Cool synopsis. I’m all for reduction from the naturalist attitude, but that realm of “transcendental experience”…..that just felt weird coming out of my mouth. To just call it “reason”, of course, doesn’t advance the phenomenological program, so I get it.

….and speaking of presenting questions, something I distinctly remember doing, which at my age, is rather significant.

Ain’t gonna happen. He’s rather well-known for the questions he presents his dialectical companions, the lack of relevant response from one or another of them, would probably make him think twice when it comes to associating himself with philosophers in general.

I did not mean to overlook your request. — Mapping the Medium

….yet it repeats itself.

Socrates would object in the most strenuous of terms.

Which would you prefer? — Mapping the Medium

I’m obviously not MU, but I asked first.

Nominalism. Denial of the reality of abstract objects? Or, denial of the reality of universals and/or general ideas? Something else? — Mww

Sorry, , for butting in, kinda. I recognize that you’re going deeper into the subject matter than my simple question asks.

A deflationist reading this will likely wonder what all the fuss is about…. — Srap Tasmaner

That’d be me, on the one hand, insofar as that which is, is given. But it is, on the other hand, the systemic function of my intelligence to internally model that which is given, in such a way as to accommodate my experience of it.

But that’s not the point herein, is it. There must already be an internally constructed model in order for there to be a duck as such, in the first place. Otherwise, there is merely some thing given, subsequently determinable by its behaviors. Or, as they liked to say back in The Good Ol’ Days, by its appearance to the senses.

So why do I need to model a real duck, if I’ve already done it? The duck I physically manufacture and situate in an environment adds nothing to my experience. Even if I discover the naturally real duck exhibits a behavior absent from my experience, and I manufacture Duck 2.0 incorporating it, the latest version must still have its own internal precursor, in order for its formally unperceived appearance to properly manifest.
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What do models model exactly? It's not a hard question; the answer is behavior. — Srap Tasmaner

While physically manufactured models model behavior, the necessarily antecedent intellectually assembled models, which do not exhibit naturally real behavior, do not. It still isn’t a hard question, it just doesn’t have a single, all-encompassing answer.

…..and then it joins a Forum. — Wayfarer

Yeah, well, you know….it’s a bitch not being able to find any decent gymnasia these days.

what do you make of it, dear reader? — Arcane Sandwich

“…. Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind. It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust. It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion….”

What do I make of it? The subject matter herein merely illustrates that not much has changed in 3-4,000 years of documented human thought.

I was not writing that comment for academic scrutinization. — Mapping the Medium

Awww damn. I’m all warm and fuzzy inside. (Grin)

….he was not speaking of metaphysics as a philosophical discipline. — Mapping the Medium

Agreed; he was commenting on the inacuteness of common sense, and that they are not proper metaphysical cognitions, re: Hume and assorted and sundry British empiricists, I’m guessing. My problem was that he implied bad logical quality to metaphysical cognitions, irrespective of their connection to common sense thinking. With the caveat, again, in that I may not have given Charles his just due.

Yes, understood. I was just carrying over what he did for himself he meant for all rational subjects to do for themselves.

Familiar, yes; studied….not so much.

From that essay, though, comes one of my more seriously held cognitive inclinations, re: to believe is no more than to think, from which follows one says nothing more when he says he believes, than what he has already thought. And insofar as no belief is possible without the arrangement of conceptions, which just is to think, to speak from belief alone, holds no power at all.

Peirce explores the idea that beliefs settle our doubts because doubts make us uncomfortable. — Mapping the Medium

I rather think doubt is merely a negative belief, both of which are cognitions, discursive judgements of relative truth, whereas comfort is a feeling. I don’t associate one with the other, myself. Smacks of psychology….the red-headed stepchild of proper metaphysics.

Also from the essay, “…. imbued with that bad logical quality to which the epithet metaphysical is commonly applied…”, which implies metaphysical cognitions possess bad logical quality, precisely the opposite of my personal opinion.
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Nominalism. Denial of the reality of abstract objects? Or, denial of the reality of universals and/or general ideas? Something else?

According to Kant…. — Corvus

Close enough, I suppose. I rather think accepting ideas and/or beliefs of others is dogmatism, which occurs when a subject presumes to advance in his own metaphysical thought without determining the validity of its ground as opposed to the habitual neglect of it, hence the proverbial “slumber”.

