What is "science proper?" — Count Timothy von Icarus

….dull reductions to "observation + modeling”…..sounds about right to me. I’d add in “experimenting”, and the whole process doesn’t have to be dull, necessarily. Although…dunno if I could sit still long enough waiting for a cosmic neutrino.

…."matter"; that being the concept which Berkeley insisted we can dispense with. — Metaphysician Undercover

Agreed.

In my understanding "matter" is a concept employed by Aristotle to underpin the observed temporal continuity of bodies, allowing for a body to have an identity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Kinda agreed. I’d be more inclined to grant to the concept of matter the underpinning for spatial continuity allowing a body to have an identity.

….under Hegelian principles "matter" is still necessary as the kernel of content within the Idea. — Metaphysician Undercover

I understand the concept represented as “becoming”, and, with respect to the kernel of content within the Idea, isn’t that more Platonic? Maybe where the notion of “becoming” initiated? My armchair mandates that matter is the kernel of content for experience; ideas, as such, have no material content at all.

Berkeley may have been opposed to realism, but that doesn't mean religion is opposed to realism. — Leontiskos

I’m not sure realism has much to do with it, whereas the primary source of it, its fundamental causality, does.

“…. Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine of nature that, whilst its motions and various phenomena strike on our senses, the hand which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and blood….”
(Principles…. , 1710, #151)

Lots commendable in the WWR excerpt, but for this:

….on the one hand, the existence of the whole world necessarily dependent upon the first conscious being….

Each conscious being indeed maintains the form, the condition, of its world in accordance with its effects, but each conscious being isn’t his own world’s existential causality.

That being said, there’s agreement whereby *reductive* materialism, as a purely monistic ontology, ignores the subject in favor of the regressive series of things.

Sure, no prob. The human can only account for his world in his own terms, and whatever the difference between his terms and Nature’s, cannot be determined by them. The illusion resides in thinking they can.

Right? Is this somewhat like what reminds you?

Science let it be known humans could have things, could do things, entirely on their own….
— Mww

Yes, but is it just modern science? — Leontiskos

I think science did more than anything else to liberate the intellect, yes.
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I'm of the view that it was this emerging modern view of the universe that the good Bishop wished to oppose. — Wayfarer

I’m not sure he could do otherwise, could he? I guess I’m of the mind that, rather than oppose science, his raison d’etre was to uphold religion. I mean….

“…..But you will say, has Nature no share in the production of natural things, and must they be all ascribed to the immediate and sole operation of God? I answer, if by Nature is meant only the visible series of effects or sensations imprinted on our minds, according to certain fixed and general laws, then it is plain that Nature, taken in this sense, cannot produce anything at all. But, if by Nature is meant some being distinct from God, as well as from the laws of nature, and things perceived by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who had not just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection of God….”
(Ibid 157)

…..YIKES!!!! Nonetheless odd as hell, I must say, that had I lived in 1710, I might have just as similar an opinion, as the different one I do have.

The interesting part? Science let it be known humans could have things, could do things, entirely on their own, or at least enough on their own to call into question isolated external causality of the Berkeley-ian “un-constructed” spirit type.
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Kant called Berkeley’s idealism “dogmatic”, meaning it was formed as a doctrine without sufficient critical examination of the warrant for doing so, and the greatest of that was the principle esse est percipi, wherein the insufficient warrant falls on what it is to perceive, as formalized in ’s OP, re: “For Berkeley, perception encompasses the whole experience of the world as presented to the mind”. Which is these days pretty much established as not the case.

The way this relates to Kant, is that, generally, as you asked, in transcendental idealism, existence is granted outright, immediately removing it from necessary reference to ideas and the condition of our perceptions. Very generally, to be sure.

When the topic of this discussion was current affairs, religion ruled the day, hence, one couldn’t stray too far from it and maintain his cultural standing. It was a race of sorts, among interested parties anyway, not so much the common man, to offer the strongest arguments for the distribution of properties, whether they belonged to things given by Nature, or belonged to things given by deities. But then….Nature itself may have been given by deities, resulting in nothing new. Comparative philosophical doldrums.

