But someone can base their morality on harm assessment. — Andrew4Handel

Sure, if that's how they feel about it.

So they can refer to objective suffering and harm in making a moral claim and their objection to another persons moral intuition can be based on the persons failure to take into consideration harm. — Andrew4Handel

Moral agents don't make moral claims without a basis in moral feeling. They can refer to an objective whatever the hell they like, talk about harm, etc. That doesn't make any relevant difference. Their ethical objection is founded in moral feeling, or it's not really an ethical objection at all, just empty words.

Like I said in another post this is how I differentiate between things I dislike and thinks I morally object to. — Andrew4Handel

Things you dislike aren't relevant unless this leads to a moral judgement. You can pretend that you only like or dislike stuff without ever making any moral judgements, but I wouldn't buy that for a second. You might as well be telling me that you have three heads and live on Mars.

I had a long discussion about this in my "quality of life" thread and I think that facts about the world can cause feelings and these feelings can be predicted from facts about the world. So that it is unlikely that feelings completely severed from what actually happened like can happen with a random emotional bout of sentiment.
This correlation between external facts and predictable emotional responses makes certain emotions seem inappropriate or absurd in response to certain scenarios. It is as if the scenarios demand certain responses.
Then again a lion can eat a deer alive without negative emotions. Natural examples of this kind make nature seem quite amoral. — Andrew4Handel

Well, of course, nonhuman animals aren't moral agents, so their world is amoral. But you're not a lion.

At any rate, there's zero evidence of there being moral rules built into the world somehow. — Terrapin Station

Isn't the challenge to try and find a valid morality and not just to be fed the rules deterministically?

I am agnostic about this. I think that I would behave differently if I knew whether or not there were rights and wrongs.

For example I grew up being told numerous things were wrong like shopping on a Sunday and watching television.
Now I have abandoned some of these beliefs altogether so I am free to act. But there are cases when I don't know what my intuition is. I still struggle with sexually related phobias.

I think people do restrain their actions or act based on moral beliefs and that if there moral beliefs changed they would behave differently so they need some notion of moral truth to justify their attitudes to themselves.

I agree that some people simply follow stuff they were taught, but in those cases, I wouldn't say that they're acting morally (or immorally) at all. They're not acting morally unless they're actually making a judgment about the behavior in question.

So yeah, probably if some people thought about this more they'd do different things than they do when they're just following stuff they're taught. I think we'd all be better off in that case, though, especially since people follow things like "no shopping on Sunday" or "no eating meat on Friday" or whatever.

So you think it would make sense for someone to say, "I don't dislike rape representations in pornography, but I feel that rape representations in pornography are morally wrong"? — Terrapin Station

I think feeling that rape is wrong is adequate to make rape representations problematic. I think it is possible with porn to be aroused by things we would not do ourselves.

People can even become aroused against their wishes when being raped.

People can have a wide range of conflicting emotions. I don't think these are all moral assessments. I like to reach a moral conclusion through reason maybe in a way like Christoffer outlined

So you think it would make sense for someone to say, "I don't dislike rape representations in pornography, but I feel that rape representations in pornography are morally wrong"? — Terrapin Station

I think this is a possible brain state to have. It might just be cognitive dissonance but I feel (heh) that at least the inverse of your statement applies to some of my views.

For example, in the abortion debate, I asked whether being responsible for an injury means one should donate blood or even organs to alleviate it. While I feel that as a matter of personal conscience, I should donate blood in that case, I am at least sceptical whether it can be a moral obligation. And on the topic of abortion itself, I consider abortion a tragedy but do not consider it morally wrong.

My experiences led me to moral nihilism because of the unreliability of guilt feelings and other emotions and the lack of a moral authority.

And this is why I think feeling something is wrong is not adequate for a morality.

Now you yourself have even said "if some people thought about this more" which seems to invoke reason.

I think this is a possible brain state to have. It might just be cognitive dissonance but I feel (heh) that at least the inverse of your statement applies to some of my views.

For example, in the abortion debate, I asked whether being responsible for an injury means one should donate blood or even organs to alleviate it. While I feel that as a matter of personal conscience, I should donate blood in that case, I am at least sceptical whether it can be a moral obligation. And on the topic of abortion itself, I consider abortion a tragedy but do not consider it morally wrong. — Echarmion

I don't quite understand this response. What, exactly, are you saying you don't dislike but feel is morally wrong?

I think feeling that rape is wrong is adequate to make rape representations problematic. I think it is possible with porn to be aroused by things we would not do ourselves.

People can even become aroused against their wishes when being raped. — Andrew4Handel

You'd be equivocating here, though. To not be equivocating, you'd need someone saying, "I don't dislike rape, but I think that rape is morally wrong." Or "I don't dislike representations of rape, but I think that representations of rape are morally wrong." It has to be someone saying that they don't dislike x but feel that x is morally wrong in just the same respect, etc.

Now you yourself have even said "if some people thought about this more" which seems to invoke reason. — Andrew4Handel

I'm not saying anything at all against reason. Thinking that I am would be seriously misunderstanding my views.