It follows that to awaken from a slumber is to begin what the slumbering prevented, in this case, determining the warrant for acceptance of any belief or idea, his own or someone else’s. So it isn’t what a subject falls into at all, but instead, what he comes out of.

So to awaken from dogmatic slumbers is to begin the critique of one’s own pure cognitions, for the origin, the warrant, hence the validity, of the principles upon which they necessarily rest, thereby promising that we “….must not be supposed to lend any countenance to that loquacious shallowness which arrogates to itself the name of popularity, nor yet to scepticism, which makes short work with the whole science of metaphysics...”

Now what was offered as opinion with respect to one purportedly missing the opportunity to be awakened, just indicates he chose not to examine, or, as I mentioned, gave no evidence that he did examine, the validity of the ground the pure cognitions of his dialectical opponent presented to him, but merely designated the words representing them as neither wise nor intelligent, the epitome of sceptical appraisal.
————-

And the dogmatic slumber to awaken from? To critique the grounding principles for? That to which I wished to direct your attention, but apparently failed miserably?

Why, the “nominalism thought virus”, of course. Maybe it’s just me, but the subtlety in that phrase, that concept…..(sigh)

Another word is "sublime" — RussellA

Yep; good catch.

In us, beauty is found; sublimity is excited.

So be it.

One purportedly missed the opportunity to be awakened from “dogmatic slumbers”, the other personifies Sisyphus with a generally unrecognized metaphysical doctrine.

Same as it ever was……

Maybe your two-party dialectical failure to continue, relates to a proposed affliction resident in the “nominalism thought virus”.

Ok.

…..you don’t think there is anything about how reality is that can dictate out it ought to be. — Bob Ross

I wouldn’t agree with that. If I judge something perceived as offensive to my moral sensibilities, it is possible I may determine an act whereby that offense is rectified, which is the same as changing reality into what I feel it ought to be.

…..the moral anti-realist has to note that the ontology of morality is really just grounded in the projections of subjects….. — Bob Ross

Dunno about moral anti-realists, but as far as I’m concerned, morality doesn’t have an ontology, in the commons sense of the conception. On the other hand, I’m ok with the projection of subjects being the exemplification, or the objectification, of their respective moral determinations.

But this arena is anthropology, or clinical psychology, whereas I’m only interested in moral philosophy itself. Just like in cognitive systems: it’s not that we know, it’s how it is that we know; so too in moral systems, it’s not that we are moral, but how it is that are we moral.

…..and this is exactly what I understand you to be saying by noting that the wills of subjects are introduce new chains of causality into the world and are not themselves causal. — Bob Ross

Hmmmm. Backwards? The will of subjects is causal, insofar as it determines what a moral act shall be, in accordance with the those conditions intrinsic to individual moral constitution. But the will cannot itself project that act onto the world, insofar as any act requires physical motivations. The missing piece, or, the controlling factor let’s say, between the determination of a moral act and the projection of it, is aesthetic judgement, re:, does the feeling I get from the effect of this act reflect the feeling I get from the cause.

See the problem? The feeling of good in having willed a moral act does not necessarily match the feeling of good in having done it. And that is the mark of ideal moral agency: the only act willed is always good, the aesthetic judgement will always be positive, the act shall be done without regard to the consequential feeling of having done it.

Hence, the ideal of pure practical reason, and the ground of what makes a will good, doesn’t have an answer, the philosophy describing its function justifiably predicated on it being so.

This is a equivocation between ontology and epistemology…. — Bob Ross

I understand what you’re saying, but there’s a conceptual divide in place. Ontology as you intend the concept, has to do with things, what is and why, how, etc, of them. Epistemology, by the same token, has to do with the method, and the system using that method, belonging to a certain kind of intelligence, for knowing about those things subsumed under the conception of natural ontology.

Those don’t work for what’s going on here. Ontology, insofar as for that Nature is causality, and the human subject is the intelligence that knows only what Nature provides.

For what’s going on here, the subject himself is the causality, and of those of which he is the cause it isn’t that he knows of them, but rather that he reasons to them. It makes no sense to say he knows, of that which fully and immediately belongs to him alone.

This is where that thing I said about feelings not being cognitions, fits. And also, why everything we’re talking about here is of a far different systemic formalism. And while it is true we need that standard discursive epistemology to talk about this stuff, and we need the standard phenomenal ontology to properly deploy it for its intended purpose, there is no need of either in its development, in first-person internal immediacy.