Enter science proper, and stuff gets real interesting.

#34 a “….. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary we spend some time in answering objections which may probably be made against the principles we have hitherto laid down.

#34 b “….To all which, and whatever else of the same sort may be objected, I answer, that by the principles premised we are not deprived of any one thing in nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or anywise conceive or understand remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever.

#37 “….The philosophic, not the vulgar, substance, taken away.--I will be urged that this much at least is true, to wit, that we take away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word substance be taken in the vulgar sense--for a combination of sensible qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like--this we cannot be accused of taking away: but if it be taken in a philosophic sense--for the support of accidents or qualities without the mind--then indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination.

#33 “…. The ideas imprinted on the senses by the Author of Nature are called real things; and those excited in the imagination being less regular, vivid, and constant, are more properly termed ideas, or images of things, which they copy and represent. But then our sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless ideas, that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it, as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of sense are allowed to have more reality in them, that is, to be more (1) strong, (2) orderly, and (3) coherent than the creatures of the mind; but this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are also (4) less dependent on the spirit, or thinking substance, which perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of another and more powerful spirit; yet still they are IDEAS, and certainly no IDEA, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it….”

#9 “…..The philosophical notion of matter involves a contradiction.--Some there are who make a distinction betwixt primary and secondary qualities. By the former they mean extension, figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number; by the latter they denote all other sensible qualities, as colours, sounds, tastes, and so forth. The ideas we have of these they acknowledge not to be the resemblances of anything existing without the mind, or unperceived, but they will have our ideas of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things which exist without the mind, in an unthinking substance which they call matter. By matter, therefore, we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in which extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist. But it is evident from what we have already shown, that extension, figure, and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance. Hence, it is plain that the very notion of what is called matter or corporeal substance, involves a contradiction in it….”
(A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge, Sec 1, Of the Principles…., 1710, in
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4723/4723-h/4723-h.htm)
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First…cherry-picked, I know. I picked out what I thought most related to the OP’s query. There’s a veritable plethora of mitigating textual relevance the cherry-picking avoids, hopefully not so much as to show I missed the point completely.

Johnson, following fellow British empiricist Locke, used the primary qualities of things in order to refute the validity of mere ideas as resemblances of them, re: ideas cannot fracture a toe. But in doing that, insofar as, e.g., solidity in things is necessary for fracturing toes, he did nothing to prove such primary qualities were existents in things, the absence from which it follows, that such primary qualities remain mere ideas in the mind of the mediating perceiver, in accordance with Berkeley’s considered metaphysical thesis, in opposition to Locke.

If you can’t prove primary perceptible qualities in us are not ideas in an immediate principal perceiver, perhaps it can be argued…….what difference would it make to the human perceiving mind, if they were not? Was the idea of measurable distance implanted in my head as an idea belonging to some sort of prevalent, re: un-constructed, spirit, or does the idea belong to me alone, as a mere distinction in relative spaces?

Sapere aude anyone?

Oh, no real reason. It’s just that’s not the way humans normally do things.

Either you are intentionally being obtuse or you're less intelligent than artificial intelligence. — Harry Hindu

…..and with that, I’m out.

Let q be any thought….. — J

Nahhhh….I ain’t doin’ that. Language use is tough enough without that nonsense. Sorry.
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Sorry for the delay; I changed my mind regarding the type and depth of reply.

