Oh, I didn’t mean to imply anything of the sort directly at anybody, just generally editorializing.

That being said, and if I was forced to think about it, which I would have to be, I might wonder how you would arrive at this: “....kind of thought if the world is finite, it lent some weight to the concept of an un-created - creator, or a non-contingent being...”, if you weren’t being, shall we say......overly speculative?

Edit:
I see you spoke of this: “Something like a necessary being is a possible answer as well.” Assuming “possible answer” applies to some causality for that which is theorized as having a finite duration, I suppose there really is no good refutation of such a statement. I certainly don’t have one, even if I could soundly argue we’d never know it, if there was such a thing.

I’ll take your word for it. Obviously, they treat transcendental differently.

if the universe is finite (by definition) it had a first moment. — Rank Amateur

Correct, in principle, according to the rules of logic.

also by definitnon there was nothing before that — Rank Amateur

Correct, within the same reference frame. While in the Universe, it can be said there was nothing of the Universe before it’s first moment. Nonetheless, both propositions, together or separately, are not sufficient to logically eliminate some other reference frame which suffices to falsify the conclusion “there was nothing before that”.

As long as knowledge is unattainable, pure speculation is allowed. But just because pure speculation is allowed does not serve as warrant to usurp logical or rational rules.

discuss why and/or how these are logical fictions — creativesoul

Ok, I’ll give it a shot.

Where there is no language there can be no truth. — creativesoul

If I fall out of a tree, it is not true I will hit the ground, if I don’t tell anybody I just fell out of a tree?

Where there is no language, there can be no thought/belief. — creativesoul

If I fall out of a tree, I won’t think a pain is coming if I just say something?

logical fiction is the result of a valid argument.... It is a fiction because it is not true — creativesoul

A valid argument is not necessarily a logical fiction; it’s conclusion can be true.

Do I get a gold star??

These, along with belief, are just judgements with degrees of certainty. An opinion has no sufficient certainty at all, as in “I think this party will win the elections”, insofar as no conditions are given to justify the “I think” part of the proposition.

A belief has subjective sufficiency, but no objective sufficiency, insofar as, again, “I believe this party will win the elections because this party has always carried enough voting districts” adds conditions sufficient to qualify the “I believe” part of the proposition but the predicate “because this party has always carried enough districts” is insufficient to justify the objective certainty of “will win”.

Knowledge is a different sort of creature, it’s certainty, at least with respect to the world, can only be derived from experience, in which case the original propositions cannot apply, but “This party has always won because they always carried enough districts” is a judgement with objectively sufficienct conditions (ballot count, show of hands, yeas and nays) warranting the certainty of the knowledge “has won”.

Then of course, there’s always inductive/deductive reasoning, necessary/contingent conditions, top down/bottom up.......but ehhhhh....too technical, methinks.

The use of “consciousness” here is a misnomer; it should be “reason”.

For Kant, transcendent means beyond the possibility of any and all experience, because transcendent objects have no possible intuitions related to them, but can still exist in consciousness as an idea or a notion “....in such a supersensible sphere...”. Transcendent objects can be described and can be assigned meaning; the problem being then, reason finds itself without any means of distinguishing these from mere illusion, fancy or superstition. It is conceptually opposed by “immanent”.

Transcendental means that which has to do with a way of thinking in general, without the influence of any part of the empirical whatsoever, hence the term may apply to a variety of subjects, re: we have transcendental conceptions, transcendental knowledge, even a transcendental philosophy itself, all depending solely on the way they are thought. It is conceptually opposed by “empirical”.

Schopenhauer uses the principle of sufficient reason for what Kant uses the principle of synthetic a priori, so they really don’t compare.

Now this makes sense to me. These “machinic assemblages”, as “important parts of subjectivity” already have names, their job descriptions are already given, their co-dependence and interactions well-discussed, and have been for close on to 300 years.

That being said, and with this more substantial groundwork......what’s next? Given a description of what’s happening, machinic assemblages, how does all that actually come about?