I don't quite understand this response. What, exactly, are you saying you don't dislike but feel is morally wrong? — Terrapin Station

I am saying that I can dislike things and not consider then morally wrong (e.g. abortion).

And I can certainly like doing things that I consider immoral. But that might not be exactly what you mean.

I am saying that I can dislike things and not consider then morally wrong (e.g. abortion). — Echarmion

Ah, sure. But I wouldn't say that that doesn't make sense. Morality is stronger than just any arbitrary dislike of something, and it's also not just any behavior. It has to be about behavior we think is more significant than etiquette, for example.

And I can certainly like doing things that I consider immoral. But that might not be exactly what you mean. — Echarmion

It would fit if you're not equivocating. It's a matter of whether it's exactly the same thing, in the same respect, etc.

For example, maybe you enjoy stealing things, but you think it's morally wrong in general for people to steal, It would be an equivocation in that case to say that you don't personally dislike stealing, but you think it's morally wrong for people in general to steal, because maybe you think the economy wouldn't be workable in that case, or whatever. That's an equivocation because you'd not be thinking that exactly the same thing, in the same respect, for the same reasons, etc. is something that both you don't dislike and that you think is morally wrong.

Isn't what someone thinks is good for them based on feelings? — Andrew4Handel

No, you can deduce what is good for you. I can deduce that the death of my father put me in a terrible position mentally, but I have grown as a person to handle life more confidently and with better emotional balance because of it, therefore, it was an event that was good for me personally, even if that sounds bad. (This wasn't an example of moral, but of a deduction of what is good for me and what is attached to feelings.

The problem is that moral philosophy has failed to reach a consensus about morality or resolve moral issues. Materialism or the scientific don't appear to leave room for moral or value claims. — Andrew4Handel

This is because of two things; ethics philosophy ignoring science (psychology and sociology) and that you can't quantify specific moral events within that science. What you can do is to use science to create a foundation that can be applied to most if not all moral questions. This means you can create a foundation of morals that are based on a moral method of thinking, not specific acts to do in certain situations that are contextual. Many ethics questions in philosophy concentrate on specific events that get detached from a central moral method and focus on behavior and ideas about those single events.

Another aspect to take into consideration is that the current understanding of the human psyche within psychology and sociology is rather new, only a few decades, if at all decades. You talk about not reaching consensus about morals from philosophical dialectics and ideas from times when we didn't even know enough about how the human psyche and social interaction actually works. While we have a lot of scientific research left on the human mind, we have come a long way even measured within the last ten years. To form a moral philosophy at this time is vastly more rational than trying to pitch ideas that have been outdated for many decades and centuries.

Ideas outside of materialistic nature are unscientific and narcissistic compared to the rational notion that we are not special beings. We can define our perception through idealistic views, but we as beings aren't detached from the universe we are in and nothing points to it in any rational way. Therefore, the more we know of how things work around us, the better we can create methods that work rather than guesses and fantasies.

The result of the scientific progress in psychology and sociology can be witnessed in how we treat mental health issues, in how we can predict behavior and so on. To not be able to utilize this science to find a foundation for a more scientific and objective moral method of living is to ignore the progress we've had the last hundred years and that wasn't clear to those who've done moral philosophy through the centuries.

So now thinkers are resorting to the idea we should just go with our feelings of what is appropriate or harmful.

I think reason can be a useful tool and moralizing but it does not seem to resolve moral disputes. — Andrew4Handel

If the person who goes by their feelings are suffering from mental health problems, or if they were raised with questionable means and because of it becomes a murderer, I think that is argument enough for "feelings" not being any good measure of moral behavior whatsoever.

As I've described earlier:

1. Do what is positive for the well-being of yourself and others combined.
2. Morality is an evolving process and each situation must be assessed carefully according to point 1.
3. Assessing what is morally good needs to involve current knowledge about human psychology, sociology, and knowledge about human well-being for the individual and larger groups. — Christoffer

Is a far better baseline for assessing what is a good moral choice in a situation and if it fails it's not because of bad morality but because of a human error in assessing the situation. But the moral assessment will still be good; the intention was good. Moral behavior cannot access knowledge about the future, therefore a person cannot demand morals to be a perfect reflection of the result of behavior, only how to think within the behavior at the moment.

I'd like to hear someone expanding or trying to test my points above, I'd like a dialectic on those points because it's still a vague description, at the moment, of my moral theories in the works.

For example, maybe you enjoy stealing things, but you think it's morally wrong in general for people to steal, It would be an equivocation in that case to say that you don't personally dislike stealing, but you think it's morally wrong for people in general to steal, because maybe you think the economy wouldn't be workable in that case, or whatever. That's an equivocation because you'd not be thinking that exactly the same thing, in the same respect, for the same reasons, etc. is something that both you don't dislike and that you think is morally wrong. — Terrapin Station

Sure, but if I need to think exactly the same thing, in the same respect, for the same reasons, the difference between "dislike" and "immoral" disappears. Which of course is your point. But I don't think using the word "dislike" in this manner helps to make the point very clear.

Anyways as to the topic of "objective morality", I think it's just a misnomer. Or perhaps a case of asking the wrong question. The point of morality is, after all, not to provide information on some object. It's to provide practical rules.