As thinking that things are so is thinking it valid to think this, the 'I think' is thought in every act of thinking. — Wayfarer

…..thinking that things are so….
(is a judgement relative to those things; thinking things, is thought as such)

….as thinking that things are so is thinking it valid to think things are so….
(Judgement, with respect to its form, cannot be self-contradictory; if I judge this plate is round it is necessarily valid that I’ve already conceived a thing as conjoined with its shape)
“…. for where the understanding has not previously conjoined, it cannot dissect…” B129)

….the “I think” is thought in every act of thinking.
(As thinking that things are so, this thinking, this unity of conceptions, only relates to things judged to be so. “I think” is not to be found in thinking of things, for such act belongs to understanding, but merely represents the consciousness that the unity of conceptions for things which understanding thinks, is given)

If all that Kantian counterargument is the case, and Rödl mandates his metaphysics to be absent the character** of the subject in order to be absolute idealism, he must eliminate the transcendental unity of apperception, which JUST IS the character of the subject in his empirical nature, and in keeping with strict Kantian dualism, his moral disposition being his rational nature.

If “I think” is self-consciousness, and “I think” is thought in every act of thinking, and I am conscious of my act of thinking, which quite obviously is the case, then very idea of self-consciousness as underlaying the subjective character has lost its validity, the character of the subject disappears, and that particular condition for absolute idealism is true.
**ibid, 1.2, pg 4, and others
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The unity of apperception, represented by “I think”, makes explicit the presence of representations, insofar as “I think”, by assertion, must be able to accompany all of them. In the proposition, As thinking that things are so is thinking it valid to think this, the 'I think' is thought in every act of thinking, there doesn’t appear to be any representations. That was a general statement, having nothing given as cognized, so…..what is contained therein for “I think” to accompany?

I don’t fathom a connection between accompanying all my representations and accompanying all my thoughts, with an identical self-consciousness.

“…. Understanding is, to speak generally, the faculty of cognitions. These consist in the determined relation of given representation to an object. But an object is that, in the conception of which the manifold in a given intuition is united. Now all union of representations requires unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently, it is the unity of consciousness alone that constitutes the possibility of representations relating to an object, and therefore of their objective validity, and of their becoming cognitions, and consequently, the possibility of the existence of the understanding itself. (…)

The first pure cognition of understanding, then, upon which is founded all its other exercise, and which is at the same time perfectly independent of all conditions of mere sensuous intuition, is the principle of the original synthetical unity of apperception. (…)

The synthetical unity of consciousness is, therefore, an objective condition of all cognition, which I do not merely require in order to cognize an object, but to which every intuition must necessarily be subject, in order to become an object for me; because in any other way, and without this synthesis, the manifold in intuition could not be united in one consciousness. This proposition is, as already said, itself analytical, although it constitutes the synthetical unity, the condition of all thought; for it states nothing more than that all my representations in any given intuition must be subject to the condition which alone enables me to connect them, as my representation with the identical self, and so to unite them synthetically in one apperception, by means of the general expression, “I think.” B137-139

Condition of all cognition, of all thought, if an analytical principle, explicates necessity; must be able to accompany is because necessity has already been given. As well, condition for, as analytical principle, is systemically antecedent to that which is conditioned by it.

Ya know….the deeper we go the cloudier it gets. Not sure there are any A-HA!!! moments here.

You say that "thought is an activity," something done by means of concepts. But does Kant have anything to say about what the noun "thought" refers to? — J

Yes, an activity of the faculty of understanding, which makes thought an object, or product of the activity, hence, a noun. Even to say I think something is to say I have a thought that refers to that something, so again, that thought stands as an object of my thinking, hence a noun.

Cognition is what is done, synthesis is how cognition is done, conceptions are what synthesis is done with. Thought, then, is cognition by means of the synthesis of conceptions.
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“…. But the conjunction of representations into a conception is not to be found in objects themselves, nor can it be, as it were, borrowed from them and taken up into the understanding by perception, but it is on the contrary an operation of the understanding itself, which is nothing more than the faculty of conjoining à priori and of bringing the variety of given representations under the unity of apperception. This principle is the highest in all human cognition….”

By this is shown the difference between uniting representations into a conception, re: apperception, and uniting conceptions into a cognition, re: thought. It also supports the argument that “I think” must not always be able to accompanying all my thoughts, insofar as self-consciousness is that by which alone conjunction is possible which is not thought, whereas understanding is that by which synthesis is possible, which is.

