I read it but a long time ago. I'd have to review it.

How would you provide justice for every person murdered? There's often no good evidence regarding just who perpetrated a murder.

Is "not disliking" different from "Liking"? — Moliere

"Not disliking" can include "being indifferent towards" for example.

You'd have to give a plausible account of someone liking and disliking the same thing without equivocation, where what's really going on isn't that they like x (about F) but not y (about F).

You've been typing a few hundred words per post. Suddenly you can't retype or copy/paste a handful?

Well, but dislike is primarily because it's not only pain that's disliked and that factors into moral views.

I've said an objective method to assess good morals — Christoffer

This is way too long from post to post. So let's try sorting out one thing at a time. I like to tackle something and move on.

An objective method to assess whose "good morals"?

When it's more dissimilar or not understood is when you get the "bad reasoning" judgment.

Re validity, there are different species of logic and different definitions of validity. For example, validity is different in relevance logics than in traditional logic. (And quirks with the traditional definition of validity was really the whole initial motivation for relevance logics.)

Pain, however, is more uniform in nature - even a masochist feels pain. So, I suggest you use pain rather than dislike in the matter of morality. The connection between morality and dislike is too weak. Pain is a better partner. — TheMadFool

The significance of pain (for morality, at least) is that people don't like it.

You miss that the deduction was about well-being. Are you saying "not surviving" is well-being? — Christoffer

I'm saying that nothing, objectively is well-being. If you want to focus on the brain chemistry factors re a feeling of well-being, that's fine, but (a) that still isn't objective (because we're talking about a mental state, which makes it subjective by definition), and (b) there's no objective fact that creating the brain states in question are preferential to not creating them.

Re conventional definitions of well-being, those aren't objectively arrived at of course. What's being reported is what the term is commonly used to denote. Those common denotations are strictly subjectively produced (as are all denotations).

It's an objective fact that particular denotations are more common. But that doesn't make the denotation objectively correct.

What is your definition of well-being for a person? — Christoffer

My subjective characterization of well-being includes survival, good health, etc. (at least roughly, I wouldn't say at all costs or necessarily as an uncompromised trump card for everyone in every situation).

I don't pretend that those preferences are somehow objective. There's no need to. We should focus on the correct realm/domain for the phenomena in question.

Why are you ignoring the point I'm making? I provided a moral method to use in order to be morally good. The method is detached from feelings and emotions. — Christoffer

You're ignoring the point I'm making. Your method is not at all detached from feelings and emotions.

If a person that has zero empathy is told to follow this moral guideline in order to function according to good morals in society, he can do it without having empathy. — Christoffer

A hypothetical person who has "zero empathy" can follow someone else's guidelines, sure. And those guidelines will count as "good morals" to people who agree with those preferences. They'll count as "bad morals" to people who disagree with those preferences. The "zero empathy" person won't have any moral view of it one way or the other insofar as they're not engaging with their own preferences, and they won't be doing anything that has anything to do with morality, except in some other persons' assessments (good or bad or whatever depending on the views in question).

Then, because of this, the choice of raising dopamine levels has nothing to do with emotions, — Christoffer

Yes it does. If someone is making a choice to do something, they're making that choice for a reason, for preferences over the alternative. (It may not be simple and direct, but it will still be for preferences over alternatives.)

"Good morals," by the way, are the morals that one agrees with.

Invent a reason, like, they need to stay on our planet but will be killed if they start a war with us. So they have to live with us and function in society like if they were people. But since they have no emotion or feelings like us, they need a method to assess good moral values. — Christoffer

If they have no emotions or feelings whatsoever, then they have no reason to choose not starting a war and being killed or anything else. They have to have preferences to make those sorts of choices.

They could use these guidelines to act like good people, even though they don't have any feelings or emotional reasons to do so. — Christoffer

Why would they do that over the alternative(s)?

If I lacked all empathy I could still deduce that food is good for a person in order for him to survive. — Christoffer

You can deduce that food is necessary to survive. You can't deduce that survival is good or better than not surviving, because that's not a fact. That's a preference that people can have.

Since that's a preference that people have, if you don't care about anyone, then it's not a preference that you'd have. But conversely, if it's a preference you have, then it's not true that you don't care about anyone. You prefer that they survive. (Or you prefer that they attain what they want (where they want survival), or whatever it is that you prefer.)

"Survival is well-being" isn't a fact. It's a preference. It's a way that people feel, where they would rather than one set of facts obtains (survival) than another set (a lack of survival).

Are you saying that giving food to someone who is hungry so that he survives isn't a choice for the well-being of that person? — Christoffer

It's not a fact that that is well-being versus letting them starve and die. Both can happen. The extramental world couldn't care less which happens. It's us, as individual persons with brains functioning mentally, who care, who have preferences.

Then a hug, which has been scientifically confirmed to raise dopamine levels in the brain, is a choice I can make for increasing the well-being of that person without even have any emotional value linked to that choice. — Christoffer

The emotional value is that you prefer raising their dopamine levels to the alternative.

There's not really any "forwards and backwards" in time. We just imagine/fantasize about that. There are just changes that happen, and changes can relatively happen at different rates.

A count of the particles that have decayed would not be a measurement of change, by the way. Again, comparative difference is not the same thing as change. I pointed that out with the atmospheric density example.

You can observe decay by observing the changes in a particular particle, say (whether it's just replaced by another particle or whatever). Or if you have a number of particles, you can observe their changing relations (spatial orientation for example) or whatever you like.

The way we measure time from any change is by assigning numbers to the changes in question. So that's what you'd do.

My example showed something where change was quite measurable but time was not, — noAxioms

How did your example show that? I certainly didn't agree that it showed that.

Do you mean that ideas about moral should not include methods that are general to everyone? — Christoffer

No. What I mean is that if your ideas about morality include methods that are general to everyone, then it's not true that there are people in the world who you don't care about (in that respect).

but assessing the well-being for all, including the self. — Christoffer

You're ignoring that "this fact rather than that is 'well-being'" IS a way that you feel. It's a preference you have. Objectively, there are no preferences for any facts (or counterfactuals) versus any other facts (or counterfactuals)

OK, I was finding inconsistency with "I'm saying that what time is ontologically is change or motion". — noAxioms

It's not inconsistent with having an effect on anything or differences between systems, because I didn't say anything about that.

So what would it be inconsistent with?

If we can't conceive of an unexperienced or objective world, then what would we even be talking about in this discussion?

I'm not proposing anything. I'm finding inconsistency in your proposal. — noAxioms

My proposal has absolutely nothing to do with effects on anything or distinctions between systems.

Also, it's not a proposal. It's an identification.

I didn't really define time. I just brought up points that seem to find flaw in equating time with change. — noAxioms

Without an argument, it just seems like arbitrary ideas that have a non sequitur connection with what I'm claiming.

What post again? My take on something being meaningful is that X is meaningful if there is a distinction between a system with X and a system without X. A distinction other than the presence of X. — noAxioms

This is what I wrote: "I don't really understand what you're asking there. Because I don't understand how you're using "meaning" really. If you're literally talking about semantics, meaning is subjective. It's a mental act of association. So are you asking if someone (who?) performs associative acts in that situation? "

And then you responded with something about "simulation" for some reason.

If you want to make an argument to the effect of "time can only be change if that (that=maybe time, change--whatever you'd need) has an effect on something" or "time can only be change if there is a distinction between a system with x and a system without x" or whatever you'd want to claim, then I'd check out the argument, but you'd have to make the argument.

You're ignoring the issues I brought up re "meaningful."

If you're going to base an argument on that idea, you can't ignore those issues.

The change is the decay of one of the particles. Not sure what you're thinking I'm assigning to that change other than the order in which it occurs. It is meaningless to say they decay at a fast rate at first, and tapering off. That case is not in any way distinct from them decaying slowly at first, and quickly at the end. — noAxioms

You were positing something decaying at different speeds where there's only that particle decaying? That wasn't clear from your earlier comment.

"At different speeds" would be nonsensical in that situation. "At different speeds" has to be relative to another change.

There can be no units. There is nothing on which said units could possibly be based. — noAxioms

It's always based on some set of changes. You posited a change in the universe. So it would be whatever you assign to that change.

Re "So are you asking if someone (who?) performs associative acts in that situation?"

There is no simulation. It is a universe with ordered events. — noAxioms

I don't know if you read "situation" as "simulation"?? I have no idea what your response amounts to otherwise.

Then you're relating processes anywhere to that wheel, and not to time. — noAxioms

I don't understand your comment.

When we're talking about measuring time, we choose some changes as the basis. I already explained this.

We then measure other changes relative to the changes we chose as our measurement basis. We could use the relatively twice as fast wheel as the measurement basis. We could use any changes as the measurement basis.

Don't understand what you're saying. It doesn't need to be any particular amount of time for the one wheel to change twice as fast as the other. — noAxioms

Right. You asked if it's twice as much time. The answer is yes, if you're using the faster wheel as the time basis. We always use some changing phenomenon (or phenomena) as our time basis (when we're making measurements like this, which is the context you're presenting). Other changes we measure relative to whatever we've chosen as a measurement changes. Changes are always relative to other changes.

I thought of an example of change without meaningful time: I have a universe with an unstable particle. It eventually decays. The time it takes to do that is meaningless. — noAxioms

Talking about time in the sense of measurement there, if that's all you have in your universe, "the time it takes to decay" is simply whatever unit you apply to the change in question.