What good is, is only determinable by moral philosophy, in which hypotheticals and mere examples have no say.

If the answer is that we cannot say, then you have no reason to believe that a will can be good. — Bob Ross

I addressed that very concern: the evidence that humanity in general determines good acts, is sufficient reason to think the will as good. I only said there is no scientific cause/effect evidence for the will itself, which is to say there is objective or empirical knowledge of it.

Our conversation became so spectacular, that they couldn’t help themselves — Bob Ross

Exactly the way I see it. Which makes….you know….two of us.

I am asking what makes a will good? — Bob Ross

I’m a fan of metaphysical reductionism, that is, reduce propositions to the lowest form of principles which suffice to ground the conceptions represented in the propositions, and, justify the relation of those conceptions to each other. Which is fine, but comes with the inherent danger of reducing beyond such justifications, often into relations irrational on the one hand and not even possible on the other, from the propositions themselves. The proverbial transcendental illusion, the only way out of which, is just don’t reduce further than needed.

And this is what happens when asking what makes a will good. If whatever makes the will good, can be represented as merely some necessary presupposition, it doesn’t matter what specifically is the case. It is enough to comprehend with apodeitic certainty that it is possible for there to be a root of what good is, hence it is non-contradictory, hence possibly true, the will just is the case. This is where it is proper for the common understanding to rest assured.

After having desolved the question of what makes a will good, it remains to be determined at least the conditions by which the possibility of its being good in itself, is given, which is the domain of the philosopher of metaphysics. These conditions are evidenced, and the case that there is such a thing as a will that is good in itself obtains, by the relevant activities of humanity in general, evil being the exception to the rule.

It is impossible to determine what it is exactly that makes the will good, for the simple reason it is impossible to determine exactly what the will is, which makes any scientific use of the principle of cause and effect in its empirical form useless. Best the metaphysician can do, is attribute certain rational constructs to the idea of a will, sufficient to explain man’s relevant activities, then speculate on the more parsimonious, the most logical, method by which those constructs originate, from which, as it so happens, arises Kantian transcendental logic.

That logic, then, while saying nothing about what makes a will good, is quite specific in a purely speculative fashion, with respect to the principles enabling the will to be that which is directly that faculty responsible for making the man a good man, by his proper use of it, and to whom is attributed moral agency.

The transcendental necessary presupposition: there is no good, in, of and for itself, other than the good will.
The form of transcendental principles: maxims, imperatives.
The transcendental logic’s original constructs: freedom, and autonomy.
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Right has nothing to do with good, but only with a good, or the good.

Anyway….food for thought. Or confusion. Take your pick.

For me it is the act we are questioning and whether this should or should not provide a person with satisfaction — Tom Storm

Agreed. That you use satisfaction, or I use contentment, we are in principle saying the same thing. To be a perfectly moral agent is to act, regardless of circumstance, only in accordance with that which provides satisfaction for the agent. Humans rarely do that regardless of circumstance, being influenced by everything from peer pressure to superficial personal gratifications, mere desires.

With that being said, I rather think it is the reason for the act needing the closest examination. It is, after all, my act, determined by my reason, so I am the act’s causality. That’s the easy part; it remains to be explained what reason uses to make these determinations. Hence….moral philosophy.

Why wouldn’t the son just say oh HELL yeah I’m happy!!! Being a kid, he doesn’t consider it as being given pleasure, but only being given that by which pleasure in him just happens to be a consequence.

I mean, even if happiness is merely a subjective condition represented by contentment, contentment itself is no less a feeling of pleasure.

….philosophers and teachers are worthless if we can never be mistaken about what is best for us? — Count Timothy von Icarus

We can never be mistaken about what’s best for ourselves iff we alone are the causality for it. We can be, and often are, mistaken in choosing to act in opposition to what is best. Philosophers and teachers have nothing to do with all that, except perhaps in the formulation of a speculative theory that explains how it all happens.

And how might we explain the ubiquitous human experience of regret…. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That’s just the feeling one gets from a post hoc judgement that he’s chosen an act in opposition to what he knows is best. The proverbial easy way out….

…..you know by human nature what morally good acts are…. — Corvus

Absolutely. And from which arises my primary contention herein, that knowing what good acts are makes explicit you know what good is. And comes the notion that asking what is good, was never the right question to ask.

