but only responses to them and then only varying degrees of pain or pleasure. We can’t have our morality predicated on pain or pleasure.

First you presented carne asada as the subject, beef as the predicate. Now you present beef as the subject and carne asada as the object, and treat it with equitable argumentative value.

It doesn’t have that.

Bingo.

Carne Asada can be conceptually reducible no further than beef; morality can indeed be conceptually reduced further than mere belief.

Acceptable/unacceptable behavior needs be no further reducible than to civil norms; morality must be reduced further than mere civil norms.

Ok, I get it. Shoot an object into space, it goes on and on and on, ad infinitum, never interrupted, never examined. The meaning of it and all it’s parts conforms to the conceptions of its creators.

What’s the point? The end game?

I see an issue, in the construction of the argument. I don’t think belief has anything to do with morality to begin with. To say as much is to say a false morality is possible if derived from a false belief, which just doesn’t make any sense to me.

Pretty much, yeah.

‘Course, you might have a syllogistic bombshell in your back pocket, just waiting and baiting for the right time, in which case I’ll be as surprised as the next guy, and you’ll have earned your “attaboy!!”.

In the meantime.......

OK.

S has got you by the short hairs.

Here I was, thinking we were moving on.

Ok, then I would answer the second question as the first: the meaning, in the sense I assume you are talking about, would be retained, because there is nothing given sufficient to remove it, but that meaning must remain unknowable.

Going beyond this, we must inevitably be presented with the paradox of retaining meaning that has no meaning, which is inescapable whenever humans disappear but human meaning is sometime thereafter presented as being in question. To ask if a thing retains its meaning presupposes an event where the question is examined but makes no allowance for who is asking.

Getting closer?

Half of it is epistemological, yes, in that there is present to our conscious attention a method known to be an artifact of communication with its intrinsic information. It is still required that the information, which would be supposed as concepts given in pictographic representation, would have to correspond to current concepts but with quite distinct representations, while attempting to retain the meaning of the original.

So, yes, meaning, re: the OP, is predetermined by the original English language rule, and may eventually be translatable to a non-English language, which is rather obvious, of course, as long as such translation uses the same perception/conception correspondence system, which is a product of mental exercise, hence rational, hence of idealistic theory.

But for the other half we’re right back where we started: if humans disappear, the information remains but is untranslatable by an intelligence that may not know how English attains to its meanings. In other words, we can translate ancient Egyptian into English, French, Swahili....whatever, because both are developed by humans, but both English and Egyptian meanings would be inaccessible to some rationality that doesn’t use a perception/conception correspondence system for its meanings. It follows logically that that of which the meaning is unknowable is therefore meaningless, which is the same as having no meaning, which is the same as concluding the transfer of information becomes impossible.

Am I properly addressing your concern?

I would explain hieroglyphics by saying the author of them, even if a different culture, is still the same kind of intelligence as I am now. They rationalize in their way as I in mine, merely with distinct conventions. It follows that I should decipher their writing, hence their meanings, given enough information. With an entirely separate kind of rationality, that information would not be available.

What say you?

Man, you’re asking for answers I think would be impossible to give. I’m a reductive epistemologist, insofar as there should still be a rock without intelligent observers, following Einstein’s metaphysical rationale, because sentience is not a necessary condition for existence. More than that, re: is there still a rock, I am not equipped to know with any certainty whatsoever. Best I could do is......probably, and.....why would I care?

At the same time I classify myself as a transcendental idealist insofar as my reason is absolutely paramount, and while I am permitted by it to speculate all I want, I have to beware of contradicting myself. If I am the intelligence that assigns meaning, and then allow meaning to obtain without me assigning it, I have right then contradicted myself. As for the question on meaning then, I must say meaning would not hold outside the intelligence that assigned it originally.

I maintain not that you are irrational, but the argument requires irrational answers if such answers claim a measure of affirmative truth.

Part 1 is the problematic idealism of Descartes, which allows the empirical reality of physical objects, such as rocks. Part 2 is the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley, which allows for nothing but that which arises out of mind alone, such as rocks and meanings. Both have been sufficiently refuted by German Idealism of the late 18th century. But such philosophical refutation is not thereby unqualified support for realism in and of itself.

Is the rock still there is the same as is the light stay on in the fridge when the door is closed. There’s no reason to suppose it does, given the mechanics of the system, but no way to directly, or without some kind of material support, make a non-contradictory affirmation of truth about the light. With respect to the tautological analytic “to be is to be”, while it may well be sufficient to deflect a contradiction, it does nothing to provide an existential truth, for its predicate conceptions are always empty, equivalent to saying, “all rocks are”.

To list a set of properties or conditions conceived as belonging to an object does not confer meaning to it, but only the means to identify it, and the more conceptions and conditions the greater the precision of the identity. It follows that another intelligence, if it assigns conceptions and conditions at all, may still identify some common object but under its own correspondence system.

It seems to me, that in the event that some intelligence formulating a rational system goes defunct in totality, anything to do with that intelligence immediately becomes irrelevant. In the event of an intelligence going defunct in totality, then for that defunct intelligence to proffer scenarios with respect to itself, is irrational.

Well said. Especially Aristotle’s contributions.

I don’t mind; everybody’s philosophy stands a good chance of being dubious or inscrutable to somebody.

Morality involves either action a posteriori or reason a priori. If he chooses to act at all, one usually doesn’t act unless he already knows what the act should be. If he is to explain in general how he is to act, he must use propositions to communicate his reasoning. Such propositions take the form of synthetic subject/predicate construction, re: if this is the case then I must do that because of this. In order to conceive his “must do” he must have a principle to base it on; he cannot conceive it reasonable, and his will cannot be obliged to determine, to shoot Bill because Pam hit a patch of ice and wrecked Bobby’s Mustang, when the moral situation requiring an objective principle has to do with, say, “...it is ok for people in the world to steal, kill and maim in order to increase personal wealth...” Here, in order to satisfy conceiving the objective principle “increasing personal wealth” in general, requires reason to formulate the imperative “do whatever it takes, such as stealing” which the will has determined as necessary to satisfy the obligation to increase personal wealth pursuant to a moral disposition saying “it’s ok for people....”

It’s philosophy, man. Ain’t nothing etched in stone, but just has to be self-consistent and non-contradictory. It’s agreeableness is nice, but not required.

Objective action is somewhat redundant, I know, but I used it in juxtaposition to the subjective principle. Sorry for the complication.

In case you already figured that out, and to answer the question, the conception of an objective principle, insofar as it is obligatory for a will, is called a command of reason, and the form of the command is called an imperative, either thought a priori and put forth in a propositional conclusion pursuant to a philosophy, or, exemplified in the world as an act pursuant to a sense of moral worth.

All imperatives indicate the relation of a freely determinate will to its necessary consequence, but humans, being....er.....all too human, may still find a way to disregard their own imperatives.

If for some arbitrary rational agency, “Let X be do whatever it takes to acquire wealth” is a principle governing the determinate will, and

assassinating, stealing, and torturing others — creativesoul

then becomes the imperative sufficient to accommodate that principle and serve as a volition determined by it, with “... as long as it makes (me) wealthy” as its end. Whether or not the world would be a better place is not deducible from that moral argument.

For some other arbitrary rational agency who knows it is possible to acquire even great wealth from doing X in the form of simply buying a lottery ticket, or doing X in the form of simply being alive and present as the sole beneficiary of an estate of unknown Aunt Betty in Tupelo, at the same time knows, irrespective of actually doing either of those things, anything to do with bodily harm or otherwise criminal activity does not serve as justifiable moral worth. A different sense of moral worthiness is therefore all that’s required in order to qualify the conclusion as merely possible, that “the world would not be a better place” given under the auspices of the imperative demanding bodily harm and otherwise criminal activity in order to acquire great wealth.

There is no room for belief; all sense of moral worth is the result of imperative objective action in compliance to a subjective principle. If one thinks conventional philosophy says belief has no objective validity, and if moral philosophy mandates objective validity in the form of consequential action, then it follows necessarily that belief has no place in moral philosophy.
There is no room for agreement; obviously, herein, there isn’t anything to agree on. Where there is tacit moral agreement there is harmonious community, and even if such harmonious community is comprised of those who steal, etc., in order to make themselves wealthy, they are indubitably soon met with an altogether non-harmonious condition with which their contradictory moral worthiness will be forced to reconcile.
There is no room for truth in the conclusion “the world would not be a better place” in the current moral argument, for the excruciatingly simple reason no such condition of the world is determinable by an imperative in itself. One may think it as possibility, even assign a probability to it, but he has not the means to determine the truth of it.

Pretty coherent to me, and quite acceptable. And there ya go. You’d probably find something to fill in the disparate behavioral blanks, to demonstrate how the morally worthy/unworthy dualism arises, if you altered your dialectical priorities.
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Maybe, dunno. I’m not a child psychologist and I sure as hell don’t remember the formation of my first worldview. Doesn’t matter though; I know moral philosophy is adequate explanation for differential moral agency.

It doesn’t miss the point; it is the point. Mine anyway.

To say that the same behavior is both moral/immoral, and have instances wherein such behavior is objectified in disparate happenstance, is the perfect reason for even having moral philosophy in the first place.

In our case, the world would not be a better place — creativesoul

....is correct from the point of view of whomsoever should hold congruent judgement. This does nothing to explain or justify the morality of those in opposition to it, whose categorical imperative obviously differs and from which they necessarily judge themselves as not wrong.

Cool. I was hoping that was the case.

So.....

Correct. They’re doing it objectively in the world, so it stands to reason they are being forced with wealth as the prize, equally objective, or their individual subjective moral dispositions facilitate determinations the consequences of which are such actions. Big deal...been that way since folks left the singular campfire for the multiple grass huts.
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I never said it was.,

Sure they are, as far as I’m concerned.

That sort of empirically predicated maxim of mine alone, could never suffice as ground for a categorical imperative, so....no. The rest of the world may think differently.

Damned if I know. I don’t even know if the world would be a better place if I did X.

No, philosophy won’t tell you what to do, that’s not it’s job. The moral philosophy of meta-ethics does nonetheless enable understanding of and judgements regarding implementation of actions.

My moral inclinations would certainly prohibit me from kicking a puppy, but if the occassion warrants, which is impossible to foresee, then cute or not.....we’d have to see.
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No, I had no intention of implying a way to judge morality. If the notion of objective morality is useless and the notion of subjective morality is useless, what notion makes morality useful?

Yeah, I guess I get that. Still, laws are founded on a necessity, which presupposes those making the laws cannot be immune to knowledge of their effects.

Then what notion of morality would be useful?

Oh, you can’t ask a Kantian what’s wrong with being a Kantian. You’ll get a answer laden with highly prejudicial bias and a hint of confusion.

Personally, I find no measure in which “reasonableness” in one associates with “agreeableness” in another. A true moral theory requires one’s reasonableness, his subjective principles, to ground his actions, and the only permissible universality given from that is for each subject to have identical, or at least similar, principles from which congruent actions would necessarily follow. Here, it is “reasonableness” in accord with “reasonableness”, in one and another, rather than reasonableness in one and agreeableness in the other.

The only way subjective criteria to work is for all similar moral agents to have similar moral agendas. Then there would be a universal code.

Thanks. Got it.

Rawls...A- because he’s obviously Kantian.

Scanlon....D, because I think this is contradictory: “....So we have the contractualist formula: an action is wrong if any principle that permitted it would be one that some affected person could reasonably reject....”

I admit to not having properly studied these two guys, just a quick synoptic understanding.

I might think the “veil of ignorance” is manifest in the American ideal, set out by a few guys sitting around a table in a very small part of a very huge territory with basically negligible population. These guys had their own principles from which to work, but had no real idea to whom their declarations would apply in the future, the present for them being a scant representation of it. The result being, of course, the social contract in the form of the Constitution.

On the other hand, some interpretations of Rawl’s original position stipulate the law-givers don’t know their own moral principles on which is to be built a system of civil liberties, while some other interpretations suggest what is unknown is the moral disposition of the population to which the liberties are prescribed upon integration into some particular social structure. The former is unrealistic but the latter is, I think, reasonable.

There are no pdf’s listed. What pdf’s are being talked about?

Oh hell, everybody and his Auntie Sue has had something to say about these dichotomies. Quine, 1951 on rejection of analyticity hence eviscerating the possibility of synthetic a priori truths, Schopenhauer, 1819, rejects the Kantian version and function of schemata hence the value and necessity of the categories, and the whole Catholic Church dumped Kantian morality in the crapper for its requirement for an autonomous freely determinate will. ‘Course, he didn’t do himself any favors, by stating for the record a real free will down here was a hellava lot more believable as a law-giver than that which resides in the far-away abstract mystical Heavens and its Divine occupant.

Other than? Nothing, actually. They’re all part and parcel of it, so issues with the problematic transcendental philosophy itself will be grounded by one or another of them.

Why should I investigate Schelling? What would I acquire from him?

OK. Thanks.

Was just wondering if you were going with the phenomenon/noumenon dualism, or the analytic/synthetic, the a priori/a posteriori, or even the empirical/transcendent types. There’s enough of them to choose from, no doubt.

Agreed, the only non-illusory noumenon is the negative.