Would they belong to "Ding-An-Sich"? or would they be just invention of human mind? What do we have to do or what can we do with Thing-in-itself? — Corvus

I think that the distinction between appearances and thing itself doesn't apply to them? Is the noumenon somehow beyond this distinction? Then they would be noumenons. I think Kant in fact calls ideas like that noumenons.

Acc. to Kant we can't have experience about ideas like "society", "freedom" etc. We can think these ideas but we don't have knowledge about them. We have "only" beliefs concerning them. "Society" can't be appearance in space and time. This means also that ideas like that are outside the realm of verification or falsification. The idea of freedom can't be verified or _falsified_ scientifically.

Kant is interested in objective knowledge. To what extent is our daily existence explicitly governed by scientific laws? Or by mathematical physics. For Kant, and for scientific realism, time and space are basic coordinate systems of nature which make objective locating of entities and events possible. In this sense we "experience" or feel/understand time and space usually/sometimes differently i.e. more "subjectively".

Embodied theorists reverse the traditional scheme of prioritization of thought over feelings, by making affective inputs the condition of possibility of relevance and meaning in thought. It is through the feeling body that things show up as salient; an alteration in how the body feels is at the same time a shift in how the world appears and in how one relates to it. — Joshs

Yes, feelings are obviously an important subject. Then there is the distinction between needs or desires and feelings? Is hunger a feeling? If I desire a new jacket is that a need? When I have acquired the desired jacket and I am satisfied with it is that a feeling? Interesting and complicated subject. We would need a phenomenology of emotions and all related phenomena.

Nietzsche had his own theories how the world functions. I think his extremely cynical views represent biologism. Or that the world becomes "fatally" ordered or disordered through the battle of strong and weak ones.

between science and Mwrleau-Ponty, it is because the particular brand of naturalism that a science is in thrall to makes no room for Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. Varela, Thompson, Gallagher, Petitot and others claim phenomenology can be naturalized
once we transform and update our thinking about scientific naturalism so as to accommodate it. — Joshs

Merleau-Ponty's aim is of course to draw phenomenology closer to history and culture rather than neurophysiology. That is, when one endeavors to relativize, still further from the intersubjectivity, the Husserlian dimension of eidetics constituted in the (naturalistically) pure ego. Transcendental receives then a new meaning. In naturalism, for instance in physiology, the idea of transcendental is not possible.

And transcendental means here philosophically explicated realm of being which makes empirical e.g. neurophysiological observations and generalizations possible. All the data is still there but under the phenomenological suspension which means that the reflection is not guided by that data as already being reality. The existing data has become something that represents something from a certain viewpoint. Neurophysiological concepts are possibilities, not natural necessities, which means that they are results of acts where certain subjectivity has corresponding objectivities or realities. And through the idea of, always relative, freedom which is involved here the transcendental can be linked "essentially" to history and culture as well?

Yes, somewhere Husserl speaks about 'parallelity' of these. He is obviously striving for a true identity. Adequate relation between meanings and object or thing itself (Gegendstand). He is conscious of all the problems and challenges involved here though. 'Mere meanings' are at least an existing fact. And the n o n-attainment of the fulfillment of the sense is a 'normal case' too.

Also, note that it ignores phenomenology, existentialism, and critical theory, which were concerned much more with life and society than with language. On the other hand, I guess maybe that by 1967, post-... — Jamal

The 'original' Husserlian phenomenology in fact was much concerned with language. Husserl's Logical Investigations was mostly about the difference between signification and intuition i.e. meanings or expressions vs. intuitive-perceptual comprehension or 'fulfillment' of the sense. Derrida's grammatological semiology or general 'graphology' is a critique of these thoughts (combined with the critique of modern linguistics and its 'phonocentrism'). Derrida in fact criticized structuralist semiology for which everything was analogical to the language as the modern linguistics saw it?

:up: Excellent! Lots of valuable ideas.

As it turns out, Dilthey’s historicism ends up
idealizing history in a way that Husserl avoids. — Joshs

Hmmm... (I guess I should reread The Origins of Geometry.)