Oooo…devolution. I like that better. Aristotle = eudaimonia with or without arete, and Kantian happiness writ large, re: “…contentment with one’s subjective condition…”.

Sure, the distinction between pleasure and happiness is alive and relatively well presently, insofar as pleasure is the primary conception of the singular positive feeling, happiness being one of many subsumed under it. Right? Is that what you’re getting at?

Is the contention that individuals always know what is best for them and what is true for them vis-á-vis ethics? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Not ethically, insofar as ethics carries the implication of external authority, re: jurisprudence, and my knowledge of what is best for me merely keeps me out of jail. If I do not accept the truth of external jurisprudence, I am entitled to simply remove myself from it, which makes that truth contingent on whether or not I am suited to it.

Knowing what’s best for me, on a much stricter sense, is an internal necessary truth, carries the implication of an internal authority alone, the escape from which is, of course, quite impossible. Being human, and given a specific theoretical exposition, yes, individuals always know what is best for himself, and he certainly knows what is true, because he alone is the cause of what he knows as best for him.
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I mean it just in the common sense that we have the potential to be/do things we currently aren't/can't. — Count Timothy von Icarus

We do in fact have the capacity to acquire skills. I admit we do have the capacity, the potential, to do things we currently wouldn’t consider possible. I won’t deny myself the capacity to cheat on speed limits which experience affirms and from which the potential stands, but experience proves I will deny myself the capacity for cutting off lil’ ol’ ladies in the checkout line, and from which the potential has always fallen but may not always. Doesn’t all that make common sense attributions rather lacking in explanatory power?

On the other hand, I do know I have the capacity to throw the trolley switch, I do know my moral constitution or agency proper, mandates that I will not, but I do not know, given the immediate occassion, whether or not that act manifests through my will. Which sorta IS the point, re: explanatory power for determining acts can never be found in capacity for acting, but only in that by which originates the determinations themselves.

True dat….but much more fun to figure out why, both that it is barmy, and in addition, the incessant supposition it’s necessary.

Cool. Gotta love it when a plan comes together.

Hey…people exploded on us. We got somebody’s attention, it seems. Was it our intellectually piercing dialectic, or were they just bored with what they were doing?
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…how does one evaluate what is a good or bad will? — Bob Ross

Oh, that’s easy: the goodness or badness of the will is a direct reflection on the worthiness of being content with one’s subjective condition, which is commonly called being happy, which is itself the prime condition for moral integrity. The one willing an act in defiance of his principles would post hoc evaluate his will as bad, earning himself the title of immoral.

It is only under the apodeictic presupposition of a good will, that immoral practices are possible. On the other hand, if the will is neutral or bad, it becomes nearly impossible to explain why the predisposition of humans in general, given from historical precedence, is to do good, to act virtuously.

….good itself is a word for property of the actions. — Corvus

I might expand to say that a word represents a property of actions, good is a word that represents a property of actions, quality is a property of actions, therefore good is a word that represents the quality of actions.

Does that expansion diminish your point? Hopefully not too much anyway, cuz I agree with your major point.

This is quite similar to the discussion (…) elsewhere…. — Leontiskos

I’m aware; I left a scant two cents there a few days ago.
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Aristotle would call this pleasure. — Leontiskos

True enough. and I understand the symbiosis on the one hand and the conceptual evolution on the other.
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….you are depriving yourself of what is truly best… — Count Timothy von Icarus

From the perspective of a case-by-case basis, have I not determined by myself the best for myself, in granting his personal philosophy irrespective of my possible disagreement with it, and, asking for his opinion of mine, irrespective of whether or not I think he’s understood it? Doesn’t this demonstrate that, at the very least, I am aware of how arrive at such determinations in this case, which would then serve as sufficient reason for consciousness of how to arrive at them in any case?
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Imagine a world where everyone is their best….. — Count Timothy von Icarus

You mean like one of these “possible worlds” the postmodern analytical mindset deems so relevant? Dunno about all that pathological nonsense, except I’ll wager that world wouldn’t be inhabited by the humans commonly understood as such, by themselves.

So it is that, the circumventing of my own deprivation does nothing to show “St. Augustine, Boethius, or Plato are right”, which is indeed possible, but only that I am, which is apodeitically certain. And from that point of view….the only one that really matters….there is the ideal of good from pure practical reason.