So is that what this is...Josh’s “dynamical systems models to convey the reflexive self-transformative quality of experience”?

OK, sure. There’s no “individuate subject that is in charge of the driving”. I suppose this is the most serious flaw in pre-modern philosophy, the lack of a director for the faculties responsible for cognitions, and this new stuff is trying to make it so a director isn’t needed. Being left to the nature of the beast was always good enough, in the Good Ol’ Day’s, the faculties know what they’re supposed to do because Nature wouldn’t have put them there to do a job if they weren’t also given the means to do it. Yet, even to this day, we still don’t know how the finer things in thought work.

I submit the subject/object duality is here to stay. It’s been that way since the dawn of reason, and in 5000 years, it hasn’t dissipated very much. If I were to speak up for it, I would just say.....don’t hate me because I’m beautiful.

Being conscious while multitasking, yes. These are the multiplicity of occasions for, and the multiplicity of forms of, empirical data given to perception.

I see conscious activity, but I’m having trouble pinning independent and autonomous to that conscious activity. Independent how, with respect to what? Conscious activity is independent from the outside empirical data? No, can’t be, otherwise there’s nothing with which to be consciously active. Independent from physiology? Sure, but I would think that irrelevant to the subject at hand. Autonomous as existing in itself? Conscious activity may be autonomous as a whole, re: the proverbial rational agent, but it’s parts certainly are not, insofar as they need to work together.

In the interest of my continuing exposure, I’ll just say yes, we can say that. I suspect you’re going to elucidate by taking the next step.

we experience "me" and "my thoughts" as if they were two different things. — Jake

I don’t think the average human being does that. It is only when I stop to theorize about what’s going on between my ears do I have to distinguish between the thinker and the thought, such that I can understand how it is my experiences even occur. Not THAT I have them, which is sometimes even painfully obvious, but HOW I have them, and that from a metaphysical point of view, the only method available to the common man. It follows that the dissection of functionality is paramount, for the entire range between perception and cognition, of which consciousness is usually viewed as a fundamental, if not the primary, aspect.

What if consciousness doesn’t process anything? Or rather, if it does, what is the function of all the other faculties of human resource used to recognize experience for what it is? If consciousness does process, either there are no other faculties sometimes considered as the processor, or those other faculties do something else. I don’t think we should so haphazardly relegate “judgement” or “understanding” to the psychological junk pile, which implies we had best find out how they fit into the picture.

A loud noise behind you is itself a perception. Otherwise, what grounds the proclamation there has been a loud noise at all? Data is already in play even before you turn to look. Any other subsequent perception, as in sight or the feeling of concussion, is merely additional data used to narrow down and help identify the experience. What in that process suggests consciousness has altered in any way?

Know what I think? I think people invent 140mph cars for no other reason than a 120mph car has already been invented. After a whole bunch of those, we reach 300mph cars and you just gotta ask....why? Who in the world needs one, how could it possibly be a benefit, and what does it prove except it can be done? Switch philosophy for cars and you catch my drift.

I guess you proved her philosophy wrong I guess... — AppLeo

A philosophy cannot be proven wrong; its empirical tenets can only be shown to be in conflict with practical experience, and its logical tenets shown to be in conflict with themselves. In the case at hand, the world as it is is infinitely different than the philosophy in question requires, and human reason does not necessarily abide by that philosophy’s fundamental rules.

There may have been a time in human history when a pure trader mentality or a pure individual paradigm may have been possible, back when animal skins were used to ward off cold and women were dragged to the cave by their hair. Nowadays......not so much.

think of consciousness as a multiplicity. — Number2018

In the interest of graduating from the outdated....OK, in principle.

conceive the nature of this multiplicity, each distinct “state of consciousness” should be identified as a working part — Number2018

Yep....”nature of” just so conceived, “states of” just so identified, got the moldy tome from which to take references.

in an appropriate assemblage.....technological, scientific, social, cultural, etc. — Number2018

Err......what? What is meant by technological, social assemblages? Within the context of being a working part in a multiplicity of conscious states, I mean.