Heidegger made the fatal mistake, which Spengler ultimately avoided, to jump from the radical-conservative standpoint into the Nazi camp. Result was that from then on he was to become stamped as a Nazi. I think that H. was nearly on the same line with the _then current_ Nazism in about 1932-1934 (it was then still possible to Heidegger to endorse Nazism) but outside this short period he was representing entirely different "Nazism" or something that is not Nazism at all from our current perspective (some sort of Hölderlinian patriot he was all his life). However, it is appropriate that whenever discussing Heidegger to remind at least in a footnote to this extremely troubling episode.

H's. later few, extremely strange and out of context, references to Jews in the late 30' meant that H. consciously couples himself with the official Germany's, or to his so dear "fatherland's", fate. That is, H. consciously victimizes himself, takes responsibility, as part of the Germany's possible future reputation with regard to its horrendously criminal treatment of the Jew population ("Jew" as a mystified notion). With those comments he makes sure that when Germany is later accused of its deeds he is also there on the side of the accused.

Here is the table of contents of Being and Time. One gets a good overview from it. In Heidegger's (or Kant's, Hegel's etc) case one has to know the "big picture" before pieces start to fall into their places.

https://www.beyng.com/pages/en/BeingandTimeMR/BeingandTimeMR.ToC.html

Together with Dilthey, Yorck was the first philosopher to elaborate the specific concept of historicity [Geschichtlichkeit] as a defining characteristic in the ontology of human beings. In particular, Yorck emphasized the generic difference between the ontic and the historical...Yorck aimed exclusively at the — plaque flag

"Temporality and historicality" is an important section in B&T. It is the (authentic) historicality that transcends the banality of everydayness.

It is interesting to note that Dilthey was one of the first to direct wider academic attention to Husserl. He began holding seminars on Husserl in Berlin around 1901. Dilthey believed that Husserl (like William James) represented the new psychology he was aiming for. Heidegger has pointed out the somewhat strange fact that Dilthey was interested in an "abstract" philosopher like Husserl (who, in fact, thought that Dilthey was too much of a skeptical relativist and not interested in "ideal" meanings).

The unitary structure of the three ecstasies, future-present-having been, determines the ‘is’, the essence, the Being of being as this structure of transit. — Joshs


Would also be interested in you translating this out of Heideggerese. — fdrake

The being of Dasein or human existence is care. Heidegger's definition of care: "to be already ahead oneself in (the world) as Being-alongside (the entities encountered within the world)" p. 191. This has a very "temporal feel" in it. That's why Heidegger argues that the sense (Sinn) of the being (of human existence) is time or temporality. In a more formal level the temporality can then be expressed as the unitary structure of the three ecstasies, future-present-having been. In B&T, right after the last chapter ("Care as the being of Dasein") of the first division ("Preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein") begins the second and last division entitled "Dasein and temporality".

Consciousness or subjective experience is a differentiated experience. In its modes of acts it is perceiving, willing, wishing etc. All these have their own sense in their intentionalities. What neuroscience does is that it transforms all these differences into differences in the physico-physiological discourse or in theoretical models. It says that the difference of the perceiving and wishing, for example, is the difference of the chemical or physical processes. So, it says that in true objective reality there is no such differences as difference between perceiving, willing, thinking i.e. difference as the difference of the sense of these intentions. According to neuroscience the difference between w i l l i n g and t h i n k i n g etc is quantitative or structural-processual difference of the underlying chemico-physiological processes. In this way the experienced differences and related consciousness disappear! Different ways to relate to different beings have no more any consciousness constituting meaning.

Are you referring to significant places or objects that may evoke strong associations and potent meanings due to their having being integral to important life events, or something else? — Janus

I am rather referring to something that is "learnable", to something that we can possibly identify with or make our "own". This means that we in a sense remember it when we become conscious of it. These can be existing historical structures e.g. "discourses" or practices and possibly even their intelligible, apriori structures.

