Sorry to detract from Schelling and other post-Kantian German idealists, but how would you go about seeing Kant’s system as dual aspect theory without ontological divide?

Or.......how to anthropomophize the bejesus out of otherwise perfectly reasonable stuff.

(Sigh)

Sure was a messed-up time, wasn’t it? Kant had just set the world on fire, with half a century of paradigm-shifting speculative philosophy, and all the others with any hope of becoming metaphysicians or natural philosophers themselves had to cope with the depth of his thinking. But, as with anything else, people found things to argue about, found things to disprove or diminish somehow or another, either within the Critiques or “The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science”, in order to get published, which was just as important then as it is now.

So Schelling took one of the things Kant had explained well enough, but perhaps not the case necessarily, to wit: on the one hand, given the deterministic nature of Nature, how can any apodectic certainty come of it, by means of something so uncertain as a transcendental “I”, the thinking subject, the object of consciousness, and on the other, given a thing so absolutely necessary as a thinking subject, how can something so indiscriminate as the alledged “thing-in-itself” be permitted because of it. Such dualism has been the matter of discussion ever since, at least up to the mid-20th century, when neuroscience/neurobiology got in the way

Kant unified reason with natural science within a logical and lawfully articulated theory and to this day, no one has succeeded in separating them, or even positing they should be so separated. This was Schelling’s problem: Kantian dualism, parts of which he accepted because he had no choice, parts of which he attempted to refute with “Naturphilosophie”, “On the I As Principle of Philosophy”, and “System of Transcendental Idealism”.

How well he succeeded in these forays into the sublime remains open to debate.

Easy stuff first: Morality is subjective, it is intersubjective in its employment, and moral philosophy does take into account all subjects in general, of the same intrinsic rationality. However, when investigating what morality is, what it means to be moral, where moral values come from, and possible proofs of its grounds, it is entirely subjective on an individual basis. I have no right to critique, nor should I have any inclinations to determine, what qualifies your personal moral predicates. How you treat me because of them, sure, but how you came by them is not within my scope of judgement. But if it be agreed we all think the same way, then it becomes possible to understand morality in general by understanding how a simple subject comes into it.

Yes, I am also referring to practical physical consequences, because such are the manifestions of moral worth. A consequence, a practical, physical action, iff it be called a categorical imperative, in order to have moral worth, absolutely must be in accordance with the principle which determines it. If it isn’t it is an “immoral” act, or, it was only a hypothetical and not categorical imperative to begin with.
No action at all, ever, within the context of reason, whether moral or merely empirical in general, can occur without a judgement which permits the action to occur (except in the case of pure reflex or accident). In other words, the judgement is not the action, it is the permission for the action.

The freedom of following a moral imperative is not the same freedom connected to the will. We are free to determine, or will, our personal CI’s, but once determined, or willed, we are obligated to act in accordance with them, or, which is the same thing, we are not free to NOT so act and still consider ourselves morally worthy. There needs to be a way to make the conception of “freedom” non-contradictory, even if it remains controversial, which Kantian moral philosophy does.

By evolving universally in order to adhere in everyone means simply a multitude of individual subjects having or developing the same sense of morality, from which the same CI’s would advance. In no other way can a subjective principle become a universal law, then if all subjects hold with the same principle. Then we can still say it is a subjective principle holds universally. The need arises here, to choose wisely which principle one holds; I wouldn’t want my subjective principle “no good deed goes unpunished” to be held by every other rational agent, in which case the CI as a universal law for every single one of them would absolutely have to be “therefore never do a good deed”.

You’re more than welcome to critique my understandings here. We both know it’s mighty hard to put Kant’s words into non-scholastic interpretation, without just simply c&p’ing his stuff right out of a book, which half the time just makes things worse.

It does not follow from the Universe being finite that we came from nothing. Even if finiteness is a necessary, perhaps even primary, condition for existence, it is impossible to know whether it is entirely sufficient. It really makes no logical sense to say we came from nothing when the sufficient conditions for us are not entirely known.