How’s that for bourgeoisie metaphysics? Consign it to the flames?

…..virtues are tide to our nature…. — Bob Ross

I don’t know that my moral integrity remains intact until there’s a call for its exhibition. The best I can do until then, is come up with a way in which it ought to work, given any case I am inclined to actively address. And the way itself, is to check the checker; for any act of will, check for its accordance with a principle. The quote I used, re: “tide”, merely demonstrates that people generally are not, or at least seldom, inclined to enforce such subjective legislation.

Through metaphysical reductionism, from volitions in accordance with principles results the good as the ideal of pure practical reason, which answers the question, how do you define good. Although not a proper definition……also wasn’t ever a proper question anyway but oh well, right?….. it becomes clear, under certain theoretical conditions, why there isn’t going to be one, and furthermore, why there’s no need for it.

I’m happy but I cheated to be that way….
— Mww

Aristotle doesn’t call this kind of cheating happiness happiness at all — Bob Ross

No he doesn’t, but there isn’t any doubt that I am happy. If I actually feel happy in the sense of pure pleasure, seems kinda silly for someone else to say I’m not really. To be consistent along those lines, that someone else would also have to say I didn’t really steal the car, insofar as the theft of the car is the necessary condition for the feeling. It’s absurd to say I didn’t steal the car, therefore the inconsistency is given.

I get the point.
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Aristotle is right to point out that it is not about taking no pleasure in the act; it is about taking pleasure in acts that are good; and displeasure in acts that are bad. — Bob Ross

Perhaps, but being…..you know, a Western modern…..I find it more the wiser, to point out the advantage in discerning, not so much whether an act dispenses pleasure or pain, but rather, the method by which any act of will leaves my moral integrity intact.

Why is it always one kind of hurt for the guy who owns the car, but a very different kind of hurt for me in the theft of it? Something as mediocre as displeasure isn’t going to make the explanatory cut.

The happiness being referred to in enjoying the stolen car is superficial, cheap dopamine. There is no true happiness in that…. — Bob Ross

Cool. Point was pretty easy to make, truth be told. The point of superficial happiness, mere pleasure as it were, highlights a thing that makes that feeling possible, so we call it a good thing, even if it only good for that one thing…..making me love driving in a particular fashion.

But that still leaves me without the worthiness of that kind of happiness, that particular pleasure. I’m happy but I cheated to be that way, so I don’t deserve it. Seemed like a cool thing to do at the time but I regret it now, kinda thing.

I want to know what kinda thing it is, to be happy and deserve it. It’s not enough to know what it is not, I want to know what it is. What happiness would I not regret, and by extension, what thing can I do that may not make me happy at all, but I don’t regret having done it? Now the worthiness comes to the fore, in such case where I do a thing, feel anything but happy about, take no pleasure in the act, but remain happy….read as satisfied, content, undeterred, consistent with my virtues….with myself for the having the fortitude to act for the sake of good in itself.

Herein lay the ideal, re: the transcendental good in Kant, and a form of Nicomachean Ethics in Aristotle, combined with the pure practical reason as the means for determining those principles under which acts in accordance with those principles, are possible as volitions of the will. So says one moral philosophy amidst a veritable plethora of them.

You are confusing hedonic with eudaimonic happiness. — Bob Ross

When I quote you, then immediately respond relative to that quote, then you respond to my response with something suggesting my confusion, I wonder if you’ve missed the point of my response.

Different renditions of happiness aside, we are Western moderns after all, I shall consider it proved that worthiness of happiness and happiness itself, are very far from….

….interlinked to the point where one cannot come without the other. — Bob Ross

….and sufficiently so, that it serves as the form of a rule rather than an example of an exception to it.

So if I have given the inkling of a rule, is it something you understand well enough to form an opinion? Or, tell me how it shouldn’t be a rule in the first place?

…..worthiness of happiness and being happy are interlinked to the point where one cannot come without the other. — Bob Ross

So I’m driving along, in this cool-as-hell ‘67 Cobra, hair flyin’, head-bangin’ to some classic Foghat turned up to 11….happy as a pig in an overturned hotel restaurant dumpster.

The car isn’t mine, I stole it.

And with that…..(Sigh)
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You are welcome to your philosophical inclinations, as anyone is, but obviously they are very far from mine. Not that that’s a problem for either of us, only that there’s little chance of meeting in the middle.