Without recognition there would be no continuity of experience. Without memory there could be no recognition. The condition known as "anterograde amnesia" attests to this.So memory is necessary, if not sufficient it seems; which leaves me wondering what are the other factors you have in mind. The world itself, with its similarities and differences? — Janus

Memory is an interesting phenomenon. I was referring to something that could be called an objective memory or external memory. This consists in various indications or traces that has been left in the "outer" world. Through these indications we can try to re-member, so to speak, various structural wholes and "adapt" ourselves into them. It can happen that we recognize ourselves in these already existing signs and their structures!

Memory is always in play. Perhaps the sense of "continuity" in our experience is on account of a story we are constantly telling ourselves, choosing the aspects of experience that we can make coherent and consistent with what we remember from previous experience. — Janus

Yes, but we can't explain the continuity with the mechanism of our personal memory alone (if at all). We move or act in various already as coherent understood situations which engender us to "see" or recognize its different aspects. We can't produce the world from our inner memory.

How Heidegger came to the idea of "persisting presence"?? Here is my interpretation (which applies more to earlier Heidegger): Aristotle used "ousia" as the philosophical term for being. Heidegger noticed that ousia had in Greek language the common meaning of Anwesen i.e. it had the meaning of being-there-constantly-accessible like one's property "laying there ready to serve". This side meaning diffused, already modified, into Aristotle's much more formal-philosophical discourse. Later in the Latin period ousia was translated as substance whereby the suggestion to a specific experience (of specific culture) disappears. Only now the Being as presence can begin its unquestionable dominance. Being as substance or as persisting presence begins to live its own life (the discourse is freed from its source or original horizon). However, the static world view of antique Greeks is still present in the traditional metaphysical discourse, even in the idea of logic. But: the original Greek world view is not static in the sense of an ideal order, it is a w o r l d in a certain state or situation. It is a historical world that has a stable, finished, existence instead of eternal, timeless order. Latin, and on this basis modern, interpretations transform the antique Greek, relatively, because historical, stable existence or stability into an ideal, eternal order (it is sought security or assurance through absolutely certain knowledge). This was further helped by the fact that already Aristotle had begun to idealize the ousia's original sense as an accessible world order. In Aristotle's metaphysical-ontological discourse the historicity i.e. certain temporality of the original experience is already blurred.

Husserl’s solution ( which was also William James’) was to argue that the present moment is ‘specious’. That is , it includes retentions and protentions (expectations). One could not hear a melody as a melody if all that one was aware of was individual notes in an isolated and punctual ‘now’. Husserl asserted that the just prior note is retained alongside the now itself. This provides us with the sense of continuity. In addition, the new always shades an element of similarity with what preceded it ... — Joshs

Quite so, but I got the impression that your thoughts represented something else than this Husserlian-Jamesian view. You are probably specifically emphasizing the differences. Or: that the most basic identity is actually merely the formal identity of temporal experience. For Husserl the retention-protention -scheme was a formal description of time i.e. it was not anything psychological or empirical. I think that Heidegger is differing here from Husserl.

... What I had in mind was the self-reflexivity of becoming as difference rather than identity. What returns to itself is always an utterly new and different meaning. There is nothing evolutionary or cumulative in this self-reflexive unfolding, no aim or goal. The self is remade in every repetition ,,. — Joshs

How about the continuity of our experience? You can't be conscious of change or novelty if you don't have a "feel" of sameness in the experience. If the experience is an aggregate or a series of exclusively "new" moments it resembles more like a constant series of separate shocks following each other. Aren't there any inner tendencies, formations in our experience? I mean if we are already "embedded" in relatively static "objective" structures which form our experiences (these are there given like a grammar). Within these structures there appear various possibilities or directions which we can try to decide to follow.

As you stress, Heidegger adds the radically subjective moment, which is a bit tricky to connect with the rest (which is not to say impossible.) Anyway, what do you think about Hegel influencing Heidegger ? And what do you make of the significance of death in Heidegger ? — green flag

Heidegger is definitely a post-Hegelian philosopher. He basically agrees with Husserl that Hegel represents constructive metaphysics in a bad sense. He doesn't ignore Hegel though. On the contrary, he highly respect him (Being and Time's final chapters treat Hegel). Hegel was the apex of the traditional metaphysics. Somewhere Heidegger remarks that for Hegel everything becomes ontology, referring here to Hegel's absolute or objective idealism.

