• "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    In the example, "p" is what is said to be true, so "p" represents a judgement which is judged as a true judgement.Metaphysician Undercover

    Understood, and here is an assertorial judgement, insofar as “p is true” affords none other than an affirmation.

    I won’t agree “p” represents a judgement, but even without that, “p is true”, does, so the feature of truth residing in judgement, holds.
  • "What is truth? said jesting Pilate; and would not stay for an answer."
    "true" and "false" are attributed to judgements. Ignoring this simple feature of truth leads to endless discussion getting nowhere.Metaphysician Undercover

    Simple feature...agreed. What would you say if “truth” and “false” weren’t so much attributed to judgements, but ARE themselves judgements?
  • Our Minimal Epistemic Commitment (Fixing Descartes' Cogito)
    C'mon, give me something to disagree with...Janus


    Sorry... I messed up. Posted a minor point I disagreed with, but that wasn’t what you asked for. I’ll have to think about it.
  • Our Minimal Epistemic Commitment (Fixing Descartes' Cogito)
    I said that my thoughts ,feelings and bodily sensations are what is most immediately present to me....,Janus

    Agreed, in principle. Just depends on which act of the play......which step in the method..... is under consideration.

    ”Descartes famously emphasized that subjective reality is better known than objective reality....”

    I don't agree with Descartes as this represents him.

    Agreed, this time wholeheartedly. Meditations II, where all this originates, is titled OF THE NATURE OF THE HUMAN MIND; AND THAT IT IS MORE EASILY KNOWN THAN THE BODY, so are we then to accept that the nature of the human mind is subjective reality. I don’t.

    All the rest is just folks figuring that’s what he really meant, and would really have said, if only he thought like us.

    We know our own existence as body, not as some "non-physical" self.Janus

    Yeah, pretty much. I as representation is logically superior to I as existence. You category can be a predicate in a logical proposition, so it is said. Biggest deal is, even so, the I qua conceptual representation, is never present in thought as such. When I say, “I think.....”, the thinking has already been done.

    Anyway....carry on.
  • Our Minimal Epistemic Commitment (Fixing Descartes' Cogito)
    I'm familiar with Kant's version, and I have little argument with it; but I don't think he has the same thing in mind that you do.Janus

    I must agree. And....good series of comments.
  • Our Minimal Epistemic Commitment (Fixing Descartes' Cogito)
    And here's a scholar summarizing:Pie

    ....and at the very end of that “scholar” summarizing, is a get-out-of-jail-free card, or, as I already mentioned, suited himself for his own ends:

    “....Such an account depends on a particular interpretation of Kant’s texts, and is both ambitious and highly complex in its ramifications....”, which is fitting, insofar as perusal of the various translations of the texts themselves, say nothing about reason’s autonomy. Kant would never have lasted as long as he has, as the GoTo Guy of epistemological metaphysics, if he insisted the will and pure reason occupied the same legislative chair.

    But I understand the derivation of the interpretation, in that, for Kant, autonomy is complete freedom from outside influence, and Kant says reason is subject to its own critique, which is not outside influence, hence someone reads autonomy into it. Which is either fine and worthy, or fast and loose, depending on how much the genius himself is respected.

    I just presented an opportunity for you to ask yourself a question....
    — Mww

    Are you really asking me how I'd apply a concept ?

    Nope; just wanted to see how you’d respond to a direct inquiry. I wouldn’t know and hardly care about how you do whatever it is you do.

    Representation isn't the only possible metaphor here, and we don't have to have to accept an entity for a noun.Pie

    You’re doing that; reason must accept that which is for that which is not, in the simplest non-contradictory way possible. That which is accepted into the system is nothing but representation, for acceptance of the thing itself is absolutely impossible. An entity for an entity, pure and simple.

    But you’re correct: we don’t have to accept anything, and in our dialectic, one theory over another. But whatever we do accept should be completely examined, understandable and not infringe on the natural order. With yours, I must say, stuff like....

    Concepts, koncepts, khancepts, conecepts.Pie mere sophistical subterfuge.
  • Our Minimal Epistemic Commitment (Fixing Descartes' Cogito)
    I recall that you hate linguistic philosophy, but language is what you must make your case in.Pie

    I have no use for OLP, but I have no choice but to use language, iff I wish to make a case. As I said....or maybe I deleted because I decided not to make that case.....expression which requires only a singular subjectivity, or communication, which requires a plurality of subjectivities, are only possible through a medium that is not subjective.

    Your version of understanding, if we grant a nonlinguistic version of this in the first place, isn't enough.Pie

    It is enough for what it does; it is not enough for that which is beyond its power. My version of understanding represents the biggest wheel in the set of cognitive gears, nothing more, nothing less. It can do nothing by itself, but nothing can be done without it. That’s how systems work. Theoretically.

    As Kant saw, reason is autonomous, one and universal,Pie

    Yeah, Kant, autonomy does not relate to universality, but causality, so whoever said Kant said, or meant, that, has merely suited himself to his own ends. And as you say, we are entitled to interpret, but we do not have license from that entitlement, to subvert.

    How does an experience of an unjust incident inform you of how it could be so, if you didn’t already have an idea what form justice itself must have?
    — Mww

    We could actually talk about semantics if you want.