LOL. I don’t have to worry about keeping my job. Or keeping my publisher off my back.

Plus the best part....everybody can say I’m hopelessly outdated, but nobody can say I’m hopelessly wrong.

Yeah, probably. Simple case of I don’t know any better.

However, does it mean, "I" or "self-reference"? I think it does. — Josh Alfred

As do I. “I” is the pure representation of the unity of consciousness, such that it becomes possible to think all contents of consciousness, whatever their names, belong to me, or, as was said, such unity is self-consistent over time. It is from this unity that understanding works, in the construction of its conceptions a priori, or the conjoining of intuitions to phenomena from which empirical representations follow, each the precursor to knowledge.

Agreed. The traditional apprehension with respect to the conception of consciousness is that it is a singular faculty, or functionality, or rational enterprise.....or this thing that does this something.

What do you think? How would you fill in the blanks?

Not being all that familiar with James, does he say what he thinks consciousness to be? Without that, how can it said whether or not it is discontinuous? Given the general conception of it, it is easy to say consciousness is continuously interrupted, merely from the mind being in a state of deep sleep, and by association, recommencing upon the attaining the state of awareness.

But that in itself being sufficient reason with respect to a specific conception, says nothing about consciousness as a “multiplicity”, which implies various kinds of consciousness, rather than various conditions of a single consciousness.

Would it be appropriate to suppose James doesn’t define consciousness, as the ground for not being able to answer his own question? If not, it remains the purview of the respondant to conceptualize consciousness in his own terms, theorize the possibility of it being capable of obtaining to a multiplicity, or simply being one initially, and finally, to justify one or the other.

Let's take the salesman. — AppLeo

The salesman is nothing but a particular member in the general set of traders. Galt, and therefore Rand, defines trader as this moral symbol of respect, implying that he who is of this kind is the epitome of some moral disposition of her announcement. Practical experience, on the other hand, shows some traders are of some other, diametrically opposed, moral disposition. Therefore, either the Randian characterization of trader, or the moral symbol which describes him, is catastrophically false.

Or, to be fair, possibly the instances of practical experience are false, insofar as a customer knows he’s getting taken to the cleaners in the name of “buyer beware”, and doesn’t bargain or walk away, which makes him morally deficient in objectivist theory. Even so, such theory makes no allowance for the altogether feasible circumstance, wherein the customer has no alternative, and the trader recognizes it and takes advantage, rather than abstaining from the capitalist mantra of “seller’s market”.

Be that as it may, I think taking a logical law and making a theory out of it, is very far less philosophically satisfying than having a theory and using a logical law to justify it.

This is ok, slightly incomplete, but nevertheless acceptable:
“...Man cannot survive except by gaining knowledge, and reason is his only means to gain it. Reason is the faculty that perceives, identifies and integrates the material provided by his senses. The task of his senses is to give him the evidence of existence, but the task of identifying it belongs to his reason, his senses tell him only that something is, but what it is must be learned by his mind...”

Then comes this:
“...Centuries ago, the man who was-no matter what his errors-the greatest of your philosophers, has stated the formula defining the concept of existence and the rule of all knowledge: A is A. A thing is itself. You have never grasped the meaning of his statement. I am here to complete it: Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification. Whatever you choose to consider, be it an object, an attribute or an action, the law of identity remains the same. A leaf cannot be a stone at the same time, it cannot be all red and all green at the same time, it cannot freeze and burn at the same time. A is A. Or, if you wish it stated in simpler language: You cannot have your cake and eat it, too....”

Now I grasp the subtlety here....a cake sits in front of you as an A, as soon as you take a bite out of it, it is no longer the A it once was. I’d like to know, if reason is the power of knowledge, how is it the identity of “cake” wouldn’t remain even with a bite out of it? Even if it is true A is no longer A in the absolute strictest sense, it does not follow from that, that reason is prohibited from a practical position in favor of maintaining a pure one, such that cake and cake - bite is not a contradiction of either reason or knowledge. And if that wasn’t enough, while it is true a leaf cannot be a stone, would a leaf be any less a leaf to a caterpillar munching on it? I think not, kemo-sabe.