I read the chapters on death in BT as metaphors. Death means ultimate nothingness or the end of the being-in the-world. On the other hand, the theme of death could be Heidegger's semi-materialistic credo. He frequently uses the term "finiteness" (Endlichkeit) to designate the basic character of human metaphysics (for Hegel, on the other hand, the infinity was an important notion).

“Idle talk is the possibility of understanding everything without any previous appropriation of the matter. Idle talk, which everyone can snatch up, not only divests us of the task of genuine understanding, but develops an indifferent intelligibility for which nothing is closed off any longer ...” — Joshs

Husserlian strive for intuiting the subject matter itself behind or under the existing conventional disourse is strong influence here.

Perhaps Heidegger was influenced by Kierkegaard in this. In his journal (I paraphrase), he criticizes the fantasy of presuppositionless philosophy by emphasizing that the medium, language, is already there, as a kind of inescapable presupposition. This is one of my favorite themes in Heidegger. This inherited ... — green flag

The basic idea is actually almost directly from Dilthey, which you already mentioned, and for whom the "life" was a central concept as the ultimate "transcendental" ground of all human acts. Life not merely as biological concept but rather as a human life i.e. as something spiritual (geistig) i.e. cultural-historical. And this human environment is at its base a language-like, differentiated-articulated whole. With his phenomenological approach Heidegger's aim is to treat this "life context", as ontology of "Dasein", more systematically and strictly than Dilthey . Heidegger's Kierkegaardian existentialism adds to this a radical individualistic and subjectivist moment (subject here can be whole life form, not just individual person). And the result is the tension between authentic and inauthentic.

like the way the I.E.P. explains Heidegger’s relation to metaphysics: — Joshs

Heidegger has to have Nietzsche's metaphysics (or the latest development of metaphysics) here in mind, he never referred to Aristotle or Hegel as nihilists.

There are those, such as Derrida, who argued that Heidegger hadn’t managed to escape metaphysics with his approach, but Heidegger himself believed that what he was doing with his fundamental ontology no longer fell within the category of a metaphysics but instead inquired into the very ground of metaphysics itself. — Joshs

Heidegger of BT agreed with Kant that we can't avoid metaphysics. Human beings or their thinking/world view is inescapably metaphysical. What is required is a new, critical metaphysics. For Derrida metaphysics is much more negative phenomenon in its strict oppositions etc. We have to be much more cautious with regard to all possible metaphysical features that occupy our thinking and behavior. Derrida is also skeptical towards all "eidetic reductions" etc. found in phenomenological method. For Heidegger it seems to be much more natural to seek and speak about what something really is i.e. about "essences" (Wesen in German and which has not the connotation of "essentia").

The guiding question is about beings, things that are. The grounding question is not about any particular being or all beings, it is about Being, the wonder that there is anything at all. Heidegger's claim is that the grounding question of Being became lost as the focus was narrowed and guided by the question of beings. — Fooloso4

I'll add to that:

Heidegger's philosophy is meta-metaphysics or he questions what is metaphysics in itself? General metaphysics is ontology i.e. it tries to define the ultimate Being of beings. It describes the basic structures of various beings. Heidegger now argues that all previous metaphysics has been pursued "naively" i.e. philosophers has commenced to think ontology without being aware of their own basic situation. It is overlooked that ontology arises out of a already functional world which already has its understanding of being. There is a basic substrate within which all thinking already operates, which it always presumes and which can't be ignored or abstracted. Heidegger calls his meta-metaphysics or meta-ontology fundamental ontology and which investigates the basic, already and always existing, "ontology" as the prevailing understanding of Being. This means that there is always already an understanding of Being prior any conceptual explications or constructions of ontologies. Heidegger will explicate the already existing ontology (of our understanding of being) instead of constructing a new ontology from his head, so to speak. Heidegger's explication leads him to find temporality as the "sense" of the Being in our basic understanding of Being. Being of the beings means how the beings are related or structured so that they can appear to us a s something. It is apriori structure. On the other hand, the sense of the Being is the peculiar temporal "regard" with regard to which the structuration or Being happens. The building or formation of Being-structures can be guided by, for example, "presencing" (e.g. logical world view) or "historicizing" which mean that they have different senses, they structurize or build the world differently. It could be said that there is two levels of "with regard to" (in relation to, in terms of): beings or concrete entities are understood with regard to their Being and Being is understood with regard to its temporal sense.

