With that I agree. "I changed my political viewpoint after the last election" "How much?" "By just over 2 hours" — noAxioms

The claim isn't about how we conventionally use language.

I am saying that I can dislike things and not consider then morally wrong (e.g. abortion). — Echarmion

Ah, sure. But I wouldn't say that that doesn't make sense. Morality is stronger than just any arbitrary dislike of something, and it's also not just any behavior. It has to be about behavior we think is more significant than etiquette, for example.

And I can certainly like doing things that I consider immoral. But that might not be exactly what you mean. — Echarmion

It would fit if you're not equivocating. It's a matter of whether it's exactly the same thing, in the same respect, etc.

For example, maybe you enjoy stealing things, but you think it's morally wrong in general for people to steal, It would be an equivocation in that case to say that you don't personally dislike stealing, but you think it's morally wrong for people in general to steal, because maybe you think the economy wouldn't be workable in that case, or whatever. That's an equivocation because you'd not be thinking that exactly the same thing, in the same respect, for the same reasons, etc. is something that both you don't dislike and that you think is morally wrong.

Now you yourself have even said "if some people thought about this more" which seems to invoke reason. — Andrew4Handel

I'm not saying anything at all against reason. Thinking that I am would be seriously misunderstanding my views.

I think feeling that rape is wrong is adequate to make rape representations problematic. I think it is possible with porn to be aroused by things we would not do ourselves.

People can even become aroused against their wishes when being raped. — Andrew4Handel

You'd be equivocating here, though. To not be equivocating, you'd need someone saying, "I don't dislike rape, but I think that rape is morally wrong." Or "I don't dislike representations of rape, but I think that representations of rape are morally wrong." It has to be someone saying that they don't dislike x but feel that x is morally wrong in just the same respect, etc.

I think this is a possible brain state to have. It might just be cognitive dissonance but I feel (heh) that at least the inverse of your statement applies to some of my views.

For example, in the abortion debate, I asked whether being responsible for an injury means one should donate blood or even organs to alleviate it. While I feel that as a matter of personal conscience, I should donate blood in that case, I am at least sceptical whether it can be a moral obligation. And on the topic of abortion itself, I consider abortion a tragedy but do not consider it morally wrong. — Echarmion

I don't quite understand this response. What, exactly, are you saying you don't dislike but feel is morally wrong?

I agree that some people simply follow stuff they were taught, but in those cases, I wouldn't say that they're acting morally (or immorally) at all. They're not acting morally unless they're actually making a judgment about the behavior in question.

So yeah, probably if some people thought about this more they'd do different things than they do when they're just following stuff they're taught. I think we'd all be better off in that case, though, especially since people follow things like "no shopping on Sunday" or "no eating meat on Friday" or whatever.

I don't want to be too crude but what about rape representation in pornography? Or maybe pornography in general? People can probably have opposing drives especially with the sex drive and the drive to respect other people. — Andrew4Handel

So you think it would make sense for someone to say, "I don't dislike rape representations in pornography, but I feel that rape representations in pornography are morally wrong"?

Oops, started typing this reply a few days ago and forgot about it.



You didn't understand my comment at all. I'm not saying remotely like "we need to list all of the explanations" and I'm not even specifically saying something specifically about explanations of consciousness.

What I'm talking about is that if we're going to say that x doesn't count as an explanation, for any arbitrary x, for any arbitrary subject matter, then we'd better damn well have practically workable criteria for just what counts as an explanation or not and why; criteria that would serve for a broad range of explanations.

Because the alternative is that anyone can reject any proposed explanation for something for any vague, half-assed reason(s) at all--often folks don't bother with any reason whatsoever--and that's just lame.

Re labels, it would just be "family," "friends" etc.

If you were looking for dividing up knowledge into categories, that would be different than focusing on influences.

Like I said in another post this is how I differentiate between things I dislike and thinks I morally object to. — Andrew4Handel

Do you think it would make sense to say, "I don't dislike this, but I morally object to it"?

What if there was a law giver like a deity or innate moral rules in reality (a la the laws of physics)? — Andrew4Handel

If there were innate moral rules built into reality somehow, then there would be objective morality, although that still wouldn't imply that anyone should conform to it rather than simply go by how they feel.

People could get statements about those innate moral rules wrong, though.

At any rate, there's zero evidence of there being moral rules built into the world somehow.

But you said values are brain states. So the actions are the same but the brain states are different. — Andrew4Handel

Right, which is one of the things that results in people not valuing everything equally.

I think it is problematic if some actions causes intense suffering but someone does not believe it is wrong. — Andrew4Handel

It's something worth coming to terms with, because the only way to avoid this situation is to do something like engineer brains to only think/feel particular things . . . which we're nowhere near technologically, and which a lot of people would also morally object to (at least until you engineer that moral objection out of them, haha)

I think we should hope for an objective standard by which to have justice and a deterrent and rationale for justice framework. — Andrew4Handel

We do have standards, a la views, principles, etc. that a large number of people agree on, or that a smaller number of influential or powerful people agree on, but they can't be made objective. And arguing that the views or principles are correct just because those folks agreed on them is an argumentum ad populum and/or argument from authority fallacy.