A further subtlety: if A is a cake is a cake, then a cake with a bite out of it is just B. In this state modified from A, B is B, law of identity obtained. Big deal; the cake is still both had and eaten.

Which makes the entire Objectivist philosophy nothing short of a 1000-word lament over the failure of a More-ish Utopia.....the world sucks because it’s inhabitants are unworthy of it, being of improper moral or even natural disposition (never mind the intrinsic nature of them), which makes any form Shanghai-La, DaTong, e.g., mere fantasies.

Finally, it is hardly my opinion. Research will show that Rand’s moral philosophy, personified in Galt’s speech, is a direct condemnation of continental Enlightenment metaphysics in general and you-know-who in particular.

And you are so bold as to say I haven’t read and don’t understand Rand, when you don't know I haven’t and I don’t? Because we disagree means I’m wrong? Wouldn’t it be better if you showed me how I was wrong, instead of claiming it despite the demonstration of a particular passage appearing to lack as much consensual philosophical merit as the entire message?

It has been long established that Rand both follows Kant is some regards, and demonizes him in others. But either way, the chances of her even being remembered as anything but a half-way decent fiction author, is directly related to her attacks on Kant, but hardly for a successful refutation of him.

The fact you don’t understand my use of the trades I chose, shows a distinct lack of understanding of the denial of a categorical assertion, which should have no exceptions, with a mere viable possibility. I summarily reject any philosophy that tells me what, who, and even why......but make no effort to tell me how, either from itself or from its proponents.

If this,

Traders are individuals who recognize property rights. Individuals are responsible and independent. — AppLeo

, is what Rand was trying to say, how can I be blamed for missing it when neither it nor anything resembling it, was included or hinted in the passage, nor any passage remotely adjacent to it? I don’t, for the same reason, think I can be blamed for proposing you simply made that up.

Just about anybody can take what Rand says as a bad thing, when Galt’s somewhat less than sustainable rant is mistaken for the foundation of a philosophy.

That there are decent tradesmen is completely irrelevant from the perspective of the proposition “The symbol of all relationships....”, they being merely exceptions to a generally toothless rule.

Interested parties can view the subject matter here:

https://docs.google.com/document/d/1x08QhNX_a1iB5Dt5uEC21q_GMvrM0sbd6zba2UOb6c0/mobilebasic#!

“....The symbol of all relationships among such men, the moral symbol of respect for human beings, is the trader. We, who live by values, not by loot, are traders, both in matter and in spirit. A trader is a man who earns what he gets and does not give or take the undeserved. A trader does not ask to be paid for his failures, nor does he ask to be loved for his flaws. A trader does not squander his body as fodder or his soul as alms. Just as he does not give his work except in trade for material values, so he does not give the values of his spirit-his love, his friendship, his esteem-except in payment and in trade for human virtues, in payment for his own selfish pleasure, which he receives from men he can respect. The mystic parasites who have, throughout the ages, reviled the traders and held them in contempt, while honoring the beggars and the looters, have known the secret motive of their sneers: a trader is the entity they dread-a man of justice....”
(“John Galt”, in Rand, 1957)

Please, someone inform the used car salesman, the pension fund schemer, the Manila street-side vendor of ill-disguised monkey meat.......you are examples of the highest moral respect delegated by your fellow man.

Or.....how to put lipstick on a pig and think it worthy of your daughter’s 16th birthday present.

Bummer. There I was, a die-hard Kantian, lookin’ to duke it out with a pesky Randian.

Sucks to be me.

You said Kant said we don’t actually perceive reality, and I give three examples where he says we do. Assertion properly denied....until something is presented to affirm the assertion that he said we don’t actually perceive reality.

How do you know a conclusion of reality cannot be known to be of actual reality if you don't know what actual reality actually is? Because you say that actual reality cannot be known. — AppLeo

Because we don’t have anything to compare our conclusions to.
———————————-

Major difference between being skeptical and understanding my limitations.

You see a bunch of nonsense; I see a basic logical argument.

I suppose the OP can mean lots of things to lots of people.

All those are rhetorical questions, right?

OK. Understood.

Logic and reason don’t fail, but rather the thinking subject misuses them. We are all subjective, but not entirely so.

Any conclusion of ours about reality cannot be KNOWN to be of actual reality. It very well may be, but we have no means to prove it absolutely. It’s not that we cannot perceive reality, but rather we cannot know the reality we perceive is as it really is.

he said that we cannot actually perceive reality — AppLeo

Maybe you have some references to sustain that assertion, but I present these to deny it:

“....The simple but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of external objects in space....”
(Which can only be given us by means of perception)

“.....For how is it possible that the faculty of cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our senses?.....”

“.....The postulate concerning the cognition of the reality of things requires perception, consequently conscious sensation, not indeed immediately, that is, of the object itself, whose existence is to be cognized, but still that the object have some connection with a real perception, in accordance with the analogies of experience, which exhibit all kinds of real connection in experience....”
——————————————

I personally do not hold with an objective meaning *OF* life. Meanings IN, sure. Objective purpose to....I guess. The expression of moral code and all that. Meaning OF....not required.

Duality is nothing but a name given to the intrinsic relational nature of the human cognitive system. Whether the world of things is itself of a dual nature is impossible for us to know, because we use a dualistic explanatory methodology to examine it, so we couldn’t determine which was the final arbiter.

One can use reason to determine the conditions under which reason works, but one cannot use reason to say what reason is.

(Yeah, well, that’s all well and good, buddy, but how can the concept of “duality”....if it’s a name it must have been a concept first, right?....have any meaning, any explanatory power, if, in a relational system, it doesn’t relate to anything? Huh? Now what?)

Dunno. To devolve into endless regress in order to find a monism, or to generate one in order to prevent it....one’s as minimally satisfactory and as maximally necessary as the other.

Explain.

But let's use the perception of the bug. — Paul24

Well, shucks. That’s easy. Smashee and smasher are in the same reference frame, smashee is obviously not in a gravity well, smasher’s smashing device is not moving anywhere near the SOL.....wait.....what’s the sense of a bug’s perception again? What’s it like to be a bug?

No wonder there’s a dearth of paradigm-shifting thinkers these days. (Sigh)

Kidding, of course. It’s fun reading you guys, witnessing the current state of philosophy. That you understand each other is just short of amazing, if you ask me.

Anyway.......carry on.

The A, B, and C, in the comment were in response to your request for what I thought, in general. I took that to mean over and above whatever is included in the conversations on these pages. Nevertheless, with respect to B, yes, it may very well be a logical argument, but it is not one for which I would volunteer; I do not acknowledge the necessity of the supernatural, therefore arguments with respect to it are superfluous.

faith would conflict with what's reasonable to believe — S

What’s reasonable to believe is at the sole discetion of the subject. I don’t think I’d consider a mere difference in understanding to be a confrontation, the word carrying the implication of alternative value it doesn’t deserve. It’s no different than this logical argument snafu: you can’t blame a guy for coming to a conclusion from his premises any more than you can blame a guy for coming to a faith from his understandings. Now, if you and a faith kinda guy were in a house fire and you had a water hose and he had faith in a thunderstorm.....well, that might be a confrontation.

You mention Nietzsche the other day. You didn’t find him all that difficult?

You would only say that they are different if you were seeing them as different. — Metaphysician Undercover

No. I would only say they are different if I cognize them as different. We do not think simultaneous thoughts. Instantaneous in succession, yes, simultaneous, no. Then, it is correct to say I judge each object presented to understanding as each representation appears to it. There is no method to compare sequential objects to each other until they are cognized, and then only when reason calls for a determination. Only then will I say whether the cognitions are similar or not. Of course, the system works so fast, it seems like it is perception doing all the work, when in actuality, it isn’t doing much of anything except deliver the goods. And, in the empirical world we live in, this is why philosophy is so ill-received. Philosopbabble, doncha know.

I’ve gone as far as I care to go in speaking for others. People weren’t talking to me directly on this so I wasn’t paying that much attention, and I’ve already got myself in deeper than I have the right to be. Still, I’m interested in what you think TS’s argument actually is, and why you think it is unsound.

So in the interest of this discussion, what is the missing premise, and what does ol’ René have to do with it? You must be aware that he proved conclusively that absolute certainty is possible, right? And if a thing is possible, and the principles grounding it are followed, other certainty is also given. To wit: the reality of external experience is every bit as undeniable as our internal experience and is necessary for it.

“....Problematical idealism which makes no such assertion, but only alleges our incapacity to prove the existence of anything besides ourselves by means of immediate experience, is a theory rational and evidencing a thorough and philosophical mode of thinking, for it observes the rule not to form a decisive judgement before sufficient proof be shown. The desired proof must therefore demonstrate that we have experience of external things, and not mere fancies. For this purpose, we must prove, that our internal and, to Descartes, indubitable experience is itself possible only under the previous assumption of external experience....”

I’m saying I don’t even need the word “different” to understand relational dissimilarities; it’s just an instance where language mitigates confusion. When I’m working stuff out in my head “difference” is never brought to my attention, even while I’m busy cognizing relative judgements. Still, in a dialogue, the word “different” and it’s variations is used in order to show the participants understand there is in fact some relational disparity between them.

I made a mistake by insinuating properties into the A and B duality in this conversation, when A and B are really logical syllogisms whose premises are grounded in A by self-imposed definitions, and in B by existential circumstance, neither of which have actual properties. My bad, and all that.

AJJ constructed his syllogism based on the definitions intrinsic to a favored discipline, and even if the form of the logical argument is valid in the holding to its definitions, the premises are not known to be true, which makes the conclusion unsound (the Universe exists necessarily because a timeless eternal thing created it).

TS, on the other hand, has constructed a logically valid syllogism where the major premise is indeed true, and from which the conclusion is sound (the Universe exists necessarily because we’re in it).

You say (pg15) logic is what makes this timeless eternal thing necessary and if one skips the logic, the principle of necessity is negated in both A and B. I disagree, insofar as it is merely the definitions grounding the logical argument A, re: “posited to exist timelessly and eternally”, which make the thing ipso facto necessary, and that is henceforth incorporated into the argument, and in B it is the absolute impossibility otherwise which grounds the principle of necessity.

On the other hand, because the human cognitive system is predicated on a priori rules from which the principles of logical thinking follow, deleting logical thought does negate the principle of necessity. But only in thought, which immediately falsifies all our judgements about the world, but says nothing about the facts of the world.

See the.......er.....difference?

The point is that "different" has a definite meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

I’m not sure it has a meaning. Or at least a cogent one. Different is a relational condition. We never describe “different”; we describe a relational discrepancy and label it a difference. The logical inference is the purview of judgement, true, an act of reason, but all that does is quantify the discrepancy by deducing that the properties for A are not the same as the properties for B. And THAT is all we can say about “difference”.

Maybe we think words need definitions or meanings just because we use them to communicate consistently.

Are you saying — S

.......yes, although I’m more agreeing with Rank saying it than saying it myself.

And are you saying — S

A.) because you believe that some form of supernatural being or entity can't exist in the universe because the universe is natural?
.......By definition, yes; what I believe is irrelevant.

B.) And that if it doesn't exist in the universe, then it must not exist at all?
.......No. B does not follow from A necessarily. Complete knowledge of the Universe as effect does not give any conception of its cause.

C.) And if it's not a fact, then we can't rightly say that anything conflicts with it as a fact?
.........That which is not a fact can be conflicted, but only by another fact. That which is not a fact cannot be conflicted by a faith-based proposition. To whit: that I am having breakfast tomorrow is not a fact, and you cannot conflict with that by supposing I am going to when tomorrow gets here. But you sure can after tomorrow gets here and I do or do not get my breakfast.

worst possible way to approach the stuff of philosophy. It is anathema to it. — S

Absolfreakin’lutely. You’d make a fine Kantian, I must say.