Heidegger explicates the metaphysics of our understanding of Being or metaphysics of Dasein/existence (first level) and within which the temporal character of metaphysics as such becomes visible i.e. the critique of former trad. metaphysics becomes possible (second level). I think this, as a rough exposition, is the very basic framework of Heidegger's philosophy.

All the above shows that the connections of Heidegger's philosophy with the Nazism are extremely weak!

Absolutely read him like a Nazi. Does that mean a phenomenological "sense of community", as Heidegger's described it, is a Nazi concept? Remains to be seen. — fdrake


It’s not a sense of community. The “they” can be thought as something like Freud’s superego— the sense of what “they” think and “they” believe. The masses, the mainstream, the general culture, this vague sense of “what one does.” — Mikie

Yes, it has obviously this connotation but it means also the "subject" of the language or the everyday understanding as such. Orienting towards language mean orienting towards "average meanings" that every one understands. Within "they" is discussed about "tables" etc and every one already understands what table is. Functional communication means that every one is "they". There has to be always common ground for the understanding and communication. However, the more this "commonness" itself is pursued the more the discussion about the matter itself becomes "mere" conversation or conventional behavior. Normally, in our every day understanding the intentions remain more or less empty i.e. we are orienting towards vague indications.

So far I've have found from the B&T only one problematic passage with regard to the future events:

"But if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny [Geschick] . This is how we designate the historizing of the com­munity, of a people. Destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-one-another can be con­ceived as the occurring together of several Subjects. Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in communi­cating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein." (385, 436 in English translation.)

But again, Heidegger's standpoint here is phenomenologically "formal" which means that the "destiny" doesn't have any specific ontical (or "existentiell" i.e. empirically concrete) meaning. It can be related to various kinds of historically "thrown" "collective Beings". It, or the whole discussion around it, c a n be interpreted as the ontology of Nazism or any other, in Heidegger's sense, historically "genuine" collective experience.

Cited passage is preceded by this:

"Dasein can be reached by the blows of fate only because in the depths of its Being Dasein is fate in the sense we have described. Existing fatefully in the resoluteness which hands itself down, Dasein has been disclosed as Being-in-the-world both for the 'fortunate' circumstances which 'come its way' and for the cruelty of accidents. Fate doesn't first arise from the clashing together of events and circumstances. Even one who is irresolute gets driven about by these-more so than one who has chosen ; and yet he can 'have' no fate(1)."

Translators comment:

"(1) This statement may well puzzle the English-speaking reader, who would perhaps be less troubled if he were to read that the irresolute man can have no 'destiny'. As we shall see in the next paragraph, Heidegger has chosen to differentiate sharply between the words 'Schicksal' and 'Geschick', which are ordinarily synonyms. Thus 'Schicksal' (our 'fate') might be described as the 'destiny' of the resolute individual ; 'Geschick' (our 'destiny') is rather the 'destiny' of a larger group, or of Dasein as a member of such a group. This usage of 'Geschick' is probably to be distinguished from that which we have met on H. 16, 19, and perhaps even 379, where we have preferred to translate it by 'vicissitude'. The suggestion of an etymological connection between 'Schicksal' and 'Geschick' on the one hand and 'Geschichte' (our 'history') and 'Geschehen' (our 'his­torizing') on the other, which is exploited in the next paragraph, is of course lost in translation."