It is a process after all, right? Getting to knowledge from mere appearances?

Again…..dunno if this helps or hopelessly occludes.

Your posts…. — Leontiskos

Thanks for that, but we all know stuff expressed in here is mere opinion, however well-supported.

And we all know there’s no substitute for first-hand exposure to the original, for then the exposure and the opinion at least belong to the same subject.

How would you categorize an animal you have not seen before but looks like an animal you have seen before? — Harry Hindu

This is contradictory. If I haven’t seen a thing before, I can’t say it looks like one I have. If I’ve not seen this cat, but I’ve seen those cats, I’m justified in characterizing the unseen as the same kind as the seen. The difference is, in the first the thing is undetermined, in the second the thing is determined as cat.

what was it about those different cats that allowed you to place them all under the umbrella of cat — Harry Hindu

The quantity of conceptions that sufficiently correspond with the original experience. Those conceptions that do not sufficiently correspond are those which tell me I’m justified in cognizing a different version of the original experience; those that do not correspond at all tells me I’m not justified in cognizing a cat at all.

What key characteristics do they share to then place them in the same visual category? — Harry Hindu

That condition belongs to sensation, not cognition. For different things be placed in the same visual category is for each to have congruent visual representation.

Doesn’t matter that an in abstracto object in general is represented by a universal idea, it isn’t a cat until I cognize that thing as such.
— Mww

What is that process like? What goes on in your mind to cognize some thing if it does not include an abstract object? — Harry Hindu

All my cognition includes abstract objects; they are representations. The objects represented in my cognitions are particulars, not universals.

It seems to me that your mental object of cat is the very cat you first experienced…. — Harry Hindu

Yes, so the metaphysical story goes. As such, it is entered into consciousness, and serves as that by which all other similar perceptions are judged.

….until you've experienced other cats in which your mental object changes to leave out certain characteristics and retain others. — Harry Hindu

There isn’t a definitive cut-off for similar or different characteristics. There was already a whole boatload of representations in order to cognize cat in the first place, so altering some relatively minor number of them wouldn’t be sufficient to cause an entirely different experience. Although, I suppose given one or two glaring differences, one could only cognize what a thing is not, relative to his experience, but not what it is.

….is it possible to give a simple discrimination between "representation" and "thought," in Kantian terms. — J

Oh man. One but not the other. Possible but not simple. Very little in Kant is simple.

“…thought is cognition by means of conceptions….” (A69/B94), from which can be inferred thought is an activity. Conceptions are representations of the faculty of understanding in the same way phenomena are the representations of the faculty of intuition. So if thought is by means of conceptions, and conceptions are representations, then it follows representations are antecedent to that activity which cognizes by means of them.

Kant does not define representation (vorstellung), thus consideration of his time is paramount, insofar as the Scholastic tradition, in which properties of things belonged to them and were “transferred” to the mind when thought about, had been overturned by Descartes with “thinking substance”. Subsequently, because “thinking substance” contradicts the categories, Kant replaced the ontology of things as having properties belonging to them, with the ontology of having the properties of objects already in us, and we transfer them to the objects, from which arises the proverbial “Copernican. Revolution”.

All that we have in us that can be “transferred” to a thing as properties, which we call judgement, and expanded to relations of those properties to each other, which we call logic, Kant denoted as “representation”. How we come by them, by what means to they arise, he does not expound, but it’s pretty obvious, whatever they really are…we got ‘em.

Probably not much help, I know. But it’s a simple as I can make it without saying nothing. Sorry.

Personally, I think it warrants the weight, and a perfect example for why I wholeheartedly detest OLP, but simply dismiss analytic philosophy. More than mere words, it’s a matter of conceptual meaning…what can this word mean, what does it indicate and thereby what can it do, that the another word cannot. If that is all given beforehand in a certain context, but consequently disavowed within that same context, that upon which the disavowal rests, must be considered undeserving.