Re antinatalism, which I know is one of your primary concerns, you're not going to have anything like an antinatlist standard anytime soon, because far more people disagree with antinatalism than agree with it.

Re mathematics and logic, I'm an antirealist. I buy a combo of social constructivism and subjectivism.

Concepts are brain states, too.

What would class as objectively wrong? — Andrew4Handel

As I explained in the other thread, you can get facts wrong by failing to match what the external world is like. So you can get right or wrong that Joe premeditatively killed Pete for $10,000, and you can get right or wrong that Pete's family subsequently went on welfare, etc. but you can't get right or wrong whether it was morally right or wrong to kill Pete, or whether it's morally right or wrong for Pete's family to wind up on welfare, etc., because there are no facts regarding whether such things are morally right or wrong.

What is the value of a morality based on fluctuating feelings with no truth value beyond how one individual feels? — Andrew4Handel

Value is subjective, so it depends on the individual we ask, what they value and why.

I am concerned with moral nihilism being reality where no one can do anything wrong and all actions have equal status — Andrew4Handel

Only that's not at all what follows. No one can do anything objectively wrong, but the objective realm is a category error for morality. What makes something right or wrong is how people feel about the actions in question, and people feel particular ways, with everyone on Earth making moral judgments. No one values all actions equally. So they don't all have equal status.

, if I could have understood what your main influences are - — karl stone

If you want to know that, it's probably better to just ask it in a straightforward manner, and then you could request that we keep our answers to 10 categories or whatever.

It's not the easiest thing to list, because there's so much overlap or so much of a little bit of this and a little bit of that contributing to the "same piece of knowledge," but for me, I'd probably say (as a top 10, with some effort to order them, though that kind of fell apart in the middle):

(1) family, especially parents, maternal grandfather, sisters, a couple particular uncles and aunts, as well as wives
(2) closest friends
(3) teachers, especially high school and university as well as private music instructors (and also the music teacher at my elementary school)
(4) general work experience, including doing the work itself, reaction to the work, interaction with colleagues, etc.
(5) philosophy in general
(6) the sciences in general
(7) views of artists, including people I've worked with (I've mostly worked in arts & entertainment)
(8) the arts from a consumer perspective--films, music, novels, video games etc.
(9) leisure experience/travel etc.
(10) media more broadly, including Internet interaction

If I dislike the taste of bacon it is eating bacon that caused that sensation. — Andrew4Handel

It's not eating bacon that causes that sensation. It's your brain states relative to eating bacon that causes it. Someone else eating bacon can love the taste. Something has to account for the difference.

Ethical stances are likewise brain states.

Something perceived as harmful or shown to be harmful is more likely to arouse morals sentiment. — Andrew4Handel

How is a "perception" or assessment that amounts to someone agreeing, "Yeah, that's harmful" divorced from their feelings?

I don't think people think their morality is just preferences. — Andrew4Handel

Sure, lots of people do not think that, but that doesn't make them correct, of course.

Saying "this proposition is true" is saying that it has the right relation to whatever one takes to be the "truthmaker" ( facts/states of affairs if correspondence theory, other propositions if coherence, etc.)

One of those "you can't have x if there is none of x's opposite" arguments?

As per my explanation, time may pass, or "proceeds" without any physical change — Metaphysician Undercover

Right. That's what you said. The problem is that "pass" and "proceed" are terms that imply change or motion, unless you have some novel definition of them that you'd need to explain for the idea of time not requiring change or motion to make any sense.

I didn't actually specify "physical change" in anything I said, by the way. Just change. So if you want to posit "nonphysical change"--whatever that would be--okay, but it's still change.

I'm not positing nonphysical change. I'd say the idea of nonphysical anything is incoherent. I'm a physicalist and a nominalist who rejects that there are any real abstracts.

I have the same problem with "proceed." You'd have to explain how we could have something proceed without changing.

I don't know what nonphysical anything would be. But who knows what you'd claim, and you specified physical change, as if there might be some other sort of change.

Okay, so you're using the word "pass" to refer to an absence of change? Could you explain that sense of "pass," as I'm unfamiliar with it.

Can we proceed to the justification of your assertion, that time is change? — Metaphysician Undercover

I want to address your comments first. That's part of justifying this against alternate views.

Okay, so in your conception, does time passing without physical change amount to time passing via nonphysical change, or just no change at all?

I explained what I meant. Now you're just changing the subject because you have no defense for your assertion. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not changing the subject. You made a claim about physicists determining something, and that claim was part of an argument against my view.. Okay, so all you meant by "physicists have determined" is that you can conceive of something, is that right? I just want to confirm that first.

What I'm asking you about is your claim about physicsts determining something. Do you understand that?

So when you say that something has been determined you mean that you and others can conceive of it?