But that’s what ‘redness’ means: it’s the property of being red. — Bob Ross

So a property of a property? Red is a property of a thing and redness is a property of red? Usually, a property facilitates establishment of consistent identity of an appearance, so that it can be said of any thing perceived as having that property, it is a particular thing. Must we then concede red is only so, inasmuch as it has this property of redness, all the while the thing we actually perceive as being red, retains its identity without regard to its redness?

That may be fine, but the problem lies in the negation, in that we can still say of a red thing it is that thing even if it has relative redness, but we cannot say of a thing it is that thing if it isn’t red.

Sure, a property is attributed to things by subjects; and so it is an estimation, to your point, of the quality which the thing has….. — Bob Ross

Property attributed by subjects to things, yes. The quality a thing has because of it, no. Property relates to the identity the thing has, whereas quality is an estimation of the property itself. This reflects the error of calling redness a property of red, when it is actually the quality of it, leaving red itself alone, to be the property of the thing.

I am not following the relevance. When analyzing redness, we would analyze redness — Bob Ross

The relevance follows from, originally, the concept under discussion was “good”, but has since been replaced by “red”, which doesn’t matter much, in that adding “-ness” to either one has the same implication. The real point resides in this: when analyzing redness we are analyzing red, not redness.

By extension, then, when analyzing goodness we are analyzing good, not goodness. And the comment addressing biology as the inappropriate science for analyzing good, resides in the “-ness” qualifier, which implies relative degrees, and herein lies the authority of metaphysics proper, insofar as for any relative degree there must be an extreme, which is EXACTLY what we’re looking for, in the negative sense…..good in and of itself, not good for this or that, but just plain ol’ good. Period. Full stop. Bare-bones, pure conception representing a fundamental condition upon which a proper moral philosophy follows.
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I would rather see us giving them the tools to ‘ethicize’ then tell them our own ethical theories. — Bob Ross

We’re already in possession of the tools for “ethicizing”. They are codes of conduct, administrative rules, edicts and assorted jurisprudence generally, in the pursuit of what is right. None of which has anything to do with what is good.

…..the question asked is “how do I determine what is good?”? — Bob Ross

Which is the whole point…..that is the wrong question to ask. It is good to “ethicize” in accordance with assorted jurisprudence, which reflects one’s treatment of his fellow man, which one can accomplish for no other reason than that’s what everyone else is doing.

When asked what good is, as indicated above, good in and of itself, not good for this or that end, not good in reflection of treatment of fellow men, we may come closer to what makes us tick as subjects rather than what makes us tick as herds. Which reduces to….a reflection on how man treats himself in accordance to his own personal code, for which he and he alone is the law-giver.
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I don’t disagree that eudaimonic happiness is the chief good for any living being — Bob Ross

Hmmm….for any living being? What happened to tools for “ethicizing”? Are ants being ethical for not crowding each other out of the way when entering the hole to the lair? I’ve seen one guy punch other guy in the face for trying to get through the same door at the same time.

Only certain forms of living beings are conditioned by happiness on the one hand, and it isn’t the chief good on the other. The chief good is worthiness for being happy, which reduces to a principle..….that by which his worthiness of being happy, directly relates to the good of his will.

So in this roundabout way, arises the premise: there is no other good, as such, in and of itself….hence undefinable….as a good will. That which doesn't do for the good of something else, but does because it is good to do. And that by which “living well” does not necessarily comport with being happy.
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I apologize Mww, I forgot to respond to this one. — Bob Ross

No need; I get that a lot.

….we mustn't engage in some sort of "leveling of history"….. — J

Well said.

Shoulders of giants all the way down.

just like redness is the one property of ‘being red’. — Bob Ross

Redness isn’t so much a property as the relative quality of being red. It may be that a thing has a certain redness, indicating some relative quality of a certain property. But this latter use requires an object to which the property belongs, whereas the concept, in and of itself, does not. We perceive that a thing is red; we appreciate how or what kind of red it is, its redness.
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Good is an ideal of pure practical reason
—Mww

This seems to contradict your previous point though: if practical reason is attributing to things ‘good’….. — Bob Ross

Attribution requires a conscious subject, the conscious subject requires functional intelligence, functional intelligence requires reason. You might say attribution requires reason, but you can’t say reason attributes.