But you’re quite correct, in that Rödl’s philosophy would stand if he hadn’t mentioned Kant, insofar as his targets were specifically members of his own peer group, Nagel and Moore. Nevertheless, the reality that he did, requires accounting, which we know because he did it himself.

I canceled probably 3 full pages here, because the arguments therein were Kantian, in opposition to the main character in the thread. Threads are invariably derailed this way and I didn’t want to be guilty of it. Rödl deserves his own limelight no less than any other, however briefly, and deserves proper respect for his bringing the relatively unfamiliar to the forefront.

Idealism writ large generally grants the validity of cognitive faculties, assigns them their respective functions, unites them into a system, toward a certain goal. Absolute idealism, by way of introduction, grants those faculties as that which, as Rödl says, “we already and always know”, but turns them back into themselves, rather than uniting them into a system. Judgement just is the consciousness of judging; knowledge just is the consciousness of knowing. It follows necessarily that thinking just is the consciousness of thought, the end result being the absoluteness of the idealism of each of those faculties. All of which is fine for an introduction to a doctrine, even if such introduction itself is not intended to account for what is to be done with those faculties after the exposition for how the author requires them to be understood.

I found no internal contradictions or inconsistencies in the introduction to absolute idealism, even though there are a veritable plethora of contradictions to other metaphysics. I also didn’t immediately find any use for it, insofar as the possibility that e.g., judgment just is the consciousness of judging, doesn’t tell me a damn thing about what judging does, and thereby its function in a system. If my primary concern is the comprehension of my relation to the external domain, for which of course, a system of some nature is requisite, I must have precious little need for absolute idealism, and lose nothing by dismissing the entire doctrine.

I am in agreement with with respect to an important initial premise attributed to Kant, and the intentional misappropriation of it in the furtherance of a doctrine in which that very same initial premise is invalid. In addition, I’m somewhat dismayed to read Rödl claims Kant’s position presupposes his own, and would have been demonstrated if Kant had seen fit to elaborate. It is my comprehension, that Kant didn’t elaborate for the simple reason to do so, such that Rödl’s position is justified, would be to falsify the very thing he just stated as the case, re: “I think” must be able to accompany all my representations.

It is not the case that “I think” must be able to accompany all my thoughts, if the origin of thought is the faculty of understanding, and the origin of “I think” is transcendental pure reason, the objects of which are principles. Understanding is that faculty by which thought is possible, in the synthesis of conceptions, the object of which is cognition. “I think” is not of a cognitive faculty as such, but of a mere human condition, and represents nothing more than “…the highest Principle of all exercise of the Understanding….”, which is nothing more than the consciousness of having conjoined conceptions regardless of whatever the cognition following from it. From which, at least in this respect, it may even be said Kant was more absolute than Rödl.
(Sidebar: the implication of intuition serves as proof we as humans, actually do unite all our representations, in this case empirical ones only, and while not necessarily conscious of doing it, must possess the consciousness of having done it. For otherwise, it is impossible that all the perceived parts of objects, each represented in us by its sensation, can be understood as the unity of conceptions, from which cognition of a whole in a single experience follows as a methodological necessity. The “I think” is nothing more than representing that the system recognizes the understanding as having fulfilled its function, which we simplify into the term “consciousness”.)

The explanatory conditions for why representation is not the same as thought, and therefore why “I think” must be capable of accompanying one but not the other, are legion in Kant, but of no use whatsoever in Rödl, insofar as absolute idealism is not concerned with representations as much as is speculative metaphysics regarding human cognition.

Which is what I meant by:

Anyway….not that big a deal. — Mww

One that might be is the same as a possible cat. — Harry Hindu

Yes, what some term a priori cognition under empirical conditions. Nevertheless I can’t think a possible cat a priori without having the antecedent experience, in order to reduce the possibility to a particular object. Otherwise, I have no warrant for representing the conception with the word “cat”.

how would you recognize a cat that is different than the one in front of you….. — Harry Hindu

Isn’t that just another possible cat? As far as my cognitive operation is concerned, it is.