Why does sentiment add value, and why is that added value is unique to the frame of reference of those who feel the sentiment? — Bliss

All value is subjective. It's dependent on an individual caring about the item in question. No one cares, then that thing has no value. Someone cares a lot, that thing has a lot of value to that person.

You wrote "this time must pass without any physical change, according to what the physicists have determined"

I'm asking you about that.

You just said that according to what physicists have determined, time shorter than Planck time must pass without any changes. You wrote "this time must pass without any physical change, according to what the physicists have determined"

I'm asking you for the support for that claim. How have physicists determined this?

according to what the physicists have determined. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to what specifically?

So let's try it this way. Could time pass without any change occurring? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, of course not. And obviously I'd say that if I'm saying that time and change are identical.

Re "this difference which is an aspect of time, is not itself a change." It's a difference that's an aspect of change, because time and change are identical.

"Future never changes into past."

Of course. "Changes that haven't happened yet change into changes that already happened" is incoherent, isn't it?

If the dilemma is supposed to be what you'll name the lockers, you could just name them:

"Stuff I learned from birth to 8 years old"
"Stuff I learned from 9 to 15 years old"
"Stuff I learned from 16 to 22"
"Stuff I learned from 23 to 30"
etc.

Or even just

"Knowledge locker 1"
"Knowledge locker 2"

etc.

Or

"Stuff I learned in school"
"Stuff I learned from family"
"Stuff I learned from friends"
"Stuff I learned from books outside of school"

etc.

I'm not denying temporal differences, so pointing out that I'm specifying temporal differences isn't an argument against what I'm saying, it's a feature of what I'm saying. Yes, those are temporal differences. That's the whole point.

Let's try it this way: could you have a change or motion if one "thing" didn't happen after another "thing"?

You have died. Before you move on - you must store your accumulated knowledge in 12 lockers. You can label the lockers - with categories as broad or as specific as you see fit. You can label two lockers the same if one is not enough, but you cannot leave any locker empty. — karl stone

I'm guessing you're leaving something out? What's the dilemma?

OK, but if there is a difference between changes which have happened and changes which have not yet happened, then this is a temporal difference. — Metaphysician Undercover

You don't think that I'm denying temporal differences, do you?

1) and 3) are identical unless "A changes to B" does not mean the same thing as "A changes to B". But that would be nonsense if it didn't. — Metaphysician Undercover

No two instances of something are actually identical. (I'm a nominalist.)

then how do we differentiate between changes which have already happened and changes which have not yet happened? — Metaphysician Undercover

You just said the difference. Changes that happened are different than changes that haven't happened. One thing happened. One has not. (And a third option is that it's a change that's happening.)

For example, think of your phenomenal experience. You watch a bird fly from one tree to another. As you're watching it, it's happening. Then you have a memory of it (which is another change after (watching) the bird flying from one tree to another). The change happened but is not happening. Maybe you'll experience the bird flying back to the first tree after that, but it hasn't happened yet.

That's the difference.

It's a brute fact of changes that they aren't all simultaneous. In terms of experience, you don't experience them all together. Just like it would be a brute fact about changes if they were all simultaneous, or you could experience them all together. Of course, the mere fact that there are changes at all means that change is not something that can be simultaneous--the idea of that is incoherent. It wouldn't be change if one thing didn't happen after another. For change to be change, one thing has to happen after another. That's what time is. Hence, time is change.

The only changes that exist, by the way, are the changes that are happening. Changes that happened existed, but no longer do. Changes that haven't happened do not yet exist, but they will.

And size is not something different than an object, either.

Propositional truth is most certainly propositional in content. Denying that much is rather silly. — creativesoul

It's a core tenet of truth in analytic philosophy, at least, that truth is a relation between a proposition and something else. The relation isn't itself propositional. Propositions and the relation of a proposition to something else are two different things.

So, for example "The cat is on the mat," a proposition, is true because of the fact that a cat is on the mat, per correspondence theory (the proposition corresponds to the state of affairs). Truth in that case is the correspondent relation of the proposition "The cat is on the mat" to the fact that the cat is on the mat. Truth is not the proposition "The cat is on the mat" itself.

I can differentiate between things I don't like and things I think are immoral. The problem is when something is utterly appalling but not wrong. I can absolutely loathe something without thinking it is harmful or immoral. So what differentiates these feelings? — Andrew4Handel

The differentiation is whether is behavior that you don't approve of to an extent that you feel it should be prohibited.

Re "actual harm," I don't know what you'd be referring to. It seems like again it's the problem I specified in the other thread re facts that you're naming "harm" contra assessments, where there's a conflation etc.

Feeling that something is wrong is what morality is. There is no objective wrong (for values).

Metaphysician Unlimited,

Would your premise be something like "If time isn't different than change/motion, then there would be no difference between motion/changes that are occurring, motion/changes that occurred, and motion/changes that have yet to occur"?

If that's your premise, you'd have to explain how you arrived at it, as it makes no sense to me.