    No need. I just presented an opportunity for you to ask yourself a question. Shouldn’t be any more difficult, or use any other faculties, than asking yourself what would be nice to have for dinner.
  • Our Minimal Epistemic Commitment (Fixing Descartes' Cogito)
    Am I to think that you imagine the possibility of a Kant without some rich culture that birth and trained him, gave him the very languages of his art ?Pie never heard the expression “thinking outside the box”? What is a culture if not a box? Being in a culture and conditioned by it, does not necessitate being restricted to it.

    My focus on language is simply that of an epistemologist trying to figure out a philosopher's minimum commitment.Pie

    ......but there’s nothing in that that says the philosopher’s minimum commitment has to be language, which implies you’re focus is misplaced, or, being an epistemologist is not the proper discipline for figuring a philosopher’s minimum commitment. I would say a philosopher’s minimum commitment, is understanding. What can any philosopher accomplish if he understands nothing? Which means he must understand something, which means he must possess a fully functional faculty for understanding. As it so happens, a transcendental metaphysician is more adept at figuring a philosopher’s minimum commitment than an epistemologist, who actually is only interested in the philosopher’s minimum knowledge, which he could never determine anyway.

    I oppose the view that (most) concepts are 'pre-given'Pie

    Pre-given carries a temporal implication. Pre-....what? Most are not pre-anything, arising spontaneously with initial perception of a given real object, but some are pre-cognition, according to one specific view. Pretty obvious, I should think. Conceptions refer to something represented by its object, but there are concepts that refer to something that does not have an object that represents it. Cause is a concept, but there is no representable cause object, but only objects represented as being caused or causal. Beauty is a concept, but there is no beauty object, only objects that are beautiful.

    Was it not clear that my point was about language acquisition ?Pie

    Nope....I musta missed it. My impression has been that you’ve merely presupposed it, at least for all intents and purposes. What was your point about language acquisition?

    Then koncepts are public and what actually matters here.Pie

    .....which implies the concepts used in private thought don’t actually matter here. That’s fine, concepts are nothing but notions in a speculative theory with respect to human cognition. Something makes private thought possible, or, there is no such thing as private thought. Pick your own preferred bondage, right? Would you saw off the limb you’re sitting on, by allowing that humans think, but find no authorization for allowing it?

    I suggest that it's not confusion but simply a matter of replacing a broken theory with something better.Pie

    “Something better” and “broken theory” are subjective judgements. Who says it’s better, and, better than what? And what’s broken about some extant theory? The insight “meaning is use” just changes the location of “use”, from the internal, rational with respect to a system, to the external, empirical with respect to a language. Left out of the insight, and solving the riddle of possible human cognitive extravagances, is.....time. Doesn’t matter that meaning is use, insofar as no use of any linguistic representation is prior to the concept to which it belongs.

    Instead of what's essentially a theology of mystic Forms.....Pie know what justice is because you’ve experience things that seem just or unjust to you? How does an experience of an unjust incident inform you of how it could be so, if you didn’t already have an idea what form justice itself must have?

    (Well, shucks, Mr. Bill. If you’ve seen enough injustice, you know what justice is, because it isn’t that.)

    It isn’t that ad infinitum still doesn’t tell you what it is, and if you are not informed as to what it is, you cannot explain why it seems otherwise. So the lackadaisically disinterested end up with, “well, damned if I know. It just is”, then go about their day kicking the cat or running over the trash barrel some fool left in the driveway.
  • Our Minimal Epistemic Commitment (Fixing Descartes' Cogito)
    Let the game continue then.Pie

    Not much point, really. I am he who unabashedly “rises to the level of speculation”, you are not, by your own admission.

    Here's the real Descartes:Pie

    Nahhhh. Here is the real Descartes:;

    Concepts are public.Pie

    As with thinking, no, they are not. They may have public exhibition, but they are not themselves public.

    We could invent 'thoughts' as postulated, explanatory entities.Pie

    ....which merely asks how inventions are possible. The common mistake of confounding the thing with the use of the thing. For those bent on misappropriation of logical systems, it is unintelligible that the thing IS its use.

    but I never made such a claim.....Pie

    ......but in each case of the claims you do make, what I say may follow without violating the LNC. Not for refutation of, but as expansion on, such claims.
  • Our Minimal Epistemic Commitment (Fixing Descartes' Cogito)
    I’m far too old and been around far too many blocks to be offended by anything but the most egregious. But thanks for the sentiment.

    The philosopher is an individual among others, offering and justifying claims presumably because others are possibly unaware of either those claims as possible truths or of their justifications as possibly warranting their adoption as beliefs.Pie

    “ does not deprive the speculative philosopher of his just title to be the sole depositor of a science which benefits the public without its knowledge. This can never become popular and, indeed, has no occasion to be so; for finespun arguments in favour of useful truths make just as little impression on the public mind as the equally subtle objections brought against these truths. On the other hand, since both inevitably force themselves on every man who rises to the height of speculation, it becomes (a) manifest duty (...) to enter upon a thorough investigation of the rights of speculative reason and, thus, to prevent the scandal which metaphysical controversies are sure, sooner or later, to cause even to the masses. It is only by criticism that metaphysicians (and, as such, theologians too) can be saved from these controversies and from the consequent perversion of their doctrines. Criticism alone can strike a blow at the root of materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and superstition, which are universally injurious—as well as of idealism and scepticism, which (....) can scarcely pass over to the public.....”
    (CPR, Bxxxvi)

    I can survive in the woods for months perhaps, because I have a few great survival books with me.....Pie

    Having the books with you and surviving, does not prove you could not have survived if you didn’t. Which immediately transforms the implied causal necessity of language into a mere conditional possibility. Cum hoc ergo proper hoc doncha know......