…..if the universal does not represent all possible cats? — Harry Hindu

Doesn’t matter that an in abstracto object in general is represented by a universal idea, it isn’t a cat until I cognize that thing as such.
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….we can never get at the world as it is independent of us, only at the relation itself. — Harry Hindu

Close enough, but given relations alone is insufficient for knowledge.

….essentially thinking what you are going to say before saying it? — Harry Hindu

Close enough.

In expressing something are you not using some form of representation? — Harry Hindu

Everything my form of intelligence does, is predicated on representation, despite what the materialists or spiritualists would have me think.

So when you think of the image of a cat, that is not a representation of all possible cats? — Harry Hindu

No. Representations are not for universals, which are objects of reason, concepts without representation. We don’t think all possible cats; we think either the one right in front of us, or the one that might be.

Isn't the primary purpose of thinking to simulate the world as accurately as possible? — Harry Hindu

Nothing wrong with that, but specifically I rather think the primary empirical purpose of thinking is to understand the world’s relation to us, the way we are affected by it. Bu empirical thinking is not the limit of thought, so technically, the primary purpose depends on the domain in which object thought about, is found.
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The OP left a bad taste in my mouth given the way it handles Kant. — Leontiskos

Me too, but I laid it off to my seriously entrenched predispositions. But I like to think I gave it a good ol’ fashion continental examination, donchaknow.

Can we simulate a third person view from the first person? — Harry Hindu

Yeah, I suppose, when I think about what another person thinks iff he speaks of it.

It seems that the very idea of a "view" is what invokes the nonsense of a Cartesian theater and homunculus. — Harry Hindu

I don’t think it’s the view that invokes the nonsense, in that a view presupposes a viewer, or that which represents agency, which is a necessary condition for philosophical theory in general, and metaphysics in particular. Otherwise, what’s the point? Multiple instances of either, is the problem, and that occurs when all that’s left for affirmation is “….recourse to pitiful sophisms…”, from which follows the conclusion that I am “…as many-colored and various a self as there are representations of which I am conscious….”.

But I see your point: there isn’t a view, in the proper sense of seeing; there is only the modus operandi of an intellect, the same intellect that allows the construction of pitiful sophisms, such that an irreconcilable mess is made in attempting to explain itself.
(As in….what follows below *grin*)
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What about when we talk to ourselves in our head? — Harry Hindu

That’s not what we’re doing. Ok, fine. I reject that’s what I’m doing. I’m processing an extent understanding given from experience, subsequently the possibility of expressing it coherently.

If language is representation and we think in language…. — Harry Hindu

I agree language is representation, but reject thinking in language. Thinking, as such, in and of itself, is cognition by means of conceptions, conceptions are the representation of extant images, again, from experience. The mental act of composing an expression, is nonetheless a thought, albeit perhaps moreso a complex arrangement of them, even a succession of arrangements into a whole.

……what does that say about which view we are participating in when thinking in a language rather thinking in images, sounds, feelings, tastes and smells? — Harry Hindu

It says there must be a difference in the view in which the subject participates, and the view the subject represents. No matter the many things I think, it is still only me thinking.
(Not sure what you’re trying to elucidate here, but that’s my understanding of it)

In thinking in representations are we not relegating ourselves to the third person? — Harry Hindu

We don’t think in representations, but by means of them in their relation to each other. I’m not getting a third-person out of that.

Anyway….for what all that’s worth.

Do you think Rodl might believe that what occurs is consciousness of the activity itself? — Leontiskos

I’m not sure. When he says…

“…. And I use “consciousness” to designate a genus of which thought, judgment, knowledge are species….” (1.4, pg 4)

….it appears he’s grouping things under a heading, the soundness of which escapes me, just yet. For me, all that which he calls species, thought and judgement belong to understanding, and knowledge, not being a faculty at all, doesn’t belong to any of them. And consciousness isn’t a genus iff it’s merely a condition. Consciousness isn’t how thought is possible; it only represents that to which thought belongs, re: “I think”.

On the other hand, if there is sufficient justification contained in the text as a whole, for the genus/species thing he’s got going on, then maybe he can affirm what Kant had denied.

Like I said….hard to unpack.

“Consciousness of the occurrence of the activity," and, "Consciousness of the activity itself" — Leontiskos

But I said consciousness of the one but not of the other.

The activity belongs to understanding; consciousness of the occurence of the activity, is merely a condition of being human.

You may still posit the two ways in which one can conceive consciousness of his own thoughts; just not this way. At least I don’t see it. Open to correction, of course.

not all thought is "first-personal,…" — Leontiskos

Which one isn’t?

A first-personal thought for Rodl is something like thinking "I think 2+2=4." — Leontiskos

Yeah, I kinda got that from him, too. But thing is….nobody does that. Or, to be fair, I question whether anybody does. Using your example, first personal thought with that content is 2 + 2 = 4. That’s it. No need for superfluous redundancies, no add-ons that make no modification.
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we are distinguishing two different ways in which one can be conscious of their own thought, — Leontiskos

Care to say more? What do you consider as two ways?

What is the difference between first and third person anyway? — Harry Hindu

Pretty open-ended question, isn’t it? Within the context I was talking about, though, there isn’t any third-person to be found, the very notion is absurd.

It seems to me that you are always stuck in one view…. — Harry Hindu

The view belonging to the subject, yet without the pitiful nonsense of Cartesian theater, right?

Thought is an activity….
— Mww

↪Mww - :up: — Leontiskos

At first, I was ok with Rödl’s initial premises; each published philosopher has his own. But later on, came to object to the development of them.

I mean…

“…. What is thought first-personally contains its being thought….” (Pg 2)

….what does that say except thought is what is thought; IS thought and BEING thought are exactly the same thing; was there ever a thought that wasn’t first-personal? Watahell’s a guy supposed to do with any of that?

Ehhhh…probably just me, too dense to unpack what’s being said.

Told you already: a contradiction on the one hand or a self-deprecation on the other.

Pick a kind of person for yourself, see which one works for that person.

I picked jackass, in which case I wouldn’t want to join a club full of jackasses. But being one, I should love to be a club full of them. Hence the contradiction.

On the other hand, when I pick Super Dad for myself, to join a club full of Super Dads puts me at risk of being too competitive, in which case I would have to lower my standards. But I wouldn’t lower my standards, which is a form of self-deprecation, hence would not want to join a club that may foist that upon me.

Then I guess I didn’t put one forward after all. Maybe it just means whatever you get out of it.

Just like anything else.

I didn’t read far enough: you said known in a different way (or not at all). I would have said not at all, re: unknown, and nothing more. As you are wont to say, to which I agree…the inaccessibility of first person experience to any subject other than the holder of it.

Still, I will treat your statement that your hand hurts very differently than if I were Bob, with respect to the conditions set forth in 2.2, re: John and his muddy face.
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I'm not sure Rödl spends sufficient time developing his notion of "first-person thinking." — Leontiskos

Agreed, albeit perhaps for different reasons. In the very beginning, we are beset with contradiction:

“…. independent of any character….”;
“….. whether it is right to think something depends (…) not on any character of the subject thinking it…..”

His notion of first-person thinking is purely mechanical, which is fine for methodology, thought is objective and all that. But the character of the subject himself is inescapable, in the determination of the conceptions he relates to each other in the manifestations of his thoughts.

It certainly seems subjectively character-laden, to represent an existence by thinking up the name “Slinky”. “Quark”. Ooooo….even a purely abstract nonsense thought….supercalifragilisticexpialidoesous!!!

But he has to be allowed his ideas, especially considering the peer group to whom he is responding; it’s up to the reader the satisfaction found in them.

…..only ever be something known to a third party…. — Wayfarer

Something un-known???

Rodl probably has only propositional, discursive thinking in mind in this essay. — J

Most of it, yeah. From which implies discursive judgements. When he talks like this, however,…

“…. In these cases, the validity of my judgment depends on something that characterizes me as the subject of the judgment: the time when I judge, the visual system whose deliverances my judgment expresses, the values that inform my judgment…”
(5.3)

….the notion behind it, is aesthetic judgements, re: necessary subjective quality thereof.

While you’re more to the point than not, I think the aesthetic kind of judgement has more to say than he’s giving it space. Meaning, I think it hard to deny that all judgement is conditioned by the quality of how the subject feels about it.

Maybe if or when he gets into moral judgements later on in the essay, that kind makes its appearance.

I just followed the required criteria, with particular interest in the puzzling part.

It’s a contradiction on the one hand, self-deprecation on the other, both merely aesthetic judgements.

Ol’ Groucho, of course, was just trying to be funny.

….an aphorism is meant to be pungent, short, and puzzling. — Bob Ross

“….I wouldn’t want to join a club that would have me as a member…”

Metallica, 1991, 1986, 1984

BOC 1972, 1973

Yeah, other’s tastes as well. Still, there are those insisting we gain nothing by deleting epistemological gnostic mysticism in order to make room for pure logic, and gain even less by inserting (gasp) a transcendental qualifier.

Another thing: in the text, 9.3, he talks about principles as they relate to and condition judgement. It’s a worthy exposé, but very far from Kantian, insofar as he treats the primacy of first judgement as conditioned by principles derived from experience, or, as he calls it, “the power of knowledge”, when in fact, these belong to pure reason. You can get to empirical judgements related to science from principles of experience, but you can’t get to judgement itself, as such, from there.
(Caveat: I skimmed; but the gist is pretty close I think. Open to deeper consideration if you’ve got some)

It must be an error to suppose that thought, in order to be objective, must be of something other than itself — Sebastian Rödl

It is an error. From a speculative metaphysical point of view, which is all we have for reference.

Thought. Not a thought, not the thought. Thought in general. Cannot be of anything but itself.

“…thought is cognition by means of the synthesis of conceptions …”, cognition in general being the object of thought in general, synthesis being the activity of thought, by which thought is represented as itself.

Hence…..wait foooorrr ittttt…..“I think”.

A thought, the thought, the cognition, is the objective to which active synthesis ascends, the conceptions conjoined therein judged according to the rules by which they do or do not belong to each other.

None of which even remotely presents, when I say I think the Yankees are a better baseball team than the Red Sox.

After spending a couple days, those linked papers/articles/essays give me a better understanding of Rödl’s general philosophy. I’m actually beginning to appreciate his neo-Kantianism in expression, if not so much in theory.

He leads us below the language barrier, re:….

“linguistic articulation” — Wayfarer

….whereas Kant had no choice but to put his speculative metaphysics to word. He expected the reader to understand the system as it’s articulated is not how the system works on its own, the only reason for its articulation is because it is not known.

Rödl attempts to show this, by saying we’re not being told anything we don’t “always already know”, but of course, we don’t always already know that, e.g., “I think” must accompany all my thoughts.

Exactly like one of Zeno’s Paradoxes.….cover half the distance with each step. Sooner or later, you’re gonna get to a point where the distance is measured in terms of outer shell electrons of different things, both of which have, of course, disappeared.

Where, in 3B neuroconnections/mm3 in the human brain, would the recording equipment probe be inserted, for recording the experience of reeling in a trophy fish, or, the memory of already having done such a thing?

At what measure of mass density, does the recording device effect that which the device is suppose to record, synonymous with the quantum “observer problem”?

The average human can’t explain his own experiences, so how would he be able to design equipment, to record what he doesn’t know how to find?

Nahhhhh…..a gigantic, cast iron, capital letter “not possible” from me.

Cool. All’s well….yaddayaddayadda.
————-

Kant says, "All hamburgers are able to be accompanied by ketchup." Rödl says, "Kant thinks every hamburger has ketchup on it." — Leontiskos

Brilliant!!!!