“......I cannot even make the assumption (...) of God (...) if I do not deprive speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent insight. For to arrive at these, it must make use of principles which, in fact, extend only to the objects of possible experience, and which cannot be applied to objects beyond this sphere without converting them into phenomena, and thus rendering the practical extension of pure reason impossible. I must, therefore, abolish knowledge, to make room for belief....”

You know as well as I, that illogical arguments are still manifestations of logic, just as unreasonable thinking is still reason. Reason is way too subjective to chastise too rigorously. Enough to disagree, but not enough to ridicule. Among otherwise reasonable people, I mean. Nutjobs get no respect, throw the fools on the fire, I say!!!

What is not a scientific fact, and is being acknowledged as true, is the existence in the Universe, or acts as the cause of the Universe, of the thing Rank claims to have faith in. Conflict with what doesn’t exist, is impossible.

All empirical science has a metaphysical ground. Metaphysics without empiricism is transcendent (mystical), empiricism without metaphysics is stagnant.

Fundamental laws of logic have no rule over faith-based cognitions, the prime example being transferring the being of some supernatural necessity from phenomenal in the world to ideal in the mind.

Threw me for a loop, no doubt. When I read “belief not in conflict with fact”, many years of cognitive prejudice comes to the fore and I wanna say....WHAAATT???

He got all tricksies on us hobbittses.....he said a thing (faith) is truthfully based on not-fact, which is of course, quite possible.

Oh hell no....I’m not arguing for or against anything I haven’t convinced myself I know something about.

I guess I see where you coming from here. Not in conflict with fact because there isn’t a fact to be in conflict with, and that’s all cool and stuff, but I’m a fan of knowledge myself, and where knowledge isn’t attainable.....or I’m just not interested in pursuing it......I’m just as happy being ignorant, rather than inject a subjective explanatory placeholder.

I bet you’re gonna get in a bunch of trouble by stipulating “not in conflict with fact”. Not in conflict with reason, sure, no problem; you had to reason to your conclusion, after all. While you are absolutely privileged to your own reason, from which a valid belief may follows, you are not so priviledged to your own facts, which suggests fact regarding faith is not the same as fact regarding empirical reality. Even so, it would appear you invite a whole world of explanatory hurt in trying to justify how a fact could ground something so subjectively dominant as faith.

Then we compare A and B, and make the inference A is different from B. Why would you say that this is not a logical inference? — Metaphysician Undercover

When I compare a brick to a cinder block, I’m not sure I’m inferring anything. Why can’t I just be observing a difference, without having to logically infer there is one?

Are you saying sensual awareness itself involves logical inference? Metaphysically speaking.....which I suspect you are wont to do......I suppose you could say perception A is the major premise and perception B is the minor, in a cognitive syllogism, from which the conclusion that the brick is different than the cinder block is rendered valid deductively, but.....who does that!!!!

Are you (plural) really using logic to determine the existence of God? — Pattern-chaser

As one of the (plural) you’s in attendance.....not me. Logic is just a set of rules for descriptions of true statements; it doesn’t determine anything existential.

Are you really debating the objective existence of God in the scientific space-time universe? — Pattern-chaser

Again, not me; I just don’t care. But if one is debating the objective existence of a thing, he must be doing so from the domain of a scientific space-time Universe; there isn’t anyplace else to find an objective existence, as far as we’re concerned.

I don’t know a damn thing about what is commonly referred to as “God”. But I sure as hell have a lot of experience with my fellow men who think THEY know about it.

Oh, yeah. Sorry. Title of the thread is sort of a clue, huh?

Part. 6 does include some thoughts on maybe not publishing right away. He doesn’t mention Galileo by name, of course, but that was the big news cycle of the day, and they were contemporaries, so....

I can’t find anything definitive on publishing, but I kinda pieced together that Discourse was written in French in 1634, put aside for three years, published in the Netherlands in 1637, translated into Latin and published in Amsterdam six years after his death, in 1656.