Ideal of is not attribution to; your misunderstanding is not my contradiction. I may have, and you may show that, I’ve contradicted myself; just not with that.
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…..all moral judgements are a priori in necessary reference to it.

Moral philosophy is not transcendental in a Kantian sense.
—Mww

Then, what do you mean by moral judgments being a priori? — Bob Ross

Moral judgements being a priori doesn’t make them transcendental. Reason isn’t necessarily transcendental, is only so in the consideration of those ideas the objects of which arising as schema of understanding, contain no possibility of experience.

Moral philosophy, then, while it may contain transcendental ideas, re: freedom, the c.i., and so on, isn’t itself a transcendental doctrine, for its end just is experience, in the form of acts conforming to it.
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…..are given to Nature.
— Mww

This sounds like you are saying that moral judgments do not express something objective, correct? — Bob Ross

Wouldn’t “given to Nature” indicate something objective?
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How reality is can dictate how it ought to be (for me). — Bob Ross

Yes, that’s the common position of the pure realist, insofar as he’s already determined reality without understanding it. And there’s your proverbial cart before the horse. In truth, reality merely presents itself, dictating nothing of its own or of itself.

Common, in that the comfort of certain knowledge as an end diminishes the theoretical means by which it obtains.
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I would say biology. — Bob Ross

Wonderful. In a place where the main contributing dialectical factor….is metaphysical?

What an odd lot we are: we know how biology gives us brains but we don’t know how brains give us reason; we know how reason gives us metaphysics but we don’t know how metaphysics gives us brains.

I dare you to call THAT a false dichotomy!!!
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This is a classical mistake, and the most common of which (in this thread) was nudging the OP in the direction of happiness. — Bob Ross

I do that on purpose, for the simple reason the moral philosophy I favor has it as a condition. It may not necessarily be true humanity in general gravitates towards instances of personal happiness, but it is certainly persuasive that it does. And even if that general gravitation isn’t happiness, it is something, otherwise there is no fundamental underlying condition which serves as a rule for describing humanity proper. Nothing is lost by initiating a rational moral philosophy, which may even attempt to define good as the OP inquires, with happiness as a fundamental condition.

Goodness is just the property of being good. — Bob Ross

I reject that good has properties, like most balls have a round property and gasoline has a fluid property. Good is an ideal of pure practical reason, that principle which serves as the ground of determinations of will which satisfy the worthiness of being happy.

I agree with Moore, insofar as to define an ideal principle does little justice to it, while at the same time, all moral judgements are a priori in necessary reference to it.
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we inevitably begin discussing transcendental idealism — Bob Ross

Don’t have to, there are plenty of other kinds. But if that happens, then Kant yes; idealism, yes; transcendental philosophy…..no. Moral philosophy is not transcendental in a Kantian sense.

how can we know what is in-itself good? — Bob Ross

Because the subject in his moral philosophy uses a different aspect of his understanding, judgement and reason for his moral determinations, than are used for his knowledge claims. An in-itself from the strictly moral perspective or domain, is such insofar as it is a construct completely internal to the subject himself, and its relative goodness is known with apodeitic certainty because it is measured against how good the subject feels about it, rather than whether or not he contradicts himself.

The understanding is prudential rather than cognitive; the judgement is aesthetic rather than discursive, and pure reason is practical rather than transcendental.

From the human point of view, a pure dualist intelligence is necessary to appreciate that…..
…..Real things, re: reality writ large, belong to Nature, insofar as Nature is their causality, and are given to us for the use of pure theoretical reason in determining how they are to be known;
…..Moral things, re: morality writ large, belong to us, insofar as we are their causality from the use of pure practical reason in determining what they will be, and are given to Nature.

Given this obvious and universal dualism, the dual aspect of pure reason itself is justified.
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So, for me, I would say that we have a sense of what it beautiful just as much as what is good (and just as much as what is a car) by our conditional knowledge of the world around us. — Bob Ross

Maybe not so much as what is a car, but we certainly do have a sense of what it is to be beautiful. That’s the question: what is it that just is this sense and from whence does it arise. As well, with this, for you, it is impossible to explain those fundamental conditions by which we can all have the same sense of what a car is, but we do not all have the same sense of what good is.
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….since you probably meant a faculty of some sort that is special for grasping morality — Bob Ross

There ya go. Others may differ, of course.