I see my mistake. A creature IN-capable of thought (…) doesn’t have any, making his incapacity for comparing them with anything, moot.

You are hardly one to be imprecise. That being given, it just seemed to me, in-capable would have lent more consistency to the overall point being made in that particular entry.

If I’m mistaken, that’s on me.

The Cogito signifies that I don't just blend into a monolithic universe. I arise out of it as a distinct thing. — frank

Ooooo….I like that.

….in the sense that we cannot understand reality other than by using our own modes of cognizing it…. — Bob Ross

Hmmm. Has your position been that transcendent has to do with that by which laws are determinable, as transcending the experience required to enounce the objective validity of those laws? If so, I can get on board with it, in a rather loose conceptual assignment anyway. Understanding certainly is very far from experience, but I’d not so much say understanding is transcended by it.
————-

The brain (…) has no part to play in the tenets of such process.
—Mww

Interesting. What, then, is responsible for it? A soul? — Bob Ross

Reason.
————-

there are natural laws — Bob Ross

There are natural relations, represented by laws the conceptions of which are empirical.

The most fundamental would be logical laws — Bob Ross

These are the most fundamental, but not of Nature but of pure reason. Where is Nature in A = A?

do you think an object as it were in-itself can be and not be identical to itself? — Bob Ross

Identical to itself makes no sense to me. Best I can do, is say that for any given thing, it cannot simultaneously both be whatever it is and not be whatever it is. I cannot say that about any thing as it were in itself, which is merely the glorified rendition of the ding an sich we’ve all come to know and love. From a distance.

How else would you say “disunity”? What other word carries similar implication?

any further knowledge about the self is unwarranted. — J

….because for that knowledge, we must have recourse to empirical science. But then, how does one experiment for that which isn’t to be found? Which gets us to : we automatically become dualists…..
———-

…..we automatically become dualists of some kind. — frank

….or, we always were, and must necessarily be.

Why…. — frank

Is there an answer that doesn’t just invite another question?

Comprehension needs to be bestowed on something representing a particular accomplishment, iff one wishes to express himself in regard to it. The cognitive system, in and of itself, in its normal modus operandi, doesn’t require it, insofar as it just IS it.
————-

…thinking is something I do. That's not "nothing." — J

Agreed. Thinking is something I do, and it does tell me something. It tells me there is a thinker and I am it. And I am….what, exactly? If I am that which thinks, I am conscious of that already. Even if it is that determines what it is to think, I still haven’t said what I am, other than I am a necessary condition for that which thinks, which is highly circular or abysmally tautological.

Hence….psychologists. (Sigh)

Why does there have to be a seat of consciousness? — frank

There doesn’t have to be; consciousness is not a physical necessity. But, the metaphysical argument, is that it is necessary in order for there to be represented, not so much that which comprehends the relations “thoughts, feelings, sights and sounds” have with respect to their causes, but moreso that upon which the comprehension is bestowed.

Agreed. That consciousness of mine that proves that I am, insofar as its negation is a contradiction, says nothing at all about what I am.

we ought to do what is good just because it is good. — Janus

Agreed, of course, but we are still left with determining what thing to do, sufficiently reflecting that good already decided.

Other creatures capable of thought….. — creativesoul

IN-capable?

Shouldn’t the discussion bear on the OP? Maybe present some theory-specific examples of transcendent laws?

Even if we’re limited to their necessity, but without examples, then we’re just doing noumenal imaginings, which have nothing to do with the possibility of consciousness of reality.
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Until there comes empirical knowledge of the brain’s rational functionality, best not involve it in our metaphysical speculations.
—Mww

What do you mean? We’ve already determined that the brain is responsible for cognizing reality into the ‘experience’ that you have. — Bob Ross

Nahhh…you may have stipulated something like that as part of your thesis, but I never agreed with it. Cognizing reality into experience is a metaphysical process, using conceptions thought, relating them to things perceived. The brain, on the other hand, even if it is the mechanism by which metaphysical processes are possible, has no part to play in the tenets of such process.

Humans do not think in terms of natural law. The certain number of phosphate ions required, at a certain activation potential, as neurotransmitters across certain cleft divisions, in some certain network or another, never registers in the cognition, “black”-“‘57”-“DeSoto”.