Richard Hönigswald (18 July 1875 in Magyar-Óvár in the Austro-Hungarian Empire (the present Mosonmagyaróvár in Hungary) – 11 June 1947 in New Haven, Connecticut) was a well-known philosopher belonging to the wider circle of neo-Kantianism.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_Hönigswald


"On April 16, 1933, as a Jew by birth, he had to leave the university due to the National Socialist Aryanization measures. Colleagues and friends, e.g. Karl Vossler and Giovanni Gentile stood up for him. Nevertheless, on September 1, 1933, forced retirement and retirement took place. A defamatory report by Martin Heidegger also contributed to this; he wrote to dr. Einhauser, a senior councilor in the Bavarian Ministry of Education, on June 25, 1933 [at this time the newly elected rector Heidegger was still an official Nazi]:


"Dear Mr. Einhauser! I am happy to comply with your request and will give you my verdict below. Hönigswald comes from the school of neo-Kantianism, which represented a philosophy that was tailored to liberalism. The essence of the human being was then dissolved into a free-floating consciousness in general and this was finally diluted into a generally logical world reason. On this path, under apparently strictly scientific and philosophical justification, the view was diverted from the human being in its historical roots and in its popular tradition of its origin from soil and blood. This went hand in hand with a conscious suppression of all metaphysical questioning, and man was only regarded as the servant of an indifferent, general world culture. Hönigwald's writings grew out of this basic attitude. But there is also the fact that Hönigswald defends the ideas of neo-Kantianism with a particularly dangerous acumen and a dialectic that runs empty. The main danger is that this hustle and bustle gives the impression of being extremely objective and strictly scientific and has already deceived and misled many young people. I still have to describe the appointment of this man to the University of Munich as a scandal, which can only be explained by the fact that the Catholic system prefers people who are apparently indifferent in terms of their ideology, because they are not dangerous to their own efforts and are 'objectively liberal' in the well-known way. I am always at your disposal to answer any further questions. With excellent appreciation! Hail Hitler! Your very devoted Heidegger”

https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richard_H%C3%B6nigswald (translated with the Google Translate)

The main problem here with the Jew Höningswald seems to be neo-Kantianism and Catholicism?! Heidegger was extremely critical towards Catholicism in those days. So, catholic faith represents a threat to "soil and blood"? It could be noted that Heidegger saw Descartes' "speculative" abstract subjectivism to be influenced by the medieval catholic philosophy which had interpreted Aristotle in a misleading way. Medieval philosophy and the following modern development was not "rooted" in a genuine or adequate manner in the antique Greek philosophy. And not to be "rooted" means that the "humanly" important basic philosophical problematics was not understood in its "inner tendency" and thus couldn't be developed in a new situation accordingly or adequately. "Horizont" as the phenomenological concept is here an important reference.

“Fichte introduced into German philosophy the three-step of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, using these three terms. Schelling took up this terminology. Hegel did not. He never once used these three terms together to designate three stages in an argument or account in any of his books. And they do not help us... — Dermot Griffin

Interesting note from Kant about "trichotomies":

"That my divisions* in pure philosophy almost always turn out tripartite has aroused suspicion. Yet that is in the nature of the case. If a division is to be made a priori, then it will be either analytic or synthetic. If it is analytic, then it is governed by the principle of contradiction and hence is always bipartite (quodlibet ens est aut A aut non A). If it is synthetic, but is to be made on the basis of a priori concepts (rather than, as in mathematics, on the basis of the intuition corresponding a priori to the concept), then we must have what is required for a synthetic unity in general, namely, (1) a condition. (2) something conditioned, (3) the concept that arises from the union of the conditioned with its condition; hence the division must of necessity be a trichotomy."

* Kant refers to his various "tables" consisting in three concepts e.g. table of categories


https://monoskop.org/images/7/77/Kant_Immanuel_Critique_of_Judgment_1987.pdf

“Hegel provides the most extensive, general account of his dialectical method in Part I of his Encyclopaedia of
Philosophical Sciences, which is often called the Encyclopaedia Logic [EL]. The form or presentation of logic, he says, has three sides or moments (EL §79). These sides are not parts of logic, but, rather, ... — Joshs

Here direct quotations:

"VI. Logic Defined & Divided

§ 79

In point of form Logical doctrine has three sides: [a] the Abstract side, or that of understanding; [ b] the Dialectical, or that of negative reason; [c] the Speculative, or that of positive reason.