Is there any meaning to a half-life of them? — noAxioms

I don't really understand what you're asking there. Because I don't understand how you're using "meaning" really. If you're literally talking about semantics, meaning is subjective. It's a mental act of association. So are you asking if someone (who?) performs associative acts in that situation?

That is a pretty light form of temptation, I'd say. Plus it's quite rational. — Moliere

I wasn't saying anything about it not being rational. I said that it doesn't make sense to not dislike x but to feel that x is immoral where we're not equivocating. The person likes and dislikes/is worried about different things in the example I gave (the cake example).

With drugs, say, it's the same thing. There are aspects the person likes, but other aspects they dislike. They're not liking and disliking the same exact thing, in the same respect, etc.

So, what is it they, or we, compare statements, or an argument against when we make that judgement? — Echarmion

People compare it to how they reason, what makes sense to them.

Yes, because if y cannot fail to have x, then x is part of what y means — sime

I think those arguments are inane. I don't understand the "if y cannot fail to have x" part of your comment, though.

We're also probably not going to agree on what meaning is.

Two equal size wheels spinning, and one goes around twice as fast as the other. That seems to be twice the motion (change) in the same time. — noAxioms

Okay. That makes sense but you're just pointing out that time is relative (in a different sense than the special relativity sense) to whatever we're using as the change for measurement. In other words, "In the same time"=you have to be referring to some set of changes that you're using for the relative measurement. For example, the changes in a clock.

If you were using the wheel that goes around twice as fast as the change for (time) measurement, then it would mean twice as much time.

Normally we try to use changes that seem phenomenally regular to us as the change for (time) measurement, but we wouldn't have to. It just has convenience for us.

, but twice as much motion is not twice as much time. — noAxioms

What would you mean by "twice as much motion"? I'm not saying that doesn't make sense, but I'm just not sure what would be an example of that.

Re this:

I can also have change without time: The air gets thinner with altitude: — noAxioms

What exactly is changing in that example? The air density at a particular altitude isn't changing, is it? It seems like you're conflating change and comparative difference there. Comparative difference is conceptual, abstract.

Some call true propositions/statements "truths". — creativesoul

I agree with that, but it would take some work (and it might not be possible) for them to try to make much sense out of that if you were to press them just what truth amounts to in those cases.

Would you say that there a way to judge "good" reasoning and "bad" reasoning that is distinct from just determining wether the statement is logically valid? — Echarmion

Definitely people do that all the time, because people judge good and bad reasoning very frequently where they're not even familiar with a concept of logical validity.

That's not the point, the point is that there are people in the world that you might not even care about who is affected by your moral choices, therefore morality isn't about emotions and feelings. — Christoffer

If there are people in the world who you don't care about, then your moral views are not going to be about them.

Re "Morality must be applicable to all people," that would only be a credo that you feel. It's nothing like an objective fact.

T-S, You seem to defend a definition of time as change, but complain about common language use, which I was not trying to do. I haven't read all your posts, but perhaps you could point to a post where you explain that if that's what you claim. — noAxioms

I'm not clear on your comment.

I'm saying that what time is ontologically is change or motion. That can't be refuted by pointing out that substituting "change" or "motion" for "time" and vice versa in various sentences sounds funny or is ungrammatical, because the argument that "what time is ontologically is change or motion" isn't about language usage, language substitution, etc. It's about the ontological or metaphysical "nature" of time.

Morality has nothing to do with your emotions since morality is not about you, — Christoffer

You don't just have emotions/feelings about yourself.

For example, you might have temptation to eat a piece of cake. You like the taste, you'd love eating it, but you don't like the calories (maybe you're trying to lose weight), the health issues (maybe you're worried about or you have diabetes), etc.

I've already explained to you how time can pass or proceed without any change or motion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you give a clue re a few words that the explanation started with so that I can look it up again?

Otherwise, re "pass" and "proceed" you'd have to explain the definition you're using that doesn't involve change or motion. And re "nonphysical change" you'd have to explain what that is so that I can make any sense of it.

So how does reason relate to feelings? — Andrew4Handel

That's not succinctly summarizable, because it relates to feelings in so many ways, but the important thing is that reason isn't objective. Reason is a mental function.

I'd say that your statement makes sense. Isn't this the structure of temptation? To like something which one objects to? — Moliere

What you're attracted to re temptation isn't the same thing, in the same respect, etc., that you have a problem with

No, you can deduce what is good for you. — Christoffer

You can, but what you're explaining is about your feelings. It wouldn't make any sense to deduce what's good for you where the deduction results in something that you're indifferent towards, that makes you feel bad in the long run, etc.