What’s the difference between the two in your view? — Bob Ross

Experience is cognition by means of conjoined perceptions; consciousness is a natural human condition, represented as the totality of representations. Sometimes called a faculty, but it doesn’t have faculty-like function, so….not so much in T.I..

transcendent is that which is beyond our experience — Bob Ross

That definition works well enough.

…..constructing such an experience. — Bob Ross

….describes empirical cognitions…..

…..the preconditions for constructing such an experience. — Bob Ross

…..describes transcendental cognitions, which covers not only experience but possible experience.
—————-

….the brain is the representation of what is ontologically “responsible” for reason. — Bob Ross

This is a kind of categorical error, in that when talking of the brain, the discourse is scientific, in which representation has no place, but when talking of representation, the discourse is philosophical, in which the brain has no place.

Nothing untoward with the fact the brain is necessary for every facet of human intelligence, but there remains whether or not it is sufficient for it. Until there comes empirical knowledge of the brain’s rational functionality, best not involve it in our metaphysical speculations.
—————-

Immanent has to do with empirical cognitions, hence experience; transcendental has to do with a priori cognitions, hence possible experience. Transcendent, then, has do to with neither the one nor the other, hence no experience whatsoever.

I'm more wondering what we can derive from it…. — Moliere

Derived from “I think”, one relatively well-known philosopher suggests….

“….The “I think” must accompany all my representations, for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought; in other words, the representation would either be impossible, or at least be, in relation to me, nothing. (…) All the diversity or manifold content of intuition, has, therefore, a necessary relation to the “I think,” in the subject in which this diversity is found. But this representation, “I think,” is an act of spontaneity; that is to say, it cannot be regarded as belonging to mere sensibility. (…)

It is in all acts of consciousness one and the same, and unaccompanied by it, no representation can exist for me. For the manifold representations which are given in an intuition would not all of them be my representations, if they did not all belong to one self-consciousness, that is, as my representations (…), they must conform to the condition under which alone they can exist together in a common self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me. From this primitive conjunction follow many important results. (…)

The thought, “These representations given in intuition belong all of them to me,” is accordingly just the same as, “I unite them in one self-consciousness, or can at least so unite them”; and although this thought is not itself the consciousness of the synthesis of representations, it presupposes the possibility of it; that is to say, for the reason alone that I can comprehend the variety of my representations in one consciousness, do I call them my representations, for otherwise I must have as many-coloured and various a self as are the representations of which I am conscious.…”

The supreme principle of the possibility of all intuition in relation to sensibility was (…) that all the manifold in intuition be subject to the formal conditions of space and time. The supreme principle of the possibility of it in relation to the understanding is that all the manifold in it be subject to conditions of (…) apperception. To the former of these two principles are subject all the various representations of intuition, in so far as they are given to us; to the latter, in so far as they must be capable of conjunction in one consciousness; for without this nothing can be thought or cognized, because the given representations would not have in common the act of the apperception “I think” and therefore could not be connected in one self-consciousness.
(CPR B132-137)

….and even if the cogito is represented as this kind of something from which can be derived that it does this other something, one could still be left to wonder what the “I” itself really is.

That it is, is given; what it is, may be better left unasked.

Wouldn’t you say that is Kant’s standard distinction? — Bob Ross

I wouldn’t, myself, no. In Kant, transcendent is juxtapositional to immanent, with respect to experience, whereas transcendental merely indicates the mode in which reason constructs and employs pure a priori cognitions, which, of course, have nothing to do with experience as such, but only with those conditions by which it is possible. It’s complement is reason cognizing in its empirical mode, the difference being the conceptions of the former mode represent ideas, but in the latter the conceptions represent things or possible things.

So it is that in Kant, transcendent relates to experience, not consciousness. Besides, and I’m surprised you’d do such a thing….you can’t use the word being defined, in the definition of it. I get nothing of any value from transcendent being defined as that which transcends.
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On related definitions being inconsistent with each other, I just mean the conceptions in one represent a thing under these conditions, but the same conceptions are said to represent a different thing under those conditions.

For instance, when you say, “that by which the brain cognizes reality is transcendental”, is the inconsistency wherein it is reason alone that cognizes anything at all transcendentally, the brain being merely some unknown material something necessary for our intelligence in general.
————-

Not that I don’t admire your proclivity for stepping outside the lines. It’s just that you’re asking me to upset some rather well stabilized applecarts, but without commensurate benefit.

He does seem to base his philosophical mindset on Kant, however over-extended it seems to be, from a purist’s perspective anyway.

Yeah, that, and I think he wants to use Kantian methods to justify them, which is fine, as long as they work. Which is possible iff the relevant definitions are inconsistent with each other.

And there hasn’t yet been mention in the thesis, of principles, under which the transcendent laws would have to be subsumed.

Guess we’ll find out….

HA!! I know…sorry. You beat me by a full 17 minutes.

Define transcendent. In what sense are you using it in this discussion? What would be its complement?

And transcendent cannot be defined as that by which the brain cognizes reality into a coherent whole, without sufficient justification that pure transcendental reason hasn’t already provided the ground for exactly that.

I think, again, depending on definitions….and indeed metaphysical predispositions….. that while a transcendental argument cannot suffice for establishing that transcendent laws precondition human consciousness of reality, it is far more relevant to consider quid juris with respect to them. To establish that, re: by what right or warrant does reason determine that such transcendent laws are justifiable to begin with, historically anyway, requires a “transcendental deduction”, in which, not arguing that conceptions belong quid facti to a cognition, as expressed in general by ’s “…. (as apodictically demonstrated by one’s own consciousness)….”, but rather, by what right do they belong.

The easiest way to demonstrate this is to assume that reality itself has no necessary conformity of behavior (of relations)…. — Bob Ross

…..these laws are, can only be conditionally mapped, or modeled, by a priori modes of cognizing reality (with mathematical equations and rules of logic being the most fundamental of them all)…. — Bob Ross

How can non-relational transcendent laws ever be determinable by a method necessarily predicated on relations? If the method is relational, mustn’t the model constructed by that method, be relational?

What’s the difference, in this thesis, between consciousness, and consciousness (of reality)? Do transcendent laws only precondition the latter, and if so, why not the former as well?

The ground of a transcendental argument presupposes a given. Depending on the choice of definitions, to construct an a priori judgement in the form of a transcendental argument, but with transcendent conceptions, is always invalid, insofar as no transcendent conceptions are given, re: that, the negation of which, is impossible.

Dunno why I need a law that preconditions the possibility of my consciousness of reality.

Doncha just love it when a plan comes together?

It's odd to call Kant's critique a "Copernican Revolution" though because he put humanity right back at the centre of things. — Janus

I think the point was relocation of center. One de-centered Earth in favor of the Sun, the other de-centered various forms of ens realissimum in favor of a certain form of thinking subject.

As for the plate and congruent macro-conditions, as long as my food stays where my fork can get to it, I’m good, as I’m relatively sure the plate-in-itself will be just as good…..whatever it may be.

Perspective, yes indeed.

It's very difficult for me to imagine what it might mean to have a degree of reality, in contrast to an existent which has a property of a given intensity. — fdrake

FYI, just in case you wanted to know, and even then notwithstanding the Enlightenment limitations, there is a sense in which the intensive quantity of degrees is meant to indicate the transition from the appearance of a thing, to the sensation of it. So it isn’t so much a relative degree of reality, which is always a unity, as it is a relative degree of consciousness of it.

Physics proper says any change of energy state invokes a loss, so philosophically that physical loss is commensurate with the difference between the thing and the representation of it.

But if you’re not interested in all that, I’d still agree it is hard to imagine what it might mean to have a degree of reality.

Yeah…the ship you build on this hand, the river you step into on that hand. I get it.

One Copernican Revolution to rule them all.

I wonder if anyone asked that guy…..who doesn’t Google, by the way……when the plate wasn’t the same plate. What if you ate two dinners in a row, one right after the other? If you ate dinner once on the plate right side up, then ate the next dinner on the same plate upside down….is it the same plate?

I just ate dinner from the same plate I ate dinner from last week.
— Mww

Are you sure the plate was exactly the same? — Janus

But I didn’t say it was exactly the same. As far as my perception informs me, it was unchanged, which is merely to highlight that to say change is always of things is not to say there is always change in the thing.

The plate perceived is the same only insofar as I do not contradict myself by continuing to call it a plate.

But I think you knew that already.

Sorry. My fault. I don’t want to work that hard unpacking your posts.

What is the substance of the object (…)? — Moliere

It’s material composition, whatever it may be.

And what is this different conditioning? — Moliere

Time.

I was taken aside by a kindly lecturer, David Stove — Wayfarer

As in Stove’s Gem notoriety, I presume.

How apropos, in a thread arguing pros and cons of elevated philosophical dialectics.

First you said….

Kant is not saying here that space and time vanish as soon as the subject vanishes. — L'éléphant

Followed by…..

Because to Kant, even space and time are only appearances to us — L'éléphant

Now you say….

And if we remove our own subject, then all relations in space and time, indeed space and time themselves would disappear — L'éléphant

Hopefully this indicates you now understand the point being made in the text, that space and time belong to the subject himself, so that when there isn’t a subject there aren’t those necessary pure intuitions that belong to him, precisely what Kant meant by the disappearance of the one entails the disappearance of the other.

He never meant it to be understood they disappear in sense of being themselves appearances, which are real physical things external to the senses. When the subject disappears there is no effect on things that appear, which makes explicit space and time, iff they were appearances, wouldn’t disappear merely because the subject did, and the transcendental methodology contradicts itself. On the other hand, if space and time are not appearances but belong to the subject himself, it is a given that when the subject disappears, it is impossible space and time remain.
————-

it is best to maintain the distinction between change of place and internal change, as a fundamental ontological principle. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh absolutely, except maybe under those conditions where such distinction is not necessary for supporting a proposition. Change is most obviously this, but it is also this and this and this.

Ya know….I wondered if I was going to be presented with the fact the plate I ate dinner on today couldn’t possibly be the same, unchanged, plate I ate on last week, insofar as electrons in the outer shells of the plate matter would have jumped to photons, or some such quantum mystique.

it is not time or change that changes but things. — Janus

Not really. Or, not always. I just ate dinner from the same plate I ate dinner from last week.

Anyway….not that important.

Must the cogito rely upon a notion of the past and future in order for its doubt to make sense? — Moliere

The cogito is I think. Does the validity of the notion that I think, require time?

The notion of past, future and therefore time itself, would be necessary regarding that which I think about, iff it is the case thoughts are always and only singular and successive. Even in the occurence of a single thought, i.e., “not-x”, or the instantaneous act of doubting, there is the antecedent time of its non-occurence, but that is in relation to the thought alone.

On the other hand, I at one time didn’t think to doubt x, and iff I subsequently think to doubt x, there must be a time of my not thinking the one then a different time of me thinking the one.

I vote for time being a necessary condition for the cogito to make sense of anything thought about, which is the same as any thought in general, which is the same as thought itself. I am, after all, nothing but my thoughts.

Descartes’ mistake: the subject isn’t as much a different substance than the object, as it is differently conditioned than an object.

For the sake of argument this is the only thing that justifies this belief. — Michael

For the sake of the current argument, perhaps. From the perspective of a metaphysical antirealist, any belief is justified by its construction, and as far as JTB is concerned, there is nothing but a mere cum hoc ergo propter hoc logical mistake.

Belief just means something is missing; knowledge just means nothing is missing, between the thought of something and the relative certainty of it.

The metaphysical antirealist doesn’t think in propositions, therefore the proposition “the cat is in the box” as expressed to him is merely a possible state of affairs for him, under the assumption he already knows what cats and boxes are. If he doesn’t, the proposition as expressed doesn’t even represent a possible state of affairs to him.

When he expresses himself with the proposition, “the cat is in the box”, he does not necessarily know anything at all about particular cats or boxes, re: idle musings, and the recipient of that expression can do nothing with it, and he himself neither knows nor believes anything in particular except he hasn’t expressed a non-sensical absurdity.

When he is expressing a fact that the cat is in the box, his belief in and of itself relative to the fact, is utterly irrelevant, insofar as the judgement the expression represents has already been proven by experience, and thereby the cum hoc mistake never occurs.
————-

That there is some thing now is possible knowledge; that there is this thing now is empirical knowledge. That there was this thing then, is nothing but deductive inference now, insofar as the time of the one is not the time of the other, hence the empirical certainty of the one, re: experience, is not possible from the mere logical certainty of the other.

Correlation (logical consistency) is not causation (experience). Some famous guy said that, I just stole it. You know….argument from authority and all.

And while it is perfectly rational to suppose that which is now was the same at som time then, or, that which was then is the same now, it is irrational to claim that supposition as knowledge. And, of course, the negation of either is rational/irrational just as well, re: just because we don’t know of a thing then doesn’t permit us to deny there ever was that thing now.