Wouldn’t it depend on what you mean by physics suggesting we are indeed in direct experiential contact with the world? Under what conditions would that theoretically, then provably, be the case?

The Critique, particularly the part you reference, is concerned with the possibility of a priori knowledge, hence the critique of *PURE* reason. Of course, the only way that would even be possible is if intuitions and conceptions already exist in the mind. So if it can be proved some do, then it becomes theoretically possible all do. And if it can logically be shown they all do, then the mind, and therefore reason, and therefore the thinking subject in possession of it, can not have, and does not function by, direct knowledge of the world. Direct perception, yes; direct knowledge, not so much.

Direct experiential contact is misleading. Experience is itself not a contact, it is a process. Perception is direct contact, but it is not an experience. Direct knowledge, ok; direct experience ok; direct sensory awareness, ok. Direct experiential contact, not ok. The first two are negatives. The third is a positive. The last is simply unintelligible.

There is no doubt The Good Professor was quite wrong about a lot of scientific things. His math for tidal friction had the Earth slowing down rotationally 1/86th of a second in 2000 years. A whole bunch of orders of magnitude too fast, because the conservation laws had yet to be codified. And being a Newtonian at heart, he would probably have embraced them. A lot of his metaphysics, if not wrong for his time, are at least outdated, re: on women’s place in social structure, the “Science of Right” having to do with ethical politics.

Dunno about a logical fallacy, because as soon as you won, it’s all moot anyway, the rationale for not winning becomes irrelevant.

We evolved to think A=A because that's the way it is in the world. — NKBJ

I dunno, man. Everybody with a few of the right letters after his name, from at least Hume all the way up to nowadays, is likely to suggest “the way it is in the world” is an empirically contingent induction and can never be a law like A = A. We may have indeed evolved with the knowledge a rock is always going to be a rock in our world, but it wasn’t until our physiological evolution was pretty much over that we discovered water isn’t always fluid and there are “objects” with no (rest) mass.

Agreed, Kant does say we arrive alive with some pure a priori knowledge, such as A = A, which is of course, not empirically contingent because it doesn’t matter what A is, but whatever it is, it is that.

I also think we are genetically inclined to view the world in a certain way, and our view, at least in general, is the way the world is. The gravity we know is attractive, the sun doesn’t really rise in the east, grizzlies are not your friends.

A maxim is a subjective principle that justifies a volition of will, such as, e.g., the principle that my utterance of a known falsehood for personal interest is never good, hence serving as the form of a law, that such false utterances to that end evolves universally in order to adhere in everyone else. What I mean is, the maxim is never implemented as a general, or universal, law; it is a subjective principle only and can never be a universal law, even if it can be universally lawful among all moral agents as individual rational subjects. Consequently, the moral imperative, the “command of reason”, the volition of the will, thereafter, is formulated *as if* this particular subjective principle were indeed a universal law, *as if* all rational agents do actually hold with the same principle, and the will that holds with that principle can do nothing else but subscribe to an action that conforms to it. In this case, the moral imperative would be, never permit a false utterance of which personal benefit alone is its end. The result of all this is, no one would utter a known falsehood for personal profit, if he consider himself morally obligated by a freely determinate will.

I think the concern does in fact have to do with the consequences of a specific act, because such act is already called for in its compliance with a principle, and failing to meet the obligation of it, is the very epitome of being “immoral”, or more accurately, having no moral worth. The consequences are in the application of the action, or in the failing in the application of the action, the determination of it already given by reason, that is, a principle, of will.

It goes without saying, that how one goes about formulating his various imperatives, the judgements he must make and the understanding he must have from which those judgements follow, are the purview of practical reason, and should verify the proposition that all morality is intrinsically subjective.

What say you?

clearly a "consequence to oneself". — Echarmion

Consequence could just as well be self-conceit, or an over abundance of personal happiness, as self-destruction. The subjective moral maxim is thus regulated in its form, by its attribution to a universal law, such that both being overly happy from egotism about an action and overly dead by suicide, is tempered by practical reason.

My use of “consequence to himself” was in response to a condition correct in principle but not in reasonable possibility. In reality, *every* moral volition has a consequence of some kind and degree, which is why consequence itself should never ground the principle from which the volition follows.

I think your basic idea is correct. A Kantian, because he considers himself, first, a deontologist, and second, affiliated with the moral, or categorical, imperative, certainly would accord with the volition the duty to his moral obligation demands, regardless of the consequences to himself, recognizing that a Roasted Universe is merely a metaphor for an extreme circumstance with vanishing probability.

Besides, Kant just expresses his philosophy on how to be as morally inclined as possible, not that anyone is actually forced to be that way, and indeed, there is not all that much evidence to say anyone actually does. Moral in their own way, maybe, but without realizing the authority of pure practical reason.

why can't reason be employed to discover something else about these things? — Evola

Reason certainly can be used to ascertain something further about these things, these things being noumena. But upon discovery of this something new, which falsifies the theory that initially developed them, it may not be advisable to continue calling them noumena at all. As in the case of any falsified theory, the terminology of it cannot be displaced, but is usually either consequently re-named, or the conditions sustaining that old terminology are remediated.

“....And even if we should suppose a different kind of intuition from our own, still our functions of thought would have no use or signification in respect thereof. But if we understand by the term, objects of a non-sensuous intuition, in respect of which our categories are not valid, and of which we can accordingly have no knowledge (neither intuition nor conception), in this merely negative sense noumena must be admitted. For this is no more than saying that our mode of intuition is not applicable to all things, but only to objects of our senses, that consequently its objective validity is limited, and that room is therefore left for another kind of intuition, and thus also for things that may be objects of it. But in this sense the conception of a noumenon is problematical, that is to say, it is the notion of that it is possible, nor that it is impossible, inasmuch as we do not know of any mode of intuition besides the sensuous, or of any other sort of conceptions than the categories—a mode of intuition and a kind of conception neither of which is applicable to a non-sensuous object. We are on this account incompetent to extend the sphere of our objects of thought beyond the conditions of our sensibility, and to assume the existence of objects of pure thought, that is, of noumena, inasmuch as these have no true positive signification....

......Thought is certainly not a product of the senses, and in so far is not limited by them, but it does not therefore follow that it may be employed purely and without the intervention of sensibility, for it would then be without reference to an object. And we cannot call a noumenon an object of pure thought; for the representation thereof is but the problematical conception of an object for a perfectly different intuition and a perfectly different understanding from ours, both of which are consequently themselves problematical. The conception of a noumenon is therefore not the conception of an object, but merely a problematical conception inseparably connected with the limitation of our sensibility....

.....Understanding accordingly limits sensibility, without at the same time enlarging its own field. While, moreover, it forbids sensibility to apply its forms and modes to things and restricts it to the sphere of phenomena, it cogitates an object in itself (consequently not itself a phenomenon), and which cannot be thought either as a quantity or as reality, or as substance (because these conceptions always require sensuous forms in which to determine an object)—an object, therefore, of which we are quite unable to say whether it can be met with in ourselves or out of us, whether it would be annihilated together with sensibility, or, if this were taken away, would continue to exist. If we wish to call this object a noumenon, because the representation of it is non-sensuous, we are at liberty to do so. But as we can apply to it none of the conceptions of our understanding, the representation is for us quite void, and is available only for the indication of the limits of our sensuous intuition, thereby leaving at the same time an empty space, which we are competent to fill by the aid neither of possible experience, nor of the pure understanding.....”

All that says is, if the theory concerning how we logically and comparatively think, and how our knowledge is constructed is true, or at least as yet unfalsified, there is room for things like noumena, even if we can’t use them for anything. A wheat/chaff kinda thing, sort of.
————————
On science. Science of the day, that is:
The Nebula Hypothesis, in “ Universal Natural History and the Theory of the Heavens”, 1755, anticipating LaPlace 1796;
The natural disposition of geography for earthquakes, Lisbon, “On the Occurences of Natural Calamities..... ”, 1756a,b; the theoretical possibility for replacing religious acts of God;
Berlin Royal Academy of Science Prize “Examination of the Question Whether the Rotation of the Earth......”, 1754a, anticipating “leap seconds” and the theory of tidal friction;
Discredit of Newtonian absolute time, “Metaphysical Foundation of Natural Science”, 1783, anticipating Einstein, 1905;

May I offer a nice Tuscan Chianti and perhaps a Hoyo de Monterrey to accompany, so to celebrate the good man’s martyrdom? My treat, of course.

Ahhh....excellent. You are quite correct. The whole reach of this kind of metaphysics has to do with the relational nature of human reason, to which everyone must agree. We relate everything to something, endlessly and completely. If we decide on a truth, it is only because we have determined something about the conditions that justify it. Same with phenomena; just because we think a certain way in order to arrive at them does not in itself preclude the possibility of cognizing another way, which still must be relational, but can have different manifestations of its objects. Simply put, under the terms of this theory, noumenal objects cannot be either intuited or conceived, but noumena itself remains as a viable concept because it fulfills a function within the terms of the theory. Different theory, different noumena, or, different manifestations of the job noumenon actually perform.

That being said, the Kantian use of noumena, while not original, is by far the most developed, even if wrongly so.

But the officer's self sacrifice, by the terms of the dilemma, accomplishes nothing. Sacrificing a life for no gain seems contrary to preservation of life being the primary marker. — Echarmion

Perhaps by the terms of the dilemma, but the dilemma itself is merely an occassion for the exploration of the predicates of moral behavior. With respect to that behavior, self-sacrifice is the epitome of the obligation to never be the cause of the arbitrary extinguishment of a human life. Even if you lose yours, you have fulfilled your obligation not to take a life.

Of course, there is nothing given which makes that specific moral obligation in itself absolutely necessary. It is only upon the determination by an autonomous free will, which declares such obligation, that the adherence to it is mandatory in order to fulfill that particular self-imposed moral duty.

I agree with your critique of the application of Kantian philosophy.

“....

But, do humans really have access to phenomena? — Evola

What you’re missing....if anything, really....is, it depends on how one uses the term. Science, including the Enlightenment era science of Kant’s time, usually terms natural events as phenomena, as a dot on a photograph is plate or, much earlier, Newton’s spinning bucket. As such, we all have access to phenomena just by being extant in an objective reality.

But Kantian metaphysics does not use the term that way, it being a particular nomenclature assigned to a very specific epistemological procedure:
“....The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon...”

In other words, the scientific phenomenon isn’t a Kantian phenomenon until the scientific, or which is the same thing, the experience, is received into and processed by reason. This distinction in terminology is important only insofar as it is diametrically opposed to the even more metaphysical name, noumenon.

Under the assumption that preservation of life is the primary marker for moral agency:

Being intelligent enough to be a law enforcement officer, and therefore having knowledge of extant immoral atrocities of gangs, the officer should never have volunteered to infiltrate such gang in the first place, knowing full well the possible requirement for his participation in similar atrocities henceforth expected of him as a “prospect”.

While it is reasonable to suppose a freely acting person’s moral credo would not prohibit some gang related atrocities, in the interest of an objectively greater good, it is hardly moral in any case to arbitrarily extinguish a human life. Under the conditions of ignorance of an expectation for the officer having to take a life in order to save his own, he is necessarily obligated by his duty to his moral law, to self-sacrifice.

All this talk about miscellaneous moral dilemmas, but never a consideration of the requisite “moral feeling” necessarily associated with them. Their proper examination is sufficient to qualify the moral worth of the dilemma itself.

I grant some conceptions may exist hardwired in the mind, as a product of the kind of rational being we are, re: necessity, correlation, existence. These are used in our mathematical and logical constructions after attaining the age of reason. We cannot begin to think A = A without the ground of those concepts.

Yes? No?

Well, a priori forms/ideas are by definition not constructed. — NKBJ

Then how do we know them? How can they be thought?

Ideas on the subject. Or, more accurately, opinions. Or, more more accurately, a possibly inaccurate understanding of an EXCRUCIATINGLY complex speculative epistemological philosophy:

Kant is accepted as being ahead of his time in the physics of his day, but only from a theoretical approach. That is, he theorized, but didn’t experiment, and just because some of what he thought has been subsequently established by physical science, I don’t think the modern science community attributes much of its progress to him.

Awareness is the same as consciousness. To remove awareness is to remove the extant intuitions residing in consciousness of the object, which immediately deletes any experience of them. Removing the intuitions, however, does not remove the conditions under which it is possible to become aware of objects given from sense. These are the “something that remains” as the pure forms of intuition, of which there are only two, called space and time. They are not noumena, but pure a priori conceptions belonging to the mind, the deduction of which is both unknown and unnecessary, because no experience is at all possible without them.

There are two ways to cognize an object, either it is given by sense or it is thought by understanding. That which is unknowable in the sensible world is the thing-in-itself, that which is unknowable in the world of thought is the noumenon.

On empirical knowledge:
The as yet undetermined object given to sense is called phenomenon, and that which resides in consciousness that relates to it is intuition. Imagination unites phenomenon to its intuition, from which representation of an object arises, of which no true identity of the object is yet allowed, but to which now understanding has something to relate its conceptions.

That a determined object of extant experience can be cognized without being presented to sense is evident by the mere thought of it, and an undetermined object remains imaginable. But if an object is thought, there is no sensuous phenomenon with which intuition may be related, and therefore imagination must import a suitable object to use for the creation of its representations. Otherwise, there would be no consistency between an object of sense and the very same object merely thought. These relations are the conceptions belonging to understanding itself, and are deduced from experience even while not derived from an immediate instance thereof.
————————-

On non-empirical knowledge:
There obviously arises in the mind conceptions for which no empirical object is possible, as is the case with “cause”, “substance”, “quality”, and such other pure conceptions. Because it is absurd to suppose the human cognitive system has two distinct methodologies to cope with two distinct kinds of knowledge, but rather it is very far more parsimonious to suppose there is but one method but with distinct components contained within it, or, which is worse, we are left with the reality of only one kind of knowledge, but by means of which it is absolutely impossible to explain how it is we really do know that things like “cause” and “quality” actually are comprehensible, effective and even necessary in our understanding of the world of sense.

Here of course, we are presented with a major problem, for we must exclude anything from our cognitions suggesting even the possibility of an object associated with an empirical conception, including the entire faculties of sensibility, intuition, imagination and most importantly, representation, yet holding with understanding and judgement, for even this method of cognizing is relational because of the type of rational being we are. It is here the transcendental deduction of, and the objective validity for, the pure categories are required, these being no more than the pure form of properties or attributes to which a concept would necessarily adhere if it were possible to think one. That is, for instance, if a thing is a cause it must be possible to conceive that it exists. If this be accepted, the method for the uniting the pure conceptions with......something....must happen, or there remains nothing to which judgement may apply, and no cognition would follow and we would have a cognition of what constitutes “cause”. Because we do think “cause”, consistently and intelligibly, it must be the case the concept relates to something. This something is a noumenon, and we have no idea what it is, but it must be something, because without it, no relation between a pure conception and a priori cognition is possible.

Ever wonder why it is, that we can cognize a multiplicity of properties for frying bacon, but we can’t intuit a smell for it. While science rightly declares the sensory apparatus precludes this information, the philosophy of speculative epistemology makes no such intuitive distinction. One of the most obvious requisites grounding our knowledge for this particular thing, has a missing intimate component. If it is possible to truthfully cognize frying bacon while missing an important consideration, it stands to reason it is possible to just as truthfully cognize a pure a priori conception without that which makes it possible.
———————

The root of the confusion:
Empirical Understanding has a thing (phenomenon) associated with it and an unknown thing-in-itself is associated with that phenomenon. Pure Understanding has an a priori thing (category) associated with it and a noumenon associated with that category, as its unknown thing-in-itself. They are not the same, not even close, even if they share a term meant to illustrate a similar quality of each.

For what it’s worth.

OK. Agreed. I’m in no position to hold with the things I learned here today, even while appreciating the exposure to them. I think I’m going to stick with what I’ve convinced myself I know, and if somebody comes along and upsets my intellectual applecart as respectfully as you did......so much the better for me.

Holy crap on a cracker.....I never even knew there was any of that stuff. Now I see where you’re coming from. I looked up some of the things you brought up, but...obviously....I didn’t get that far.

Any countable set of real numbers has Lebesgue measure 0.
.....put a measure on any set: the "size" of a subset is taken to be.....

Back to the OP. Is the opinion correct?

Wha....wait. A finite set is has size zero? So an unpopulated empty set is the same size as a set of countable numbers? In other words, the set is what makes the size, not the members of it. But what is it about a set that determines it’s size?

I'm not sure it makes as much sense when we talk about basic math or logic. — NKBJ

Don’t we have to construct our mathematical and logical forms a priori? Then go about proving their truths in the world?

Ahhh....that’s what you meant before by involving sets or elements of sets. OK, fine. I can dig chopping off sets of zero size; that’s just an empty set. And by association, the totality of the divisible quantity is undiminished, which seems to sustain the OP.

Now that you mention it, I am favoring intuitions of discreteness, aren’t I. It never crossed my mind there was any other way to look at the a priori conceptions of “quantity”. Or the infinite for that matter. Apparently, though, I shouldn’t be, with respect to the problem at hand. So....thanks for that.

The OP stipulates a infinitely divisible quantity. Number lines do not exist in Nature, but one can be imagined a priori, consisting of an arbitrary, progressively conceivable set of real numbers (the numerical totality of the set cannot be imagined). Because it’s an abstraction, the guy chopping off numbers one at a time is itself an abstraction, but sustains the conclusion he is not chopping off parts of zero size, because the number line must be conceived as getting shorter.

I’m gonna stop now; I don’t want to be responsible for the math guys hurting themselves laughing at me. (Grin)

I’m trying to picture a guy, standing there chopping off sections of a number line of x units, each part having zero size. I understand doing so is the only possible way to divide infinitely, but you gotta admit....he isn’t really doing anything. So there does appear to be some kind of contradiction.

Do you agree with the opinion contained in the OP?

If the universe has existed for ever then that means it has crossed an infinite amount of time to get to NOW. But it is impossible to cross an infinite amount of time. — albie

So the conclusion is, there is no NOW? NOW is impossible because getting to it is impossible?

So the real reason people’s sense of reality is threatened is because there is no NOW, rather than the two illogical origins of the Universe?

So your opinion is, because a quantity divided infinitely would have parts with zero size, no quantity can be infinitely divided?

Not being a math guy, I have to ask.....is there a rule for obtaining a zero size part from any division at all?

the realist posits there is an objective reality, but humans may have imperfect access to it. — NKBJ

I can live with that. If I were to modify it to fit me better, I’d say, may have imperfect knowledge of it. This because we only have one means of access, re: perception, so it’s relativity is moot. Of course, one obligates himself to forward some sense of idealism, by insisting it is judgement in error, not perception, in the case of sensible illusion and such, which is the only way to mitigate your “imperfect access”.

As far as “truth” is concerned, however, I suppose the constructivist holds sway, insofar as the human cognitive system is predicated on a network of interwoven faculties, the sole employment of which is to construct relations between the objects of those faculties. Theoretically, that is; no one really has the correct answers.

Interesting read. Thanks for giving me something to think about.

I wonder...is it possible to be one at the exclusion of the other? If not, how far does one have to go in the reduction of their respective arguments in order to meet with their mutual exclusivity. On the other hand, if one finds fault with empirical skepticism in realism and finds fault with cognitive activity in constructivism, then it would seem a combination of parts of each is called for. If for nothing else, just to establish a personal comfort zone, which wouldn’t do for a professional, but suits the regular guy just fine.

Different perspectives are always good, so.....thanks.

“...preoccupation with questions about methods tends to distract us from prosecuting the methods themselves. We run as a rule, worse, not better, if we think a lot about our feet....”
(Ryle, 1929, in Hutchinson 1971)

(Charlie Chaplin shuffle, stage left)

Yeah, well, some thought experiments were intentionally constructed to exemplify a theoretically impossible situation.

And, if I’m putting my knowledge in a locker, fercrissake.....let’s just make it an isolated system, forego all that entropy stuff.

But it was fun to play with, while it lasted.

If I’m dead, and THEN the lockers are presented to me......all my knowledge is junk. The implication is I understand what a locker is, what it’s for and what I’m supposed to do with, but all that without a functioning brain. How do I know the same stuff without a brain, that I knew with one? Either all I learned while alive is in question, or being dead and being alive are the same thing.

But even if I could get around all that, I’d still wonder....how in the hell do I put knowledge in a locker? It’s not like switching out from street clothes to a uniform. Or is it? I’m hardly in a position right now to conclude one way or the other.

Just a figure of speech, you say? Sure, maybe, but if I put part of my knowledge here and part of it there, don’t I lose it? What if the part I lose is the part that tells me what I know? How would I fill the lockers I’m not allowed to leave empty, when I don’t know what I know?

On the other hand, if I’m in the supersensible condition and I know arithmetic still works, and all kinds of stuff like that, because I still know what a locker is, and I can still follow directions, then I haven’t really put any knowledge in any locker anyway.

I’m not making fun of the OP, honest; I just don’t have a clue how I would accomplish what it wants. I suppose, though, if the negation is so much easier than the affirmation, there’s something wrong with the exercise to begin with.

If I see a syllogism manufactured with a false major premise, I have a tendency to disregard the conclusion. Sorry.....just the way Mama tol’ me.

On the other hand, because a statement can be a fiction even if not part of a syllogism, it then becomes just a matter of understanding the subject/predicate relation, in order to determine how the fiction/illusion arises, if it does.

I gave examples of necessary truths, the certainty of which I know without ever saying a word, or even thinking any. Although I might bellow OHHHH CRAPPP on the way down. But you wouldn’t ever hear it, and it’s not a logically fictional proposition anyway, so who cares.

The principle of inductive reasoning is linguistic, as are each and every "test of truth"... — creativesoul

How is that not a logical fiction? If you think principles are linguistic.....how do you do arithmetic in your head? How can logical absolutes be possible? Just because we don’t consciously invoke a principle in order to arrive at a logical, consistent truth, we aren’t using one? It only becomes a principle after having been written down? We don’t operate by deducing our primary principles then see if our observations conform to them, which is blatantly circular and potentially self-contradictory; we reason from observation, then deduce the principles under which our reasoning should conform in order to be trusted as observation demands.

I didn’t say, and certainly had no intention of implying, we all respect the law.

What makes you think the government dictates, or wants to dictate, the morals of its populace?

If respect is to ground something as important as morality, it should be given a meaning undiluted by variables. Respect for this, respect for that, respect for the other, drains respect of its power. It becomes realistic to suppose morality may indeed be a matter of respect, if one respects a particular thing upon which morality may depend.

The course of human events does exhibit one condition under which respect is centralized, and that is for the law. If that is true, then, in the case of morality, the centralized respect would be for a moral law. So, with respect to the OP, yes, the moral by respect is at least reasonable.

What the moral law may be, on the other hand, is not, and cannot be, given by the agreement that morality by respect is reasonable.

From where I sit, three of four of the fundamental tenets of Objectivist philosophy don’t correlate to basic human nature. Simple as that.

I grant your general thesis with respect to propositional truths, but the OP designates “logical fictions”, one of which is “a truth is propositional in content”. A simple example shows a truth not to be necessarily propositional in content.

There need be no language for any of that to happen. — creativesoul

True enough. It is not a matter of language that when I fall out of a tree, hitting the ground follows necessarily. The physical part adheres to the principle of cause and effect, the conclusion adheres to the principle of inductive reasoning, both of which stand the test of truth whether or not speech or any other kind of language is involved.

The statement “I will hit the ground” itself does require language, of course, because it is merely objectified natural communication. But the necessary truth the statement represents, an a priori apodictic certainty, needs no communicable objectification, which would seem to affirm the logical fiction, “where there is no language there can be no truth”.

Now. About that star.......