    And by including the relational qualifier “perhaps”, only turns the cum hoc mistake into a post hoc mistake. I did survive because of having the books becomes if I do survive it will be because of having the books. Neither condition is necessarily true in itself, conditioned by merely having the books.

    All I’m saying is hopefully there are formal pro-language arguments less susceptible to self-destruction than that one. And the first thing required for that, is a commonality of presuppositions, which is missing in your proposition. You have the books and your presupposition is that you read them and transform the contents into the physical means for your survival. I, in merely reading your proposition, have no such presupposition, insofar as I’m concerned, you have the books, and although as books their primary purpose is to be read, I have no ground to presuppose you actually did read them merely from the fact you have them and perhaps survived.

    Your thinking, given its presuppositions, and my thinking absent those presuppositions, makes explicit each ends in a private determination belonging to an individual subject, which in turn contradicts the notion that.....

    Thinking is public. The negation of this statement is unintelligible.Pie

    The negation of that statement, re:, thinking is not public, or, no thinking is public, is both logically sustainable and intelligible, given the axiomatic principle “thought (the process of thinking) is cognition** by means of conceptions”
    (CPR A69/B94, my parenthetical; **”knowledge” in Kemp Smith, 1929, “cognition” in Guyer/Wood, 1988)

    The totality of private thinking, the compendium of all subjectively determinable cognitions by means of conceptions, does not authorize thinking as being more public than private. Even if it is true that everybody thinks, in itself such is no justification for the claim that thinking is grounded by communal necessity. Communication of private thinking by means of language, on the other hand, requires reciprocity, which in turn requires a more than singular private subjectivity, but mere expression of private thinking, also by means of language, requires neither reciprocity nor community and only a singular private subjectivity. It follows that absent both communication and expression of private thinking, language has no absolutely necessary function whatsoever.

    “.....if some of the moderns have thought to enlarge its domain by introducing psychological discussions on the mental faculties (...), or anthropological discussions on (cognitive or personal) prejudices, their causes and remedies: this attempt, on the part of these authors, only shows their ignorance of the peculiar nature of logical science. We do not enlarge but disfigure the sciences when we lose sight of their respective limits and allow them to run into one another....”
    (CPR Bvii)

    This individual body is trained into the language system.......Pie The idea is, upon reception of “your shoe’s untied!!”, the body immediately proceeds to go through the motions of rectifying the implication of the received language. The body first yanks the strings to gather the requisite material for tying, crosses one string over the other, etc., etc., etc. But none of those actions are contained in the given language.

    So the argument is that all those actions were trained into the body at some anterior time, given by their own anterior language reception. Now arises the absurdity that the body can never go through the motions of tying shoes if it hadn’t been trained in a language system.

    A body could never have a “shoe” to tie if not for a language system that trains it as to what a “shoe” is?
    (A protective covering on the foot is only possible because of language training?)

    A body could never have a “foot” to cover if not for a language system that trains it as to what a “foot” is?
    (That one thing is to be contained within another thing can only happen because of language training?)

    .....and through the series of deductive inferences, at last is concluded the absolute necessity that even given all the conditionals dependent on language training, there is nothing whatsoever in any of the training, that assembles the manifold content of it into an activity perfectly satisfying the training. There just isn’t enough language to be trained by, nor precise enough language quality to promise strict compliance with, to facilitate the exchange of every empirical occasion with another. Something else is requisite, antecedent to and more powerful than language, such that tying a shoe is accomplished, but after three or four steps, that damn tying is not again undone, or that tying a shoe is accomplished but not with that by which the tying can never be undone.

    Where in the language game is it that the guy, howsoever trained in the language system for shoe-tying, walks around with them untied, simply because he can’t be bothered with his training.

    The links concerning Kant are full of holes, as the respective original texts would show.

    If nothing else, I appreciate being given the subject matter and thereby the opportunity, to talk too much. As you say: mass quantities of my sole remaining vice......exceptionally good coffee.
  • Our Minimal Epistemic Commitment (Fixing Descartes' Cogito)
    That's a silly objection.....Pie

    Alrighty then.....
  • Our Minimal Epistemic Commitment (Fixing Descartes' Cogito)
    But I dispute very much that they are the product of an individual intelligence.Pie

    Such is your prerogative. So what are they a product of, or, from where do they originate?

    Even the idea of an individual intelligence is problematic. I don't mean that a man can't write poetry in the woods.Pie

    How would it be problematic, if the individual writing of poetry presupposes the individual intelligence of the writer? Is the writer using an intelligence that does not belong to him alone? Perhaps it is the case that writing poetry requires no intelligence, which makes the individuality of it, irrelevant.

    much of my thinking in this thread.....Pie

    .....would seem to follow from your individual intelligence. Conditioned by others, maybe, but the thinking, as such, must be your own else in saying “my thinking”, you contradict yourself.