Everybody here knows this shit already, not like I’m teaching any wonderous story. (tip of the pointy hat to Jon Anderson) The mockery of it, on the other hand…..

Time is nothing more than change. — Janus

Not quite; time is the representation of change, change presupposes time as the means by which changes are determinable. Change requires things that change, usually in the form of movement, but nevertheless, something empirical, whereas time itself does not change. But time itself is not empirical, insofar as the form of time is infinite and without substance, and all times are but one time.

For us, then, this argument stipulates there can be time without change in things, but there cannot be change in things without time, therefore one must be something more than, or at least very different from, the other.

Kant is not saying here that space and time vanish as soon as the subject vanishes. (…) Look again. "space and time exist only in the subject as modes of perception. Because to Kant, even space and time are only appearances to us — L'éléphant

Given minor differences in translations, yes, he is, and no, they are not. Mode of perception is not perception, and neither space nor time is ever an appearance, but only that which is in space and time, is.

“….It will first be necessary to explain as distinctly as possible our opin­ion in regard to the fundamental constitution of sensible cognition in general, in order to preclude all misinterpretation of it.
We have therefore wanted to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be, nor are their relations so con­stituted in themselves as they appear to us; and that if we remove our own subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all the constitution, all relations of objects in space and time, indeed space and time themselves would disappear, and as ap­pearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this recep­tivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are ac­quainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being. We are con- cerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. We can cognize only the former a priori, i.e., prior to all actual perception, and they are therefore called pure intuition; the latter, however, is that in our cognition that is responsible for it being called a posteriori cognition, i.e., empirical intuition. The former ad­heres to our sensibility absolutely necessarily, whatever sort of sensations we may have; the latter can be very different for different subjects. Even if we could bring this intuition of ours to the highest degree of distinctness we would not thereby come any closer to the constitution of objects in themselves. For in any case we would still completely cognize only our own way of intuiting, i.e., our sensibility, and this always only under the conditions originally depending on the subject, space and time; what the objects may be in themselves would still never be known through the most enlightened cognition of their appearance, which is alone given to us….”
(Guyer/Wood, 1988, emphasis mine)
(Kemp Smith, 1929 is clearer, but older, so….)

Cognition in general is the process writ large, for which perception is merely the initial occasion;
To take away the nature and relations of objects is not to take away the objects;
The mode of perception merely indicates particular affected sense(s);
“ and as ap­pearances they cannot exist in themselves” only means the constitution and relations of objects of appearance;
To be real is to appear to a sense as given matter, to appear to a sense is to affect it, to affect it is to cause a sensation,
…..there is no sensation of space or time, neither affect a sense, neither appears to senses in general, neither are appearances, neither are real as given matter;
The mode of perception is not the same as the mode of intuition, the former determined by physiology, the latter determined by the type of sensation such physiology provides;
Space and time merely represent the irreducible commonality of every sensation, without regard to its physiological cause;
Absent this particular, albeit speculative, form of human intelligence, there is no need for irreducible commonalities, thus the absence of space and time is given from the absence of the human subjective condition.

But that is besides the point: the babies conscious experience is still in space and time. — Bob Ross

What point is it beside, when I’m agreeing with it? All experience is IN space and time, whether or not the subject is cognizant of relations as such, in general. And it is a given that thinking and cognizing are not the same thing, at least in accordance with this particular metaphysic.

I think the term 'antirealism' can sometimes be misleading. — Wayfarer

I got one for you, for a change. Hopefully not overly simplistic.

“….Most writers on the topic agree, as the name suggests, antirealism is defined in contrast to realism: antirealism is not what realism is. In J. L. Austin’s phrase, realism wears the pants of the pair…”
(Braver, “Thing of This World”, 2007)

https://books.google.com/books?id=YIGHyP3tesC&pg=PA13&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=2#v=onepage&q&f=false

what, then, would a square, which is a spatial concept, be in a consciousness that doesn't represent it in space?!?? — Bob Ross

A baby does not have the experience required to name things as square. No parent says to a baby….this is round, that is square, keep ‘em separate, because he knows the baby desn’t know the difference.

What the baby’s doing….who knows.

Ehhhh…..the continental antirealist in general will only go so far as to say if the cat’s in the box, fine; if the cat’s not in the box, that’s fine too. If I’m interested enough, if it’s important enough, to know which, I’ll go look for myself.