Anyways as to the topic of "objective morality", I think it's just a misnomer. Or perhaps a case of asking the wrong question. The point of morality is, after all, not to provide information on some object. It's to provide practical rules. — Echarmion

Practical rules that are objective in their intention of the well-being of all humans (and maybe beyond).

I'd say that your statement makes sense. Isn't this the structure of temptation? To like something which one objects to?

Practical rules that are objective in their intention of the well-being of all humans (and maybe beyond). — Christoffer

What does it mean for a rule to be 'objective in it's intention"?

I think you have a point when you say:

This means you can create a foundation of morals that are based on a moral method of thinking, not specific acts to do in certain situations that are contextual. — Christoffer

Making moral decisions is about using moral reasoning. Trying to find rules which can be applied consistently to all cases, like the scientific theory looks for theories that are consistent with all observations.

What does it mean for a rule to be 'objective in it's intention"? — Echarmion

In that it follows something that is general for all people regardless of culture or situation. Well-being for someone else and the self, combined, does not have any change between cultures and different lives. What is good for the self and others is another assessment, but the moral intention is good if it is out of the well-being of others and the self. The other points on my list address the risks of when ideas about what is good come from a culture of, for example, "murder" being good for someone.

Making moral decisions is about using moral reasoning. Trying to find rules which can be applied consistently to all cases, like the scientific theory looks for theories that are consistent with all observations. — Echarmion

And moral reasoning is what I mean when I say moral thinking compared to acting in the context of a specific event.

And I provided such points that can act consistently in all cases. If you like, please test them out or expand, this is a theory in progress not a final solution for me.

So how does reason relate to feelings?

No, you can deduce what is good for you. — Christoffer

You can, but what you're explaining is about your feelings. It wouldn't make any sense to deduce what's good for you where the deduction results in something that you're indifferent towards, that makes you feel bad in the long run, etc.

I'd say that your statement makes sense. Isn't this the structure of temptation? To like something which one objects to? — Moliere

What you're attracted to re temptation isn't the same thing, in the same respect, etc., that you have a problem with

So how does reason relate to feelings? — Andrew4Handel

That's not succinctly summarizable, because it relates to feelings in so many ways, but the important thing is that reason isn't objective. Reason is a mental function.

What's the difference? I'd say that this is exactly what temptation looks like -- to object to something yet want it.

You can, but what you're explaining is about your feelings. It wouldn't make any sense to deduce what's good for you where the deduction results in something that you're indifferent towards, that makes you feel bad in the long run, etc. — Terrapin Station

Point being; can you deduce what creates the most well-being for the self and others in a situation? I argue that you can, based on my list of points. Morality has nothing to do with your emotions since morality is not about you, it's about well-being for you and within your relation to others combined.

My experiences led me to moral nihilism because of the unreliability of guilt feelings and other emotions and the lack of a moral authority.

And this is why I think feeling something is wrong is not adequate for a morality.

Now you yourself have even said "if some people thought about this more" which seems to invoke reason. — Andrew4Handel

But there's no other way. It's either that or nothing, and nothing isn't a real option. You can't just switch off your moral feelings.

The experience you've described in this discussion is of feeling and thinking about the stuff of ethics differently over time. That's not so unusual, and it's no reasonable basis for rejecting a position such as mine. And fallibility is not a sufficient basis for rejecting anything at all.

People seem to like mischaracterising ethical stances such as mine as being reasonless just because of the acknowledgement which myself and others make of the necessary emotional foundation in moral judgement. Perhaps they do so because it's easier to attack such a position. The problem is, I don't know anyone who is actually holds such a position.

Your conclusion of moral nihilism isn't warranted because there are better explanations which you're skipping past to get there.

That's not succinctly summarizable, because it relates to feelings in so many ways, but the important thing is that reason isn't objective. Reason is a mental function. — Terrapin Station

Would you say that there a way to judge "good" reasoning and "bad" reasoning that is distinct from just determining wether the statement is logically valid?

What's the difference? I'd say that this is exactly what temptation looks like -- to object to something yet want it. — Moliere

They're different competing desires. It's simply not possible to simultaneously desire X and not desire X.

For example, you might have temptation to eat a piece of cake. You like the taste, you'd love eating it, but you don't like the calories (maybe you're trying to lose weight), the health issues (maybe you're worried about or you have diabetes), etc.

Morality has nothing to do with your emotions since morality is not about you, — Christoffer

You don't just have emotions/feelings about yourself.

You don't just have emotions/feelings about yourself. — Terrapin Station

That's not the point, the point is that there are people in the world that you might not even care about who is affected by your moral choices, therefore morality isn't about emotions and feelings. It can also be corrupted if you are a person who has mental health issues which makes you unable to feel normal emotions and empathy. Morality then, must be applicable to all people, even those with lack of empathy.

That's not the point, the point is that there are people in the world that you might not even care about who is affected by your moral choices, therefore morality isn't about emotions and feelings. — Christoffer

If there are people in the world who you don't care about, then your moral views are not going to be about them.

Re "Morality must be applicable to all people," that would only be a credo that you feel. It's nothing like an objective fact.