    I'll grant that, in this tiny corner of human life, we have relatively exact concepts.Pie

    Relatively exact. Can’t be both simultaneously. Up is relative to down, but up and down are each exactly representative of their part in a logical relation.

    But 'self-evident' non-linguistic thoughts sounds like mysticism.Pie

    Metaphysics carries a less pejorative implication, but, suit yourself.
  • Our Minimal Epistemic Commitment (Fixing Descartes' Cogito)
    I think it's incoherent to deny that concepts are public......Pie

    The use of them is public, as a means to an end. The origin of them cannot be public, iff they are the product of an individual intelligence.

    That named things are given to us as a matter of course, from the day we individually began learning what things are, obscures the fact that, originally, nothing already named was ever given to anybody.

    The implications were obvious to the ancients, merely uncomfortable for the post-moderns, who would prefer to be told this thing is a basketball, rather than think about how it came to be one.

    how or why should I trust that I understand what you 'intend' 'behind' the concepts 'privately'?Pie

    You first need to grasp the categorical error of conjoining what you understand, with what I intend, upon which is found trust has nothing to do with it. You understand, or you do not, regardless of what I intend, which reduces to similarities in experience, and nothing more, insofar as the mechanisms of our respective intelligences are sufficiently similar, if not exactly identical, to each other.

    Concepts need not be perfectly definite.Pie

    Yes, they do, otherwise, logical systems, and therefore human knowledge, is impossible. How the concept is represented.....the name assigned to it......may be contingent, but that which is named, is perfectly definite. If this were not the case, then a square circle could be an object of experience.

    The 'important' part of my mind, as I see it, is the thinking, linguistic part.Pie

    There is no thinking linguistic part; there is the thinking part, and the linguistic part, from which arises the old adage, “think before you speak”, or, “for that which you don’t know you cannot speak”.

    We’re so inescapably surrounded by people, that we’ve forgotten ourselves.
  • Our Minimal Epistemic Commitment (Fixing Descartes' Cogito)
    The 'we' is 'deeper' or more 'primordial' than the (linguistic) 'I.'Pie

    Yet, it was an “I” from which that notion of primordial is given. If the other way around, how come “we” is at the top of the second column of pronouns, while “I” is at the top of the first?

    If the (linguistic) “I”, what qualifies the “we”? What is a linguistic “I” anyway?
  • Our Minimal Epistemic Commitment (Fixing Descartes' Cogito)
    I'm hoping you'll enjoy what he makes/takes of Kant.Pie

    Not bad. Don’t agree with much of it, but then....I ain’t got no letters after my name, so what ta hell do I know.

    Some time later: it’s actually pretty good. First I read only the posted excerpt, hence the disagreement, only later the whole link, which helps the context of the post.
  • Our Minimal Epistemic Commitment (Fixing Descartes' Cogito)
    The ghost story remark was meant to emphasize that it's superfluous.Pie

    What’s superfluous? Experience? The remark? Doesn’t matter; I’m not interested in the superfluous.

    I do believe that norms govern our claims.....Pie

    What norms; what is a norm and from whence do they arise? And for that in which you merely believe, what governance can there be?
  • Our Minimal Epistemic Commitment (Fixing Descartes' Cogito)
    Do you believe in some kind of wordless angelic 'language' of 'pure' concept, unsoiled by the filthy outerworld ?Pie don’t? That can’t be right; you’ve already admitted to it, calling it “one and universal”.

    'Experience' is a ghost storyPie

    Yes it is, as are all such abstracted explanatory devices regarding proposed speculative methodologies. So what? Must it be said, then, that there is no such thing as experience, simply because talking about it removes it from its occurrence which isn’t and can’t be talked about?

    Even if there isn’t, as the cognitive neurobiologists are wont to insist, still we are predisposed by our very nature to call out by name whatever it is that seems to be happening in us, not to judge an obtained internal understanding, but iff such internal speculative mechanism is accompanied by a wish to promote an explanation of that judgement.
  • Our Minimal Epistemic Commitment (Fixing Descartes' Cogito)
    I can be right or wrong about the world all by myself.....
    — Mww

    I don't dispute that rational agents can make true or false claims.

    That I make empirical mistakes relative to the eternal world says nothing about a private language nor about whatever normative reports....or even internal rationalizing excuses.....I may offer following from such mistakes.

    Do we not bark and hiss in these inherited norm-governed, sound patterns known as English ?Pie

    Sure we do, but it is never necessary that we do, with respect to the aforementioned minimally rational intelligible epistemic situations.

    The problem is when the solipsist tells me that I can't know there's a world beyond me.Pie

    We rational ones ought not care at all what lil' Rene smarty pants figures out just for himself.Pie

    Smarty Pants paved the way for disappearing the problem. Even if a good god or a bad demon rather than a merely foolish solipsist is the source of your apparent deception, there is recourse, and you are it. Nothing more than, hey!! I jumped the shark, so can you!!!