These three sides do not make three parts of logic, but are stages or ‘moments’ in every logical entity, that is, of every notion and truth whatever. They may all be put under the first stage, that of understanding, and so kept isolated from each other; but this would give an inadequate conception of them. The statement of the dividing lines and the characteristic aspects of logic is at this point no more than historical and anticipatory.

§ 80

[a] Thought, as Understanding, sticks to fixity of characters and their distinctness from one
another: every such limited abstract it treats as having a subsistence and being of its own.
...

§ 81

[b) In the Dialectical stage these finite characterizations or formulae supersede themselves, and pass into their opposites.

(1) But when the Dialectical principle is employed by the understanding separately and independently — especially as seen in its application to philosophical theories — Dialectic becomes Skepticism; in which the result that ensues from its action is presented as a mere negation.
...

§ 82

[c] The Speculative stage, or stage of Positive Reason, apprehends the unity of terms (propositions) in their opposition - the affirmative, which is involved in their disintegration and in their transition.
...
(1) The result of Dialectic is positive, because it has a definite content, or because its result is not empty and abstract nothing but the negation of certain specific propositions which are contained in the result - for the very reason that it is a resultant and not an immediate nothing.

(2) It follows from this that the ‘reasonable’ result, though it be only a thought and abstract, is still a concrete, being not a plain formal unity, but a unity of distinct propositions. Bare abstractions or formal thoughts are therefore no business of philosophy, which has to deal only with concrete thoughts.

(3) The logic of mere Understanding is involved in Speculative logic, and can at will be elicited from it, by the simple process of omitting the dialectical and ‘reasonable’ element. When that is done, it becomes what the common logic is, a descriptive collection of sundry thought-forms and rules which, finite though they are, are taken to be something infinite."

Here is an interesting version of the article Differance. Its first five paragraphs (which contain a dense presentation of that notion) are not included in the published version (in Marges).

http://mforbes.sites.gettysburg.edu/cims226/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Week-5a-Jacques-Derrida.pdf

Hegel is not saying the materiality of the world is fake. Like Aristotle he is say the form of objects is what we conceive and therefore the intelligibility of the world. Not separate from its material. — Jackson

Materiality is true only via spirit or mediation or idea (acc. to Hegel).

ultimately Hegel holds that what we can consider as 'world' is ideal. — Tobias

I've studied a lot of his work and see that nowhere. Please cite something by Hegel. — Jackson

How about this one:

"Third Subdivision: The Notion

C. The Idea

§ 213

The Idea is truth in itself and for itself — the absolute unity of the notion and objectivity. Its ‘ideal’ content is nothing but the notion in its detailed terms: its ‘real’ content is only the exhibition which the notion gives itself in the form of external existence, while yet, by enclosing this shape in its ideality, it keeps it in its power, and so keeps itself in it. The definition, which declares the Absolute to be the Idea, is itself absolute. All former definitions come back to this. The Idea is the Truth: for Truth is the correspondence of objectivity with the notion — not of course the correspondence of external things with my conceptions, for these are only correct conceptions held by me, the individual person. In the idea we have nothing to do with the individual, nor with figurate conceptions, nor with external things.And yet, again, everything actual, in so far as it is true, is the Idea, and has its truth by and in virtue of the Idea alone. Every individual being is some one aspect of the Idea: for which, therefore, yet other actualities are needed, which in their turn appear to have a self-subsistence of their own. It is only in them altogether and in their relation that the notion is realised. The individual by itself does not correspond to its notion. It is this limitation of its existence which constitutes the finitude and the ruin of the individual. "

https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/sl/slidea.htm

How wonderful the nature is! Full of complicated geometrical figures!

But you can look at them only through the pure intuition!

How these forms are observed to exist?

There are "pure" or ideal triangles in nature (as sensible matter)??

:up: