"X is immoral" is false if... — creativesoul

Depends on the interpretation and the method. :roll:

Be clearer.

Do you hold that "X is immoral" can be true/false?
— creativesoul

...Yes, I do, in the sense I think is the best way forward for ethics, which is the moral relativism sense... — S

"X is immoral relative to A" is true if X is immoral relative to A, and false otherwise.

But that's obvious. — S

"X is immoral" is not equivalent to "X is immoral relative to A".

You've answered how the second could be false.

The first?

Answer?

On your view, because it is the one being discussed, remember?

So we've arrived at X is immoral relative to A's belief, and A's belief can be false.

Pretty much, yeah.

‘Course, you might have a syllogistic bombshell in your back pocket, just waiting and baiting for the right time, in which case I’ll be as surprised as the next guy, and you’ll have earned your “attaboy!!”.

In the meantime.......

Nah. I don't operate like that. I'm taking what is being claimed and examining it.

Do you not see the issues I just raised?

X is immoral relative to A's belief.

If being moral/immoral is determined solely by one's belief, then A's belief could not be false.

But...

A's belief can be.

Being moral/immoral is not determined by one's belief.

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"X immoral relative to A" is about A's belief.

"X is immoral" is about X.

I see an issue, in the construction of the argument. I don’t think belief has anything to do with morality to begin with. To say as much is to say a false morality is possible if derived from a false belief, which just doesn’t make any sense to me.

I don’t think belief has anything to do with morality to begin with — Mww

Go on...

Morality consists of belief about acceptable/unacceptable behaviour. How can it not have anything to do with belief? That would be to say that carne asada has nothing to do with beef.

Carne Asada can be conceptually reducible no further than beef; morality can indeed be conceptually reduced further than mere belief.

Acceptable/unacceptable behavior needs be no further reducible than to civil norms; morality must be reduced further than mere civil norms.

...morality can indeed be conceptually reduced further than mere belief. — Mww

Perhaps...

Do you at least agree that morality consists of belief(at least in part).

Beef is not carne asada, by the way...

:wink:

"X is immoral" is not equivalent to "X is immoral relative to A".

You've answered how the second could be false.

The first?

Answer?

On your view, because it is the one being discussed, remember? — creativesoul

I don't really have a view, except in relation to a particular interpretation and a particular method, and with a particular end in mind. I think I've made what I think about the ways that it can be interpreted and the methods for determining truth and falsity pretty clear. What more do you want to know? I don't really have a rigid way of looking at this. There's a bunch of ways, depending on what you want to get out of this. Is your priority an interpretation which arguably best reflects what people mean, considering the wording, rather than the associated emotions? Then maybe moral objectivism is right for you. But that leads to falsehood or at least the absence of warrant in my assessment. Is your priority getting truth and falsity from moral statements? Then I offer up moral relativism to you. It becomes more about what best suits you or I or him or her, rather than what's the case. I think they call this pragmatism.

Somewhat ironically, what's right for me isn't necessarily what's right for you!

I see an issue, in the construction of the argument. I don’t think belief has anything to do with morality to begin with. To say as much is to say a false morality is possible if derived from a false belief, which just doesn’t make any sense to me. — Mww

I would swap the talk of belief, which is what creativesoul introduced, for what I've been talking about from the start: moral judgement.

Bingo.

Carne Asada can be conceptually reducible no further than beef; morality can indeed be conceptually reduced further than mere belief.

Acceptable/unacceptable behavior needs be no further reducible than to civil norms; morality must be reduced further than mere civil norms. — Mww

Agreed. I think that, to end up somewhere meaningful, and to avoid the kind of the consequences that you get with Moliere's error theory or Hanover's moral objectivism (see the previous discussion), then morality ought to be reducible to moral judgement, which in turn can be reducible to moral feelings. And I see moral relativism as the way forward.

First you presented carne asada as the subject, beef as the predicate. Now you present beef as the subject and carne asada as the object, and treat it with equitable argumentative value.

It doesn’t have that.

Again, I do not see what's so funny. — creativesoul

Going back over our discussion, this one little comment from you has been bugging me. Do you really not see what's so funny about the following?

Are you claiming that "X is immoral" can be true/false as a result of agreeing with a person's moral belief?
— creativesoul

Aren't you reading what I'm saying about "X is immoral" for the position of moral relativism?
— S

It's a yes or no question, that I would like to read. Care to answer it?
— creativesoul

Are you trying to be funny? It is an inappropriate question, so no. Clarify first, then we take it from there.
— S

Can "X is immoral" be true/false?
— creativesoul

That genuinely made me laugh. It's like you went into malfunctioning robot mode! I tell you there's a problem with the question, you respond by asking the question in the same way. :rofl:

I made a comment somewhere about moral feelings, because no one seems to attribute any important, or even relevance, to them. I’m not sure about reducible to, but they have to be accounted for somehow because they can be said to exist in a moral system. Feelings are not cognitions but only responses to them and then only varying degrees of pain or pleasure. We can’t have our morality predicated on pain or pleasure.

I know people attribute their morality to what they believe. I know I have no such inclination, because belief, while subjectively sufficient, has no objective validity, which is exactly what morality demands.

I made a comment somewhere about moral feelings, because no one seems to attribute any important, or even relevance, to them. I’m not sure about reducible to, but they have to be accounted for somehow because they can be said to exist in a moral system. Feelings are not cognitions but only responses to them and then only varying degrees of pain or pleasure. We can’t have our morality predicated on pain or pleasure. — Mww

Maybe "reducible to" is the wrong way of putting it. We can and do reason about our moral feelings, after all. But I think that the emotive element is what distinguishes moral statements from empty statements which only appear to be moral in nature. It's the test for genuineness.

In this way, contrary to what Banno and others have said, they are not identical to claims of the sort about a cat on a mat, where moral feelings are irrelevant.

Is your priority getting truth and falsity from moral statements? Then I offer up moral relativism to you. It becomes more about what best suits you or I or him or her, rather than what's the case. I think they call this pragmatism. — S

:roll:

The astute reader will note the conflation of truth and belief here. That is exactly what I charged moral relativism with. That charge is exactly what began this 'exchange' between S and I.

Seems I understood it a bit better than some gave me credit for.

The astute reader will note the conflation of truth and belief here. That is exactly what I charged moral relativism with. That charge is exactly what began this 'exchange' between S and I.

Seems I understood it a bit better than some gave me credit for. — creativesoul

No, I'm not conflating truth and belief. So the astute reader will do no such thing. And besides, what would you know about the astute reader?

Here's another tip: ask questions to clarify instead of jumping to conclusions.

You know, Hume, 1740, insists our morality is based on emotion not reason. Slave of the passions and all that. Kant 1788, on the other hand....what else....insists the opposite.

But I will grant emotive moral statements are better than empty ones.

Is your priority getting truth and falsity from moral statements? Then I offer up moral relativism to you. It becomes more about what best suits you or I or him or her, rather than what's the case. I think they call this pragmatism. — S

The above can be simplified...

...getting truth and falsity from moral statements... ...becomes.. ...what best suits you or I or him or her, rather than what's the case...

:lol:

You know, Hume, 1740, insists our morality is based on emotion not reason. Slave of the passions and all that. Kant 1788, on the other hand....what else....insists the opposite.

But I will grant emotive moral statements are better than empty ones. — Mww

Don't you just love those two? They stand out amongst the crowd, at least for me.

I know people attribute their morality to what they believe. I know I have no such inclination, because belief, while subjectively sufficient, has no objective validity, which is exactly what morality demands. — Mww

The objective/subjective dichotomy is inherently incapable of taking account of that which consists of both and is thus neither.

Morality is one such thing.

Have fun.

The above can be simplified... — creativesoul

"...taken out of context and misinterpreted".

There, I fixed that for you. You're welcome!

Much of this thread is yet another example of how getting thought/belief wrong to start with leads to inherently emaciated positions, approaches, and (mis)conceptions...