    Can’t blame the late Renaissance or Enlightenment folks that removed the deistic impediment to human intellectualism, for the nonsense of the post-moderns who, in fancying their supposed progress, did nothing more than install a different one.
  • Our Minimal Epistemic Commitment (Fixing Descartes' Cogito)
    I claim that the minimum rational intelligible epistemic situation is a plurality of persons subject to the same logic and together in a world that they can be right or wrong about.Pie

    Your view is so close to mine. Do you not see that ?Pie

    I can be right or wrong about the world all by myself, thank you very much. So, no, I don't see it, sorry.
  • Our Minimal Epistemic Commitment (Fixing Descartes' Cogito)
    It's not 'I think' but 'we think.'Pie

    You stipulated Descartes’ cogito, so it follows from the original French (1637) Discourse on Method, Pt 4.....

    “... je pense, donc je suis....”

    .......and subsequently in First Principles 1. 7., 1644.....

    “....So this item of knowledge—I’m thinking, so I exist—is the first and most certain thing to occur to anyone who philosophizes in an orderly way....”

    ....that ol’ Rene intended it to be understood cogito relates to individuals, even if speaking in general regarding all individuals. is “I think”, not “we think”. You know.....philosophizing in an orderly way.

    Unless of course it's not just babble...and you appeal to a reason or logic that binds us both...Pie

    I do so appeal, but only insofar as it is at least counterproductive, and at most utterly absurd, to suppose we are not of the same intellectual character. In whatever form that character manifests, does nothing to detract from the fact that there is one, and it is common to all of us. Otherwise, one relinquishes his claim to being human.

    That being said, philosophizing in an orderly way completely destroys.....

    ....the assumption that the external world, the one beyond 'my' experience, is merely a more or less reasonable hypothesis.Pie

    .....insofar as the external world in toto is the ground of my experience, which makes explicit the external world beyond my experience, is no less the external world, but only of my possible experience. What the external world beyond my experience, and thereby the possible experience of it, can a reasonable hypothesis. Conditioned by changes in time, not the permanence in reality.

    Philosophizing in an orderly way reduces our minimal epistemic commitment to.....granting that for which the negation is impossible. Which, ironically enough, gets us right back to Descartes’ philosophy that everybody hates.

    But then, “in an orderly way” is a subjective judgement, so, there is that.......(sigh)
  • Our Minimal Epistemic Commitment (Fixing Descartes' Cogito)
    It doesn't make sense for us to use logic (...) to a argue against the (...) force of logic....Pie

    It makes perfect sense, for us, taken as a community of identical intelligences. It makes no sense for each of us, individually, with respect to ourselves alone. The intrinsic circularity of human reason, formerly called its illusory nature, in the most basic construction and use of logic and logical principles a priori, has been exposed for centuries.

    We need to go back to the absolutely minimal notion of whatever there is to make correct or incorrect statements about.Pie

    How to know that, without the antecedent conditions for making correct or incorrect statements. Getting back to the minimal notions for that which justifies the conditions for the correctness of statements.....

    I claim that the minimum rational intelligible epistemic situation is a plurality of persons subject to the same logicPie

    The absolutely necessary ground for the possibility of skeptical opinion, the very thing said to not make sense for us, insofar as any one subject operating from congruent logical form yet employing dissimilar objects premised by his own logical principles, can readily, and possibly successfully, argue against any other subject’s logic.

    Affirming cogito, while not doing much to “fix” it.

    More cart-before-the-horse metaphysics.....
  • Is there an external material world ?
    Less like truth, more like meaning.creativesoul

    Short, sweet, to the point....the boon of good philosophizing.

    Scopes......(chuckles to self).

    Still, at the end of the day, I’m more convinced by my own logical reasoning than I am persuaded by another’s semantics. I never question my own meanings, for then understanding must question itself insofar as it is the source of all my meanings and is therefore a self-contradiction, but invariably question another’s logical reasoning.

    consistent language use alone is insufficient evidence to conclude that what's being said is true....creativesoul

    True enough, insofar as determinations of what is true has nothing to do with what’s being said in the first place.

    Counterpoint: the bane of philosophy doesn’t reside in wrong kind of value placed on consistent language use. It is that consistent language use is valued at all.
  • Is there an external material world ?
    Is there an external material world? (....) Such questions are the bane of philosophy. They are consequences of placing (...) the wrong kind of value upon consistent language use.creativesoul

    What would the right kind of value look like?
  • Is there an external material world ?
    philosophy must be done within the limits of our concepts and language,Hello Human

    Philosophy can only be done within the limits of reason, philosophizing is done within the limits of language.

    It's a matter of what existed in its entirety prior to, and thus regardless of, all accounting practices thereof thereafter.creativesoul

    “Its” being experience, the assertion is true iff the accounting practice is reason itself, brain machinations aside, insofar as it would be very difficult to establish neurological function as an accounting practice.
  • Is there an external material world ?
    We select from among a range of options which phenomena, to use (possibly abuse) your terminology, we are to make a concept.Isaac

    I see what you’re saying, but I find it rather inefficient. According to the Old Guys, each perception generates only its own phenomenon, so a range of them, for any one perception, generates inefficiency. But we do, on the other hand, select from a range of options what constitutes each phenomenon, which is the purview of the productive imagination, so there is a selection process in there.

    The boundary separating tree from not-tree is real, a phenomena we sense, but it is not the only available real boundary.Isaac

    Again, I somewhat agree, your boundary being my limitation, both being real. Each property of any object has its own boundary/limitation, the totality of them determining te phenomenon as such, and from that, how the object is to be named.

    Something like that?

    I think a major sticking point between Old Guys and New Guys is.....where are phenomena to be found, in the complete picture.
  • Is there an external material world ?
    Some things we think about are themselves existentially dependent upon words.creativesoul

    Special Relativity...a physical relation of the Universe to us....does not need words. To think about Special Relativity and form his theory thereof, Einstein used his imagination; to record the objects of his imagination as a theory he used words and symbols. When I think about the theory, I use the words of it, but not the symbols because I am not proving the hypotheses contained by the theory, to form in me the images the words represent, just the reverse of what Einstein did. So, yes, my thought about SR depends on Einstein’s words, insofar as the images I think for myself are given from the affects the external words perceived as mere objects prescribe, to which I assign my own understanding. This works quite well for SR and GR, but not so well for QM. At least for me.

    the content of that toddler's experience depends upon how we define the word "experience". That cannot be right.creativesoul

    It could be right, if experience is define as having content. Or, if a principle of a theory of experience mandates that an empty experience is impossible. Herein, experience is not so much defined, as necessarily conditioned, is susceptible to certain criteria in order to be an experience. Biggest mistake in metaphysics, is reification; experience is not a thing, it is an logical end given from consistently determinable logical means.

    Those and many other experiences existed in their entirety prior to our naming and descriptive practices.
    — creativesoul

    No. Something existed prior to our naming practices.

    Keyword: practices. The practice of, the innate ability to, name, may be as necessary to human intelligence as reason itself, but the actual employment of that ability does not occur absent that which is to be named. And that is conditioned by time, insofar as there is only and always a mere undetermined something prior to its name. That which is a mere something, is phenomenon; that which is named, is conception, which may or may not be given from phenomenon, but is so necessarily with respect to real objects.
  • Is there an external material world ?
    how could non-verbal images be used to symbolize abstract notions.....generalityJanus

    (grain of sand/beach)


    (Grain of sand/this beach)


    (Grain of sand/not this beach)


    (Grain of sand/beach; this beach; not this beach; any beach; all beaches)

    All parenteticals can be images, obviously. Now, perhaps I’m treating your “abstract notions” as universals, which may have particulars as their objects. I did that because, technically speaking, abstract notions are pure conceptions that do not have objects of their own, which makes explicit they cannot be represented by either words or images, but only the relations which constitute them, may.

    Now my claim has just been that a complex argument or train of thought involving abstract concepts cannot be followed except in symbolic language terms.Janus

    Agreed, with the caveat “cannot be followed”. It remains that while it is rather absurd to suppose I have a complex argument with myself, I can nonetheless have a complex chain of thought comprised of a series of conjoined images, which, of course, no one else could follow. Or, in fact, even know about. To objectify my chain of thought, such that another could both know and possibly understand it, language would be necessary.
  • Is there an external material world ?
    There is no denying that thinking about words is a kind of thought that needs words. Otherwise, there would be nothing to think about.creativesoul

    True enough, but is it not therefore logical, and rational, to claim that thinking about anything except words, would not need them? While it is true every thought must have its object, it does not follow that ever object must be a word.

    We're considering whether or not any thought needs words......creativesoul

    It’s been established that some thoughts need words....thoughts with wordsk as their object.

    ......any and all meaningful coherent answers to that particular question are based completely upon what counts as thought that needs words, as well as what counts as thought that does not.creativesoul

    Ok....the kind of thought that has words as its object counts as the kind of thought that needs words. The kind of thought that has anything but words as its object.....why does that kind of thought need them?

    It seems to me that the difference between thought that needs words and thought that does not is one of existential dependency. The former is existentially dependent upon words, and the latter is not.creativesoul

    Ok, fine. A thought that needs words to exist is impossible without the words that are its object. This is true for particular thoughts of a certain kind, but does not hold for thought in general. It follows that the existence of thought in general is not necessarily existentially dependent on words. Which is exactly where we began this dialectic.

    Here we face a 'problem' though. If we claim that simple thought existed prior to the first words......creativesoul

    That’s not the claim, which is simple thought doesn’t require words. Simple thoughts occur whether or not words exist, and regardless of their temporality relative to thought in general.

    ......and we aim to set out that kind of thought, then we are taking account of that which existed in its entirety prior to our taking it into account.creativesoul

    Yes, we can do that. Aim to set out, and, take account, are just about the same thing, so when we do either we are describing something. So we are describing an antecedent. Can’t account for that which hasn’t occurred, I wouldn’t think.

    Thus, we can get it wrong!creativesoul

    This carries the implication that the occurrence and the account of the occurrence can be incompatible. I submit this only possible from a distinction in chronological reference frames. I have often taken account of an existant thought and found it wanting, but only from the perspective of a successive, and conceptually differentiated, thought. Commonly called instruction if from external source, or introspection if from the same internal source.

    if we're using the term as a means to take account of that which exists in its entirety prior to our taking it into account......creativesoul

    I understand this as....if we use thought to take account of thought, to which I agree wholeheartedly...

    ......then whatever we say about such thought must not only be consistent with the ability to exist in its entirety prior to words, but our account must set out how it can/does.creativesoul

    .....but now it is that what we say that takes account. So what we say must be consistent with our thoughts...yes, it should, in order to be productive. The account sets out the consistency between the thought and the account we take of it, by relegating words to the representations of the conceptions that are the content of our thoughts. In this theory, the consistency in the account is given, under the assumption of an otherwise rationally operative intelligence.

    You’re a tough nut to crack, mon ami, and hopefully I did some justice.
  • What makes an observation true or false?

    Ahhh, yes, thanks. Both my guess that’s what you meant, and my assertion observational statements are not what Kant is “splitting” between analytic and synthetic, is validated.

    You may have a valid argument in its own right, just not with respect to Kant. Something more modern than Enlightened, more analytic than continental, more conventional than metaphysic.....
  • What makes an observation true or false?

    Yeah....I don’t know what an observational sentence would be, except maybe sentences regarding observations. I hope it’s not that, because that has nothing to do with what Kant split.

    That a triangles angles add up to 180 degrees was an analytical truth.Count Timothy von Icarus

    “.....Mathematical judgements are always synthetical....”
    (CPR.....referential pagination unavailable, cuz I’m not at home. Sorry)

    Except that non-euclidean geometries were later developed where triangles' angles don't add up to 180 degreesCount Timothy von Icarus

    Kant knew of spheres, and knew triangles could be drawn on spheres, and surely would have noticed the difference with respect to planar triangles. Doesn’t matter if he didn’t, and does nothing to negate his proofs, insofar as his exposition respecting triangles stipulates straight lines. In fact, to even arrive at the truth that interior angles on a sphere sum to more than 180 degrees, involves exactly the same synthetic a priori deductive judgements as demonstrated in the text.

    It's unclear if there are analytical truths. Or rather, even if there are, there is no clear way to distinguish then from arbitrary dogmatic beliefs.Count Timothy von Icarus

    Doesn’t matter. The only reason for analytic truths in Kant, is to set the stage for the possibility of what isn’t that, but at the same time, uses the LNC for its logical validity. Even if it’s a dogmatic belief, albeit hardly arbitrary I should think, while still susceptible to the LNC, it is a valid dogmatic belief, therefore useful for subsequent hypotheses, particularly in regard to the determination of principles.

    As far as Quine is concerned, you were probably directing that to the Josh, I already know it, so I’ll leave it alone.
  • Is there an external material world ?
    How would that look?Marchesk

    The solution looks like some form of transcendental idealism, insofar as it uses, rather than disregards, an intrinsic logical dualism in the human intellect.

    First....because it is a metaphysical problem, it must look like a metaphysical solution; would look like an epistemological solution, if it explains something we want to know; would look like a logical solution, if it is predicated entirely on logical conditions; looks like a solution based on, or incorporating, relations, because that about which we want to know involves conditions that do not belong to us, in juxtaposition to conditions that do.

    There is an established metaphysical solution, predicated on logical conditions, sufficiently explanatory for what we want to know, which effectively combines direct empirical realism with indirect representational idealism in a single intelligence.

    Whether the solution is worth a damn has nothing whatsoever to do with how old it is, or whatever name by which it is called, but is a function of how many of its core tenets are held in common by its opponents, which merely exemplifies the very human intellectual duality upon which the proposed solution is predicated.

    And the fact none of a metaphysical solution’s core tenets are susceptible to empirical proof is irrelevant, because all physical sciences with co-relevant procedural constituency, are equally unprovable. Beside the point that the dialectical discourse is in a philosophy medium, not one in which empirical proofs for the validity of its arguments, is absolutely necessary.

    That’s how it would me.

    nobody can quite agree on the terms under disputeMarchesk

    Same as it ever was, throughout the ages, right?
  • Is there an external material world ?
    Mighten it be a fundamental misconception, to attribute to “appearance” the notion of “looks like” as opposed to the notion of “makes present to”? If so, what a thing “looks like” may be considered an imputed logical relation by a system of intelligence capable of it, but to be “presented to” may only be a direct effect on the system, having only a physical relation to it. From that, it is hypotetically feasible that both indirect and direct relations occur, with respect to things real, insofar as logical relations cannot manifest in mere physical presence, and mere physical presence cannot authorize logical resemblance.

    What is perceived is real directly, insofar as that thing is not mediated by a system; what is experienced is real, but mediated by a system to which it is given by its presence, thus, with respect to perception, is real indirectly.

    What really....I mean the problem here? How come, in 50-odd pages, consensus that the possibility of both forms of realism may be incorporated necessarily in the human cognitive system? If each form is justifiably refutable by the other, and the exceptions to each as a general rule are rampant, then the ground of the possibility of both, each limited to its own specific domain, but functioning in unison towards a given end, becomes the better option.

    (Back in the day, on the tv show Taxi, Danny Divito and Judd Hircsh were arguing about something, and Cristopher Lloyd, butts in with some comment. They both give him The Look, to which he says, completely deadpan, “oh, I’m sorry, am I still here?”. Call me Lloyd)
  • Is there an external material world ?
    One entity represents a massive thought complex.Metaphysician Undercover

    Sure. Mathematics comes to mind.
  • Is there an external material world ?
    I would whole heartedly agree that words presuppose thinking....creativesoul

    My major premise, the fundamental ground of my argument. I shall call that a win, and issue an exuberant....and wholeheartedly honest....thank you. be more precise and consistent, some does anyway.creativesoul

    I might agree some complex thought does not presuppose words, but rather, ensue from them, insofar as the words are given to me, from which my complex thoughts arise, in which case, I may treat of those words as any of my perceptions. Still, the dialectical continuity should limit the relation of word and thought to individual subjects.

    Acknowledging that some thought is existentially dependent upon language does not force us into saying that all thought is.creativesoul

    But it does force a sufficient explanation as to the relation between the quality of thoughts wherein words are necessary and the quality thoughts wherein they are not. Parsimony...the elimination of self-contradiction...should suggest thought does not have a quality, such that it follows words perform no qualitative conditioning on them, or, the quality of thoughts resides in some other procedural constituent.

    Wondering about time is a kind of thought that needs words.creativesoul

    Does it? The first thing that occurs to me, is an image of a device by which a change can be demonstrated. Never does the representation arise in the form of a word. I will agree, nonetheless, that wondering about time, as the subject of a series of propositions, might elicit a series of representations of words I’ve experienced concerning what others have said about it. But then, when I do that, in effect, all I’m doing is treating my own private cognition as if I am in the process of expressing myself.

    Which leads inevitably to this: do you see where ego might explain the position that complex thoughts require words? Complex thoughts would require words, merely from the seeming that whatever is being thought, ought to be expressed? Or, perhaps, I am so desperate to be understood, I treat my thoughts as if they were words, in order to facilitate the congruency of the recipient’s understanding. Dos the sound of a thought carry the same weight as the thought?

    Given those possibilities, it is clear words may adjust the quality of a complex thought, thus can be said to be necessary for such adjustment. But not necessary for the thought itself. Also given is possible sufficient reason for simple thoughts requiring no words at all, insofar as the quality of simple thoughts is determined by its simplicity. If one does not understand how I arrived at the word “BOOM!!!”, then he will have great difficulty with how I understand, e.g., religion, should I talk to him about it.

    Not all opinions are equal.creativesoul

    Oh, but they are. The correspondence between the truth of them, and that to which it is directed, may not be. Opinion is merely a relative judgement, after all.

    The disagreement in our respective frameworks, is predicated on the differences in our definitions. Still, given that.....

    the human brain has not undergone much evolution at all over the past ten thousand or so years.creativesoul remains that our brains work compatibly with each other, which implies our thinking must, if thinking is only a production of brain mechanics necessarily. How we think about things, on the other hand, is governed by the contingency of our experiences, and not the stationary condition of our physiology.

    this is not our first exchange.creativesoul

    And time well spent, I must say, even if this....

    You misunderstand the modern argument. Mine anyway.creativesoul the case.
  • Phenomenalism
    Set out that transcendental argument for us again....Banno

    “....we are not entitled to maintain that sensibility is the only possible mode of intuition....”

    Now that’s only a premise in the transcendental argument, but you know how it is, that....

    The arguments are detailed, and get lost in the noise of the forums.Banno
  • Is there an external material world ?
    On your view...creativesoul

    In my view..... is preposterous, bordering on the catastrophically absurd, that the totality of that of which I am aware, re: the entirely of my cognitions, requires that I read, write and speak;
    ......if language developed as a means of simplex expression by a single thinking human subject, or as a means of multiplex communication between a plurality of thinking human subjects, then it is the case language presupposes that which is expressed or communicated by it;
    ......if language is assemblage of words, and words are the representations of conceptions, and language is the means of report in the form of expression or communication, then language presupposes the conceptions they represent, and on which is reported;
    ......thinking is cognition by means of conceptions. If language presupposes conceptions, and conceptions are the form of cognitions, and cognition is thinking, then words presuppose thinking.
    ......that which presupposes cannot be contained in that which is presupposed by it;
    .....there is no language in thinking; there is language in only post hoc reports on thinking.

    If language is so all-fired necessary for the formation of complex thoughts, why did we come equipped with the means for the one, but only for the means of developing the other? Why did we not come equally equipped for both simultaneously, if one absolutely requires the other? The robotics engineer manufactures a machine with pinpoint circuit board soldering accuracy; the toddler has somewhat less accuracy but still understands the distinction between thing-as-object and thing-as-receptor-of object, and the congruency of shape for both, to put a round object in a round hole.

    So I come upon a thing, some thing for which I have absolutely no experience whatsoever. Maybe something fell to Earth, maybe I discovered something previously unknown in the deep blue. The modern argument seems to be......I can form no complex thoughts about that new thing, can have no immediate cognition of it, unless or until I can assign words to it. But, being new, which words do I assign if I don’t cognize what the new thing appears to be? What prevents me from calling the new thing by a name already given to an old thing?

    And, of course, everything is new at one time or another.

    Views: Like noses. Everybody’s got one.
  • Phenomenalism

    Everyone has a box with something in it.....major premise;
    The something is a beetle....minor premise;
    The box might be empty....minor premise.

  • Phenomenalism

    But the major is not an either/or propositional dichotomy. Everyone has a box with something in it, so the box that one has, has something in it.

    The reconciliation is that “beetle” might be not anything (“...the box might be empty...”). Hence arises the absurdity, for then the box, being empty, still contains not anything.

    (Double sigh)
  • Phenomenalism Erwin plagiarized Ludwig. Bet they weren’t best of friends.